

Master in Advanced European and International Studies

Master Thesis:

**The Effectiveness of Foreign Lobbying on the Allocation of
United States Foreign Aid:
Case Studies of Liberia and Ethiopia**

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Abstract

After the publication of 'the Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy', increasing attention and concern was raised on the influence of interest groups in the decision-making process of foreign aid. Following studies of Montes-Rojas in 2013 and Pevehouse and Vabulas in 2013, next to ethnic lobbies, also foreign entities have a significant influence on the allocation of the foreign aid budget (Montes-Rojas, 2013) (Pevehouse & Vabulas, *The Informational Role of Foreign Lobbying in U.S. Foreign Aid: Is U.S. Assistance for Sale?*, 2014). Findings of Alesina and Dollar show that this can partially be explained by the colonial past of these countries in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa (Alesina & Dollar, *Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?*, 1998). However, little research has been done into Sub-Saharan countries without a colonial past. This has led to research question of this thesis: to what extent do lobbying efforts by the Ethiopian and Liberian governments effect the allocation of the United States foreign aid budget to their country? The lobbying efforts by private firms in the United States have a positive effect on the allocation of aid. Through informational lobbying of both Congress and the general public, foreign governments emphasize the common interests of the two countries. The focus of the lobbying activities in relation to the two chambers of Congress depends on the issue at hand in the two case studies. In both cases, central figures, such as the Deputy Whip and Minority Whip, play a significant role in asserting of the specific case. In light of the War on Terror, the lobbying efforts of these cases do not alter the primary objectives of United States foreign aid allocations.

Keywords: Foreign aid, Foreign Lobbying, Congress, Liberia, Ethiopia.

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List of Abbreviations

ACVFA	Advisory Committee for Voluntary Foreign Aid
AIPAC	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
CBC	Congressional Black Caucus
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FARA	Foreign Agent Registration Act
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HAC	House Appropriations Committee
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee
HSSFORP	House Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Government Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front

PAC	Political Action Committee
PRC	People's Redemption Council
SAC	Senate Appropriations Committee
SFRC	Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSSFORP	Senate Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

“It is [...] pointless to raise the question whether the United States ought to have a policy for foreign aid – as much so as to question whether the United States ought to have a foreign political or military policy.” (Morgenthau, 1962)

The growing integration between foreign aid and other foreign policy areas of the United States aid programs after the Second World War is demonstrated by its' significant size. The long-standing commitment of the United States government to foreign aid has created expectations, both domestically as well as internationally. In recent years, literature on foreign aid has been mainly focused on the ineffectiveness of foreign aid in reaching its objectives in the recipient country (Tarp, 2009) (Easterly, Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?, 2003). However, these publications have not changed the share of foreign aid in terms of absolute financial flows, which have only been increasing since the end of the Cold War (Tarnoff & Nowels, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, 2005) (Radelet, A Primer on Foreign Aid, July 2006) (Alesina & Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, 1998). With the growing size of the foreign aid budget, a growing engagement and influence of different interest groups in the aid allocation process has been a significant consequence.

After the publication of the article 'The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy' by Mearsheimer and Walt in 2002, followed by the book in 2007, attention has increased on the significant impact of lobbying efforts of interest groups on the United States process of foreign policy-making (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). In the foreign aid policy area, more interest groups became convinced that, by actively trying to influence the decision-making process, the highest level of foreign aid could be secured

(Smith R. A., 1995) (Lahiri & Raimondos-Møller, 2001). Due to this increasing amount of actors in the political environment, it became more difficult for embassies to assert their case, which gave foreign governments the incentive to lobby through alternative channels. The reaction to the influence of these third parties by the public has been largely negative, especially when the actors are not United States citizens (Pevehouse & Vabulas, Foreign and Ethnic Lobbies in U.S. Foreign Policy: Information versus Elections Tariff Policy, 2013) (Pevehouse & Vabulas, The Informational Role of Foreign Lobbying in U.S. Foreign Aid: Is U.S. Assistance for Sale?, 2014) (Newhouse, 2009). The difference between US and non-US citizens is not only reflected in the reaction of the public, but also in legislative procedures through the enforcement of the Foreign Agent Registration Act, originally enacted in 1938 (Foreign Agent Registration Act: 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq., 1938).

In two econometric studies by Pevehouse and Vabulas in 2014, the influence of these foreign entities was found to be highly significant for foreign aid allocation in the United States (Pevehouse & Vabulas, Foreign and Ethnic Lobbies in U.S. Foreign Policy: Information versus Elections Tariff Policy, 2013) (Pevehouse & Vabulas, The Informational Role of Foreign Lobbying in U.S. Foreign Aid: Is U.S. Assistance for Sale?, 2014). From this perspective, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are not perceived as significant players. These states are often used to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of allocated foreign aid and the permanence of poverty and corruption (Easterly, Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?, 2003) (Easterly, The Cartel of Good Intentions: Bureaucracy versus Market in Foreign Aid, 2002) (Alesina & Weder, Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?, 2002). Still, this has not changed the allocation of aid to these countries. Research shows that the colonial past of these countries is a significant determinant for the

allocation of foreign aid (Alesina & Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, 1998) (Radelet, A Primer on Foreign Aid, July 2006). However, little research has been done into Sub-Saharan countries without a colonial past, particularly Liberia and Ethiopia.

These elements have led to the research question: to what extent do lobbying efforts by the Ethiopian and Liberian governments affect the allocation of the United States foreign aid budget to their country? Several steps need to be taken to answer the central research question. First, what is foreign aid and what is meant with foreign aid budget? What are the objectives of foreign aid and what factors influence these objectives? Furthermore, the historical process of foreign aid in the case of the United States will be described in order to place the case of Sub-Saharan Africa and the case studies of Ethiopia and Liberia in a global setting. What are the deciding dynamics of the United States government regarding these countries? Are the allocations based on the realist tradition of self-interest or influenced by the liberal approach of the 'need' factor? And what are the positions of the President and Congress in the decision-making process?

From there, the focus will shift to the role of foreign entity interest groups. What is lobbying exactly? What is the difference between ethnic lobbying and lobbying by foreign governments? And what tools are used to achieve the desired result? These questions will be answered in the third chapter of this research.

The case studies of Liberia and Ethiopia will also be analyzed. What is the current situation of these countries, in relation to previous results and future needs? What are their historical relations with the United States, in terms of aid? Focusing on the lobbying efforts, what is the cause of the lobbying activities and how does this influence the

lobbying process? Who are the lobbying efforts focused on? And are there government officials involved as key players in the process? Finally, the influence of foreign lobbying on the decision-making process will be looked at to observe whether it changes the primary objectives of the United States.

To answer the central research question of this thesis, an extensive literature review of the United States Congressional Research Service and the Department of Justice will be performed. Furthermore, data of the United States government and of the non-profit organization the Sunlight Foundation, acting on behalf of accountability and transparency, will be analyzed on the media attention paid to the significant impact of lobbying efforts by Liberia and Ethiopia. By combining previous literature with the data of the specific case studies, this thesis aims to provide a valuable contribution to this new field of research.

2. Foreign Aid

2.1 The Concept of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid is a very broad concept and manifests itself in many different forms. Before a closer look can be taken at the United States and the different influences on the decision making process of foreign aid, it needs to be clarified what kind of foreign aid is discussed in this thesis.

Two types of approaches can be applied to foreign aid to later analyze the case of the US. The first type of classification, created by the Congressional Research Service of the United States, is based on an inside-out approach (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2005). Based on the established theory of Hans Morgenthau, a distinction is made between five major categories of foreign assistance (Morgenthau, 1962). These are bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting US political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions and military aid. Even though these categories are separated, this does not immediately imply that they cannot be combined. Especially the category of economic assistance supporting US political and security goals seems to be applicable to all other categories, except humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid only applies to the immediate aid necessary for natural disasters, such as floods, disease or earthquakes. It is especially important to keep in mind that the military aid is already taken out of bilateral development aid, when looking at the next definition of foreign aid.

The second way to categorize foreign aid is based on an international approach. This type of categorization takes a top-down position towards international relations and only focuses on bilateral aid. In this, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has

defined foreign aid, also known as foreign assistance or development aid, as the following:

“Foreign aid is financial flows, technical assistance and commodities that are (a) designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective; and (b) are provided as either grants or subsidized loans.”

Comparing these two approaches of foreign aid, the most obvious element that should be noted is that military aid or any other aid purposes not focused on development are left out of this definition. Foreign aid is only focused on the financial means provided for development. Even though this is the same for the inside-out approach, the difference is that the bilateralism here includes military aid, where in the inside-out approach it does not. In this thesis, both types of sources will be used to create the most well rounded argumentation. This means that, in terms of bilateral assistance, military aid is not taken into account in this research, as it will focus on financial flows.

Next to this practical element, another element of grants and subsidized loans needs further explanation. These two types of financial assistance are also referred to as ‘concessional financing’ (Radelet, July 2006; Tarp, 2009). Following the definition of the DAC, a loan can be specified as a ‘grant’ if the present value is at least 25% below the present value of a similar loan at market interest rates. When transnational loans do not meet this criterion, these are referred to as ‘non-concessional’ loans as they are linked to the international financial market and cannot be defined as foreign aid. Going deeper into the group of concessional financing, the DAC makes since 1972 a distinction between three broad classes. The largest of the three is ‘Official Development Assistance’

(ODA), where donor countries provide aid to low- and middle-income countries. The assistance needs to be provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, with the main objective of economic development and welfare of developing countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1972). Secondly, there is 'Official Assistance', consisting of recipient countries of a richer nature, with a gross domestic product (GDP)/capita above approximately \$9,000, - for three consecutive years. This income is based on the World Bank's high-income threshold (Radelet, July 2006). Lastly, 'Private Voluntary Assistance' is aid, which includes grants from non-government organizations, charities and private companies, meaning it is outside of the government framework. In this paper, as well as in most literature, when development aid is discussed, the focus will be on ODA as it wants to measure the absolute influence of external lobbying efforts on the US decision making process concerning foreign aid. To avoid repetition, foreign aid and development assistance will be used simultaneously in this paper.

The level of ODA going towards recipient countries can be measured in three different ways. All three methods show a different aspect of bilateral development assistance. The most straightforward way measure aid is the total amount of US dollars going from the donor- to the recipient country. This amount can be misleading as it does not reflect the percentage of GDP of the donor country and can thus not show the efforts made by this country. This is why the second method focuses on the percentage destined for foreign assistance of the total GDP. Again, this method seems to be lacking, as the focus is only on the benefactor and not on the actual needs of the receiving state. Lastly, then, is the amount of aid per capita in the beneficiary state. In this paper, mainly the absolute

number of US dollars, the first method, will be used to show the possible change after external lobbying influences.

All previous elements have given the basic framework of foreign aid and will help to clarify the formulation of this research. However, these elements are also static principles and are subject to influences from outside. Even though this paper will focus mainly on lobbying efforts from foreign governments, it cannot be taken separately from other influences on the allocation of foreign aid. This is why in the next part different general objectives of foreign aid will be clarified. Also, there will be looked at the influence of big events, such as the end of the Cold War and the consequences of changing from a bipolar to a unipolar world. Lastly, the general public should not be forgotten, as different public opinions or misconceptions might have a big impact on the space within the political system to maneuver. It is important to be aware of the effects while looking at the possible influence of lobbying to not overestimate this relation.

2.2 Objectives of Foreign Assistance

Objectives of foreign aid are dependent on a lot of different variables. Thus, when discussing objectives separate from state politics, it means that only broad aims can be formulated after allocation distribution. These aims could then be applied to all institutions, both governmental and non-governmental. This also means that these objectives are not focused on who is meant to receive aid, but only on what should be achieved when aid is given, otherwise no general objectives could be formulated. In his framework, four broad targets can be formulated, according to Radelet: (1) to stimulate economic growth through building infrastructure, supporting productive sectors such as

agriculture, or bringing new ideas and technologies, (2) to strengthen education, health, environmental, or political systems, (3) to support subsistence consumption of food and other commodities, especially during relief operations or humanitarian crises, or (4) to help stabilize an economy following economic shocks (Radelet, A Primer on Foreign Aid, July 2006).

Looking at internal objectives of development assistance, he suggests that countries give aid to retain or gain political influence and to support economic interests of firms and sectors of the donor country itself. There is also interest for allocating money to the poorest countries, however this is mostly executed by international organizations, for example the World Bank. Alesina and Dollar found these results already in 1998 and show that mainly colonial past and political alliances are big determinants for foreign aid (Alesina & Dollar, 1998). This research excludes non-governmental organizations and only focuses on bilateral relationships, which is most essential for this study. As in this research the internal objectives are the main priority in the process of policy-making, it will focus on the domestic political system and the influences on this process.

2.2.1 The Significance of US Foreign Policy and Public Opinion

As in every aspect of political life, there are a lot of influences on the foreign aid decision-making process both domestically as well as internationally. What motivates the establishment of a certain foreign policy? Where the political debate is of essential importance, there are other factors that are relevant in this debate, which should be highlighted. Firstly, big historical events will be discussed in the following part together with its influence on both the political level and on the civil

society and the foreign aid process. Furthermore, a theoretical framework will be discussed throughout this subchapter to see if certain reasoning can be developed. Following Omoruyi, the theories of realism and liberalism are applied (Omoruyi, 2001). Even though there are more theories trying to explain the allocation of foreign aid, these two theories are primarily useful as they are two theories that were subject to and can be applied to a long-term process.

The first of the historical events discussed, which has major impact on the perception of foreign assistance, is the impact of the transition from World War II to the Cold War. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the alliance between the Soviet Union and the other allied forces fell apart. After the division of Germany and Berlin, both sides started to work on their own recovery and a possible new war. The United States was an active player in the international environment. This can be seen in the impact on the United States foreign aid policy. Between the end of the war and 1952, Harry S. Truman spoke multiple times during his speeches of the importance of foreign aid in the development of, especially, Europe. The United States, as the “giant of the economic world”, had the responsibility to help this process get started (Radelet, Bush and Foreign Aid, 2003) (Paterson, 1961) (Milner & Tingley, *The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid*, 2010). This led in 1947 to the creation of the Marshall plan, named after former Secretary of State George C. Marshall. As part of the foreign policy of stopping Soviet Imperialism, the Truman Doctrine, the goal was to avoid the spread of communism by stimulating market economies and, through this, open a road to development. Even though the policies in the 1950s were not focused on the other parts of the world, the motivation behind foreign assistance was the same, to ‘save’ people from communism and

the Soviet Union (Paterson, 1961). This was a big stimulation for Hans Morgenthau to publish an article on a political theory on foreign aid (Morgenthau, 1962). As no framework was available to provide standards of judgment, Morgenthau not only tried to frame the different types of foreign aid, but also why foreign should be a crucial part of any country's foreign policy:

“It is in fact even pointless to raise the question whether the United States ought to have a policy of foreign aid – as much so as to ask whether the United States ought to have a foreign political or military policy. For the United States has interests abroad, which cannot be secured by military means and for the support of which the traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If foreign aid is not available, they will not be supported at all.”
(Morgenthau, 1962)

It is clear that the national interests of the US are central in his reasoning, which suggests a more realist approach to foreign aid. The distribution of aid is used as a tool for achieving goals. Most foreign policy decisions were made short term, in the case of the US, by the State Department (Fleck & Kilby, 2008). Even though there are liberalists, like Lumsdaine, suggesting it is the proper humane response to provide aid and to promote democracy for the sake of the population. The realist ideology was the prominent one during the times of the Cold War, also with regard to African countries. This is supported by the fact that communist countries such as Zaire and Indonesia, before the coup d'état of Suharto, received high levels of aid allocation, despite widespread corruption and human rights abuses. The Truman Doctrine underlined this personal interest of the United States in the Marshall plan and the provision of aid, also to African countries. This was mainly based on the

fact that a lot of African states became independent during the 1960s, which gave the choice to either join the West or the East in the Cold War arena (Omoruyi, 2001). At the end of the Cold War, this led however to a new struggle for both approaches.

With the change from a bipolar to a unipolar world, realists questioned the importance of countries receiving foreign assistance. Most African countries did not hold any intrinsic strategic significance for the United States. This would have as a consequence that the assistance to these countries would decrease and eventually be canceled completely. Even though the overall budget for foreign aid did decrease during the 90s, as visible in figure 1, the allocation to African states did not disappear.




Figure 1: Total US Net Official Development Assistance to SSA in Million US\$. 1960 – 2013. (Source: OECD/DAC Database)

This shows that after the Cold War the realist approach was not able to explain the allocation of development assistance (Omoruyi, 2001). On the other side of the debate, the results were not much better. In this perspective, the liberalist thought the foreign aid to be allocated to the

countries most in need, which could explain some of the policies during the Cold War (Lumsdaine, 1993). However, the allocations of foreign aid did not go to the poorest countries, nor to the countries, which showed most promise in the fields of democratization and market economies. Apart from the 'need' motive, these two motives are also considered to be liberalist ideas about the motivation behind the allocation of foreign assistance. Even though both theories agree on the necessity to maintain the area of foreign aid in the foreign policy area of a state, both have difficulty to explain the motivations causing foreign aid allocation decisions.

The last historical event that needs to be discussed in relation to the allocation of foreign assistance is 9/11. This event has changed the way foreign aid was seen, not only for the United States, but also for the whole western world. During the following years, the allocation of foreign assistance was heavily influenced by the War on Terror under the Bush Administration. Unlike after the Cold War, the budget showed a big increase after the horrible events in 2001 (Moss, Roodman, & Standley, *The Global War on Terror and U.S. Development Assistance; USAID Allocation by Country 1998-2005*, 2005) (Radelet, *Bush and Foreign Aid*, 2003). This rise was especially distributed to countries actively involved in the War on Terror, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Jordan. Still, these countries were not known for their democratic or free market values. Furthermore, these states can also not be considered as the poorest and thus most in need for external assistance, leaning to the realist approach. Fleck and Kilby state that the allocation of ODA to the poorest countries has increased after the start on War on Terror in 2001, however the increase for other developing countries has been higher (Fleck & Kilby, 2008). In their analysis, the

emphasis placed on the 'need' element of aid allocation has only been falling.

It shows that the influence of external events has a major impact on the national approach on foreign policy. This is especially the case when these external events have an effect on national security. As demonstrated in the examples above, the United States is often a leader in these processes. It should not be forgotten that political actors are dependent on their local constituencies. Without public support, decisions made on a central level would not stay in place for long. This is why it is important to highlight the level of salience and influence of domestic public opinion on national policies in this sector. Another effect of the level of salience is that the lower the level of salience for a topic, the more influence lobbying efforts have on the policy outcome (Freeman & Godwin, 2010).

Public opinion has long been researched and debated in relation to foreign policy (Milner & Tingley, *Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay*, 2013). However not a lot of literature has been written about the relationship between public opinion and foreign aid. This is due to the difficulty how to measure public opinion in a practical manner and in what way it influences foreign assistance policy in a daily manner. There are some scholars, who have tried to set a precedent for further research (Milner & Tingley, *Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay*, 2013) (Holsti, 1992). Still, most state that the conclusions are hard to generalized due to the difficulty in measuring public opinion.

Throughout the debate on this relationship, the division between the liberal and realist perspectives can be observed. In both approaches, public opinion is crucial for the construction of democratic legitimization, however its construction is different according to sector of policy-making on both sides. Realists see public opinion more as a barrier for diplomacy.

Generally skeptical towards the contribution of public opinion in the policy-making process, this is especially the case for foreign policy, as the general public is not sufficiently informed to develop 'good' options. The liberal approach of Kant and Bentham remains static in its position that the public opinion should be part of democracy and that without the democratic values cannot be met (Holsti, 1992) (Powlick & Katz, 1998). Therefore, it should always be included in policy decisions. Moreover, democracies are more peaceful when the population is involved in the decision-making process by creating accountability. Nonetheless, this statement is based on a theoretical ideal and not on a practical approach towards daily politics. The research on the gap between theory and practice of the relationship between aid and public opinion has revealed mainly two problems for a high level of inclusiveness of public opinion in foreign aid policy decisions. These only apply to bilateral financial assistance, as for military aid other dynamics of salience would apply (Milner & Tingley, *Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay*, 2013).

The first problem is focused on the distance between the general public and the eventual recipients of assistance and the problems that are created by this distance (Svensson, 2006) (Milner & Tingley, *Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay*, 2013) (Lumsdaine, 1993) (Holsti, 1992). Radelet describes this phenomenon as the Principle-Agent Problem (Radelet, *A Primer on Foreign Aid*, July 2006). It starts with the general level of awareness in the case of budget, aid agencies and effectiveness and the misconceptions that this awareness creates. The literal distance between the taxpayers providing and the beneficiaries receiving financing can be half the world away, not to mention the institutional distance created by the national governments (Svensson, 2006). There are different levels of authorities present in both donor and recipient country to order the

projects. This again creates a big distance from start to end. Following the argumentation of Bertin Marten, this distance, both literal and emotional, blocks the normal feedback process functions (Martins, 2002). Even if the effects of assistance can be observed, these effects are not attributed to the sponsors, as there is no mechanism to make the results clear. Many of these agencies, both domestic and international, are not even known to a part of the population.

In a research of Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) in 2010 in the United States, as visible in Table 1, the results showed that in the case of multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) around 70 – 80% of the respondents were aware of its existence. However, only 45% was aware of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 30% ever heard of the bilateral United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the central institution for US foreign aid (Milner & Tingley, Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay, 2013).

Agency	All Respondents	4-Year College Degree
International Monetary Fund	44,5%	71,5%
USAID	29,3%	54,1%
World Bank	68,9%	88,2%
NATO	76,9%	96,3%
United Nations	89,6%	99,3%
World Trade Organization	80,7%	94,4%

Table 1: U.S. Knowledge of International Organizations – 2010. (Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) 2010)

Thus, the USAID has a clear lack of awareness among the American population to create a realistic view of its assistance efforts. In 2008, the Advisory Committee for Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) already expressed its concern about this lack of knowledge for development assistance. Their statements were based on the weakening and more ambivalent public opinion, due to misconceptions and prejudices of foreign aid that were upheld for too long. Because of lacking communication by USAID, partially explained by shortage of funding, and governmental structures, no institution is responsible for publishing positive communication about foreign assistance achievements and thus nothing is brought to public on a regular basis (ACFVA, 2008). In 1962, Hans Morgenthau already warned in his paper on a Political Theory of Foreign Aid that positive news is not worth mentioning and only when deficiencies or abuses occur, this will put out in public (Morgenthau, 1962). This shows the role of the media in the shaping of public opinion and the lack of governmental initiative to avoid this. What are the consequences of the absence of information and what does it imply for policy-making processes?

In a World Public Opinion survey in 2010 in the US, the median response of 848 participants estimated that foreign assistance took up 27% of the Federal budget (WorldPublicOpinion, 2010). Furthermore, when asked what the budget for foreign aid should be, the average response was 10%. This clearly shows the negative influence of the media and lack of government efforts in shaping US public opinion about foreign aid. In reality, the percentage of the Federal budget allocated for development aid is not even 1%.

The second element, which is important for affecting public opinion, comes back to a different liberal-realist level of discussion. What

is supposed to be the purpose behind foreign assistance? As this is mainly dependent on political affiliation, this will be discussed in the next chapter. As seen so far, the United States has been a key initiator and player in the allocation for foreign aid in the different eras. In the next chapter a closer look will be taken at the United States and its position in the world. Also, a closer look will be taken at the influence of the political affiliation of different Administrations, as this could be a big influence on the primary goals of US foreign assistance. Furthermore, the policy-making processes will be further researched to see where there should be focused on in terms of lobbying efforts. What is the influence of the president in the allocation of foreign aid? And, who decides over the budget and its distribution?

2.3 The United States: Global Position and Political Dynamics

It is clear that the United States is a key player in the area of foreign assistance and has been since the start after the Second World War. In 2014, the total budget amounted to around 33 billion US\$, as visible in Figure 1. In the Congressional Budget Justification for the fiscal year (FY) 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized the words of President Obama's State of Union Address that "if there's one thing this new century has taught us, it's that we cannot separate our work at home from challenges beyond our shores" (Kerry, February 2015). He continued that the most essential thing for Washington is the US citizens' safety and that in the international environment a combination of strong diplomacy and military power is necessary to be able to take advantage of the opportunities of this century. These tools should be used to work towards coalition building, in which development and diplomacy are increasingly important. It is interesting that Truman spoke similar words in 1947, when

pushing for the implementation of the Marshall Plan, apart from the overriding importance of the ideological fight with the Soviet Union. Before the decision making process in the United States political system regarding foreign aid can be described, an overview needs to be created of the historical process of foreign assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa together with the legislation that stimulated it. Both these processes should be discussed within the political framework, which caused it. In this chapter, these developments will be discussed.

2.3.1 Historical development of aid allocation to Sub-Saharan Africa

The Marshall Plan introduced an era, in which development aid would be used as a central tool within the foreign policy of countries, especially of the United States. During this era, until the end of the Cold War, all foreign policy was focused on the defeat of communism, as mentioned by Tarnoff and Nowels (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2005). In this process, other policy goals were achieved, however mainly to maintain the spread of communism. The Sub-Saharan African countries were part of this policy. During the '60s of the last century, a lot of SSA countries became independent as a consequence of the wave of decolonization. With independence, there comes the choice of political system. As the United States feared the growing attraction of communism for these new established states, a system of development aid was created to stimulate economic development, policy reforms and, with these changes, political stability (Omoruyi, 2001) (Rennack & Chesser, 2011). In the following overview, a system created by Goldstein and Moss will be used to explain the composition of the three levels of government. As all levels can be controlled by either Democrats (D) or Republican (R), the scheme will use a three letter system to illustrate what the political affiliation of the

President (X), the Senate (Y) and the House of Representatives (Z) is, in this specific order (XYZ) (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). The data that is used came from the OECD and US bilateral ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa.

After the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security Act, which was the successor of the Marshall Plan and lasted from 1953 until 1961, this process led during the beginning of the 1960's to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (Foreign Assistance Act, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.; 75 Stat.424, 1961). Under the presidential leadership of John F. Kennedy, the FAA was introduced on the fourth of September 1961. Kennedy emphasized in Congress in March that year that the previous system was "bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow. Its administration is diffused over a haphazard of irrational structure covering at least four departments and several other agencies" (Rennack & Chesser, 2011). First and foremost, it was an outdated system, which needed revising and a more long-term approach. As visible in Table 2, this initiated a complete new time for development aid for SSA. In terms of development assistance, this led to a budget of \$1.2 billion for the fiscal year 1961. Furthermore, \$1.5 billion would be made available for the four succeeding years, starting in 1962.

On an institutional level, to solve the bureaucratic fragmented situation, Kennedy created the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on 3 November by executive order. This agency was brought together from several existing development assistance programs and started the first so-called 'decade of development' under the presidents Kennedy and Johnson (USAID, 2015). This agency is responsible for most of the bilateral development assistance. In FY 2005, this meant it managed a foreign aid budget of \$9.5 billion, with direct control over \$6.1 billion. Even though there are also other programs, such

as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the international HIV/AIDS program, this is the main institution dealing with development assistance in close cooperation with the Department of State.

Program	Post-War Relief Period '46-'48	Marshall Plan Period 1949-1952	Mutual Scty Act Period 1953-61	Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Period					Total FAA Period 1962-12
				1962-08	2009	2010	2011	2012	
I. Total Economic Assistance	9.6	3.6	395.5	69,397.7	9,815.5	9,734.4	7,979.9	7,751.6	104,679.0
A. USAID and Predecessor		2.3	342.9	29,658.4	2,290.0	2,493.7	2,344.8	2,251.7	39,038.6
Economic Support Fund/Security Support Assistance			64.9	4,007.3	606.3	776.4	619.7	305.0	6,314.7
Development Assistance				5,221.6	1,068.0	1,191.0	951.1	1,188.4	9,620.1
Child Survival & Health				3,708.1	0.2	-1.7	-1.4	-2.7	3,702.5
Other USAID Assistance		2.3	278.0	16,721.5	615.4	528.1	775.4	760.9	19,401.3
B. Department of Agriculture		0.1	30.0	21,108.9	2,049.0	1,614.7	1,295.2	1,447.1	27,514.9
Food Aid Total		0.1	30.0	21,106.4	2,048.7	1,593.7	1,294.2	1,440.1	27,483.1
Title I				2,429.2	66.7	40.3			2,536.2
Title II (USAID Implemented)		0.1	30.0	16,788.7	1,930.9	1,486.2	1,205.6	1,298.7	22,710.1
Food For Education				241.1	46.4	49.0	42.7	82.2	461.4
Other Food Aid Programs				1,647.3	4.7	18.1	45.9	59.2	1,775.3
Other USDA Assistance				2.5	0.4	21.0	1.0	7.0	31.9
C. State Department				10,738.7	4,224.7	4,583.8	3,938.9	3,500.9	26,987.1
Global Health and Child Survival				3,305.1	3,689.6	4,021.3	3,351.2	2,792.0	17,159.2
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative				4,334.0	63.7	41.9	8.7	15.9	4,464.1
Narcotics Control				44.4	53.9	40.6	51.9	75.3	266.2
Migration and Refugee Assistance				2,741.1	361.3	400.5	449.2	527.2	4,479.3
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining & Related				180.5	30.8	50.8	43.3	41.3	346.6
Other State Assistance				133.6	25.6	28.7	34.6	49.3	271.7
D. Other Economic Assistance	9.6	1.2	22.6	6,657.1	1,098.9	887.2	335.1	288.0	9,266.3
Millennium Challenge Corporation				3,440.1	807.6	572.9	56.4	62.8	4,939.9
Peace Corps				1,912.6	78.1	82.1	86.6	82.7	2,242.0
Department of Defense Security Assistance				11.1	3.3	1.9	21.9	8.4	46.6
Other Active Grant Programs				1,293.3	210.0	230.2	170.3	134.1	2,037.8
Inactive Programs	9.6	1.2	22.6						
E. Voluntary Contributions to Multilateral Organizations				1,234.6	152.8	155.0	65.8	263.9	1,872.1
II. Total Military Assistance				66.5	2,988.2	449.8	279.9	256.2	4,277.8
III. Total Economic & Military Assistance	9.6	3.6	462.0	72,385.9	10,265.3	10,014.3	8,236.1	8,055.3	108,956.9
Annual Obligations to International Organizations (Assessed)				5,531.6	1,855.9	1,727.2	1,555.2	1,660.1	12,330.0

Table 2: Total Economic and Military aid to Sub-Saharan Africa 1946-2012. (Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook))

The act was the result of a joined effort between J.F. Kennedy and the 87th Congress. Democrats controlled all three branches of government (DDD) and it would remain this way until 1968. This created the impression, together with the public discourse of a friendly and liberal approach towards Africa, that Democrats are more in favor of foreign assistance towards Africa, even if no national interest is involved (Kesselman, 1961). In public discourse, also in SSA, this still seems the status quo today. Moreover, most African-Americans vote strongly for the Democratic Party (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). However there are scholars who argue, looking at actual data, that Republicans overall have allocated

more foreign assistance in real terms to SSA than Democrats have (Goldstein & Moss, 2005) (Moss, 2007). This will be discussed later on in this chapter, when the effect of different configurations on the foreign aid budget for SSA will be analyzed.

Throughout the following Administrations, SSA would always be part of the foreign aid budget with an overall growing trend, as visible in Figure 2. Overall the assistance going towards SSA increased with 218% from \$358 million to \$1.14 billion. Next to that, also the percentage part of the total ODA increased almost 400%, from 2,5% in 1961 to 11,4% in 2000.




Figure 2: Total U.S. Official Development Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa and as Percentage of Total ODA 1961-2000. (Source: OECD)

Next to the continuing presence of Sub-Saharan Africa in the foreign aid budget, other processes were at play, especially during the '60s and '70s. More and more African-Americans were able to get voted into Congress and slowly started to gather to express their shared interests. This in 1971 led to the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) (Omoruyi, 2001) (Milner & Tingley, *The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid*, 2010). Even though foreign

assistance was no longer on their priorities list for the Congressional session in 2005, its efforts have had its impact in the starting years of its existence (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). It succeeded to pass the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) through Congress in 1988. The campaign for this fund started in 1987 with an informal coalition between CBC and InterAction (an NGO umbrella group) and some high-ranking intellectuals. Following the argumentation of Omoruyi, this eventually led to the high levels of assistance to SSA countries in the first years after the Cold War. In 1991, the 101st Congress allocated an amount of \$800 million to SSA, while President George H.W. Bush only requested an amount of \$560 million (Omoruyi, 2001). Also Milner and Tingley, in their research analyzing the factors that shape foreign aid preferences, find that interest groups certainly have a significant influence on the outcome of foreign aid allocation (Milner & Tingley, *The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid*, 2010; Milner & Tingley, *The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid*, 2010) (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). This shows that an increasing number of interest groups were able to have an effect on the distribution of funds. In this case, the evidence clearly shows to difference between the requested amount by the President and the eventually allocated amount by the two chambers of Congress. The evidence, however, is not always as clear. Figure 2 provides an idea about the relationship between the real ODA allocated to SSA and the percentage this outlay occupies of the total ODA budget. It most importantly shows that an increase in one does not necessarily mean an increase in the other. This is an important element to keep in mind not to overstate the influence of lobby groups in relation to absolute foreign assistance.

The success of the first years of the 1990s did not last long. With the election of a fully Republican controlled Congress, the attitude regarding Africa changed to a more conservative side, without any intrinsic strategic importance for the US, even with the Democratic Presidency of Bill Clinton (DRR) (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). Secondly, the US budget deficit was at an all time high with interest rates on public debt alone rising to \$343 billion in FY 1996 (Omoruyi, 2001). With no direct results from the foreign assistance programs and higher pressure on other segments of the budget, such as defense expenditures, both economically and from the American public Congress decided to reduce foreign aid to create space in the federal budget, indicating the subordinate nature of foreign aid on the political agenda. Lastly, which was discussed above and linked to the previous reason, is the reduction of public support for foreign assistance due to misconceptions on the size of the development aid budget and the effectiveness of aid in general. This resulted in 1996 in a recalculation to \$518 million of development assistance, the lowest amount since 1990, and 5% decrease in the share of ODA to SSA of the total budget to 7%. This process shows that the influence of the President in terms of the foreign aid budget and allocation is limited. This will further be discussed later on in this chapter, when dealing with the decision-making process of development assistance allocation. Overall, in real terms the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa after the Cold War did not change significantly and is even positive when including the first years of the 21st century.

After 9/11, George W. Bush added global development as a third pillar to the national security system (Radelet, Bush and Foreign Aid, 2003) (Tarnoff & Nowels, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, 2005). As aforementioned, the attack on the World Trade Center introduced a new era in international aid. Naturally, the biggest part of

these aid flows would go to the rebuilding of Iraq and to countries taking part in the War on Terror, such as Pakistan, Jordan and Afghanistan. However, as the new focus on terrorism included the emergence of it, new programs were designed to avoid countries to turn into 'failed states' and provide space for terrorist activities. With Al Qaeda presence in Kenya, Tanzania and Liberia, and previous visits from Osama Bin Laden to Somalia, this meant that the strategic importance of SSA for US national security was raised drastically (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). Next to this direct security dilemma, with a high level of salience at the time, also other transnational threads, such as AIDS/HIV and drugs, got a higher level of attention in the United States political agenda (Mangala, 2010). Adding global development to the national security dilemma changed the way Republicans viewed foreign assistance. George W. Bush with his Administration proposed the Global AIDS Initiative with an all controlled Republican government (RRR) in 2001, which led to a \$15 billion five-year plan. Finally, the conservative, and highly religious, group within the Republican Party is strongly supportive of foreign aid as charitable work and has used its power in Capitol Hill to lobby in favor of certain African causes (Goldstein & Moss, 2005) (Moss, U.S. Aid to Africa After the Midterm Elections? A "Suprise Party" Update, 2007) (Moss, Roodman, & Standley, The Global War on Terror and U.S. Development Assistance; USAID Allocation by Country 1998-2005, 2005). What should not be forgotten, however, is that foreign aid is perceived to have a positive effect on the donor's own political economy, which shows, partially, the self-interest behind some of these policies (Svensson, 2006) (Milner & Tingley, The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid, 2010) (Martins, 2002). In a report of the Congressional Research Service in 2005, the authors' estimate, based on USAID findings, that between October

2002 and September 2003 around 80% of the procurement came from US sources (Tarnoff & Nowels, *Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy*, 2005). Still, it has become clear that also the Republican Party has activists for charitable goals to achieve with the yearly development assistance budget.

From this chapter so far, some questions arise that are not clear yet. Who has the final decision for the size and allocation of the budget? What is exactly the role of the President, as he seems decisive in only some cases? And how big is the role of interest groups in the decision-making process? To give an answer to these questions, a closer look should be taken at the legal framework of development assistance and the political process of the foreign aid budget.

2.3.2 The US Foreign Aid Budget and Political Framework

Through 1985, regular amendments authorizing legislation would be enacted by Congress to update the time frames set in the act of 1961 and to expand the number of programs and authorities (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2005) (Tarnoff & Tiersky, *State, Foreign Operations: A Guide to Component Accounts*, 2015). Since then, however, the Congress stopped amending the 1961 act and started to create appropriation bills to keep the authorizations up to date, as authorization bills continuously stalled in Congress (Rennack & Chessner, 2011). These Foreign Operations Appropriation bills are signed per fiscal year. Amendments and authorizations could entail the budget for multiple fiscal years. Since 1985, the President, State Department and Congress have the possibility to adjust the development assistance in size and country every year. This has given Congress the possibility to have more direct influence on the foreign aid policy. Despite the transfer from authorizations to appropriation bill,

the distribution of competences still points back to the Foreign Assistance Act of President Kennedy.

As laid down in this act, the President is officially the person who has the power to determine the terms and conditions under which most aid is provided (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2005). In this framework, with direction of the President, the Secretary of State is responsible for supervision and general direction of the economic assistance (Rennack & Chesser, 2011). One step further down the hierarchy is the position of the USAID Administrator. While USAID became an independent agency in 1999, its Administrator is under direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. These three authorities, under the leadership of the President, have the authority to propose the budget to the US Congress and, after confirmation, the authority to proclaim the eventual bill. Once proposed, the bill will go through numerous subcommittees of the House of Representatives and Senate separately. During this time, adjustments can be made on the budget and the attached conditions, such as democratic reforms or freedom of speech, in both houses before sending it to the Appropriations Committee, dealing with all discretionary spending legislation, of each chamber separately (Tarnoff & Nowels, *Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy*, 2005) (Tarnoff & Tiersky, *State, Foreign Operations: A Guide to Component Accounts*, 2015). Here, again, adjustments can be made, after which it will be put to a vote in each of the houses.

If an agreement is made, a final joint committee of House and Senate will solve the final differences settled in the debate. Subsequently, the bill will go back to each house for a final vote. When the final approval is made, it will be sent back the President, the Department of State and USAID. The State Department and USAID will only take their individual

responsibility over the planned budget, once the President has signed the bill. Overall, this procedure can last up to 18 months (Goldstein & Moss, 2005).

This long and complex process with many stops on different levels of Congress along the way, further enhanced by the annual nature of it, gives the House and Senate a high level of influence on the eventual outcome of the foreign aid budget process. Not only has Congress the position to influence the actual appropriations, moreover it has the possibility to attach preconditions and other conditionality clauses to the separate allocations (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014). This can vary from pro-democratization and freedom of expression to the release of American workers. To find out how much impact this has on the eventual outcome, it is necessary to analyze what factors influence the considerations of members of Congress in their support. If the President's position would be a significant factor for the individual considerations, this would provide both sides of the decision-making process with a significant impact on the outcome and limit the influence of Congress.

2.3.3 Party Affiliation and Personal Consideration

As described above, there is the general view that the Democratic Party has a more caring and liberal approach on the foreign aid allocation towards Africa than the Republican Party. This view can be based on different elements. The first factor is that George W. Bush was the first Republican President to ever bring a visit to the African continent. Looking at Democratic Presidents, Bill Clinton visited Ghana in 1998 with loud cheering of its population, and Rwanda in the same year. Carter was a big supporter of human rights in relation to African issues and Kennedy established the Agency for International Development (Goldstein & Moss,

2005). On a social level, these Presidents are still remembered and appreciated for their efforts and concerns. Bush, however, is known for the invasion in Iraq. Going further back, even though George H.W. Bush sent both money and troops to Somalia and Richard Nixon sent humanitarian assistance to Biafra, part of Nigeria, they are not remembered for these efforts. Overall, Democrats are seen as more pro-aid, and thus more pro-Africa (Kesselman, 1961) (Fleck & Kilby, 2008) (Milner & Tingley, Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay, 2013) (Milner & Tingley, The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid, 2010) (Thérien, 2002). This perception however is solely based on ideology and subjective impressions. Goldstein and Moss studied the actual absolute difference was between different power configurations between Republicans and Democrats in perception to the three branches of government (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). The results were further strengthened by a study by Moss two years later (Moss, U.S. Aid to Africa After the Midterm Elections? A "Suprise Party" Update, 2007).




Figure 3: Development Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa by Administration in million US\$ (Constant 2000). (Source: Goldstein & Moss (2005) based on OECD Data)

The results of these studies showed there was no significant difference between the Presidents from each political party, as visible in Figure 3. Whereas the aid flows under Republicans would be \$36 million, or 4%, higher, this was found non-significant (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). Both Democratic and Republican Presidents tend to spend around 8% of the total development assistance budget to SSA. This leads to the assumption that the party of the President is not relevant for the relative foreign aid flows. As the President only proposes the foreign aid budget, the next step is to look into the impact of party affiliation within Congress in its several forms. It has become clear that the relationship between Presidency and Congress is most relevant in the perspective of foreign aid.

As already pointed out in the previous part of this chapter, the party formation of the government can be coded by a letter system. This coding system provides a practical way to view the political configuration and can help to show what the influence of a particular formation has on the level of bilateral development assistance flowing to SSA.

Congress consists of two houses with equal voting right in the budget process. As both have their separate analysis and adjustments to the proposed budget and both have to agree on the final proposal going back to the President, their influence is more or less the same. Naturally, it is to be expected that the highest level of assistance arise when the same party controls both the Presidency and Congress. This has as a consequence that a divided government causes a restraint for the foreign aid budget with the result of a lower outcome. The question remains if there is a difference between the different configurations and if so, which composition causes the highest level of aid. In total, there have been four configurations, visible in Table 3 below.

Configuration	Time period
DDD	1961-1968 1977-1980 1993-1994
DRR	1995-2000
RRD	1981-1986
RDD	1969-1976 1987-1992

Table 3: Configurations of Political Party for Presidency, Senate and House of Representatives, 1961-2000. (Source: Goldstein & Moss (2005)).

Firstly, the worst possible formation with regard to the level of the budget process is a one party majority in both houses of Congress against a Presidency of the opposite party (DRR or RDD). When looking at the

data, the configuration of a Democratic President and a Republican Congress has the lowest outcome for African aid with a budget \$745 million lower than an all-Democratic controlled government (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). In the reverse scenario, aid is around \$239 million lower compared to DDD. Of all possible scenarios, the highest level of aid is allocated to Africa when Republicans control the White House and, in this case, the Senate. Considering the generally held view on position of Republicans on the foreign aid to SSA, this might come as a surprise. There are however some elements that should be highlighted when analyzing the Republican ideology of national interest. Exactly because the interests of the United States are its main priority, the amount aid to be spent is decided by transnational threats and strategic concerns. When under Republican Presidents world tensions rise, more aid is appropriated. In case of the Democratic Party, most liberals are in favor of foreign assistance, which creates discussion about the targets of this aid. Discussion about allocation often leads to lower levels of aid, through concessions. Other concerns play a less important role. Moreover, the rhetoric of Republicans may be considered strong, but also very well defined and clear, whereas Democrats such as Clinton have a more difficult time in properly formulating their foreign aid preferences, with special focus on humanitarian issues. In public opinion polls, Republicans get higher scores than Democrats in terms of foreign policy as a consequence (Goldstein & Moss, 2005). Linked to the factor of public opinion, the influence of interest groups should be discussed. With a broad enthusiasm for development assistance, there comes a broad range of political agendas, supported by different interest groups. Instead of standing together, these interest groups could work against each other, which would eventually have a paradoxical effect on the outcome. Again,

the conservative party only has a few strong and well-organized interest groups, which have been more effective in pressing their political agendas. Another consequence of the general interest for foreign assistance is the lower level of partisanship compared to the Republican Party. This could be an explanation for the highest level of aid with the configuration RRD compared to the lowest under DRR. Even with a Republican led White House, Democrats are not the inhibitory factor on the issue of foreign aid (Kesselman, 1961). This leads to the personal consideration of members of Congress to support or deny a certain appropriation bill.

This is where Kesselman states that the President does have some influence (Kesselman, 1961). He analyzes how many members of Congress change their position regarding foreign aid during the transition from Truman to Eisenhower. Both of them were in favor of substantial foreign assistance allocation. Furthermore, in both cases Democrats controlled both houses of Congress. This makes it a good comparison, as it seems that the only major difference is the party affiliation of the President. In this transition, it is indeed the case that some of the Republicans previously against foreign aid became more internationalist and pro foreign aid. Also, with the change from Democratic to Republic President, more Democrats became isolationist. However, overall the influence of the President was still relatively restricted, as a far larger number of member of Congress were not influenced by the changed Presidency.

The number of factors that influence the decision-making process of the individual Congresswomen and men is vast. There seem, however, to be a couple of more essential ones that play a bigger role. The first is the continuous awareness for re-election (Mayhew, 1974) (Milner & Tingley, *The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid*, 2010). Even if there is a broad but thin level of public

opinion and no well-organized interest groups, members of Congress still seem to keep in mind the ideological, economic and social position of their constituency. Especially the economic factor seems to play a significant role in their consideration, looking at the resources available and the gains or losses for the state trade allocation of the foreign aid policy (Alesina & Dollar, 1998) (Milner & Tingley, *Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay*, 2013) (Holsti, 1992). But this is not the only significant factor, which influence legislator in casting their vote. The ongoing increase of interest groups has caused an increase in support for aid (Milner & Tingley, *The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid*, 2010). The financial contributions that come with these interest groups do not affect the legislators' vote directly, as some studies have found (Smith, 1995) (Fleck & Kilby, 2001). Instead, contributors tend to give money to members, who are like-minded. The contributions are driven by the intention to strengthen previously existing common interests instead of the intention to influence the outcome of the vote in a different direction. Still, the contributions, at least for the sector of foreign trade, do seem to make a difference for the outcome of individual voting. Some conservative Republicans tend to defect more easily from their strict party position to a more aid friendly one. The same applies to Democrats, who may take a more strategic position for the US towards aid compared to the humanitarian nature of the party position. The influence of interest groups and lobbying is nothing new in 2015. After the publication of Mearsheimer's and Walt's book 'The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy' an extensive collection of literature has been written (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007) and documentaries made in the case of the 2008 financial crisis on the highly significant influence of third parties in policy-making (Ferguson, Beck, & Bolt, 2010) (Gawande, Krishna, & Robbins, *Foreign Lobbying and U.S.*

Trade Policy, 2006) (Lahiri & Raimondos-Møller, 2001). Both of these are highly criticized by academics, politicians and the American population alike. The strong response to both publications make the cases much more interesting. This has led since then to a wide range of journalists looking into the aspect of lobbying. The public has an extremely negative view on lobbying because of the lack of democracy and the victory of money. Most of the financial contributions are made through donations.

In the case of foreign lobbying, this is not an option. Contributions to campaigns from a non-national actor are not allowed through the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA), created in 1938. In the next chapter a closer look will be taken at different forms of lobbying by foreign entities. Are embassy efforts also considered lobbying? And how can foreign entities lobby if they are not allowed to through the Foreign Agent Registration Act? These questions are explained in the next section of this thesis.

3. Foreign Lobbying

The growing influence of interest groups in the United States political landscape is not something new. Within every society, people will try to influence political decision-making to their own advantage, just like the American government is trying to do for the United States. The influence of lobbying for foreign causes, however, touches upon a totally different part of the democratic values people and politicians attach to the United States political system. This phenomenon became especially clear with the publication of Mearsheimer and Walt in March 2007, "The Israel Lobby" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). It discusses the way the United States has been involved in the power struggle in the Middle East, maybe for too long and too deep. Furthermore, it focuses on the influence of the US-based Jewish community in this process of decision-making for military and bilateral financial aid. Until the beginning of the 2000's, Israel was the biggest recipient of US foreign aid as a consequence of the Camp David peace agreement in 1979 (Radelet, Bush and Foreign Aid, 2003) (Radelet, A Primer on Foreign Aid, July 2006). For this thesis, several aspects are important to be described. First, the part of lobbying sector that is involved in influencing the foreign policy, and more specifically foreign aid, in the US. There are two ways to get to this part, which will be explained in this chapter. Next, it is important to describe who the different actors are, which are involved in this process and what their roles are. What is, for example, the role of embassies in this process? Thirdly, the mechanisms through which influence is exerted or tried to be will be described. It has been explained that the Congress is the most relevant actor within the decision-making process, but the mechanisms should further be expanded upon. Lastly, some examples of these

mechanisms will be described to demonstrate the effect of these lobbying efforts in general before focusing on to the Sub-Saharan African cases, which will be analyzed in more detail.

3.1 Types of Lobbying: Ethnic versus Foreign

So far, multiple factors have been discussed, which influence the foreign aid decision-making process, from party ideology to public opinion. One of these factors was the presence of interest groups. So far these interest groups, or the lack thereof, have mainly been discussed in the case of domestic constituencies. Still, the origin of these groups can vary in terms of size, strength, public versus private and country of origin. Many different groups are trying to lobby the process by which decisions are made in Washington on foreign aid.

Before moving on to types of lobbying, the definition of lobby should be clarified, which will demonstrate how difficult it is to determine the influence, size and cases of lobbying within the United States alone. In the Oxford Dictionary, lobbying is defined as “Seek to influence (a legislator) on an issue” (Oxford University Press). The most significant part of this definition is the word ‘seek’. It implies that people are specifically trying, alone or in groups, to directly influence the personal consideration of one or more legislators. The source of the issue can be from a wide range of topics. Most research has been done into corporate lobbying and the level of influence it has on publically elected members of Congress, particularly on their relationships with the rich business owners from Wall Street and the financial institutions, especially after the crash of the financial market in 2008 (Ferguson, Beck, & Bolt, 2010) (Hafner-Burton, Kousser, & Victor, 2014). A big part of previous literature covers influence of contributions to campaigns and Political Action Committees (PACs)

(Milner & Tingley, *The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid*, 2010) (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). PACs are organizations that pool contributions from individuals and interest groups to donate to campaigns in favor of or against candidates, bill or legislation. Some studies suggest that the amount of contributions to campaigns and PACs is contingent upon the policy the government adopts (Montes-Rojas, 2013). In the case of foreign lobbying, this is not an option. In relation to foreign entities, the difference between these ethnic lobbying groups and foreign lobbying is confused in the literature, but the difference is of importance. The Foreign Agent Registration Act, created in 1938 and administered at the Department of Justice since 1942, prevents foreign entities from giving contributions to US based campaigns or PACs (Foreign Agent Registration Act: 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq., 1938). This restriction is based on the reason that ethnic lobbies are US citizens or US-based diaspora trying to influence US policy-making towards these ethnic groups or other nation-states (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014) (Haney & Vanderbush, 1999). Foreign lobbying originates in locations based outside of the United States. These lobbying entities include individuals, non-US based corporations, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and foreign governments. This means that, as ethnic lobbies are of US origin, they have resources, tools and goals that foreign entities have no access to, of which the financial factor is of most significance. Since the expansion of the Foreign Agent Registration Act in 1966, this also included the exclusion from election-relation activities. Some scholars argue that this has a negative impact on the success for these foreign entities (Freeman & Godwin, 2010).

At the same time FARA provides a legal way for foreign entities to lobby US policy-making and American public opinion. An analysis by

John Newhouse shows that in recent years more than 100 countries have lobbied the US foreign policy process (Newhouse, 2009). The most prominent requirement for these institutions to be allowed do so, they will have to hire 'an agent' to perform the lobbying. There have been studies, in the fields of economics, demonstrating the influence of foreign lobbying on trade and tariffs, immigration and even tourism (Montes-Rojas, 2013) (Gawande, Krishna, & Robbins, 2006) (Gawande, Maloney, & Montes-Rojas, Can Foreign Lobbying Enhance Development? The case of Tourism in the Caribbean, 2009) (Kee, Olarreaga, & Silva, 2007). All of these studies show that lobbying has a significant influence on the policy decision made in Washington. Further on it will become clear that the mechanisms through which these efforts are performed are similar. The focus of these studies however is not directly related to the topic of bilateral foreign assistance and thus to the focus of this research. The most closely related research to the subject of this thesis is the influence of ethnic groups in the US on the allocation of foreign aid. Again, the possibility to make contributions to political parties makes a big difference in the impact an interest group can have on the decision-making process in Congress (Lahiri & Raimondos-Møller, 2001) (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014). This is why it is difficult to make comparisons with groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The reaction of the public in terms of foreign lobbying is often more extreme than on domestic types of lobbying. The idea that money makes the difference in the decision making process of the political system already gives the feeling of losing democratic values. If non-American citizens perform these lobbying efforts, this feeling will be all the more prominent (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014).

Looking at foreign policy in total, 75% of the lobbying efforts, in terms of money, are performed by firms, which spend millions of dollars

each year to influence Congress on policy bills (Hafner-Burton, Kousser, & Victor, 2014). Aid is only a small part of the total amount of money spent on Capitol Hill targeted by foreign policy lobbying. Between 2007 and 2010, only around 7,5% of all lobbying money was aimed at aid. According to Hafner-Burton et al., this amounted to a total of around \$100 million. Compared to other big lobbies, such as AIPAC, the size of lobbying on foreign aid by foreign entities is relatively small with a total amount of lobby spending around \$1.35 billion. This could partly explain the limited research into the specific aspect of foreign lobbying as it takes up only an even smaller part of this 7,5%. The goal of this lobbying is also focused on only two aspects of foreign policy, the foreign aid budget and the conditions that might be attached to this budget. In terms of the budget, the result could be to either increase the amount of money allocation to foreign or countries might be competing for the biggest possible percentage of the budget (Montes-Rojas, 2013). Even though it is only a small part of the total lobbying efforts, still there is competition for the best result possible. In the second case, in term of conditions, certain democratic reforms, measures for freedom of expression or media might be loosened or totally canceled. What the impact is of the competition element on the consideration of the legislators and if they might use this power position is not clear in the case of foreign lobbying (Gawande, Maloney, & Montes-Rojas, Can Foreign Lobbying Enhance Development? The case of Tourism in the Caribbean, 2009).

3.2 Mechanisms of Foreign Lobbying

In general, there are two main mechanisms through which interest groups try to lobby and influence the policy outcome. First, and the biggest part of lobbying efforts, these groups try to place direct pressure

on legislators. This pressure is mainly exercised, in negative terms, through the threat of negative electoral results and, in positive terms, it is based on campaign contributions, trying to get access or time with elected officials or the mobilization of a big group of voters (Milner H. V., 1997). The second way for interest groups to try to exercise influence is through information mechanisms, the focus of this chapter. Information and knowledge are of high value in the political environment. The informational mechanism of lobbying tries to decrease the asymmetries between legislators and experts in a specific policy field (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014). Montes-Rojas argues that the foreign lobbies are not always trying to achieve a higher level of aid allocation, but are trying to inform legislators about the needs of their specific country, because of natural disaster, civil war or the spread of a disease, and about possible common trade or geostrategic interests, which were not clear before (Montes-Rojas, 2013) (Newhouse, 2009). This informational mechanism is furthermore also focused on the public discourse and media. By keeping the country in the news and showing the public the needs of the country and common interests, interest groups try to create a basis and common ground for the policy-making process (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007) (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014) (Montes-Rojas, 2013). As mentioned before, the public opinion is one of the significant factors members of Congress include in their consideration.

The way foreign lobbies are performing is through an American agent. Often this comes in the form of US law firms and lobbying agencies (Newhouse, 2009). However, an agent, as defined in FARA and Department of Justice, is any person who (a) engages in political activities or acts in a public relations capacity for a foreign principal, (b) solicits or dispenses anything of value within the United States for a foreign

principal, or (c) who represents the interests of a foreign principal before any agency or official of the US government (Foreign Agent Registration Act: 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq., 1938). These firms and agencies often employ or are run by people, who worked close to members of Congress or even were former members of Congress themselves, examples of this are ex-Senate leader Bob Dole and former House Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston (Marrero, 2010) (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014) (Montes-Rojas, 2013) (Lahiri & Raimondos-Møller, 2001). Their former roles give them the opportunity to operate more effectively in Congress. The firms and agencies try to keep information and updates on voting records, public statements and discourses of the key players in the Senate, in the House of Representatives and the different (sub-)committees, such as the Foreign Relations Committee. At the same time, they try to inform members of Congress on the countries they represent, their needs and their communalities with the United States. By confronting a legislator with this information, they try to create a supporter and advocate for this country's cause.

The law firms and agencies are thus of crucial importance for the foreign governments to achieve their goals. The role of these institutions thus needs to be analyzed in more detail. In the international environment, it seems that the national embassies have an important and high-standing role in interstate communication. Often, the ambassador, especially in the United States, is seen as part of the elite of the Department of Foreign Affairs (Smith J. M., 2011) (Newhouse, 2009). During the last years, also these delegates of national governments have seen it is wise to be familiar with the political structures in the United States and lobby for the interest of their countries. However, also these, often, experienced and respected diplomats cannot go to far outside of their

institutional roles. From the view of Capitol Hill, these ambassadors are one of many and not particularly vital for the final outcome. This makes it hard to make a case for smaller players in the international political environment and shows that the power of embassies in the big amount of international players has been decreasing (Newhouse, 2009). This is where the domestic firms and agencies come in. As said by Bill Allison of the Sunlight Foundation, a non-partisan, non-profit organization advocating open government, “what these countries are able to do is really get an insider who know Washington and can press their case with the right people” (Marrero, 2010). This is what the delegates at the embassies are missing and what the foreign governments through lobbying efforts are trying to solve.

Through their connections on Capital Hill, these insiders are able to reach and influence members of Congress and its committees much more directly. For this reason, Rowley and O’Leary wrote an article in *Business Week* in 2011 to explain the influence of the PLM Group in dealing with the foreign aid allocation to Egypt (Rowley & O’Leary, 2011). The PLM group, consisting of experienced lobbyist Tony Podesta, former Republican Congressman and House of Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston and former Democratic Congressman Toby Moffett, supposedly prevented the foreign aid budget to Egypt from being cut because of a lack of democratic reforms in 2007 (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014). Between 2007 and 2010, the PLM Group managed to make 1873 contacts with legislators and staff members of Congress to press the importance of the relationship between the United States and Egypt. Eventually, the aid budget for Egypt was not cut and remained constant between 2007 and 2010. In return, the firms received a total amount of \$1.1 million during these years for their efforts.

A second example is the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Aforementioned, during the War on Terror, countries like Jordan, Afghanistan and Pakistan received high levels of foreign assistance for their partaking in this war. As the death of Bin Laden might alter these financial flows, the Pakistani government started enabling lobby firms in the US to act on their behalf with the goal to keep the financial aid to Pakistan going when such an event might come about. In 2009, Locke Lord Strategies managed to help in creating a \$7.5 billion aid program to Pakistan (Seidl, 2011). In total, Pakistan has since 2002 received \$20 billion in development assistance (Tarnoff & Nowels, *Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy*, 2005). Still, there seems to be a limit to the influence of lobbyists. Salience, and the lack thereof, is a significant factor in this process. After news came out in July 2011 that the military trainers in Pakistan were being expelled, foreign aid decreased with around \$800 million, around a third of the total budget, of security aid to pressure Pakistan to take measures against these actions (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014). This shows the impact of public attention, when American citizens are the victims and the influence of this awareness on the decision making-process in Congress. Still, the foreign aid allocation to Pakistan was the third biggest receiver in 2012 with an amount of over \$2,9 billion (USAID).

Considering these examples, it still could be a possibility that these cases are stand-alone cases and no systemic influence of foreign governments can be measured over a long range of time. For this reason scholars like Pevehouse & Vabulas, through econometric research, tested the indication of a larger pattern of aid allocation and the significance of this type of informational lobbying (Pevehouse & Vabulas, *Foreign and Ethnic Lobbies in U.S. Foreign Policy: Information versus Elections Tariff Policy*,

2013) (Pevehouse & Vabulas, 2014) (Montes-Rojas, 2013) (Newhouse, 2009). By using data from the FARA and the USAID Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), they were able to perform a quantitative research on data between 1978 and 2008. While controlling for variables, such as GDP/Capita, Exports from the US and the Cold War, the results showed that the lobbying efforts had a highly significant influence on the outcome of foreign aid allocation. This means that an increase in spending for lobbying efforts over time will generate an increase in the aid budget for a specific country. Furthermore, they were able to make a list of 20 countries most active in foreign lobbying during the same timeframe (Pevehouse & Vabulas, *The Informational Role of Foreign Lobbying in U.S. Foreign Aid: Is U.S. Assistance for Sale?*, 2014). It shows that some surprising countries are part of this list, such as Chile and Poland. Most of these players barely actively or through non-visible means lobby US Congress.

Lobbying has thus been an effective tool for foreign governments to maintain a foreign aid flow going, without severe conditions attached to these allocations. The countries discussed so far however are or have been of great strategic importance for the interests of the United States. This gives them a more prominent position in the process of the allocation of funds compared to countries less critical in the international environment. It is then interesting how politically smaller countries do in the respect, with the focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. If and how are these countries able to compete with these big players? The cases that will be discussed are Ethiopia in East Africa and the Republic of Liberia in West Africa.

4. Case Studies: Liberia and Ethiopia

The position of Africa in relation to the United States has experienced different changes over time, due to different historic events (Mangala, 2010) (Omoruyi, 2001). This has led to a change in the allocation of the US foreign aid budget and the US involvement over time. First, the history of the relationship between the US and these countries will be presented. This is relevant, because a long history of aid provides a precedent for continuation. In this history the primary reason for aid will be highlighted. An overview of the annual budget will be added to create an overview of possible differences. Furthermore, the possible reasons, if any, for changing the budget for the recipient country. It is important to demonstrate what triggered the activity of foreign lobbying. In this process, the position of the American agents lobbying on behalf of the foreign government will also be explained. Eventually, the relative success or failure of the lobbying efforts will be looked at.

Both the Republic of Liberia and the Federal Republic of Ethiopia have never been colonized. These cases are exceptional, looking at the Sub-Saharan African region. As colonization has been linked with certain regular flows of foreign aid with their former invaders, it is especially interesting how these countries act in the international political environment without these precedents (Radelet, A Primer on Foreign Aid, July 2006) (Alesina & Dollar, 1998) (Omoruyi, 2001). This has led to the case studies of these countries. This has led to the case studies of these countries.

4.1 Republic of Liberia

The Republic of Liberia is currently led by the Sirleaf Administration. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is the first female president in Africa and she has been in this position since January 2006. With a similar political system as in the United States, she is currently serving her second term. During her presidency, she has managed to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 for her efforts in rebuilding Liberia after decades of political unrest. Last year, Western Africa was hit by a big Ebola outbreak, which was declared a threat to global peace and security by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Freedom House, 2015). The epidemic also hit Liberia. This has increased the amount of aid drastically to control the outbreak throughout the last year. In this case study, the focus will be on the period before this event, as it is hard to control for this huge influx. Next to this, the country still has a score of 3.5 on the Freedom House index, 7 being the least and 1 most free. Similar scores apply to civil freedoms and political rights and have not been improving in recent years. Even though President Sirleaf has put major efforts to reduce corruption, nepotism and procedural injustices since the end of the Second Civil War in 2003, these practices are still highly present in current day Liberia. On the global ranking of the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom, it takes the 141st place and 31st place out of the 46 Sub-Saharan African countries (The Heritage Foundation, 2015). Due to its high level of economic growth for five consecutive years, visible in Figure 4, the opening of the market seems to be successful, however the systems of the judiciary and property rights are still not improving, which keeps damaging the conditions needed for stability.




Figure 4: Annual GDP growth Republic of Liberia 2001-2015.
(Source: TradingEconomics.com: Central Bank of Liberia).

4.1.1 Historical Development of Aid Relation

Liberia has been a long-standing recipient of US foreign aid and partner during the Cold War. Already before the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, during the time of the Mutual Security Act, funding to an amount of \$167 million over a five-year period was allocated to Liberia for development purposes. Liberia, as one of the four independent countries during the wave of decolonization, saw in the United States as solid partner in the fight against communism. The country felt responsible for the formation of its neighboring countries. During the first years after the Second World War, Liberia assigned itself a role for guiding its neighbors through the process of decolonization and unification (Dunn, 2013).

The relationship between the two states came under pressure with the military coup in 1979 as a result of the oil crises that caused economic instability, which created a nation of corruption and nepotism and 12 people of the standing government were executed. During the five following years, the US tried to pressure the new government of the People's Redemption Council (PRC) led by Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe

to general elections. In 1985, elections were held of which Doe was victorious with 50,9% of the votes. Until today these results are highly contested (Harris, 1999). During this time, Samuel Doe started to favor the ethnic Krahn, who formed only 5% of the population. This group started to dominate most positions of government and during the following years the country was ruled as an authoritarian regime. At the same time, a former participant in the coup of 1979 and former leader of the General Services Agency Charles Taylor started getting support from Americo-Liberians abroad. In 1989 this resulted in attacks starting from Ivory Coast into Liberia. During the uprising Taylor was in heavy conflict, not only with the PRC, but also with international support of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and occupied not only most of Liberia, but also parts of Guinea and Sierra Leone (Ojo & Agbude, 2012). The United States was mostly not involved in the conflict, despite the long-lasting relationship, except from a small increase in bilateral aid in the beginning of the '90s, as visible in Figure 5. With the end of the Cold War, the strategic interest of the US seemed to be waning (Kieh, 2010). This first civil war eventually lasted until 1997. The relations during the presidency of Taylor with the United States remained hostile for the remainder of his rule.




Figure 5: US Official Development Assistance to Liberia in million US\$, 1960-2014. (Source: OECD/QWIDS).

This also influenced the lack of intervention in the second Civil War, which started in 1999. As most of the violence only took place in the border regions of Liberia, the atrocities were not very publicly known for a long time of the war (Human Rights Watch, 2006). It was only when the violence reached the capital of Monrovia in the beginning of 2003 that the United States and other countries started taking actions against the major violations of human rights. With the growing threat of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, especially in failed states, the interest of the US in an intervention Liberia drastically increased. The support remained mainly financial with necessary training for the peacekeeping troops of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Due to strong international pressure of the international community, on 11 August 2003, Charles Taylor resigned from his presidency and left to Nigeria where he received political asylum (Kieh, 2010). Since then, the United States has

tried to maintain a close relationship between the two countries and to help to create a stable system. Between the end of the war in 2003 and 2010, the US gave a total amount of over \$1 billion dollars in bilateral assistance and again \$1 billion was provided through international organizations like the United Nations (US Department of State, 2010).

4.1.2 The Foreign Lobbying Efforts

During the autumn of 2007, journalists and non-profit organizations, such as ProPublica and the Sunlight Foundation, started linking the Republic of Liberia with foreign lobbying efforts in the United States (Marrero, 2010) (Skiba, 2007). Especially, Democrat Congresswoman Gwen Moore is linked with lobbying efforts coming from the West African country. Marrero argues that Moore was involved in the repeal of a federal rule canceling extra oversight on Liberia (Marrero, 2010). This rule was enacted in the times of Charles Taylor and was never canceled, even though the transformation period had long started in 2007. The rule entailed extra oversight of the Liberian governments' finances and restricted the aid allocation budget. For this reason, Moore gave a speech in Congress on 21 June 2007 to argue that this extra oversight is no longer needed after the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006 (Marrero, 2010). This suspicion of Moore's involvement with lobbying firms, acting on behalf of Liberia, was further enforced by Katherine Skiba of the Journal Sentinel, who wrote an article about the number of times Gwen Moore was traveling throughout the summer of 2007. In August, she visited the President of Liberia together with colleagues of Congress, USAID and State Department (WikiLeaks, 2007). Not long after in October, Congressional records show, Moore again visited Liberia twice in a 10-day trip (US Congress, 2007). Eventually, the efforts paid off as the amendment

passed in 2007 and, even though foreign assistance did not increase the same year, it did drastically a year later, as visible in Figure 5. From data provided by the Sunlight Foundation, it can be concluded that Gwen Moore met with KRL International LLC on 18 September. KRL International LLC is a Washington-based corporation managed by Riva Levinson, which eases the market entry in the US for large and small companies, as well as governments, by helping them understand the economic and political environment in the US, as stated on their website. Throughout the year she has formed a close relationship with Liberian President Elle Johnson Sirleaf. Through “trusted working relationships with elected officials and senior staff in the US Congress, decision makers in government agencies, and leaders in the business and non-profit sectors”, this company tries to maximize support for different sectors (KRL International LLC). The same company met the same day with another 21 offices of the House of Representatives and related committees, such as the House Appropriations Committee (HAC), responsible for the allocations of the budget, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), and some of these even multiple times per day. Meetings are not only limited to representatives in the House, but also with Senators and related committees, eight on that day, and with members of USAID and the State Department. This shows that the efforts are focused on both sides of the decision-making process, both on the drafting by State Department and USAID and on the adjustment and approval side by Congress. All of this is further described in Appendix 1A. Unfortunately, the database of Influence Explorer, the site for all data on agents and their relations domestic and abroad, only starts in 2007.

In the FARA Semi-Annual Reports, however, it is visible that the first lobbying efforts on behalf of the Liberian government took place in

2005 (US Department of Justice, 1999-2014). During times of the transition after the Second Civil War, the Republic of Liberia hired a law firm in Washington named BKSH & Associates. As stated in the FARA First Semi-Annual Report of 2006, “the registrant”, in this case BKSH & Associates, “provided strategic guidance and support during the presidential transition period, through public relations. The registrant also contacted Congressional staffers, and US government officials to discuss bilateral matters between the US and Liberia” (US Department of Justice, 1999-2014). The costs for this guidance and support in 2006 were \$50,000, - , visible in Appendix 1D. Through the last report in 2014, the Republic of Liberia has continued to spend money on these efforts through different departments of the government. As a result, the ODA has not been less than around \$100 million since 2005. Overall, it is interesting to notice that most of the contacts within USAID, State Department, Senate and House resulted in many activities. Of the hundreds of contact between 2007 and 2013, only five were visited once. Furthermore, most of the members of the House were part of the Democrat Party, sixteen compared to seven Republicans, as visible in Figure 6. Within these groups, there are a few key players, who tend to be visited more than others. As these people continued meeting these lobbying firms, it may be assumed these people are crucial in the process. The returning names, in case of the Senate, are of Democrat Russell Feingold, Deputy Whip and Representative of Wisconsin, and Republicans Samuel Brownback of Kansas and Jeff Flake of Arizona. In the House, this list consists of Democrats Gwen Moore, in close contact with President Sirleaf, Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader at the time (RDR), and Jesse Jackson. In the group of seven Republican Representatives, no one particularly stands out. Also with staff of the different committees regular contacts were made. In the HAC both staff

members, Steve Marchese and Nisha Desai, often had meetings with KRL International LLC. Furthermore, in the HFAC, Pearl Mash was the main contact person. Lastly, in the committees of the Senate, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Michael Phelan is mentioned most often. In the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC), these are Republican Minority Staff Clerk Paul Grove and Democratic Majority Staff Clerk Tim Rieser. The varied list of close contacts indicates that the interests are represented on different levels and in political preferences. Likewise it implies a long-term effort in the distribution of the chambers (RDR). Additionally, it is interesting to see that most of the meetings are set in autumn. Apart from some meetings for visits from the Ministers of Planning & Economics and Finance in 2009 and the visit of President Sirleaf from 20 to 28 May 2010, most meetings take place around August, when Congress recesses for 30 days as implemented after the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. All these data can be found in Appendix 1B.




Figure 6: Distribution of Contacts by KRL International, 2007-2013. (Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.com)

There are some elements, which are still hard to determine. First, the total amount of money allocated to foreign lobbying is hard to estimate. Due to different data from the FARA Semi-Annual Reports and the Foreign Influence Explorer, there seems to be a difference in payment outcomes, as visible in Appendices 1C and 1D. This could be explained by the fact that the Semi-Annual reports do not always apply to the months January to June and July to December, which creates overlap between the two sources. Moreover, lobbying efforts by Steven C. Radelet in 2008 aid found by the Foreign Influence Explorer with a clear description of his efforts are not reported by the Department of Justice. This is the more surprising as the data collected by Foreign Influence Explorer comes from a official government website, indicating all government spending information. Thirdly, the process and specific targets of the lobbying efforts while meeting with members of Congress and their staff is not mentioned, only the general purpose of the visit. This makes it difficult to create a direct link between lobbying efforts and the results. However, with the current state of Liberia and the tendency for the US to act on self-interest, the allocation of foreign assistance to Liberia has remained mostly stable since the lobbying efforts started. Aid mostly increased after the lobbying efforts started in 2005, which shows some relationship between the lobbying input and the aid outcome. This notion is supported by the econometric analysis of previous research (Pevehouse & Vabulas, *The Informational Role of Foreign Lobbying in U.S. Foreign Aid: Is U.S. Assistance for Sale?*, 2014) (Montes-Rojas, 2013).

4.2 Federal Republic of Ethiopia

After the highly criticized results of the election in 2010, the elections of May this year do not seem to be any more credible for

Ethiopia (Freedom House, 2015). For the last couple of years the Federal Republic has received a all around rating of six of the Freedom House Index and is considered around the most 'not free' countries in East Africa. After the death of former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in 2012, who ruled since the 1991 Civil War, there was some hope for reforms by Hailemariam Desagne. However, the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is not planning to adjust its policies anytime soon. The country still suppresses the freedom of speech and journalists and members of the opposition are regularly harassed and imprisoned throughout the last couple of years under the national anti-terrorism law (Freedom House, 2015). Even though the country shows high levels of GDP growth during the last ten years, as visible in Figure 7, the country is highly criticized by the international community for its ongoing human rights violations.

The Republic is a combination of nine regional states, which in theory have high levels of autonomy. In practice, however, the decision-making process is very centralized (Furtado & Smith, 2009). Because of this and the fact that the EPRDF seems to enforce its domestic promises and policies, Ethiopia has low levels of corruption and leakage in government structures. This could also be explained by the fact that members of the EPRDF occupy over 90 percent of the seats in Parliament after both elections in 2005 and 2010 (Tronvoll, 2010) (Abbink, 2006). Abbink argues that after the 2005 elections policies were even more focused on the restriction of liberal values and democratic principles. In June and August after the elections, scores of people died during demonstrations against the government due to counteractions by the government and showed that there was no advancement in democratic reforms (Borchgrevink, 2011).




Figure 7: GDP growth of Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 2001-2015. (Source: TradingEconomics.com: National Bank of Ethiopia)

4.2.1 Historical Development of Aid Relation

From 1975-1990, the Derg Regime ruled Ethiopia, Derg being a nickname for Colonel Mengistu Mariam. Mengistu Mariam came to power through the 1974 Revolution dethroning Emperor Haile Selassie and creating a Marxist state. This naturally was not well received by the United States, which felt the new regime chose the ‘wrong side’ in the Cold War. This led to decreased levels of aid during this period. As the state was controlled like an authoritarian regime, more and more citizens of the lower classes started to support the guerilla movement EPRDF led by Meles Zenawi (Furtado & Smith, 2009). This climaxed in 1990 in a Civil War, after which Derg was ousted. With the end of the Cold War, the United States did not consider Ethiopia to be of strategic interest and in line with the general decreasing trend in development assistance by the Western world, aid to Ethiopia also decreased slowly. The feelings towards the new regime were mixed and even though a small part of

Congress was for an increase in aid and the relationship got somewhat closer, no aid bills were past during this time (Borchgrevink, 2011).

In 1998, a war broke out between the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the West, this war was perceived as a war between two African states, which could use the money better for a combined effort for development. Through international pressure and by threatening to cut of bilateral assistance, multiple countries tried to stop the escalation of the conflict. Ethiopia was not impressed by the external pressure and continued the fight with Eritrea. The United States had the reverse approach to others like the European Union (EU) (Borchgrevink, 2011). By increasing aid, the administration of President Clinton tried to lighten national struggles and eventually motivate peace, as visible in Figure 8. With the end of the conflict, this had the result of a decrease in foreign aid from the United States. This, however, did not last long. With 9/11 and George W. Bush's War on Terror, the strategic position of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, next to Somalia and near the Middle East became of utmost importance for the US. With this, also aid increased significantly from 2001 onwards. Attached to foreign assistance after 2001, a list of conditions was added for Ethiopia to change its policy and reforms towards democracy, open economy and human rights. Ethiopia, systematically stubborn and non sensitive to external pressure, accepted the terms of the bilateral assistance but throughout the years has not managed to fulfill the conditions attached to the allocation of funds (Freedom House, 2015). This inherently put the US in a difficult position.




Figure 8: US Official Development Assistance to Ethiopia in million US\$, 1960-2014. (Source: OECD/QWIDS)

Since 2005, multiple efforts have been made to make Ethiopia adhere up to its commitments through sanctions and the cancelation of funding. Still, Meles Zewali never gave in to these pressures with the knowledge of the geostrategic importance in the region. So far, he has been right in assuming no grave consequences would result. A bill introduced and passed in the House of Representatives in June 2007 eventually stalled in the Senate, because “the US needs Ethiopia in order to fight terrorism” (Borchgrevink, 2011). Especially after Ethiopian troop invaded Somalia as a response to terrorist threats, the US does not want to risk Ethiopia withdrawing from Somalia and a growing risk of terrorism. Most likely, aid will be continued, despite the ongoing high level of human rights violation in the country.

4.2.2 The Foreign Lobbying Efforts

After years of financial support by the US mostly starting after 9/11, none of the conditions attached the foreign assistance funds were fulfilled in 2007. Representative in the House Donald Payne, a Democrat of New Jersey and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, introduced a bill to further restrict the amount of aid allocated to Ethiopia and even refuse the grant after an agreement was signed if Ethiopia would not start with democratic reforms (Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007: H.R. 2003, 2007) (Narayanswamy, Roslak, & LaFleur, 2009) (Borchgrevink, 2011). The bill was signed in the House on 3 October 2007. It, however, never got to a vote in Congress as the Senate decided the strategic location of Ethiopia was too crucial for the US interests and stalled it. It is very interesting to see the shift of lobbying efforts from the House of Representatives before 03/10 to the Senate after, clearly shown in Figure 9. During this time, DLA Piper LLP mainly represented Ethiopia. This firm is one of the three best-paid lobbying firms in the United States and has a record of being the most busy contact government officials. It is also known for representing the governments of Afghanistan, Turkey and Cote d'Ivoire in the past with successful results (Narayanswamy, Rosiak, & LaFleur, Adding it up: The Top Players in Foreign Agent Lobbying, 2009). By looking at the FARA Semi-Annual Reports, it becomes clear that DLA Piper has had a long-lasting relationship with the Federal Republic of Ethiopia since 2002 under different names, described in Appendix 2E. For the lobbying efforts, the firm has received a total amount of around \$20 million from 2002 until 2009. After stalling the bill in the Senate, the activities of DLA Piper spread out more evenly over the two chambers of Congress, visible in Appendix 2A. The foreign aid allocation to Ethiopia doubled next year to \$800 million.




Figure 9: Meetings with Members of Congress for Republic of Ethiopia, Before and After 03/10/2007. (Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.com)

Due to the nature of the problem, Ethiopia is not only involved in lobbying Congress directly. Through public communication tools, the country has had companies work to ease the negative public opinion about Ethiopia since the beginning of the lobbying efforts in 1999 with Zemi Communications, as visible in Appendix 2E (US Department of Justice, 1999-2014). The increase in this negative trend of public opinion translated into a negative effect in the assistance allocation process, which indicates that public opinion has significant influence on the lobbying activities. In total, ten companies have worked on behalf of the Ethiopian government from 1999 until 2010. It is interesting to see that over the years, especially from 2008 onwards, the lobbying efforts shifted from foreign lobbying to ethnic lobbying. The ethnic interest group, even though present since the beginning, has been growing stronger in these years. As there are great benefits for ethnic lobbying, for example the

ability to give contributions to PACs and campaigns, the interests and resources of the government have changed to the domestically located groups, like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) – USA.

Another effect of the situation is that the activities seem very sudden. Even though it cannot be said with certainty, the group targeted by DLA Piper LLC is highly diverse and rarely multiple times with the same office in one day. At the same time, the same people seem to appear on the contact list every day, which shows the resourcefulness of DLA Piper to involve this many members of Congress in the short amount of time. In this timeframe, also some key players are formed by more regular contact. In the case of the Republican Representatives in the House, this mostly entails Christopher Smith from New Jersey and Steve Chabot from Ohio. Where Smith is seen as one of the most Liberal Republicans, Steve Chabot is perceived more conservative, opposing abortion and euthanasia, which shows the diversity of the lobbying efforts and the focus on US interests in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. In the case of the Senate, the same names can be found as in the Liberian activities. Democrat Russel Feingold, Republicans Samuel Brownback and Jeff Flake again show high levels of involvement. Furthermore, Minority Whip Jon Kyl of Arizona is closely involved in the process. With the involvement of different Whips as key players in the negotiations in the Senate, DLA Piper clearly focuses on pragmatic people with high levels of influence. Furthermore, the different Senate and House committees are also affected by the lobbying activities. Around 25 staff members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Appropriations are contacted through the timespan of September 2007 until October 2008 on a regular basis. Out of the regular list, mostly Staff Director Sheri Rickert is met frequently.




Figure 10: Distribution of Contacts DLA Piper LLC, 2007-2008.
(Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.com)

The focus of DLA Piper LLC is mainly on Congress and meetings with staff members of the Department of State or USAID are rare. Another company employed by the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, did speak with four staff members of the State Department, however this was only on 19 occasions. Again this is a factor that suggests that the lobbying was a reaction to the introduction of the act in April 2007 and not focused on the long-term foreign assistance budget process.

In this short timeframe, DLA Piper met at least 740 times with government officials, which confirms the position the company has within the world of lobbying. In the case of Ethiopia, however, the services ended after 2008. The transition from lobbying through foreign agents to domestic ethnic population had as a result that DLA Piper and the other firms of Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP and Mark Saylor Company LLC were no longer needed.

The history of civil war in both cases studies has shown that lobbying efforts do not tend to start without a solid government. The

significance of a recent history of war needs further research to be generalized to other cases in the Sub-Saharan region. Furthermore, the substantial impact of the geopolitical location of both countries on the aid allocation cannot be denied. As this geopolitical aspect also has major influence on their approach to their donor country, in this case the United States. This has led to a difference in the origin and focus of the two cases, both having a different approach of lobbying actions. In the case of Liberia, the widespread contacts over the different chambers and political parties indicates it is focused on long-term influence on the presence of the Republic of Liberia on the agenda of the aid allocations. In contrast, Ethiopia, especially, is focused on the solving a specific problem, which in this case was the cancellation of aid flows, because of non-fulfilled conditions. This presents itself in the focused lobbying of the chamber of importance and the absence of lobbying contacts in the drafting side of the lobbying process, namely USAID and the Department of State. Only on the aspect of public opinion, the government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia tries to have a long-term positive influence to secure its foreign aid position in combination with the US national interest in the Horn of Africa.

Changing focus to the individual actors, similar names appear on both meeting lists. Congress members like Russel Feingold, Samuel Brownback and Jeff Flake are in both cases involved as a central figure in the lobbying activities of the firms. Also in the committees, Sheri Rickert, Michael Phelan and Tim Rieser keep reappearing on both lists. The general tendency of both lobbying companies is to approach Democratic Representatives in the House. This is not the case in the Senate. This could for Ethiopia be explained by the desire to stress the American national interest in the geopolitical location of the country. For Liberia, it could be

to balance out the focus on Democratic key connections in the House of Representatives (RDR). Still, there cannot be said if this is significant. The balance between 435 Representatives and 100 Senators suggests that the emphasis on the House of both KRL International LLC and DLA Piper LLC is not surprising.

Another difference between the two case studies is that Ethiopia has shifted its lobbying activities from foreign to ethnic, which resulted in the disappearance of foreign lobbying of its agenda. In contrary, Liberia is still practicing foreign lobbying activities, according to most recent data. The return of freed African slaves to West Africa to move back to the continent of origin caused a very low level of ethnic Liberians. This is further enforced by the historic highly diverse amount of ethnicities in the Republic of Liberia.

Overall, it has become clear that the United States, in the case of foreign aid, is acting on own interest, a feature of realism. Especially after '9/11', the US government has used foreign assistance as a tool to achieve their foreign policy objectives, in this case the War on Terror. In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, this appeared in the prevention of 'failed states'. The necessity of lobbying efforts to achieve the goals of Liberia and Ethiopia demonstrates that, without these efforts, not the same levels of aid would be allocated. As the activities are focused on informational lobbying, the focus is on the needs and especially the communalities, both socially as well as in terms of geostrategic interests.

5. Conclusion

The findings of this research have shown that, in the cases of Liberia and Ethiopia, the lobbying efforts of their governments have had a positive effect on the allocation of foreign aid to their countries, taking into account general increases of the US budget. The hiring of US-domestic lobbying firms gives these foreign governments the possibility to assert their case in the decision-making process of Official Development Assistance. Because of the enactment of the Foreign Agent Registration Act of 1938, the activities of these companies, like KRL International LLC and DLA Piper LLC are based on informational lobbying. The main efforts are focused on Congress, confirming previous findings of Goldstein and Moss on the limited role of the President's position in the decision-making process (Goldstein & Moss, 2005) (Moss, U.S. Aid to Africa After the Midterm Elections? A "Suprise Party" Update, 2007). Informational lobbying is based on notifying and updating members of Congress and the general public on the common interests of their countries and their development needs. Because of the different reasons of the lobbying efforts in the case studies – Liberia to increase aid flows and Ethiopia to maintain them – these activities are executed using different strategies. In the case of Liberia, the widespread list of contacts in the four parties involved demonstrates a long-term effort on both the drafting side as well as the approval side of the process. For Ethiopia, the efforts were focused on stalling the Democracy and Accountability Act by targeting the two separate chambers of Congress, in accordance with their voting procedures. In both cases, key figures take part in the lobbying process. In the forms of Deputy Whip and Minority Whip, these members have a central position in the voting process to align the different voting groups. These central positions

make these members of Congress attractive for lobbying companies to approach in order to reach their goals. Concerning the general public, the considerations of the members of Congress cannot be separated from public opinion. The aspect of public opinion is of crucial importance in the decision-making process. Negative publicity about human rights, freedom of speech and corruption in a recipient country leads to a negative outcome on foreign aid allocation. A part of the lobbying efforts are focused on maintaining a positive flow of information and common interest to avoid negative impacts on the allocation process.

The transition of lobbying from the Ethiopian government to ethnic interest groups in the United States suggests, when presented with both options, the benefits of ethnic lobbying outweigh the tools of lobbying firms. This supports the findings of Freeman and Godwin that the probable success of ethnic lobbying is higher because it offers the possibility to make contributions to campaigns and Political Action Committees (Freeman & Godwin, 2010). As ethnic lobbying is not part of this research, it would be interesting for future research to see the impact of the shift from foreign to ethnic lobbying of Ethiopia.

The allocation of aid to Liberia and Ethiopia has a long history. Still, the real bulk of ODA has been allocated since the 2001 War on Terror, which has set a precedent for future allocations. Furthermore, lobbying efforts were necessary to maintain and increase these aid flows. This suggests that common interests need to be expressed and asserted to reach these goals. Without these efforts, foreign aid would have decreased. Therefore the United States Congress clearly shows realist characteristics in their foreign aid allocation. As a last conclusion, the question remains if the lobbying efforts of foreign governments change the primary objectives of foreign aid of the US government. In light of '9/11' and under the

pretext of a terrorist threat in failed states, aid allocations can be perceived as a financial tool of US national security. The conclusions of this research suggest that in 2007, the United States distributed the foreign aid budget following the realist theory of Hans Morgenthau. Instead of altering the primary objectives of United States foreign aid, the lobbying groups made use of them in their efforts.

There are several elements that need further research in the field of lobbying by foreign governments concerning aid. Firstly, the gap between the data of the Sunlight Foundation and the Department of Justice should be further researched to provide a clearer picture on the amount of money spent on lobbying efforts by foreign governments. The amount of data on contacts of the Sunlight Foundation caused a limitation of this thesis to only start in 2007. Therefore it was not possible in this thesis to make clear conclusions on the exact payments made to private firms in the United States. Furthermore, because this is a new field of research, it is hard to make general assumptions on the basis of these case studies. It should be interesting to analyze countries of less geopolitical significance or threat for the United States to create different approaches to the topic. Also, other Sub-Saharan African countries, like Somalia, should be further researched to make a general conclusion on the difference between colonized and non-colonized states in perspective to foreign aid allocation. Lastly, an article in the New York Times in September 2014 investigated lobbying activities and suggested that these activities are not only linked to firms, like DLA Piper or KRL International, but also to non-profit organizations, like the Center for Global Development (Lipton, Williams, & Confessore, 2014). Together with the involvement of Steven C. Radelet in the lobbying process of Liberia, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain objective

sources necessary for academic research. What influence will the inclusion of such actors have on the future landscape of foreign lobbying?

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7. Appendices

Appendix 1A: Lobbying Contacts KRL International LLC for Republic of Liberia, 2007-2013. (Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.nl)

2007	USAID	State Dep.	Senate	House
18/09	S. Swift	K. Moody	S. Brownback II	N. Pelosi II
		L. Thomas-Greenfield	B. Cardin	N. Lowey II
		P. Davis	H. Clinton II	D. Price
		S. McCarty	S. Smith (SFRC)	G. Moore
		D. Booth II	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)	K. Ellison
		J. Frazer	P. Grove (SAC)	J. Jackson II
			T. Rieser (SAC)	B. Lee II
			R. Feingold II	F. Wolf II
				S. Marchese (HAC) II
				D. Payne II
				S. Bachus
				R. Waters
				J. Clyborn
				C. Rangel
				P. Kennedy
				D. Watson
				H. Flynn (HFAC)
				N. K. Desai

				(HAC)
				J. Condon (HFAC)
				T. Lantos II
				P.A. Marsh (HFAC)
				E. Royce
2008				
22/08	F. Moore II	P. Carter	S. Brownback II*	J. Jackson III*
	K. Almquist	J. Frazer*	B. Cardin*	J. Condon (HFAC)*
	R. Greenberg	T. Moss	H. Clinton II*	P.A. Marsh (HFAC)*
	T. Lavelle	L. Thomas-Greenfield*	S. Smith (SFRC)*	E. Royce*
	Y. Malcioln	P. Davis*	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)*	N. Pelosi II*
	S. Swift*	S. McCarty*	P. Grove (SAC)*	N. Lowey III*
	H. Fore	K. Moody*	T. Rieser (SAC)*	D. Dreier
		T. Doherty	R. Feingold*	G. Moore*
		C. Snyder	S. Lengsfelder	K. Ellison*
				T. Lantos*
				D. Payne III*
				B. Lee II*

				F. Wolf*
				S. Marchese (HAC)*
				S. Bachus II
				R. Waters*
				J. Clyburn*
				C. Rangel*
				P. Kennedy*
				D. Watson*
				H. Flynn (HFAC)*
				N.K. Desai (HAC)*
20/10	K.	T. Moss*	S. Brownback II*	D. Watson*
	Almquist*			
	F. Moore*	L. Thomas- Greenfield II*	B. Cardin*	C. Smith
		T. Frazer*	S. Smith (SFRC)*	N. Lowey III*
		P. Carter*	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)*	J. Jackson IIIII IIII I*
		T. Doherty*	P. Grove (SAC)*	D. Payne*
		C. Snyder*	T. Rieser (SAC)*	F. Wolf*
		K. Moody*	R. Feingold III*	S. Marchese

			(HAC)*
	P. Davis*	J. Flake	P. Kennedy*
	S. McCarty*		H. Flynn
			(HFAC)*
	D. Booth*		J. Clyburn
			J. Condon
			(HFAC)*
			P.A. Marsh
			(HFAC)*
			E. Royce*
			N. Pelosi II
			D. Dreier*
			D. Price*
			N.K. Desai
			(HAC)*
			P. Kennedy III*
2009			
01/01		J. Flake*	P. Kennedy*
			N. Lowey*
			J. Jackson III*
			E. Royce III*
			B. Rush
			D. Payne*
			N. Pelosi*
07/03	L. Thomas-		
	Greenfield*		
16/04	L. Thomas-	T. Rieser	D. Payne II*

	Greenfield*	(SAC)*	
		J. Flake*	B. Rush*
			N. Lowey*
			N. Pelosi*
			J. Jackson*
16/08	K. Moody*	J. Flake*	S. Jackson Lee
	C. Snyder*	R. Feingold II*	J. Clyburn*
	P. Carter*	J. Ensign	B. Rush II
	S. McCarty*	T. Rieser	N. Lowey III*
		(SAC)*	
	L. Thomas-	P. Grove	F. Wolf*
	Greenfield*	(SAC)*	
	T. Moss*	M.V Phelan	S. Marchese
		(SFRC)*	(HAC)*
		S. Smith	P. Kennedy II*
		(SFRC)*	
		S. Brownback	D. Payne II*
		II*	
			N.K. Desai
			(HAC)*
			N. Pelosi II
			J. Jackson III*
			J. Condon
			(HFAC)*
			G. Moore*
			S. Cohen
			D. Watson*

			C. Smith*
			E. Royce*
2010			
20/09	T. Moss*	S. Smith (SFRC)*	B. Rush*
	K. Moody*	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)*	J. Clyburn*
	C. Snyder*	P. Grove (SAC)*	S. Jackson Lee*
	D. Goldwyn	T. Rieser (SAC)*	D. Watson*
	J. Carson	R. Feingold II*	C. Smith*
	S. McCarty*	J. Flake*	N. Pelosi II*
	L. Thomas-Greenfield*	S. Brownback II*	N. Lowey*
			F. Wolf*
			S. Marchese (HAC)*
			N.K. Desai (HAC)*
			J. Jackson III*
			J. Condon (HFAC)*
			P.A. Marsh (HFAC)*
			E. Royce*
2013			

31/01	D. Steinberg	J. Carson	J. Isakson	G. Moore*
	E. Gast	L. Thomas-Greenfield*	C. Coons	E. Royce*
	L. Ney	A. Stewart	T. Rieser (SAC)*	N. Pelosi*
	T. Amani	E. Redding	P. Grove (SAC)*	D. Price*
	E. Houston	D. Malac	L. Graham E. Kolodjeski (SSSFORP)	K. Granger C. Smith
			E. Kaufman	G. Simpkins (HFAC) K. Quaker (HFAC) T. Dubovi (HSFORP&HAC)
17/05		R. Menéndez	C. Coons III*	J. Condon (HFAC)*
		J. Flake II*	T. Grove (SAC)* T. Rieser (SAC)*	W. Gauchu (HFAC)* D. Payne*
			R. Lugar J. Isakson*	K. Bass K. Granger*
				S. Rickert (HFAC)* G. Simpkins

				(HFAC)*
				E. Royce II*
				N. Pelosi II*
				S. Jackson Lee*
				D. Payne*
				D. Wasserman Schultz
				B. Lee*
				E. Engel
31/07	D. Steinberg*	L. Thomas- Greenfield II*	J. Isakson*	N. Pelosi*
	E. Gast*	D. Tietlebaum	E. Kaufman II*	E. Royce*
	L. Ney*	D. Marac*	R. Lugar*	G. Simpkins (HFAC)*
		E. Redding*	T. Rieser (SAC)*	S. Rickert (HFAC)*
		A. Stewart*	P. Grove (SAC)*	K. Granger*
			J. Flake*	K. Bass*
			B. Cardin*	D. Payne*
			E. Kolodjeski (SSSFORP)*	W. Gauchu (HFAC)*
			L. Graham II*	J. Condon (HFAC)*
22/08	R.	T. Doherty*		

Greenberg*

T. Lavelle*

'*' = Contacted more than once

'I' = Number of times contacted

**Appendix 1B: Lobbying Efforts per Party in two Houses of Congress
and related (sub-)committees by KRL International for Republic of
Liberia, 2007-2013 (Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.com)**

Senate		House	
Republican (6)	Democrat (5)	Republican (7)	Democrat (16)
S. Brownback	H. Clinton	J. Condon	J. Jackson
J. Flake	B. Cardin	E. Royce	N. Pelosi
J. Isakson	R. Feingold	D. Dreier	N. Lowey
R. Lugar	C. Coons	F. Wolf	G. Moore
J. Inhofe	E. Kaufman	S. Bachus	T. Lantos
L. Graham		K. Granger	K. Ellison
		C. Smith	B. Lee
			M. Waters
			J. Clyburn
			C. Rangel
			D. Watson
			P. Kennedy
			D. Price
			D. Wasserman Schultz
			B. Rush
			S. Cohen

<u>SAC (2)</u>	<u>SSSFORP (1)</u>	<u>HAC (3)</u>	<u>HFAC (6)</u>
P. Grove	E. Kolodjeski	S. Marchese	H. Flynn
R. Rieser		N.K. Desai	W. Gachu
		T. Dubovi	K. Quaker
<u>SFRC (2)</u>			S. Rickert
S. Smith			P.A. Marsh
M.V. Phelan			G. Simpkins

Appendix 1C: Payments to Foreign Agents by Republic of Liberia, 2008-2013 (Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.com)

2008	\$309.023,34
KRL International LLC	\$169.023,34
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLC	\$100.000, -
Steven C. Radelet	\$40.000, -
2009	\$315.566,72
KRL International LLC	\$315.566,72
2010	\$69.950, -
KRL International	\$69.950, -
2013	\$65.000, -
KRL International LLC	\$65.000, -

Appendix 1D: Payments to Foreign Agents by Republic of Liberia, 2005-2014 (Source: FARA Semi-Annual Reports)

2005	-
BKSH & Associates	-
2006	\$50.000, -
BKSH & Associates	\$50.000, -
2007	\$356.978,70
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton	\$228.933,70
KRL International LLC	\$128.045, -
2008	\$424.590,06
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton	\$315.566,72
KRL International LLC	\$109.023,34
2009	\$109.950, -
KRL International LLC	\$109.950, -
2010	\$95.000, -
KRL International LLC	\$95.000, -
2011	\$60.000, -
KRL International LLC	\$60.000, -
2012	\$75.000, -
KRL International LLC	\$75.000, -
2013	\$40.000, -
KRL International LLC	\$40.000, -

Appendix 2A: Lobbying Contacts DLA Piper LLP for Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 2007-2013. (Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.nl)

2007	USAID	State Dep.	Senate	House
05/09				S. Chabot
18/09				S. Chabot*
24/09			J. Boozman	C. Smith
			J. Flake	S. Rickert
				(HFAC)
				D. Burton
				R. Mereu
				(HFAC)
				Y. Poblete
				(HFAC)
				D. Rohrabacher
				T. Sheehy
				(HFAC)
				S. Chabot*
				S. Su (HFAC)
				T. Tancredo
				R. Paul
				M. Pence
				T. McCotter
				J. Wilson
				J. Barrett
				C. Mack
				J. Fortenberry
				M. McCaul

		T. Poe
		B. Inglis
		L. Fortuño
		S. Hoyer
25/09	J. Boozman	C. Smith II*
	J. Flake	S. Rickert (HFAC)*
		D. Burton*
		R. Mereu (HFAC)*
		Y. Poblete (HFAC)*
		S. Chabot II*
		T. Sheehy*
		N. Su (HFAC)*
		T. Tancredo*
		R. Paul*
		M. Pence*
		T. McCotter*
		J. Wilson*
		J. Barrett*
		C. Mack*
		J. Fortenberry*
		M. McCaul*
		T. Poe*
		B. Inglis*
		L. Fortuño

	P.A. Marsh (HFAC)
	R. King (HFAC)
	D. Abramovitz (HFAC)
	P. Yeo (HFAC)
	K. Wells (HFAC)
	H. Berman
	P. Murphy
	N. LuSane (HFAC)
	D. MacDonald (HFAC)
	W. Delahunt
	G. Meeks
	J. Crowley
	D. Watson
	R. Carnahan
	J. Tanner
	S. Jackson Lee II
	R. Hinojosa
	D. Wu
	R. Miller
	L. Sánchez

		D. Scott
		J. Costa
		A. Sires
		L. Doggett
		R. Klein
		A. Smith
27/09	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)	C. Smith II*
	K. Myers (SFRC)	S. Rickert (HFAC)*
	D. Dillar (SFRC)	D. Burton*
	P. Clayman (SFRC)	R. Mereu (HFAC)*
	C.A. Keehner (SFRC)	Y. Poblete (HFAC)*
	C. Hagel	D. Rohrabacher*
	N. Coleman	T. Sheehy (HFAC)*
	G. Voinovich II	S. Chabot*
	J. Sununu	S. Su (HFAC)*
	L. Murkowski	T. Tancredo*
	B. Corker	R. Paul*
	J. DeMint	M. Pence*
	J. Isakson	T. McCotter*
	D. Vitter	J. Wilson*
	J. Kyl II	J. Barrett*

	S. Brownback II	C. Mack*
	J. Inhofe	J. Fortenberry*
	J. Flake*	M. McCaul*
	J. Boozman*	T. Poe*
		B. Inglis*
		L. Fortuño
		S. Hoyer
01/10	R. Feingold II	E. Cantor
	J. Flake*	S. Rickert
		(HFAC)*
		C. Smith*
		D. Burton*
		R. Mereu
		(HFAC)*
		Y. Poblete
		(HFAC)*
		D.
		Rohrabacher*
		T Sheehy
		(HFAC)*
		S. Chabot*
		S. Su (HFAC)*
		T. Tancredo*
		R. Paul*
		M. Spence*
		T. McCotter*
		J. Wilson*

	C. Mack*
	J. Fortenberry*
	M. McCaul*
	T. Poe*
	B. Inglis*
	L. Fortuño*
02/10	T. Blinken (SFRC)
04/10	I. Ros-Lehtinen
05/10	B. Cardin
	C. Dodd
	B. Nelson
10/10	B. Cardin*
11/10	N. Coleman*
	R. Feingold II*
	J. Sununu*
16/10	S. Brownback*
	C. Dodd*
23/10	S. Brownback*
24/10	T. Rieser (SAC)
25/10	J. Inhofe*
	B. Cardin*
	T. Rieser (SAC)*
26/10	J. Biden
29/10	J. Kyl II*
02/11	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)*

	K. Myers (SFRC)*
	D. Diller (SFRC)*
	P. Clayman (SFRC)*
	C.A. Keehner (SFRC)*
	C. Hagel* N. Coleman*
	G. Voinovich II* J. Sununu*
	L. Murkowski* B. Corker*
	J. DeMint* J. Isakson*
	D. Vitter* J. Kyl II*
	S. Brownback II* J. Inhofe*
08/11	S. Brownback* R. Feingold II*
15/11	J. Kyl II*
19/11	J. Kyl II*
26/11	J. Kyl*
27/11	S. Brownback*
30/11	M.V. Phelan

	(SFRC)*
	D. Diller
	(SFRC)*
	P. Clayman
	(SFRC)*
	C.A. Keehner
	(SFRC)*
	C. Hagel*
	N. Coleman*
	G. Voinovich*
	J. Sununu*
	B. Corker*
	J. DeMint*
	J. Isakson
	D. Vitter*
04/12	J. Kyl II*
06/12	S. Brownback*
	R. Feingold II*
07/12	R. Feingold II*
10/12	J. Kyl II*
12/12	R. Feingold II*
13/12	J. Sununu*
	R. Feingold II*
14/12	J. Kyl II*
18/12	J. Kyl II*
19/12	J. Kyl II*
20/12	J. Kyl II*

21/12		J. Kyl II*
2008		
07/01		J. Sununu*
		R. Feingold II*
		N. Coleman*
08/01	M. Singh	M.V. Phelan
		(SFRC)*
		K. Myers
		(SFRC)*
		D. Diller
		(SFRC)*
		K. Armitage
		(SFRC)
		P. Clayman*
		C.A. Keehner
		(SFRC)*
		N. Coleman*
		J. Sununu*
		L. Murowski*
		B. Corker*
		J. DeMint*
		J. Isakson*
		D. Vitter*
		S. Brownback II*
		J. Inhofe*
		G. Voinovich*
10/01		P.A. Marsh

	(HFAC)*
	P. Yeo (HFAC)*
	D. Abramovitz
	(HFAC)*
	K. Wells
	(HFAC)*
	H. Berman
	D. Adams
	(HFAC)*
	P. Murphy*
	N. LuSane
	(HFAC)*
	D. MacDonald
	(HFAC)*
	R. Wexler*
	J. Steinbaum
	(HFAC)*
	W. Delahunt*
	G. Meeks*
	J. Crowley*
	R. Carnahan*
	D. Watson*
	J. Tanner*
	L. Woolsey*
	S. Jackson Lee
	II*
	R. Hinojosa*

		D. Wu*
		R. Miller*
		L. Sánchez*
		D. Scott*
		J. Costa*
		A. Sires*
		G. Giffords
		R. Klein*
		A. Smith*
28/01	R. Feingold II*	
	J. Sununu*	
15/02	J. Kerry	
	J. Webb	
	J. Reed	
19/02	J. Webb*	
20/02	M.V. Phelan	C. Smith*
	(SFRC)*	
	K. Myers	D. Burton*
	(SFRC)*	
	D. Dillar	R. Mereu
	(SFRC)*	(HFAC)*
	P. Clayman	Y. Poblete
	(SFRC)*	(HFAC)*
	C.A. Keehner	D.
	(SFRC)*	Rohrabacher*
	C. Hagel*	T. Sheehy
		(HFAC)*

	N. Coleman*	N. Su (HFAC)*
	J. Sununu*	T. Tancredo*
	L. Murkowski*	R. Paul*
	B. Corker*	M. Pence*
	J. DeMint*	T. McCotter*
	J. Isakson*	J. Wilson*
	D. Vitter*	J. Barrett*
	J. Kyl II*	C. Mack*
	S. Brownback II*	J. Fortenberry*
	J. Inhofe*	M. McCaul*
	G. Voinovich*	T. Poe*
	J. Flake*	B. Inglis*
	J. Boozman*	L. Fortuño*
		S. Kiko (HFAC)
21/02	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)*	C. Smith*
	K. Myers (SFRC)*	D. Burton*
	D. Diller (SFRC)*	R. Mereu (HFAC)*
	P. Clayman (SFRC)*	Y. Poblete (HFAC)*
	C.A. Keehner (SFRC)*	D. Rohrabacher*
	C. Hagel*	T. Sheehy (HFAC)*
	N. Coleman*	S. Chabot*

	G. Voinovich II*	N. Su (HFAC)*
	J. Sununu*	T. Tancredo*
	L. Murkowski*	R. Paul*
	B. Corker*	M. Pence*
	J. DeMint*	T. McCotter*
	J. Isakson*	J. Wilson*
	D. Vitter*	J. Barrett*
	J. Kyl II*	C. Mack*
	S. Brownback II*	J. Fortenberry*
	J. Inhofe*	M. McCaul*
	J. Flake*	T. Poe*
	J. Boozman*	B. Inglis*
		L. Fortuño*
		S. Kiko (HFAC)*
22/02	J. Boozman*	R. Miller*
		A. Smith*
		D. Watson*
		L. Woolsey*
		L. Plumbley (HFAC)
		M. McCaul*
		J. Fortenberry*
		T. Tancredo*
		C. Smith*
25/02		A. Smith*
04/03	R. Feingold II*	

	J. Barrasso	
	N. Coleman*	
06/03	R. Feingold*	
	B. Cardin*	
07/03	B. Nelson*	
10/03	B. Nelson*	
25/03	S. Brownback*	
27/03	S. Brownback*	
28/03	S. Brownback*	
07/04	R. Feingold II*	
16/04	A. Specter	
24/04	J. Isakson*	S. Rickert (HFAC)*
	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)*	P. Martin (HFAC)
	K. Myers (SFRC)*	C. Smith*
	D. Diller (SFRC)*	D. Burton*
	C. Hagel*	R. Mereu (HFAC)*
	N. Coleman*	Y. Poblete (HFAC)*
	G. Voinovich II*	S. Kiko (HFAC)*
	J. Sununu*	D. Rohrabacher*

L. Murkowski*	T. Sheehy (HFAC)*
B. Corker*	S. Chabot*
J. DeMint*	S. Su (HFAC)*
J. Isakson*	T. Tancredo*
D. Vitter III*	R. Paul*
J. Flake*	R. Wittman
J. Boozman*	M. Pence*
S. Smith (SFRC)	T. McCotter*
T. Blinken (SFRC)*	J. Wilson*
B. McKeon (SFRC)	J. Barrett*
C. Dodd*	C. Mack*
J. Kerry*	J. Fortenberry*
R. Feingold*	M. McCaul*
B. Boxer	T. Poe*
B. Nelson*	B. Inglis*
B. Obama	L. Fortuño*
R. Menéndez	P.A. Marsh (HFAC)*
B. Cardin*	R. King (HFAC)*
R. Casey	P. Yeo (HFAC)*
J. Webb*	D. Abramovitz (HFAC)*
	K. Wells

	(HFAC)*
	H. Berman*
	D. Adams
	(HFAC)*
	L. Williams
	(HFAC)*
	N. LuSane
	(HFAC)*
	D. MacDonald
	(HFAC)*
	R. Wexler*
	J. Steinbaum
	(HFAC)*
	W. Delahunt*
	G. Meeks*
	J. Crowley*
	D. Watson*
	R. Carnahan*
	J. Tanner*
	L. Woolsey*
	S. Jackson Lee
	II*
	R. Hinojosa*
	D. Wu*
	R. Miller*
	L. Sánchez*
	D. Scott*

		J. Costa*
		A. Sires*
		G. Giffords*
		R. Klein*
		A. Smith*
30/04	D. Vitter*	
06/05	D. Vitter*	
07/05	J. Isakson*	
09/05	T. Blinken*	
12/05	M.V. Phelan	S. Rickert
	(SFRC)*	(HFAC)*
	K. Myers	P. Martin
	(HFAC)*	(HFAC)*
	D. Diller	C. Smith*
	(SFRC)*	
	C. Hagel*	D. Burton*
	N. Coleman*	R. Mereu
		(HFAC)*
	G. Voinovich II*	Y. Poblete
		(HFAC)*
	J. Sununu*	S. Kiko
		(HFAC)*
	L. Murkowski*	D.
		Rohrabacher*
	B. Corker*	T. Sheehy
		(HFAC)*
	J. DeMint*	S. Su (HFAC)*

	J. Isakson*	T. Tancredo*
	D. Vitter*	R. Paul*
	J. Flake*	R. Wittman*
	J. Boozman*	M. Pence*
		T. McCotter*
		J. Wilson*
		J. Barrett*
		C. Mack*
		J. Fortenberry*
		M. McCaul*
		T. Poe*
		B. Inglis*
		L. Fortuño*
14/05	S. Smith (SFRC)*	P.A. Marsh (HFAC)*
	T. Blinken (SFRC)*	R. King (HFAC)*
	B. McKeon (SFRC)*	P. Yeo (HFAC)*
	C. Dodd*	D. Abramovitz (HFAC)*
	J. Kerry*	K. Wells (HFAC)*
	R. Feingold*	H. Berman*
	B. Boxer*	D. Adams (HFAC)*
	B. Nelson*	L. Williams

	(HFAC)*
B. Obama*	N. LuSane (HFAC)*
R. Menéndez*	D. MacDonald (HFAC)*
B. Cardin*	R. Wexler*
R. Casey*	J. Steinbaum (HFAC)*
J. Webb*	W. Delahunt* G. Meeks*
	J. Crowley* D. Watson*
	R. Carnahan* J. Tanner*
	S. Jackson Lee II* L. Woolsey*
	R. Hinojosa* D. Wu*
	R. Miller* L. Sánchez*
	D. Scott* J. Costa*
	A. Sires* G. Giffords*
	R. Klein* A. Smith*

21/05	J. Isakson*	
30/05	J. Inhofe*	
	S. Brownback*	
04/06	H. Fore	S. Brownback*
10/06		S. Brownback*
24/06		S. Brownback*
16/07	J. Wysham	
21/07		S. Jackson Lee*
23/07		S. Brownback* S. Jackson Lee*
28/07	J. Wysham*	
30/07	J. Inhofe*	S. Rickert (HFAC)*
	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)*	P. Martin (HFAC)*
	K. Myers (SFRC)*	C. Smith*
	D. Diller (SFRC)*	D. Burton*
	C. Hagel*	R. Mereu (HFAC)*
	N. Coleman*	Y. Poblete (HFAC)*
	G. Voinovich II*	S. Kiko (HFAC)*
	J. Sununu*	D. Rohrabacher*
	L. Murkowski*	T. Sheehy

		(HFAC)*
	B. Corker*	S. Chabot*
	J. DeMint*	S. Su (HFAC)*
	J. Isakson*	T. Tancredo*
	D. Vitter*	R. Paul*
	J. Flake*	R. Wittman*
	J. Boozman*	M. Pence*
		T. McCotter*
		J. Wilson*
		J. Barrett*
		J. Fortenberry*
		M. McCaul*
		T. Poe*
		B. Inglis*
		L. Fortuño*
02/09	K. Flowers	
05/09	K. Flowers*	
10/09		S. Brownback II* S. Hoyer*
		J. Inhofe*
		R. Feingold*
		J. Isakson*
11/09		P. Leahy
		T. Blinken
		(SFRC)*
		J. Kerry*
		B. Boxer*
		R. Menéndez*

	B. Cardin*
	J. Webb*
12/09	R. Casey*
	J. Webb*
	J. Kerry*
15/09	J. Webb*
	S. Brownback*
16/09	B. Cardin*
	B. Nelson*
	N. Coleman*
	D. Vitter*
	C. Hagel*
	Jefferson
	J. Warner
17/09	D. Vitter*
18/09	N. Coleman*
19/09	D. Vitter*
	B. Nelson*
	B. Boxer*
23/09	J. Isakson II*
	B. Nelson*
	D. Vitter*
24/09	B. Cardin II*
	N. Coleman*
	S. Brownback
	III*
26/09	B. Nelson*

01/10	S. Brownback*	
02/10	S. Brownback*	
03/10	R. Feingold II*	C. Smith*
	M.V. Phelan (SFRC)*	D. Burton*
	K. Myers (SFRC)*	R. Mereu (HFAC)*
	D. Diller (SFRC)*	S. Rickert (HFAC)*
	P. Clayman (SFRC)*	Y. Poblete (HFAC)*
	C.A. Keehner (SFRC)*	D. Rohrabacher*
	C. Hagel*	E. Royce
	N. Coleman*	S. Chabot*
	G. Voinovich II*	D. Manzullo
	J. Sununu*	T. Tancredo*
	L. Murkowski*	R. Paul*
	B. Corker*	M. Pence*
	J. DeMint*	T. McCotter*
	J. Isakson	J. Wilson*
	D. Vitter*	J. Barrett*
	J. Kyl II*	C. Mack*
	S. Brownback II*	J. Fortenberry*
	J. Inhofe*	M. McCaul*
	J. Flake*	T. Poe*
	J. Boozman*	B. Inglis*

		L. Fortuño*
		S. Kiko
		(HFAC)*
06/10	A.M. Harms	S. Brownback*
07/10		V. Snyder
		D. Payne
10/10		R. Feingold*
15/10		R. Feingold*

'*'= Contacted more than once

'I'=Number of times contacted

Appendix 2B: Lobbying Efforts per Party in two Houses of Congress and related (sub-)committees by DLA Piper LLP for Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 2007-2013. (Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.com)

Senate		House	
Republican (17)	Democrat (8)	Republican (18)	Democrat (26)
S. Brownback	R. Feingold	E. Royce	D. Payne
J. Flake	B. Cardin	C. Smith	D. Watson
J. Isakson	C. Dodd	S. Chabot	S. Hoyer
J. Boozman	B. Nelson	D. Burton	C. Murphy
C. Hagel	B. Boxer	D. Rohrabacher	B. Delahunt
N. Coleman	B. Obama	T. Tancredo	G. Meeks
G. Voinovich	R. Menéndez	R. Paul	J. Crowley
J. Sununu	R. Casey	M. Pence	R. Carnahan
L. Murkowski		T. McCotter	J. Tanner
B. Corker		J. Wilson	S. Jackson Lee
J. DeMint		J. Barrett	R. Hinojosa

D. Vitter	C. Mack	D. Wu
J. Kyl	J. Fortenberry	L. Sánchez
J. Inhofe	M. McCaul	D. Scott
I. Ros-Lehtinen	T. Poe	J. Costa
A. Specter	B. Inglis	A. Sires
J. Barrasso	L. Fortuño	L. Doggett
	R. Miller	R. Klein
		A. Smith
		H. Berman
		R. Wexler
		G. Giffords
		J. Kerry
		J. Webb
		J. Reed
		V. Snyder
<u>SFRC (9)</u>		<u>HFAC (14)</u>
M.V. Phelan	D. Dillar	S. Rickert
K. Myers	P. Clayman	R. Mereu
C.A. Keehner	T. Blinken	Y. Problete
K. Armitage	B. McKeon	T. Sheehy
S. Smith		N. Su
		D. MacDonald
<u>SAC (1)</u>		P.A. Marsh
T. Rieser		S. Kiko
		L. Plumpley
		P. Martin

Appendix 2C: Lobbying Contacts Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP for Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 2007-2013. (Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.nl)

2007	USAID	State Dep.	Senate	House
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06/11	B. Schofield
08/11	B. Schofield*
09/11	B. Schofield II*
13/11	B. Schofield*
21/11	B. Schofield II*
	J. Knight II
	J. Swan II
27/11	B. Schofield II*
	J. Swan II*
29/11	B. Schofield*
	K. McBride
2008	
18/01	B. Schofield*
29/01	B. Schofield*
*'= Contacted more than once	
'T'=Number of times contacted	

Appendix 2D: Payments to Foreign Agents by Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 2007-2009. (Source: Foreign.InfluenceExplorer.com)

2007	\$183.307,48
Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP	\$183.307,48
2008	\$2.132.496,23
Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP	\$402.604,80
DLA Piper LLC	\$1.401.851,25
Mark Saylor Company LLC	\$328.040,18
2009	\$617.433,65
Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP	\$31.654,13

Mark Saylor Company LLC	\$585.779,52
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Appendix 2E: Payments to Foreign Agents by Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 1999-2014. (Source: FARA Semi-Annual Reports)

1999	\$382.270, -
Verner Lijpfert Bernhard	-
McPherson & Hand (VLBM&H)	
Zemi Communications	\$97.270, -
C/R International LLC	\$285.000, -
2000	\$250.000, -
C/R International LLC	-
VLBM&H	\$250.000, -
Zemi Communications	
2001	\$1.975.000, -
C/R International LLC	-
VLBM&H	\$1.975.000, -
2002	\$12.006.961,87
Piper Rudnick	\$12.006.961,87
2003	\$7.669.643,98
Piper Rudnick	\$7.669.643,98
2004	\$1.095.303,59
DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP	\$795.303,59
Hunton & Williams LLP	\$300.000, -
2005	\$1.285.918,50
Hunton & Williams LLP	\$1.285.918,50
2006	\$1.857.201,75

Hunton & Williams LLP	\$1.757.201,75
DLA Piper LLC	\$100.000, -
McGuireWoods Consulting LLC	-
2007	\$1.508.534,71
DLA Piper LLC	\$526.264,71
Hunton & Williams	\$982.270, -
Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP	-
2008	\$2.870.223,85
Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP	\$1.190.332,42
DLA Piper LLC	\$1.351.851,25
Mark Saylor Company LLC	\$328.040,18
2009	\$31.704,13
Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP	\$31.654,13
DLA Piper LLC	\$50.000, -
Mark Saylor LLC	-
2010	\$585.779,52
Mark Saylor LLC	\$585.779,52