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Reflections on the problem of reality in International Relations:  
A Three-level Analysis of South African Foreign Policy

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# Introduction

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## **Big fish in a little pond: South Africa in contemporary International Relations**

On the 7th of May 2014, post-apartheid South Africa held its 4th universal general elections since the victory of democracy under leadership of then-president of the African National Congress (ANC),<sup>1</sup> Nelson Mandela in 1994. Twenty years after the victory of South Africa's "struggle generations" over racial oppression in favour of the consolidation of democracy in this former international pariah, there has been as much change in the political landscape as there hasn't been any. Since the election into office of the ANC, political South Africa has spiralled downward into a deep moral crisis with an executive involved in scandals "so often in the last few years that it is no longer shocking,"<sup>2</sup> widespread corruption is costing the economy billions in revenue annually<sup>3</sup> and threatening international trade and commerce<sup>4</sup> while also opening doors to international crime syndicates and terrorist organisations.<sup>5</sup> Its relations with the international community are becoming more strained almost by the day as South Africa's emergence into adulthood has been delayed while its peers wait for it to step up and assume its responsibilities as a good international citizen. Nelson Mandela's death in December 2013 marked the end of an era for South Africa if not Africa as a whole: the last of Africa's great freedom fighters has passed. Africa is for all intents and purposes "liberated" and, as South Africans mourned the loss of its internationally celebrated symbol of hope, the rest of the world took stock of post-Mandela South Africa - what has

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<sup>1</sup> Ruling party since 1994.

<sup>2</sup> Professor Adam Habib of the University of Johannesburg, quoted in "*Habib: South Africans no longer shocked by political scandals*", SAPA, 12/10/2013.

<sup>3</sup> Transparency International ranks South Africa the 72nd most corrupt country on the planet in 2013, with Corruption Watch estimating losses in sovereign revenue to corruption since 1994 at 385 billion South African rand, or roughly 38,5 million US dollars. See "*Public service needs a shake-up, Mr President*", Pillay, K. 17/04/2013; and *Corruption Perceptions Index 2013*, Transparency International.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example "*The Good and Bad: The strengths and weaknesses of doing business in South Africa*", Oxford Business Group.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, "*SA citizens linked to terrorist groups*," iolnews, 17/05/2013; "*SA Now a 'safe haven' target for terrorists*," Watson, A., The Citizen, 26/09/2013; "*Can SA be target for merciless terrorists*," Hartley, W., BDLive, 25/09/2013; "*SA at high risk of illicit financial outflows, SARS commissioner says*", Ensor, L., BDLive, 17/05/2014.

it achieved, where did it fail and what will it do next?<sup>6</sup> Dissatisfaction with the ANC as a liberation-movement-cum-oligarchy that has simultaneously sought to uphold its romantic image as "the only true champion of South Africa's black majority" while turning into a despotic interest-dominated political party,<sup>7</sup> lies at the crossroads between anti-colonial liberation romanticism and the *realpolitik* of interests and power, all within the setting of a history that has in ways been forgotten on the surface but that lives on in other ways deep below the layers of consciousness. If senior research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Keith Somerville, considers the ANC's domestic dilemma as rooted in its "struggle organisation mentality" of a "right to rule" where the "struggle party" derives its legitimacy from its contribution to the liberation of the people from minority rule rather than from its merits as a government of-, by- and for the people,<sup>8</sup> the South African "struggle mentality" is as evident in its foreign relations as it is in the executive's apathetic approach to government domestically. Like its "Born Frees," democratic South Africa has come of age yet it seems stuck in the glorious past of the liberation struggle, to the detriment of its foreign relations. In this spirit, I will briefly contextualise the country's position in contemporary international relations below before turning to an enquiry into post-Mandela South Africa's foreign relations, with a specific focus on its foreign policy toward Europe.

In its *Twenty Year Review*,<sup>9</sup> the South African government recalls the late Nelson Mandela's remarks that apartheid South Africa was the "skunk of the world" and goes on to develop how the ruling government has gone about transforming political South Africa's image in international relations since 1994 by writing into South African foreign policy its enduring commitment to the values of "equality, non-racialism, non-discrimination, liberty, peace and democracy [as values that are] central to South Africa's national identity."<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the report states that South African foreign policy is "inspired by the notion of Ubuntu [...] characterised by cooperation, collaboration and the building of partnerships rather than conflict and competition."<sup>11</sup> Thus, at least

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<sup>6</sup> See "A giant passes," *The Economist*, 05/12/2013; "Les peurs de l'après-Mandela," Remy, J. P., *Le Monde*, 06/12/2013; "Mandela's Death Leaves South Africa Without Its Moral Center," Polgreen, L., *The New York Times*, 05/12/2013; "South Africa since apartheid: Boom or bust?" Kangralou, T., *CNN.com*, 27/11/2013;

<sup>7</sup> See "*After Mandela, South Africa's ruling party struggles*," McGroarty, P., *The Wall Street Journal*, 05/12/2014.

<sup>8</sup> See "*Why are South Africa's 'Born Frees' scaring Zuma ?*" Somerville, K., *African Arguments*, 22/11/2013.

<sup>9</sup> Presidency of the Republic of South Africa. 2014. *Twenty Year Review*. Pretoria: Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.* p. 148.

<sup>11</sup> *idem.*

superficially, South African foreign policy has been approached by the incumbent government from a liberal democratic paradigm of economic cooperation to maximise gains from international interaction, to assist in developing not only South Africa but the whole of the African continent through economic initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), regional economic blocs and the Africa Agenda. Keeping in mind the particularities of diplomacy and diplomatic communication, government documents are of little to no use to analysts without a critical investigation of the ways in which policy translates in reality. If this brief introduction to the South African political reality seems simplistic, it serves the momentary purpose of illustrating the multidimensional complexity of the competing realities within which South African foreign policy is made. The task of making sense of these multiple realities will be the ultimate objective of this paper however, a first brief discussion of existing scholarly literature on South African foreign policy should serve to further nuance the initial line of thought that will ultimately guide the formulation of the research question.

### **i. Schizophrenia, multiple identity disorder and the doctors: South African foreign policy on the psychologists' couch**

Recognising a chasm in analyses of South African foreign policy since democracy, the Africa Institute of South Africa and the Institute for Global Dialogue, two Pretoria-based Think Tanks, co-commissioned a series entitled "South African Foreign Policy Review" in 2012,<sup>12</sup> aiming to collect relevant public and academic discourses on the country's policies post-apartheid and to provide methodological and analytical tools for future research in the field for the first time since the release of the only serious scholarly volume on South African Foreign Policy in 2006, *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy Since Apartheid*.<sup>13</sup> In its preface, former South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, remarks that hitherto "analysis [...] was not based on policy documentation of the African National Congress (ANC) [...] These documents will help to explain why our foreign policy since 1994 is driven by an Africanist, anti-colonial and anti-imperialist perspective."<sup>14</sup> If Chris Landsberg criticises

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<sup>12</sup> Landsberg, C., Van Wyk, J.A. (eds.) 2012. *South African Foreign Policy Review: Volume 1*. Pretoria: AISA and IGD.

<sup>13</sup> Carlsnaes, W., Nel, P. (eds.) 2006. *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy Since Apartheid*. Midrand: IGD.

<sup>14</sup> Pahad, A. Preface to *South African Foreign Policy Review: Volume 1. op. cit.* p. vii.

earlier scholarly work on South African foreign policy as tending to describing policy anomalies and shortcomings without giving due consideration to how these policies are made in the first place, what they contain and how they are or are not implemented in reality,<sup>15</sup> Garth le Pere points out that *South African Foreign Policy Review* fails to bridge the existing gap in South African foreign policy analysis particularly because it does not provide adequate cause-and-effect interpretations of the country's foreign policy, therefore rendering it incapable of identifying those factors that will influence policy making in the future.<sup>16</sup> Referring to Rosenau's watershed contribution to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Le Pere recalls that

"[t]o identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand factors that affect external behaviour is not to know how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not others. To recognise that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other."<sup>17</sup>

Although I fundamentally disagree with Le Pere's preoccupation with the liberal world order of post-Cold War international relations, which I consider a scholarly misdirection that I will address duly in the coming chapters, my own questioning of South African foreign relations finds resonance in Le Pere's imperative that any analysis of South African foreign policy should "ask how does South Africa compare in terms of how it views itself and the role it has assumed in the liberal international arena since 1994?"<sup>18</sup> Admittedly, South African foreign relations are extremely complex, owing to the country's position somewhere between the old North and South, between Africa and Europe and between the most industrialised nations and the least developed states. It is at once this statute as a sort of "gateway" between the old, rich world and the young, developing democracies that informs South Africa's ideology of "exceptionalism"<sup>19</sup> and

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<sup>15</sup> Landsberg, C. "Towards a South African foreign policy review," in Landsberg *et al.* 2012. *South African Foreign Policy Review... op. cit.* p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Le Pere, G. "Landsberg, Chris/van Wyk, Jo-Ansie (eds), *South African Foreign Policy Review*, Vol 1, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa and the Institute for Global Dialogue 2012, 290 pp." in *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol. 35, No. 1, June 2013, pp. 161-165.

<sup>17</sup> Rosenau, J. "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", quoted in Le Pere, G. 2013. *op. cit.* p. 162.

<sup>18</sup> Le Pere, G. 2013. *op. cit.* p. 162.

<sup>19</sup> Literature on South African exceptionalism is abundant. See, for example, Lazarus, N. "The South African Ideology: The Myth of Exceptionalism, the Idea of Renaissance," in *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Volume 103, Number 4, Fall 2004, pp. 607-628; Mamdani, M. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 27-32; Hudson, H. *When foreign policy meets foreigners: Xenophobia and the case of South African exceptionalism*. Paper presented at the 2009 ISA-ABRI Joint International Meeting.

that presents its greatest challenge. In this spirit, Landsberg traces the origins of South African exceptionalism to "[t]he view from the infant government [...] that South Africa occupied a unique position in the North-South configuration [...] South Africa grasped the new-found opportunity to flex its muscles, at once promoting the interests of Southern Africa, the broader African continent, and even the entire southern hemisphere."<sup>20</sup> Indeed, Landsberg reminds us that South Africa foreign policy should be approached from a number of angles far beyond Robert Putnam's two levels to include the influence of domestic, sub-regional, continental, global South, industrialised North and global governance<sup>21</sup> on the policy making process. It is perhaps within this context of extremely diverse, competing political realities of South Africa as a developing state, as an emerging power, as a strong economy relatively to its less industrialised peers, as the voice of Africa and even the global South, as the good student of the liberal democratic world and as old freedom fighter that we are best able to understand the inevitability of a schizophrenic foreign policy. Nevertheless, this paper does not have as vocation to analyse all and sundry of South African foreign policy toward all the most remote corners of the world. Rather, the focus of this paper lies on trying to determine South Africa's foreign policy toward Europe specifically and then to analyse how the Euro-South African political reality impacts on foreign policy decision making.

Gerrit Olivier<sup>22</sup> contends that post-apartheid South Africa sought to distance itself from the "West", which it considers synonymous with imperial colonisers, by turning its foreign policy focus to Africa and the global South instead. However, Olivier holds, though South Africa has aimed to distance itself from the West, to consolidate its independence from Western influence, it has nonetheless retained a high degree of economic dependence with the West, particularly with Europe which had been, until 2009, its largest export market. This point is of absolute importance to the current analysis of South African foreign policy toward Europe because, as I will argue in the first section aptly titled "The material-positivist approach," South Africa quite simply cannot afford to turn its metaphorical back on Europe. And it is essentially for me this incompatibility between South Africa's aspirations to autonomy from the global North, and its material incapacity to translate its aspirations in reality that ultimately lends its foreign policy to bouts of schizophrenic incoherence.

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<sup>20</sup> Landsberg in Landsberg *et al.* 2012. *op. cit.* p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.* p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Olivier, G. "South Africa's Foreign Policy towards the Global North," in Landsberg *et al.* 2012. *op. cit.* pp. 173 -197.



## ii. Then, the question

If some scholars consider South Africa's apparently schizophrenic foreign policy as the result of the complexity of its incompatible ideological micro-identity as African liberation struggler against its "pragmatic multilateralist" macro-identity as international reformist,<sup>23</sup> this paper will attempt to demonstrate that South Africa's multiple identity disorder stems rather from the complexity of the incompatibility between its aspirations as a participant in the anarchic theatre of international politics and its physical limitations, with a third dimension located in the past, present and future of the unconscious. To reinterpret former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad's remarks at the closing of a foreign policy workshop held in Pretoria in 1996, "[t]he problem we face in this regard is the issue of possibilities and limitations on South Africa in the real world."<sup>24</sup>

Considering the important impact of South Africa's physical, geopolitical reality on its ideological, identitary reality, and accepting an underlying third dimension located within space and time but below the level of consciousness, this paper will seek to address two questions, one ontological, the other epistemological in nature. The research question can thus be formulated as:

*"How do the tensions between South Africa's multiple realities contribute to its perceived "schizophrenic" foreign policy and how can a multitier approach assist in better understanding South Africa's relations with Europe?"*

Guiding the line of thought to arrive at a conclusive response to the research question, are three working hypotheses. Firstly, with its out-dated exceptionalist ideology that is no longer compatible with its new status as emerging power in a multipolar global order, South Africa is trapped in the glory days of the mid-1990s and thus unable to take full advantage of its place in contemporary international relations. Secondly, because of its inability to reconcile its adolescent identity with its new political realities, South Africa suffers from pervasive multiple identity disorder. Thirdly, in its relations with Europe, it is problematic to approach an analysis of South African foreign relations from within the

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<sup>23</sup> Hudson, H. *When foreign policy meets foreigners: Xenophobia and the case of South African exceptionalism*. Paper presented at the 2009 ISA-ABRI Joint International Meeting, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup> Pahad, quoted by Landsberg, C., in Landsberg *et al.* 2012. *op. cit.* p. 7.

liberal paradigm and continued insistence thereupon contributes to South Africa's schizophrenic foreign policy. Departing from the axiom that South African foreign relations - particularly its relations with Europe - are driven by power games and strategic interests, set within the mould of multiple identities as a package located in time and space, I will approach the analysis from three theoretical paradigms being 1. a revived neorealist theory; 2. moderate constructivism; and 3. a "socialised" quantum theory. By virtue of its ambitious concept, the structure of the paper will reflect its somewhat unorthodox research design as it is outlined in the methodological approach.

### iii. Methodological approach

If the global approach to this paper is located squarely within the constructivist paradigm, it will be my argument that, in spite of Alexander Wendt's claims that constructivism is fundamentally incompatible with realism, a somewhat reformulated realist approach is essential to understanding South African foreign policy toward Europe today. Moreover, I will attempt to show how a realist approach may complete and even assist in building a constructivist understanding of South African foreign policy sources and outputs. For this reason, and taking into account Wendt's call for "a *via media* between positivism and interpretivism"<sup>25</sup> in his seminal *Social Theory of International Politics*, this paper will advance a three-level approach to analysing South African foreign policy. It is thus divided into three parts: The first approaching the subject from a material-positivist perspective, attempts to redefine the realist discourse on international relations in such a way that it naturally introduces the second part, which deals with the cognitive-constructivist aspect of South African foreign policy. It should be clear from the first section that the *realpolitik* dimension of South African political reality weighs significantly on policy makers' perceptions of their political reality. In a way, the positivist dimension represents a reality *per se* and, by that virtue, its use to illustrate South African perceptions of its place in international relations is essentially a constructivist endeavour. The relevance of the second part of the paper, the cognitive-constructivist approach, thus speaks for itself inasmuch as the foregoing introduction has shown that South African foreign policy reposes fundamentally on an action-reaction interaction with other members of the international community. Finally, the third section of the paper introduces a radically new historical approach to analysing South African

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<sup>25</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science. An auto-critique from a quantum perspective," in Guzzini, S., Leander, A. 2006. *Constructivism and International Relations. Alexander Wendt and his critics*. New York: Routledge, p. 182.

foreign policy, themed the subatomic-quantum level of analysis. Essentially, as Lacan's symbolic-interactionist turn in psychoanalysis transformed our understanding of psychology and the individual's linguistic relation to his or her physical reality, Wendt's eventual foray into the quantum consciousness hypothesis is not as antithetical as some would have believed. Taken in relation with Alfred Whitehead's process philosophy, a quantum theory of international relations does in some way follow naturally from the constructivist project and could potentially explain anomalies in state behaviour that currently defy our best rational attempts to understand agency in international politics. Thus, although the three analyses of South African foreign policy toward Europe could be read separately from one another, such a reading would be simplistic at best. *A fortiori*, the coherence of the analysis lies in the interplay between the three dimensions.

Empiric evidence to support my philosophical argumentation is sourced mainly from the most recent policy document on South African foreign policy, being the Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy: Final Version. It is important to note that, in spite of its repeated promises to do so, the post-apartheid South African government has never officially issued a White Paper on its foreign policy other than the Draft which is analysed in this paper. The empirical method thus comprises a manual qualitative discourse analysis, based on an interpretative reading of the policy document as a South African discourse on its foreign policy. For the sake of validity, though not totally eliminating bias of interpretation, I will support some of my most important assumptions with references to other discourses by South African elites in the field of international relations, focusing on key discourses issued between 2011 and 2014 because of the historical importance of this time period for South Africa's relations notably with Europe. These discourses further provide an important source of contextualisation of the South African political reality to a reader unfamiliar with South Africa's foreign relations, often providing additional support for interpretations of tacit positions in the Draft White Paper as these discourses generally leave aside some of the diplomatic niceties of euphemism in addressing tensions with Europe or the global North. Nonetheless, without any real ambition to enter too deep into the murky waters of South African party politics, supporting discourses are included solely for the purposes stated here and will not be discussed at length. Official declarations made during bilateral state visits *et cetera* are excluded because the use of diplomatic language renders any attempt at analysis of these statements fruitless.

# Black on white: Exposing South Africa's foreign policy

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If Garth le Pere laments *South African Foreign Policy Review's* "tour d'horizon" character,<sup>26</sup> Chris Landsberg is vindicated in his claim that "[i]n South Africa, there is a tendency on the part of many analysts and scholars to [...] remind us of *what is wrong* with foreign policy before telling us *what the actual policy is*."<sup>27</sup> Insofar as foreign policy is and remains a form of public policy, we may borrow from public policy analysis, notably from discursive institutionalism,<sup>28</sup> the idea that discourse may reveal to the political scientist or policy analyst interesting nuances concerning the policy making process and the factors that underlie decisions. Discourse is interesting to the social scientist exactly because it seems to reflect a collection of symbols, some kind of subjective impulse derived from the metaphysical state of the unconscious.<sup>29</sup> Recalling the Lacanian premise concerning the importance of the symbol for the relationship that the individual maintains with the outside world as a bridge between *ego* and *alter*, language as a collection of symbols becomes the means through which the individual (or the group - *us*) locates itself in reality.<sup>30</sup> Could policy documents, however, be treated as discourses? Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault as the grandfather of discourse analysis, Sharp and Richardson remark that "discourses are manifest in 'policy rhetoric, documents, plans or programmes, but also in institutional structures, practices and events.'"<sup>31</sup> As Landsberg hypothesises, a look at the *actual* South African foreign policy documents as primary texts may well be the sole manner in which to identify and compare the ways in which South African foreign policy is operationalised and implemented.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Le Pere, G. "South African Foreign Policy Review...", in *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, *op. cit.* p. 164.

<sup>27</sup> Landsberg in Landsberg *et al.* 2012. *op. cit.* p. 2.

<sup>28</sup> See notably Schmidt, V. A. "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse," in *Annual Review of Political Science*, Volume 11, June 2008, pp. 303-326.

<sup>29</sup> See Stenner, P. "Q methodology as a constructivist method," in *Operant Subjectivity: The international journal of Q methodology*. Vol 32, No. 1, 2009, pp. 46-69.

<sup>30</sup> See notably Stavrakakis, Y. 1999. *Lacan & the Political*. Etats Unis et Canada: Routledge.

<sup>31</sup> Sharp, L., Richardson, T. "Reflections on Foucauldian discourse analysis in planning and environmental policy research," quoted in Hewitt, S. *Discourse Analysis and Public Policy Research*. Centre for Rural Economy Discussion Paper Series No. 24, October 2009, p. 11.

<sup>32</sup> Landsberg in Landsberg *et al.* 2012. *op. cit.* p. 2.

As its trendy qualifier as "schizophrenic" suggests, attempting to analyse South African foreign policy from within the neat confines of scholarly empiricism is the cognitive equivalent of whiplash however, it is this very "flaw" that also lends the policy its virtue as subject of academic analysis. In the brief outline of South African foreign policy that follows, I propose an overview of the country's 2011 Draft White Paper<sup>33</sup> entitled *Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu*,<sup>34</sup> by three sub-sections. The first section will attempt to determine and outline the ideology and sources underlying South African foreign policy and should serve to trace the outlines of the psychological factors that drive South African foreign policy. The second section will summarise the objectives and goals of the South African government, which will serve as an interesting guide for later analysis on the real output or implementation of the policy. The third section seeks to list the concrete actions, including the government's strategies and institutions, through which the policy is deemed to become operational. It should be kept in mind that this section does not set itself the goal of discussing the foreign policy in depth, as the actual discussion will follow in the coming chapters. Nor should the reader expect to find value judgements or normative prescriptions for future foreign policy action as, quite simply, it is not the vocation of the scholar to make policy recommendations. Rather, the aim of the analysis is just that - to describe what is observed and to attempt to find the causal relationships that explain policy choices with the aim of understanding future hypothetical courses of action.

### **i. Written in history and in the present: Sources of South African foreign policy**

With a foreword, a preamble and an introduction, there is no shortage of opportunities to trace the underlying ideologies and sources of South African foreign policy. Even if the excessive introductory sections had been missing, one would not have to look far to get to the essence of the policy: The very first line of the introductory paragraph of the foreword contextualises the South African *Weltanschauung*

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<sup>33</sup> Acknowledging the desirability of sourcing official legislation rather than draft or proposition policy documents, it is perhaps telling of South African foreign policy that the Department of International Relations and Cooperation has never released a final White Paper. As a matter of fact, the "Final Draft" here analysed appeared on the government website apparently overnight without any formal notification or communication. Nonetheless, the Final Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy is currently the best source available to scholars and diplomats alike.

<sup>34</sup> Government of the Republic of South Africa. 2011. *Building a better world: The diplomacy of Ubuntu*. White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy. Final Draft. Pretoria: Government Communication and Information System.

as a product of its "liberation history." And this theme would continue to appear and reappear throughout the quasi-totality of the White Paper, when it recalls the centrality of the 1955 Bandung Conference to its foreign relations,<sup>35</sup> the prioritisation of "an Afro-centric foreign policy rooted in national liberation, the quest for African renewal, and efforts to negate the legacy of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism,"<sup>36</sup> or its commitment to the pursuit of "democracy within the international system of governance."<sup>37</sup>

Thus it is, according to the Paper, that South Africa's values and national interests - "deeply rooted in the long years of struggle for liberation"<sup>38</sup> - are not only derived from but also inscribed in the country's Freedom Charter and its progressive 1996 Constitution. In accordance with the values espoused in these sources of the South African national identity and its consequent interests, decisions are made on the basis of the nation's "desire for a just, humane and equitable world order of greater security, peace, dialogue and economic justice [that] promotes cooperation over competition and collaboration over confrontation."<sup>39</sup> Moreover, the country views its commitment to human rights, social justice, equality, peace and liberty as "a universal goal, based on the principle of Batho Pele (putting people first)."<sup>40</sup> If South Africa approaches international relations with an imperative of respect for all nations, peoples, and cultures<sup>41</sup> it considers that its "destiny is inextricably linked to that of the Southern African region."<sup>42</sup> Having internalised the view that "[s]ince 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing the values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment," issues that most directly affect the African continent if not the global south as a whole, the South African elite has adopted a "unique approach"<sup>43</sup> as the voice of the marginalised and oppressed not only in Africa, but across the global south and the rest of the world.

Politics is not purely ideological, however, and South Africa is fortunately aware of it. Thus the government identifies seven "drivers and trends [...] that significantly influence

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<sup>35</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* Foreword, p. 3.

<sup>36</sup> *ibid.* p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>38</sup> *ibid.* p. 10.

<sup>39</sup> *idem.*

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.* p. 4.

<sup>41</sup> *idem.*

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.* p. 20.

<sup>43</sup> Let us recall the mention of South African exceptionalism in the foregoing literature review.

world affairs and will therefore play an important role in determining how South Africa conducts its international relations,"<sup>44</sup> being:

1. A steady demographic growth that puts increased pressure on vital resources, thus creating the risk of social and political instability;
2. The realignment of economic power distribution globally that may result in greater instances of protectionism and competitive rivalry in the attempt to protect vested power interests;
3. Scientific and technological innovation as a key driver of change that challenges the Nation-State by easing the flow of information, ideas and capital across national borders. As much as these innovations may bring benefits, they may also be exploited with malicious intent, thus posing a new type of national security threat;
4. New media technologies that create greater interdependence but also facilitates convergence that may be used to further development agendas but that also renders states more vulnerable to new transnational threats;
5. Climate change as a threat to all aspects of human development through the continued challenges that they pose to food, water and energy security in addition to global social and economic systems;
6. A heightened demand for scarce resources that may, through the use of energy diplomacy and resource nationalism, contribute to increased tensions between states;
7. The changing nature of conflict and insecurity that impact on the socio-economic and political landscapes of countries.

To briefly summarise the foregoing *exposé* of the ideologies that characterise South African foreign policy, South Africa as a young democracy, having struggled for decades if not centuries to gain autonomy and respect as a sovereign state, remains committed to "the cause" of human rights, dignity, equality, justice, respect and freedom not only for itself and its own people, but for all the people of the world. As such, it remembers the support received from other members of the international community throughout its struggle for liberation from colonial-, post-colonial and white minority rule and commits itself to "pay it forward" to assist nations in need of similar forms of aid or assistance. Moreover, in keeping with its Africanist philosophy of *Ubuntu* - "the idea that we affirm

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<sup>44</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 12.

our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others"<sup>45</sup> - South Africa has effectively made itself into the Nelson Mandela of global civil society. Moreover, these agent-specific ideologies combine with transformations of the international political sphere as well as local pressure to address domestic issues. It is interesting to now see how these values and conceptions of South Africa in international relations translate into policy objectives.

## **ii. Changing the world, one selfless-selfish act at a time: South African foreign policy objectives**

Having once established the sources of South African foreign policy, or the drivers of the public action as the White Paper refers to them (and certainly before there can be any action,) it is essential to look at the objectives that the foreign policy actors set themselves if we are to have an idea of the factors that shape these actors' behaviour in the international sphere. Keeping in mind the foregoing sub-section, South African foreign policy, according to the Draft White Paper,

*"draws on the spirit of internationalism, pan-Africanism, South-South solidarity; the rejection of colonialism and other forms of oppression; the quest for the unity and economic, political and social renewal of Africa; the promotion of poverty alleviation around the world; and the opposition to the structural inequality and abuse of power in the global system."*<sup>46</sup>

Concretely, these imperatives translate into the explicit global policy objective of promoting the wellbeing, development and upliftment of its people and of the people of the world,<sup>47</sup> achieved in sum or in part by<sup>48</sup>

1. Positioning itself in the global political sphere as an influential actor by taking on a leading role in relevant international bodies;
2. Contributing to the transformation of the global order to reflect greater equality among sovereign states by pushing for the reform of existing international bodies such as the UNSC, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank;

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<sup>45</sup> *ibid.* p. 4.

<sup>46</sup> *ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>47</sup> *ibid.* p. 10.

<sup>48</sup> *ibid.* pp. 7-20.



3. Transforming the global system of governance from a power-based to a rules-based system by calling for greater accountability of states to international regulatory bodies;
4. Promoting greater security, peace, dialogue and economic justice through multilateralism in global political fora such as the United Nations (UN), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77+China (G77+China), the Commonwealth;
5. Eradicating poverty and ending the marginalisation of the poor by ensuring the prosperity of the country, its region and continent through socio-economic and human development;
6. Negating the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism notably through Africa's economic development;
7. Protecting of the planet for future generations through international actions against climate change;

If these policy objectives are stated explicitly in the Draft White Paper, certain policy objectives remain implicit or even tacit, and it is these tacit policy objectives that are more interesting to our analysis of the South African foreign policy because they embody the South African predicament in international relations. In the first sentence of the second paragraph of the foreword, right below the introductory paragraph stating that South Africa is "an integral part of the African continent [...] intrinsically linked to Africa's stability, unity and prosperity," South Africa declares unashamedly its aspirations "to become a winning nation in the coming decades of the 21st century,"<sup>49</sup> though it fails to further qualify what exactly it means to be "a winning nation." Luckily we have 33 more pages from which to try to construct an idea of what makes a nation a winning one, and on the eighth page of the Paper mention is made of South Africa's as the largest and most developed economy on the continent, with certain sectors comparable to that of the developed world.<sup>50</sup> Some ten pages later we get a first glimpse of a more tenacious international actor than what we have seen in the first eighteen pages of the White Paper, when we learn that

*"South Africa's vision for 2025 is to be a successful and influential member of the international community, supported by a globally competitive economy [with the*

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<sup>49</sup> *ibid.* p. 3.

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.* p. 8.

capacity to] *maximise their influence by playing a leading role both on specific issues and within their regions.*"<sup>51</sup>

How, then does one grow the economy and maximise influence? The answer is ready and waiting in the next paragraph where the South African government declares its intentions to "take advantage of the next group of high growth economies, including key economies in Africa and Latin America." Furthermore, the Paper mentions that evolutions in the international political economy "could see the emergence of other regional economic centres, with aspirations for regional influence and leadership [that would pose] challenges to South Africa's regional leadership position,"<sup>52</sup> while it laments the negative impact of other international socio-economic evolutions on stability in the region.<sup>53</sup> What we are thus left to deduce from these diplomatic euphemisms is that hidden within the core of its altruistic "Nelson Mandela foreign policy," South Africa is looking to strategically maximise its soft power in such a way that it gains greater influence not only regionally but also internationally and, ultimately, to accumulate greater wealth and security. This deduction is not minor, and will become the central focus of the first level of analysis in the following chapter. Moreover, it is my hypothesis that we have in this tacit foreign policy objective the essential ingredient in South Africa's schizophrenia. The question we should really ask in this regard is :

*"Was the euphemism intentional, or are South African decision makers unaware of the competitive nature of their explicit and implicit policy objectives such that we could consider them incompatible?"*

Regrettably we can only construct intelligent guesses at the answer to this question however, I will attempt to demonstrate *why* these competing policy objectives could be written into a single legislative document of one state. Before delving into the darkest secrets of the policy however, I will briefly outline the instruments and strategies adopted to implement the policy, focusing specifically on those that concern South Africa's relations with Europe.

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<sup>51</sup> *ibid.* p. 18, emphasis added.

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.* p. 19.

<sup>53</sup> *idem.*

### iii. Machinations of implementation: The instruments and strategies of South African foreign policy

The strategies and instruments employed to implement South Africa's foreign policy could be divided into two groups that could be categorised as belonging to the inner circle of immediate impact, and another, wider circle of peripheral action and impact. Given Africa's centrality in South African foreign relations, it is hardly surprising to find the Africa strategy, or the "Africa Agenda" at the core of the machinations of its policy implementation.<sup>54</sup> Of relevance in its "Africa Agenda" is South Africa's pledge to "leverage its strategic relations with [...] the EU, to assist Africa with its socio-economic development,"<sup>55</sup> reinforcing the exceptionalist conception of South Africa as the gateway between underdeveloped, voiceless Africa and industrialised Europe. This gateway position is operationalised in the accompanying inner circle strategies of Multilateralism and Economic Diplomacy as tools for the implementation of its foreign policy. Because it is important to understand how South Africa proposes to use multilateralism and economic diplomacy as implementation tools in the quest to achieve its policy objectives, I will briefly discuss these two strategies below.

#### **Multilateralism**

If we consider the discipline of international relations as having taken form in the ruins of the post-World War world, South Africa considers the entire "global multilateral architecture" as rooted in this post-War context and, by extension unable to "adequately respond to the challenges facing an interdependent world in the 21st century [...] threatening our collective wellbeing and placing increased pressure on the global system of governance."<sup>56</sup> Thus, in order to better address the challenges of human security, environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation, development, political and economic crises, human rights, disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,<sup>57</sup> South Africa aims to achieve its objectives through the use of global political fora, notably the UN system and its organs, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the WTO Rounds, the G20, regional economic groupings like the BRICS as well as international conferences such as

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<sup>54</sup> As the instruments and strategies linked to the Africa Agenda are too vast to discuss in great detail and certainly given that these mechanisms are not of particular interest to the current analysis of South Africa's foreign relations with Europe, the interested reader is encouraged to see Draft White Paper... *op. cit.*, pp. 20-23.

<sup>55</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 23.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.* p. 24.

<sup>57</sup> *idem.*

the UNCTAD, the World Economic Forum and the World Summit for Sustainable Development. While it sees the BRICS grouping as an important driver "reshaping the global economic and political order,"<sup>58</sup> the South African government pledges to continue to push for the reform of other institutions of global governance. In this "pursuit of greater equity in decision making [and more] equitable representation of Africa on the United Nations Security Council," South Africa is driving a campaign to obtain permanent membership on the UNSC.

### **Economic Diplomacy**

The Economic Diplomacy doctrine continues much on the same trajectory as the Multilateralism strategy, calling for reform of international bodies regulating trade and commerce with the aim of achieving "a fair and equitable rules-based international trade regime that accommodates the developmental interests of developing countries."<sup>59</sup> For the most part, its Economic Diplomacy reiterates what has already been repeated a dozen or so times in the Paper however, two interesting points emerge from the doctrine. Firstly, South Africa is aware that its economic success "will determine the extent to which [it] can achieve its domestic priorities."<sup>60</sup> Moreover, in its aspirations to achieve an economy of scale able to participate competitively in the global market place,<sup>61</sup> its *Trade Policy Strategy Framework* considers the exploitation of the African market and strategic integration processes tantamount to South African economic success. Secondly, as much as South Africa aspires to compete on equal footing with the most industrialised and sophisticated economies of the world, it considers itself as yet a developing economy and, as such, a victim of its classification as an industrialised, developed economy following the WTO (GATT) Uruguay Round.<sup>62</sup> As one of the 23 original signatories to the General Agreement on Trade Tariffs (GATT) in 1948, pre-democratic South Africa already participated in the liberalising of the global economy as a developed economy prior to its suspension under the apartheid regime and upon readmission by signatory of the Marrakesh agreement in 1994, once again accepted the obligations of a developed economy under the policies of the WTO.<sup>63</sup> Thus, South Africa endeavours under its

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<sup>58</sup> *ibid.* p. 26.

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.* p. 27.

<sup>60</sup> *idem.*

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.* pp. 27-28.

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.* p. 27.

<sup>63</sup> A more in-depth discussion of this fascinating aspect of South African foreign relations falls outside of the scope of this paper. However, the interested reader is encouraged to see Soko, M. "Thrown in at

Economic Diplomacy strategy to "ensure that the outcome [of the WTO Doha Round] is beneficial to its economy and remedies the negative consequences of its classification in the Uruguay Round."<sup>64</sup>

To refer to discourses of African political philosophy as a way to summarise South African policies of multilateralism and economic diplomacy, the majority of the most relevant African scholars consider the free market economy as having been designed *by* industrialised countries *for* industrialised countries based on their premature conceptions of global economic development. Because countries of the South are unable to compete therein based on their insufficient levels of economic development and therefore excluded from the capitalist system and marginalised by default, the current global economic architecture represents a structural violence against Africa.<sup>65</sup> Being the self-appointed voice of marginalised Africa that still struggles under the burden of neo-colonialism and the legacies of past injustices, South Africa is the global power leading Africa to true freedom. Nowhere is this ideology more relevant than in South Africa's foreign policy toward Europe.

### **The Europe Strategy**

Europe is far from sub-Saharan Africa, confirmed by the peripheral position that it occupies in South African foreign policy. Yet, the Euro-South African relationship is a curious and rich case for the policy analyst because of the tensions inherent to South Africa's Europe strategy. From the very introduction to its Europe strategy, it is clear that Europe "remains an important source of foreign direct investment and official development assistance into South Africa, as well as a primary market for tourism."<sup>66</sup> As such, and keeping in mind its commitment to the Africa Agenda, South Africa approaches its relations with Europe strategically, ready to

*"leverage its strategic partnerships with the EU and its major member states to meet its domestic priorities, open up market opportunities, attract increased*

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the deep end: South Africa and the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, 1986-1994," in *Politeia*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2009. Pretoria: Unisa Press.

<sup>64</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 27, emphasis added.

<sup>65</sup> See Coetzee, P.H. "Later Marxist morality: Its relevance for Africa's post-colonial situation" ; Morube, M.F. "Globalization and the African Renaissance: An ethical reflection"; and Ramose, M.B. "Globalization and ubuntu", in Coetzee, P.H. and Roux, A.P.J. 2002. *Philosophy from Africa: A text with readings*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa.

<sup>66</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 31.

*foreign direct investment, and support the AU's peace and security initiatives [and] advancing economic development in Africa."*<sup>67</sup>

All of one page of the Draft White Paper is dedicated to South Africa's relations with the European Union, with which it claims to share values around democracy and human rights. Its immediate objectives to "encourage European partners to be engaged in the development of the African continent [...] as well as push for the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)" are deemed to be achieved through not only the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership under the "more coherent and effective" Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and which is, according to the Draft White Paper, based on the existing Joint Action Plan, but also through global dialogue platforms such as the G20.<sup>68</sup> The last paragraph of the European Strategy is perhaps a good characterisation of the relationship between these two polities:

*"The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership [...] includes institutional and financial support for the AU and its institutions [and] provides both an opportunity and a challenge for South Africa to engage with the EU."*<sup>69</sup>

In a word, South Africa's relationship with the European Unions "is all about money." And it is this conclusion that will thematically reappear throughout the course of this paper. This conclusion, then, serves to introduce the theoretical analysis of South African foreign policy as it embodies the tension between the moralistic aspirations of South Africa as the Nelson Mandela of global civil society, but particularly as Africa's great liberator, and the physical limitations of a less industrialised economy in a world ruled by the religion of money.

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<sup>67</sup> *idem.*

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.* p. 32.

<sup>69</sup> *idem.*

# A three-level approach to South African foreign relations

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## The material-positivist approach

*"We are not a great power, and therefore our foreign policy costume, as it were, should be cut according to our cloth."*

- Former South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo<sup>70</sup>

To borrow from esteemed French political analyst and research associate at the *Institut de relations internationales et strategiques*, Dr. Eddy Fougier, theories of international relations have nationalities - or at least *regionalities*.<sup>71</sup> Some theories are simply more relevant to the analysis of the actions of certain regions or even to some countries in international relations while others would be "an ill fit." While it is true, for instance, that (neo)realism may have become somewhat redundant to IR analysts specialising in the foreign relations of the European Union because intergovernmentalist-, functionalist or even liberal democratic theory describes and explains their approaches to foreign policy more satisfactorily, realism remains a pertinent theory for analyses of the foreign relations of the United States of America. After all, neorealism as a theory of the then-nascent discipline of international relations (if not the discipline of international relations in its quasi-entirety) originated in post-War Anglo-Saxon academic circles and owes its decidedly militaristic character to the Cold War ideology of mutually assured destruction, or the famous security dilemma.<sup>72</sup> As I will argue in this section, however, the growing complexity of political interconnectedness since the rapid rise in popularity of the phenomenon of globalisation requires a drastic widening our definition of security to include new forms such as energy- and food security, human security, economic- and

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<sup>70</sup> Quoted in Landsberg in Landsberg *et al.* 2012. *op.cit.* p. 6.

<sup>71</sup> Introductory remarks to a seminar on United States Foreign Policy held at the European Institute in Nice on Friday, 25 April 2014.

<sup>72</sup> One could, and should, note the origins of classical realism in the violent context of Renaissance Europe, where Machiavelli and Hobbes already laid the foundations for present day realist occupations with power, security and anarchy. However, I refer here to realism as the primary theory of the discipline of international relations that only came into existence concretely following the First World War.

financial security<sup>73</sup> and, in doing so, revitalising realist theories of international relations. Moreover, this section will have as its aim to demonstrate the primordial importance of realist theory for contemporary South African foreign relations, specifically its policies toward and interactions with Europe. In order to bridge the existing gap in realist conceptions of power, I suggest a combination of neo-realist theory with aspects of liberal theory however, I maintain a degree of caution in the application of liberalism particularly as pertains Democratic Peace Theory which I consider a *modus operandi* for policy implementation rather than a framework for understanding decision making in the South African case.

### **Euro-South African relations viewed from a new neorealist paradigm**

Despite its many critics, realism remains among the best theories of international relations to explain particularly the political realities of a State such as South Africa. For Donnelly,<sup>74</sup> realism has two faces: firstly, as the legacy of Machiavelli, realism is a prescriptive corpus of theories centred on the acquisition and maintenance of (absolute) power; secondly, it represents a body of explanatory theories, models and requirements aimed at facilitating the analysis of the balance of power in the anarchic configuration of international politics. In fact, Donnelly postulates that "the core of realism lies in the combination of anarchy and selfishness, and therefore, in the mandatory politics of power."<sup>75</sup> Drawing on Donnelly's<sup>76</sup> overview of realism, the theory may be summarised through the following Hobbesian dialectic:

All men are equal in the elementary sense that even the weakest can kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others. By virtue of this assumption of absolute equality among men, all of man has the legitimate hope and aspiration to achieve his own goals thus, within this conception of equal chance all men interact with others in a state of perpetual anarchy. In this context where every man is equal to any other and where he has the same legitimate claim to the equal allocation of resources as any other, man is motivated by perpetual competition, mistrust and the quest for glory.

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<sup>73</sup> This is in no way a novel approach to international relations, as Professor Susan Strange addressed these and other security interests in her four pillars of the global power structures of international political economy in the late 1980s. See most notably "*States and markets*", 2nd edition, 1988, Bloomsbury academic publishers.

<sup>74</sup> Hobbes, "*Leviathan*" (1651), cited by Donnelly, J. "Realism," in Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Nardin, T., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C. et True, J. 2009. *Theories of International Relations*. (4th edition). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 31.

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.* p. 32.

<sup>76</sup> Donnelly, *op. cit.*, in Burchill *et al.* 2009, p.34.



However, resources are limited therefore hindering the satisfaction of individual needs thus, by simple math, every man is the enemy of another.

By this logic, Hobbes describes the inevitability of war between States in this anarchic nature of international politics as a state of perpetual war interposed by periods of peace. The problem with classical (Hobbesian) realism reposes on three fundamental flaws. Firstly, written and conceived as it was within the extremely violent context of the Renaissance period of world history, realist conceptions of war and conflict suffer from a linguistic-semantic anaemia that needs to be remedied if the theory is to assist in understanding the South African foreign policy decision making process better. Secondly, Hobbes' assumption of absolute equality among states represents a fundamental fallacy that has been addressed at least in part by Waltzian structuralism but which is, by its very fallacious character, a vital aid in analysing the South African international political reality exactly because of what it fails to explain. Thirdly, owing to its conceptual context of the violent Renaissance period, realist notions of power fail to account for new types of power, as Complex Interdependency theorists will show. Nonetheless, once the realist notion of power is infused with a new meaning, its contribution to understanding the game of power politics presents an invaluable description of the reality in which South African foreign policy is elaborated. In what follows, I will discuss these three flaws of classical realism in greater detail, at each "redefinition" showing the ways in which a broadened understanding explains South African foreign policy decision-making.

### **i. Of war, conflict and capacity**

The first deficiency in realist theory lies within the linguistic-semantic domain and it is in their narrow semantic application of the concepts of power, violence and war that the liberals would find room for critique. At the time of writing, interstate wars have become the content of historical archives and it is inconceivable that we will see interstate wars again in the near future. The volatility of the anarchic international political system may well prove the assumption untrue and realists will be vindicated however, for the time being, Donnelly agrees that realist assumptions of perpetual war are simply untrue. Notwithstanding, if we were to replace the realist term "war" with a loose concept of "conflict," where conflict signifies perpetual disparity and incompatibility between the interests and aspirations of states, realism already presents a more conceptually sound approach to international relations. Furthermore, if we were to

redefine "security" and "interests" as per the power structures favoured by international political economists to include new forms of security such as human-, food-, energy-, economic and financial security among others, the realist theory of perpetual *conflict* between states aiming to maximise their security takes on an entirely different meaning and becomes relevant to contemporary IR again, and even more so for the analysis of international relations between more and less capable<sup>77</sup> states such as European *versus* African states. This is important to the case study at hand because, to refer back to the foregoing exposé of the Draft White Paper on South African foreign policy,<sup>78</sup> these three themes - *conflict*, *security* and *interest* - appear in the policy document with relative frequency.<sup>79</sup> As I have noted above, the Draft Paper identifies seven "drivers" of international politics, one of which is explicitly termed "the changing nature of conflict and security." However, in its discussion of the of these drivers, the Paper ties the totality of the "challenges" that these drivers pose the South African government to these redefined realist themes of international relations. A critical reading of the six pages dedicated to this discussion of the drivers of South African foreign policy reveals no less than fifteen concepts connected to the realist notions of security and conflict alone, being:

1. pressure;
2. risk;
3. instability;
4. insecurity;
5. vulnerability;
6. volatility;
7. exploitation;
8. malice;
9. destruction;
10. competition;
11. aggression;
12. threat;
13. unsustainability;
14. tension;
15. disruption.

These concepts take on more meaning still when compared to the results of a similar reading the Draft Paper against the premises of the liberal paradigm. We can identify ten keywords that relate either directly or contextually to a liberal worldview, being:

1. democracy;
2. liberal;
3. dialogue;
4. norms;
5. values;
6. institutions;
7. cooperation;
8. human rights;
9. rules (rules-based);
10. solidarity.

In comparison to the average (combined total) frequency of appearances of concepts with realist connotations per page, notions linked to the liberal paradigm appear nearly half as often in frequency. By far, "*cooperation*" figures most frequently of all notions (even those connected to a realist preoccupation with international relations) however, the term

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<sup>77</sup> *Capable*, here, may be replaced by "powerful" however, as I will deal with the concept and definition of power in greater detail later on, suffice it to use capable for the immediate purpose of this argument.

<sup>78</sup> See also the codified transcription of the Draft White Paper in Annexe I.

<sup>79</sup> See frequency calculations in Annexe II.

is used in direct relation with the explicitly material objectives of economic, developmental, social or financial gain rather than that of finding mutually beneficial solutions to common challenges or problems. In short, although the Draft Paper on South African foreign policy reads a little like a textbook on neoliberalism, a closer reading thereof, accompanied by a critical analysis of concepts and connotations reveal an underlying, dominant realist preoccupation with material resources, (in)security and anarchic volatility. To make a realist assumption of South African foreign policy: South Africa is definitely in the game to help its neighbours but first, it will help itself.<sup>80</sup>

Thus far, my analysis has dealt primarily with the objective aspect of the material-positivist level of analysis. If we were to conceive of the material reality as a sphere comprising many different levels, and if we imagined the objective level to be the outer level covering a more complex, more abstract physical reality, we would come to find a structural dimension of physical reality that reappears systematically throughout the South African policy discourse and that is central to understanding the policy making process. This abstract, structural dimension of the physical reality is discussed below.

## ii. The violence of asymmetry

The second great deficiency in realist theory lies within the assumption of equality between states, which is evident in the relationship of domination between more capable states (often referred to as "superpowers" or "great powers") and others that may be considered "weak" (or simply less powerful or capable.) To paraphrase the celebrated dystopian allegory *Animal Farm*, "all [states] are... equal, but some are more equal than others,"<sup>81</sup> and from former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo's quotation at the beginning of this chapter, it is clear that even South Africa is aware of its unequalness. Added to Hobbesian classical realism, then, Waltzian structuralism proposes a more moderate if not less controversial paradigm from which to approach an analysis of international relations. In the neo-realist conception of IR, the Hobbesian system of perpetual war is replaced by a system of political power games. According to Waltz,<sup>82</sup> the

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<sup>80</sup> See the discussion on "self help systems" as central to the notion of anarchy in the (neo)realist paradigm in international relations in Wendt, A. "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," in *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425 (p. 392.)

<sup>81</sup> Orwell, G. 1945. *Animal Farm*. London: Secker and Warburg.

<sup>82</sup> Waltz, KN. 1979. "Theory of International Politics" (pp. 96-107) cited by Donnelly, *op. cit.*, in Burchill *et al.* 2009. pp. 36-37.

international political sphere comprises a complex system of political structures characterized by groupings, hierarchies, by differentiation and by the distribution of capacities. States are obliged to position themselves strategically within the configuration of political structures to maximize their prospects of prosperity by way of imitation and the replication of each other's actions. For Waltz, the international political power game is essentially a series of calculated guesses concerning the actions of another state, accompanied by efforts to proportionally strengthen those resources deemed to protect its vitality in case of unfriendly or disadvantageous acts by other actors.<sup>83</sup> To better illustrate Waltz's conception of *power* in international relations, I will discuss his theory of power games by use of the *zero-sum* diagrams used for conflict studies :

Scenario I		Scenario II		Scenario III	
<i>sum</i>	<i>sum</i>	<i>sum</i>	<i>sum</i>	<i>sum</i>	<i>sum</i>
A	B	A	B	A	B
<i>zero</i>	<i>zero</i>	<i>zero</i>	<i>zero</i>	<i>zero</i>	<i>zero</i>

In the first scenario, we may accept that both States A and B have the same amount of power and are therefore both able to force their opponent's agreement in negotiation, though it is likely that they will both have to make certain concessions on their demands in order to achieve their desired result. The same holds true for scenario III, where power is symmetrical and both parties are unable to force their opponent to agree to the terms of the negotiation. What is most interesting for us, however, is the game being played out in scenario II where State A will emerge from the negotiations as the absolute winner at the overall expense of State B. Scenario II is likely to be a situation where State B, which finds itself in the zero quadrant, does not have much power (whether that be military power, the power of influence, powerful allies, strategic resources or "bargaining chips".) It is unlikely in this scenario that State A will make any concessions to accommodate State B because, quite simply, it doesn't have to. However, in international politics, State B may seek to "join forces" as it were with other powerful actors that may exert an influence over State A so as to finally force it to sacrifice its position of dominance and exploitation. And it is this ability to influence states to do something they would not have done otherwise that Waltz calls "relative power." This is no small concept for understanding South African foreign policy. In its Draft White Paper, the government

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<sup>83</sup> For illustrative purposes, see Donnelly's discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma in *op. cit.* Burchill *et al.* 2009, pp. 38-39.

recognises that it "must make key strategic decisions that will determine [its] future prosperity, standing and influence."<sup>84</sup> Although *influence* will be dealt with in great detail below, it suffices for the moment to mention the emphasis that the South African government places on *strategy*. In this context, then, it is worth noting the importance that Machiavelli attached to "strategy" as a means to attain power and to keep it.<sup>85</sup> There is also no shortage of popular linkage between "strategy" and war. If one could question the intentionality with which the term is applied by South African decision-makers, Lacanian psychoanalysis will remind us that the choice of symbol with which the subject relates to his external reality is no coincidence. Moreover, if we take a closer look at the South African "strategies" from within the paradigm of Waltz's neorealist structuralism as discussed above, South Africa is engaged in a game of power politics with other actors in the international sphere, where it seeks to establish alliances and partnerships that will ultimately reinforce its own position in international negotiations. This is particularly relevant where negotiations are held with more capable states, as South Africa will "strategically leverage" its relations and partnerships with other states to *in fine* secure the maximum amount of available resources for its own vitality.

Thus, South Africa's increasingly close relationship to the African continent, China and India in particular, and with other states of the global south to a lesser extent, may be ascribed to both its need and its desire to strengthen its strategic position within international affairs. In fact, as we have seen that South Africa does not *a priori* dispose of the economic and military resources to guarantee its bargaining power, it is not impossible to imagine that South Africa would (and indeed has) called on China or India, both of whom have recently gained importance as international counter-weights in international politics, to support its position in international negotiations with European states among others. Quite simply, South Africa is more likely to reach favourable terms on negotiations where China or India is able to exercise some degree of influence over the course of bargaining than if it were to attempt to influence the decisions of France, the United Kingdom, Germany or Italy of its own accord and by using its own resources as strategic "threats" to force a more favourable agreement. Recalling Orwell's credo, South Africa is rather less equal than other international actors and so needs to align with more equal partners to achieve the effect of "numbers." This argument extends naturally into the second conclusion that we may draw from the realist paradigm, being that South

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<sup>84</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 7.

<sup>85</sup> See, for example, Paret, P. (ed.) 1986. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. United States: Princeton University Press.

Africa is seeking to establish itself as a relevant political actor in international relations by acquiring the status of "the voice of Africa" through its Africa Agenda.<sup>86</sup>

To further qualify the neorealist conception of the arbitrary violence of structural force that has been criticised extensively by liberals, I shall briefly mention the anaemic definition of "violence" found in liberal theory. In fact, liberalism seems paralysed by a blind acceptance of violence (or force) as relating to military action solely. With reference to Johan Galtung's article *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*,<sup>87</sup> it may be said that some institutionalised norms and socio-political structures constitute a form of violence against the target of its finality that effectively denies the target access to vital services and resources. While these policies do not explicitly aim at the physical death of the target, they do contribute to the systematic deterioration of not only the physical living standards of target populations, but also of their moral and psychological wellbeing. Though some authors have since Galtung's introduction of the concept of structural violence touched on giving his hypothesis a Marxist twist of class struggle, where structural violence is most likely to affect the lower ranks of society and specifically within the context of international relations, the lesser-developed states, their arguments have either fallen outside of the scope of what would be useful for the analysis at hand,<sup>88</sup> or have been weakened by their quasi-propagandist nature.<sup>89</sup> Notwithstanding, the notion of structural violence is tantamount to an analysis of South African foreign policy because within in this context of structural violence and coercion, the attribution of development assistance and other forms of international funding or finance under the condition of undertaking comprehensive political reforms constitutes a form of violence. Because of the arbitrary requirements of reform of the existing political culture in the assisted state, the imposition of the liberal democratic model in the image of Western democracies constitute a violence in that, if the state in need of development assistance and other forms of international funding refuses the application of political reforms, international institutions and other States may refuse to make these funds available to them. And, since less economically and financially powerful states such as South Africa are unable to continue to ensure the wellbeing of their citizens without external funds, the denial or the threat of denial of funding constitutes an indirect refusal of the population's

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<sup>86</sup> DIRCO. *Strategic Plan 2012-2017*. Pretoria: GCIS, p. 8.

<sup>87</sup> Galtung, J. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," in *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol 6, No. 3. 1969, pp. 167 - 191.

<sup>88</sup> James Gilligan's *Violence: Reflections on a National Pandemic* has some promising elements of the social class dimension of structural violence however, his study is limited to the socio-economic realities of United States inmates.

<sup>89</sup> See, for instance, Kelly, P. 1984. *Fighting for Hope*. United States: South End Press.

access to vital resources. If we thus accept that this type of relationship is violent, the realist paradigm becomes once again perfectly legitimate and relevant to explain the conduct of interstate relations and sources of foreign policy decision-making. Moreover, within this context of structural violence, even soft power could constitute a violent means of influencing state action particularly given the asymmetrical post-colonial dependence between the highly industrialised European states and their lesser developed African counterparts. It is thus that we find in the South African foreign policy, almost centrally, the "opposition to colonialism [and] efforts to negate the legacy of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism [with the eventual aim to] address the injustices of our past."<sup>90</sup> More explicitly still, the Draft White Paper mentions its "opposition to the structural inequality and abuse of power in the global system."<sup>91</sup> The irony lies, though, in the fact that South Africa sees itself as a victim of this asymmetric relationship of less-and-more capable states in international relations, while rationalising its own dominant position *vis-à-vis* its neighbours through the "Nelson Mandela factor" where it proposes to use its reputation and relative power in international negotiations to advance "the African cause." This "leveraging of influence" brings us to the last central concept of realism as a paradigm from which to approach the material-positivist analysis of South African foreign policy, being *power*.

### iii. On the nature and sources of power in international relations

Literature on the nature and sources of political power is abundant and its study has been the subject of many a thesis. Therefore, my discussion of power will be brief and to the point for the case study at hand, if not somewhat simplistic. In sum, the idea is to establish what makes states do things or not do things and to what degree one or another *technique* or *strategy* is a means to an end or an end in itself. When Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" in 1990 with his book entitled *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, the actual term for the opposite of soft power, "hard power" was almost automatically born. Although most definitions of power are inspired from the Machiavellian-Hobbesian tradition of military force or coercion,<sup>92</sup> and

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<sup>90</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* pp. 3-7.

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>92</sup> The reader is referred to Machiavelli's classic work "The Prince," as well as to Morgenthau's seminal 1948 publication *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. See also, Arendt, H. 1970. *On Violence*. United States: Harcourt Brace & Company; and Arendt, H. 1973. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. United States: Harcourt Brace & Company.

keeping in mind my foregoing reconceptualisation of realist theory to include a broader definition of power, violence and conflict, I will rely on Joseph Nye's outline of hard and soft power in his 2006 lecture at Harvard University entitled *Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership*.<sup>93</sup>

For Nye, hard power extends beyond the use or threat of use of military force to include other tools of the "carrots and sticks" strategy used by states to influence the actions of other states in international relations. Supported by Thomas Schelling's thought,<sup>94</sup> Nye notes that "[i]nducements, rewards and bonuses are more pleasant to receive than threats, but the hint of their removal can constitute an effective threat."<sup>95</sup> Accordingly, Nye posits that hard power includes all forms of incitement to a certain action, usually in the form of military threat and the threat of imposing economic sanctions (intimidation) that could also include manipulation by structural incentives such as side-payments or the threat of withdrawal of aid or assistance in the case of a state in need of this assistance. This is important not only because the word "power" appears in the Draft White Paper with relative frequency, but more importantly because it makes its appearance in the context of a system of global governance in dire need of reform because of tendency to "structural inequality and abuse of power,"<sup>96</sup> after which it is employed almost exclusively in connection with the global trend to a redistribution of economic power where "the new emerging powers have pursued alternative models of development consistent with their own cultural norms."<sup>97</sup> Recalling the foregoing exploration of structural violence, South Africa's warning that it would continue to "caution against Official Development Assistance (ODA) being used to impede African unity and solidarity"<sup>98</sup> is explained sufficiently by the notion of economic incentive being used in Nye's thinking as a form of threat aimed at influencing state agency. And, once we can tie *power*, in this case economic power, to *threat*, we have returned to a realist conception of international relations. Even though one could perhaps argue that South Africa's aspirations for the

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<sup>93</sup> Available online :

[http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11\\_06\\_06\\_seminar\\_Nye\\_HP\\_SP\\_Leadership.pdf](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.pdf), last accessed on 03/05/2014 at 11h22.

<sup>94</sup> Nye neglects to cite the source of Schelling's quotation.

<sup>95</sup> *ibid.* p. 3.

<sup>96</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* pp. 7-11.

<sup>97</sup> *ibid.* p. 14.

<sup>98</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* pp. 20. Though I will not have the occasion to discuss the South African position on Development Assistance in greater detail, I shall refer the reader to Dembisa Moyo's influential work "*Dead Aid*" (2009) that introduces the imperative of "*more trade, less aid*," a notion that has become almost a stockpile of South African rhetoric on the topic of development assistance and which informs its reorientation of trade and commerce toward the South in an attempt to free itself of its trade dependence on European markets for exports. On this point, see the Draft White Paper, pp. 13-14; 18-23; 26-29.



power of influence in Africa is best described or explained using the liberal paradigm, it is worth noting that, unlike its defensive position toward European "hard power" of coercion to agency through economic incentive, South Africa's quest for the power of influence is an output of its foreign policy. To return to my introductory remarks on the objective of this paper, I am not seeking to simply describe the tools and outputs of South African foreign policy. Rather, the aim of the paper is identify the causal factors that contribute to South African foreign policy making. Thus, for the purposes of understanding the "why" of South Africa's Europe strategy, we need to concede that the policy is conceived from within the offensive-defensive strategic power game of Waltzian neorealism.

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To summarise the most important assumptions of the foregoing discussion of the theoretical approach appropriate to the material-positivist level of analysis of South African foreign policy toward Europe, we note that South Africa is engaged in fierce competition with Europe for a share in scarce resources, thus constituting a state of perpetual conflict, although the conflict cannot be seen as physically violent or military. Because it is relatively less powerful than its European counterparts and therefore at a strategic disadvantage in its relations with Europe who may attempt to influence South African agency in international relations by material incitation (carrots), itself a form of coercion (sticks) because South Africa is not in a position to refuse political conditions attached to the release of vital external funds, South African international relations resemble a Waltzian offensive-defensive strategic power game. Within this neorealist conception of power games, South Africa as a relatively weaker State may seek to establish strategic partnerships with politico-economically stronger states such as China and India in an attempt to counter-balance the structurally unequal distribution of relative power in international relations and ultimately, to ensure a stronger position in multilateral negotiations with the aim of obtaining a maximum share of scarce resources. Moreover, South Africa may experience the "imposition" of the European political model over its own political culture through political reforms attached to international funding as conditions for access to these vital funds as a form of violence, therefore reacting defensively in a manner to preserve its political and cultural integrity.

From these concluding remarks arises two interesting concepts: Firstly, to paraphrase one of my former professors of political sociology, Dr. Boris Gobilie, one cannot tell a victim that he or she is a victim, and by extension suffering his or her situation, if the person does not *perceive* his or her reality as causing him or her suffering.<sup>99</sup> Reality is, for all intents and purposes, perceptive. Thus, South Africa's foreign policy is the product of a perceptive experience that causes it. Secondly, its perceptive experience of the international political sphere will determine how South Africa *identifies* with its external reality and therefore determine its internal reality. To borrow from Kantian epistemology, any will to action is born from a synthesis of *a priori* and *a posteriori* manifolds of knowledge.<sup>100</sup> The two key words of this paragraph being *perception* and *identity*, both products of social interaction, we cannot claim an understanding of South African foreign policy making until we have passed through the cognitive-constructivist level of analysis.

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<sup>99</sup> Remarks during a seminar on Political Conflict and Extreme Violence held at the *Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS) de Lyon* from March to May 2013.

<sup>100</sup> See a discussion of Immanuel Kant's "Transcendental unity of apperception" by Pereboom, D. "Kant's Transcendental Arguments," in Zalta, E. N. (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition.)

## The cognitive-constructivist approach

"As we engage with the world, let us radiate our collective heritage of humility, of hard-work, of selflessness of warmth, of human dignity and of love for our country."

- Maite Nkoane Mashabane, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa<sup>101</sup>

Constructivism emerged in the 1990s as the *wunderkind* of international relations theory, establishing itself as one of the core theories of the discipline within the microscopic space of 20 years. Born from decades of academic infighting between the dominant positivist schools, social constructivism proposed alternatives where the aforementioned theories had fallen short. Recalling the paradigm shifts that accompanied the structuralist turn, contemporary political science tended to a negation of the positivist conception of atomic selfish political actors in favour of the assumption that political actors, like any other person, "are fundamentally social beings and their identities and interests are socially constructed [...] products of their intersubjective social structures."<sup>102</sup> Inspired by the interpretative meta-theory of the critical school, constructivists made a successful appeal for the incorporation of identity theories into international political analysis. However, the eventual aim of the project "goes all the way down"<sup>103</sup> in that it attempts to rise to "to arrive at a study of human discourse and practices beyond the limiting structures of international relations theory [by] incorporating in their scientific project the concept of the human being as involved in social life, constructed through communication and reinforced by culture."<sup>104</sup> Indeed, Wendt holds that identity (and by extension, interests) is essentially an "inherently social" conception of the *ego* through a complex process of *differentiation-identification* that,

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<sup>101</sup> "Message from the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mme Maite Nkoane-Mashabane," in Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa. 2012. *Strategic Plan 2010-2013*. Pretoria: Government Communication and Information System.

<sup>102</sup> Reus-Smit, C. "Constructivism", in Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Nardin, T., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., True, J. 2009. *Theories of International Relations*. (4th ed.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 212-235. This notion should [1871] ) as well as Popper's three worlds (see *Three Worlds. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values*, delivered at the University of Michigan, 1978.)

<sup>103</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as a Cartesian Science. An auto-critique from a quantum perspective", in Guzzini, S., Leander, A. (eds.) 2005. *Constructivism and International Relations*. United States: Routledge.

<sup>104</sup> Reus-Smit in Bruchill *et al.* 2009. *Theories of International Relations*. *op. cit.* p. 219.

outside of the social context, has no meaning or importance.<sup>105</sup> Wendt summarises the central assumption of the constructivist approach when he notes that "each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world."<sup>106</sup> Often enough it is easier to explain something by what it is not than by what it is and, as we have the luxury of having dealt with the positivist worldview of international relations in the previous section, I will borrow from French political scientist Yves Schemeil<sup>107</sup> a characterisation of the paradigmatic differences between the positivist and humanist theories of international relations to introduce this section on constructivist theory.

*Theoretical characterisations of the world*

<b>Realist and rationalist notions</b>	<b>Institutionalist and constructivist notions</b>
Imperative	Morality
Security	Equity
Caution	Trust
Efficiency	Justice
Power	Growth
Honour	Wisdom
Glory	Reserve
Liberty	Solidarity

To once again reinforce the argument that we need to approach an analysis of South African foreign policy from at least a realist and a constructivist paradigm, the quasi-totality of these notions are found in these exact same words throughout the Draft White Paper on South African foreign policy. If the ongoing academic debate between positivists and humanists can be essentialised to a "chicken or egg" debate on the interactions and impacts of structure on agency or *vice versa*,<sup>108</sup> the interdependent and interactive nature of this structure-agent relationship is neither contested nor challenged.

<sup>105</sup> Wendt, A. "Anarchy is what states make of it..." *op.cit.* p. 398.

<sup>106</sup> *idem.*

<sup>107</sup> Schemeil, Y. 2012. *Introduction à la science politique. Objets, méthodes, résultats* (2ème édition). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz. p. 344 (own translation.)

<sup>108</sup> See particularly Dale Copeland's comprehensive review of Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*, "The constructivist challenge to structural realism," as well as Drulak's exploration of "Reflexivity and structural change" in Guzzini *et al.* 2005. *op. cit.* pp. 1-20; and pp. 140-159.

Although I will deal with the exact moment of interaction between these two forces of international politics in greater detail in the next section, we may momentarily accept Wendt's premise that decision makers "act [...] on the basis of the meanings that [situations] have for them."<sup>109</sup> As noted in the final phrase of the previous section, interaction is born from *ideas* or *perceptions* inasmuch as the actor first has to perceive his or her reality and to situate the *self* therein before he or she can act. To this end, we may present a breakdown of social action and interaction in Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* as per the following schema taken from Zehfuss's important work on reality in constructivism:<sup>110</sup>

1. *Ego*, informed by its interpretation of the situation, engages in a process of signalling to *alter* what role *ego* will play in the interaction as well as the role that it envisages for *alter*;
2. *Alter* interprets the meaning of *ego*'s signals from within the context of its own interpretation or perception of the situation and
3. *alter* returns its own signals to *ego*;
4. *Ego* responds.

This process Berger and Luckmann<sup>111</sup> refer to as "reciprocal typification," or repeated interactive processes through which stable identities and expectations about each other are developed. Departing from this psychosocial understanding of identity formation, we are obliged to look at reality as a perceptive experience of the social world in order to determine the ways in which this process impacts on the ontology of identity and finally how these processes affect or determine agency. Having explored the material or exogenous reality of the South Africa's international relations particularly with Europe in the previous chapter, the objective of this chapter will be to determine how South African identity is shaped *vis-à-vis* the "reality out there," and how this identity determines its relations with and its foreign policy toward Europe.

## **i. Realities as perceptive experiences**

Following the influential contributions of the Berlin School to the branch of psychology that would eventually come to be known as Gestalt psychology, which draws on the work of Hume, Kant and Goethe among others, reality can be viewed

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<sup>109</sup> Wendt, A. "Anarchy is what states make of it..." *op. cit.* pp. 396-397.

<sup>110</sup> Zehfuss, M. 2002. *Constructivism in International Relations. The politics of reality.* Cambridge Studies in International Relations 83. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 41-43.

<sup>111</sup> Berger, P. L., Luckmann, T. 1966. "The Social Construction of Reality", in Zehfuss, M. 2002. *Constructivism in International Relations... op. cit.* p. 43.

as a neuropsychological synthesis of a number of "parts" or ingredients that coexist within the greater whole.<sup>112</sup> The importance of Gestalt to constructivist theory is particularly evident in Wendt's process of social signalling since perception is, to the psychologists of the Berlin School, nothing more nor less than the brain's efforts to collect *and* synthesise information from its external environment.<sup>113</sup> Wendt's line of thought in "Anarchy" however introduces the idea that finally reality *is* "fundamentally intersubjective." More interesting still is the natural extension of this understanding of reality as a social construct based on the subjective experience of the external world into the inevitability of multiple realities. If reality is indeed a subjective experience of the world, and if each actor arrives on the international political scene with his/her own *Weltanschauung*, then the international political sphere will at any given time consist of multiple subjective realities.<sup>114</sup> The existence of multiple competing realities among actors in the international political sphere already complicates any analysis of foreign policy decision making almost irreconcilably. However, as Maja Zehfuss would go on to argue in *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*, reality will by virtue of the intricacy of the immeasurable amount of interactions between actors "take on multiple forms simultaneously within the same actor."<sup>115</sup> To state her conclusion differently, one actor will not have one reality that is different to that of another, but will at any time live a multitude of realities in him or herself. Thus, if Putnam's two level game seemed at some point in the history of International Relations theory a splendidly complex analysis of foreign policy making and multilateral negotiation, the constructivist turn adds not two or three mere dimensions of complication to the analysis, but an almost un-surmountable corpus of factors that will influence decision making as we are no longer simply required to take into consideration inter- and intrastate interactions and their implications for the construction of social reality, but also the level of the individual actor and his psychology. The pages of this dissertation will not be enough to consider South African foreign policy in such great detail thus, as much as we accept the importance of the domestic- and individual levels of foreign policy making as a constitutive aspects of South African identity, I will in this paper focus solely on the

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<sup>112</sup>After Kurt Koffka's statement that "the whole is *other* than its parts." See Heider, G. M. "More about Hull and Koffka," in *American Psychologist*, Vol. 32(5), May 1977.

<sup>113</sup> See also Humphrey, G. "The psychology of the gestalt," in *Journal of Educational Psychology*, Vol. 15(7), 1924, pp. 401-412.

<sup>114</sup> Although this concept is treated by a handful of scholars, notably outside of the IR sphere, the concept of reality in relation to constructivism is only treated explicitly in Zehfuss, M. 2002. *Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>115</sup> Wendt, A. *Social Theory... op. cit.* p. 230, quoted by Zehfuss, M. "Constructivism and identity. A dangerous liaison," in Guzzini *et. al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 99.

notion of collective identity though focusing the discussion of South African identity through the lenses of the state as a person.<sup>116</sup>

To return to the Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, we could situate the government's perceptions of its political reality or realities within the three "images" or international systems that Alexander Wendt identifies in *Anarchy is what states make of it*, being 1. A competitive Hobbesian system, where states identify negatively with one another because of a realist preoccupation where relative gains and losses makes collective action impossible as it inspires constant fear and suspicion; 2. An individualistic Lockean system, where states are indifferent to security relations because they consider security their own concern and aim to maximise absolute gains through mutually beneficial collective action; and 3. A cooperative Kantian system, where states identify positively with one another because security is considered a collective responsibility due the a quasi-assimilation between *ego* and "we." By way of a minor simplification of the South African spheres of reality for the reasons mentioned above, one could conceive of South African reality as four spheres. The first would correspond to the sphere of international relations in the broadest sense, where 190 odd sovereign states conduct their politics simultaneously, and could be likened to Wendt's competitive Hobbesian security system. The second would correspond to the sphere of regional politics, encompassing different regional groupings like the BRICS, or the African Union, comparable to Wendt's individualistic Lockean system. The third sphere would correspond to South Africa's relations with the rest of continental Africa, and could be likened to Wendt's cooperative Kantian security system. The fourth sphere falls somewhere within all of Wendt's security systems, and concerns the domestic political reality. As I have already mentioned, the domestic sphere will not be discussed in great detail here, nor will the second sphere of regional politics. It suffices to take note of the complex coexistence of at least four different realities for South Africa as a single state, to which one could add even more realities if one were to venture into the personal realities of each individual decision maker or other "stakeholders" as it were. What is of greatest importance here is to understand how South Africa places itself in the international sphere where it will interact with Europe and then to consider how its identity is constructed consequently.

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<sup>116</sup> After Wendt's watershed article "The state as person in international theory," in *Review of international studies*, Vol. 30, 2004, pp. 289-316. See also Wendt, A. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, No. 67,) pp. 215-224.

As I have shown in the previous chapter, South Africa perceives the international political environment as violent, volatile and vicious. This reality is characterised by power games, exploitation, injustice, a lack of consideration for human dignity and the right to a good life, malice and aggression. Its perception of the international sphere as inherently dangerous and inhumane is evidenced not only in the keywords highlighted in the previous chapter, but also in the government's self-professed commitment to shaping "a better world,"<sup>117</sup> by fighting to "end the marginalisation of the poor"<sup>118</sup> and opposing "structural inequality and abuse of power in the global system."<sup>119</sup> The violent and oppressive nature of the international political sphere leaves "vulnerable" South Africa with "a limited voice."<sup>120</sup> Moreover, the legacy of colonialism and the heritage of a global system ruled by the great powers of yesteryear has not only underdeveloped Africa and South Africa, but has created *in fine* exploitative relationships of dependence that continue to contribute to structural inequalities. To perhaps summarise South Africa's perception of the international political reality, the government considers that

*"Our struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with our pursuit of a better Africa in a better world."*<sup>121</sup>

By contrast, the country's domestic and continental or even regional realities and relationships are characterised by a like-minded approach to international politics where humanity takes primacy over power and material wealth<sup>122</sup> and where the principles of human dignity, equality and freedom<sup>123</sup> find expression in "acts of selfless solidarity."<sup>124</sup> The concluding phrase of the Draft White Paper exemplifies and embodies the South African perception of its various realities when it notes

*"In an uncertain world, characterised by a competition of values, South Africa's diplomacy of Ubuntu, focusing on our common humanity, provides an inclusive and constructive world view to shape the evolving global order."*<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 4; p. 20.

<sup>118</sup> *ibid.* p.7

<sup>119</sup> *ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>120</sup> *ibid.* p. 24.

<sup>121</sup> *ibid.* p. 20.

<sup>122</sup> *ibid.* p. 4.

<sup>123</sup> *ibid.* p. 10.

<sup>124</sup> *idem.*

<sup>125</sup> *ibid.* p. 36.



Accepting thus the Wendtian imperative that perception conditions identity,<sup>126</sup> we should be able to better understand South Africa's apparent Multiple Identity Disorder against its inconsistent exogenous and endogenous realities. And, if Wendt holds that "identities are the basis of interests,"<sup>127</sup> then a clearer understanding of South African *identities* should assist us in better understanding its foreign policy decisions.

## ii. Many realities equal multiple identities

Though one could concede that the notion of identity is central to Wendtian constructivism, Zehfuss laments that in Wendt "[h]ow either the actors or the ideas about self and other are constituted in the first place is not part of the account."<sup>128</sup> Though I do not fundamentally agree with Zehfuss's final judgement that "Wendt's constructivism does not work,"<sup>129</sup> and certainly considering as I do that the Zehfuss-Wendt meta-theoretical debate has little or no significance for the current paper, there does seem to exist in constructivist literature in general a desideratum for greater consideration of exactly *how* identities are formed beyond the simplistic account of State identity as some form of a bargain between states on the inner circle of the *ego*.<sup>130</sup> It is thus quite necessary to take an incursion through at least Lacanian psychoanalytic theory though I will take from Eliasian sociology to complete Lacan's theory of identity.

For Stavrakakis,<sup>131</sup> Lacanian logic reposes on the idea that we are all constantly involved in a process of identity construction, a dialectic necessitated by the inability to fully achieve a complete identity. Born from the strong influence of Freudian theory of subjective identity, Lacanian thought opposes the tradition of cognitive philosophy in the hypothesis that there can never be a synthesis between the subjective (the subject/*ego*) and objective (the reality outside the subject/*cogito*.) For Lacan, as for Freud, identity is constructed through a necessary opposition to the outsider or *étranger*. To state it

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<sup>126</sup> For reasons of limited space, I will not discuss the relationship between perception and the construction of identity in greater detail here, but will refer the interested reader instead to a the influential works of Sigmund Freud (see *Civilisation and its Discontents* [Das Unbehagen in der Kultur], 1930), Jacques Lacan (see particularly Stavrakakis, 1999, *Lacan and the Political*, *op. cit.*) and Norbert Elias (see *Au delà de Freud. Sociologie, psychologie, psychanalyse*, 2010.)

<sup>127</sup> Wendt, A. "Anarchy is what states make of it..." *op. cit.* p. 398. See also Wendt, A. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. *op. cit.* and Zehfuss, M. "Constructivism and identity..." in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.*

<sup>128</sup> Zehfuss, M. "Constructivism and identity..." in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 104.

<sup>129</sup> *ibid.* p. 116.

<sup>130</sup> *ibid.* p. 112.

<sup>131</sup> Stavrakakis, Y. 1999. *Lacan & the Political*. United States and Canada: Routledge, p. 4.

differently - identity *is* what it *is not*.<sup>132</sup> If Lacan's definition of the subject through that *which it is not* draws from the Freudian notion of subjective identity as partially located in society, Lacan expands the notion of negative identification to the point where we are brought to conceive of society through an understanding of that which hinders its existence.<sup>133</sup> In Lacan, the perpetual quest for conciliation between the "me" (*moi*) and the "it" (*ça*) entails a process of construction and internalisation of a symbolic image to operationalise that which is essentially without substance - the *ego*. This process, termed "the mirror stage" in psychoanalytic theory, functions from the assumption that *in fine* no symbol can ever fully represent the *ego*; no representation is ever complete. The mirror image, accepted by the subject as a symbolic representation of the *ego*, remains a foreign symbol because it is, by definition, an inverted and distorted representation of the self. The resulting perpetual search for a suitable symbol to fully operationalise not only the *cogito* but also the *ego* in Lacan means that identity exists only partially and only symbolically - an illusionary operant located somewhere between the subject and reality.<sup>134</sup> Thus, not only is identity unstable, as Zehfuss suggests,<sup>135</sup> it basically exists only partially.

I will not spend a great amount of time translating the link between the process of individual identity construction and that of a society or even that of the state as the apotheosis of collective identity construction for I consider it somewhat self evident. Suffice it to note as does Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy<sup>136</sup> that there is no subject in existence, either in Freud or in Lacan, which is not essentially a social subject. In this logic of man as a fundamentally social animal, then, Norbert Elias challenges Freudian psychoanalytic theory where the individual "lives in a world of experience of which it forms the centre, at a distance from others,"<sup>137</sup> in posing the question "could one conceive of a mode of human existence that would separate the individual from the social?"<sup>138</sup> In Elias, finally, we find the bridge between abstract psychoanalysis and Wendtian constructivism in that both Wendt and Elias conceive of identity and personality as strongly influenced by changes in social structures, presupposing an innate ability to evolve. What this implies is that, in contrast to Freudian theory, consciousness, reason

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<sup>132</sup> See Freud's discussion of the intricate process of differentiation-identification in the construction of individual identity in *Civilisation and its discontents*, 1930, *op. cit.*

<sup>133</sup> Laclau. 1990, p. 44, quoted in Stavrakakis, Y. 1999. *op. cit.* p. 4.

<sup>134</sup> See a full discussion of the mirror stage in Stavrakakis. 1999, *op. cit.* pp. 17-19.

<sup>135</sup> Zehfuss, M. "Constructivism and identity," in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 112.

<sup>136</sup> In Stavrakakis, Y. 1999. *op. cit.* p. 37.

<sup>137</sup> Elias, N. 2010. *Au delà de Freud. Sociologie, psychologie, psychanalyse*. Paris: La Découverte, p. 135 (own translation.)

<sup>138</sup> *ibid.* p. 134 (own translation.)

and personality are not the product of biology alone but rather the fruit of a complex nonlinear evolution or social dialectic. What is richer in this approach to identity construction than in Wendt's simplistic treatment thereof is that in Elias as in Lacan, individual narcissism is extended to finally make possible collective identification, a dichotomy between society and the individual as dependent on one another as day on night. More interesting still, there arises from Elias and Lacan the idea that finally "human societies are constructed through a game of differences"<sup>139</sup> where opposition to an "Other" is the *sine qua non* of identity.

Before exploring how South African identity is constructed from within this psychoanalytic-sociological paradigm, it is necessary to briefly mention in which way identity determines foreign policy, for it is not quite as evident as it may seem. Given as it is in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that identity is constructed through a process of identification with and differentiation from exogenous socio-political objects, socio-political reality is fundamentally a social construction. By extension, the political is, for Stavrakakis, not real *per se*, but rather one of the ways in which we come in contact with reality. It is in essence the point of departure for the perpetual hegemonic game between reality and symbolic representations thereof - the constant quest for political identity. Yet, in the same way that individual identity can never be achieved, the perfect realisation or actualisation of a political project at state level is impossible thus resulting in the dialectic of constantly evolving policies, their potential dislocation and their replacement by a new project.<sup>140</sup> Wendt does account for policy evolution and changes in interests due to changes in the state's conception of its identity though, as Zehfuss points out, Wendt's account of structural change in international relations depends more on the transformation of state behaviour than on the evolution of its actual identity.<sup>141</sup> However, if Zehfuss, Adler and Ruggie consider the "constructivist dependent variable [...] the transformation of identities and interests,"<sup>142</sup> I would argue that identity is best viewed as a continuum of possible conceptions of self on which the state may situate itself strategically at any time, in accordance with the evolving international political sphere. It is thus less a transformation of identity than an emphasis being placed on different aspects of the possible representations of self that a state may choose in reaction to the social interaction.

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<sup>139</sup> Blok, A. "Le centre vide," in Chevalier, S., Privat, J.M. (eds.) 2004. *Norbert Elias et l'anthropologie. « Nous sommes tous si étranges... »*. Paris: CNRS Editions, pp. 107-115. (p. 107)

<sup>140</sup> See Stavrakakis. 1999. *op. cit.* pp. 73-75.

<sup>141</sup> Zehfuss, "Constructivism and identity," *op. cit.* p. 104.

<sup>142</sup> *ibid.* p. 117.

Thus departing from this theory of identity construction as the process of differentiation-identification, the South African discourse on its international relations provides an interesting underlying basis from which to approach an analysis of its foreign policy. The cognitive-constructivist approach, as I have mentioned in the introduction, goes "deeper" still than the surface material-positivist approach to foreign policy analysis, in that it further qualifies South African decision making on the policy level by revealing to us exactly *why* it is that South Africa defines its interests *vis-à-vis* its relations with Europe differently to how it defines its interests *vis-à-vis* China or India. In fact, if in the previous chapter I identified a number of structural factors that may characterise South Africa's relations with different members of the international community, we can hardly claim any real understanding of *why* it is that it conceives of its different realities and relations with these states the way that it does. Why, for instance, does South Africa perceive its dealings with Europe as more violent or conflictual than its relations with China? Are both of these relationships not interest driven? If we concede that all relations are interest driven, then why are some relations perceived as exploitative or malicious, while others are perceived as beneficial or peaceful? In short, the question becomes "*how* does South Africa identify with its external realities and how do these realities impact on its conceptions of self, or its personality?"

From the foregoing discussion of identity and its construction, we know that in order to have an identity, South Africa needs to first construct its identity by both identifying with, or aspiring to, a form of how it perceives its ideal self, automatically presupposing a dichotomous Other that it sees itself as *not* being like. Though its difficult relationship with Europe may be revealed to the analyst with expert knowledge of South African discourses surrounding Europe, the direct linkage of Europe to what South Africa would consider undesirable characteristics to have for itself remains tacit. In fact, the Draft White Paper goes so far as to mention a certain like-mindedness with European nations on issues close to its metaphorical heart, such as democracy and human rights. However, I shall take heed from former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Azziz Pahad's appeal to scholars and analysts to play closer attention to the ANC's policy documentation when attempting to decipher the intricacies of South African foreign policy, and consider a moment a key theme in the ANC's official standpoint on its relations with Europe, dating from its 1994 policy document entitled *Foreign Policy Perspective for a Democratic*

South Africa,<sup>143</sup> and which continues to reappear throughout its discourses on Europe and its relations with Europe:

*"We notice with great concern and disquiet the emergence of racism [...] particularly in Europe. Given our own painful and destructive past [...] a democratic and non-racist government is morally-bound to do everything in its power to thwart and frustrate the efforts of **those seeking to impose their evil, criminal and immoral ideology.**"* (Emphasis added.)

To echo Mzukisi Qobo in his policy brief for the Open Society Foundation for South Africa,<sup>144</sup> there seems to be in the collective South African imagination an assimilation between "West" and "racist." With this characterisation in hand, it is quite evident that Europe is the dichotomous Other of South African identity. Based on an interpretative reading of the Draft White Paper,<sup>145</sup> we can schematise its differentiation from Europe as the Other *sine qua non* for its own identity in the following way:

Europe	South Africa
Author of suffering	Victim of past injustices
Oppressor, aggressor	Liberator
Selfish, exploitative	Altruist
Unjust	Just
Discriminatory, racist and elitist	Inclusive
Seeks to model others to its own image	Promoter and champion of difference and diversity
Intolerant	Humanist

Consider, for instance, the characterisation of "global agricultural trading arrangements and protectionist policies" as "discriminatory,"<sup>146</sup> or the "aggressive pursuit of intellectual property rights protection by [the developed world as the primary] originators" as

<sup>143</sup> ANC. 1994. *Foreign Policy Perspective in a democratic South Africa: African National Congress Policy Document*. See Annexe III for an extract of the document.

<sup>144</sup> Qobo, M. 2012. "South Africa's Foreign Policy: An Assessment of the Draft White Paper and the ANC's policy document on International Relations," SAFPI Policy Brief No. 2, 11/05/2012. Cape Town: Open Society Foundation for South Africa.

<sup>145</sup> To be read in conjunction with discourses contained in Annexe IV, which contain an important contextualisation of Euro-South African relations. If the Draft White Paper employs a degree of diplomatic euphemism such as to mask much of the South African hostility toward Europe, South African discourse following the NATO invasion of Libya constitute an interesting vocalisation of these negative emotions. These discourse thus provide paramount recent background knowledge against which to approach an analysis of Euro-South African relations.

<sup>146</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 13. We know these "global agricultural trading arrangements and protectionist policies" to refer specifically to the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) because it is the only global agricultural policy to be mentioned explicitly in the same context in South Africa's Europe Strategy on page 31 of the Paper.

"protectionism used against demands for technology transfer for development."<sup>147</sup> By these characterisations, Europe is effectively constructed to be a malicious oppressor, the former perpetrator of the past injustices of ruthless colonialism, against which the South African identity of "a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial country that embraces [...] humanity"<sup>148</sup> takes its form. If "States with aging populations [...] have to find ways to absorb a younger workforce [against] the rising perception that multiculturalism is failing [and] the attendant risk of increased pressures of xenophobia, racism and insecurity,"<sup>149</sup> then South Africa is the "champion of solidarity [...] even beyond the nation's borders."<sup>150</sup> Similarly, if Europe is the ancient, exploitative coloniser, then South Africa is the well-intentioned do-gooder that sees Africa's "potential" and that aspires to assist in Africa's development to ensure its "future economic competitiveness and its development and prosperity"<sup>151</sup> by taking on a "constructive leadership role"<sup>152</sup> in the spirit of helping Africa break free from the dominant cycles of structural dependency. In this same context of Europe as former oppressor, South Africa takes on a second identity, parallel to that of liberating leader for Africa's upliftment, as a victim itself of Europe's "evils." Over and above its historical struggle for liberty, South Africa like the rest of Africa is the victim of the developed world's excessive and inconsiderate exploitation of "rare earth materials [...] of which known reserves are concentrated in [...] South Africa."<sup>153</sup> Moreover, analogous to South Africa as the opposite of Europe, the South African identity is constructed via a process of identification with the corporate identities and behaviours of those states that it aspires to be like - its role models in a manner of speaking. If we might consider that these role models were at the time of the 1955 Bandung Conference those African states that had fought for, and kept fighting for, the liberation of African colonies - most notably Ethiopia and Ghana - South Africa has in the past 70 years transcended its inferiority to other liberated African states to the point that the new challenge in this relationship is now "the asymmetrical nature of the South African economy in comparison with that of the region."<sup>154</sup> Thus considering itself the "voice of Africa" in international relations, capable of contributing to "reshaping the global economic and political order"<sup>155</sup> by virtue of its privileged position in the eyes of

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<sup>147</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 14.

<sup>148</sup> *ibid.* p. 4

<sup>149</sup> *ibid.* p. 13.

<sup>150</sup> *ibid.* pp. 3, 19.

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.* p. 21.

<sup>152</sup> *ibid.* p. 22.

<sup>153</sup> *ibid.* p. 16.

<sup>154</sup> *ibid.* pp. 8, 21.

<sup>155</sup> *ibid.* p. 26.

the international community, South Africa mirrors or imitates the identities of the idealised state, incarnated in this case by the BRIC quartet.

Parallel to this identity construct via exogenous identification and differentiation, South Africa has a second, corporate identity. Corporate identity, according to Wendt, is "the intrinsic, self-organising qualities that constitute actor individuality," and is a compliment to the social identity as the "sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others."<sup>156</sup> This corporate identity finds its expression in the South African identity as victim, liberator, humanist, altruist, democrat, Afro-centrist, pan-Africanist, leader and champion. If there is an intra-academic debate in the constructivist school on the ontological primacy of either structure or agent, my argument would align itself to Wendt's claim that "state identity is about the production not only of difference from without, but of sameness within [where] the latter cannot be reduced to the former."<sup>157</sup> This ontological argument will be taken up in the next chapter, which will advance the radical subatomic-quantum approach to foreign policy and I will not go into greater detail on the subject here. For the purposes of the current level of analysis, it is sufficient to note that we have to do, in this reflection on South African foreign policy making and specifically the impact of identity thereupon, with an extremely complex and delicate interplay between exogenously constructed social identity and endogenously constructed corporate identity. Both of these identities are conceived based on a Kantian unity of apperception, though the South African identity remains imperfect and never fully achieved which, in turn, explains the instability of associations with other states as well as changes in foreign policy even in the absence of any real threat. As a last and very brief consideration of the cognitive-constructivist level of analysis of South African foreign policy, I will pose the question "in which way does perceived aggression or threat from Europe influence South African agency?" To state that South Africa perceives European action as aggressive or threatening, which in turn determines how South Africa will identify with Europe, is hardly to explain why the perception would give way to action. To answer this question, I will return once again to psychoanalysis, to reflect on Freud's theory of *narcissistic injury and rage*.

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<sup>156</sup> Wendt, A. 1994. "Collective identity formation and the international state," quoted by Cederman, L. E., Daase, C. "Endogenizing corporate identities. The next step in constructivist theory," in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 120.

<sup>157</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian Science..." in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 208.

### iii. Neither Schizophrenia, nor Multiple Identity Disorder. But Narcissism.

*"South Africa's unique approach to global issues [...] informs our particular approach to diplomacy and shape our vision of a better world."*<sup>158</sup>

Although much has been written on South African exceptionalism, multiple identity disorder and apparent foreign policy schizophrenia, little or no attempt has been made to link these apparent inconsistencies to its very personality. This is hardly surprising, given that Wendt only contributed to international relations the idea that "states are people too" in 1999.<sup>159</sup> And, though the academic study of political psychology has made important advances in applying psychoanalytic theory to political decision-making in recent years,<sup>160</sup> the idea that a state can take on the same patterns of behaviour as an actual person has yet to be verily consolidated in international relations scholarship. Nonetheless, the important work that has been done on state identity and personality, as well as on psychoanalytic applications in political science<sup>161</sup> allows us to make the bridge with a fair amount of ease, albeit simplistic for the time being.

From J. M. Post's article "Current Concepts of the Narcissistic Personality: Implications of Political Psychology,"<sup>162</sup> we may accept Narcissistic Personality as an "exaggerated sense of self-importance [...] manifested as extreme self-centeredness, egocentricity, and self-absorption."<sup>163</sup> It is essentially an "imbalance of self versus other"<sup>164</sup> that ultimately leads to what Tartakoff (1966) described as a "Nobel Prize complex," where the narcissist is perpetually caught in a quest for unlimited power, wealth, beauty or fame.<sup>165</sup> By virtue of his extreme self-obsession and insatiable lust for achievement, all driven by a pervasive uncertainty about identity, the "interpersonal relationships of the narcissist are regularly and characteristically disturbed"<sup>166</sup> where the Other becomes an extension of the self and serves solely to affirm the narcissist's achievements and brilliance. Driven by a

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<sup>158</sup> Preamble to Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 4.

<sup>159</sup> Wendt, A. 1999. *Social Theory...* *op. cit.* pp. 215-224.

<sup>160</sup> See Elif Erisen's "Introduction to Political Psychology for International Relations Scholars," in *Perceptions*, Autumn 2012, Vol. XVII, No. 3, pp. 9-28 for an overview of the most important contributions of this academic field. See also McClosky, H. "Perspectives on Foreign Policy and Personality," in *World Politics*, Vol. 13, Issue 1, October 1960, pp.129 - 139.

<sup>161</sup> See specifically Vamik Volkan's opus: <http://www.vamikvolkan.com/>

<sup>162</sup> Published in *Political Psychology*, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 99-121.

<sup>163</sup> *ibid.* p. 102.

<sup>164</sup> *ibid.* p. 101.

<sup>165</sup> *ibid.* p. 103.

<sup>166</sup> *idem.*



sense of divine destination for greatness and a *de facto* superiority to others beings that are created inferior and lack the favour of the gods, as it were, the narcissist "tends to greatly exaggerate the degree of influence [he] can have"<sup>167</sup> over another or even the heights that he can achieve. Born from a parental overestimation of the child's capacities,<sup>168</sup> the narcissist is motivated by a dream of superhuman greatness certain to be achieved through "charmed fate."<sup>169</sup> Language, as the ultimate symbolic expression of the subjective self, serves not simply the purpose of communicating but is fundamentally egocentric, thus discourse is at least seemingly addressed to the self.<sup>170</sup> Moreover, given his exceptionality, the narcissist is prone to a "righteous indignation with which he stands in judgement if the moral failure of others [...] often in striking contrast to his own self-centered behavior,"<sup>171</sup> while this inflated sense of self and pervasive insecurity leaves the narcissist exceptionally vulnerable to criticism, rejection, or judgement. Simply, the narcissist needs to be constantly loved and admired and any falling short thereof is experienced as a deep and crippling wound to the *ego* - referred to in Freud as narcissistic injury.<sup>172</sup> The finality for the unstable, injured self is expressed by Post<sup>173</sup> as

*"[w]hen a narcissistic wound is suffered, it can promote a profound narcissistic rage - a quest for [...] righting a wrong, for undoing a hurt."*

It is certainly a very feeble challenge to trace in the South African discourse notions of grandiosity, exceptionalism or predestined greatness corresponding to the foregoing characterisation of the narcissist.<sup>174</sup> As I have shown in the previous sub-chapter, South Africa considers itself the altruistic liberator and leader of marginalised and oppressed Africa, the voiceless victim of European malice. Its "diplomacy of Ubuntu" is by its own admission "unique." To return to my conclusions from the previous chapter on the material-positivist aspects that influence South African foreign policy decision making, the country is not simply "destined" to be Africa's great liberator and benefactor, it is in fact set on its path to become the "Nelson Mandela of global civil society." In their own words, "many expectations about South Africa's international role have been created

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<sup>167</sup> *ibid.* p. 111.

<sup>168</sup> From Freud's 1914 essay "On Narcissism," in Post, J. M. *op. cit.* p. 118.

<sup>169</sup> Meissner (1979) in Post, J. M. "Current Concepts of the Narcissistic Personality..." *op. cit.* p. 103.

<sup>170</sup> Post, J. M. "Current Concepts of the Narcissistic Personality..." *op. cit.* p. 104.

<sup>171</sup> *idem.*

<sup>172</sup> See specifically Post's discussion of psychogenesis of narcissistic injury, pp. 7-8.

<sup>173</sup> *ibid.* p. 114.

<sup>174</sup> See also Annexe V as an additional example of exceptionalism and grandeur in South African discourse.

[and] many demanding responsibilities have been assumed."<sup>175</sup> Since this assertion in 1996, the South African perception has widened to qualify these "demanding responsibilities" as the international community's expectations of South Africa "to *play a leading role*" in international relations.<sup>176</sup> By its discourse, the South African government creates the idea that without its exceptional "principles of Batho Pele (putting people first)," a better world is hardly imaginable. In fact, it is the very "birth of democratic South Africa in 1994 [that made operational] the quest for African renewal, and efforts to negate the legacy of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism."<sup>177</sup> Though its insistence on its actions to help Africa if not the whole of the South and the entire world by extension could seem a counter-argument to the narcissist thesis, two important points arise from Post's article on narcissism in political psychology:

1. By a complex process of self-object identification, that which the narcissist deems good for himself *is* good for the other. And, because of the narcissist's exaggerated concept of the self as divine altruist, he communicates with sincerity not only because he aims to gain greater support and admiration (narcissistic supply), but also because he *is*, in that moment, sincere about his good intentions. The fact is that the narcissist wants you to know that he is fundamentally a good person, and so will tell you that in explicit terms.
2. Vamik Volkan advances the hypothesis of "reparative charismatic" narcissist who, in healing the wounds of his nation, heals his own narcissistic wound.

We could thus conceive of Africa as the "reparative charismatic" South Africa's "nation" in the sense of Volkan's thesis, whose healing heals injured South Africa's own narcissistic wound. Being the narcissist that it is, though, South Africa wants the world to know that it is fundamentally altruistic and righteous, therefore states it explicitly. In "fixing" Africa, South Africa soothes its own narcissistic rage, righting the wrong, undoing the hurt that was done to it previously. The statement that its "destiny is inextricably linked to that of the Southern African region [...] intertwined with [the] pursuit of a better Africa in a better world"<sup>178</sup> thus takes on almost a life of its own. Further yet, healing the hurt and undoing the injustice that has been done unto its self

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<sup>175</sup> *South African Foreign Policy: Discussion Document*, Department of Foreign Affairs, July 1996, quoted by Cooper, A. F. "The multiple faces of South African foreign policy," in *International Journal*, Volume 53, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 705-732. (p. 710.)

<sup>176</sup> See the Preamble to Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 4.

<sup>177</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 7.

<sup>178</sup> *ibid.* p. 20.

necessarily presupposes a morally obligated externalisation of narcissistic rage or aggression against the perpetrator of the act of injustice.<sup>179</sup>

It is perhaps this comprehension of the narcissistic state and the will to action with the aim of healing the narcissistic wound that best contributes to a clearer understanding of South Africa's reaction to the Libyan invasion in 2011. Firstly, we could analyse South Africa's favourable vote to UNSC Resolution 1973, against and in spite of the abstentions of historic partners such as Germany as well as new partners such as the BRICS bloc, in light of its own understanding of the "great responsibilities" that the international community places on it by virtue of its exceptional qualities as the leader, liberator and peace maker of the African continent. Its eagerness to please effectively led to a catastrophic vote that was completely against character for the country which had, until that moment, maintained a relationship of historic loyalty with Libya and its former leader. In keeping with the narcissist character, loyalties can shift very quickly to wherever the narcissist deems it will receive the greatest amount of admiration for his actions and achievements - a product of the famous Nobel Prize complex.<sup>180</sup> Secondly, once criticisms of the South African vote started seeing the light, and specifically following the "betrayal" of France and the United Kingdom in their almost immediate NATO action, the South African *ego* suffered a profound narcissistic wound that ultimately resulted in severe narcissistic rage. This narcissistic rage, as we have seen, morally obliged South Africa to externalise its anger in the most aggressive means available to it in an attempt to soothe the injury, thus resulting in its almost two-year long campaign of diplomatic war against the perpetrators of the act of injustice, and culminating in its vocal critiques of anything international including the UNSC, other organs of the UN and even of the International Criminal Court (ICC).<sup>181</sup> It could not be otherwise, the perpetrators *must* be punished and it is South Africa's responsibility to set things right again.

The thesis is certainly interesting but grossly underexplored in this paper due to certain constraints beyond my control. Future research should focus on further exploring personality theories for application in analyses of state behaviour further to those studies that have thus far focused on the impact of individual personalities in policy making.

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<sup>179</sup> See Post, J. M. "Current Concepts of the Narcissistic Personality..." *op. cit.* p. 116.

<sup>180</sup> p. 110.

<sup>181</sup> In this regard, see two important discourses on South African foreign policy, particularly its dealings with Europe during its tenure as non-permanent member of the UNSC in Annexe IV.

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In sum, if in the first chapter I demonstrated how South African reality is determined by the physical effects and constraints of *realpolitik*, this chapter aimed to illustrate the ways in which the country's perceptions of its different spheres of reality impact upon the construction of its identity and how this identification with reality causes agency. Where literature falls short on exactly how identity is constructed, I have attempted to incorporate into the discussion psychoanalytic theories of identity, specifically as pertains to large-group identity and enmity as the dichotomous *sine qua non* of identity, thus demonstrating the necessity of differentiation from Europe for the construction of a South African identity. This is, in fact, a healthy enmity without which no political identity could exist. Moreover, if we accept the Wendtian claim that "states are people too," and that they have personalities, then we could successfully apply psychoanalytic theories of personality to explain state agency. In this sense, South African actions and reactions surrounding the 2011 Libyan crisis and the NATO "*coup*" could be understood through the lenses of narcissistic injury and rage - a theme that occurs and reoccurs throughout the South African history. Though identity theories could help us predict state action under certain conditions, the fundamentally volatile nature of personality and identity renders impossible exact and certain predictions of future foreign policy decision-making.

What this chapter did not consider is *how* the state as a person comes to be in the first place. Does an entity just appear from thin air on a warm summer's day, with at least a basic *a priori* identity as "given?" And, if this is the case, how does the *a priori* entity with its ontologically primal personality or identity come to be? In other words, are we to accept the existence of some divine force located outside of biological reality that makes things exist and determines their destiny prior to their existence? With these inevitable questions, we have entered squarely the "hard problem" of philosophy, the perpetual mystery of the human condition and the force that continues to drive science even in a highly advanced technological age.

## The subatomic-quantum approach

"[M]ind is already inherent in every electron, and the processes of human consciousness differ only in degree but not in kind from the processes of choice between quantum states which we call 'chance' when they are made by electrons"

- Freeman Dyson, quoted in Wendt (2006:196)

This last chapter has its roots in my personal search for an appropriate methodology to operationalise subjectivity as the ultimate methodological puzzle of the constructivist paradigm. The implications of constructivism for science are extremely complex and our lacking knowledge on the nature of consciousness and qualia renders the operationalisation of constructivist theory challenging at best. Among the most damaging criticisms raised against constructivism as a scientific paradigm is certainly the call for a methodological codification of the approach beyond intelligent conjectures and biased interpretation.<sup>182</sup> Still others attempt to advance constructivism as an actual methodology however, my argument (like many others) is that constructivism is a theoretical approach with certain basic assumptions and causal explanations but it is not a method *sensu stricto*.<sup>183</sup> Thus, the meta-theoretical debate among constructivists remains open and the epistemic search continues.<sup>184</sup> The ontological "hard problem" of contemporary social science notwithstanding, certain important advances have been made in the quest for a scientific study of subjectivity, notably in the field of psychology where the phenomenological subject represents the very essence of the scientific inquiry. Considering the accepted maxim that true objectivity can never be achieved in the scientific process, popularised by Thomas Kuhn's paradigms theory,<sup>185</sup> mixed methods have become increasingly popular in the field of psychology exactly because they allow

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<sup>182</sup> See for instance Andreas Behnke's critique of Wendt's *Social Theory*; "Grand Theory in the age of its impossibility. Contemplations on Alexander Wendt," in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* pp. 48-56. Also, Pouliot, V. "'Subjectivism': Toward a constructivist methodology," in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 51, Issue 2, pp. 359-384;

<sup>183</sup> For an excellent in-depth discussion of method, see Lakatos, I., Feyerabend, P. et Motterlini, M. 2000. *For and against method*. United States: University of Chicago Press; and Hung, E. 1997. *The Nature of Science: Problems and Perspectives*. United States: Wadsworth Publishers.

<sup>184</sup> See Kratochwil, F. "Constructing a new orthodoxy? Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* and the constructivist challenge," in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* pp. 21-47.

<sup>185</sup> See Kuhn, T. S. 2012 (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. 4th edition. United States: University of Chicago Press.

at least some degree of objectification for the study of the subject. One such mixed method, and currently one of the most reluctantly popular, is Q methodology which was introduced to the social sciences in 1953 with the publication of William Stephenson's *The Study of Behaviour: Q Technique and its Methodology*. The virtues of Q Methodology are, in my view, many but its full discussion falls outside of the purpose of this study. What *is* interesting about Q Method for the current chapter, is its roots in quantum physics.<sup>186</sup> The reason why this is interesting is because Alexander Wendt would respond to his many critics with a quantum theory of international relations in Guzzini and Leander's 2006 publication *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics*.<sup>187</sup> What is more interesting still, is that Wendt makes no mention of Q Method or William Stephenson, and my own discovery of the quantum connection to constructivism had its occasion not in Wendt's quantum hypothesis, but almost as an inevitable finality of the search for a sound methodology from which to approach the study of subjectivity in international relations.

What Wendt and Stephenson have in common is the idea that "there is a reality 'out there'"<sup>188</sup> coupled with a Whiteheadian influence that informs the understanding of subjectivity as a process. But subjectivity presupposes consciousness, which I have previously pointed out as a perpetual mystery both in the human- and social sciences, if not in science more broadly (considering if we will, that even the physical sciences - medicine, biology, neurology *et cetera* - have trouble defining or clarifying what exactly consciousness is, and where it comes from.) And as I have previously hypothesised, consciousness may be the only explanation for agency or the will to action. Thus, as Wendt notes, we need to make serious efforts in the human- and social sciences to understand consciousness if we are to seriously claim an understanding of human behaviour. By way of extension of the thought experiment, I have claimed that *realpolitik* fails to truly assist us in understanding foreign policy decision making because, accepting the constructivist claim that interests cause agency, and that identity determines interest, the *explicans* for foreign policy decision making is found in the psychology of identity.

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<sup>186</sup> A detailed discussion of this notion is not useful to the study at hand. The interested reader is referred to Pauls Stenner's 2009 article entitled "Q methodology as a constructivist methodology," in *Operant Subjectivity: the international journal of Q methodology*, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 46-69.

<sup>187</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science. An auto-critique from a quantum perspective," in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* pp. 181-219.

<sup>188</sup> Stephenson, W. "William James, Niels Bohr and Complementarity, IV: The significance of time" in *The Psychological Record*. Vol. 38. 1988. pp. 19-35, quoted by Stenner, P. "Q methodology as constructivist methodology," *op. cit.* p. 26. See also Wendt, A. *Social Theory of International Politics*. *op. cit.*

However, as we have a very limited understanding of the core ingredient of the human being as the *domicilium* of identity, being consciousness, we cannot truly claim that we understand the origin of agency. Thus, the true *explanans* of foreign policy making, as a human activity, lies not in identity or cognition. It lies in the minutest process of construction, in the origin of consciousness where consciousness separates animate from inanimate, subject from object.<sup>189</sup>

Thus far, the reader has hopefully been struck by my total ignorance of historical realities that could possibly impact on South African foreign relations - this has been done with prepenance. In the discussion that follows, my understanding of history and of its place in decision making has evolved over the course of the present research to the point that simple memory, even transferred, no longer suffices to explain the incredibly complex role that history takes on in process philosophy and quantum theory. To state an intriguingly difficult phenomenon simply: history is not the past, history is almost literally the past, the present and the future *at the same time*. In fact, in quantum theory, one could say that the present is a backward extension of the future and that the future determines the present. And, if the future determines the present, it determined the past as well. With this mind-warp I thus enter into this last chapter, issuing right from the outset the warning that the reader should expect to find in this approach more questions than answers and the very frustrating conclusion that stimulating as the quantum approach may be, quantum physics is a very young science - even within the domain of physics - (in)famously referred to as "hocus pocus" by Albert Einstein. It should further be noted that, despite its many critics, not a single quantum theoretical hypothesis has been falsified to date. And we know from Popper that that which is not false, remains true until it is proved false. With this in mind, the reader should not expect much more than a theoretical reading of the possibilities of a quantum theory of international relations and its possible implications if not explanations for observable phenomena. In a word, quantum theory is a science of possibilities and should be approached as such. In this chapter I will rely mostly on Wendt's interpretation of quantum theory for application in international relations, though my own reading differs from his in certain aspects.

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<sup>189</sup> See also Wendt's own discussion of the mind-body problem as the "hard problem" of philosophy in "*Social Science as Cartesian science...*," *op. cit.* pp. 185-189.

## i. When quantum met process

Without the ambition to venture too far into the many intricacies and eccentricities of quantum theory and its various interpretations "that are not only wildly different, but simply wild,"<sup>190</sup> I will delve directly into Wendt's summary of the basic assumptions of classical physics *versus* those of quantum physics and refer the interested reader, as Wendt does, to Gary Zukav's 1979 publication entitled *The Dancing Wu Li Masters: An overview of the new physics*. Classical physics being concerned as it is with the material make up of all things physical, the quantum revolution challenged classical physics in a number of ways of which the most important for this paper are 1. physical objects, at the subatomic level, break down into what Wendt describes as "ghost-like processes." Material objects are not, in fact, material "all the way down"; 2. the world does not behave deterministically, but functions according to choice; 3. agency can be influenced non-locally, or from a distance; 4. subject and object do not exist independently of one another, but rather exercise a mutual influence on each other at the most basic level of existence.

By way of summary, "things" at the quantum level break down into waves and/or particles, where waves and particles are irreducible but distinct components of a unit. That is, at the smallest level of existence, matter is both a wave and a particle (wave/particle dualism) and its transition from wave to particle (wave function collapse) occurs spontaneously and instantaneously without any apparent causation. To quote Stephenson, "there is a reality 'out there' [...] and it 'jumps.'"<sup>191</sup> The intriguing thing is that we don't know why it jumps. It seems, for the here and now, that it jumps simply because that is what it does. More than this unpredictable nature of the wave in quantum physics, the particle's position on the quantum level can never be determined without disturbing its behaviour, but can only ever be guessed.<sup>192</sup> It is, as I have posited before, a science of possibilities because literally *anything* is possible at any given moment in time at the quantum level. Stranger still, variations of Hugh Everett's original "Many Worlds Interpretation" of quantum theory dictates that in opposition to Niels Bohr's and Werner Heisenberg's Copenhagen Interpretation of wave function collapse as I have outlined it

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<sup>190</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science..." *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 190.

<sup>191</sup> Stephenson, W. "William James, Niels Bohr and Complementarity..." *op. cit.*, quoted by Stenner, P. "Q methodology as constructivist methodology," *op. cit.* p. 26.

<sup>192</sup> See for example the famous "double slit experiment" which attempted to measure the position of the particle at any given moment and which found that neither wave nor particle behaves as expected at quantum level.



above, wave function does not actually collapse into a single physical reality, but rather that reality "splits" into an immeasurable amount of parallel universes where each possible outcome of the collapse of quanta (subatomic matter) into physical matter crystallises simultaneously.<sup>193</sup> To deepen the quantum mystery just a little, the act of measuring quantum waves *influences* their behaviour, or disturbs them, to the point where they will appear as particles (collapse) rather than waves the moment that we attempt to observe them. Thus, the mere act of observing quanta changes its very nature, giving a whole new, elementary, meaning to interconnectedness. To Wendt, this inseparable linkage between subject and object means that "[i]n quantum measurement observer and observed initially constitute a single system."<sup>194</sup> In this view, the subject-object relationship extends beyond mere subjective *identification with* the reality out there; the subject *is part of* its external reality and is influenced by it as much as it influences the object. Moreover, the principle of quantum entanglement (non-locality) further qualifies the interconnected nature of quantum phenomena such that distinct waves and particles "communicate" at a distance so that changes to one *eigenstate* (subatomic state of quanta) immediately and profoundly impacts the very essence of another wave function. As Wendt rightly points out, "[e]ntangled particles [behave] as parts of a 'superposition' of particles that absorbs their individual identities into a larger whole."<sup>195</sup>

Before entering deeper into the abysses of quantum theory, it is prudent to note the "process" component of quantum mechanics. From the above summary, it should be clear that the behaviour of quanta is best described as a constant "becoming" where waves constantly collapse or decohere into macro-physical states, or what we know as the physical world. Quantum behaviour is in a word, transitive. And it is in this transitive context that Whiteheadian process philosophy becomes important for our present discussion. In contrast to classical philosophy, where change is accidental and subordinate to permanent substances, process philosophy views change as the only constant in metaphysical reality.<sup>196</sup> Corresponding to quantum wave function collapse, Whitehead advances the "occasion," a grouping of experiences in time, where "[a]n actual

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<sup>193</sup> See Vaidman, L. "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/qm-manyworlds/>, last accessed on 19/05/2014 at 19h02.

<sup>194</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science...", *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 192.

<sup>195</sup> *ibid.* p. 193.

<sup>196</sup> See Seibt, J., "Process Philosophy", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2013 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/process-philosophy/>, last accessed on 19/05/2014 at 20h07.

occasion 'prehends' its world [...] by feeling the 'objective data' of past occasions which the new occasion utilises in its own concrescence."<sup>197</sup> In a sense, each new event or occasion (corresponding in everyday language to "moments") "superjects" itself onto past events and becomes the past occasion that future events will "feed off." There is thus no continuum of time; the past is assimilated into the present (*synthesis* in Whitehead), which in turn is assimilated into the future as the "next" present. Time is, therefore, not to be understood as a linear trajectory of events, but instead as distinct groupings of moments. In this way, memory is preserved at the most elementary level and *becomes part of the present*. It is thus that I hypothesise that history is not the past. It could not be. History *is* the present because it is assimilated into it. The present has no meaning if not a derivative of the past and *idem* for the inverse. Similarly, the present is necessarily part of the future, which it will be assimilated into. Therefore, the present is simultaneously a backward extension of the future. To borrow a metaphor from Kraus,<sup>198</sup> time could be seen as ripples on a pond, where the larger, outer ripples "cover" the smaller, inner ripples. Moreover, if one were to take a photograph of ripples on a pond and look at it after it is developed, the ripples would appear all at once as a collective whole rather than a succession of events in time. We are, in effect, impervious to the process of time when we have no former and latter to compare its effect to.

To return a moment to the Copenhagen Interpretation of the quantum mechanics, at the moment of collapse, the possibility exists for quanta to take on any number of outcomes (Uncertainty Principle.) The finality (eigenstate) that it assumes upon wave function collapse is random and cannot be predicted, implying a choice. This is perhaps the most radical aspect of quantum theory, as it essentially assigns to quanta a quality of consciousness, being choice. As Paul Dirac declared on the topic of collapse and why a certain reality is assumed as opposed to the multitude of other possible realities, "nature makes a choice,"<sup>199</sup> famously inspiring Einstein's critique that "God doesn't play dice with the world."<sup>200</sup> The basic hypothesis is that nature, for all intents and purposes, calculates

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<sup>197</sup> Irvine, A. D., "Alfred North Whitehead", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2013 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/whitehead/>, accessed on 08/02/2014 at 16h15.

<sup>198</sup> Kraus, E. M. 1998. *The Metaphysics of Experience. A companion to Whitehead's Process and Reality*. 2nd edition. New York: Fordham University Press. p. 22.

<sup>199</sup> "P.A.M. Dirac." *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*. Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/164795/P-A-M-Dirac>, last accessed on 20/05/2014 at 12h58. See also Barrett, J. A. 1999. *The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 26-28.

<sup>200</sup> Quoted in Hermans, W. 1983. *Einstein and the Poet. In Search of the Cosmic Man*. Massachusetts: Branden Press. p. 58.

the best possible outcome for a specific function and then excludes all other possible outcomes. The Copenhagen Interpretation, it should be clear, differs from the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) in that, in Everett's MWI, the choice is not made, but all possible outcomes are realised simultaneously and in parallel. Unlike wave function collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation, wave functions do not collapse in the MWI, but rather decohere where quanta essentially stops "communicating" (measuring each other) through entanglement thus becoming distinctly individual. Whitehead seems to subscribe to the Copenhagen Interpretation and wave function collapse in his process philosophy, where the "actual entity [...] decides what it will be: realizing certain potentials and positively excluding others [...] The result of the status decision is a new fact in the world, inexplicable in terms of anything outside its own self-creative process."<sup>201</sup> However, although the entity is 'externally free,' "it is still what others make it to be as the result of their own free decision."<sup>202</sup> Wendt seems to subscribe to this interpretation as well, though my reading of his *Social Theory as Cartesian Science* revealed a certain ambivalence or ambiguity in this respect. Notwithstanding, by all accounts there seems to be an implicit consensus that in nature, at its most minute level of existence, one finds both possibilities and choices. And the "things" that make up reality at the subatomic level exercise an influence on each other's existence such that everything is first interconnected before it individuates and distinguishes itself from the collective "rest."

Quantum theory is, by any measure, fascinating. But fascination is not helpful *per se* to the present analysis of South African foreign policy. How, then, does the foregoing discussion relate to the human being? After all, as Wendt himself notes,<sup>203</sup> the quantum revolution did not overturn or completely invalidate classical physics because the existence of physical reality as we know it means that quantum states have decohered or collapsed into classical states. At molecular level, quantum rules no longer apply and the rules of classical physics become dominant. Classical physical states do not behave like quantum states. And people are classical physical states. Referring back to my opening remarks to this section, neither physicists, nor neurologists, nor biologists, nor philosophers have been able to demystify "consciousness" to date. Some have suggested that it is "ideas all the way down," others that it is "matter all the way down," all an *ex*

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<sup>201</sup> Kraus, E. M. 1998. *The Metaphysics of Experience... op. cit.* p. 60.

<sup>202</sup> *idem.*

<sup>203</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science...", *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* pp. 190-193.

*nihilo* product of whatever force of nature one would choose to subscribe to. Some simply attribute it to God. Exact is science. At least attempting to find an explanation for the coming into existence of consciousness, theoretical physicist David Bohm introduced the idea that the puzzle of quantum mechanics may be hiding the answers to the consciousness dilemma in his 1980 book *Wholeness and the Implicate Order*, though he never concretely proposed any working hypotheses from which to approach any future research in this field. Since then, numerous theories have seen the light, including the Quantum Mind/Brain hypothesis, the Quantum Consciousness hypothesis and the Quantum Psychology hypothesis though all of these theories remain highly contested or are even rejected outright by physicists and social scientists alike. Though Wendt seems rather more at ease than I am personally to accept the Quantum Consciousness hypothesis, I do share the view that consciousness may well be born at the moment of wave function collapse. Moreover, I share with Wendt the idea that "[h]uman beings are in effect 'walking wave particle dualities,'"<sup>204</sup> or in Whiteheadian terms, that "[t]he human person is a society of billions of [...] occasions."<sup>205</sup> As highly sceptical of some the proposed assumptions of quantum applications to the social sciences as I may be, my "feeling" is that memory, unconscious transference and identification lies somewhere within the realm of the subatomic and acts on our actual physical makeup in ways that we are as yet unaware of and unable to comprehend with our flawed and incomplete knowledge. With this argument in hand, I will turn to some of the most important hypothetical contributions of quantum theory to the social sciences, where I will attempt to demonstrate in which significant ways the quantum explanation would provide a viable alternative account for problematic aspects of South African foreign policy analysis without having to make the theological claim that agency is caused by a divine Being.

## ii. Going quantum on constructivism

On exploring the relevance of the quantum turn for social science, and perchance as a summary of the dominant arguments in the preceding sub-chapter, Alexander Wendt notes<sup>206</sup> that the quantum model challenges classical metaphysical considerations of human beings in four important ways, being: 1. consciousness "plays

<sup>204</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science....," *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 183.

<sup>205</sup> "Process Philosophy," in *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/processp/>, last accessed on 19/05/2014 at 20h44.

<sup>206</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science....," *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* pp. 197-199.

an essential role human behaviour;" 2. identity as the operant of behaviour is not a given, but comes to exist only at the moment of wave function collapse. Thus, process is both constitutive and operant, at once calling into existence the subject *through* behaviour; 3. because wave function collapse is spontaneous and instantaneous, reason cannot cause behaviour; rather it forms an irreducible part of a larger whole that includes both reason and behaviour simultaneously; Moreover, and in accordance with my suggestion that time is both a forward projection and a backward extension of groupings of fact, reason is teleological by nature where "we literally 'feel' the future through a kind of 'temporal non-locality'"<sup>207</sup> 4. through the subject-object "oneness" (entanglement) that makes possible non-local communication, man has purposive free will and as such chooses his own destiny.

To briefly comment on Wendt's conclusions from quantum theory for man, I agree mostly with his interpretation however, on the last point concerning man's free will and his freedom to choose his own destiny, I have a rather different understanding of quantum literature. To situate the technically challenging quantum literature in slightly more accessible Whiteheadian thought, I shall recall from the previous sub-section that an entity is distinctly independent from his environment and has free will yet is constrained by the free will of others. Based on this interpretation, if we accept that consciousness is first determined by non-local measurement between quanta, free decisions are only as free as the intra-action allows them to be. Metaphorically speaking, man chooses his own destiny, but his destiny is also chosen, or at the very least influenced, by other men and even by inanimate objects through entanglement and measurement. Thus, although I do not contest Wendt's conclusion, I do find myself at odds with his slightly simplistic treatment of free will on a quantum basis. To nuance my own thought, process philosophy is not quantum theory. This is true. However, as I pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, Whitehead was himself a quantum physicist before reorienting his focus to philosophy and my extension of this particular branch of Whiteheadian thought to address this problematic interpretation of the literature should not reveal itself to be inconsistent with the principles of quantum metaphysics.

This friendly critique notwithstanding, the most important assumptions to be taken from Wendt's conclusions for the current study are found not in the meaning of quantum for the individual human being and his place in his own destiny if we could speak of one, but

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<sup>207</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science...", *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 199.

rather in the implications of entanglement for collective knowledge and memory. If we concede that particles communicate non-locally through entanglement at the subatomic level, and if these particles, aware as they are of each other's existence and pre-existing "data," will finally collapse into the classical physical state that constitutes our physical reality, then we could well imagine that at some elementary level, all physical states are aware of other physical states and their data. The hypothesis could not carry much further than the moment of wave function collapse, though, as quanta lose all "memory" upon collapse or decoherence.<sup>208</sup> However, if the assumption that consciousness emerges at the moment of wave function collapse is true, and if quanta still have memory up to the point of collapse, then it would not be much of a stretch to imagine that quantum memory or data could be "transferred" to the conscious. To borrow from Whitehead, "[t]he subjectively formed feeling felt by the concrescent occasion enters the present."<sup>209</sup> For Wendt, on the other hand, it is this intra-implication at the level of the *unconscious* (i.e. before consciousness emerges from wave function collapse) that structures action, provides memory and conditions reason not only of the individual, but also of the collective.<sup>210</sup> In fact, Wendt argues, "[i]nstead of being distinct entities, minds participate in each other's reality."<sup>211</sup> By this argument, we are already implicated in social life even before we *exist* as such (considering as we do that a necessary condition for human existence is consciousness.) This is an important point specifically for the problem of multiple realities arising from the constructivist project because, by extension of Wendt's foregoing assertion, reality is not, as I argued in the previous section, an individual experience, but becomes once again a single, objective reality that subjects "act into." Reality is shared at a level far more fundamental than constructivist social life. In this regard, Whitehead's forewarning might have saved constructivism such an expensive detour:

*"If formal togetherness is reduced to mere existential juxtaposition, the universe is fragmented into as many realities as there are perspectives."*<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Wendt does attribute some space in his critique to the quantum brain hypothesis, which strengthens the case for quantum behaviour in individual brains (*Cartesian Science, op. cit.* pp. 193-196). However, beyond the point that quantum brains would play host to billions of quantum particles, each capable of measuring the quantum particles in other quantum brains, the quantum brain hypothesis does not add much to the present reflection. Suffice it to note for the immediate purpose, that brains potentially act as the "gateway" between physical and quantum and that the secret lies almost certainly in the brain.

<sup>209</sup> Kraus, E. M. 1998. *The Metaphysics of Experience...* *op. cit.* pp. 61-62.

<sup>210</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science...", *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 201.

<sup>211</sup> *idem.*

<sup>212</sup> Kraus, E. M. 1998. *The Metaphysics of Experience...* *op. cit.* p. 62.

Wendt's own discussion of the quantum-IR hypothesis as I like to call it is significantly more complex and exhaustive than my own. Where I will suffice my discussion with the conclusion that we could perhaps postulate a collective unconscious that functions within the quantum realm and that may provide a better and more comprehensive understanding of the unconscious transference of memory when it may seem as though some memories have been long forgotten, Wendt goes on to consider the possibility of a quantum collective conscious.<sup>213</sup> For the very reasons that quantum laws no longer apply following wave function collapse, I will not treat this conjecture with much importance. It is, however, stimulating to pose yet another unanswerable question at this point, being "*what is the relationship between conscious and unconscious?*" The unconscious is not insignificant to social science. Much of Freudian psychoanalysis ascribes identity construction to unconscious processes, though Wendt would qualify his own interpretation of the unconscious as "understood not in the narrow, Freudian sense of something repressed, but in the more general sense of all the background knowledge we have about ourselves and our environment"<sup>214</sup> (*a priori* knowledge.) If the unconscious, then, feeds into the conscious, perhaps Wendt is vindicated in calling for consideration of a collective conscious where the collective conscious feeds off unconscious data that is essentially a perpetual flux of measurements between wave functions, while structuring action, identification and reason. For this premise to work, we need to accept that a wave function will collapse into a metaphysical collective. Although I do agree with Wendtian holism and the assertion that "groups can have 'collective intentionality' irreducible to their members,"<sup>215</sup> I remain unconvinced by his attempt to situate collective intentionality at the collapsed physical level. In my view, the collective will remain subatomic and is vehicled by individual consciousness in the realm of the physical. If, as I argued above, the individual *is* at the subatomic level the social, then I have difficulty accepting Wendt's need to translate the collective unconscious to the conscious. Is this not a form of reductionism, then? Am I not reducing the collective to its individual members in arguing that *quantum* is the playground of the collective? No, because the individual is above all and before anything else, *the collective*. One reality, many individuals. All part of the same Whiteheadian togetherness.

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<sup>213</sup> Wendt, A. "*Social Theory as Cartesian science...*," *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* pp. 203-204.

<sup>214</sup> *ibid.* p. 198.

<sup>215</sup> *ibid.* p. 202.

Fundamentally constructivist, Wendt further searches for a quantum approach to identity construction by referring to a hybrid "quantum game theory." An in-depth discussion of quantum game theory is not useful for this paper,<sup>216</sup> thus I will only mention some of Wendt's conclusions. Given the argument that it is, from a quantum perspective, not identity that determines action, but rather that identity and action arise simultaneously from wave function collapse which gives birth to consciousness - and by extension, a will to action - Wendt holds that cooperation under quantum conditions is much easier to achieve exactly because "quantum decision makers' [have] indeterminate and entangled properties and strategies before action."<sup>217</sup> Cooperation is easier to achieve because action takes place at the same time as identity is constructed, thus action and identity may be tailored to one another. Moreover, if indeed it is true that we "feel" the future through temporal non-locality, then decision makers should be able to integrate their unconscious knowledge of the future outcome of the action into their strategies.

Owing to its probabilistic *versus* exact nature, and certainly given the novelty of combining a hard science with the fuzz that is the human sciences, current prospects for testing the hypotheses advanced in this section are zero to none and, by this virtue, I am discouraged to admit that this chapter contributes little more than ideational alternatives from which to explain certain abnormalities. It should hardly be a surprise. Nonetheless, it is my opinion that the foregoing exploration of the quantum link provides a viable alternative explanation for contradictory or anomalous observations of South African foreign relations. Working with some of the assumptions that have arisen from the foregoing discussion, I will conclude this section with a short hypothetical application of the theory to analyse South African foreign policy. Rather than attempting to provide empirical proof to corroborate the quantum hypothesis, I will concentrate on exploring what the hypothesis might mean for foreign policy analysis and to provide some recommendations for future research.

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<sup>216</sup> The interested reader is referred to Wendt's sources: Arfi, B. "Resolving the trust predicament: a quantum game theoretic approach," in *Theory and Decision*, 58(1), 2005, pp. 1-48; Barad, K. "Posthumanist performativity: toward an understanding of how matter comes to matter," in *Signs*, 28(3), 2003, pp. 801-831; Zak, M. "Quantum decision-maker," in *Information sciences*, 128(3-4), 2000, pp. 199-215.

<sup>217</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science...," *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 203.



### iii. Quantifying South African foreign policy

From the quantum hypothesis, I take three important assumptions from which to approach yet another reading of the South African foreign policy document. First, I have argued that time should be approached not as a linear continuum with a clearly delineated past, present and future, but rather as a "Big Bang" explosion that forces an instantaneous repetition of all past occurrences or occasions, plus a novel occurrence or occasion, where it furthermore makes sense only to speak of probable future(s.) To reformulate this in symbolic language,<sup>218</sup> and accepting the Copenhagen Interpretation of a single outcome based on the choice of the best possible alternative, the present ( $P$ ) equals the sum ( $\sigma$ ) of past occurrences ( $O$ ) plus a deviation representing the new occurrence ( $n$ ), thus:

$$P = \sigma O + n$$

I have further noted that, owing to its probabilistic nature rather than exactitude, it is impossible to determine the future ( $F$ ) because  $F$  is a collection of infinite possibilities, each a further deviation from  $\sigma O + n$ . Expressing  $F$  symbolically would thus take on the following form:

$$F = P + \infty n$$

The non-symbolic implication of the experiment for South African foreign policy is intensely interesting. In fact, given that the past *is* the future, and that past occurrences are assimilated into the present occurrence as if it were part thereof, South Africa is not simply a victim of *past* injustice as it states in its discourse, but it experiences past injustices *as if* they were actual events. The narcissistic injury is not simply a memory of injustices past but is perpetually inflicted anew on the South African *ego* as it emerges from wave function collapse. Not only is Europe the Other *sine qua non* of South African identity, it is the perpetrator of an injustice that South Africa experiences *as if* it was *actually* occurring. Thus, South Africa's vilification of Europe

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<sup>218</sup> This is neither a mathematical nor a quantum mechanics equation. It is a logical notation (signature) to express in symbols my thinking and to facilitate further discussion without having to revert to the full ordinary semantic formulation at each revisiting. *Idem* for any further such formulations.

as demonstrated in the previous chapter, is not a simple process of differentiation based on transferred memory, it is an instantaneous reaction to a perceived attack on the *ego*, its integrity and its personal security. This, then, explains why South Africa would take on and maintain its neorealist offensive-defensive position in the international political sphere as I have shown to be the case in the first section: its foreign policy is made from this subconscious<sup>219</sup> perception of a threat that it experiences as real and current. This conclusion reinforces both levels of argumentation advanced in previous sections simultaneously. That is, from this perspective, South African foreign policy could be analysed from both the neorealist- and the constructivist paradigms as two sides of the same coin produced at the moment that consciousness emerges. This explanation would further complete the quantum argument that wave function collapse or decoherence into consciousness both constructs identity and causes a will to action.

So arises another set of questions, introducing the second assumption that I retain from the foregoing discussion of the quantum-IR hypothesis for application to South African foreign policy analysis: "*Why, then, do we have change?*" If life is a perpetual repetition of past facts that condition the present, why is it at all possible for South Africa to cooperate with Europe or to change its corporate identity and its international alliances? Why do interests change, and why do loyalties shift? The answer comprises a two-part explanation. First, to return to my logical expression of time on the previous page,  $+n$  would represent a deviation from  $\sigma O$  at each occurrence. Thus, if we were to present successive occurrences as beads on a string, to borrow again from Kraus's discussion of Whitehead,<sup>220</sup> then each new occurrence  $+n$  would curve ever so slightly the trajectory of the string so that no two concentric beads of occurrence would ever be in line with the previous or the next. New occurrence  $+n$  is thus the manifestation of change. The explanation for *why*  $+n$  alters the course of occurrences, I shall recall the discussion on free will as a principle of quantum theory: with each new occurrence  $+n$ , a choice is made concerning the

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<sup>219</sup> Note the use of the word subconscious as neither *unconscious* nor *conscious*. We have returned here, in the perception of its reality, to the classical physical state following wave function collapse. I would argue, though, that the perception of the threat is not entirely conscious either, as from plain observation, South Africa is no longer a European colony. Rather, without any empirical evidence to support my claim, I would argue that the perception subconsciously exercises an influence on South African agency.

<sup>220</sup> Kraus, E. M. 1998. *The Metaphysics of Experience... op. cit.* pp. 23-24.

appropriate action to take against the synthesised data accumulated from past occurrences  $\sigma O$ . To situate the South African case in Wendt's<sup>221</sup> account of reflexivity from a quantum perspective, thereby introducing the third and final assumption that I will retain, South African foreign policy toward Europe like any other state is influenced at the unconscious level by a large amount of measurements between entangled particles in the quantum realm. As an irreducible part of the larger whole, *society*, South African foreign policy is in some way *first* a collective "strategy," becoming distinct only upon wave function collapse when it remains part of the whole, but takes on a second, superposed identity as an individual state with its own version of the collective strategy. From this perspective we would be able to explain the almost schizophrenic single reference to "shared" interests between South African and Europe in the Draft White Paper that:

*"Bilateral relations with European Nations in general extend considerably beyond political, diplomatic and trade relations, finding expression through [...] shared values around democracy and human rights."*<sup>222</sup>

If Europe is as much of a villain as South Africa perceives it to be, then explaining this inconsistency according to the material-positivist approach and according to the cognitive-constructivist approach is problematic: from the first approach, it is difficult to explain why South Africa would cooperate with Europe on the flowery shared values of democracy and human rights when it has only egocentric interests and concerns for security. To this, we may hold the constructivist argument that social learning can take place and can influence identification with European values of democracy and human rights such that South Africa is willing to make exceptions on this specific topic. This is, from the perspective of identity construction theory, unlikely since, as I have shown, a positive conception of the Self requires an absolute evil Other against which to construct the positive Self. Identifying positively with an evil Other gives occasion to a frightful psychosis. Moreover, South Africa's anomalous friendliness toward perceived undemocratic human rights abuser states such as China, Russia, Libya, Zimbabwe, Cuba among many others, poses a serious

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<sup>221</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science....," *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* pp. 206-207.

<sup>222</sup> Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, *op. cit.* p. 31.

problem to the coherence of such an argument. Thus, I would argue that the explanation lies outside of these theories and, to refer to Wendt once more, we have in the quantum *unconsciousness* hypothesis a sort of collective understanding that arises from entanglement and that supports a shared *weltanschauung* that is ontologically prior to individual perspectives. However, if democracy and human rights were a basic, shared understanding of the greater society that constitutes the quantum whole, then why do the aforementioned human rights abusers abuse human rights? Simply: because they choose to do so at the moment of wave function collapse. If this is true, then why do some states choose to do right by the common understanding while others choose to deviate? Is goodness inherent to some states and the Achilles heel of others? No, because as consciousness emerges from wave function collapse for each classical physical state, the newly collapsed classical physical state feeds off of the data of previous occasions. Historic habits matter, but in a different way than before.

To bring together the foregoing line of thought before concluding on this chapter, change in new occasion  $+n$  requires first intentionality, where intentionality is the result of reflexivity. Wave functions are almost immeasurable in amount therefore wave function collapse could result in many overlapping classical physical states, including what Wendt calls a "Self" quantum wave function. Having a Self wave function implies that South Africa could, in theory, perform a "measurement of itself which induces a collapse toward novel outcomes."<sup>223</sup> Whether it chooses to engage in self-reflection and by default perform a self-measurement is another question for another thesis. The explanation for sources of change in South African foreign interests and alliances, more than the two possible sources discussed in the previous sections, lies in this complex conception of free will. Thus, the shift of South African interests and allegiance toward China and India would be a result of intentionality based on the action-reaction thesis posited above and would be conditioned by unconscious measurements of European agency, of observation between BRICS *et cetera*. My final observation on this point would be that, following initial intentional deviations in  $+n$  from  $\sigma O$ , and given the inevitable absorption and reabsorption *ad infinitum* of each  $+n$  into  $P$ , the deviation will eventually change the identity of  $P$  such that a return to  $\sigma O$  becomes almost impossible without new, intentional shifts in

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<sup>223</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science...", *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 207.

agency. As such, the shifting of the focus of South African foreign policy toward the global south and its increasingly hostile attitude toward Europe will continue along this path almost inevitably.

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Though the implications of the quantum-IR hypothesis for an analysis of South African foreign policy are exciting to say the least, empirical testing, corroboration and the establishment of verisimilitude is problematic.<sup>224</sup> As I pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, Q Methodology may well be the method to operationalise the quantum hypothesis in social science. In this regard, Paul Stenner makes the highly interesting conjecture that the Q Sort in Q Method "can be grasped as the deliberate staging of a Whiteheadian event or actual occasion in which the subject comes into being through 'feeling' their objects."<sup>225</sup> From this perspective, Q Method studies the subject not simply following the emergence of consciousness, but at the actual moment of wave function collapse. Moreover, I would argue that the method requires self-measurement and induces consciousness as such. I will not discuss the method in greater detail here, but will refer the interested reader to Stenner's article instead. A more important challenge to the quantum-IR approach, Wendt notes, is that "quantum social science could sometimes simply recapitulate or support existing social theories [...] quantum social science is just 'old wine in new bottles.'"<sup>226</sup> Indeed, if my initial reactions to months of research was an overwhelming and deflating "so what?" the actual writing of this chapter and more importantly, the conclusions that I have drawn here, have served to reiterate the interest if not the imperative of exploring the quantum thesis further. Should my hypothesis that the past is not simply the past, but is experienced *as if* it was actually happening reveal itself to have substance, then understanding state behaviour is rather more complex than simply looking at the material constraints of power and resources, and goes deeper than processes of identity construction based on state actions and reactions. *In fine*, the quantum-IR thesis is a challenge to uncover what exactly causes agency.

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<sup>224</sup> See also Wendt's discussion on epistemic difficulties related to a quantum social science, "Social Theory as Cartesian science...", *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* pp. 214-219.

<sup>225</sup> Stenner, P. "Q methodology as a constructivist methodology," in *Operant Subjectivity... op. cit.* p. 21 (Online version. Page numbering in print edition differs.)

<sup>226</sup> *ibid.* p. 219.

Given the importance accorded to time, the past, present and future in notably this chapter, the question may invariably arise as to why I failed to compare the most recent South African foreign policy document to past policy documents and in so doing, tracing the historical basis for current trends of the country's foreign relations. This is a valid question. To situate my response in the context of the foregoing discussion on the present as the sum of past occurrences plus a deviation, historical comparison could reveal to us how South African conceptions of reality today deviate from its conceptions of reality yesterday. In a sense, and referring specifically to recent studies on the nature of time particularly at the quantum level,<sup>227</sup> human discourse as the crystallisation of subjective impulses of the collapse from unconscious to conscious already contains in it all the necessary data of past occurrences such that the comparative study of policy documentation over time serves the purpose solely of measuring the passing of time. It reveals to us nothing more than deviance as the measurement of change. Though there is a legitimate space in foreign policy scholarship for the study of institutionalisms and their effect on decision-making, this paper did not have as its objective to measure change in South African foreign policy over time. Rather, its objective was fixed as aiming to discover why it is that the policy is described as suffering from schizophrenia, as well as the ways in which the South African experience of reality contributes to such schizophrenic foreign relations. Thus, a comparative study of changes in its foreign policy over time would have served little to no purpose in this study. Nonetheless, with this conjecture in mind, future studies on South African foreign policy could focus on the ways in which perceptions of political reality differ in the South African foreign policy discourse, thus tracing the different manifestations of (collective?) consciousness over time. Furthermore, accepting the entanglement hypothesis where the collective predates the individual state and where there exists a collective *Weltanschauung* conditioning individual action,<sup>228</sup> future comparative foreign policy studies could trace anomalous albeit convergent action in international politics, *id est*, convergent voting in international fora against national interests or historical alliances.

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<sup>227</sup> See Moreva, E., Brida, G., Gramegna, M., Giovanetti, V., Maccone, L., Genovese, M. "Time from quantum entanglement: An experimental illustration," in eprint arXiv:1310.4691, 17/10/2013, available online from Cornell University Library: <http://arxiv.org/abs/1310.4691>, last accessed on 24/05/2014 at 13h20; see also a discussion of the article in *The Physics arXiv Blog*: "Quantum Experiment Shows How Time 'Emerges' From Entanglement," <https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933>, last accessed on 24/05/2014 at 13h26.

<sup>228</sup> Where "individual" signifies "the state."

# Conclusion

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Departing from the widely accepted description of South African foreign policy as "schizophrenic," this paper had as its objective answering the question *"how do the tensions between South Africa's multiple realities contribute to its perceived "schizophrenic" foreign policy and how can a multitier approach assist in better understanding South Africa's relations with Europe?"* To this end, I have argued that a thorough analysis of South African foreign relations necessitates a three-level approach where each level should be seen as part of a larger whole such that any one level only partially explains policy decisions (agency) and influences other levels in important ways. Thus, I have advanced a three-tiered model, comprising a surface, material level of analysis, a second, deeper level located in the process of identity construction and a third subatomic level, located in the unconscious. In this conclusion, I propose a summary of the conclusions that are to be drawn from this paper by tracing back the line of argumentation in reverse order before generalising the findings for possible applications beyond the scope of the current study.

If the paper departed from the axiom that South African foreign policy and its schizophrenia are the products of multiple competing if not irreconcilable realities, then the quantum approach has demonstrated that reality cannot be "juxtaposed" as to split the irreducible whole into as many different parts as there are perspectives. Though individuality and individual perspectives or experiences of reality represent an important part of the larger, interconnected whole, individual experiences or perspectives in no way constitute a reality of their own as constructivist literature might have suggested. In this regard, I shall recall my conclusion "One reality, many individuals. All part of the same Whiteheadian togetherness." Taken from the quantum understanding of entangled wave functions as the basis of all being, individuation and individual experiences of the external reality only take shape after wave function collapse or decoherence into classical physical states. And it is this individual consciousness as distinct from, but part of, the collective unconscious that leads to different perceptions of the single reality "out there" as it were, which in turn gives way to differentiated will to (state) action. State agency is thus already conditioned at least in part before the birth of consciousness and is,

therefore, neither the complex product of action and reaction that follows the identification and differentiation mirror stage of identity construction as per Wendtian constructivism, nor the simple effect of power games and the quest for maximisation of material wealth as per the neorealist paradigm. Thus, I posited that the South African identity is formed at least partially by its status as an irreducible constituent of the quantum whole, where its interests are the interests of the greater unit. It is, in effect, first part of the general, undifferentiated society before it becomes a distinct state with a distinct identity and distinct interests. Moreover, I have shown that history is not simply the past but that the past, taken in the context of Whiteheadian process philosophy, is in fact part of the present *per se*. Thus, I have argued, the wounds of yesteryear are experienced by South Africa as though past injustices are in actuality being inflicted on the country today.

Following decoherence or wave function collapse, matter no longer behaves according to the laws of quantum physics, but is governed by the laws of classical physics. At this macro-level, then, we are free once again to apply the "traditional knowledge" of social science to state behaviour in our search to explain foreign policy decision-making. As such, I have argued that in order to fully understand *why* a state like South Africa may experience its external reality and certainly its international relations as volatile, malicious, threatening or selfish in certain situations under certain conditions, while in yet others it may perceive the same external reality as friendly, secure, cooperative and beneficial, we need to understand how its identity is constructed and how this identity conditions interest as per the Wendtian claim. Drawing on psychoanalytic theories of identity, we may assume that identity *is* what it *is not*. Speaking of an "identity" presupposes a dichotomous Other *sine qua non* from which to differentiate the Self, while aspiring to mirror the honourable qualities of yet another Other. Thus I have posited that South Africa constructs its own identity *against* Europe as the "evil" Other, while it may aspire to mimic the qualities of "admirable" states such as India and Brazil. More than its identification with- and differentiation from, however, I have taken from Lacanian thought the conclusion that by virtue of the incomplete achievement of a synthesis of the subject with its external reality (subject-object relationship,) identity is not only unstable as Wendt claimed, but it is never complete. The perpetual search for a complete, integrated and synthesised identity thus contributes to the flux of South African foreign policy orientations and international allegiances. Within this context, and as a partial explanation for seemingly anomalous behaviour on the part of the South African state in



international politics, I have introduced the argument that if we can speak of the "state as a person" in international politics, then we should look at personality theories to explain certain state behaviours. Thus, I have shown the South African personality as displaying some characteristics of the Narcissistic Personality, where the apparent externalisation of self-righteous rage is the product of a wound or injury to its narcissism. Furthermore, theories surrounding the Narcissistic Personality and its behaviour may, I have argued, explain South Africa's seemingly paradoxical double standards of combatting colonialism and exploitation by Europe in Africa, while simultaneously "taking advantage of" and "benefiting from" its own exploitation of African markets. While the constructivist paradigm aids our analysis of South African foreign policy in providing a clearer understanding of the aspirations of the country, or its interests, the theory simply does not accord enough importance to the effects of material constraints in international relations on state agency. Thus, I have suggested that any constructivist analysis of foreign policy would benefit from an accompanying neorealist analysis to account for physical dimensions of policy making *versus* a purely ideational conception thereof.

Having alluded to contemporary international relations as the political organisation of a world "ruled by the religion of money," I have argued that the neorealist paradigm allows for an approach of South African foreign policy making from within the material constraints of the physical world as part of the country's external reality. An analysis of South African identity and consequent interests thus reveals a disparity between policy objectives and real life policy outputs, leading to the inevitable description of a "schizophrenic foreign policy." If the country is so opposed to "evil" Europe and is so sceptical of Europe's intentions in Africa, why does it nonetheless bow the knee to European whims? Why side with the enemy, as it were? As I have remarked in the first section, South Africa simply does not have the resources - material or symbolic - to turn its back on Europe. By redefining "old" (neo)realism to broaden previous realist conceptions of security, conflict and power so that it corresponds better to the contemporary state of international affairs, I have shown that South African foreign policy preoccupations are indeed of the realist kind. I have argued that South Africa is engaged in a perpetual game of power on the international sphere, where state interests and aspirations are fundamentally incompatible and where states *de facto* constantly stand in conflict with one another. Though interstate wars have become the exception in international relations, new concerns to human wellbeing, such as poverty, food scarcity, energy- and financial crises, all pose a real threat to states in contemporary international

politics. State efforts to secure sufficient resources for the wellbeing of their citizens, therefore, represent a realist preoccupation with security, in turn fuelling competitions and conflicts. In this sense, I have shown that, although the South African foreign policy document reads almost like a neoliberal university textbook, a critical analysis of the document where concepts are read in context by taking into account the concepts to which they are attached, indeed supports the claim that the country's foreign relations are approached from a neorealist paradigm, though its policy objectives may be implemented using neoliberal tools. Moreover, South Africa's "less than equal" status in international relations, combined with its grandiose narcissistic ambitions, renders the country incapable of achieving in full its foreign policy objectives. In order to bridge the gap between its unfulfilled aspirations and its less-than-ideal capacities, I have argued that South Africa may seek to "join forces" with relatively more powerful states such as China, India and Russia to gain greater bargaining power in international negotiations, while its self-proclaimed status as the "voice of Africa" affords it the power of numbers in international fora. To further explain the South African perception of its reality as unstable, abusive and hostile, I have suggested incorporating theories of structural violence into the realist project, where the proffering of vital international funds for the purposes of development to a country like South Africa, under the conditions of certain political reforms that in ways threaten the existing political culture in the country, effectively constitutes a form of violence and has as its effect a country that acts like "a deer in the headlights." Here, the overwhelming economic power of richer actors, such as Europe, represents a threat to a relatively poorer country such as South Africa, thus validating the South African experience of reality as hostile and abusive.

Within the complex and delicate interplay between the three levels of analysis, each with its own *raison d'être* yet each inseparable from the other, my arguments reveal the description of South African foreign policy as "schizophrenic" as fallaciously self-evident and, by virtue, render the ontological component of the research question misguided. As I have shown, there is only one reality "out there," although individual experiences of that same reality differ greatly. Moreover, I have hypothesised that, as much as state interests are conditioned by state identity, identity is never fully achieved at the level of the conscious and subconscious. The identity problem is exacerbated by the fact that, more than the physical subject-object identification-differentiation problem, identity is partially constructed in the unconscious realm of quantum where the individual state is the whole of society. Thus, even if the Self were to find the symbolic object through which to fully

and completely represent its subjective *id*, its identity would never be complete because it is split between conscious and unconscious. And, accepting that "states are people too," states should logically have personalities, which in turn means that states could suffer from personality disorders that cause anomalous behaviour and pervasive instability in relationships with other states. Added to this extremely complex subjective experience of reality, South Africa is constrained by its physical limitations as a "less-than-equal" equal sovereign state with grand aspirations and little hope of achieving its aims. In addition, international politics is an opera performed by different divas at the same time, each one suffering from personality disorders and disruptive narcissism. Given the inherently unstable nature of identity and interests by extension, South African foreign policy cannot be anything other than schizophrenic. The very South African identity is schizophrenic. And one can only get out of something what has been put into it. To rephrase this idea in Wendt's conclusions from his own quantum-IR thesis, identity is no longer identical to itself because the parts of reality are no longer separable.<sup>229</sup> In fact, by the very virtue of this conclusion, expectations for South African foreign policy to be homogenous and coherent are in themselves schizophrenic wishes. The real question that arises from this conclusion is not *why South Africa isn't aware of its schizophrenia*, but rather *why analysts find it so surprising that South African foreign policy is so schizophrenic*. The answer to this question is articulated in the research design and simultaneously answers the epistemological component of the research question:

*South African foreign policy analysis has hitherto been handicapped by overly simplistic observations from the simplistic view of policy making as the simple product of actions, interactions and reactions which can be approached either from a realist-liberal paradigm or from a constructivist paradigm and which will furnish simple conclusions on which to make policy recommendations that will never be adequately adapted to the complexity of reality.*

To conclude this paper with some final remarks and perchance a few generalisations for similar future research, any thorough analysis of a state's foreign policy will need to take into account the three levels of experience of reality outlined in this model, while remaining sensitive to Putnam's two level games. Approaching foreign policy analysis from the paradigms of a single theoretical framework is certain to oversimplify the complexity of the conditions under which policy decision-making takes place, and would

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<sup>229</sup> Wendt, A. "Social Theory as Cartesian science...", *op. cit.*, in Guzzini *et al.* 2006. *op. cit.* p. 208.

*de facto* mask important influences that factor into state behaviour. Though the accurate paradigm from which to analyse other states' foreign policy constraints and experiences on the material-positivist level may differ for the reasons stated in the appropriate section, the majority of theoretical considerations employed to analyse the South African case can be extended to any other state inasmuch as identity is constructed in the exact same way for any state; any state is under at least some type of material constraint that impedes the full actualisation of its aspirations; and quantum law applies to the whole before anything else. Nature makes a choice, but it doesn't discriminate based on nationality. From the quantum hypothesis, and keeping in mind the Lacanian premise of language as a symbolic expression of the subjective unconscious, an interesting direction for future research would be to compare and contrast foreign policies of different states where it may be possible to find the first traces of a collective unconscious will to action. Should such an ambitious enterprise be undertaken however, it would be primordial to the integrity of the research that a thorough analysis in the same model as the one presented here be carried out first so as to determine factors for divergence and to avoid a biased interpretation of convergent ideation as stemming from the collective unconscious.

As I remarked in the introductory chapter to this paper, since the election into power of the African National Congress during South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, there has been as many changes in the political landscape as there hasn't been any. South Africa remains caught up in a liberation romanticism that is no longer applicable to its post-colonial relations with Europe and effectively harms the delicate relationship. Moreover, in continuing to "champion the cause of marginalised comrades" in spite of its blooming into political adulthood, the South African position on its foreign relations continues to suffer from irrevocable schizophrenia where the country is torn between its inevitable selfish interests and needs to remain competitive and relative in international relations, and its "best friends forever" approach to childhood friendships with countries of the South that have long since evolved into exploitative adult games of power. To be blunt, humanism and altruism are noble phenomenological qualities and it's nice that a state should have them, but the real world just doesn't work like that. Curiously, given that South African identity is perpetually reconstructed by a reliving of the past as a tangible present, its old wounds yet as fresh as they had been on the very first day they were inflicted, South Africa's schizophrenia is likely to persist well beyond the modern age even if it should decide to commit to assuming the new identity it is currently battling to suppress.

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# Annexe I: Transcription of the 2011 Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy

## Key

	Of or relating to South African exceptionalism, Narcissistic Personality
	Of or relating to identity and/or identification with the Other; characterisation
	Of or relating to a neoliberal worldview
	Of or relating to a neorealist worldview; relating to anarchy
	Of or relating to gains and benefits, particularly material in kind

## *Building a better world: The diplomacy of Ubuntu*

White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy: Final Draft<sup>230</sup>

### Foreword

In terms of South Africa's **liberation history**, its evolving international engagement is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity. South Africa recognises itself as an **integral part of the African continent** and therefore understands its national **interest** as being intrinsically linked to Africa's **stability**, unity, and **prosperity**. Likewise, the 1955 Bandung Conference shapes our understanding of **South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism** as a natural extension of our national **interest**.

In **preparing the country to become a winning nation** in the coming decades of the 21st century, our international relations work must endeavour to shape and strengthen our national identity; cultivate our national pride and patriotism; address the **injustices of our past**, including those of race and gender; bridge the divides in our society to ensure social cohesion and **stability**; and **grow the economy** for the development and **upliftment of our people**.

South Africa strives to promote its national **interest** in a complex and fast-changing world. The impact of these **complexities and changes** must be factored in to the nation's **work to achieve a better life for its people both at home and in a regional and continental context**.

### Notes

Struggle mentality
Interests linked to security; material gain/wellbeing
"winning nation" ?
victim
security; material wealth
instability Narcissistic grandiosity: Mandela factor

<sup>230</sup> This is a transcription of the original Draft White Paper. Care has been taken to ensure its conformity with the original format however, page numbers will not correspond to the original documents. Emphasis has been added to highlight conceptually important key terms or connections and do not correspond to the original



The business of national **interest** cannot be the purview of the state alone, but it can encourage an enabling environment of dialogue and discourse among all stakeholders to interrogate policies and **strategies**, and their application in the best **interests** of the people. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation therefore undertakes to conduct its business of managing South Africa’s international relations ever **mindful of its responsibility to the people it represents, even beyond the nation’s borders**.

**PREAMBLE**

**DIPLOMACY OF UBUNTU**

**South Africa is a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial country** that embraces the concept of Ubuntu as a way of defining who we are and how we relate to others. The philosophy of Ubuntu means ‘humanity’ and is reflected in the idea that **we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others**. It has played a major role in the forging of a **South African national consciousness** and in the process of its democratic transformation and nation-building.

**Since 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment**. South Africa has risen to the challenge and **plays a meaningful role in the region, on the continent and globally**.

South Africa’s **unique approach** to global issues has found expression in the concept of Ubuntu. These concepts inform our **particular approach** to diplomacy and shape **our vision of a better world for all**.

This philosophy translates into an approach to international relations that **respects all nations, peoples, and cultures**. It recognises that it is in our national **interest** to promote and support the **positive development of others**. Similarly, national **security** would therefore depend on the centrality of **human security** as a **universal goal** based on the **principle of Batho Pele (putting people first)**. In the modern world of globalisation, a constant element is and has to be our **common humanity**. We therefore **champion collaboration, cooperation and building partnerships** over **conflict**. This recognition of our **interconnectedness and interdependency**, and the infusion of Ubuntu into the South African identity, shapes our foreign policy.

South Africa therefore accords central importance to our immediate African neighbourhood and continent; **working with countries of the South to address shared challenges of**

Universal Mandela
<p>Inclusive; not exclusive like Europe.</p> <p>Humanist, not selfish &amp; driven by material gain</p>
<p>Exceptional responsibility;</p> <p>Only SA can save Africa from its fate</p>
<p>As opposed to rest of the selfish world</p>
<p>Unlike oppressive Europe, supports universal good. Humanist values linked to selfish desire for security</p> <p>Liberal values linked to aspirations of grandeur.</p>
<p>Gateway between North &amp; South</p>

underdevelopment; promoting global equity and social justice; working with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for a better world; and doing our part to strengthen the multilateral system, including its transformation, to reflect the diversity of our nations, and ensure its centrality in global governance.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In a fast-changing and interdependent world, it is essential for South Africa to regularly make an evaluation of its foreign policy and to ensure that its national interests are maximised. Foreign policy is not an abstract matter separate from domestic policies and as such South Africa ensures that these inform its foreign policy.

Remaining loyal to the constitutional principles that have inspired South Africa since 1994, our foreign policy is currently based on the primacy of the African continent and the Southern African Development Community; commitment to South-South cooperation; the centrality of multilateralism; consolidating relations with the North; and the strengthening of bilateral social, political and economic relations.

In her Budget Vote Speech of 22 March 2010, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, reiterated the need for South Africa's foreign policy to be "assessed against the weight of rising expectations". She also reflected on the critical role of foreign policy in meeting domestic priorities.

South Africa is committed to pursuing a more focused and effective foreign policy. As principal adviser on foreign policy issues, the Department coordinates the implementation of South Africa's international relations. To this end, the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) as an integral part of the Department will enhance South Africa's international cooperation and implementation of development and humanitarian assistance programmes.

Furthermore, in the spirit of a more inclusive and open foreign policy approach, it is the intention to further engage key stakeholders by establishing the South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) as a forum for interaction with the Department on foreign policy development and implementation, with the aim of creating dynamic partnerships for development and cooperation.

The name change in 2009 from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation reflects the Department's role in building deeper and more expansive relations and using these partnerships to advance South Africa's national interests. This approach

SA can make the difference that's needed
volatility/instability selfish/self-centered
Grandiose feeling of high expectations
Inclusive actor, not isolationist/ oppressive like Europe

promotes foreign policy alignment with South Africa’s domestic and developmental **needs, particularly to create a better life for all South Africans.**

South Africa’s foreign policy takes into account the ever-evolving global environment in which we operate in order to respond effectively to our domestic imperatives. Effective policy development is essential for the **survival** and **prosperity** of any country in the global system. Governments are faced with complex and ever rapidly occurring global inflection points and **must make key strategic decisions** that will determine a country’s **future prosperity, standing and influence** in the world. South Africa’s foreign policy responses continue to be shaped by its history and the evolution of its foreign and domestic policies since 1994. In this regard, South Africa contributes towards the **transformation** of the global system of governance from **power-based** to a **rules-based system in a just and equitable global order.**

Since the birth of democratic South Africa in 1994, the country has **prioritised an Afro- centric foreign policy rooted in national liberation, the quest for African renewal, and efforts to negate the legacy of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism.** This resulted in **major and ambitious** African initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and support for the transition of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002.

South Africa’s foreign policy was evaluated against the government’s priorities and objectives in the Fifteen Year Review of South Africa’s Foreign Policy for the period 1994 to 2009. This evaluation assessed progress made, but also identified shortcomings and challenges in order to enable the Department to contribute more effectively to government initiatives. The review highlighted the Department’s **dedication to the eradication of poverty and to end the marginalisation of the poor,** not only in South Africa, but **throughout the world.**

South Africa has **embraced multilateralism** as an approach to solve **challenges** confronting the international community. In this regard, it **took up a leading role in various multilateral fora,** including SADC, the AU, NAM, G77+China, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations, **championing the cause of developing countries and Africa in particular.** As a non-permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 2007-2008 and for the period 2001-2012, South Africa promoted peace and security with **emphasis on Africa** and improving cooperation between the UNSC and regional organisations such as the AU Peace and Security Council. (Emphasis added.)

Foreign relations to maximise own gain
<p>security/wealth</p> <p>influence power</p> <p>South Africa as <i>sine qua non</i> for a better world</p>
<p>Construction of identity as eternal victim</p> <p>Professing its own high achievements</p>
<p>Relating to structural violence</p> <p>Universal Mandela</p>
<p>Inclusive identity</p> <p>Liberal values again attached to achievement; SA as Africa's only hope</p>

South Africa's foreign policy takes cognisance of the **socio-economic realities** that continue to prevail in the country. South Africa remains deeply marked by its **historical legacy**, and economic disparities still prevail. South Africa's economy continues to be characterised by great **inequality**. The developed component of this economy with its large capital-intensive firms, modern and outward-looking orientation has been best placed to take advantage of trade liberalisation and macroeconomic stability. Parts of the country have advanced physical infrastructure and sophisticated financial, ICT and telecommunications networks, comparable to that of the developed world. (Emphasis added.)

The underdeveloped section of the economy comprises the majority of the population, who are largely disadvantaged and unskilled. Sections of the country represent poverty comparable with that of Least Developed Countries. Despite increased spending in social services and a steady increase in GDP growth, South Africa continues to face both **structural** and social **challenges**. In this regard, South Africa has identified key areas which include education, health, rural development and land reform, creation of decent jobs, and crime prevention.

The government is committed to narrowing the enormous gap between rich and poor through a set of comprehensive policy measures such as new industrial development programmes, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), skills development, and social grants.

Although tangible but moderate **economic growth** and the **stable** internal and external macro-economic situation, unemployment remains one of the most pressing domestic issues. The opening up of the economy has reduced the importance of some sectors while boosting other less labour-intensive sectors. Annually, a growing number of unskilled youth are entering the labour market without access to economic opportunities. South Africa also continues to attract economic migrants.

Despite the complex economic challenges facing South Africa, it is nevertheless the most developed economy on the continent. South Africa's investment and trade with African countries have increased dramatically since 1994, and **South Africa is now the largest investor in Africa**.

## 2. THE MANDATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION

International relations are conducted against a long and rich history of diplomacy between states. **Diplomatic norms and practices** have been developed over the centuries across cultures and political ideologies, and are now widely accepted universally. **In accordance with international law and practice,**

Material preoccupations. victim
Structural violence
Exploitation for personal gains & security
SA as Africa's benefactor, yet unaware (?) of its own exploitation of Africa

the conduct and coordination of international relations have been the responsibility of the foreign ministries and reflected in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.

In line with this practice, the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, empowers the President, as head of the national executive, to formulate national policies and assigns cabinet portfolios. Thus, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation is tasked to formulate, promote, and execute South Africa's foreign policy. The Minister assumes overall responsibility for all aspects of South Africa's international relations in consultation with the President. The Department is the principal adviser on foreign policy, and lead coordinator and manager of South Africa's international relations and cooperation.

The Department and its Missions abroad carry out its mandate by:

- Aligning, coordinating, and managing South Africa's international relations and related activities;
- monitoring **developments in the international environment**, including the provision of early **warning** to political principals;
- formulating foreign policy options;
- **protecting** South Africa's sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- conducting economic diplomacy;
- conducting public diplomacy;
- establishing and managing structures and mechanisms for achieving foreign policy objectives;
- managing development cooperation and partnerships;
- advising on international law matters and acting as custodian for all South Africa's international agreements; and
- providing consular services.

#### 4. SOUTH AFRICA'S VALUES AND NATIONAL INTERESTS: BORN IN STRUGGLE <sup>231</sup>

The **values** that inspire and guide South Africa as a nation are deeply rooted in the **long years of struggle for liberation**. As a **beneficiary of many acts of selfless solidarity** in the past, South Africa believes strongly that what it wishes for its people should be what it **wishes for the citizens of the world**. Its national **interest** can thus be articulated as **people-centred**, including promoting the **well-being, development and upliftment** of its people; **protecting the planet for future generations**; and **ensuring the prosperity of the country, its region and continent**. In pursuing our national **interests**, our decisions are informed by **a desire for a just, humane and equitable world order of greater security, peace, dialogue and economic justice**.

The values that inspired the creation of a free and democratic South Africa are enduring because they have transcended time

Self-victimisation+ Struggle mentality
Eternal victim Return the favour Mandela of the whole world  Unlike oppressive Europe; yet driven by own gains  Wants good unlike evil Europe

<sup>231</sup> This is, in fact, chapter 3 of the Draft White Paper. The error appears in the original Draft Paper and has not been changed for the purposes of this study.

and **conflict**. **Equality, democracy and human rights** were entrenched in documents such as the Freedom Charter, which **emphasises that non-racialism, non-discrimination, liberty and peace, democratic organs of self-government and equality** are essential to achieve the common objective of a “South Africa that belongs to all who live in it, black and white”.

These values inspired thousands during **the struggle years** and have been entrenched in the founding provisions of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The Constitution, **one of the most progressive in the world**, affirms the **aspirations of South African society to live in human dignity, equality, and freedom**.

Foreign policy, being an extension of national policy and **interests**, is an important component in South Africa’s **strategy** for **development and social purposes**. Creating a **better South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world** encapsulates and conceptualises a South African foreign policy that enables the country to be a good international citizen. As **the country engages with its region, continent and the international community**, it seeks to build an environment in which it can **realise its national socio-economic agenda as well as its political and security interests**.

Reflecting national **interest**, South Africa’s foreign policy recognises that states are **interdependent and promotes cooperation** over **competition** and **collaboration** over **confrontation**. In this context is committed to **development partnerships** around the world. It draws on the **spirit of internationalism, pan-Africanism, South-South solidarity; the rejection of colonialism and other forms of oppression; the quest for the unity and economic, political and social renewal of Africa; the promotion of poverty alleviation around the world; and opposition to the structural inequality and abuse of power in the global system**. South Africa further pursues democracy within the international system of governance.

At times, South Africa faces the challenge of balancing its national **interests** against **global realities** in a **rapidly changing world**. Our foreign policy imperatives will need to be able to address and manage these dynamics.

## 5. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: DRIVERS AND TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM

Drivers and trends constitute the forces that significantly **influence** world affairs and will therefore play an important role in determining how South Africa conducts its international relations. Successful foreign policy implementation requires that countries take into account the **ever-changing environment** in which they operate.

Mandela factor  SA as the ultimate do-gooder
Struggle mentality  Exceptional Mandela factor
Linked to security & material gain; Africa as SA's narcissistic pet  Liberal engagement linked to security & gains
Characterisation as liberator and leader of poor, oppressed, exploited South; Universal Mandela  Structural violence
unstable, volatile anarchic world
unstable/insecure



Poverty and underdevelopment remain the most prevalent **challenge** facing our region and continent. Central to South Africa's national **interest** is to address the challenge of **eradicating poverty, developing its people and creating prosperity not only in South Africa but also in the region and continent.**

We are in a period of **convergence** of a number of trends that are leading to major **shifts in global political, economic and social/cultural dynamics**: such as demographics; climate change. Therefore, in order for South Africa to be effective in meeting its **challenges**, it must shape its domestic and foreign policies to respond to global drivers and trends that are influencing the international system.

These influences have varying impacts in different parts of the world and include, without order of priority: **demographics**; realignment of new **economic powers**; new media and social networks; innovation; **environmental change**; heightened demand for **scarce resources**; and **changing nature of conflict** and **insecurity**.

### **Demographics**

The world population continues to grow at a steady pace, with changes in population profiles that are concerned with population composition (e.g. age, race, gender and population size) and patterns. The **increased population growth** is apparent in the developing world, whilst the developed world population is decreasing and **rapidly aging**. These demographic changes are **putting pressure** on the sustainability of welfare systems, **vital natural resources**, infrastructure, services, and the labour market. The youth bulge in the developing world offers both social and economic opportunities in terms of larger markets, labour force and economic tax base. However, if skills development and youth employment remain unaddressed, this creates the risk of **social and political instability**. It is estimated that more than half of the world's population is urbanised; however, infrastructure lags behind population growth. Increased urbanisation continues to fuel an increase in the number of megacities.

The **tension** between population growth and labour demand continues to encourage **migration flows**. Economic migration, both documented and undocumented, **present major challenges to states** and communities that experience a measure of economic growth. **States with aging populations**, however, will **have to find ways to absorb a younger workforce**. Given the rising **perception that multiculturalism is failing**, there is the attendant **risk of increased pressures** of **xenophobia, racism** and **insecurity**.

Security threats;  Gains drive; Universal Mandela
instability
New security threats  Anarchy
Wholly linked to insecurity, anarchy, hostility and volatility
threats  Europe as old, declining power; unable to adapt to new standards & practices

**Realignment of economic power**

The rise of **new economic powers** is influencing a shift in the **balance of the global distribution of power**. As these **emerging economic powers assert their positions** and seek to **increase their influence** in global affairs, **new economic and political groupings are formed**. As a consequence, the primary forces of this driver include new **global markets; redirection in trade and investment flows; globalizing labour market; realignment of economic alliances**; increase in social **divisions**; new consumption patterns and production networks.

**Globalisation** continues to shape the world at an accelerating pace. People, businesses and governments are interlinked across the borders of the nation-state. Trade, global finance, and migration have encouraged decades of economic growth. Global economic **imbalances**, the **global economic crisis**, **climate change**, and **insecurity** are bringing the **vulnerabilities** of globalisation to the fore. Global growth is **characterised by growing inequalities** with the social divide between rich and poor widening.

The global economic **crisis** has **accelerated the change in balance of economic and political power** towards the emerging economies and it is expected that this trend will continue. The **rules and institutions of the 20th century global economic and trading system** are **in a state of flux**. This includes a reassessment of the role of the state, with alternative models of state intervention being tested. Underlying global **imbalances** may lead to further **currency volatility and protectionist tendencies**. Trading patterns are shifting to new markets, with a notable growth in South-South trade between the emerging economies. Regional and preferential trading arrangements are proliferating, leading to

Certain middle and regional **powers** have emerged as lynchpin states through **like-minded alliances** and **power blocs**. These **new powers challenge the established political order** and place **pressure** on international organisations to reflect new political realities or **risk** irrelevance. **Vested power interests** are opposed to the diminution of their **power** and may **provoke rivalries and competition** amongst the **new powers**.

The process of globalisation has had **major implications** for cultures. The **dilemma** that has emerged across the world is the extent to which **globalisation threatens existing cultures**. In the 1990s, the dominant ideology was to recast the world in a neo-liberal paradigm. However, the new **emerging powers have pursued alternative models of development consistent with their own cultural norms**.

<p>Power games, quest for influence</p> <p>Liberal outputs</p> <p>linked to gains, both material &amp; symbolic (influence)</p>
<p>Globalisation as threat, source of instability; anarchy</p>
<p>instability, threat</p> <p>volatile</p> <p>structural violence, new conflicts</p>
<p>Wholly related to power games</p>
<p>Globalisation as sources of instability &amp; threat</p> <p>Identity construction through difference &amp; identification</p>



***Innovation***

Scientific and technological innovation is a key driver of change. Businesses and civil society have been more successful than governments in harnessing its benefits. Rapid innovation in information and communications technology has transcended international **increased intra regional trade to the exclusion of others. Discriminatory global agricultural trading arrangements and protectionist policies continue to be an obstacle to the development of African agricultural production.** boundaries and regulatory systems, empowering the rapid flow of information, ideas and capital across the world. Developments in the sphere of biotechnology can hold great **benefits for humankind** through the production of medicines and vaccines. Similarly, nanotechnology **offers many benefits**, while green technology has the potential to change patterns of production and consumption. However, these same innovations can be **exploited** with **malicious** intent with potentially **destructive** consequences.

Although **the developed world continues to be the primary originator of innovation**, there is **increasing competition** from the major emerging economies of the South. This is linked to an **aggressive pursuit of intellectual property rights protection by originators** to protect their **global competitive advantage**. This protectionism continues to be **used against demands for technology transfer for development**. However, emerging economies may gain momentum by leapfrogging existing technologies and platforms by using their **financial power** to acquire high-tech companies of the North. Developing countries will continue to secure partnerships in order to ensure relevant technology transfers for development in critical areas, such as health and education.

***New media and social networks***

Rapid technological change has created social media networks that are changing the manner in which societies operate today. The ***distribution of the power of information and media*** has brought elements of society closer together, **created more interdependence**. The information society continues to expand its reach to the developing world. Globalised social media and networks **empower the individual, strengthening democratisation and transparency**.

New media technologies facilitate the proliferation of national and global social networks of individuals and organisations with **shared interests**. The **convergence of information platforms, global mass media and social networking empowers the free flow of information and ideas** which can have an impact on governance, economic activity and mobilization across social, cultural, religious and national boundaries. **Control of all this**

<p>Relating almost solely to the EU; characterisation as oppressive, guilty of marginalisation</p> <p>Preoccupation with material gains</p> <p>Hostile international system</p>
<p>Developed world as selfish; guilty of marginalisation &amp; structural violence</p>
<p>Linking liberal progress with games of power</p>
<p>Linking liberal</p>

**information** is the next frontier as comprehensive information management is in its infancy and **vulnerabilities** are **exploited** by states, nonstate actors and criminal networks, **creating new transnational threats**.

progress with insecurity and threat

***Environmental change***

Signposts of climate change include **environmental degradation**, desertification, melting of the icecaps, rising sea levels and more **volatile and extreme** weather patterns. Both natural and man-made environmental changes **impact on all aspects of *human development***. These changes will increasingly **hinder sustainable development** and have a significant **impact on the world’s social and economic systems**. The **negative impact** on agriculture as well as **food, water and energy security**, will lead to **instability**, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Economic development and urbanisation exacerbate the impact on the environment through increased pollution, waste **pressures** and changes in biological diversity. The world continues to be **unsustainably dependent** on fossil fuels for its energy.

Wholly related to perception of modern political reality as essentially hostile, threatening and dangerous; concerns almost all areas of new types of security threats in international relations.

Desertification is one of the greatest **challenges** to the developing world with a direct impact on the poor due to gradual loss of agricultural productivity **increasing famine and malnutrition**. The effects of a global food price **crisis** are **felt most acutely in the developing world**. Water is an essential but **scarce resource** that increasingly feels the **pressure** of population growth, urbanisation and environmental factors. Joint management of water resources continues to be addressed multilaterally but **unequal treaties** remain historical **obstacles** to the **equitable use** of water.

Characterisation of developing world as victims of collective overexploitation

Green technology and green jobs offer new opportunities for change. Environmental standards are increasingly globalised but **tensions** exist when the **use of environmental measures limits development in the developing world**.

Conflict as result of new security threats

***Heightened demand for scarce resources***

Countries dependent on oil will remain **vulnerable** to energy shocks and **instability** in oil-producing regions. Increased energy demands carry the potential of inter- and intra-state **competition** thereby heightening the **risk of tensions** over access to these **scarce resources**. This **competition** will have implications for global geopolitics as **major powers seek to secure** sustainable energy sources **for their economic development**. This **scarcity** has necessitated a reappraisal of alternative technologies such as nuclear, solar and wind. Additionally, a **growing demand** exists for mineral resources as the emerging economies **compete** with the established industrialised economies. There are opportunities and **threats** in increased demand for resources which allow supplier countries to **leverage their new influence** to affect supply and demand in

Wholly related to neorealist security threats, competition over scarce resources and quest to attain maximum share of resources.

Influence as power

the global economy.

Increased demand and limited supply of scarce resources is driving up commodity prices and fuelling a **scramble for resources in Africa** and Latin America. The raw material supply chain of the 20th century is under **pressure** to change as demand increases rapidly in Asia and **established colonial linkages** are **challenged by the emerging powers**. Demand also increases the **leverage of supplier countries** to introduce beneficiation policies and export quotas **to stimulate local economic growth**. Europe and America will increasingly focus on ensuring the **security of supply** of the rare earth materials necessary for the new wave of green technologies, of which known reserves are concentrated in the emerging economies of Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa. The use of energy diplomacy and resource nationalism may lead to **increased tensions** between states.

### *Changing nature of conflict and insecurity*

In recent decades, the incidence of inter-state **conflict** has decreased, although resource driven **competition** may lead to its resurgence.

Due to **disruptions** in economic activity and **political instability**, intra-state **conflict** continues to frustrate sustainable development. The historical concepts of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs are coming under legal scrutiny in the search for suitable responses for intervention. Increasingly, **conflict** perpetrated by non-state actors takes on the form of **asymmetrical warfare**. The commercialisation of **state security, mercenaries and private security companies poses a challenge** given the lack of international regulation.

Ever-growing **dependence** on information technology also creates **vulnerability** with respect to **cyber warfare**. **Cyber attacks and criminal activity** continue to increase amid an absence of global control of the internet. The accumulation of resources and wealth through **organised crime and cartels allow criminal activity** to disproportionately impact on the socio-economic and political landscape of countries. The activities of **trans-national organised crime extend to drugs and human trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering and other forms of corruption**.

New technologies increase the possibility of the global projection of **military power** by states or groups with sufficient resources. The **militarisation** of outer space and remote-controlled assets increase the potential to **project power globally** at low risk. Advancing technologies in **volatile** regions enhance the **risk of terrorists** acquiring and using **weapons of mass destruction**. Recent **conflicts** have shown the limitations of **hard power**, yet emerging powers are still **arming** as **military power** and participation in the space race are **symbols**

Africa as victim of competition & conflict

Identity construction *against* former colonial powers, still seen as wanting to "own" Africa

Risk, threat

Neorealist view; war & conflict has changed, but has not been eliminated cf. Waltz

of great power status. Consequently, defence spending is increasing in their neighbourhoods.

The international system and global economy are therefore characterised by accelerated change and a process of transition, to which South Africa’s foreign policy will need to respond.

## 6. GLOBAL POSITIONING OF SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa’s vision for 2025 is to be a successful and influential member of the international community, supported by a globally competitive economy on a sustained growth path that has made significant inroads in addressing unemployment, inequality and poverty in South Africa, and contributing to the development of our region and continent. In a rapidly evolving global environment, South Africa will more frequently be faced with key strategic decision points. Its response to these will determine its success in the future.

The shift in the balance of power in the international system combined with the rapidly closing capability gap between developed countries and emerging powers create opportunities for South Africa. The convergence of trends has created an unprecedented opportunity for countries to maximise their influence by playing a leading role both on specific issues and within their regions. This influence is a result of taking the policy initiative, building institutions and originating solutions. Playing this role in African continent has enhanced South Africa’s influence in international fora. The next strategic challenge is for South Africa to utilise this opportunity to take the initiative in shaping a new global order.

Simultaneously, South Africa can benefit from diversification and deepened integration into the global growth markets. The trend towards regional integration is accelerating across the world. Globalisation and regional integration present the opportunity for significant gains depending on the level of integration into the global economy. This would support the diversification of South Africa’s trade links. South Africa should also take the opportunity to position itself to take advantage of the next group of high growth economies, including key economies in Africa and Latin America.

South Africa should note that rapid industrialisation and increasing resource demand by emerging economies are set to fuel potential conflict around access to natural resources. The challenge remains for South Africa and the region to realise maximum benefit from its natural resources through infrastructure development, value addition and beneficiation. In this regard, it might be necessary to explore the possibilities of a number of structural reforms in order to make the most of the expected commodity super-cycles in the future. The broader business environment and supporting infrastructure will have to

Neorealist quest for power and influence  Mandela factor Unstable system
Desire for more power and influence  SA as the answer to contemporary political problems  Grandiose ambition
Exploitation of political systems & relations for personal gain  Also exploitation of global South

ensure future **competitiveness**.

South African companies have been at the forefront of adapting technology to developing market conditions as well as the pioneering of new business models. This has enabled South Africa to **explore previously untapped markets** in sectors such as mobile communications and financial services. South Africa should continuously explore opportunities to use similar leapfrogging strategies to open up market sectors.

Although **globalisation** has presented many opportunities, it has also brought about many **serious risks**. The combined impact of climate change, rapid population growth, urbanisation, youth bulge and growing **inequality** in general exacerbates **social stresses** relating to **food security, access to water, and increasing environmental degradation**. These **stresses have the potential to cause instability** in our region.

A number of regional trends could combine to result in **challenges to South Africa's regional leadership position**. High energy prices and rapid growth rates could see the emergence of other regional economic centres, with **aspirations for regional influence and leadership**. The rapid development of a growing number of developing countries is also likely to result in **increased competition** among states to position themselves in order to **maximise their international profiles and visibility**. **South Africa's position of global influence** not only **depends on its regional positioning** but also on its ability to contribute to global solutions and policy innovation.

The **cohesion of the countries of the South** may be eroded as certain key developing countries progress towards becoming developed countries. This group of developing countries are already differentiated, and differentiating themselves, from the rest of the developing world based on their **capabilities** and integration into global governance structures. The effect is that the **capacity gap and influence** has widened between these powers and the rest of the developing world, especially the LDCs. This has a **potential impact on the solidarity of the South** and the **championing of the developing world agenda in international fora**. In this context, **South Africa should continue to champion the solidarity and the concerns of the South**. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that **strong bilateral relations enhance the strength** of South Africa's international positions and **influence** in multilateral organisations and groupings.

## AFRICA

Our **struggle** for a better life in South Africa is **intertwined with our pursuit of a better Africa in a better world**. Its **destiny** is inextricably linked to that of the Southern African region. **Regional and continental integration** is the foundation for

Modern, globalised political system as root of new security threats
Neorealist preoccupation with power and influence + maximisation of personal gains  Quest for dominance in Africa ?
Self characterisation as perpetual victim; Africa's



Africa's socio-economic development and political unity, and essential for our own **prosperity and security**. **Consequently**, Africa is at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy. South Africa must therefore continue to support **regional and continental processes** to respond to and resolve **crises**, strengthen regional integration, significantly **increase intra-African trade**, and **champion sustainable development and opportunities in Africa**.

South Africa will intensify its engagements in the AU and its structures *in order for* the AU to **fulfil its role in building African** unity and the social and economic development of the continent. South Africa will **continue to champion the role of the AU** as the primary organisation for **coordinating continental positions with development partners** and **caution against Official Development Assistance (ODA) being used to impede African unity and solidarity**. At the same time, South Africa will continue to **advance common African positions** through its structured bilateral activities and other international fora.

**Peace, stability, and security** are essential **preconditions for development**. Increased **global competition for access to natural resources, as well as demographic pressures, and energy, food and water scarcities, will increasingly pose the threat of future conflicts**. These **challenges** may be exacerbated by socio-cultural, ethnic and religious divides. The most effective response to these **challenges** lies in regional political and economic integration and **addressing colonial legacies and neo-colonial influences**.

South Africa will therefore **continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction**. South Africa will continue to work with the AU to **discourage unconstitutional changes in governments**. It will also continue to **support AU and UN initiatives** to find **just and lasting solutions to outstanding issues of self-determination and decolonisation on the African continent**. South Africa subscribes to the principles of **sovereignty and non-interference** in the internal affairs of other states.

The African Union is determined to reinvigorate **peace and security initiatives**, reinforced through the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In this regard, it is critical to **strengthen the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and the AU Peace and Security Council, and its linkage to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)**. Recognising the importance of the African Standby Forces (ASF) for achieving the African Union's **peace and security aims**, South Africa will work with SADC and its member states to maintain the readiness of the SADC Brigade. **Support for the African Peer Review**

development as crucial to SA's own security and interests; Africa's upliftment not out of goodness but out of selfish concerns
Also sole leader of AU, linked to personal gains; European aid as divide & conquer tactic; SA as great defender of African identity
Development to ensure stability  Still suffering wounds of past
Narcissism SA as Africa's great peacekeeper and liberator;  Leading Africa to "true" liberation

Mechanism (APRM) remains important to assist the continent consolidate democracy and meet universally accepted standards of participatory democracy.

Structural changes in the global economy are opening up opportunities to position Africa as a significant player in the global economy. Africa is benefitting greatly from the demand for its natural resources as a result of the rise of emerging powers. However, this carries the risk of the continent remaining mainly a supplier of raw materials. Africa has a unique opportunity now to alter existing trading paradigms by restructuring its economies to support value-addition, industrialisation and intra-African trade.

Both traditional and emerging powers are taking notice of these new opportunities and are therefore increasing economic and diplomatic activities on the continent. Despite starting from a very low economic base, in the next fifteen years the resource-fuelled growth in a number of African countries will create both opportunities and challenges for South Africa in terms of new markets and political influence. Likewise, other African economic growth centres are taking advantage of this potential. South Africa should therefore continue to develop partnerships with key countries on the continent as a mechanism for mutual advancement.

The acceleration of Africa's regional integration is imperative for its future economic competitiveness and its development and prosperity, consistent with the global trend towards regional economic integration. Essential in this regard will be the development of skills, infrastructure and interconnectivity, intra-regional trade, common markets, and the removal of trade barriers. Challenges include harmonising policies, addressing overlapping memberships, developing cooperative sovereignty, and the asymmetrical nature of the South African economy in comparison with that of the region. Africa must respond urgently to these challenges in order to avoid again being locked into structural dependencies.

NEPAD is the socio-economic development programme of the AU that also represents a comprehensive vision for Africa's renewal. South Africa, in cooperation with its African partners, should continue to support the implementation of NEPAD programmes, particularly those that strengthen cross-border infrastructure development, ICT, agricultural, tourism, capacity building and industrialisation.

Future African economic prosperity and unity will be realised to the extent that the continent is able to rationalise and streamline the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as building blocks for African integration. Complementarities continue to exist in areas such as agriculture, energy, and water that will drive

Concerned solely with maximisation of absolute gains from new world order
Changing global order as threat to Africa specifically
Maximisation of material gains
Self-appointed as Africa's hope for a new future

industrial development and regional integration. Failure to **maximise the advantages** that these complementarities offer will leave regions **vulnerable to external interests**. South Africa will therefore prioritise a **constructive leadership role** to accelerate and deepen integration in our region.

The **integration of SADC** remains **critical for the economic development of the region** and for **South Africa's global competitiveness**. Regional economic cooperation and integration offers an opportunity for regional industries to overcome the limits of small national markets, achieve economies of scale, and enhance competitiveness as a platform to participate in the global economy. **South Africa therefore will advance a developmental integrated agenda in southern Africa** that combines trade integration, infrastructure development and sectoral policy coordination that will **correct imbalances in current relations**. The **region must be allowed to determine its own regional integration agenda and pace, without external interference**. South Africa will continue to place particular focus on cross-border infrastructure development, in collaboration with other development partners. The **strengthening of governance and institutional capacity within SADC** is an **urgent and essential requirement to ensure the economic viability** of the region.

South Africa will continue to **support the regional economic programme of SADC** that provides for **policy co-ordination and convergence, sectoral co-operation and market integration** through the SADC Free Trade Area. The integration of SADC, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC) will **advance political unity and economic strength of Africa**.

South Africa will strongly support the transformation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) into a vehicle for advancing and deepening developmental integration, particularly as an anchor in the SADC regional project. This transformation can only be achieved through the development of common trade and industrial policies, as well as strategies to build production value chains across all member states, underpinned by regional infrastructure development programmes.

South Africa continues to strengthen trade and investment relations with countries across the African continent in support of the economic agenda of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). This is underpinned by a strong bilateral country focus. **Africa will remain an important export destination for value-added goods and services from South Africa**. However, most imports from the rest of the continent to South Africa are restricted to a narrow range of primary goods.

African integration to benefit SA's global influence

African Agenda thus means to a selfish end; Characterisation as perpetual victim of exploitative system designed by developed world (Europe); Essential for attainment of stability

Cooperation as means to "more power" end.

African economic development to SA's economic benefit



In this regard, South Africa is committed to **building mutually beneficial trade relations** through supporting the diversification of economies, and addressing trade barriers and capacity constraints. South Africa will implement policies that promote outward investment into the continent. South Africa will support Africa to take advantage of market-access arrangements such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD). It should **continue to leverage its strategic relations with countries such as China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, the USA, as well as the EU, to assist Africa with its socio economic development**. Africa should also utilise its own resources in support of its own **development needs**.

SA exceptionalism, "special" relations with "West" that rest of Africa don't have.

South Africa's relations with individual African countries remain central to its foreign policy practice. It will continue to **strengthen bilateral cooperation with African countries by engaging in sustainable partnerships for development**, including through the promotion of trade and investment; the establishment of joint projects for infrastructure development; and the provision of technical assistance for institutional and policy development. South Africa will also pursue closer synergy between its bilateral and multilateral engagements in the region. (Emphasis added)

SA as sustainable constructor of Africa *versus* exploitative, selfish past colonisers

South Africa will continue to **engage internationally on aid effectiveness, increased global development assistance, and strengthening development partnerships**. The South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) will be an important instrument to promote more effective development cooperation. It will therefore pursue bilateral cooperation with African countries as well as trilateral cooperation with international partners in support of African development.

International relations driven by preoccupation with material gains

## MULTILATERALISM

As the **established global multilateral architecture** has its roots in the post-Second World War context, it is no longer able to adequately respond to the **challenges facing an interdependent world** in the 21st century, which are complex and global in nature, **threatening our collective wellbeing** and placing **increased pressure** on the global system of governance. These challenges encompass issues such as **human security, environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation, development, political and economic crises, human rights, disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**. As a result, unilateralism is no longer an option to address these challenges. Multilateral cooperation is more relevant than ever before in seeking equitable multilateral solutions to global problems. The United Nations (UN) system, through its universal membership and broad mandate, occupies the central and indispensable role within the global system of governance.

21st century international system as hostile, volatile, dangerous; bringing various new threats

The developing world, especially Africa, has a **limited voice** and participation in the decision- and policy-making processes of the global trade, economic and financial institutions. This **weakens** the world's response to the developmental agenda of Africa and the South. A **continued over-emphasis by the developed world on issues of peace and security** undermine efforts to deal with the root causes of poverty and underdevelopment. To **address this imbalance**, South Africa will promote the increased **alignment between the developmental agenda of Africa and the South and that of global organisations**. In this regard, South Africa will work in partnership with other African countries to forge a collective vision.

Characterisation as marginalised victim

Developed world as selfish, uncaring & cause of suffering;  
SA as *the one* that will undo the injustice

South Africa's foreign policy will continue to recognise the **importance of multilateralism and a rules-based international system that is governed by international law**. It will remain an active participant in the **efforts to comprehensively reform the architecture of global governance**, including the UN system and the Bretton Woods Institutions, to make them **more effective, legitimate, and responsive to the needs of the developing world**. South Africa must continue to support a development outcome to the WTO Doha Round and to achieve this, will continue to play an active role in the Africa Group, G77 and NAMA 11.

Transformation of current global system linked to pursuit of personal gains and benefits.

Effective multilateralism rests on the political will of countries to **honour their obligations** under international law and commitments agreed to in multilateral institutions. The UN utilises its resolutions as one of its instrument to encourage and promote cooperation among Member States on a variety of issues. However, many **resolutions of the UN, in particular those adopted by the General Assembly are not enforceable and therefore not implemented**. The lack of enforcement poses a **challenge** to the effectiveness of the multilateral system to address global challenges.

anarchy

South Africa strongly supports the **reform of the United Nations system** in pursuit of **greater equity in decision making**, balanced against increased efficiency and effectiveness. Whilst pursuing **equitable representation of Africa on the United Nations Security Council, South Africa seeks to become a permanent member itself**. Meanwhile, South Africa will use non-permanent membership as a **strategic opportunity to advance the interests of Africa and the South**. It will also champion the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, in particular the African Union.

Structural violence, marginalisation and exploitation of Africa & SA;  
Quest for more power & influence globally;  
maximisation of benefits from IR

An emerging trend is for **like-minded countries** to form groupings outside the formal multilateral structures in order to address specific issues affecting the international community. Groups such as the **G20, Major Economies Forum, BASIC, IBSA and BRICS have grown in prominence** and are focused on

Identification *with* notably the South;  
BRICS

global **issues related to political, security, environment and economic matters**. South Africa supports the use of such groupings as an important **mechanism for consensus building**, whilst recognising the centrality of the UN and ensuring that these groupings should strengthen the primacy of the UN. South Africa's multilateral relations with the South will continue to find expression particularly through the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), the Commonwealth, the NAM, and the G77.

South Africa is a strong proponent of multilateralism as a necessary intergovernmental response to **managing globalisation and the deepening interdependence of national economies**. The **marginalisation** of many countries in the global economy, particularly those in Africa, and the question of coherence in global economic policy-making are some of the key challenges confronting the international community in the context of an integrating global economy. In this regard, the G20 has become the premier global forum to coordinate an integrated and coherent global **response to financial and economic crises**. South Africa will seek to ensure the **G20's responsiveness to African developmental needs**. It also uses its membership to advance the reform of the International Financial Institutions to give a stronger voice and greater representation to the developing world in the interest of a **transparent, stable and equitable global financial system**.

South Africa will actively participate in the BRICS, whose members are **reshaping the global economic and political order**. We will use our membership as a **strategic opportunity to advance the interests of Africa** in global issues such as the reform of global governance, the work of the G20, International trade, development, energy and climate change.

South Africa remains **committed to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control**, as well as being a **responsible producer, possessor and trader of advanced nuclear technologies**. It supports the inalienable right of nations to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Based on the Pelindaba Treaty, South Africa continues to support Africa as a nuclear weapons free zone.

Following the **successful hosting of UNCTAD, the World Conference against Racism (WCAR), the World Economic Forum, and the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD), NAM, CHOGM and the launch of the AU**, South Africa remains willing to host high-level conferences, as a valuable diplomatic platform in support of multilateralism and global consensus.

South Africa will continue to cooperation with the United Nations Organisation, Specialised Agencies, and other

BRICS = power & influence

South Africa as leading country in contemporary IR

accredited international organisations present in South Africa to align their activities with the country's domestic priorities. In this regard, there is a need to **enhance its international representation** through the candidatures and secondment of South Africans into **strategic positions** in key regional, continental and global governance institutions.

Quest for power & influence globally

As part of its **commitment to ensuring peace and stability in zones of conflict**, South Africa encourages multilateral options in seeking global solutions. South Africa also remains **committed to the major international instruments for the promotion and protection of human rights** and advocates a **holistic approach** that places equal emphasis on **civil and political rights as well as social, economic and cultural rights**.

SA as righteous protector of liberty and human rights; Mandela factor

### ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

South Africa's future **global and continental standing** will be determined by how South Africa remains true to its **enduring values, economic success**, and the continued **leadership role on the continent**. The success of its economic diplomacy will determine the extent to which South Africa **can achieve its domestic priorities**. For South Africa to meet these priorities, its economy must be able to participate **competitively in the global market place**.

South Africa's integration into the global economy is laid out in the South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework. The aim is to **pursue national economic policy objectives** and **leverage opportunities** that arise from global markets and increasing flows of global trade and investment. South Africa's economic diplomacy will therefore be focused on providing guidance to government and the business sector on economic developments and markets, pursuing market access for South African products, attracting investments and tourism, removing barriers to trade, and **supporting the development of larger markets in Africa**. It should also enhance competitiveness of South African goods and services in the major global markets, while maintaining its international reputation as a stable and reliable supplier. Central to South Africa's economic diplomacy is the **pursuit of a fair and equitable rules-based international trade regime** that accommodates the **developmental interests of developing countries**. In the context of the WTO Doha Development Round, South Africa **must ensure that the outcome is beneficial to its economy** and **remedies the negative consequences** of its classification in the Uruguay Round.

Victim

Deepened regional economic integration and the proliferation of Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs), especially in Asia and Latin America, carry the risk of excluding South African goods and services from these markets. Economic diplomacy should

therefore explore ways to strengthen ties with other regional economic groupings that allow for a **more strategic integration process amongst developing countries**. Economic diplomacy should further seek outcomes that deal more effectively with non-tariff barriers in all markets. South Africa's development objectives require the negotiation of **mutually beneficial sectoral co-operation agreements and investment treaties** that **support South Africa's development policy** space.

Liberal cooperation for personal benefit

Regional integration arrangements such as FTAs and RTAs provide the necessary environment for national companies to compete globally. As the majority of intra-African trade takes place within own regional trading blocs, it is necessary to stimulate inter-regional trade as stepping stones for deepening continental integration. South Africa will therefore support the **harmonisation of policies and standards across the continent**, as strengthened regional integration presents opportunities for regional industries to overcome the limits of small national markets, achieve economies of scale, and enhance competitiveness as a platform to participate in the global economy.

South African economic diplomacy in the region will therefore support an integrated development strategy for SACU, SADC and the continent that includes Spatial Development Initiatives, investment promotion into the region, region-wide industrial development linkages as well as the development of supply-side capacity that will **enable countries in the region to diversify their economies and take advantage of opportunities for more dynamic and diverse exports**.

South-South trade is expanding rapidly and the major new sources of growth in the global economy are in the South. Common challenges and shared perspectives provide an **opportunity for South Africa to strengthen our trade and investment linkages**. South Africa will have to pursue **value-added exports to the new emerging markets** in order to **deal with structural trade imbalances**. The dynamism of the economic growth in the South should be **harnessed** to support the diversification and industrialization of African economies. Economic diplomacy will **target foreign direct investment to South Africa and Africa** as well as **assist in the development of human, institutional, technological and infrastructural resources**.

Successful economic diplomacy requires a close partnership with government, business, and labour. A coordinated government-wide effort is essential to **promote South Africa's economic interests in the international arena**, including the use of high-level engagements. South African Missions abroad are key in these endeavours and must be adequately resourced for these purposes. In particular, they can assist South African business abroad through advice, advocacy, and market access

support. The Department must therefore improve its economic research capacity to strengthen its economic diplomacy.

Within the partnership of government, business, and labour it is important that South Africa's values, principles, and reputation are reflected in their conduct abroad. Government should provide sufficient intelligence on market conditions, as well as local cultural nuances that would assist business to better access those markets and act in a socially responsible manner.

## WIDER BILATERAL INTERESTS

### ASIA

Asia is of increasing importance to South Africa and Africa. Power shifts in the global political and economic system have increased the relevance of the Asian region, with major emerging powers such as China and India increasing their global influence. The Asian region has been experiencing on average higher economic growth than other regions. Its growing economic importance is also reflected in South Africa's changing trade patterns with Asia. The accelerating economic integration of Asia, with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the core, holds both opportunities and challenges for South Africa.

Asia has become South Africa's largest trading region and an increasingly important source of investment, particularly China, India and Japan. South Africa must increase its value-added exports to this region in order to address its generally large trade deficit. South Africa should focus on identifying under-explored markets in the region that will provide new export opportunities. Asian markets are characterised by severe competition and proliferation of free trade agreements. South Africa therefore runs the risk of marginalisation and exclusion from supply networks, and will pursue a comprehensive trade strategy to improve South Africa's competitiveness and anchor it in Asian markets.

Asia will play a meaningful role in contributing to South Africa's domestic priorities through cooperation in space, science and technology, education and skills development, health, infrastructure, and mineral beneficiation. Tourism to South Africa will be further developed. Innovation and commercialisation of green technology could be a new area of cooperation in the face of the challenges of climate change.

The political ascendancy of Asia will be increasingly reflected in the global system of governance, peace and security, and finance. This provides opportunities for South Africa to closely cooperate in multilateral organisations in order to reform the global architecture. A possible challenge to the solidarity of the




South is the positioning of emerging powers to associate more closely with the traditional powers.

South Africa should not lose sight of the fact that there are also many middle powers in Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Vietnam that are both partners and competitors. South Africa will leverage the fact that these countries share similar views on reform of global governance, solidarity and economic justice. South Africa will continue to work with development partners in Asia for the implementation of NEPAD programmes.

South Africa should closely monitor unresolved issues in Asia such as territorial disputes, domestic political instability, as well as religious and ethnic extremism, and the risk of nuclear proliferation as these have the potential to disrupt economic relations and pose challenges for South Africa's core values of democracy, human rights, and non-proliferation.

South Africa must take note of the fact that the Indian Ocean Rim has become the world's major energy and resource supply route to the fast-growing Asian economies, and that the major global powers have a heightened military presence in the region. Consequently, a maritime security policy for Africa becomes essential.

### ***MIDDLE EAST***

South Africa's foreign policy in the Middle East will have to take cognisance of changing and complex regional dynamics as well as competing interests of major powers. Political developments in the region continue to have a major impact on the global economy especially with reference to energy price stability and supplies.

South Africa will remain consistent in its support for the peaceful settlement of disputes in the region, in particular the Middle East Peace Process premised on a two-state solution, and continue to pursue a diplomatic role based on South Africa's successful political transition and solidarity with the Palestinian people. Through various mechanisms, South Africa will continue to support the developmental and humanitarian needs in Palestine.

It is important to engage the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries for the realisation of South Africa's development priorities. The Gulf region has adopted an agenda for development and seeks to reduce its economic reliance on finite resource commodities. The diminishing oil and gas reserves necessitate the consideration of alternative oil suppliers as well as renewable energy for South Africa in the long term.

Middle Eastern markets remain small, but the growing


population and oil wealth offer South Africa opportunities, particularly in agro-processing, construction and civil engineering, engineering technologies in gas to liquid energy production, and its advanced service sector. South Africa should continue to source investments from the Gulf region's Sovereign Wealth Funds as well as private investors, including in support of continental initiatives such as NEPAD projects.

**EUROPE**

Europe will remain of **strategic interest to South Africa**. European enlargement has created the largest economic bloc in the world and presents a leading model of regional integration. The **European Union remains South Africa's largest trading partner**, with the region **generating more than a third of South Africa's total trade**. It remains an **important source of foreign direct investment and official development assistance** into South Africa, as well as a **primary market for tourism**. Bilateral relations with European nations in general extend considerably beyond political, diplomatic and trade relations, finding expression through cooperation in areas of science and technology, arts and culture and shared values around democracy and human rights.

Notwithstanding Europe's economic challenges, such as an **aging population, high debt levels, and low-growth economies**, South Africa will continue to encourage European partners to be engaged in the development of the African continent, meet their development assistance commitments, as well as push for the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) due to its detrimental effects on development in Africa.

South Africa will continue to leverage its **strategic partnerships** with the EU and its major member states to **meet its domestic priorities, open up market opportunities, attract increased foreign direct investment, and support the AU's peace and security initiatives**. South Africa will also **continue to cooperate and engage with European countries** beyond the EU, **such as Russia and Turkey**, recognising their important role in regional and global politics. South Africa will **build on its historical strong ties of friendship and mutual understanding with the Nordic countries to shift from donor cooperation to building long-term sustainable economic and scientific relations**.

South Africa and Europe will continue to enjoy **strategic and multifaceted political, economic and social cooperation**, which translates into **close, substantial and fruitful relations**. The focus on **trilateral cooperation as a platform for advancing economic development in Africa**, as well as support for the continent's **peace and security architecture** will be maintained. **Economic relations** will continue **including initiatives in support of the Africa Agenda**. **South Africa must ensure that the trading**

Exploitative  Europe as cash-cow for South Africa
Europe as poor, declining has-been Exaggerated sense of power/influence over European action Europe as bad
Use perceived influence to exploit Europe for personal gain  Anything <i>but</i> "old" Europe; Friends with benefits
Preoccupation with material gain & physical benefits; We don't want Europe, we want euros;  SA as only country



relationship between Europe and Africa must support **the continent's** regional integration agenda as well as its development objectives.

South Africa's relations with Europe cut across the EU, the region consists of members of the G8, G20, permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC and regular engagement through both multilateral and bilateral interaction on all levels is essential.

The Lisbon Treaty has introduced a more coherent and effective Common Foreign and Security Policy that impacts on Africa and South Africa. The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership will continue to drive future Africa-EU relations, based on the Joint Action Plan, which includes **institutional and financial support for the AU and its institutions**, as well as support for the African peace and security architecture. This provides both an **opportunity and challenge for South Africa to engage with the EU to promote the African Agenda through its strategic partnership with the EU.**

#### ***AMERICAS AND THE CARIBBEAN***

Within the Western Hemisphere, the Americas and Caribbean span a vast geographical area that includes developed, developing, and least developed economies as well as regional and global powers. Stark contrasts exist among these countries, inter alia, in terms of territorial size, populations, economies, technologies, and military power. The diversity within this hemisphere necessitates a nuanced foreign policy approach and offers a wide range of opportunities for engagement that spans the whole spectrum of South Africa's foreign policy priorities.

South Africa's bilateral relations with the countries of the Americas and the Caribbean will serve as a firm foundation for advancing multilateral cooperation as well as to promote South Africa's domestic priorities.

South Africa's total trade with the Americas will continue to be of great importance for its development trajectory with further potential for substantial growth in trade and investment. The core objective would be to leverage economic bilateral relations with countries in the Americas for partnerships to support sustainable economic growth, social development, and capacity building. Bilateral relations would therefore be used to enhance economic, scientific, technical, and business opportunities through structured bilateral mechanisms.

The USA will continue to remain a dominant political, economic and military power, with significant potential for South African and African trade, tourism, and investment. The economies of North America remain vital sources of investment and technology, and will remain prominent trading partners for

that can further the African cause in Europe.
Any further relations <i>mediated</i> through international organisations
Cash-cow
Grandiose idea of its relations with Europe

South Africa and Africa. South Africa will therefore continue to build its trade and investment relations with these economies on the basis of institutional frameworks for engagement. South Africa is the largest non-oil beneficiary under the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) but ample scope remains for improving South Africa and Africa's market share in the US market. The extension of AGOA is of strategic importance for the economic development of the continent. South Africa should also continue to engage the USA and Canada to meet development commitments to Africa.

The USA and Canada are important supporters of peacekeeping as well as post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in Africa, through the UN and bilaterally. In this regard, South Africa will continue to urge them to align their support with the AU peace and security objectives.

An increase in political aspirations and the active role of middle powers in Latin America will enable partnerships and strategic coalitions to advance mutual interests. South Africa's interactions with Brazil as an emerging power should be a platform for significant bilateral growth in economic and political cooperation, as well as for collaboration on specific global multilateral objectives. Other countries in the region also provide economic and political opportunities to pursue complementarities within the context of South-South cooperation, multilateralism, and closer bilateral strategic relations.

The special historical political relationship between South Africa and Cuba continues to provide the benchmark for mutually beneficial cooperation in areas such as health and education. South Africa will continue to call for the lifting of the US embargo against the island.

Latin America and Africa share similar development trajectories, characterised by resource-based economies and single-commodity exports as well as similar patterns of underdevelopment and poverty. This creates both opportunities and challenges for economic cooperation in the Latin American region. Mutual benefits exist in terms of sharing best practices in socio-economic development, mining, agro-processing, beneficiation of mineral products, science and technology, and infrastructure development. South Africa will utilise the SACU/MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement to foster complementarities in its industrial, agricultural and services sectors. South Africa's geo-strategic location between Latin America and Asia provides the opportunity to position itself as a trade and transport hub between these two regions.

In addition, contact with the African Diaspora in the region would serve to enhance relations with South Africa and the


African continent, especially with respect to the Caribbean countries. The African Diaspora in the Americas, particularly in the Caribbean, continues to have significance for South Africa in light of their support for Africa's liberation and a shared vision of an equitable world.

## 6. TAKING DIPLOMACY FORWARD

In 2009, the Department of Foreign Affairs was renamed as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in order to respond in order to better align South Africa's foreign policy and domestic objectives. This provided the Department with an opportunity to redefine its role in building deeper and more expansive relations and using these partnerships to advance South Africa's national interests. Global issues shaping the environment in which South Africa operates are increasingly complex and multidimensional and require a coherent cross-sectoral approach and a coordinated response across all spheres of government, public enterprises, the private sector, labour, civil society, and other non-state actors. In order for South Africa to maximise the benefits from the successful implementation of its foreign policy, a coordinated approach is essential to address weaknesses of working in a compartmentalised manner.

In order to ensure proper implementation, the Department will strengthen and formalise the management and coordination of South Africa's international relations. In this regard, the Department and its Missions abroad will enhance their role in providing strategic information on global developments to all stakeholders, providing strategic guidance on policy options, and managing and facilitating South African activities and engagements abroad in order to deliver tangible outcomes for the betterment of the lives of South Africans.

Coordination and consultation is essential with the growing number of stakeholders, Close cooperation with technical departments is critical for an integrated approach to international engagements. The Department will strengthen the Consultative Forum on International Relations (CFIR) as a vehicle to manage and coordinate the international activities of all stakeholders. The establishment of a South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) is also envisaged as a consultative platform for engagement with non-state actors. Under the auspices of the Department, the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) will facilitate and manage development assistance in **support of South Africa's foreign policy objectives**. Therefore, to enable effective coordination and to ensure policy cohesion and synergies in South Africa's bilateral and multilateral interactions, the establishment of a professional diplomatic service as well as these coordinating structures through the adoption of legislation will be pursued. Given

**dynamic changes in the global environment** in which the Department operates, it will be critical for it to have the institutional flexibility to adapt its structure and operations to meet new challenges.

**In a world of competing interests**, public diplomacy is essential to **actively project South Africa's image, values and culture both domestically and abroad**. The Department will broaden the use of available technologies and platforms, especially social media networks to communicate with stakeholders on South Africa's international relations. Public diplomacy activities include outreach programmes to bring **foreign policy to the people**. The South African government will continue to contribute to institutional support and capacity building to other requesting states and in this regard, the Department will continue to provide training to foreign diplomats as a means of creating goodwill and understanding.

In conclusion, **South Africa's greatest asset lies in the power of its example. In an uncertain world, characterised by a competition of values, *South Africa's diplomacy of Ubuntu, focusing on our common humanity, provides an inclusive and constructive world view to shape the evolving global order.***

Mandela factor; SA as the only good in an uncertain, hostile & dangerous world

## Annexe II: Quantitative analysis of frequency of appearances of key words in Draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy

### 1. Frequency of appearance by keyword (realist notions)

Keyword	Number of appearances in context <sup>232</sup>	Frequency (f) <sup>233</sup>
aggression	1	0,03
competition	12	0,35
conflict	14	0,41
destruction	1	0,03
disruption	2	0,06
exploitation	2	0,06
instability	6	0,18
interest	20	0,59
malice	1	0,03
pressure	8	0,24
risk	11	0,32
security (+insecurity)	26	0,76
tension	4	0,12
threat	5	0,15
unsustainable	1	0,03
volatility	3	0,09
vulnerability	3	0,09
<b>Combined total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>3,54</b>

### 2. Frequency of appearance by keyword (liberal notions)

Keyword	Number of appearances in context	Frequency (f)
cooperation	34	1
democracy	7	0,21
dialogue	2	0,06
human rights	6	0,18
institution	15	0,44
liberal	2	0,06
norms	2	0,06
rules	4	0,12
solidarity	9	0,27
values	11	0,32
<b>Combined total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>2,72</b>

<sup>232</sup> Care was taken not to count the appearance of keywords out of context or relation as per the realist connotations with these concepts; for instance, where the word "security" appeared in the name "United Nations Security Council" or as pertaining to the "African Union peace and security architecture," the word was not counted.

<sup>233</sup> Where  $f = \frac{n_{appearances}}{34pages}$

## Annexe III: African National Congress (ANC) Foreign Policy Perspective, Relations with European Union

### Key

	Of or relating to South African exceptionalism, Narcissistic Personality
	Of or relating to identity and/or identification with the Other; characterisation
	Of or relating to a neoliberal worldview
	Of or relating to a neorealist worldview; relating to anarchy

### WESTERN EUROPE<sup>234</sup>

In mapping out our relations with Western Europe, our attention will be focused on the European Union (EU). A democratic South Africa **will seek to negotiate a mutually-beneficial trade and co-operation agreement with the EU** and the nations of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). This **must be based on the recognition of the reality of South Africa as a developing nation which needs to secure reasonable access to global markets.**

A democratic South Africa will endeavour to expand and develop bilateral relations with the countries of Europe **in pursuit of our national interests**. Recognising the important role played by the countries of Scandinavia in ending apartheid, a democratic government will give particular attention to South Africa's relations with these countries.

We notice with great concern and disquiet the *emergence of racism* in many parts of the world, *particularly in Europe*. Given our own painful and destructive past flowing directly from the policies of apartheid, *a democratic and non-racist government is morally-bound to do everything in its power to thwart and frustrate the efforts of those seeking to impose their evil, criminal and immoral ideology*. A democratic South Africa, *as a responsible member of the global community is also bound, in terms of various UN Conventions and declarations* to assist in every way possible to eradicate the scourge of racism. And the ANC is committed in doing so.

#### Commentary Box

In this characterisation, Europe is linked to racism and discrimination as early as 1994, though my argument would be that the perception dates back much further (on this topic, see also Annexe V.) Racism, discrimination and oppression are the evil qualities that South Africa aspires *never* to be guilty of. And, as Europe embodies these qualities per this characterisation, Europe is the evil Other against which the South African identity as inclusive, supportive, multiculturalist is constructed.

<sup>234</sup> Extract from ANC. 1994. *Foreign Policy Perspective in a democratic South Africa: African National Congress Policy Document*. Accessible online: <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=230>, last accessed on 29/05/2014 at 18h55.

## Annexe IV: Discourses surrounding recent international conflicts that have generated tensions in the South African camp

### Key

	Of or relating to South African exceptionalism, Narcissistic Personality
	Of or relating to identity and/or identification with the Other; characterisation
	Of or relating to a neoliberal worldview
	Of or relating to a neorealist worldview; relating to anarchy

**Speech by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr Ebrahim I Ebrahim, on the occasion of a Public Lecture on “Libya, the United Nations, the African Union and South Africa: Wrong moves? Wrong motives?” Pretoria University<sup>235</sup>**

16 Sep 2011

Programme Director, Prof Africa,  
Fellow Speakers on the podium,  
High Commissioners and Ambassadors here this evening,  
Prof Crewe, Vice-Rector of the University  
Prof Schoeman, Head of the Department of Political Studies,  
Professors and Lecturers with us,  
Members of the media,  
Students and staff,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

Please allow me to take this opportunity to thank the University of Pretoria for organising this public lecture and extending the invitation to us. By organising this public lecture through the Centre for Mediation in Africa, the Department of Political Sciences, and the Centre for Human Rights, this University is sending out a clear message that it is about time that we familiarise ourselves with the fundamentals of our foreign policy objectives.

Programme director,

Our President, the Minister, Deputy Minister Fransman and I have used the chief instruments of Public Diplomacy such as lectures, electronic media, publications etc. to put across and make known South Africa’s engagements and thoughts on the Libyan crisis. Because we have already highlighted our public diplomacy strategies, I believe ours tonight is to make some reflections on and around the developments in relation to the crisis in Libya.

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<sup>235</sup> Ebrahim, E. "Speech by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr Ebrahim I Ebrahim, on the occasion of a Public Lecture on “Libya, the United Nations, the African Union and South Africa: Wrong moves? Wrong motives?” Pretoria University," 16/09/2011, Pretoria: DIRCO. Available online: <http://www.gov.za/speeches/view.php?sid=21657>, last accessed on 29/05/2014 at 23h30.

I will also share some perspectives on what I regard as the [wider implications of the response of the Western powers on the kind of a world that we as a country wish to see](#). In order to enrich our discussions this evening, I will conclude my lecture by sharing with you the outcomes of the Ad Hoc Committee meeting of the African Union (AU) High-Level Panel on Libya, held on 14 September in Pretoria.

You may have noticed that in all our Public Diplomacy engagements, we have continued to condemn the actions of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) towards Libya. It is [very well known that NATO misused the United Nations \(UN\) resolution 1973 to carry out its bombing escapades on a defenceless African country](#). In our view, this action completely ignored the other important aspects of the resolution.

[Although we have criticised the manner in which NATO has decided to interpret the resolution, however, within the context of the AU position, we remain committed to working with the UN, the League of Arab States, the European Union \(EU\) and others in order to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Libya. We have also insisted that the foundations for laying a lasting peace could only come from a negotiated and inclusive political settlement leading to democratic elections.](#)

Programme director,

[Inspired by the Freedom Charter, the South African Government has always believed that every citizen of the world is entitled to enjoy their fundamental human rights and freedom, including the right to live in dignity. This is a right, which we wish not only for the peoples of Libya, and Syria, but equally for the peoples of Bahrain, Yemen, and other countries which in the recent past have seen their people rising up.](#)

I say this because, for whatever reason, there [seems to be concerted efforts to selectively focus on the issue of Libya, as well as Syria, while ignoring other situations right now in the Middle East and North Africa whose challenges may require similar, if not more, attention of the international community.](#)

#### Commentary Box

Having personally participated in this lecture, Deputy Minister Ebrahim here makes reference specifically to the Palestine-Israel question, which remain a thorn in the South African side and which is of particular importance to the recent African Union threat of boycott of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. Though it should hardly be surprising that South Africa, as the eternal liberator of the oppressed and marginalised supports the Palestinian right to self-determination, South African woes on the topic extend well beyond altruistic support for the Palestinian cause, to a criticism of the United States' apparent favouritism of Israel and subsequent nepotistic support of Israel's position on Palestinian independence particularly in matters where the UNSC is concerned. Moreover, the South African government laments ICC prosecution of sitting African Heads of State and Government despite AU fears of destabilisation of fragile peace in these countries should such a Head of State or Government be arrested, while the ICC remains mum on prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Israeli individuals. The UNSC is instrumental in this matter as cases are referred to the ICC by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus feeding claims that the ICC is biased against Africa.



I am of the view, and perhaps we can debate this further during the question and answer session, that the situation and the case of Libya, has long ceased to be characterised within the broader developments which have come to be popularly known as the Arab Spring, especially the events that unfolded in Tunisia and Egypt.

This is the case, because the people of Egypt and Tunisia, who took to the streets demanding their freedom, did so peacefully. In the case of Libya, what we had was an **armed insurrection** and it was therefore necessary for the AU to intervene to bring all stakeholders together to **address the legitimate demands of the people through dialogue and negotiations**.

Programme director,

**Our position on Libya is not divorced from our approach to issues of peace and stability**, both on the African continent and indeed other parts of the world. And **this approach is the settlement of international disputes through dialogue**.

As we speak today, Libya remains divided, its civilian population has been severely affected by the resulting aerial bombing by NATO, the march by the rebels to Tripoli, and indeed by the actions of that country's armed forces—all these due to failure to create a conducive environment for dialogue. You would have read that the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) Health Minister recently stated that 30 000 people were killed and 50 000 wounded in the six-month conflict, and that he expects the figure to be higher once a final count is completed.

I strongly believe, long after NATO has left Libya, long after the media has shifted its focal lenses and its pens away from Libya, **we would still be left with a huge challenge of re-building that country**; of making it possible for the Libyans to consider each other as brothers and sisters occupying the same space.

This challenge was succinctly captured in the Open Letter from Concerned Africans, which stated: “At the end of it all, **Africa will inherit a much more difficult challenge** to successfully address the issue of peace and stability, and therefore the task of sustained development.”

Ladies and gentlemen,

The **current situation in Libya is as a result of the failure to transform the global system of governance. Powerful States remain dominant and imposing over the powerless**. This does not augur well for an international system founded on the principles of international peace and security that underpin the UN as an institution. It is precisely for this reason; amongst many, that **we believe we are correct in calling for the reform of the institutions of global governance**.

We cannot continue like this! And allow institutions such as the UN, which were formed to preserve and guarantee peace, which were supposed to be the embodiment of humanity's collective resolve to live in peace, **to be used to as a military machine to effect regime change**.

**There are those that act as though they own the world**, and somehow uniquely know what is good for others. They are opposed to the reform of international institutions

because they fear that they would lose the power, informed by their own selfish interests, to dictate to lesser nations about how to conduct their affairs.

However, we will not waiver on our call for reforms. We need to advance an international programme that seeks to paralyse this militaristic approach to solving world problems.

#### Commentary Box

Characterisation of Africa, and South Africa by extension as the perpetual victims of European evil. It is interesting to note the selectivity with which South Africa chooses to identify as either helpless, powerless, weak victim at the feet of merciless Europe, *versus* South Africa as the fearless, important, exceptional torchbearer of oppressed Africa leading the continent and any other marginalised victims to their Marxist-Leninist destiny (it is perhaps also prudent to mention, in this regard, the close relationship between the ANC and the former Soviet Union as one of the most important supporters - both in material and symbolic terms - of the struggle cause. See notably Karis, T. G. "South African Liberation: The Communist Factor," in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1986/7.

Programme director,

At the centre of our foreign policy is our commitment to peace; stability; and socio-economic development on the continent. This being our stance, we have sought to work with other African countries, to contribute towards strengthening our institutions such as the AU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and others, to play and take their rightful place in dealing with challenges facing the continent.

It is unfortunate that **right from the start the AU was never given an opportunity to lead in finding a solution to the situation in Libya**. The African leadership collective, against all odds, continued to seek to engage the parties, as proposed by Road Map for Peace, and offered to assist the parties engage in a process that would end the Libyan.

All of this never worked, because **powers outside the continent were determining the future of Libya**, and **ceaselessly worked not for a political solution but regime change**.

As a government, we have sought to and will continue to work within the structures of the AU and we will respect its decisions. In particular, I am referring to the 291st meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) which took place on 26 August and resolved that Libya would be welcome to occupy its seat as soon as an all-inclusive transitional government is formed.

The AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee which President Zuma chaired yesterday in Pretoria welcomed the assurances provided by the NTC leadership stressing their strategic commitment to the African continent, and their commitment to “bring together all Libyan stakeholders, without any exception, to re-build the country”.

**Our on-going analysis and reflections about the character of the international system tells us that powerful States could unilaterally by force of arms begin a process of regime change, if it suits their geo-political interests.**

To make the point, in 2007, the African National Congress (ANC) made the following observation about our present day international relations: At the political level, the ***dominant imperialist powers*** have historically used various means to asset their geo-political and economic interests. This **finds contemporary expression in unilateralism and militarism which have reared their ugly head on a scale hardly witnessed in recent history.**

In intellectual and policy discourse, notions of empire and **benevolent colonialism** find respectable articulation. In many respects, the current global balance is evocative of the situation in **previous eras of dominant empires and colonialism when brute force was the currency of geo-political intercourse.**

The **above characterisation has a direct and relevant connection to the conduct of some of the major powers, not only to the situation in Libya, but Ivory Coast, and other cases in the recent past.**

#### Commentary Box

Europe is, hereby, characterised not solely as an "evil racist," but as an even more morally defunct "evil racist warmonger." This characterisation is important, since South Africa constructs its Self through discourse as a peace-loving pacifist that favours dialogue and negotiations over military action. The interesting question here becomes whether South Africa chooses to identify as a peace-loving pacifist simply because that is a quality it considers noble, or whether the identification is a deliberate act of rebellion against European warmongering.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I also wish to raise the role of the media since the events in Libya has unfolded. As the saying goes, the first casualty of war is the truth, and I think the media plays a big part in this. In the main, our own local media, which is an important instrument to inform our people about developments of note, has actually failed to do so.

For instance, the approach taken by the media, especially the local media, was to create an impression, deliberately or otherwise, that necessarily because we were opposed to the bombing of Libya by NATO, we were therefore pro-Gaddafi, i.e. that in fact we were opposed to the Libyan peoples yearning for freedom.

No matter how much we tried to explain our stance, somehow we were brought back to one and the same thing, that we are protecting Col Gaddafi. And yet, the AU PSC was the first organisation to criticise the use of force against ordinary Libyans. All of these seem to have been deliberately forgotten.

In what appears to be **an attempt to vilify the African position, while the recent history of Gaddafi, and his associations, connections and links to major European capitals is being conveniently brushed under the carpet.**

Ladies and gentlemen,

Having said all these, there are several interesting issues that the approach to Libya and the actions of NATO bring up, especially for those already established in academia, as well as our young minds gathered around here today.

These include:

- In the world we inhabit, what needs to be done, and done better in order to create an axis of peace? That is States that are genuinely committed to tipping the scales of response away from military action to political dialogue;
- What kind of a world would we leave for our children, if **narrow national interests are allowed to overtake a higher and nobler commitment to principle, and respect for the international rule of law**;
- Is it feasible to speak of an African leadership collective, that can **stand together even against powerful forces (our former colonisers)** in order to ensure that we as Africans, indeed become the midwives of our own destiny;
- If inter-governmental institutions continue to serve interests, other than what they were founded for, what alternatives are there; and,
- Is there **a progressive voice that is willing to mobilise for a better world, truly founded on the equality of nations?**

In conclusion,

Libya will remain one the recent harsh reminders that indeed it is neither principles nor international law that matters in world politics, but the narrow national interests of those who have the best and the most sophisticated means of perpetuating violence, and who do not hesitate to unleash them on anyone to further their objectives! The centuries old maxim of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides still applies: **that the strong do as they wish, while the weak suffer what they must!**

Libya, will serve as another recent reminder of how the AU, despite its best intentions to be at the centre of dealing with African challenges, **continues to be deliberately sidelined.**

In spite of all this, we remain firm on our values that embrace the spirit of internationalism; the rejection of colonialism and other forms of oppression; our quest for the unity and economic, political and social renewal of Africa; the promotion and defence of the plight of the suppressed masses and the poor of the world. **We will never lower our voice when it comes to the structural inequalities and abuse of power by any structure in the global system – this is a virtue for which we are prepared to be criticised.**

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for this opportunity, **let us engage!**

**Remarks by Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) on 'South Africa and the United Nations Security Council: Promoting Peace in the Middle East and North Africa'<sup>236</sup>**

03 September 2012

Chairperson and Member of the SAIIA National Council, Mr Kuseni Dlamini;  
National Director of SAIIA, Dr Elizabeth Sidiropoulos;  
Senior Government Officials;  
Ambassadors and High Commissioners;  
Members of Diplomatic Corps;  
Distinguished guests;  
Ladies and Gentlemen;

I am particularly grateful to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) for bringing us together this evening to reflect on South Africa's role in the UN Security Council in Promoting Peace in the Middle East and North Africa.

Chairperson, Ladies and Gentleman,

It has been South Africa's privilege to serve in the UN Security Council for four of the past six years. These **historical first and second terms** [emphasis added.] have brought with them many challenges and opportunities. Earlier in the year I addressed the University of Limpopo to explain how South Africa used its tenure in the Council to promote the African Agenda, the main priority of our foreign policy. This evening I would like to address another important area for South Africa, namely the promotion of peace in the Middle East and North Africa, especially in the wake of the Arab Uprisings.

First of all I would like to sketch the context for my remarks by outlining South Africa's approach to foreign policy in general and then by reflecting on the mandate of the UNSC.

Our foreign policy decisions since 1994 have been guided by our **principles**, foremost amongst which is the **desire for a more just, humane and equitable world** [emphasis added.] In the conduct of our international relations, we attach the **utmost importance to the promotion of human rights, democracy, justice and international law**. Inspired by **our history and ethos, we believe that it is our moral duty and in our national interest, to champion human rights struggles around the world** [emphasis added.] We do so not merely by condemning human rights violations but also by asking how we can do something concrete to address such violations. **We do this through our active engagement bilaterally, as well as in the execution of our responsibilities as a member of the UN Security Council and other multilateral fora.**

The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and acts on behalf of the entire UN membership. Two Chapters of the Charter, VI and VII, provide the Security Council with a toolkit it can utilize to address conflicts.

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<sup>236</sup> Ebrahim, E. "Remarks by Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) on 'South Africa and the United Nations Security Council: Promoting Peace in the Middle East and North Africa,'" 03/09/2012, Pretoria: DIRCO. Available online: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2012/ebra0903.html>, last accessed on 29/05/2014 at 23h30.

It is **wrong to think that the Council only has one or two options at its disposal, namely sanctions and military intervention** [emphasis added.] What is often forgotten is that the Security Council **should** [emphasis added] at all times promote the **pacific settlement** of disputes and that it should act preventively. The provisions under Chapter VI of the Charter encourages parties to a conflict, as well the Council, to first and foremost seek **negotiated** settlements, through mediation, conciliation, arbitration or even judicial means. The Charter even anticipates that initial measures might fail, encouraging the Council to recommend an adjustment to the proposed settlement if this happens – the aim is thus to exhaust the options for the pacific settlement of disputes with the emphasis on prevention - not response.

I am emphasizing **these elements of the mandate of the Council because they are often not even considered when addressing disputes**. It has become **a habit for members of the Council to automatically jump to the provisions of Chapter VII**, which provides for the Council to adopt a number of measures to pressure parties and/or to mandate responses to crises as well as to maintain or restore peace. However, these must be measured, appropriate and, as the Charter reminds us, without prejudice to the **rights, claims and/or positions of the concerned parties** [emphasis added.] It is under this Chapter that the Council can adopt sanctions and should these fail to restore peace it can mandate urgent military measures.

Chairperson, Ladies and Gentleman,

I apologise for the technical start to this conversation, but as I explained it is important background to keep in mind for our discussion this evening.

There are many **reasons why developments in the Middle East and North Africa are a priority for South Africa**. First and foremost being that **because of our own historic struggle for liberation**, we **identify with the struggle of the Palestinian people for self determination** [emphasis added.] This is a cause we unequivocally support.

Palestinians have the right to their own state, as Israeli's already do. South Africa explicitly supports the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a negotiated agreement between the parties that would result in two states, Israel and a Palestinian State, which is viable and contiguous, with East Jerusalem as its capital. These states must exist side-by-side in peace and security, within internationally recognized borders.

**Any form of violence is unacceptable** [emphasis added] and we strongly support the international community's call for a re-start of negotiations between the parties to determine the borders and land-swaps, the status of East Jerusalem, the return of refugees and security guarantees. However, the format of the **negotiations has not been able to yield any outcome for 21 years, so we believe it is time for a new approach** rather than resuscitating a process that has no life and no chance of working. We are **particularly disappointed with the Quartet, which seems unwilling and unable to take decisive action** [emphasis added.]

We believe, with the overwhelming majority of the international community, that the continued illegal settlement expansion by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories undermines the possibility of a negotiated settlement. This expansion is aimed at changing the realities on the ground and if fully implemented, would make a contiguous Palestinian State unviable, if not impossible. In addition, as we have seen in the most recent past, the settler communities perpetrate a great deal of violence against ordinary



Palestinians. Coupled with the inhuman conditions created by the continued blockade against Gaza these developments make the possibility of a negotiated settlement and eventual reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians very difficult.

We are deeply concerned by the humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, especially the dire situation in Gaza. Palestinians have to contend with occupation by the Israeli military; a separation barrier that separates not only Israel from Palestine, but Palestinians from one another; a set of bypass roads, checkpoints, and other demeaning measures, such as destroyed olive trees, and a lack of water which, according to UN reports, is worse than in refugee camps elsewhere in the world. The situation is so bad that the UN has recently warned that should this trend continue Gaza will be unlivable as early as 2020.

Part of the **failed diplomatic approach is that the UN Security Council** [emphasis added] has not been able to address these developments nor to move a negotiated settlement forward. Since the year 2000, Permanent Members of the Security Council have vetoed 17 resolutions addressing the situation in the Middle East, ten of which were cast by the United States, of which 9 related to the situation between Israel and Palestine. The most recent US veto was cast in February 2011, when 138 Member States of the United Nations introduced a Security Council resolution calling for an end to settlement activities by Israel in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as such activities are illegal under international law.

It is with these stark realities in mind that **South Africa as a member of the UN Security Council has consistently called for more assertive action by the Council to bring about a permanent settlement** [emphasis added.] The Question of Palestine was a top priority for South Africa in its first term on the Council, when we galvanized the members of the Non-Aligned Movement to call for the monthly meetings of the UN Security Council on the Middle East to be conducted in the public Chamber and not behind closed doors – **a position strongly opposed by the Permanent Members of the Council** [emphasis added.] Because of our continued pressure, the Council eventually agreed to a formula where the briefings of the Secretariat will always be in public, with a Council Debate on the Middle East every three months open to all UN Members. We took this initiative further in January this year when as President of the Council we successfully held two public meetings, one in which the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ms Valery Amos, briefed on the humanitarian situation in the Occupied Territories and the second a High-level Open Debate on the situation in the Middle East. The large number of UN Member States who participated in the debate illustrates the importance the international community attaches to finding a resolution to the crisis.

**Unfortunately, it suits the narrow domestic interests of one Permanent Member to prevent real action by the UN Security Council** [emphasis added.] We will continue to promote the cause of Palestine, including support for its membership bid to the United Nations, because we believe that Palestinians deserve better.

I want to conclude on this particular question by reiterating that South Africa's strong support for Palestine should not in any way be interpreted as being anti-Israeli. What we oppose are policies and actions of occupation, not the existence of Israel or the right of Israeli citizens to live in peace and security.

Chairperson, Ladies and Gentleman,

Another reason the MENA region is important to South Africa is that it forms part of our Continent. There is an **inextricable link between our developmental aspirations and genuine stability in the Middle East and particularly North Africa** [emphasis added.] We have recently seen, for example, how the **uncontrolled flow of arms** from Libya has **directly affected stability elsewhere on the Continent**, particularly its neighbours such as Mali and Mauritania [emphasis added.]

Over the past decade, the **African Union has adopted one of the most comprehensive security regimes in the world**, and is able to bring to bear a great deal of experience in resolving conflicts that it can share. It was with this experience in mind that the African Union proposed a Roadmap last year to assist in resolving the situation in Libya through a negotiated settlement.

Some argue that the manner in which the Security Council addressed the developments in Libya is an example of how it should respond to all conflicts. We don't agree. Yes, South Africa voted in favour of Resolution 1973 last year mandating a no-fly-zone, because the information available at the time indicated that a massacre was about to occur in Benghazi. Preventing mass atrocities is well within the mandate of the UN Security Council. However, regime change by foreign military intervention is not and it was this aspect that South Africa objected to.

Let me be clear, **South Africa does not promote nor support dictatorships**. In our view the Arab Uprisings have demonstrated clearly that the **legitimate rights of the majority cannot be denied**. Similarly, **their aspirations cannot be reduced to a security problem to be managed**. These popular uprisings have fundamentally challenged the whole Arab order, giving renewed **hope and energy** to people of the region and beyond for liberty, democracy and a better life. South Africa welcomes the positive changes that have been taking place in the MENA region. **We have availed ourselves to post-uprising states to share our experience of successful political transition as they lay the foundations for their new systems of government** [emphasis added.]

But in the unfortunate cases where popular uprisings have transformed into military conflicts, South Africa believes strongly that the key to finding a lasting solution is through **inclusive processes of dialogue and reconciliation**. **Military intervention and regime-change solutions are almost always counterproductive, exacerbating conflicts and prolonging the killing** [emphasis added.]

We believe that our approach has been validated by the manner in which the international community approached the situation in Yemen. Mounting domestic and international pressure finally ended the suppressive 33 year rule of President Saleh and led to the formation of an inclusive government under former Vice President Hadi. South Africa remains convinced that **patient mediation efforts by the international community, especially the regional organizations is the best model for solving other crises, as opposed to the aggressive intervention that we witnessed in Libya** [emphasis added.] As Nelson Mandela reminded us: "If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner" What is called for in Yemen today, is sustained international focus to ensure that the process of transitions moves forward, there are still too many cases of violence in that country and people are still leaving Yemen because they feel insecure.



Chairperson, Ladies and Gentleman,

Turning to the dire situation in Syria, South Africa deplores the escalating violence and continued massacres of civilians. The increase in the levels of violence by both sides, especially the use of heavy weapons and aircraft in attacking civilian populated areas, is **shocking** [emphasis added.] South Africa condemns these deplorable acts.

The Human Rights Council mandated International Independent Commission on Syria, which investigated the deteriorating human rights situation in Syria, recently released a report which clearly states that the intensity and duration of the conflict, coupled with the increased organization and capabilities of the organized opposition, has escalated the conflict to a civil war. In addition to the report's conclusion that the Government forces and Shabbiha militias are perpetrating serious human rights violations, it found that the opposition groups are also violating human rights, although not at the same level of intensity as the government. Given the nature of the conflict and the conclusions by the Commission, it is clear that all parties to the conflict are in the logic of war, and that the crisis fulfils the international requirements for civil war. Both sides therefore have obligations under international humanitarian law. We also reiterate that all those in violation of international law and international humanitarian law should be held accountable.

We are therefore **deeply disappointed that the Council has, as yet, not been able to apply pressure on all sides to bring an end to the violence and to comply** [emphasis added] with their respective obligations under the Six-Point Plan and the Geneva Action Group Communiqué. It is essential that a political path be supported by a united, cohesive international effort towards a Syrian-led negotiated political transition aimed at establishing a democratic pluralistic society in which minorities are protected. As the former Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Mr Kofi Annan, stated, the parties will have to negotiate, the only question is whether they do so now, or after a bloody and protracted civil war. A civil war serves no one's interests, least of all the innocent civilian population.

We welcome the appointment of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi as the Joint Special Representative of the UN and the Arab League. We also welcome the appointment of and Mr. Nasser Al-Kidwa as his deputy. Whereas we were disappointed by the resignation of Mr. Annan as the Joint Special Envoy, we thank him for his outstanding commitment to the peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis and commit to building on his noble efforts.

It is now widely accepted that the legitimate struggle of the Syrian people for reform has been hijacked by other elements, such as jihadists, including Al Qaeda, as well as powerful states using Syria as a proxy to pursue geopolitical rivalries. These developments do not bode well for Syria, nor for the region. Should Syria collapse it will adversely affect regional stability in the Middle East and potentially even spark a sectarian bloodbath throughout the region.

South Africa reiterates that the situation in Syria cannot be solved by military means or by **assisting one side militarily and otherwise to defeat the other** [emphasis added.] A military approach may look appealing in the short term, but it will inevitably expose the country's confessional and sectarian fault lines, resulting in the **sort of horror that we continue to witness in Iraq** [emphasis added.]

The uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa is in fact the rejection by ordinary people of autocratic elites who for too long have governed with narrow self-interests instead of for the greater good. **Unfortunately the militant suppression of uprisings has not elicited a consistent response from the UN Security Council** [emphasis added.] Libya received intervention, Yemen strong support for a mediated settlement, and Bahrain – ignored. On Syria, the Security Council’s divisions have rendered it ineffective. **This organ of the United Nations has noble intentions,** [emphasis added] which South Africa fully supports. *Unfortunately the antiquated structure and working methods of the Council, compounded by the narrow interests of its permanent members, undermines the global quest for peace, resulting in selective action and patchy outcomes* [emphasis added.] The inability of the Security Council to address the needs of all people for peace and security **undermines the legitimacy of the entire United Nations.**

This is why we as emerging states have to ask ourselves, is it not time for a new approach to addressing peace and security matters? *Should we not use our solidarity to place pressure on the Security Council to become more responsive to the needs of the majority* [emphasis added.] Reforming the Security Council to become more representative seems an impossible task at times, but we should never give up. It is time that **we the South, specifically Africa and Latin America, which are not represented at all, gain permanent membership** of the UN Security Council? [emphasis added.] It will make the body **more responsive, representative and legitimate** - and will go a long way to **restoring its ability to meeting its obligations to the victims of conflict around the world.**

I thank you

### Commentary Box

To make a general comment on both discourses, the Libyan crisis seems to have inflicted some injury on South African pride, developing into a full-scale identity crisis for the country that eventually resulted in the externalisation of its indignation through severe criticisms and diplomatic quagmires that are typically avoided at all costs in the conduct of international relations. These discourses are, as I have noted, extremely valuable to the international relations specialist exactly because they avoid any and all forms of diplomatic euphemism, allowing the analyst a very rare look into the subject's inner experience of its external reality. With these discourses, South African criticism of Europe as evil, ruthless, selfish and cruel is no longer implied tacitly and therefore possible to explain away by little white lies, but is stated very concretely without any room for confusion: Europe is the evil Other of South African identity and has been so since evil colonialists arrived to the pristine shores of the African continent which they then proceeded to defile with their immoral decadence (on this point, see also Minister Maite Nkoane-Mashabane's watershed speech on liberation movements in Africa in Annexe V.)

## Annexe V: Examples of exceptionalism and grandeur in South African discourse

### Key

	Of or relating to South African exceptionalism, Narcissistic Personality
	Of or relating to identity and/or identification with the Other; characterisation
	Of or relating to a neoliberal worldview
	Of or relating to a neorealist worldview; relating to anarchy

**Speech by Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, on the occasion of a Public Lecture on “*Celebrating the Legacy of Liberation Movements in Africa: Freedom through Diplomacy*”, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.**<sup>237</sup>

06 March 2012

Programme Director;  
Honourable Vice Chancellor, Dr Max Price;  
Members of the University Management;  
Faculty members;  
Senior Government Officials;  
Community Leaders here with us this evening;  
Members of the Media;  
Students;  
Ladies and Gentlemen;

Let me take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude, and indeed a sense of appreciation to management, staff and students of the University of Cape Town for having us here today. We feel privileged to be associated with such an institution ranked amongst the oldest and most reputable in South Africa – we thank you for receiving us with such pomp and ceremony!

The topic of our talk tonight is: “Celebrating the Legacy of Liberation Movements in Africa: Freedom through Diplomacy”. In this regard, I would like to preface my lecture with a well known quote that: *“Until the lions have their historians, tales of hunt shall always glorify the hunter”*

It is common knowledge that the **evolution of Africa’s international relations and diplomacy, particularly during the liberation struggles on the Continent, has always been told by those who were neither Africans nor participated or supported the liberations struggles on the Continent.** Our history as a continent and as a people has always been told from a non-African perspective. We need our historians to tell our side of the story of the evolution of Africa’s international relations and diplomacy. That is a challenge I would like to place squarely on the doors of our African Historians and our

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<sup>237</sup> Nkoane-Mashabane, M. "Celebrating the Legacy of Liberation Movements in Africa: Freedom through Diplomacy," Public lecture held at the University of Cape Town, 06/05/2014. DIRCO, available online: <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2012/mash0306.html>, last accessed on 29/05/2014 at 19h30.

Universities. The relationship between diplomats and academics should be strengthened as a way of sharpening and consolidating Africa's international relations and diplomacy.

Therefore, tonight's discussion should be the beginning and not the end of our conversation. Indeed, SADC has commissioned a study to document the history of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. In my view, the dimension of the **use of diplomacy as a tool for persecuting our struggles for political liberation and independence** should be given the necessary focus it deserves as SADC is trying to do.

As we celebrate the centenary of the oldest liberation movement in Africa, the ANC, we have called upon our friends to join us in celebrating this milestone of **unparalleled trials and tribulations**. This is our victory; these celebrations belong to all of us together! This is our victory of Ubuntu and Humanity!

You will recall that our Cabinet is of the view that the **Centenary Celebrations of the ANC are National celebrations - they do not belong to the ANC alone**. It is the celebrations of **our collective struggle against colonialism** and its apartheid manifestation.

These celebrations give us, our country and the people of South Africa, Africa and the world, an opportunity to reflect on the journey we have travelled together. This freedom that we have attained is not based on colour – it belongs to all of us – black and white together. Above all, **it belongs to humanity at large**.

We should also pay homage to African countries that are celebrating 50 years of their liberation from the chains of colonialism. Accordingly, we wish them well in their pursuits, and indeed their **struggle to further eradicate from their countries the remnants of Colonialism**.

Programme Director

The complex and dynamic world of diplomacy did not begin on this continent with our encounter with colonialism. Our ancestors had an established diplomatic practice of the use of emissaries and conflict mediation and resolution as well as treaties to manage relations between communities and nation-states. *Diplomacy as practiced today may have been codified in Europe from the 17th century, but it has a long history dating back to the ancient period. It is not European in origin; and nor has it been the monopoly of Europe in history.* It is therefore not an accident that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 could open its preamble with the observation that “peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplomatic Agents”.

However, in terms of today's international law, as defined in the Convention cited above as well as other relevant instruments, our notion of diplomacy is state-centric.

But then what is the place of the diplomacy of liberation movements in our international law, state-centric as it is? This is a question we will try to answer in this lecture.

Ladies and gentlemen

Friends

It is *thanks to African diplomacy, that is fundamentally collective-oriented and radical in character, that today we have what could be called revolutionary diplomacy. African diplomacy post-colonial rule was generally radical.*

A pre-eminent African diplomat with a distinguished service in Ghana and the United Nations, Ambassador Frederick Arkhurst, recently reflected on the emergence of African diplomacy in the years after the Second World War. Writing in his much-read memoirs entitled *African Diplomacy*, Ambassador Arkhurst, who was also the chairperson of the first Africa Group at the United Nations in 1960, suggested that (I quote):

*“Their common history under Western European colonialism; the frustrations of dependency; the ravages of apartheid in the southern part of the continent; the appearance of neo-colonialism in the newly independent Republic of Congo (Zaire) – all these factors led to a reaction which injected a certain radicalism to the collective African posture in international relations.” (close quote)*

This meant that out of their experiences in the past and owing to the **continued demon of neo-colonialism**, African diplomacy would be dedicated wholly to opposing colonialism in countries that were not yet free, fighting neo-colonialism and continued imperialism in independent Africa, and affirming that Africa was free.

While in conventional diplomatic theory states are expected to conduct their diplomacy primarily **on the basis of national interests**, independent African countries tended to show a sense of collective, continental allegiance. This is a tendency that countries inherited from liberation movements that tended to have a pan-African outlook, joining forces at times with their counterparts in other African countries to force the common colonial rulers to heed the grievances of the colonised peoples.

**Vulnerable individual African countries** coming out of decades of harsh colonial rule realised that **bilateral diplomacy would have limited benefits for them in negotiations against powerful states in the international system**. So, they would favour **collective diplomacy as the key tool of fighting colonial and neo-colonial tendencies**. They gravitated towards **collective action with other former colonies within the rubric of global south solidarity**. For this reason, this anti-colonial African diplomacy would find concrete expression in cooperation in the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations.

The independence of Ghana in 1957 triggered a wave of independence movements that would lead to the independence of over thirty African countries in a period of a mere three years. This movement took the form of energetic movements that learned quickly to form links with counterparts to pile up pressure on colonial powers to give up their power. The **imaginative politics of the first generation of post-colonial leaders** led to the initiation of policies and programmes designed to assist unfinished liberation struggles succeed.

Some of the newly independent states would later crumble internally partly because the first generation of our leaders focused intensively on foreign affairs, mainly in the support of the liberation struggles of colonial territories in Africa. In this way, they **sacrificed their own national interests and neglected to invest all their energies to deal with huge domestic challenges in their pursuit for the liberation of not-yet-liberated countries**.

For this reason, the sudden decline of colonial powers in Africa from the 1960s was not a spontaneous and inexplicable development. But it was very much an outcome of the agency of African liberation movements and the revolutionary diplomacy of independent African states.

Collective African diplomacy in the UN was remarkable given the fact that in most cases the newly independent states had to send diplomats without experience, resources, and guidance into this very complex arena of multilateral diplomacy. Indeed, there were few African diplomats in the UN in the 1960s, the decade in which diplomacy played a critical role in the liberation struggles of 30 countries that became independent in this period.

In their wisdom, the new African leaders and governments sent to the UN some of their sharpest minds, probably the most needed in the reconstruction of their newly independent countries. The distinguished early African permanent representatives to the UN used their resourcefulness and collective wisdom to champion many achievements on behalf of Africa in the UN system **to the surprise of many established diplomats.**

Programme Director,

The creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and subsequently, the establishment of the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, is a story that is yet to be told in full. These are two important institutions in the history of Africa's international relations and diplomacy and indeed our own history.

For South Africa, we remember the words of OR Tambo, the 9th President of the ANC, in 1985 when he declared that "our movement and our people have been sustained in our struggle by the firm solidarity of the African continent. The chief agency of that solidarity has throughout been the OAU and its Liberation Committee."

Indeed, the OAU and its Coordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa provided a strong platform for the launching of Africa's International Relations and Diplomacy to the rest of the World. This was conducted through the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Security Council, the Committee of Twenty-Four on Decolonization, the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Excellencies

Ladies and Gentlemen

As pointed out already, the 1960s marked a significant turning point in the history of our Continent. It is undeniable that the anti-colonial sentiments and the struggles for political independence in Africa were largely influenced by events in Europe and North America, particularly after World War II.

The Pan African Congresses convened largely by the African Diaspora outside our continent, also contributed immensely in shaping Africa's International Relations and diplomacy prior to the establishment of the OAU.

In fact, the diplomatic support to the liberation struggle in South Africa was clearly outlined at the founding Summit of the OAU. During that Summit, and having considered the question of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa, a Declaration issued by the Summit stated that the OAU Member States were unanimously convinced of the



imperious and urgent necessity of coordinating and intensifying their efforts to put an end to the criminal policy of apartheid and wipe out racial discrimination in all its forms.

The intrinsic strategy and logic of Africa's international relations and diplomacy against the apartheid regime was essentially to mobilize the international community to support the liberation struggles in South through a policy of effective sanctions and complete isolation of the apartheid regime from the rest of the international community. In this regard, Africa's international relations and diplomacy focused on ostracizing and isolating the apartheid regime from the international community and at the same time supporting the armed struggle through the OAU Coordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa. The Committee had the mandate to mobilize military, financial and other resources to enhance the capacity of the armed struggle.

In my view, the manner in which the OAU conducted its international relations and diplomacy, particularly at the level of the United Nations and indeed at various multilateral levels, was very effective and without doubt contributed substantially to the success of our struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Besides the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, the OAU's anti-colonial machinery was also supported in its anti-apartheid crusade by the Front-line States – a body which later transformed into the Southern African Coordinating Conference, a regional economic community intended to lessen economic dependence on apartheid South Africa. The body would lay the groundwork for the post-apartheid Southern African Development Community (SADC) that we have today.

Formed in 1976, the Front-line States maintained military and diplomatic pressure on the white minority regimes to accept the principle of majority rule. During the same period, they successfully demanded that Zimbabwe's divided anti-colonial movement negotiate as a united front and accept some unpalatable compromises in order to reach a settlement. As a result, Zimbabwe became Africa's 51st independent country on 18 April 1980 and an important addition to the membership of the Front-line States.

The OAU Member State and Members of the OAU Coordinating Committee, with the support of the Front-line States, used every opportunity available at the multilateral level to convince the international community that the wars of liberation were just wars in accordance with international law and therefore had to be supported by the international community. The OAU argued that the struggles constituted the fundamental requirement for an **oppressed people** for self-determination and political independence as well as economic **emancipation** as recognized in various UN instruments, including the Charter.

One of the achievements in this regard was when the apartheid regime was expelled from most of the multilateral institutions recognized by the United Nations as well as the Commonwealth.

Clearly, the entire concept of Africa's International Relations and Diplomacy drew its inspiration from the OAU Charter which, among others, called for the **promotion of the unity and solidarity of African states to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa and to promote international cooperation**, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To achieve these goals, OAU Member States pledged themselves to harmonize their policies in the fields of political and diplomatic cooperation and in cooperation for defense and security,

among others. **This, I submit, is the source of Africa's International Relations and Diplomacy and its intrinsic logic to support all liberation movements in Africa.**

As you are aware, the OAU was eventually transformed into the African Union in 2002.

Significantly, at the launch of the African Union in 2002, the assembled Heads of State and Government noted that nowhere had the OAU "proved more decisive than in the African struggle for decolonization." Through the liberation committee, they declared, "the continent worked and spoke as one with undivided determination in forging an international consensus in support of the liberation struggle." Indeed, **the new South Africa stands as historical testimony and an internationally acclaimed product of Africa's international relations and diplomacy.**

Friends

The **ANC was part and parcel of Africa's diplomatic onslaught** against apartheid and an active member of the family of liberation movements on this continent. If anything, the **ANC was in many respects playing a leading role in actions undertaken against apartheid on the international front.**

However, the use of diplomacy in our struggle against colonialism in this country did not begin with the formation of the ANC 100 years ago, in 1912. It began the very day colonialists set their foot on our shores. During the wars of dispossession from those that were fought by the Khoisan people in the 17th century to the Bambatha Rebellion of 1906, diplomacy played a role as our weapon of struggle.

Land, cattle and labour were all key ingredients in the many wars fought between the colonialists and the indigenous people. The role of diplomacy was prominent throughout, not only in the form of the use of interpreters and emissaries between the warring parties, but also in peace agreements and other treaties that were entered upon. In many cases wars would arise as a result of conflicting interpretations of these treaties which in most cases were intended to protect the interests of colonialists. **Conflicting understandings of land ownership also led to countless wars. To Africans, land belonged not to an individual but to the community - it could only be shared, and used communally. To encroaching colonialists, land was for exclusive, private appropriation.**

Moreover, colonialists did not recognize indigenous sovereignty. They saw **no problem in dispossessing the indigenous people of their land, and killing them if they fought back.** In dispossessing the indigenous people of their land, colonialist used a **combination of violence, threats, and conquest**, side by side with diplomatic methods such as negotiations, treaties, **blackmail and buy-offs.**

Our first diplomats of the liberation struggle in this country were the three Khoi interpreters who played an essential role in the interface between the Khoi people and the early Dutch settlers in the 17th century in what is today the Cape Peninsular. These Khoi personalities were: Autshumato, Kratoa (a woman known also as Eva), and Doman. The three interpreters had a good knowledge among themselves of Dutch, English, French and Portuguese languages and cultures which they put into good use in Khoi-Dutch interactions. They were all key in the first war of dispossession known as the First Khoikhoi - Dutch War of 1659 as interpreters, the go-betweens, negotiators, and even warriors on the side of the Khoi people.



Kratoa is worth singling out because she was a woman in a male dominated environment. She was employed by Jan van Riebeeck as a domestic helper at an early age, being groomed as a mediator between the Khoi and the Dutch, and became the first African in this country to be married to a white person. She lived a painful life after the death of her husband, including being imprisoned on Robben Island several times for what they called “immoral” behavior. The Cape-Slavery-Heritage published an article on its website entitled “[Van Riebeeck and the Three Diplomats - the Founding of Modern South Africa](#)”, which paid tribute to Kratoa as follows, that (I quote):

*“She fell pregnant a number of times by different men and each time her infants were taken from her into care. This tragic founding mother of modern South Africa and early diplomat died at the age of 31 in 1674. She is the early ancestral mother of many Coloured, white Afrikaner and indigene African families of today”. (close quote)*

The same article concluded that: “The stories of the three diplomats - Autshumato, Kratoa and Doman - are as much a part of the founding of modern South Africa as that of Jan van Riebeeck”.

Historians are in agreement that during the wars of dispossession **Africans employed strategies and tactics that had in them both elements of resistance and accommodation**. The latter, accommodation, entailed the use of diplomatic tactics such as the building of alliances. Indeed, Africans **built alliances to exploit divisions among different European colonial powers such as when King Moshoeshe of the Basotho used alliance with the British to protect himself from the so-called Voortrekkers**, this resulting in Lesotho being a British protectorate instead of part of the Union of South Africa.

Programme Director  
Friends

The formation of the ANC in 1912 took the diplomacy of our struggle to another level. The founders of the ANC had continued with the diplomatic strategies that were used during the wars of dispossession of engaging the British imperial government and other colonial powers as a way of seeking a peaceful solution to the South African question. However, like with earlier attempts, this non-violent, diplomatic approach did not take our struggle any far towards the solution. This happened to the 1909 delegation sent to England which failed to convince the British Crown to remove the colour bar clauses from the constitution of the Union of South Africa. The same fate visited another ANC diplomatic mission which was dispatched to England in 1914.

ANC’s diplomatic overtures to the world were not limited to sending delegations to the British Crown. The visit by Josiah Gumede, the 4th President of the ANC, to the former Soviet Union in November 1927 not only was it the first by an ANC president to that part of the world. It also led to the so-called Black Republic resolution by the international communist movement which helped the South African Communist Party transit ideologically to the eventual development of the famous theory of Colonialism of a Special Type. The Black Republic resolution transformed the SACP into a truly South African movement with a theory and strategies and tactics grounded in the South African reality. It helped the SACP recognise the colonial question and integrate it into its class analysis of the South African struggle.

One big issue that preoccupied the ANC and the entire Africa in the 1940s was the future of South West Africa (known today as Namibia). The Africa Group at the United

Nations had kicked into action when in 1946 the racist regime in South Africa sought unsuccessfully to incorporate South-West Africa into South Africa as a fifth province. For his part, Dr Alfred Xuma, the 6th President of the ANC, in addition to addressing letters to the United Nations, also travelled to the headquarters of this world body in New York in 1946 to join the campaign against the incorporation of South West Africa.

However, it was in exile, between the 1960s and the unbanning in 1990, that the ANC perfected the use of diplomacy as a weapon in our struggle. With international solidarity identified as a pillar of our struggle alongside three others (namely: armed struggle, the underground, and mass struggle), the ANC built an unrivalled diplomatic arsenal that stretched from the OAU and the UN to many countries all over the world. With the anti-apartheid movement established in many countries for internal mobilization and lobbying of governments and observer missions in existence at the OAU and the UN as well as formal diplomatic representation in many countries – the ANC was a force to reckon with in the international arena. When the organization was unbanned in 1990, it had more diplomatic representations in the world than the apartheid government.

One of the shining lights of ANC's diplomacy in exile was the late Johnny Makhathini who died in Zambia in December 1988 and reburied in his home province of Kwazulu-Natal in February 2010. In his eulogy at the reburial ceremony, President Jacob Zuma reminded us that:

*All who lived and worked with him will recall that as ANC representative in Algeria, [Comrade Makhathini] was highly effective, making the message of freedom heard in all corners, from Algeria to the Western Europe. Comrade Johnny Makatini was also a respected figure in the Organisation of African Unity, pushing the agenda of the unity of the African people and the fight against apartheid*

*He distinguished himself as the head of the ANC mission in the United Nations. He was highly influential and was known by every diplomat worth his salt.*

Programme Director

From the foregoing, it is clear that **liberation movements have indeed transformed the state-centric nature** of international law, especially in four areas. Firstly, the right of nations to self determination is firmly established in international law. Secondly, just cause for which people can fight is recognized in international law in the context of the use of force. International law also recognizes the right of a people to institute a revolutionary change of government as opposed to unconstitutional change of government (known as coups). Thirdly, over the years, elements of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations were qualified when the **UN adopted a resolution granting observer status to some liberation movements, including our ANC**. Finally, **liberation movements came to be considered as party to a conflict in terms of international humanitarian law and therefore bound by obligations under such law like on the treatment of prisoners of war. The ANC was one of the few liberation movements that respected this aspect of international law.**

In a word, the ANC's diplomacy was successful in that, firstly, it made the struggle against apartheid an aspect of international law when apartheid was condemned as a crime against humanity and a threat to international peace as defined in the UN Charter. Secondly, the UN Convention on the suppression of apartheid of November 1973 was one example of the body of international jurisprudence that evolved against apartheid.

Thirdly, the UN deployed boycotts and sanctions for isolating and weakening apartheid South Africa as a member of the international community, including targeting its access to arms as well as international trade and investment. Fourthly, the establishment of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and its Center against Apartheid, created a follow up mechanism in the UN system on anti-apartheid issues. Finally, the granting of observer status to the ANC was the cherry on the top!

In this regard, Chief Albert Luthuli, the 8th President of the ANC, spoke for many of us when he thanked those who laid down their lives for the attainment of our freedom, when he said (and I quote):

*“To these champions of the noble cause of freedom for Democracy I say, money to give you we have none, but in full measure, we express our deep-felt sympathy and admiration, we are proud of you”.* (close quote)

Excellencies

Ladies and Gentlemen

I would like to end this lecture by quoting from the words of a great Pan-Africanist who participated at the 1st Pan African Congress in London, England, in 1900 and the 5th Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England, in 1945. It was, indeed W.E.B du Bois who said in a statement delivered at the 1900 Congress that (I quote):

*“Let the nations of the world respect the integrity and independence of the free Negro states of Abyssinia, Liberia, Haiti, and the rest, and let the inhabitants of these states, the independent tribes of Africa, the Negroes of the West Indies and America, and the black subjects of all nations take courage, strive ceaselessly, and fight bravely, that they may prove to the world their incontestable right to be counted among the great brotherhood of mankind. Thus we appeal with boldness and confidence...for a generous recognition of the righteousness of our cause.”*

There is no doubt that the African spirit that blessed the 1st Assembly of the OAU in Cairo in 1964, a year after OAU was established in 1963, derived from the 1st and the 5th Pan African Congresses of 1900 and 1945 respectively. **Our struggle** and the historical support it gained from the OAU, the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, reflects **the spirit of Pan-Africanism which logically demands the united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa to assume its responsibility in the promotion of peace, security, stability and development in Africa**. Accordingly, we are determined to work closely with Members States of SADC to play an active role in the strengthening of AU, the successor institution of the OAU, to ensure that the AU remains a viable framework for the conduct of Africa’s international relations and diplomacy.

As the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, we have used the last eighteen years (18 yrs) of our freedom to reposition our country within our continent and in the rest of the world. ***Today, South Africa stands out among the front ranks of those countries who strive for peace, democracy, prosperity, infrastructure development, and poverty eradication*** (among others).

Programme Director, Dr Xuma (ANC President) once wrote to the then UN Secretary-General in November 1946 that “I may mention that **it is difficult for the native African in South Africa to get his views and aspirations known by the outside world**. The views represented by the Government of the Union of South Africa generally represent

the interest of the ruling European minority”. Decades of ANC’s diplomacy, supported by the OAU anti-colonial machinery, would change this picture radically. **The struggle of the South African people was known in almost all households in the world.** Today we pay homage to all those dedicated cadres who made this possible.

Once again, we thank the University for inviting us. You did so, because you yourselves have been part of this journey that led us to our freedom in 1994. You did not stop there. You have continued to be on our side in another leg of our journey to a prosperous, non-racial, non-sexist South Africa, free of poverty, unemployment, inequality, and all the vestiges of the legacy of apartheid. Today’s lecture is part of this journey!

I thank you!

#### **Commentary box**

Foreign Minister Mashabane seems to insinuate that the very origins of important elements of international law were inspired by South African liberation struggles and difficult power relationships between indigenous Africans and European colonisers, while the practice of diplomacy was either originated in Africa or simultaneously originated in Africa and Europe. To put my intellectual indignation at such a suggestion aside, it is interesting in the optic of my suggestion of South Africa as having a Narcissistic Personality to note that by this suggestion, the Foreign Minister is placing South Africa and its colonial past at the centre of the international political universe, in keeping with theoretical suggestions that the narcissist exists in its own glass bubble where the rest of the world exists solely to feed narcissistic supply. This is perhaps the most radical example of South African exceptionalism and delusions of grandeur to date, betraying the country's desperate need to lay claim to exceptional achievements as per the Nobel Prize complex discussed earlier.

In speaking of a colonial heritage that is still felt in South Africa if not Africa on the whole to this day, South Africa keeps the old colonial wound open. Not only did post-colonial South Africa inherit the ruins of colonial occupation, the ashes from which it battled to rebuild itself and its political infrastructure, the statement that South African history is still being told by Europeans rather than by South Africans suggests a continued feeling or perception of oppression and marginalisation. It is not my vocation to make any value judgements on Minister Nkoane-Mashabane's claims though I do have some difficulty accepting the idea that a country with as much voice as South Africa in international relations should encounter as much problems with making that voice heard. Therein lies the articulation of South Africa's schizophrenia, then. In the apparent impossibility for the country to decide on an identity as either victim or champion, as either leader or led, the South African identity suffers a certain incompatibility with itself more than with Europe or the rest of the world.