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The European External Action Service and Europeanisation

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List of Abbreviations

BFA	Burkina Faso
CFSP	The Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	The Common Security and Defence Policy
COELA	The Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU
COREPER	The Committee of Permanent Representatives
DG	Directorate-General
DG DEVCO	The Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG ECHO	The Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECJ	The European Court of Justice
ECSC	The European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	The European Economic Community
EPC	The European Political Cooperation
EPP	The European People's Party
EU	The European Union
EEAS	The European External Action Service
EURATOM	The European Atomic Community
European Union Delegation	EU Delegation
FAC	The Foreign Affairs Council
High Representative	The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
PJCCM	The Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matter
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
PESCO	The Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSC	The Political and Security Committee
RELEX	The Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors
TEU	The Treaty on European Union

TFEU	The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
UN	The United Nations

1. Introduction

The political project that is the European Union (EU), as first envisioned by the French bureaucrat Jean Monnet, has so far been an incredible success story. Certainly, this success has neither been unquestioned nor without its setbacks, but instead has been achieved in small and often painful, crises-inflicted incremental steps (Hix 2007, p. 141). Nonetheless, if we look at the overall development of the EU and its achievements, one can hardly dispute that it has by far outperformed its founding fathers' aspirations, who wished to create a more peaceful and prosperous Europe after centuries of gruesome wars. However, despite this success, the scientific world continues to struggle to comprehensively capture the nature of the EU in its entire complexity (Börzel and Risse 2007, p. 483; Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 1–3). This is partially due to the EU's unique supranational structure, which somewhat always puts it 'in between' and makes it ever changing, a one-of-a-kind organisation 'sui generis'¹ (Hix 2007, p. 141; Zandonella 2006, p. 86).

In the light of the EU's evolution and the increasingly interwoven relations between the EU and its Member States on all levels and across a rising number of sectors, the conciliatory concept of *Europeanisation*² emerged at the end of the 1980s in an attempt to describe the EU and its inner workings, as well as the consequences of its deepened integration on the Member States (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 1–3; Dyson and Goetz 2003, pp. 12, 21–6; Featherstone 2003, p. 5; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 4). Despite Europeanisation still not having found an overall accepted theoretical framework, the concept rapidly proved itself to be of added explicatory value in those areas where the EU is most notable and traditionally held major legislative competencies, for instance in agriculture or competition (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 1–3; Featherstone 2003, p. 6; Knill 2005, p. 157; Lypp 2008, pp. 6, 11; Radaelli 2004, p. 14). Nonetheless, literature on Europeanisation developed alongside the perpetual expansion of the EU's competencies and borders³ and endeavoured to further affirm its usefulness in policy sectors where the EU is only now starting to acquire

¹ Latin for “of its own kind”, “unique”.

² Also “Europeanization” in the US version.

³ Usually referred to as “deepening and widening” (Zandonella 2006, pp. 34, 90).

more competencies (Featherstone 2003, p. 6; Lypp 2008, p.12).

One of these sectors is European foreign policy, an arena still decisively shaped by intergovernmentalism, with the Member States being particularly sensitive and reluctant to transfer sovereignty (Lypp 2008, pp. 5-6; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003, pp. 329–30; Moumoutzis 2011, p. 608; Smith 2008, p. 17). In defiance of this reluctance and driven by the mission to elevate the EU's political influence to the level of its economic power, the Member States launched institutionalised efforts to better coordinate their stances in foreign policy with the European Political Cooperation (EPC) at the beginning of the 1970s, which later became the EU's second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Bindi 2012, pp. 18-19, 26). Even though this was mostly a reaction to economic and political crises and ultimately proved to be very difficult to achieve, especially faced with the increased number in Member States, a goal was set, namely, for the Member States to speak with one European voice in order to safeguard the EU's common values, independence and security (Bindi 2012, pp. 18-19).

In its latest attempt to make this European voice reality, the Member States introduced a new player along with the EU's latest contractual reform, the Treaty of Lisbon: The European External Action Service (EEAS) under the lead of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative) (Lypp 2008, pp. 5-6; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003, pp. 329–30; Moumoutzis 2001, p. 608; Smith 2008, p. 17). Where doubts about this new institution's useful- and effectiveness were plenty, since its founding years⁴ it has transformed itself into a resourceful actor in the EU's foreign politics, decisively shaping the EU's external action in the world (Lypp 2008, pp. 5-6).

In light of this seemingly reinforced external action and the ongoing debate about the weakness of the European voice in the world, this Master's thesis will take a look at how the EEAS and its actions can be linked to the theoretical concept of Europeanisation, how it affects the concept's usefulness in the EU's foreign policy arena and, first and foremost, if the EASS furthers Europeanisation in the EU's

⁴ The EEAS, as foreseen in the Treaty of Lisbon, that was signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009, was officially launched on 1st of January 2011 (EEAS 2016c).

foreign policy realm.

1.1 Research Question and Hypothesis

This Master's thesis attempts to contribute to the research on Europeanisation in foreign policy by linking this theoretical concept with the tangible achievements of the EEAS, as perceived by three distinct experts working in the EU's foreign policy field. In doing so, it strives to shed light on how this new player contributes to Europeanisation in the EU's foreign policy sector through its internal and external genesis and work since its official launch in 2011. It will try to respond to the specific research question whether the EEAS supports Europeanisation in the field of foreign policy (EEAS 2016b).

In regard to this principal research question, I hypothesise that the EEAS does indeed further Europeanisation in the EU's foreign policy sector, despite it still being a very young institution that has not yet reached a complete sophistication and has more room for development.

1.2 Definitions and Clarifications

It is essential for the understanding of this thesis to clarify what we mean when talking about *Europeanisation*, a concept that holds different meanings depending on the respective discipline and research focus (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 3; Knill 2005, p. 157; Lypp 2008, pp. 6, 11). While I will address this theoretical concept, its advantages, as well as its inherent flaws in further depth in Chapter 2, I find it useful to already anticipate that for the purpose of this thesis, I lean on Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli's definition of Europeanisation and, therefore, understand Europeanisation in a broad fashion as a “process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests” (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; p. 3), that are closely linked to the EU and the penetration of the national systems of the Member States by a European mind-set in a much broader sense (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003;

pp. 3-4). Furthermore, I limit the scope of this Master's thesis on Europeanisation within the Member States, hereby excluding accession candidates and other third countries (Börzel and Risse 2007, p. 487). While Europeanisation's overall main interest is usually to research and explain notable changes in national politics caused by the deepened integration of the EU, this thesis' focuses most on the changes the EEAS and its High Representative have caused in the EU's foreign policy arena, with a particular focus on how this change is perceived by the Member States and how they adopt to this new player in a policy field they previously dominated (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; p. 4).

Under the broad term *Foreign Policy* I understand the entirety of foreign activities of a nation, or an international or supranational organisation towards each other, be it in the political, military, economic, legal or cultural sector (Bergmann 2012, pp. 94-102; Pfennig 2012, p. 39; Weber-Fas 2008, p. 37). For the purpose of this thesis, I approach foreign policy primarily from an EU perspective, specifically meaning the EU's Common Foreign- and Security Policy (CFSP), but also the foreign policy of the Member States, as they also constitute an elemental part of the EU foreign policy and increasingly exist in a European framework (Lypp 2008, p. 11). As this would exceed the scope of this Master's thesis, I will focus on foreign policy while neglecting the security policy aspects, with its own distinct features and its complex institutional setup. This can also be seen in the changed self-awareness of Member States, with them classifying their relations towards other European Member States outside of their 'usual' Foreign Policy, with divergent frameworks and expectations (Lypp 2008, p. 11). When I instead employ the term *EU's external action*, I intentionally and in difference include all other policy fields that exist next to the EU's Foreign Policy, for instance, its development cooperation, humanitarian aid or crisis reaction.

1.3 Methodology

This Master's thesis will approach its research question, whether the EEAS supports Europeanisation in the field of foreign policy, by employing two different methodological instruments. For Chapters 2 and 3, the presentation of

Europeanisation in general and specifically in foreign policy as well as the development of the EEAS, I will follow a literature analysis approach. Here, I will provide a general overview of the theoretical concept that is Europeanisation, in particular the concept's origins, strengths and weaknesses before moving on to discuss the distinctive features of Europeanisation in the EU's foreign policy. For this, I will particularly draw upon Featherstone and Radaelli (2003), Krill (2005), Lypp (2008), Moumoutzis (2011) and Axt et al. (2007). In Chapter 3, I will then introduce the reader to the EEAS and its development from the founding years under the first High Representative, Lady Catherine Ashton, to its current High Representative, Federica Mogherini. Here, I will especially draw upon the Review of the EEAS in 2013 (EEAS 2013), the EEAS' Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy (EEAS 2016a) and the EEAS' Annual Activity Reports (z.B. EEAS 2018).

Chapter 4 then builds on the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 2 and 3 to apply the concept of Europeanisation to the development and the dynamics that the EEAS created in the EU's foreign policy realm, especially how the different changes were perceived by the Member States and how they accommodated. Here, I draw from three expert interviews that I conducted with two representatives of diplomatic missions of Member States in Brussels and one representative of the EEAS who is currently serving in the European Union Delegation (EU Delegation) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. I chose the qualitative research method of expert interviews, as this enabled me to gather concentrated, in-depth insider information in a more efficient and timely manner than would have been possible through, for example, systematic quantitative surveys or participatory observations (Bogner et al. 2009, pp. 1-2). I believe this to be particularly true for research on the sensitive foreign policy sector, where it can be difficult to gather wide and truthful data and access a sufficient number of relevant stakeholders (Bogner et al. 2009, pp.1-2). Where sensible for the understanding, I will complement the statements from the experts with literature.

When it comes to the selection of the experts interviewed for the purpose of this Master's thesis, I chose to rely on a mixture of external and internal views on the EEAS, namely two representatives of Member States and one representative of

the EEAS itself. Interview Partner I, who wished to remain anonymous, hereby represents a larger and more influential northern Member State, whereas the second interview partner from a Member State, Dr Peter Krois, works as Counsellor for the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Austria to the EU, hence represents a smaller northern Member State. Additionally, in a previous position within the Austrian Foreign Ministry he was involved in the debate surrounding the establishment of the EEAS and its institutional setup, which enabled him to provide a very detailed assessment of its history and the mindset behind its structure. Initially, my aim was to also include different regions of the EU, especially newer Member States from Eastern Europe or southern Member States. Unfortunately, I was unable to identify representatives from these Member States open to an interview, with the Permanent Representations of these Member States declining requests. However, I do believe that the assessment of these two experts is an adequate starting point to evaluate the EEAS' impact on Europeanisation, especially as their different observations were mostly in agreement.

As I was also interested in the internal perspective of the EEAS, in order to provide a coherent picture I included an interview with Mr Thierry Barbé, who is currently serving as Deputy Ambassador at the EU Delegation in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Mr Barbé previously worked within the Commission and therefore can assess the EEAS' development both from the outside and the inside. An initial attempt to also include the view of an EEAS representative working at headquarter in Brussels failed due to a lack in willing interview partners.

In regard to the documentation of the three qualitative expert interviews, I restrained from word-for-word transcriptions due to the interview partners' reluctance to be recorded on tape. This is understandable, since foreign policy remains a sensitive issue, with diplomats usually shying away from delivering direct, verifiable quotes. Following consultation with my thesis supervisor, I therefore decided to capture the essence of each interview through abbreviated summaries that can be found in the annexes I-III of this Master's thesis. The summaries are based on personal notes compiled in the course of these interviews, which will be kept as a record in case questions concerning the

content of the interviews emerge. In order to provide additional context, the summaries, furthermore, include an indication as to the information provided to the interview partners beforehand, in which language, when and where the interview was conducted, and the professional background of the interview partners, with the exception of Interview Partner I, who wished to remain anonymous. Additionally, the author confirms for each interview that the basic content of the interview was not altered, except for linguistic adaptations and those necessary to improve readability.

With regard to the different dimensions of the political, I decided to follow the classic distinction in political science between polity, policy and politics, in order to create a clear analytical pathway for analysing the interviews and to do justice to the complexity of this multidimensional term (Andersen and Woyke 2013; Börzel and Risse 2007, pp. 486-488). I employ a rather broad and inclusive understanding of all terms, with the aim to capture as many aspects brought up by the experts as possible. Polity hereby focuses on structure and institutional aspects, such as new formal and informal institutions, the rules they follow, their political culture or their moral code (Andersen and Woyke 2003; Mickel 2003; Schneider 2017, p. 50). Here, I aim to assess which new formal and informal institutions, forums, exchange platforms or moral guidelines have been developed together with the Member States since the High Representative and the EEAS came to be and how they are perceived by the Member States. Policy instead takes a look at the content of political discourse, especially specific goals, tasks or programmes with whom the political actors aim to shape our society (Andersen and Woyke 2013; Mickel 2003). With regards to the EEAS I strive to assess, how this new institution has shaped and is influencing the content of the political discourse with the EU foreign policy realm. Lastly, the politics dimension focuses on the processes of political discourse, mediation of interests, their power play and how things are decided upon (Andersen and Woyke 2013; Mickel 2003). Here, I will assess how the EEAS has changed the way discourse is conducted and agreements are found amongst the Member States, with a particular focus on how the EEAS itself is starting to engage in power play. With regards to all three dimensions, it is necessary to point out that the EEAS is still a relatively young institution and that change in this context is clearly a relatively

long-lasting and non-linear process (Mannin 2013, p. 10). This Master's thesis can therefore only ever try to capture certain aspects of this change, with further extended research being necessary.

Within this segregation between polity, policy and politics, I differentiate between the EEAS' achievements, its limitations and the opportunities the three experts see for its future development. Again, this structure aims to create a clear analytical pathway and enable the reader to clearly distinguish between these three analytical levels.

2. Europeanisation –

Theoretical Rapprochement to a Contested Concept

When talking about the theoretical concept that is Europeanisation, it's important to be aware of the fact that just as with the EU itself, the scientific world still has difficulties capturing the entire picture (Börzel and Risse 2007, pp. 483-84; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 3; Knill 2005, p. 157). Yet, as Europeanisation is the theoretical point of departure of this thesis, it is crucial to acquire an initial understanding of the origins of this complex concept and the specific debates as well as controversies surrounding it, before trying to link it with the EEAS.

The following chapter will therefore provide some general information on what exactly we mean when talking about Europeanisation, under what circumstances this term emerged and what scientific debates surround it, before quickly narrowing my attention on its distinctive features in foreign policy. Here, I will first give a brief overview of the development of the EU's foreign policy realm, in order to sharpen the reader's understanding why Europeanisation is of particular nature in this sector.

2.1 Europeanisation – An Overview

The reinforced willingness amongst Member States to push for a stronger community at the end of the 1980s, with the Single European Act, two new Member States⁵ and later on the Treaty of Maastricht, increased the complexity of the European reality and the interwovenness between Member States dramatically (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 1–3; Jørgensen 2007, p. 521; Featherstone 2003, p. 5). In the light of this complexity, some scholars turned to the assumption, that the Member States would largely still simply *upload* their proper national and unchangeable interests to the European level and only concede their coordination power (Moumoutzis 2011, p. 608). Others saw the EU institutions themselves as increasingly powerful actors that started influencing the decisions of the Member States in a rather *top down* manner (Moumoutzis 2011, p. 608). Despite both concepts raising interesting aspects, they quickly proved too simplistic to capture the EU's reality of reciprocally emphasised exchange and were limited in their explanatory value (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 1–3; Economides 2005, p. 472; Featherstone 2003, p. 59; Knill 2005, p. 156; Wong 2005, pp. 137, 150; 2006, pp. 8–9).

As an alternative, the conciliatory concept of Europeanisation emerged at the end of the 1980's, trying to offer a more differentiated picture of the deepened European integration and to combine the 'bottom up' and the 'top down' approach (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 1–3; Dyson and Goetz 2003, pp. 12, 21–6; Featherstone 2003, p. 5; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 4). This concept rapidly proved itself to be of added explicatory value in the course of the 1990s, notably in those areas where the EU's competencies had started and where it had largely shaped the hard legislative framework (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, pp. 1–3; Featherstone 2003, p. 6; Knill 2005, p. 157; Lypp 2008, pp. 6, 11; Radaelli 2004, p. 14). Nonetheless, what Europeanisation specifically entails remains difficult to detect, as the term holds varying meanings across different disciplines, such as history and economics, as well as cultural, political or social studies (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 3; Knill 2005, p. 157; Lypp 2008, pp.

⁵ Spain and Portugal joined the EEC in 1986.

6, 11).

In political science it is generally agreed upon that Europeanisation refers to more than the European regional integration, harmonisation or simple convergence, yet, and this is of importance, partially relates to these terms (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 3; Radaelli 2003, p. 33; Schneider 2017, p. 41). Additionally, the term is usually considered to be normatively charged, as its use is often times closely linked to the author's recognition of the EU as a valid political system of its own merit (Mannin 2013, p. 10; Schneider 2017, p. 41⁶). That means that for scientists researching Europeanisation the basic question: 'if the EU matters', has usually long been resolved (Börzel and Risse 2007, p. 483). Instead it has been replaced by further reaching questions as to what extent, in what direction and in which circumstances it does matter (Börzel and Risse 2007, p. 483). Here, research usually takes a bottom up perspective, looking up from the Member States, even though Europeanisation clearly entails more than simple reactions on the national level to EU input or an unquestioned uploading of Member States interests (Axt et al. 2007, p. 137; Börzel and Risse 2007, p. 484; Moumoutzis 2011, p. 608; Schneider 2017, p. 40). Apart from these general agreements, the understanding of what Europeanisation exactly entails often remains vague and heavily contested (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 3; Knill 2005, p. 157; Lypp 2008, pp. 6, 11). Christoph Knill (2005) for instance, remarks that until today there only exist vague theoretical fragments offering different analytical aspects on Europeanisation and a truly comprehensive theory still remains to be developed (Knill 2005, p. 157).

When faced with this unclear picture, a fair share of scholars completely discards the concept, as they regard it as of limited usefulness, especially when it comes to tracking the direction of possible changes other than describing it or identifying clear causalities (Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 609-10). They claim that the concept fails to simplify reality and therefore does not comply to the most basic requirement of a scientific model (Clarke 1996, pp. 19-21; Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 609-10; Olsen 2002, p. 941). They furthermore criticise that the vagueness surrounding Europeanisation makes empirical research, including falsifiability,

⁶ s. also Hooghe and Marks 2001; Hix and Høyland 2011.

very difficult (Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 609-10). In contrast, some will use the term, and thereby indirectly affirm its usefulness, but refrain however from relying on a clear definition and rather indirectly fall back on using Europeanisation in the broad, unspecified terms of “the internalisation of norms” or even “the delegation of sovereignty to the Union” (Tonra 2001; Lypp 2008, pp. 10-11).

Rather than referring to Europeanisation in absolute terms, it is better to understand it as a spectrum of possible definitions. These may range from its most minimalistic understanding, “a response to the policies of the European Union” (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 3) to a more broader understanding of “processes of structural change variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests” (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 3), that are closely linked to the EU and the penetration of the national systems of the Member States by a European mind-set in a much broader sense (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 3; Radaelli 2004, p.3). More concretely, Radaelli (Radaelli 2004) believes that “Europeanisation consists of a process of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2004, p. 3, s. also Mannin 2013, p. 15; Schneider 2017, p. 43).

In Featherstone and Radaelli's (2003) broader understanding, Europeanisation's main interest is to research and explain notable changes in the national dimension of the Member States caused by the deepened integration of the EU and possible adjustments to the European framework. This extends to all dimensions of political science – Policy, Politics and Polity (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, p. 4; Knill 2005, p. 156; Radaelli 2003, p. 33; Schneider 2017, p. 40). The central question Europeanisation asks according to this logic, is under what circumstances on the European level, changes in content, processes and structure of national politics occur (Axt et al. 2007, p. 146).

With regards to the policy dimension, hence the content of political discourse,

one can predict possible impacts the European supranational level will have on the development and representation of the Member States' national interests (Anderson and Woyke 2013; Axt et al. 2007, p. 140). Here, Europeanisation analyses, to what extent political players use negotiation mechanisms to further their interests (Axt et al. 2007, p. 140; Goetz and Hix 2000). Europeanisation can also impact the construction of national and European identities, discourse, norms and values, "ways of thinking" and thereby national priorities (Radaelli 2003, p. 36; Schneider 2017, p. 42). When it comes to the politics dimension, or the processes of political discourse, the focus is often laid on requirements or standards that were developed on a European level and have or can have specific implications on the selection of steering instruments and their design (Axt et al. 2007, p. 140; Goetz and Hix 2000; Mickel 2003). With regards to the dimension of polity, the most popular focus of research is often referred to as "institutional Europeanisation". Institutional Europeanisation is understood as a process of institution-building, hence, the construction and development of governance structures on the European level concerning political, legal or also social institutions, that again have an influence upon the Member States (Börzel and Risse 2003, p. 59; Knill 2005, p. 156; Radaelli 2003, p. 29). According to these studies, Europeanisation can cause the establishment of new institutions and structures. Some examples include the establishment of permanent representations at Brussels or the creation of special committees in the national parliaments (Axt et al. 2007, p. 139; Mannin 2013, p. 14; Schneider 2017, p. 41).

On a more technical note Moumoutzis criticises Radaelli's (2004) definition, as it makes it very difficult to distinguish between the effects of Europeanisation and the original sources of it, as "construction" indicates that Europeanisation already includes the policy formulation (Radaelli, 2004, p. 12; Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 3-5; Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 611-12). Furthermore, it leaves the instruments of "diffusion" and "institutionalisation" open, therefore including everything from loose intentions to hard institutional set implementation (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 3, 7). Moumoutzis, therefore, recommends to not further specify the level of incorporation into the domestic sphere in Radaelli's definition and to better speak of "a process of incorporation" (Moumoutzis 2011, p. 611), with the option for each researcher to adopt the specific process form assumed in that

policy area (Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 611-12).

Lastly, and this is the line of argumentation this Master's thesis follows, some scholars argue that exactly this flexibility and openness of the concept can be regarded as its actual strength (Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2004; Moumoutzis 2011). Olsen (2002) and Radaelli (2004) for example, simply see the usefulness of the concept in its important "ability to raise interesting questions" (Moumoutzis 2011, p. 609), while simultaneously being adaptable enough to serve as an overarching theoretical concept that captures the complex reality of a multitude of different policy areas and institutional mechanisms as well as their development (Moumoutzis 2011, p. 609). This line of research, therefore, aims at finding a way to balance the usefulness of the concept's openness to different approaches and policy areas while at the same time working with varying definitions that are adapted to each specific case, in order to remain useful and applicable for empirical research.

2.2 Europeanisation in Foreign Policy

Despite difficulties to agree upon one single definition of Europeanisation, it is certain that the level of notable Europeanisation varies decisively between the different European policy sectors, between the respective country or even within the different regions within that country (Cowles et al. 2001; Hyde-Price 2006; Moumoutzis 2011, p. 608; Radaelli 2004, p. 14; 2003, p. 33; Schneider 2017, p. 40). Where Radaelli (Radaelli 2004) has shown that Europeanisation generally has been stronger in the field of public policies and weaker in national politics as well as domestic politics, there is also a general consensus that the level of Europeanisation greatly depends on the level of EU engagement, the EU's competencies, the specific form of EU legislation and the institutional arrangements in that policy area (Featherstone 2003, p. 6; Moumoutzis 2011, p. 608; Radaelli 2004, p. 14).

The observation of divergent intensities of Europeanisation in different European policy areas is of particular importance when discussing Europeanisation in the

field of foreign policy, where it initially only attracted moderate attention due to the distinct nature of this arena (Featherstone 2003, p. 6). However, as the EU has started to increasingly establish itself as an independent collective foreign policy actor next to the nation states, the original foreign policy actors, debates regarding Europeanisation have also reached this policy area (Lypp 2008, p. 12). Here, it is important to note that while the question, 'if the EU has a coherent policy or to what extent', of course affects the interests of scientists researching Europeanisation in this field, it only loosely concerns the concept of Europeanisation, that is rather interested in procedural change and the reasons for this amongst the MS (Moumoutzis 2011, p. 620).

Before presenting the specific debate on Europeanisation in the EU's foreign policy I will, first, provide a brief overview of the development of this policy sector current shape and its main characteristics. As I will address the High Representative and the EEAS in more depths in Chapter 3, I will only briefly touch upon these new institutions in this chapter. Hereby, I aim to hand the reader some background information of this policy sector that I deem crucial to understand the debate surrounding the debate about Europeanisation in the EU's foreign policy sector.

2.2.1 The Origins and Genesis of the EU's Foreign Policy

Despite some divergent opinions, such as Moravcsik (2001), the European Economic Community (EEC) always has had a foreign policy dimension, even though nobody called it by that name and the Member States failed on several attempts to institutionalise it (Carlsnaes 2004, pp. 497–503; Jørgensen 2007, p. 521; Moravcsik 2001, pp. 163-4). This lacking behind of European integration in comparison to other policy fields, has to do with the very specific nature of the sector, traditionally regarded as the crown jewel of sovereignty (Lypp 2008, pp. 10, 14). This sensitivity, the overall political context of the Cold War, national reflexes and, of course, the fact that some European countries had only just regained their independence, made Member States less eager to transfer powers to the EU (Lypp 2008, pp. 10, 14; Moumoutzis 2011, p. 62). The fragmented

structure we face today, therefore, isn't the result of a carefully thought-out "master plan" but rather a logical consequence of all of these considerations linked with the pragmatism of the Member States to incrementally go ahead anyways (Bindi 2011, p. 132; Lyppp 2008, p. 14; Schmidt and Schünemann 209, p. 299).

The first concrete steps towards a more formalised European foreign policy were made by the Member States with the establishment of the EPC and its Political Committee in 1970, in the context of exogenous crises⁷ that called for a closer coordination of policy stances and a more coherent joint action (Bergmann 2012, p. 95). With the EPC, the Member States set up a principle of consultation between them on all important questions of foreign policy and agreed that the Foreign Ministers of the Member States would meet every six months, something that soon proved to be insufficient (Bindi 2012, pp. 18-19).

These careful first steps were further bolstered with the Copenhagen Rapport and the Single European Act (Bergmann 2012, p. 95; Bindi 2012, pp. 18-19, 26-28). With the entering into force of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) in 1993, the EPC was replaced by the CFSP, that was accommodated within a separate pillar in the EU's newly created institutional architecture (Bergmann 2012, p. 95; Bindi 2012, pp. 26-28). Where the first pillar, that included the European Communities⁸ were supranational, the second and third pillar, namely the CFSP and the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matter (PJCCM), relied on the intergovernmental cooperation method with the Member States having to decide in unanimity (Große Hüttmann and Wehling 2013; Herdegen 2013).

More specifically, the Treaty of Maastricht reassured the CFSP's policy objectives that were to be pursued through systematic intergovernmental cooperation between the Member States and joint actions in a "spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" (Treaty of Maastricht 1992), while refraining from "any action which is contrary to the interest of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations" (Treaty of Maastricht 1992). The Council

⁷ For instance the oil crises of the 1970s and the abolition of the Bretton-Woods. agreement.

⁸ More specifically the European Community (EC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Community (EURATOM).

Presidency was from now on to represent the Union's CFSP towards third parties with its general guidelines to be defined by the European Council (Treaty of Maastricht 1992). The Council would then implement these guidelines (Treaty of Maastricht 1992). The diplomatic missions of the Member States and the Delegations of the European Commissions abroad, that had existed since the 50s but had increased in the 60s, were admonished to cooperate more closely (EEAS 2019; Treaty of Maastricht 1992). While remaining of secondary importance within the CFSP pillar, the European Parliament and the Commission gained some minor competencies, with the European Parliament receiving informative rights and the Commission a right of initiative (Treaty of Maastricht 1992). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) continued to have only in very few and exceptional cases the right to judicial control (Bergmann 2012, p. 95; Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; Treaty of Maastricht 1992).

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2000) continued this institutionalisation, with the latter introducing, amongst others, the office of the “High Representative for Common and Foreign Security Policy” in order to provide the CFSP, in response to a taunting comment made by Henry Kissinger, with one telephone number (Bergmann 2012, p. 95; Bindi 2012, pp. 26-28; Schmidt and Schünemann 2009, p. 299). Together with the EU Presidency's foreign minister and a senior representative from the European Commission, this office was to form a new CFSP troika (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; Bindi 2012, pp. 26-28). The Treaty also introduced the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which replaced the original Political Committee, and reduced barriers to set up enhanced cooperation between willing Member States (Bindi 2012, p. 36; Treaty of Amsterdam 1997). The Presidency of the Council could from now on negotiate international agreements and the new instrument of “common strategies” was introduced with the aim to develop more joint stances (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997). The treaty also foresaw more possibilities for the European Council to decide with qualified majority voting (QMV), in case a common position had already been found, and introduced the possibility of constructive abstentions⁹ (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997).

⁹ Meaning that every Member State can declare by formal declaration that it will abstain from a vote. This releases the respective Member State from having to adhere to the decision agreed upon by the other Member States (Große Hüttmann and Wehling 2013). Simultaneously, it ac-

The Treaty of Nice (2001) further extended the areas in which QMV was possible as well as the competencies of the PSC, that gave it today's shape as the Council's central steering mechanism (Bergmann 2012, p. 95; Bindi 2012, p. 36; Treaty of Lisbon; Treaty of Nice). However, neither the common strategies nor the possibility of constructive abstentions truly furthered the CFSP, as it added no real value to the strategies and partnerships the EU had already developed in the past. Furthermore, the European Council barely voted, making the constructive abstentions irrelevant in practice (Bindi 2012, pp. 26-28). In light of this, a true deepening of the CFSP was still missing (Bergmann 2012, p. 95; Bindi 2012, pp. 26-28).

Alongside the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the EU'S latest contractual reform, high hopes were raised to finally make the CFSP more coherent and effective (Bergmann 2012, p. 5; Lypp 2013, p.13). The treaty resolved the pillar structure created by Maastricht and the CFSP was transferred into a single legal framework, however, still following particular regulations and procedures (Bergmann 2012, p. 5; Lypp 2013, p.13; Treaty of Lisbon 2007). It extended the EU's competencies in the CFSP and introduced a more powerful High Representative, now supported by its own 'European foreign office', the EEAS (Treaty of Lisbon 2007; Bergmann 2012, p. 5; Lypp 2013, p.13). Additionally, the EU finally became a legal entity that could now sign international treaties or join international organisations (Bergmann 2012, p. 94). At these international organisations the Member States promised to coordinate their actions to further the EU's interests (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). This meant a significant step, especially for those Member States holding a permanent or non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council (Bergmann 2012, p. 94; Treaty of Lisbon 2007). At the UN Security Council, the High Representative could now speak on behalf of the EU upon application (Bergmann 2012, p. 94; Treaty of Lisbon).

While the Treaty of Lisbon created a new framework for joint action in the EU's CFSP, it left the principle of intergovernmentalism and the fundamental

cepts that the overall decision will be binding for the EU and it agrees to not try to prevent the other Member States from achieving their goals (Große Hüttmann and Wehling 2013).

independence of Member States in foreign policy untouched (Bergmann 2012, p. 95; Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The EU's role in the CFSP, therefore, remains one of a compound actor that is not yet comparable to the EU's position in other policy fields (Lypp 2008, p. 13). It is characterised by an enormous complexity and a fragmentation in different sectors, actors, procedures, decision-making mechanisms and instruments, making coordination and the swift agreement on international action very complicated (Lypp 2008, p. 14). As a result, the Union has, until today, failed to gain the political influence it would deserve from observing its economic power as the world's largest economy and trading block (European Commission 2019; Lypp 2008, pp. 13-14). This discrepancy between the EU's economic and its political weight as well as recent cases, in which the EU was unsuccessful in finding a common response to international events¹⁰, inspires recurrent calls for an expansion of QMV¹¹, in order to allow the EU to more coherently speak with one voice (Lypp 2008, pp. 5-6; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003, pp. 329–30; Moumoutzis 2001, p. 608; Smith 2008, p. 17).

2.2.2 Europeanisation in Foreign Policy

Considering the CFSP's complex institutional structure and genesis, the suspicion is understandable that, here, the effects of Europeanisation could be much weaker than in supranational areas (Hooghe 2005; Major 2005, p. 182; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003, pp. 329–30; Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 608, 613; Smith 2008, p. 17). Additionally, the CFSP sector is largely void of 'hard' regulatory measures, with policy instruments dominating that are considered to be weaker, such as general declarations, statements of intent or diplomatic pressure (Major 2005, pp. 182-83; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003, pp. 329–30; Moumoutzis 2011, p. 608; Smith 2008, p. 17). All these aspects together with the “unique nature of the policy area” (Moumoutzis 2001, p. 608) were assumed to make Europeanisation in this field at least much harder to trace and to measure (Major 2005, p. 182; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003, pp. 329–30; Moumoutzis

¹⁰ For example on the governmental crisis in Venezuela (NZZ 2019).

¹¹ For example by the European People's Party's (EPP) Spitzenkandidat Manfred Weber on May 5, 2019 (Deutschlandfunk 2019) or the agreement between Germany's Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, and Commission President Juncker to better take advantage of the already existing possibilities to use QMV (Valero 2018).

2011, p. 608; Smith 2008, p. 17).

Nonetheless, several scholars, amongst others Bulmer and Radaelli (2004), Economides (2005) and Moumoutzis (2011), still insist that the concept remains of value even in the field of foreign policy but should not be overloaded with expectations (Dyson and Goetz 2003 pp. 13–15, 20; Economides 2005, p. 472; Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 608, 615; Radaelli, 2003, p. 3; Wong 2005, pp. 136–40, 149–50; 2006, p. 10). First of all, Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) point out that the concept proved useful in other policy areas, such as social security and employment, where the community method also doesn't dominate, thus, raising the question why the CFSP should be that different (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 12–13).

Moumoutzis (2011) highlights that the different decision-making mechanisms in foreign policy, leading to Member States changing their policies more out of conviction than out of fear of being outvoted, could base Europeanisation in foreign policy more on voluntary mechanisms while still creating similar outcomes (Börzel and Risse 2003, p. 61; Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, p. 7; Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 608, 614-15; Nuttall 2000, pp. 188-90; Smith 2008). Even if the Member States choose not to adhere to this conviction over long time to serve national interests, they would still be aware of the breach (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 912; Moumoutzis 2011, p. 617; Tonra 2000, p. 229). Furthermore, by drawing on the unique nature of foreign policy with its dependency on national sensitivities and history, a correlation between the level of integration in a policy field and the extend of Europeanisation is established, without such a connection having been proven (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, pp. 12–13). It also remains to be verified, if Europeanisation's affects on the CFSP are indeed less often institutionalised and, therefore, easier to be revoked (Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 611-12).

Also, the intuitive notion, that intergovernmental decision making permits a lesser degree of Europeanisation to take place, is founded on a fundamentally flawed understanding of the nature of foreign policy and the EU itself (Moravcsik 1993, pp. 499–502; Moumoutzis 2011, pp. 611-12). Hereby, it is often simply assumed,

that because of the increased difficulty to find consensus in an institution setting of unanimity, the outcome will imperatively only represent the unfiltered national interests of the Member States, where it in reality only has to be preferential to the status quo (Moravcsik 1993, pp. 499–502; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, pp. 281–83). It is therefore very possible that even though every Member State has to agree to the decision in the end, it will nonetheless leave a discrepancy between the unfiltered, un-negotiated national preference and the decision decided upon in the end (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, pp. 281–83). The only effects both liberal inter-institutionalists and rational choice institutionalists could find were that the Member State the least likely to want change has the power to largely determine the scope of the outcome, despite still having to make some concessions (Moravcsik 1993, pp. 499–502; Moumoutzis 2011, p. 614; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, pp. 281–83).

It is therefore very plausible, that Europeanisation has its own value when it comes to explaining policy changes in the field of foreign policy, especially if the alternative is to simply end any attempts to explain and understand changes in this sector (Dyson and Goetz 2003 pp. 13–15, 20; Featherstone 2003, p. 10; Moumoutzis 2011, p. 615; Radaelli, 2003, p. 34).

3. The EEAS and its High Representative -

A new actor in a complicated political realm

In the following chapter, I will present the new office of the High Representative and its EEAS, as designed by the Treaty of Lisbon. Hereby, I will only briefly address their legal foundation and instead will present the debates surrounding its development in more detail - from its turbulent founding period under its first High Representative, Catherine Ashton, to its second High Representative, Federica Mogherini, who transformed the EEAS into a resourceful actor in the EU's foreign politics (Lypp 2008, pp. 5-6).

The idea to further alter the office of the High Representative for Common and Foreign Security Policy, as introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and to create

a true 'Foreign Minister' for the EU, emerged around 2002 within the Convention on the Future of Europe (Wouters 2004, p. 77). The idea was accompanied by the perception that the future would bring a greater need for the Union to act with more coherence in formulating and implementing its foreign policy decisions (Wouters 2004, p. 78). Despite reservations of some Member States, who saw this idea as the first step towards a too powerful 'European government', or Commission officials who sensed an intergovernmental intrusion, it survived and was eventually incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty with only small alterations (Treaty of Lisbon; Wessels 2016, p. 13; Wouters 2004, p. 86).

More specifically, the Lisbon Treaty created the office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative) and a supportive European External Action Service (EEAS) (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The High Representative and the EEAS were both granted a 'sui generis' nature, adding to the unique architecture of the EU's CFSP (Bátora 2010, pp. 2, 5). Neither is an official EU institution but they are treated as such in reality (Bátora 2010, pp. 2, 5; Blockman 2011, p. 7; EEAS 2013, p. 3). The High Representative, after the approval of the Commission President, is elected and dismissed with QMV by the European Council for the working period of the Commission (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). In February 2010, Catherine Ashton became the EU's first High Representative in its new form. Thereupon the EEAS was officially founded on 26 July 2010 after fierce debates and power struggles, with the decision of the European Council on "Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service"¹², (Bindi 2011, p. 130). It then took up its activities on 1 January 2011 (Bindi 2011, p. 130). The decision, determined that the EEAS' personnel would mostly derive from the Commission and the Council Secretariat while at least a third would be seconded from the Member State's diplomatic services for a certain time period (Bindi 2011, p. 131; EEAS 2013, pp. 3, 12).

Whereas the European Council decides upon the overall goals and guidelines of the CFSP, the High Representative now coordinates the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In doing so, an attempt was made to

¹² Document Nr. 2010/427/EU.

overcome the EU's practical dualism between those two sectors (Balfour and Raik 2013, p. 1). In both areas the High Representative can now speak and negotiate on behalf of the EU in matters where the Member States have agreed upon a common stance (Balfour and Raik 2013, p. 1; Treaty of Lisbon 2007). It contributes to the CFSP through own proposals and ensures that these decisions are consequently implemented by the EEAS and its EU Delegations (Lisbon Treaty 2007). Just as originally envisioned by the Convention, the High Representative received an institutional “double hat”, meaning the High Representative would hold a position in the Commission as well as in the Council (Treaty of Lisbon; Wouters 2004, p. 78). This close connection between the two, often competing, institutions was seen as important, as the High Representative would also work on external EU affairs where the Commission has major competencies, for example, in development assistance, humanitarian aid, energy and the EU's enlargement policy (The EEAS 2016c; Wouters 2004, p. 78). In these instances, the Commission now has to decide with the High Representative, partially also making the EEAS a European Development and Defence Ministry (The EEAS 2013, p. 2; 2016).

Within the Commission, the High Representative acts as Vice-President and as permanent President of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in the Council (The EEAS 2016c; Treaty of Lisbon 2007). Additionally, the High Representative attends the meetings of the European Council, is Head of the European Defence Agency and is responsible for the EU's special representatives (The EEAS 2016c; Treaty of Lisbon 2007). Finally, it is the Head of the EEAS and the EU Delegations around the world (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). Another major change was that the High Representative would from now on appoint the chair of the PSC as well as the chair for 16 working groups concerned with external action amongst EEAS officials (EEAS 2013, p. 5; Treaty of Lisbon 2017).

The complicated institutional design of this new office was already considered dangerous before it became reality. Wouters (2004) and Bátorá (2010), for example, predicted in advance that institutional loyalty, democratic legitimacy, accountability and checks and balances would become an issue and would probably require more fine-tuning and revisions (Bátorá 2010, p. 2010; Wouters

2004, p. 86). Wessels (2016) later points out that most observers believed the High Representative was wearing too many hats, making the office extremely difficult to manage (Wessels 2016, p. 2). Wouters (2004) adds that the new office would not automatically lead to the desired more coherent European voice because a lack of consensus amongst the Member States could still leave it crippled (Wouters 2004, 86).

The new legal framework also affected the Delegations of the European Commission abroad that were renamed as European Union Delegations (EU Delegation). They were placed under the authority of the High Representative and received a more coherent institutional and political framework (Treaty of Lisbon, EEAS 2013, p. 11). These Delegations, whose network steadily expanded, were now to represent the Union and its CFSP towards the host country and the diplomatic community while closely cooperating with the diplomatic missions of the Member States in that country (EEAS 2013, p. 11-13; Lisbon Treaty). In doing so, they are supposed to contribute to the formulation and the implementation of common approaches (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). Within the EU Delegation, the Ambassadors and approximately one third of staff would from now on originate from the EEAS, with two thirds still coming from the Commission (EEAS 2013, p. 12). This divided structure permits both institutions, the Commission and the Council, to give directives to the EU Delegations, in practice creating divergent accountabilities (EEAS 2013, pp. 12-13).

In the years following the launch of the EEAS, the institutional and political challenges it had to face were immense (EEAS 2013, p. 1). However, just how enormous they really were can be seen in the EEAS' review of 2013 (EEAS 2013; Wessels 2016, p. 2). In this review, it becomes clear that the EEAS was simultaneously fighting several wars. First, it was overburdened with expectations at a time when the EU had lost its integrationist dynamic and was struggling with 'enlargement fatigue', the financial crisis and the outbreak of conflicts in its neighbourhoods (Devrim and Schulz 2009; EEAS 2013, p. 1-3; Tocci 2017, p. 13). All of this left the Member States more divided than ever (Tocci 2017, p. 17). Second, the EEAS had not been equipped with sufficient financial resources and personnel to quickly set up the activities envisioned for it, and the budget

restrictions in the course of the financial crisis were not making the situation any easier (EEAS 2013, pp. 1, 11-12). Third, the complicated institutional setup of the office of the High Representative, torn between the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, the Member States and their divergent expectations and visions, left it struggling to find its place and created an enormous work load impossible to be managed by one person (Balfour and Raik 2013, p. 1; Bindi 2011, p. 130-132; EEAS 2013, p. 14; Howorth 2014, p. 21). The High Representative was facing all these challenges with an EEAS that still had no clear and stable internal structure and that was struggling to merge staff coming from very different backgrounds and institutional traditions, whilst being suspiciously eyed by everyone (Bátora 2010, p. 14; EEAS 2013, p. 1-4). All of this had to be accomplished with Catherine Ashton as High Representative, who had no previous experience in foreign policy or international leadership and, therefore, did not receive much trust - neither amongst the Member States nor within the Commission (Bindi 2011, p. 127; Howorth 2014, p. 4).

At the end of Ashton's term, the EEAS was still struggling with all these challenges. However, it showed some promising first achievements in joint programming, crises management, the development of some regional strategies and also successes, for example in inciting the negotiations for the Iran Deal (Howorth 2014. p. 3, 13; Wessels 2016, p. 3). In the end, the EEAS had not yet managed to build up the capacity to swiftly react to international events, effectively negotiate between the Member States and decisively shape policies and was, therefore, mostly regarded as a coordinating secretariat by the Member States and as irrelevant by most larger powers in the world (Balfour and Raik 2013, pp. 2-3; Blockmans 2012, pp. 3, 37-38; Howorth 2014. p. 3, 13). With regards to the institutional setup, reports of disillusionment amongst increasingly frustrated staff and chaotic conditions made the rounds (Howorth 2014, p. 10). Furthermore, distrust between the EEAS and the Commission had deepened and especially smaller Member States increasingly felt that they were at a disadvantage when it came to influence and posts within the EEAS (Balfour and Raik 2013, p. 8; Bindi 2011, p. 131).

The EU's second High Representative, Federica Mogherini, came into office on 1

November 2014 and quickly proved to be more successful despite facing equally challenging political turmoil, with a changed transatlantic relationship, the migration crisis, Brexit, the rise of nationalistic movement across the EU or the war in Syria (von Ondarza and Scheler 2017; Novotná 2017, pp. 1-3). For once, Mogherini had previously served as Italian Foreign Minister, giving her experience, standing and a network amongst Member States (von Ondarza and Scheler 2017). Furthermore, it quickly became evident that she had a better strategic mindset and the political talent to use all possibilities to expand the EEAS' influence within its complicated institutional setup (von Ondarza and Scheler 2017). Under her leadership, with its Global Strategy for instance, the EEAS managed to illustrate the full potential of the EU' external action when the Member States team up for a purpose (EEAS 2016a; Novotná 2017, pp. 1, 5).

This ambitious document, that was created via an open participatory approach with various stakeholders, including the Member States, provided the EEAS and the EU's external action with a general direction that incited a debate about the EU's future CFSP (Dijkstra 2016, p. 373; Novotná 2017, pp. 1, 5; Tocci 2017, p. 6). Since Mogherini took office, the EEAS has gained a more favourable reputation amongst the European institutions and the Member States, has become a recognised international stakeholder, and has celebrated some successes, as with the conclusion of the Iran Deal in 2015 (Dijkstra 2016, p. 373; Novotná 2017, p. 3). When critique emerges, as for instance for her weak stance towards Russia, it is usually aimed at specific policies and less at her overall performance, with Commission President Juncker praising her performance during his 2016 State of the Union Speech (Juncker 2016, p. 63; Novotná 2017, pp. 2-3). However, for the sake of fairness one has to point out that Mogherini did have a different starting point, with the EEAS already having been set up and having reached a moderate level of routine (Howorth 2014, pp. 9, 20-21; von Ondarza and Scheler 2017). Looking back, the decision to choose a political 'heavy-weight' as Ashton's successor proved to be wise and should not be forgotten when it comes to the selection of Mogherini's successor (Howorth 2014, p. 21; von Ondarza and Scheler 2017).

4. The EEAS and Europeanisation

In the following Chapter, I will analyse the possible effects the EEAS has on Europeanisation and how the Member States react to this new stakeholder. This analysis will be based on three qualitative expert interviews, conducted with Interview Partner I, Thierry Barbé and Dr Peter Krois (s. annexes I-III). In some parts, the interviews are complemented by literature with the aim of clarifying or affirming certain statements. The Chapter itself differentiates between the different dimensions of the political, namely polity, policy and politics. The differentiation is, then divided into specific achievements, limitations and opportunities of Europeanisation. As some observations touch upon all three dimensions, intersections are possible but will highlight different aspects respectively.

4.1 The EEAS and Europeanisation on the Polity Level

When it comes to the polity dimension of the political, hence, the structural and institutional aspects of change, the focus generally lies on new institutions, the formal and informal rules they adhere to, their political culture and moral basis (Andersen and Woyke 2003; Mickel 2003; Schneider 2017, p. 50). My objective is to analyse the changes the EEAS has brought to this dimension, I will focus specifically on Europeanisation effects amongst the Member States, thus, how the Member States perceived and embraced these changes. When addressing the limitations, I will loosely differentiate between external and internal limitations.

4.1.1 Achievements

When asked about their views on the institutional changes the EEAS has brought to the European foreign policy sphere, all three interview partners pointed out that the EEAS has truly established itself as an important new actor, despite its young age. Dr Krois and Mr Barbé both described the EEAS as a new independent player in the EU's foreign policy realm, that has a completely different nature than the traditional actors, namely the Member States. For Mr Barbé, it is an additional

instrument for the EU's external action and for Dr Krois, the introduction of a new instrument that is recognised as such by the Member States, in itself, is already an advancement for Europeanisation.

All three experts further mentioned that the EEAS' very complex institutional setting impeded it from gaining its standing sooner. Here, Mr Barbé and Interview Partner I highlighted that the EEAS under Mogherini is seen to increasingly develop its own institutional interests and is moving towards the Commission, whereas Ashton was located closer to the Council. According to Interview Partner I, this institutional shift helped to decrease distrust between the Commission and the EEAS, and opened up opportunities. Dr Krois believes that this is also due to the close personal relations between Mogherini and Juncker, giving her much more freedom than Ashton had before. In their opinion, this additional freedom and manoeuvring space is seen as something positive and in compliance with the intentions set out in the Treaty of Lisbon.

All three interview partners mentioned the enormous change the new EEAS chairs have had on the working of the PSC and the different Workings Groups. They confirm that the chairs brought a communal spirit to the table, with Interview Partner I calling it “a unique European voice” that was previously missing. Dr Krois specifies, that this new voice increased communication and information flow within the PSC and the Working Parties, while also enhancing their institutional memory. To Interview Partner I's surprise, this change has been accommodated rather well by the Member States and without any major conflicts. However, all the interview partners clearly state that despite the Member States accepting the new player among their ranks, they remain the most powerful in this arena.

Apart from the institutional changes made by the Treaty, Interview Partner I has not observed the creation of many new formats on the European or national level, with the exception of maybe one or two new capital formats and more staff in the Ministry departments related to the EU¹³. Instead, he/she believes that the EEAS chairs have strengthened the existing formats. He/she further observed that the

¹³ Balfour and Raik (2013) instead observe a general trend to slim down within the Foreign Ministries of the Member States, however, this having more to do with the overall economy and less with the EEAS and possible synergy affects (Balfour and Raik 2013, p. 7).

different EU institutions and the Member States seem to have moved closer together since Mogherini took office and have somewhat started to interlock on all levels of Foreign Policy, the UK being the only exception, trying to avoid too much closeness. Mr Barbé also mentioned that the EEAS' 'Esprit de Corps' as an institution has improved since Mogherini took office.

The reinforced EU Delegations are regarded as dynamic new actors that help to hold up the EU's flag abroad by Mr Barbé. He sees their particular added value in their ability to create new platforms of coordination and information exchange between the Member States' diplomatic missions and other local stakeholders, including the CFSP, which was previously off limits. He mentioned that in Burkina Faso (BFA), for instance, the EU Delegation organises two meetings per month for the Heads of Missions and the Heads of Cooperation, plus additional ad-hoc meeting in case needed. In his perception, these meetings are welcomed by the Member States on the ground, who consider them a real added value. Interview Partner I believes this to be true especially for smaller Member States, that are usually less present on the ground, have a smaller network and, therefore, less access to information. Nonetheless, he sees the larger Member States also profiting from the new EU Delegations, even though they usually somehow treat them as 'small brothers'. Interview Partner I and Mr Barbé believe, that these forums are especially useful in a crisis.

4.1.2 Limitations

Despite these achievements, the interview partners also mentioned several limitations the EEAS is facing when it comes to polity, having observed developments they see critically or oppose.

All three interview partners mention one important limitation to the EEAS: its creation has not changed the very nature of this particular policy field, meaning the dominance of the Member States and the prevailing intergovernmental decision-making mode. This becomes evident when looking at the EEAS' actions in development cooperation, where it has more competencies. Also, in case the

Member States fail to agree amongst themselves, block the EEAS. Dr Krois raised doubts that this will ever change, as, for him, foreign policy is simply not a policy field like any other. He also does not believe the European public is ready for such a change.

With regards to the institutional development, Interview Partner I believes that the EEAS has not yet managed to develop a comprehensive institutional identity, with him/her and Mr Barbé seeing a lot of room for development in this respect. For Dr Krois this has to do with a combination of the EEAS' young age, its difficult institutional setup and the sheer expectation overload, which he considers counterproductive. In the light of these limitations, he advises patience when judging the achievements of the EEAS. Mr Barbé also highlights the institutional restraints imposed on the EEAS by the Treaty of Lisbon, which in his opinion create an incredible need for coordination between the different institutions and the Member States, making its work extremely difficult. Despite the institutional relations between the EEAS and the Commission having improved under Mogherini, Interview Partner I doubts that this distrust can ever truly disappear as long as the EEAS remains financially dependent on the Commission.

Mr Barbé also sees limitations emerging from within the EEAS itself, especially highlighting its 'unreadable' organisational chart, with its excessive use of abbreviations and an exhaustingly detailed division of labour, at times following geographic and, at other times, functional lines. He notes that this is often a result of the EEAS' complicated legal institutional framework between the EU institutions. Nonetheless, in his opinion, this way of organisation is too complex and makes it very difficult for the Member States to understand how the EEAS works.

Another important limitation mentioned by all three interview partners is the EEAS' heterogenous personnel structure. Here, Dr Krois criticised that only the staff from the diplomatic services of the Member States rotates, with no rotation in the other two groups. However, he deems any change in this structure as unlikely to happen due to the fact that the Member States do not want to touch this sensitive compromise. With regard to the EEAS staff from the national

diplomatic services, Interview Partner I adds that that the EEAS is yet another institution that the national foreign ministries have to furnish, which is sometimes described as a sort of 'cannibalism'. He/She mentions, that, at least for Germany, switching from the national diplomatic service to the European level often times does not advance the person's career, which unfortunately does not motivate the best of the best to apply for such a position¹⁴. All interview partners pointed out that this personnel structure adds to the perception that the EEAS is not a homogenous actor and its capacities vary a lot depending on the counterpart in question.

Mr Barbé and Dr Krois believe this observation to be equally accurate for the EU Delegations, who's work and effectiveness, in their opinion, to a great extent depend on the capacity of the competent department in the Commission and the EEAS, but especially on the respective Ambassador, his/her nationality and willingness to cooperate with the Embassies of the Member States. All experts explain this dependence on people and the lack of incoherence between the EEAS representatives at headquarters and abroad with a lack of specific directives and clear guidelines. Mr Barbé would, thus, welcome stricter guidelines for the EU Delegations, as he believes this would lead to a more coherent and homogenous appearance of the EU Delegations abroad and would help them to build-up trust and work more efficiently.

Addressing the new EEAS chairs in the PSC and several Working Parties, Dr Krois points out that the 'Esprit de Corps' amongst the Member States has suffered. They increasingly leave it to the EEAS to defend overall European interests and instead focus on their national agenda. All three interview partners, in compliance with this observation, remark a certain 'us against them' mentality emerging in these forums. Dr Krois, therefore, doubts that the EEAS will receive additional chairs for the time being, despite its calls for just this. Mr Barbé notices similar tensions between the EU Delegations and the traditional diplomatic missions of the Member States on the ground, especially towards the 'bigger'

¹⁴ Addition of the author: Both observations conform with the experience the author gained during her nine years within the German Foreign Office despite Balfour and Raik (2013) arguing that the high salaries and the Ministries' push towards a better representation within the EEAS would create such an incentive (Balfour and Raik 2013, p. 7).

actors (e.g. France in West Africa).

4.1.3 Opportunities

When evaluating the achievements as well as the limitations of the EEAS's polity dimension in light of the information provided by the three interview partners, a divergent picture emerges. On the one hand, the Member States regard the EEAS as an important, independent new player that has increasingly consolidated its institutional standing. The same can be said for the new EU Delegations that they see as a dynamic new instrument, especially for smaller Member States. In principle, they consider all of these developments as something positive. In their opinion, the EEAS, its delegation and especially the new EEAS chairs have reinforced the existing formats in the CFSP and have brought an important European voice to the table, that they saw as missing before. They mostly welcomed the EEAS amongst their ranks and accepted the institutional changes it implicated. With regards to these achievements on the polity dimension, one can, therefore, state clear signs of Europeanisation.

However, this might also be the case because the new institution has not attacked the intergovernmental core of the sector, with them still having the final say. In comparison with the sovereign powers of a nation state, they don't perceive the EEAS to be equally important and also want to strictly guard this differentiation. Despite their general acceptance of the EEAS and its achievements, the Member States, for the time being, don't plan to expand its influence by creating new institutions or forums under its influence. They remain prudent and want to wait for the dust to settle, before creating any further institutional change in this sensitive policy area as they can't foresee all repercussions. The weakened solidarity and the new 'us against them' feeling in the formats now chaired by the EEAS, has added to this preference. They also don't think the EEAS has already reached its institutional maturity, with it still having to determine its final institutional location and develop a comprehensive institutional identity. Furthermore, they perceive the EEAS as still struggling to create an effective and efficient internal organisation, staff structure and regularity

framework. Despite the Member States partially being responsible for these limitations, they believe that these are limiting the EEAS usefulness and importance.

These objectives and reservations from the Member States, that are partially shared within the EEAS, are understandable considering the EEAS' young age and many of them will probably be resolved over time. Still, the interviews highlight several areas, where improvements could further strengthen Europeanisation on the polity dimension.

To achieve this, Dr Krois thinks a pause in the creation of new institutions and formats is wise, as for him simply this would be 'the easy way out' and would neglect important underlying issues. He personally believes that the reflex to simply create new institutions for every problem, is especially problematic in the sensitive foreign policy realm, where every change holds unforeseeable repercussions and the main blockage emerges from disagreement amongst the Member States. Instead, Dr Krois pledges for 'a new European rapprochement' between the Member States in order to reinforce their relationships and to better understand the deeply ingrained national reflexes that stand in the way of consensus and a profound European integration process. He believes that deepening the EU has, unfortunately, led to a development, that has replaced efforts for a good neighbourhood policy. As a negative example for this, he refers to the recent problems in French-Italian relations¹⁵. While working on these bilateral relationships would be more cumbersome than to simply create new institutions, he thinks that this could bring forward trust between the Member States, especially in the European Foreign Policy sector. In this realm, he sees a lack of trust at times. By stating "we have to get to know each other again", he calls for a respectful discourse that addresses differences in mentality and historic perception on all levels of state and society, with personal contacts at the very centre. Via such an approach, a true political willingness to further the European integration in foreign policy could be achieved. Whilst he already observes first steps towards such a rapprochement, he deems those to be

¹⁵ For example, Barigazzi (2019) with '5 fights between France and Italy' or Reid (2019) with 'Italian and French relations are falling apart fast. Here's why'.

insufficient and too slow.

Such a rapprochement could, in the long run, have the potential to alter the nature of this sector and, with it, abolish some limitations of the EEAS in the polity dimension. More specifically, it could lead to the necessary political momentum, to address and resolve some institutional limitations regarding to the EEAS' institutional setup. This momentum could benefit the simplification of the institutional position of the High Representative, the EEAS' financing its personnel structure. Without such momentum, there is little hope that these limitations will be addressed any time soon, as the different stakeholders are currently unwilling to touch the sensitive compromise achieved with the Treaty of Lisbon.

When looking at the limitations arising from within the EEAS, especially the complex organisational structure and the lack of clear guidelines, there is reason for hope that these issues can be resolved in the years to come. Here, the young EEAS is only starting to build up an institutional memory and a baseline of formalised rules, standards and ways-of-doing things. As it took the Foreign Ministries of the Member States centuries to build up their respective internal regulatory frameworks, patience seems advisable. However, considering that the lack of coherence amongst the EEAS staff doubtlessly affects the EEAS' reputation amongst the Member States and their willingness to establish reliable relations, it would be prudent to accelerate this process.

4.2 The EEAS and Europeanisation on the Policy Level

When addressing the EEAS' policy dimension, we have to take a look at how the EEAS influences the content of the CFSP and the political discourse, specific goals, tasks or programmes aimed at shaping it (Andersen and Woyke 2013; Mickel 2003). In light of Europeanisation, this thesis' spotlight is directed at the Member State's reaction to the EEAS' influence and their general view on the EEAS' development when it comes to influencing and developing own policies. The analysis is limited to the policy examples brought up by the experts, and recognises that this is by no means a complete list.

4.2.1 Achievements

When looking at the EEAS' policy dimension, Dr Krois recalled that the idea behind the creation of the EEAS with its High Representative was to create a European Foreign Policy that consists of more than just the sum of its components. Here, he and Mr Barbé both consider that this has not yet been achieved. Still, for them, the EEAS has slowly developed into an independent political stakeholder that is increasingly influencing and also developing own policies.

All three experts very quickly addressed how important the personality of the office-holder as High Representative has been for this development. For them, the Treaties only set the general outlines for what is possible. Mr Barbé noted a general increase in activity and willingness to shape policy since Federica Mogherini became High Representative, with her trying to exhaust the possibilities of the Treaty. Interview Partner I and Dr Krois both attest that Mogherini has a political talent for strengthening the political discourse, setting the agenda and preparing votes, joint statements, final conclusions and agreements, even if not all hold up in the end. With regard to the intergovernmental decision-making mode, Mr Barbé stressed the importance of the High Representative being a very good negotiator, as nothing can be achieved against the Member States in this policy sector. He highlights the full extent of this task: constantly having to communicate with 28 Member States in order to know exactly what stance each of them has on an issue, how much weight this Member States embodies, what room there is for compromise and what initiatives have a chance of passing. He briefly states that Mogherini is doing a very good job in this regard, especially in her priority areas such as Iran, whereas he considers the opposite to have been true for Lady Ashton.

He believes that this is largely due to Mogherini's good connections to the Council, with her solid reputation amongst her former counterparts, and to the Commission, with Juncker granting her a lot of freedom. Additionally, Dr Krois

and Interview Partner I both believe that Mogherini successfully plays the role of an 'honest broker' that, with regards to content, neither leans too much towards one Member State nor is too "pushy" while in fact pushing the Member States towards a consensus. Under her lead, Dr Krois sees the EEAS increasingly formulating an agenda and priorities of its own, which it considers to be in the EU's interests. Interview Partner I adds Mogherini's input has inspired a higher number of joint statements, which in his/her opinion are also of better quality. He/She believes that the EEAS has strengthened the CFSP's assertiveness and has definitely increased public attention for it. All three interview partners consider this general increase in activity and strategic ambition as something positive.

When talking about specific policy achievements, Interview Partner I and Dr Krois highlighted the Iran Deal. They both regard this agreement as a major success of the young EEAS. In addition, Interview Partner I accentuates the importance of the EEAS' Global Strategy¹⁶ of 2016. With this document, he/she believes the EEAS really 'stepped up' its efforts to create an ambitious strategic document for the development of a European Foreign Policy, while allowing all stakeholders to get involved. He/She believes that this document is an attempt of the High Representative to slowly alter mentality through processes in order to embed the message 'together we are stronger' within the European foreign policy mindset. In doing so, he/she believes the EEAS is reinforcing Europeanisation through a process of complex interlinking in small incremental steps.

This spirit also entered the PSC and the different working parties now chaired by the EEAS, with the three experts noticing that the EEAS increasingly acts as an advocate for a European voice and hereby influences policy outcomes. Interview Partner I and Dr Krois observed that this new setup and the recurrent interactions between Member States give the EEAS an important and powerful tool to mediate between the Member States. Also, it uses instruments such as agenda-setting, increased communication and additional information presented through a European lens to influence policy. Interview Partner I remarks that this has

¹⁶ Meaning the EEAS document "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy" (EEAS 2016a).

worked surprisingly well so far, with major conflict having been avoided successfully.

The new EU Delegations, in Mr Barbé's opinion, further add substance to the EU's CFSP, by coordinating efforts of the EU and the Member States towards the host country on the ground. He and Interview Partner I believe that this is often not sufficiently done in advance in Brussels, with a lot of information getting lost within the different headquarters. In the country of his current posting, he believes these coordination efforts to be extremely important, considering the amount of activities and the importance of the region for the EU's security. Furthermore, Interview Partner I and Mr Barbé see the EU Delegations as important providers of information, both for the EU institutions and the Member States, with the smaller Member States certainly profiting over-proportionally. In his opinion, this information, presented from a European point of view, increases the quality of policy decisions and sensibilises the Member States to the interests of the EU. Additionally, Mr Barbé mentions that the EU Delegations also pursue their own projects and joint programming in areas, where they have more liberty, for example in Development Cooperation or Humanitarian Aid. He does not believe that this would have been possible under Ashton.

4.2.2 Limitations

Despite these notable achievements of the EEAS when it comes to influencing and creating policies, the interview partners also mentioned several severe limitations to its actions, observing negative developments or holding reservations.

To begin with, all experts mentioned repeatedly the specific nature of the EU foreign policy, with the predominant Member States deciding in unanimity amongst themselves. According to them, this nature greatly limits the EEAS and its High Representative when it comes to influencing or developing policies. As Dr Krois puts it, one can simply not force something upon the Member States in this field and they have the ultimate power to block everything. Here, he names the example of the Middle East, where a common approach is far out of reach,

even with the EU institutions trying their best to further a common position. Dr Krois does not see this changing any time soon. He further exemplifies this power of the Member States by mentioning, that the High Representative or the EEAS chairs cannot ignore even the most “idiotic proposals” from a Member State, without the backing of other Member States. This creates a gap between the expectations the EEAS is facing from the European public and the world and its actual capacity to deliver on them (Hill 1993).

At the same time, the Member States themselves further this gap by expecting the High Representative and the EEAS to find a common approach even in those occasions, where they disagreed amongst themselves. Here, they expect a lot from a young institution considering that they themselves often do not have the capacity to reach a consensus. This was for instance the case during the crises in Ukraine or Libya. Here, Dr Krois pointed out that despite the disagreement between the Member States having been the main problem, the High Representative Ashton, should have been more vocal and strategic. He names this as the reason why some Member States were forced to engage bilaterally or in small alliances outside the EU framework.

However, Dr Krois also admitted the Member States' tendency to use the EEAS and its High Representative as a scapegoat to divert from their own failure to find a common stance. Here, Dr. Krois sees an inherent flaw in the setup of the EEAS. For him, the willingness of the Member States to find more common positions should have been the analytical starting point and not the final objective of the new institution. In Dr Krois' view, the EEAS should have been designed as a catalyst for the Member States' willingness to develop a European foreign policy. Instead, it often times is the single actor trying to achieve this goal against unwilling Member States.

Considering all this, the experts recognised that the demands on the person filling the office as High Representative are very high. He/She has to be an incredible negotiator with a high acceptance amongst the Member States. This person would also have to be able to shoulder the enormous communication and coordination burden that emerges between 28 Member States with different

interests and historic backgrounds in order to identify the smallest common ground. Dr Krois stresses that this constant balancing of diverging interests, especially between Member States from the North and South, is extremely time consuming and puts the EU at a disadvantage in comparison to other actors, such as the US and Russia.

Simultaneously, the full potential can be seen in the Development Sector, where the Union already has more competencies and can, therefore, more freely develop own policies. All experts point to this area when talking about the potential of the EEAS and the High Representative. Interview Partner I especially highlighted that the EEAS is much more successful in steering the general direction of debates or setting topics in this field. However, it is interesting to note that all experts, including the two representing the perspective of the Member States, mentioned that they would wish for a greater influence of the EEAS in shaping policies.

The heterogeneity of staff and the incoherence between EEAS representatives are also a limitation to the EEAS on the policy dimension. Also, all experts mention that not every EEAS representative is able to fulfil the high demands the institutional setup imposes on him/her. They consider this to be a problem especially amongst EEAS chairs and EU Ambassadors that have great influence on policy. They also reiterate that the diverse background of the EEAS staff members can be problematic, as they notice many of its representatives at headquarters or abroad remain in the national policy mindset of their Member State. In case this shows too much, that person's standing amongst the Member States suffers a lot and he/she will be less likely to be accepted and influence policy.

In addition to this aspect, Mr Barbé noted that the increasing influence of EU Delegations at times creates tensions with the diplomatic missions of the Member States, especially with the more powerful ones. In Mr Barbé's experience, these Member States are often not too keen to harmonise approaches or formulate common objectives, as they regard this as some kind of interference in their historic competencies. Mr Barbé stresses that even in cases where such

harmonisation or joint action succeeds and the EU Delegations manage to speak with one European voice for everyone, this process is extremely sumptuous. At the same time, he would like the EU Delegations to sometimes be less technocratic.

4.2.3 Opportunities

When evaluating the EEAS' achievements and limitations with regards to the policy dimension in the light of the information provided by the three interview partners, one cannot help but to notice contradictions.

On the one hand, the EEAS has become much more active since Mogherini came into office and is increasingly influencing and developing own policies, formulating agendas and setting own priorities. All experts believe that this is a positive development and in the interest of the EU. Again, they all mention that they believe this to mainly be Mogherini's achievement with her strategic mindset, her good connections and negotiation skills. The new EEAS chairs, which now add their 'European voice' to the policy making process, are also regarded as influencing the decisions made in these formats. They observed all of this having lead to a higher number of joint statements that are in the eyes of the experts also of higher quality. This could, again, be one result of the additional information, the EEAS and its EU Delegations provide. It also helped that the EEAS was able to celebrate some successes that accentuated the idea that the Member States are stronger when they speak with one voice. Suddenly seeing this added value the EEAS was creating, really bolstered the Member States' acceptance of EEAS' influence on CFSP policies and further enhanced it. This becomes impressively clear, when considering how actively the Member States participated in creating the EEAS Global Strategy, something it had not expected to happen in advance. Here, one can remark a big step towards more Europeanisation.

On the other hand, we again have to acknowledge the restraints the structural particularities of the EU's foreign policy sector impose on the EEAS, somehow

setting it up for failure. Specifically, if the Member States are at odds with each other, they can leave the EEAS blocked and, in the worse case, then blame the failure to form a joint stance on the EEAS and its High Representative. However, there are small signs that this scapegoating of the EU level has reached its limits. This might be because the EEAS' second High Representative is – for the most part - successfully using the instruments handed to her by the Treaty, has built up trust in the European Council and has also attracted more public attention to her work. Especially the latter achievement has helped show the European public that it is often Member States and not the European level who prevent the EU from speaking with one voice. One sign for this could be the current debate on the introduction of QMV to the EU's CFSP, with the Spitzenkandidat of the EPP and several high-ranking politicians, such as Merkel and Macron, publicly supporting this idea (Deutschlandfunk 2019; Die Bundesregierung 2018). Despite Dr Krois and Interview Partner I believing that this might not be such a good idea in the foreign policy realm, the debate depicts a dynamic that could eventually lead to an alteration of the particular nature of the sector. Such a change in the 'DNA' of this sector, would give much more power to a well connected and respected negotiator, such as the EEAS. The fact alone that some prominent Member States consider such a change, shows that at least some Member States have changed their stance towards the EU's influence in this realm and have gained trust into the EEAS.

As an alternative, Dr Krois prefers a rapprochement between the Member States, with them reaching the political will to find more common stances instead of leaving the EEAS and its High Representative constantly fighting for this cause against their opposition. In the meantime, he advises the EEAS to focus on reinforcing the few messages the Member States have already managed to agree upon. All interview partners, however, agree that the EEAS needs more time and patience to reach its full potential.

In addition, all interview partners pointed out that the EEAS and its EU Delegations are much more successful in shaping and influencing policy in the sector of Development Cooperation. Despite this not being the primal focus of this thesis, one could, hence, propose that the Member States could test the

EEA's capacities in this sector before maybe expanding some successful approaches to the CFSP. This would be an interesting approach, especially with some emerging topics, for example migration, that touch upon both sectors and could create synergies.

As Dr Krois and Mr Barbé point out, the person shapes the office with the EU Treaties only serving as general outlines - especially in such a young institution as the EEAS. Considering that the interview partners pointed out the difference between Ashton and Mogherini when it came the EEAS' impact on Europeanisation, the decision who will become the new High Representative is essential for the development of the EEAS. For the EEAS to continue along the path of Europeanisation, the new High Representative has to bring an equally rich set of qualities and skills to the table.

Another challenge is the heterogeneity of the EEAS' staff with its divergent national mindsets and the lack of internal guidelines. Here, as already recommended for the polity dimension, the EEAS should increase its efforts to build up such an internal framework over the next years, to make its staff's contribution to policy more coherent. Also, additional training of the staff is needed to raise awareness among staff and especially the EU Ambassadors on national bias and its impact.

4.3 The EEAS and Europeanisation on the Politics Level

When addressing the EEAS' politics dimension, we now take a look at the processes of political discourse, hence, how decisions are made, power play and how interests between the different actors are mediated (Andersen and Woyke 2013; Mickel 2003). With Europeanisation in mind, this thesis sheds light on the Member State's reaction to the EEAS changing these processes and it becoming a political actor with its own interests and a willingness to pursue them.

4.3.1 Achievements

All interview partners regard the EEAS, especially under Mogherini, as an

independent actor that is increasingly developing and pursuing own institutional interests. All highlighted that the EEAS under Mogherini is very successful in using procedure to extend the EEAS' influence. Mr Barbé sees her doing this by, for instance, strategic interaction with all stakeholders in order to further acceptance for a European point of view. She also seeks alliances with the Member States to push topics and teams up with the European public to pressure Member States into a common position and proposes long-term strategic direction. For Dr Krois, the EEAS' institutional linkage between the Commission and the Council gives it an important tool to influence and steer debates within these institutions. Interview Partner I emphasised the importance of the EEAS' Global Strategy, which for him shows that the EEAS is trying to alter policy through shaping processes. Interview Partner I added that even the EEAS was surprised at the amount of enthusiasm the Member States entered into participating in the creation of the Global Strategy, hereby, indirectly accepting it¹⁷.

For all three experts, the same can be said for the new EEAS chairs that decisively altered the ways these formats work and their framework of decision-making. Interview Partner I observed that this new setup gives the EEAS a powerful tool to mediate between the Member States and to influence the general direction of debates through, for example, agenda-setting or deciding upon the schedule of votes. To his/her surprise, Member State have generally welcomed the influence the EEAS has won through employing these methods, maybe because they feel that they still remain the most influential actors.

Apart from the institutional setup, all interview partners judge the personality of the High Representative as extremely important for the way the EEAS works, uses opportunities and seeks to extend its influence. Interview Partner I believes that Mogherini's strategic mindset and her network was crucial for her success, with her knowing exactly the weight that each member state carries on a particular issue. This weight is then reflected in the degree in which Member States are informed or consulted upon. All experts perceived Mogherini's voice as more or less balanced, which, in their opinion, helped Member States to

¹⁷ This perception is shared my Nathalie Tocci (2017), 44.

accept her and built up trust.

Mr Barbé believes that the EU Delegations, through creating a systematic framework for the Member States to coordinate their action, helped to achieve a greater assertiveness in their action. With the EU Delegations organising these meetings, drafting agendas and setting thematic topics, he asserts that they have a gained greater influence over the outcome of decisions. In his experience it is very rare that the representatives of the Member States decide on any joint action abroad against the will of the EU Delegation, even if it doesn't have a formal vote.

4.3.2 Limitations

When looking at the limitations the EEAS faces in the politics dimension, I again differentiate between external and internal ones. Externally, the structural restraints of this particular policy field clearly dominate. All experts point out, that despite the informal power the EEAS has gained, in the end it has no vote and, hence, quickly reaches its limits when the Member States don't agree and are unwilling to compromise, even if the EEAS, as Dr Krois puts it, 'it plays its cards right'. The Member States remain the absolute decision makers, with every single one of them being able to prevent a decision. In the worst case, this leaves the EEAS and its High Representative as a powerless organiser of meetings.

This lack of hard power is joined with a change in atmosphere in those forums, now chaired by the High Representative and the EEAS. Interview Partner I mentioned a general feeling amongst the Member States that something 'had been taken away' from them, with all experts noticing a certain 'us against them' momentum. In Dr Krois' opinion, this has led to a counterproductive development in which Member States now focus, more than ever, on pushing their national agenda, as they now see the responsibility of defending the European stance lying with the EEAS. For Dr Krois, this is reinforced by the belief that they can at the same time blame any failure to come to a joint decision on the EEAS, with a European public generally being uninformed about the power balance in the CFSP.

Turning to EEAS internal limitations, Dr Krois and Interview Partner I added that the EEAS is not a particularly neutral actor. While they see Mogherini as generally more or less balanced in her stance between the Member States, Dr Krois and Mr Barbé both mentioned a number of non-transparent personnel decisions and her blatant favouritism of Italian candidates. In their opinion, this has led to a certain distrust between the EEAS and the Member States, with especially smaller Member States feeling at a disadvantage¹⁸. All three further pointed out that they don't regard the EEAS as a homogenous actor. Dr Krois assured that, just as the EEAS as an institution, individuals working for it at headquarters or abroad have their own interests they follow. He sees the mixed personnel structure reinforcing this tendency, with Interview Partner I adding that the non-permanent staff from the diplomatic services of the Member States, often retain their own structural and political logic. For him this raises the question, if they truly represent a European point of view.

While Dr Krois perceives the voice of Mogherini as mostly balanced, he doesn't take this to be true for many EEAS representatives, for example the new EEAS chairs. He is convinced that the missing regulatory framework within the EEAS provides individuals with too much freedom to pursue their own interests. As an example, he points out that the work and the loyalty of EU Ambassadors depend to a great extent on the person in question. This is especially sensitive considering Interview Partner I and Mr Barbé stressed that the perceived degree of impartiality of an EU Ambassador can have an enormous impact on the extent he/she can influence decisions or exert influence amongst them. Mr Barbé believes that the overly complex organisational structure of the EEAS makes it additionally difficult for Member States to understand how decisions within it are made and adds to distrust.

Another aspect of this distrust is the EEAS' information policy. All interview partners mentioned the EEAS' and its EU Delegations' value, when it comes to additional information, especially for smaller Member States. At the same time, they neither regard this information as neutral nor as to be complete. They

¹⁸ This observation is shared by Balfour and Raik (2013) (Balfour and Raik 2013, p. 8).

believe that the EEAS is aware of how powerful information is and therefore only share the parts of information useful in furthering its goals. However, according to Mr Barbé, the same is true for the Member States and their diplomatic missions. In mentioning this, he expressed discontent with the way information is often withheld by them with a general lack of transparency. He sees this to be especially the case for the diplomatic missions of larger Member States, that have their own sophisticated infrastructure and don't necessarily depend on the information provided to them by EU Delegations. Furthermore, if a Member State has a historic connection to the host country, for example reaching back to colonial times, this adds even more to the general suspicion. Both Dr Krois and Mr Barbé observe that these geographic 'backyards' are still very visible when looking at the nationality of the personnel working on them within the EEAS. Here, Dr Krois, as a representative of a smaller Member State, would wish for a tougher stance of the EEAS towards the Member States.

Mr Barbé sees the larger Member States with their augmented presence on the ground at a clear advantage when it comes to influencing the EU Delegations and their actions. Instead, the smaller Member States are, in his opinion, at a double disadvantage as they already have less information because of their weaker network of diplomatic missions and also, because they can't directly influence the actions of the EU Delegations and make sure their interests are taken into account.

4.3.3 Opportunities

When analysing the EEAS' politics dimension in light of the information provided by the three interview partners, one sees clear signs of Europeanisation.

All experts think that the EEAS under Mogherini has become very successful in extending its influence by using the different procedural instruments available to them. Here, Mogherini's strategic mindset is regarded as crucial with Interview Partner I seeing this manifested in the EEAS Global Strategy that, he believes, tries to alter reality through procedure. The fact that the Member States

enthusiastic accepted this approach when it came to the Global Strategy illustrates just how powerful this approach is. Equally, the new EEAS chairs changed the way these formats work and make decisions with the 'European voice' influencing the general direction of debates via procedural tools such as agenda setting. Overall, the Member States welcome these changes and the results they have delivered, indicating some important steps towards more Europeanisation.

However, as in the previous two dimensions of the political, the institutional setup sets clear boundaries to this path. All interview partners agree that, despite the EEAS having come a long way and having gained influence, in the end it is still the Member States who vote and can block everything. Despite this 'hard' power and the EEAS not even having a vote in the final say, the interview partners also notice that altered chairs have led to a changed atmosphere in these formats, with the Member States now openly focusing on their national interests. They describe this atmosphere as 'if something had been taken away from them' and a certain divide into 'us against them'. Here, all interview partners, especially Dr Krois and Interview Partner I, believe that they need more time to get used to the new setup, build up trust and develop new procedures and ways of doing things. Only if these procedures prove to be successful will Member States even consider giving up more chairs to the EEAS. Dr Krois, particularly doesn't consider the debate surrounding the introduction of QMV in foreign policy to be useful. As the ECJ has no competency in this sector, he believes one would immediately have to talk about sanction mechanisms, which could lead to a further deterioration in the relationships between the Member States. He considers this to be a 'slippery slope' that could in the end lead to a weaker Union. Instead of focussing on legal mechanisms and possible sanctions, he proposes that the Member States intensify their relationships in order to better understand each other.

One way for the EEAS to support this process, especially the build-up of trust, would be to encourage the development of a more comprehensive internal regulatory framework, especially with regards to a more transparent way of filling positions amongst candidates from different Member States. Here, the perception

that the nationals from the High Representative's Member State were favoured created a lot of discontent among Member States. Dr Krois stressed that this had not been expected beforehand and ways should be found to prevent this from happening in the future. Furthermore, same applies to situations whereby some Member States have managed to protect their geographic spheres of interest by filling positions with their nationals. As this especially concerns the larger and more powerful Member States, smaller ones rightfully feel that their influence in these areas is very limited. Here, Dr Krois recommends the EEAS stand up to the Member States and tackle the personnel structure of these departments in order to divert suspicion of being biased. Such a comprehensive regulatory framework together with the introduction of some control mechanisms could also lead to a more coherent workforce and set some boundaries to personal ambitions of individual EEAS representatives.

With regards to the additional information the EEAS and its Delegation provide, the EEAS has to take note of the fact that the Member States, despite regarding this service as useful, consider it as incomplete or filtered. Even if that means that the Member States recognise the EEAS as an independent actor with own institutional interests, this also adds to their distrust. Here, more specific guidelines for the tasks of EEAS representatives and the way in which they should represent the EEAS together with more transparency could be prudent to counter such tendencies and create more coherence. More transparency would also help the Member States to understand how decisions within the EEAS are made. If such guidelines could be developed together with Member States to include their diplomatic missions, they could also serve the interests of the EU Delegations on the ground that often miss such transparency. The EU Delegations for their part must pay attention and take into account the interests of smaller Member States, even if those are not in person present on the ground. Otherwise, they run risk of being considered as biased and of only further reinforcing the interests of the larger and more powerful Member States instead of the interests of the EU.

Considering all these areas, where the EEAS has the potential to better its standing among the Member States and to build up more trust, the selection of

the next High Representative will be extremely important. Only if that person is perceived to be impartial and to speak with a balanced voice as Mogherini, he/she can initiate credible reforms.

5. Conclusion and Outlook

To conclude, I will now return to this Master's thesis initial research question, namely, whether the EEAS furthers Europeanisation in the field of foreign policy. Hereby, I aimed to analyse how the Member States perceive and reacted to the changes the EEAS and its High Representative have caused in the three dimensions of the political, namely polity, policy and politics. I originally hypothesised that the EEAS has already furthered Europeanisation, while at the same time not yet having reached its full potential. After the evaluation of the three qualitative expert interviews, this hypothesis can be confirmed with notable signs of Europeanisation on all three dimensions.

The Member States have accepted the EEAS in their ranks as an important and independent stakeholder, which has started to consolidate its institutional standing. It is increasingly employing its procedural powers to incrementally extend its influence with the aim of setting its own priorities and shaping policies. In doing so, they believe that the EEAS is enhancing the CFSP's quality and assertiveness, while at the same time embedding the important message 'together we are stronger' into the CFSP. In their opinion, the EEAS, its EU Delegations and, especially, the new EEAS chairs have reinforced the existing CFSP formats, interlinked the different stakeholders and brought an important European point of view to the table, which they previously had missed. The EEAS' first renowned successes, for instance the adoption of the Iran Deal and the participative formulation of the Global Strategy, bolstered the Member States' acceptance of the EEAS' influence on the CFSP. The same can be said for the EU Delegations, which they regard as a dynamic new instrument for joint action towards third countries. Overall, the Member States are increasingly welcoming the diverse changes the EEAS has brought and consider them to be both in their own interest and that of the EU.

However, just as my hypothesis assumed, the EEAS is facing numerous challenges on all three dimensions that, in addition to its young age, prevent it from reaching its full potential towards a path of more Europeanisation. The most notable challenge remains the prevailing intergovernmental characteristics of the

foreign policy sector. Here, the all-powerful Member States can leave the EEAS blocked and reduced to a meeting organiser, even if it 'plays its cards right'. Considering the large gap between the expectations the EEAS is facing and its real influence, together with old patterns of 'Brussels shaming', it comes of no surprise that tensions arise from time to time.

While these external factors are only marginally in the EEAS' control, the interviews illustrate that the EEAS is also facing numerous internal challenges that prevent Europeanisation. Here, the most important one is its heterogeneous staff structure and its missing internal regulatory framework. This very much makes the EEAS' actions depend on the person in question, often times lacking coherency and raising questions of national loyalties and bias. Here, the EEAS should work on its image as a more or less neutral actor in order to decrease distrust among Member States. This is even more important as it gains influence and progressively engages in power play. Also, in order to speed up institutional maturing, the EEAS should consider to bolster efforts to develop an effective and efficient internal organisational structure and a more transparent way to provide information.

Looking ahead, one has to bear in mind that the EEAS is a very young institution, which is still searching for its final place in the complicated institutional setup, that the Member States created for it. Therefore, it is wise to be patient, also, because an institutional history of less than 10 years is not very long in comparison to the sometimes century-old history of many Member States' foreign ministries and diplomatic services. In this light, the EEAS' contribution to Europeanisation is already a remarkable achievement that is probably owed to the EEAS' current High Representative, Federica Mogherini. All experts again and again have highlighted how her personality and her particular set of skills contributed to the EEAS' current standing among the Member States and its successes. Considering this, the European Heads of Government should be extremely prudent when choosing the next High Representative if they wish for the EEAS to develop its full potential.

Depending on the outcome of the current debate about the possible extension of

QMV to the CFSP, this policy area could make its first steps towards becoming more similar to other policy areas of the Union. If this were truly to happen, it could at last intensify the interest of scholars in research on Europeanisation in foreign policy. With regards to furthering research on Europeanisation in foreign policy, it could be fruitful to extend the scope of this thesis, in order to gain a more rounded picture of the Member State's perception on the EEAS. Here, I would welcome similar qualitative studies to also include the views of other Member States, especially from the European South and East. Additionally, it could be useful to conduct similar research within the EEAS, in order to detect how the EEAS staff itself perceives its development from an intrinsic point of view.

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7. Annexes

In the following three subsections, the reader can find the abbreviated summaries of the expert interviews with Interview Partner I, Mr Thierry Barbé and Dr Peter Krois that were conducted for this Master's thesis and on which it builds upon.

7.1 Annex I - Summary of Interview with Interview Partner I

Date: 15.11.2018
Location: Brussels
Interviewee: Representative of the diplomatic corps of the Member States in Brussels
Duration: approx. 90 minutes

I. Background information and Confidentiality

The interview partner agreed to this interview under condition that he/she could remain anonymous. He/She did not wish to be recorded or be directly quoted. However, the author assures, that the Interview Partner Is currently employed in a position in which he/she has direct access to information regarding the operation of the EEAS in which he/she works closely together with representatives of the EEAS on topics concerning the CFSP. He/She has previously served in a diplomatic permanent representation of an Member States to the EU in Brussels for several years and also has professional experience in the EEAS.

Prior to commencing, the interviewee was informed of the topic of this Master's thesis, the definition of Europeanisation that this thesis adheres to, as well as, the rough structure it follows. The author, furthermore, assures that the following text provides a truthful summary of the information provided by the interviewee throughout the course of the interview, as collected in the hand-written notes of the author. The spoken interview content has been slightly adapted linguistically,

and rearranged with the aim to fit a written format and improve readability. The hand-written notes will be kept as a record by the author. The interview was conducted in German.

II. Summary of the Interview

How has the High Representative with its EEAS changed or/and continues to change the framework, the processes of decision making and the content of Foreign Policy making on the European and the national level? Where do you see achievements, risks and potential?

This is a very difficult question as the High Representative with its EEAS is a very young institution and, in my opinion, still hasn't fully developed a comprehensive institutional identity. However, I have the general impression that communication has shifted from a more bilateral mode of communication and decision making to a more communal one. The process of recurrent group interaction between representatives of the Member States through which Foreign Policy is addressed, especially the FAC, the PSC and its Nicolaidis Group, certainly helps. Today, for almost entirely every thematic topic, the EU-level, its specificities, the stances, as well as, interests of the other Member States or group of Member States, at least the most important ones, have to be taken into consideration. Even on the national level in the different Ministries and sometimes even on the sub-national level. It's my impression that the High Representative with its EEAS is reinforcing this development of complex interlinking in small incremental steps. However, it is important to note that the CFSP is a very specific policy field and I'm not sure if majority rule would really change something. This might be unrealistic in Foreign Policy. In a less extreme form, this is also true for the Defence Policy, and even Interior and Home Affairs. But the CFSP is very specific.

In this context, it is of special importance that EEAS representatives now reside over every meeting in the Foreign Policy arena, e.g. the FAC, RELEX¹⁹, COELA²⁰, COREPER²¹. To chair these meetings can be a very powerful tool.

¹⁹ Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors.

²⁰ Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU.

²¹ Committee of Permanent Representatives.

Nonetheless, the Member States mostly continue to dominate the theme setting in the different forums of the CFSP, even when they depend greatly on exterior world events. The Member States can still force topics on the agenda, depending on their regional preferences (e.g. France's focus on Africa). Here, the EEAS usually tries to take a balancing stance and is often considered to be a more or less 'honest broker', that attempts to find a consensus amongst the Member States. It is also perceived as being less "pushy" than the Commission had been beforehand. At the same time, one does notice that the High Representative with its EEAS is increasingly developing an agenda and priorities of its own (e.g. Iran, Middle East), which it furthers by employing agenda-setting, steering, and framing. In using these instruments, the High Representative with its EEAS has managed to win a relatively great influence. This is especially true since Federica Mogherini took office. Here, the Iran Nuclear Deal²² can be deemed as a major success of a young institution. Mogherini also managed to decrease the distrust between the Commission and the EEAS, something that was rather obvious during Lady Ashton's time. Still, despite Mogherini being perceived as being in the cluster of Juncker's cabinet, the relationship between these two institutions continues to be difficult, especially since the High Representative with its EEAS financially depends on the Commission. Another grand challenge for the High Representative with its EEAS is to constantly balance the often diverging interests between Northern and Southern Member States, a time consuming task that puts us at a major disadvantage in comparison with actors such as the US and Russia.

The greater influence of the High Representative with its EEAS holds advantages and disadvantages. On the one side, this situation has, until now, not yet lead to major conflicts and is mostly regarded as an effective method of bringing an entirely "European perspective" to the table. By the way, one should not make the mistake to think of the EEAS as a monolithic actor, especially since the staff has a very diverse background and many representatives also pursue their personal interest. The view the different representatives take usually depends on the time they have spent working in European institutions. If they only are there for a very limited time, they usually stay rooted in the national point of view and remain loyal

²² Official Name: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

to their Member States. If they have a long-term perspective within the EU institutions, they usually at some point adopt the EU's point of view and take up a more European stance. On the other side, on some occasions one does notice a certain 'us against them' momentum amongst the Member States, which had been less noticeable in the times of the rotating Member States chair. Here, the knowledge that at one point each would have their turn to chair, might have helped to prevent such a sentiment. In the end, the new way in which the different formats are chaired has certainly changed the way they function.

In this context, the Global Strategy is of particular importance, as the High Representative with its EEAS really stepped up its game with this strategic document. Despite offering a vast consultation process amongst Member States, Think-Tanks, and CSOs, the Global Strategy remained 'the document' of the High Representative. Building on the review process of the EEAS in 2013, it pushed for an inclusive consultation process every few weeks, but refused a joint drafting, something it felt would have undermined its strong position. In the Global Strategy the EEAS attempts to alter mentality through processes. The message 'together we are stronger' clearly aimed at highlighting the added value of a joint European approach.

With regards to the institutional framework, I don't see significant changes, even though the creation of the EEAS might have created two or three new capital formats. On the German national level, the creation of the High Representative with its EEAS has not significantly changed the structure of ministries, especially the German Foreign Office. For example, the political section 2 (Abteilung 2) and the European section (Abteilung E) already existed beforehand. However, after the creation of the High Representative with its EEAS, they became more important and, hence, received more staff. Apart from this, the High Representative with its EEAS, of course, is yet another organisation that the German government must equip with German experts in order to secure its influence. As these experts very often come from the Foreign Office, this process is often referred to as a sort of cannibalism. Other German ministries are, in my opinion, not at all, or only slightly, affected by the new actor. However, the trend to increase the number of staff working on European affairs, at home in the

Member States and in Brussel, is generally increasing.

In the realm of Development Cooperation, the High Representative with its EEAS seems to hold more influence, as it quite often sets the topics, inspiring the general direction of debates. The same is true for the defence policy, e.g. Mogherini's Africa Strategy. The German Ministry of Defence likely increased its capacities, one the one hand with regards to PESCO (Permanent Structures Cooperation), but also with regards to other areas, even if new forums haven't necessarily been established. In general, the capacities of the existing institutions have been extended with the aim of enhancing the already existing instruments and steering all-together. In my perception, PESCO is more of an additional tool for ad-hoc projects of some Member States.

All of this together has led to a tighter interlocking on all levels within these Foreign Policy areas, even though the UK has somewhat always tried to avoid these influences. Apart from this, in my opinion the CFSP has gained a higher assertiveness with the creation of the High Representative with its EEAS. Besides attracting increased public attention, it has inspired more joint statements, that are in my perception also of higher quality. Whereas the EEAS is often regarded as the 'little brother' by larger Member States, such as Germany, the UK, or France, it provides the smaller Member States, that uphold a less extensive network of diplomatic missions abroad, with valuable added information and representation. Here, the EU Delegations take up an important role in coordinating the efforts of the EU and the Member States on the ground. However, to what extent such coordination is achieved depends on the location and the EU Ambassador in place. The EU Delegations abroad send reports directly to the EEAS, and in some cases DGs of the Commission, with a specific mailing list via an encrypted system. This EEAS specific encryption system, of course, makes it difficult to include the Member States in the mailing list. Also, I don't think that this would be desired by the EEAS, as information is power. If the EU Delegation works well it can be a big plus, as it can balance communication between the EU institutions and the Member States, as they sometimes fail to do so sufficiently beforehand. This can, especially, be of added value in a situation of crisis. Again, the EEAS with its delegations abroad is a very young

organisation and still has to find its role. However, if these efforts are thoroughly continued, they, in my opinion, have great potential.

It is also important to take note of the fact that the High Representative and its EEAS knows exactly how much influence each and every single Member States holds and this is reflected in the degree each Member States is consulted and informed. However, even though the treatment of the High Representative and the EEAS varies depending on the power and status of the Member States, this still leaves the less influential Member States with much more information and influence than before. Among the more influential Member States, the way they try to 'get their way' varies greatly. Germany, a representative of a larger Member States, in general attempts to be more compromising, usually eager to conciliate with other smaller Member States and to form coalitions. France, on the other hand, is usually much more confident. A good example is Mogherini's new focus on Africa, which is regarded to be highly influenced by France. Prior to Africa, Mogherini was more focused on Iran and the Western Balkans.

7.2 Annex II - Summary of Interview with Thierry Barbé

Date: 05.02.2019
Location: EU Delegation Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (BFA)
Interviewee: Mr. Thierry Barbé, Head of Cooperation of the EU
Delegation, Deputy Head of Mission
Duration: approx. 80 minutes

I. Background information and Confidentiality

Mr. Barbé has been the Head of Cooperation and the Deputy Head of the EU Delegation in Burkina Faso since March 2015. Prior to this role he spent approximately two years in the DG ECHO of the European Commission as Head of Sector for West Africa, and has more than 10 years experience in the DG DEVCO as Head of Sector for West Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa.

Prior to the interview, Mr. Barbé was informed of the topic of this Master's thesis, the definition of Europeanisation that this thesis adheres to, as well as, the rough structure it follows. Mr. Barbé neither wished to be recorded on tape, nor to be directly quoted. The author assures, that the following text provides a truthful summary of the information provided by the interviewee throughout the course of the interview, as collected in the hand-written notes of the author. The spoken interview content has been slightly adapted linguistically, and rearranged with the aim to fit a written format and to improve readability. The content has not been changed. The hand-written notes will be kept as a record by the author. The interview was conducted in French.

II. Summary of the Interview

How has the High Representative with its EEAS changed or/and continues to change the framework, the processes of decision making and the content of Foreign Policy making on the European and the national level? Where do you see achievements, risks and potentials?

The EEAS is, in my opinion, first and foremost an instrument of exterior politics, that basically hasn't changed that much about the nature of the field. However, the fact that EEAS representative are now chairing all meetings in this arena did have an enormous impact, both positively and negatively. The Member States now, at times, behave as if something has been taken away from them. This feeling of 'us against them' sometimes appears. Then again, the EEAS is a mixed institution that added the community spirit to the policy field, something that, in my opinion, did not exist previously. In the time of Lady Ashton, it was perceived as an institution outside of the Commission, more belonging to the Council, and hence, not yet communal. This has changed substantially with Mogherini. Now the EEAS is seen as belonging more to the Commission, as being more communal than intergovernmental.

The EU Delegations Ambassadors are also something new, something very dynamic that really helps to 'raise' the EU's flag abroad. However, as the EEAS is still very young and doesn't have its own 'old' staff, the behaviour of these Ambassadors is still very much influenced by their nationality. This engrained national view can be difficult to overcome. Meaning, if you have a Spanish EU Delegation Ambassador, he/she will rather represent Spanish interests, or at least act according to the logic of Spanish politics. However, there also are others who really try to represent the EU interests.

As the EEAS is such a young institution, the EU ambassadors have a lot of freedom with very few concrete directives from the HQ. The level of activity an EU ambassador can show, and the influence he/she can have, therefore, very much depends on his/her personality and his/her connections in the HQ. The same is true for the different departments within the EU Delegation. If they work

with weak departments or DGs in Brussels, they have enormous freedom in comparison to their counterparts in the Member States' embassies.

Of course, this can lead to conflicts with some Member States' embassies in that country, especially if that country belongs to the 'turf' of one particular Member State²³. In my opinion, the smaller Member States - the ones that are not represented in the country or only with very little personnel - are in reality now at a compounded disadvantage. Firstly, they are less represented in that country, and, hence, already receive less information. Secondly, the larger and better represented Member States now also have the opportunity to influence the EU Delegation on the ground and not only the EEAS in Brussels. They, therefore, have another channel of influence, and the smaller Member States don't even have the possibility to realise if the EU Delegation doesn't serve them well.

Federica Mogherini really attempts to exhaust the options the treaties and the possibilities that present themselves. On the ground, the EU Delegations now try to coordinate between the Member States in a more coherent manner, and, hereby, to create an 'added value'. Additionally, they have their own projects, for example in cooperation. In Burkina Faso, we also experience the difficult situation where few Member States are represented, but there is an incredible need for coordination, for instance between the EU Delegation, the Member States, the International Organisations, and the active non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Here, the inter-personnel level is incredibly important, and, I fear, the EU Delegation is sometimes too technocratic and would need more flexibility. It might sometimes also be advisable to listen more to the Member States - all Member States and not only the few that are present. Here, I hope that the Trust Fund²⁴ will provide more options and flexibility. In Burkina Faso, the Delegation organises two meetings with the Head of Missions and the Heads of Cooperation every month. Ad-hoc meetings are convened if needed, for example in the fields health, humanitarian action, or security. The regularity and the format of these meetings depend on the respective EU Delegation²⁵. However, I feel that we

²³ Indication towards the French influence in their old African colonies.

²⁴ The EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund.

²⁵ Remark of the author: The EU Delegation in Hanoi/Vietnam for example organised monthly meetings for all sectors of the Member States' Embassies (for example Administration, Consular Affairs, Cooperation, Environment, Human Rights).

should work on the transparency between the Member States' embassies and the EU Delegation, as we often don't get the necessary information, at least from some Member States.

The level of cooperation very much depends on the willingness, and also the capacity of the embassies in question, and, again, also on the current EU Ambassador. The occasional lack of transparency also makes it difficult to attempt joint programming. However, in the cooperation sector we try to achieve this, for example with a new secondary programme which attempts to focus on common sectors. We also try to create added value by functioning as an 'information hub' between the Member States, e.g. by offering a daily press newsletter. I would also like to highlight that the Security and Defence Sector is a very positive exception, where the functioning of the EU Delegation as an information hub for the Sahel region works very well, and the EU Delegation is perceived as representing the EU Member States with the partners. Here, I see a real added value and this probably wouldn't have happened under Ashton.

With regards to the High Representative, I believe that his/her personality is very important. The High Representative can't be 'imposed' on the Member States and must be an extremely skilled negotiator. For example, he/she shouldn't table anything that won't pass, and in order to know what can pass, one must remain in very close contact with all Member States. Here, Mogherini is really competent; Ashton was not. However, one must also consider that the task of the High Representative is gigantic. Imagine constantly negotiating and coordinating between 28 Member States, soon 27. Considering the young age of the EEAS, Mogherini is doing a good job, especially in teaming up with some important Member States for her priority issues (e.g. Iran, Russia, Ukraine). The "esprit de corps" within the EEAS has very much improved since Mogherini took office, even if much room for development remains. One difficulty is the illegible organigram, with too many abbreviations and an exhaustingly detailed division of labour, randomly according to geography or functionality. As it is, nobody knows who is doing what and it's just too complex. I'm also of the opinion that the EU Delegations at times need clearer directives in order to work efficiently. This would help to harmonise their work, as well as, their presence in the different

countries, and, thus, would to make their added value less dependent on the personality of the ambassador.

Internally, the EU Delegations still have to follow two strictly separated lines of reporting -one to the EEAS and one to the different DGs in the Commission, especially with DEVCO. We try to merge these different lines of reporting, but it's very difficult - especially since the list of recipients in each line is different and the two headquarters jealously guard their competencies. However, Cotonou²⁶ changed things a bit, as for instance 'migration' emerged as a new hot topic that both HQs are interested in. This created, and is still creating, synergies and new connections, for example, visits and missions that have to be jointly prepared, also with the Council.

²⁶ The Cotonou Agreement.

7.3 Annex III - Summary of Interview with Dr Peter Krois

Date: 01.03.2019
Location: Via telephone
Interviewee: Dr. Peter Krois, Counsellor at the Permanent
Representation of the Republic of Austria to the European
Union
Duration: approx. 90 minutes

I. Background information and Confidentiality

Dr. Krois is currently a Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Austria to the EU where he is responsible for the Middle East, the Gulf Region, and North Africa. For several years, he previously worked as Head of Department in the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria and was, amongst others, responsible for EU-Institutions and EU institutional questions. In this position, he also worked on the establishment of the EEAS. He has served in the Austrian Embassies in Warsaw, Pristina, and Berlin.

Prior to the interview, Dr. Krois was informed of the topic of this Master's thesis, the definition of Europeanisation that this thesis adheres to, as well as, the rough structure it follows. Dr. Krois did not wish to be recorded on tape. The author assures that the following text provides a truthful summary of the information provided by the interviewee throughout the course of the interview, as collected in the hand-written notes of the author. The format of this interview has been slightly adapted linguistically, and rearranged with the aim to fit a written format and to improve readability. The content has not been changed. The hand-written notes will be kept as a record by the author. The interview was conducted in German.

II. Summary of the Interview

How has the High Representative with its EEAS changed or/and continues to change the framework, the processes of decision making and the content of Foreign Policy making on the European and the national level? Where do you see achievements, risks and potentials?

The EEAS is an additional independent player in the Foreign Policy arena, which is not comparable to a Member States, but something different. It was created with the idea in mind that, when it comes to international politics, the EU should be more than the sum of its components. In reality its possibilities and impact on policies still remain limited, because you simply can't force Member States when it comes to Foreign Policy and they don't like it when manoeuvring space is 'taken away' from them. In other policy sectors the EEAS is active in, for example development, it clearly has more freedom.

This hesitance to give the EU level more influence is true, not only for France, but also for Germany and the UK, which are the usual names that come to mind on the topic of reluctance to grant the EU level more power, and that often appear to surrender to their particular national interests. For the UK, this has strangely slightly shifted since the Brexit referendum, as the colleagues on the working level now seem very eager to represent what they believe to be in the European interest with regards to Foreign Policy. Maybe this is because they know they won't be affected by it in the long-term or maybe these colleagues feel that this way they can somewhat compensate for the whole Brexit drama. However, some smaller Member States, especially the ones that are relatively young countries and only in the last century or so gained independence, are also extremely sensitive in matters regarding foreign policy. For those countries, other players, such as the US, are just as important for their national raison d'être as the EU and they don't want to lose power they have just gained back.

As of now, the biggest success of this young institution is clearly the Iran Deal²⁷,

²⁷ The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

that was achieved together with the E3²⁸. The 'Kashoggi case' can be considered another positive example of a strong joint European stance. However, the High Representative with its EEAS has had difficulties in selling this success to the public. Then again, on other occasions of international crisis, the High Representative failed to be vocal and then the Member States had to step in again. In these more difficult situations, the EU institutions remain of little importance and the Member States still dominate, sometimes in a rather brutal way. One good example of this are the Council Working Group meetings with regards to the Middle East. Here, the EU institutions really do their best, but there is no consensus amongst the Member States as to how to proceed, hence, there isn't a strong European approach. This portrays how limited the High Representative with its EEAS are when the Member States don't agree amongst themselves.

Against the background of this particular policy field, where the spoken work is of essence and one doesn't find a lot of 'hard' legislation, I don't believe that the discussion surrounding the QMV is helpful. If we talk about QMV, we must also discuss possible sanction mechanisms, in the case in which a decision reached in this way is not respected by a Member States. Remember that the ECJ does not have the competencies in this policy area and, I believe, justifiably so. Imagine, what would happen if it's a larger Member States that disobeys, one with power? Think about the intervention of France in Libya, who tried to stop France? Or would sanctions only be considered for smaller Member States, just as with the EU's budget restrictions? Also, politicians that were outvoted on some issue could have reactions of defiance and do the exact opposite. Who could hold them accountable? The potential for conflict would be enormous and, in my opinion, would negatively affect the relations between the Member States. Such an approach is the wrong way of thinking, a dangerous slippery slope, and, in my opinion, would not lead to a 'more' Europe in the end. Especially, when you consider the current situation in Europe, in which we have experienced increasing difficulty over the last years, for example, the famous Article 7²⁹ that was invoked against Poland and Hungary. One can honestly say that this article

²⁸ The EU Member States France, Germany and the UK are in the context of the Iran Deal often referred to as „E3“.

²⁹ Meaning Article 7 of the TEU.

has completely failed, because it is already flawed in its basic structure. Originally, it was designed to deal with a maximum of one 'black sheep', back then Austria. However, because you now have several 'bad' countries, that are willing to provide cover for one another, this article doesn't work anymore. It was simply designed for another reality.

Instead of QMV and sanctions, I would support a more in depth mutual process of understanding between the Member States. We as Member States must get to know one another again, and here I mean on all levels of state and society. In fact, this is already happening, but it's happening too slowly. For example, I often witness that my European colleagues on the working level meet nationals from other Member States, especially smaller ones, for the first time in their life - and these are not especially young colleagues. How can this happen in the EU and how are we expected to understand each other this way? I believe the focus on legal mechanisms, such as sanctions, shows that we aren't truly interested in the other Member States anymore, but would now, more than ever, need a respectful discourse between the Member States, that addresses their difference in perception of history and mentality. A sort of 'new European rapprochement'. Then we might also better understand some national reflexes that are deeply ingrained, and at times, prevent progress when it comes to the EU. We have to take note of the fact that the EU doesn't replace a good neighbourhood policy. Just think of what is happening between France and Italy at the moment. This is incredible! We also have to keep in mind that Member States have to grow into the EU and that this is a process that takes decades and, as we can now witness in the UK, can also fail.

Such a discourse would be more useful than new institutions and formats. To simply create new institutions every time we face a problem is 'the easy way out', but isn't very forward thinking. In my opinion, institutions are often created with too little thought and then results are also expected too quickly. This is also true for the EEAS. The intent behind its creation was to strengthen European joint action abroad and to increase the willingness to act in a coordinated manner. However, this willingness should have been the starting point for the EEAS and not its final goal. Institutions should act as a 'catalyst' of existing willingness, not

the method to achieve it. This is why I think one must ensure to be critical of the still very young institution in a fair manner. One must think of it as someone who enters an arena with a specific goal and pretty much everyone is already against the goal this person is trying to achieve. Here, and also towards new Member States, patience is incredibly important.

One example: In my opinion the Commission is right to energetically address the problems we face in the new Member States Poland in Hungary, especially when it comes to the rule of law. However, I feel that we often underestimate the problems these countries face with their own history, the fact that they never truly came to terms with what happened under their respective communist regimes. The former leaders and the elites profited from a de facto amnesty and went scot-free for their crimes, with some even returning to power later on. I believe parallels can be drawn from countries such as Chile and Argentina. There, societies that didn't come to rest for decades, are now starting to politically and legally process their military dictatorships of the past after the amnesty laws were, with some distance, perceived as unbearable and unjust. The same could be true for some newer EU Member States. Also, the elites in these countries know very well how to employ this general vague feeling of injustice in their societies.

With regards to the EEAS I see a lot of conflicting messages—conflict of interests but also strong tendencies of Europeanisation through, for instance, agenda setting and the EEAS' role as briefer. I think the High Representative has increased the communication between the Member States and, here, clearly provides an added value. The institutional memory of the EU's Foreign Policy formats which are now chaired by the High Representative with its EEAS, has also improved. At the same time, even with the new chairs, the EEAS still depends a great deal on the Member States. This is evident, for instance, when the EEAS can't ignore even the most idiotic of proposals by Member States if other Member States are not backing up its decision. Mogherini's focus on Africa also originated in the Member States, and was a joint decision in the Council - probably less her idea than a necessity after the migration crisis. Even for the future I have difficulties imagining the prioritization of decisions being made in a

different fashion.

However, as with anything, the new EEAS chairs in the Foreign Policy arena also has disadvantages. For instance, Member States now have the possibility to solely focus on pushing their national agenda, something that I had noticed less before, when the Member States knew they would at some point depend on the other Member States as chair. The Esprit de Corps among the Member States in these forums has also deteriorated. With these effects in mind, even though the first experiences with the EEAS chairing aren't all negative, at this point nobody really wants to give it more chairs. One should also clearly note that the EEAS is not a 'neutral' new actor, but also follows its own interests. This can reach the point where the EEAS attempts to rupture consensus between the Member States, something that, in my opinion, should be against the constitution. In this light, the High Representative is a very colourful figure with bright, but also dark, parts.

The reflex to create new institutions for every problem is, in my opinion, not always a good one, especially when it comes to foreign policy. There, every change creates possibilities, but also dangers. One good example here is the number of Commissioners and the old question of effectiveness versus representation. As much as it made sense to reduce the number of Commissioners in a growing EU, in reality it was not feasible because it lacked acceptance, and acceptance is of enormous political value.

When discussing the EEAS' potential, it's important to note that the EEAS itself is not a homogenous actor. Each analysis, therefore, depends on the personality of the person in question. Where the voice of the current High Representative is perceived as more or less balanced, the same cannot always be true for the EEAS employees with their different backgrounds. For example, only few EEAS chairs dare to present clear statements. The same is true, to some extent, for the EU Delegations abroad. There don't seem to be too many general guidelines or internal directives, which leads to a situation where Head of Delegations have an enormous freedom. Some Heads of Delegation are great, some are really not.

The EEAS' personnel structure is a challenge, as it consists of former employees

of the Council, the Commission, and the national diplomatic services. Initially, a rotation of all these groups was foreseen, but now only the staff originating from the national diplomatic services rotate. For the rest, there is almost no fluctuation. However, as personnel is always a very sensitive question amongst Member States nobody wants to touch it, even if this lack of rotation was also criticised in the EEAS review. And informal directive is: As long as the ECJ is not involved, almost anything goes. A weird European understanding of the Rule of Law. The way some EEAS positions were awarded was poorly received by Member States, especially when the calls were not performed in a transparent manner. With regards to this situation, I don't see a big change between Lady Ashton and Mogherini. However, one can clearly observe that under the latter, Italian candidates are clearly favoured and the Italian presence in the EEAS has risen extremely. This has caused a lot of bad blood amongst the Member States, as I don't think people had expected it to happen to such an extent. With regards to the new High Representative after the European elections, this clearly should not become the new normal.

The new EU Delegations abroad certainly provide added information, even though the EEAS HQ often 'softens' their reports or 'filters' them, if you want to be harsh as 'knowledge is power'. I've noted on several occasions that the end result that is shared amongst the Member States is less detailed and certain things are completely omitted. Additionally, it took the EEAS a very long time to implement their secure communication lines. In addition, the EEAS has not succeeded to get rid of the 'backyards' of some Member States, for example France in West Africa. This still shows in the nationality of staff working in the respective departments and creates distrust. Here, the EEAS is taking a too weak stance towards the Member States. I personally don't see a federal future for the EU, mainly, because people don't want it. If the elites introduce it, nonetheless, through the backdoor, it will never be truly accepted. And we can see what kind of problems arise, if political projects are never truly accepted by the population.

In my opinion, the EEAS should, instead, focus more-so on reinforcing the messages that the Member States have managed to agree upon. Here, Mogherini has shown political talent for successfully steering discourses, agenda

setting, the preparation of votes, joint statements, final conclusions, and agreements. Even if those agreements don't always hold up, I feel that, in general, the Council works very well here. Juncker also gave Mogherini more freedom than he had previously given Ashton, or even his other Vice Presidents - something that I regard as positive and in line with the treaties. Here one can truly observe how a person shapes the office and that the treaties really only set a framework.

8. Affirmation of Authorship

Statement of Authorship for Master's thesis

I hereby declare that the paper presented is my own work and that I have not called upon the help of a third party. In addition, I affirm that neither I nor anybody else has submitted this paper or parts of it to obtain credits elsewhere before.

I have clearly marked and acknowledged all quotations or references that have been taken from the works of others. All secondary literature and other sources are marked and listed in the bibliography. The same applies to all charts, diagrams and illustrations as well as to all Internet resources. Moreover, I consent to my paper being electronically stored and sent anonymously in order to be checked for plagiarism. I am aware that the paper cannot be evaluated and may be graded 'failed' if the declaration is not made.

15.05.2019

Date

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'F. Long', written in black ink.

Signature