DOES EUROPE NEED A COMMON ENEMY?

A quantitative research thesis on the relation between threat perceptions and European identity in the Netherlands

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Summary

This study looks in to the relation between perceived threat and European identity. From a random sample (probability) in the Netherlands, data was gathered using a questionnaire. A regression was executed (N=264) finding two proposed predictors to be significant at 0.05 level. Perceived threat from Russia, and perceived threat from the Climate are found to be positively related with European identification. The variables: perceived threat from the USA, and perceived threat from China were not found to be significant. This research adds to the existing literature on the subject.

Preface

Proudly I present this thesis for the Master in Advanced European and International Studies at CIFE; International Centre for European Studies. A place where I have developed myself in many ways. I enjoyed working on this thesis and proving to be able to independently carry out a social scientific research.

Off course I could not have done it exclusively on my own, that is why I want to thank my research advisor Dr. Mattias Waechter and second reader Dr. Laurent Baechler. I also want to thank my family because they make studying possible for me and always support me unconditionally. This also counts for my friends and my girlfriend, with whom I could always find some distraction and have a motivating influence on me.

Finally, I want to thank all respondents that contributed to this study by filling a questionnaire. By allowing me to take a small moment of their time they helped making this research into a success.

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1. Theoretical framework

This theoretical framework will focus on analyzing the multiple academic concepts that are required to answer the research question. First there will be an evaluation of the concept of identity which will start with an overview of the grand theories around identity. This will narrow down to national identity and European identity, where the definitions, indicators, approaches around this complex concept will be discussed and compared. The second half of the theoretical framework will aim to dismantle the concept of threat. The examination of the concept threat will follow the same model as used for identity, working from broad "grand theories" on the subject, to then narrow down to specific cases that can be observed when studying threat and identity in the European Union.

1.1 Identity

According to the Cambridge English Dictionary, identity is: "*Who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different*". In science however, identity is harder to grasp. It is a concept that researchers have been trying to define for many years. And although in recent decades research and attention around the concept of identity has been growing substantially many aspects of the context, function, indicators and formation are still unknown (James, 2015). Not only the ambiguity makes it hard to define, also the different interpretation in different academic disciplines makes that it has multiple meanings depending on which article and which scholar is being studied. Philosophy, political science, sociology, psychology, pedagogy, social geography and anthropology, and more disciplines, all try use to use the concept in their studies, often with various definitions and different angles when approaching it.

And even within these academic disciplines views on identity are very split up. In sociology for example there is one side an enormously growing interest in the subject. Because more and more scholars used the concept as a way to explain the world, some scholars now argue that the concept has lost value and has become a buzzword (Versluys, 2007). There is a big discussion within the sociological community on whether or not the concept still has value,

not only because of the diverse use, but also because of the characteristics modern times. Under the conditions of late or post modernism, many things that are used to hold value are said to become loose. This also goes for identity, for some scholars argue nowadays it is too loose, unstable and quickly changing (Meuter, 2013). Critics also say that identity lacks the consistency and coherence to function as a variable or subject of research. Other scholars plead for a reshape of the current concept of identity because "*the way of life of the individual in postmodern societies can no longer be adequately described in the classical narrative sense*" and instead plead for a new "*conceptual framework of a "patchwork-identity*" (Kraus, 1996; Salmon, 2007; Keupp; 1996 in Meuter, 2013).

Not only in sociology but also in political science the use of the term identity has come into fashion. Although many political scholars first treated the concept with skepticism because of its many different interpretations and definitions. Nowadays it used in studies more and more as researchers find out that categorizing identities on basis of 'race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, citizenship and other social categories' can be a very useful tool for explaining politics and society (Fearon, 1990).

In order to decrease the ambiguity around the subject and make it more useful for political sciences, Stanford researcher James Fearon (1999) tried to banish the vagueness of the term in political science. He proposes that, when talking about identity in future studies, researchers use the terms "*(a) a social category, defined by membership rules and allegedly characteristic attributes or expected behaviors, or (b) a socially distinguishing feature that a person takes a special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential (or, of course, both (a) and (b) at once)*".

1.1.1 Social identity theory

As has been explained above, there are many differences in use, interpretation, context and definition of the concept identity. Differences that can be found between different disciplines as well as within disciplines in the form of paradigms. Despite the many different in views there are also some 'Grand Theories around identity that are commonly used across the various disciplines to explain and study identity. One commonly respected theory on this is the Social

Identity Theory which was written down by social psychologist Tajfel and his student Turner (1979) who named it the Social Identity Theory (SIT).

The theory assumes that individuals who belong to social groups, for example a football team, a country, a family or a job, use this group when shaping values in their lives. The group helps shaping the identity of an individual because they internalize norms, behaviors, values and more through socialization with this group. In addition to this, the group has an influence on the way a person views itself and the world because of 'positive distinctiveness'. This part of the theory assumes that individuals have an intrinsic motivation to 'strive for a positive self-concept' (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Like explained before, a major part in shaping a view of the self and one's identity is done through the membership of social groups and interactions, so in order to improve an individual's self-concept they will favor their own group over another group.

The distinction happens in two ways, firstly view individuals themselves and their group, the so called the "in-group", as positively distinctive over another. Secondly, this also has an effect on the views of the so called 'out groups'. By holding prejudice and discriminating 'the out group' and having a positive bias against the 'in group' they will keep the idea of group superiority intact, which will automatically extend to the individual. The preferential view of the in-group is said to be self-sustaining because individuals give preferential treatment to persons in the 'in-group', which will lead to a better response and therefor reinforce their positive idea of the in-group.

An important hypothesis lies in the way these views and prejudices are being created. It is stated that in-group members, when looking at, or having interaction with other groups, will rather look for negative traits. This will lead them to therefore find more negative traits. Negative views can often lead to stereotypes which can eventually turn in to racism. Extreme examples of this have been seen throughout history like between Hutu and Tutsi and in Nazi Germany. Where superiority views of the in-group and a view of inferiority against the out-group led to extreme consequences for Jewish people (Islam, 2014).

The Social Identity Theory describes three mental stages of identification with a group, in which each stage is a little bit more meaningful (Turner, 1975). The first stage is called Social

Categorization, and in this phase, individuals make a distinction between a group in terms of in-group and out-group. This process is very useful and happens all the time in daily life. It structures and simplifies actions which give a framework to handle situations. Examples of these categorizations in daily life include: identifying supermarket employees from shoppers or Germans from Americans. They are often highly structured through context, for example outside workhours an individual will view a supermarket employee different. This also means that an individual can belong to many groups at the same time, often highly depending on the context (Turner, 1975).

The second stage is called Social Identification and is more meaningful to the individual than just categorizing. According to Tajfel and Turner this process happens when individuals start to identify more with the so-called in-group. This process, sometimes also called norm conformity, is driven by emotional attachment to a group and its values. People start attaching their self-esteem and identity to being a member of the group because they recognize the similarities between their identity, norms and values and the groups identity and norms and values (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

In third and final phase is called Social Comparison. People now have recognized differences between social groups and have identified themselves to which they belong. They also have they linked part of their identity and values to that of the group. The Social Comparison Phase brings relative value into this comparison. According to the theory, in order to keep an individual's self-esteem up, they have to keep their views of the group up, because they are now linked. This happens by viewing other groups as rivaling in relation to their groups. By holding negative stereotypes and discriminating against the out-groups, and having a positivity bias towards their in-group, they can keep their group positively distinct (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Like most great theories in social sciences many aspects of the theory have been debated. The first debate is on the assumption of striving towards a positive self-concept. Although the effects are not so much debated, some scholars claim that the relations between predictors and outcomes are more complex than previously explained (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Another debatable critique is the finding that the theory has a far greater explanatory

power than predictive power, which means that the strength of the expected effect might be influenced by other factors. Despite the critiques the theory still stands after more than 50 years, it has been confirmed and extended by researchers in many ways, and is till today, often used by researchers studying the topic of identity (Ouwerkerk et al., 2018)

1.1.2 National identity

An important form of identity and often heard concept in the field of political, psychological and social sciences is the term National Identity. Like other forms of identity, national identity is often viewed as a fluid and multidimensional concept which makes it *"both complex and highly abstract".* An often-used definition of national identity is coined by political scientist Emerson (1960) "a body of people who feel that they are a nation".

In order to come to a definition of the word national identity, Smith (1992) first tried to describe the word nation. His proposal is: *"Some of the main assumptions and beliefs common to all nationalists everywhere. Drawing on these, we may define a nation as a named human population sharing a historical territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common economy and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the collectivity".* The list of characteristics of a nation can be extended and stretches over many areas which sometimes overlap or exclude each other, examples of these include language, media, culture, symbols, ethnicity, political system, ideologies etc. can be added as well.

When speaking about the concept of national identity, scholars also often refer to the concept of imagined community. Benedict Anderson (1983) is the first big name to popularize this term and he proposes the following definition of the nation: *"it is an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion".* To still have a feeling of affinity with the group, active identity- and nation building is required. According to Anderson the mass media play a big role in this process, for it was only after the introduction of print capitalism that the first nation states were formed. He even argues that before that

invention, people in one country could sometimes barely speak the same language (Anderson, 1983).

Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) add to this theory and see so called 'invented traditions' as the foundation for a nation, as a glue that binds the nation together. Examples of invented traditions can be seen everywhere and include: a common history, a flag, joining the Olympic games with a national team. He also argues that parts of the common history or practices that do not fit in the right paradigm of nationhood are held back and concealed. Governments can actively reproduce and stimulate the invented traditions in order to strengthen the imagined community and increase the idea of nationhood. Billig (1995) does not fully agree with the idea that nations are only held together by invented traditions. He argues that besides invented traditions, a nation is symbolized and characterized by more, non-invented factors. To prove this statement, he gives examples like national news, food, sports teams or weather reports.

National identity is often viewed in a way Tajfel and Turner describe identity, meaning in terms of us and them. This implies that individuals can categorize different groups and have a feeling of recognition to which group they belong to. National identity in this approach refers to the subjective feeling an individual can have regardless of their legal nationality. According to the theory of Tajfel and Turner individuals will experience positive discrimination towards the in-group, and sometimes negative stereotyping against the out-group.

The concept of national identity is socially constructed and formed during social encounters in life. It is often actively strengthened through national symbols, daily practices like food or national sports and enlarged through the media. The amount of exposure to the system in which national identity is reproduced has been found to be linked with the degree to which an individual adopts a national identity as part of an individual identity (Kelman, 1997).

1.1.3 Nation state in demise?
While some countries have a strong history of national identity, others struggle to construct one. An interesting example of is the case of Canada, which is seen as a country including multiple nations and multiple languages. Researchers find that Canada has a stronger regional identity but still manages to have a small layer of national identity on top. The country is seen

as a community build on values and not so much on traditional aspect of identity like race or history. To maintain this national identity, Canada is actively trying to construct an inclusive feeling of belonging. By creating a community that is, not based on race or history (something that people cannot influence) but on values (Henderson & Ewen, 2005).

The other side of the coin can be viewed in Russia, where according to researchers from the Kennan Institute (2011) there are reports of false figures circulating about negative aspects of immigrants framing them as "unwelcome and abusive guests". This can be explained by the earlier described Social Identity Theory, where out-group the out-group experiences negative discrimination. The perceived definition of 'Russian identity' is very much based on ethnicity which makes it almost impossible for newcomers to join (Kennan Institute, 2011).

National identities are not inherently rigid, but dynamic and constantly changing by nature (Mansbach & Rhodes, 2007). In recent years, some scholars have argued that national identity has been changing in a direction where it becomes less important. One argument they provide to explain this is the observation of increasing effects of globalization. This phenomenon explains that the world becomes more globalized through things like increasing trade, education, tourism, cultural exchanges, services, platforms and collaborations. According to some theories this trend should facilitate an increase in common norms and values because of common experiences. Leading to an increased identification with the international community and an emerging international identity, sometimes known as cosmopolitanism (Israel, 2012).

While some research states that multiple identities can exist next to each other, some scholars argue that increased globalization is a threat to the value of national identity (Henderson & Ewen, 2005). The claims are backed up by a recent research done in 63 countries, which finds that in country that becomes more internationalized, levels of chauvinism and patriotism are declining. Effect of internationalization are also found to be associated with a decreased amount of loyalty to the nation, and willingness to fight in a national army (Arelie, 2012).

Another example of shifting role of the nation state is given by Alexander Wendt. His work focusses on identity in a national and international context, and states that supra national

identities can emerge in an international environment as countries form alliances. New alliances or blocs can emerge when similar identities are already existing. But also when countries themselves do not per se view their identities as similar, but other actors in the world view them like that. Even if this external view is inaccurate, and the countries identities are not that similar, the perceptions will have an influence on the way those countries are being treated. Resulting into a situation where the countries will start to identify more with each other, especially with regards to their common position in the international field (Wendt 1994; Wendt 1999).

1.1.4 European identity

In the vision of Alexander Wendt, it is interesting to take a look at European identity. From an institutional point of view, it can be hard to identify communalities on the European continent. One the one side this has to do with the already great amount of different, already existing, identities in Europe. On the other side with the many different formations within Europe. There is the European Union, Economic Free Trade Area, Eurozone, Council of Europe and many more. Although it is commonly recognized that the highest degree of integration within these institutions can be found in the European Union (Schmale, 2007).

According to Leonce Bekemans, holder of the Jean Monnet chair, Europe is "*in the first place a community of shared values, based on values such as the centrality of the human being, freedom, equality, respect for human rights, and acceptance of diversity as an asset, tolerance, justice and solidarity".* Bekemans (2012) distinguishes three models of European identity formation. The first one is called Communitarian and explains European identity as being grounded in cultural communalities which have been formed throughout history. Factors in support of this theory are the common (cultural) movements through history on different facets like seen in religion, philosophy, science and arts.

The second view approaches European identity through the common political culture. This Liberal and Republican theory, states that European civic identity is built on universal principles like democracy, human rights and rule of law. The main difference with the first theory is that the Communitarian theory mainly focuses on the private spheres of religious and

cultural identities while the Liberal and Republican theory focusses on the public spheres like law, government institutions etc.). Liberal and Republic theory thinkers claim that future European identification will emerge from the state's public aspects, while people will continue to have differences in the practices of their private and cultural spheres (Bekemans, 2012).

The third group of scholars are supporters of the Constructivist approach. They believe a person's identity is constantly subject to influences and changes. Because of this changeability they argue that a common identity can by constructed and that this can only be achieved by actively building on common civic, political and cultural topics. If there are enough active exchanges, interactions and collaborations in material and immaterial topics (think about trade, ideas, projects etc.) they believe that constructing a common European identity is possible (Bekemans, 2012).

Multiple examples of this identity construction can be found throughout the history of the European continent. There have been many attempts to create religious, economic, political, military and cultural homogeneity in which people always had to find an equilibrium between diversity and integration (Bekemans, 2012). During the formation of the EU, the precursor of the European Commission, named the European Communities, also started showing interest in the formation of a European identity. The concept was first mentioned in a European treaty called: The Declaration on European Identity. The treaty was signed in 1973 in Copenhagen where it was proposed as a counter measure against the "*current global threats*" and to *"defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress – and of respect for human rights'* (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1973).

1.1.5 European identity building

Within the constructivist belief of 'makeability' of a European identity, the Commission recognizes 2 models of European identity building. These two models explain how Europeans can identify with each other and how this will lead to the development of a common European identity (European Commission, 2012). The Commission uses the models proposed by Recchi (2012) named the Culturalist model and the Structuralist model (European Commission, 2012).

The Culturalist model explains how European identity derives from European values and expressions that can be observed through expressions in the public sphere. For example, the functioning of governments and the legal system.

The Culturalists insinuate that identification with Europe is mainly a top down driven process, and therefore see a big role for internalization of identity through exposure to discourses and symbols. When this exposure mechanism happens to younger people it is in the form of socialization, during adult life this happens through persuasion and indoctrination (European Commission, 2012). This approach is in line with the earlier described formation of imagined communities and invented traditions (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm, 1983). Where Anderson and Hobsbawm explain that maintaining or creating a common identity requires nation building and invented traditions. Hobsbawm also emphasized that invented traditions (like symbols) can be actively stimulated by governments in order to create more common identity.

The Structuralists do not follow this top down approach but instead have a more human centered approach. They claim that identity is formed mostly through association, interaction and exchanges with others. An important difference in this approach is that it views the process as coming from the bottom up, in contrast to the Culturalists. But they do see a role for the government, because the government can play a role in facilitating and promoting the interpersonal association process. For example, by introducing proper (interaction promoting) policies (European Commission, 2012). The structuralist approach is said to work best after childhood because it assumes interaction between people that are in the same situation. This exposure should make people realize that they have a lot in common and therefore removes the previously existing stereotypes and borders between in-group and out-group. The European Union has multiple policies to promote common identity following both models like Eurofestival, DYLAN, Eurobroadmap and Erasmus (European Commission, 2012).

The Structuralist approach has a lot of communalities with the Contact Hypothesis (sometimes called: Intergroup Contact Theory). This theory has some of the same assumptions as seen in the Social Identity Theory because it assumes that group division creates prejudices and stereotypes. These prejudices are constantly recreated through interaction with the other

group. Where the Contact Hypothesis differs from the SIT is in the type and content of this interaction. Contact hypothesis states that intergroup contact, can, under certain circumstances, lead to a positive change in attitudes towards another group (Stangor et al. 1996; Pettigrew, 1998) therefore, decreasing the borders between groups and making space for the existence of a dual (common) identity (Gaertner, 1996). Contact hypothesis can happen in many forms, studies have shown that media, electronic contact and even imagined contact can change stereotypes, intergroup relations and threat perceptions (Schiappa et al. 2005; Crisp & Turner, 2009; White & Abu-Rayya, 2012).

The contract hypothesis has been partly proven in European context by a study from the European Commission in 2012. There they find strong evidence that "*One of consistently strongest causes of developing a true 'European' sense of self was being from and/or involved in a cross-national 'intimate relationship*", examples of these strong and intimate relationships are having children, a parent of another affective cross border relationship (European Commission, 2012). Efforts of the European Commission also seem to work out other segments of society because research shows that "An investment into student mobility at both high school and university levels can improve attitudes towards the EU" (European Commission, 2012).

1.2.1 Integrated Threat Theory

One of the main grand theories on threat and group relations is called Integrated Threat Theory or sometimes Intergroup Threat Theory. This theory in a way can be seen as an extension on the Social Identity Theory as described before, because it presumes a division of groups in which people can indicate to which they belong and to which they do not belong. One of the main components of this theory is called perceived threat which is seen as a driver of prejudice and negative stereotypes between groups (Stephan, Ibarra, Morrison, 2009).

The Integrated Threat Theory is mainly build on the concept of perceived threats, which stands loose from the actual possibilities of this threat happening. An often-used example which to clarify this theory, is that of immigrants as a threatening out-group. Often members of the in-group will have the idea that the immigrants will steal jobs or use welfare funds while in reality, the presence of immigrants has no influence on their situation. The perceived threat, in

this case a threat to economic stability, creates and strengthens negative stereotypes which increase boundaries between groups.

The original theory covered four categories of perceived threat but was later updated by Renfro & Stefan (2002) after doing several studies in an experimental condition. They reduced the original four into two components which are: Realistic threats and Symbolic threats. Realistic threats in this theory are defined as threats that potentially have an impact on the group or its members with regard to resources or security, for example perceived threats to physical health, political or economic power.

Symbolic threats, on the other hand, express themselves in a less physical way. Instead they include nonmaterial aspects like morals, values of beliefs (Renfro & Stefan, 2002). For this part of the theory differences in values and world views are assumed. It also is assumed that when values transfer from group to individual that these values become a part of this person's identity. When other groups have contesting world views, this will not only be perceived as a threat to the groups values, but they will also become a personal threat because the groups norms and values are now linked to one's own identity. Because of this threat, negative prejudices against the out-group can increase (Allport, 1954). The negative feeling against the out-group are found to increase even more when this out-group tries to interfere in the in-group's affairs, behavior or norms and standards. Because it poses an actual threat to the groups identity (Esses, Haddock & Zanna, 1993).

Another factor that can increase or decrease the amount of perceived threat is the power dynamics between the groups. According to Stephan, Ibarra & Morrison (2009) low power groups feel more threatened by of high power groups, and vice versa high-power groups usually experience less threat from low-power groups. This has been proven in multiple studies, one example of this it the relationship between white and indigenous Canadians, where indigenous Canadians felt more threatened by whites then the other way around (Korenblum & Stephan, 2001). An interesting addition to this research is that, when high power groups feel threatened, their reaction will be more intense than when low-power groups are threatened. This probably has to do with the fact that they have more power that they can activate case of threat and because the high-power group has more to lose than the lower group.

Intergroup threat theory focusses especially on treat as having an influence on identity as seen from an individual. Other studies found more factors that can influence threat perception between groups, both in a positive and negative way. People who indicate that their group membership is an important part of their individual identity are more likely to find other groups threatening. This has to do with the finding that they encounter other groups in a cautious manner. The individuals are more likely to observe (threatening) group differences because they are more focused on finding these, this self-fulfilling prophesy maintains the believe that the in-group group is better and so continues reinforcing the existing stereotypes (Renfro & Stephan, 2016). This means that the theory, to a certain extend is round, which in this context means that perceived threat leads to bias in how a group is viewed, which on its turn can lead to more perceived threat etc. etc.

1.2.2 Rally around the flag

As the above-mentioned models were mostly abstract theories and descriptions of the behavior of groups and individuals in relation to each other, the upcoming part the focus will be on research derived from observations on whole nations. One famous observed relation between threat perception and public support, identity and more, is called the "Rally Round the Flag Effect". (RRF). The effect was first observed by political scientist John Mueller (1970) during the cold war. In his study on the RRF he described the three conditions needed for this effect to happen: "Is international", "Involves the United States and the President", "Specific, dramatic and sharply focused".

As a result of these factors, shortly after an increase is visible in the popularity, approval rating, positive attitudes towards the president and nation. In addition, patriotism and identification with the country and the president are significantly boosted. This usually goes along with a silenced opposition which gives less critique on law proposals. In America for example Congress is said to ease its role in the process of checks and balances. This together with the increased input legitimacy gives the president power to make radical decisions (Mueller, 1970; Baker & O'Neill, 2001; Hetherington & Nelson, 2003).

The effect has also been described as being used in a different manner, named diversionary foreign policy. This means that in times where there is a big incentive for the president to be popular, there is an incentive to create a conflict in order to gain support. This can happen when the president wants to pass a law which would usually be controversial. By rallying around the flag opposition decreases where normally there would be more critique (Baker & O'Neill, 2001; Hetherington & Nelson, 2003).

Another accusation of using diversionary foreign policy is given at the address of president Putin of Russia. During the annexation of Crimea, behavior was observed which led to a distraction of the Russian public from internal problems. The event also led to an increase in popularity and support for the president. Results on the countries internal status included an increase patriotism and reinforcement of national identity (Yudina, 2015).

Other researchers also found unusual levels of rising popularity against "*the background of a large-scale economic and political crisis in Russia*". It was seen as very unusual because the country's economic and political situation was getting worse (Kazun, 2016). In order to find an explanation for this the rally around the flag effect was used. Researchers found that this partly explained what happened after the Russian annexation of Crimea but they also saw another interesting phenomenon happen. An extension of the rally 'round the flag effect, functioning through a crisis into other sectors than the traditional conflict sector. Framing in the media led the public to believe that not only the countries involved in the Crimea conflict were viewed as enemies, but also the countries that put economic sanctions on Russia after the Crimean conflict. This created a very strong us versus them response, in which national identity was reinforced (Kazun, 2016).

Research by Teper (2015) even finds that the conflict in Crimea caused a shift in the definition of Russian identity. The in-group characteristics shifted, from being inhabitant of the Russian state, to one where state and nation must coincide. This frame puts more emphasis on the ethnic aspects of a national identity. Other theories also prove this effect, this is properly summarized by Feinstein as: "*international crises activate the nationalistic schema and bring it to the fore of people's cognition, thereby fostering a sense of "groupness" (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004)*" (in Feinstein, 2010).

1.2.3 Elites' identity and common threat

A research on the relation of threat and identity in a European context was done in 2009 by Matonyte & Morkevicius. The researchers studied amounts and type of threats as perceived by national elites from European countries in order to define a relation with identity. They focused on the countries elite because they argue that a shift in the elite's perception can be a leading factor for the change of the public's perception. They emphasize that for formation of a common European identity, it is important to have common perceived threats and a shared idea of 'the other'. The researchers studied Turkey, USA and Russia, who, although all not open enemies, can be perceived as external threats on different fields (Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2009).

During the questionnaire the countries were portrayed not so much in a specific way of potential war enemies but more as "the other" which can be important for European identification. The respondents indicated that Russia was perceived as the biggest threat to internal European coherence because of the interference in the European Union's affairs. The USA were not explicitly viewed as an external threat, although some respondents stated that the *"Close relation between some EU countries and the United States are presented as threatening EU cohesion"* (Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2009).

The article concludes with the founding that threat perceptions among different national elites differ from each other. If the hypothesis that identities are (partly) driven by common perception of threats and out-group is followed, the conclusion is that there is no coherent identity among European elites. The researchers do however give the note that identities are very fluid, context bound and constantly changing based on the policy topic. Together with the fact that the measurement only included three variables (countries) this cannot cover enough about the whole view of national elites. Therefor they recommend more research must be done on this topic (Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2009).

1.2.4 Threat in Europe

In previously described sources there is a clear conclusion that threat has an influence on groups. Often it strengthens opinions and boundaries which can increase the differences between groups. Because of this, identities can be reinforced, which again can lead to stronger negative stereotyping making the effect to a certain extend 'round' (Renfro & Stephan, 2016). In a European context the specific effects of external European threat perception in relation to European identity has not been studied yet. But threat perception among European countries has been studied by McLaren (2002).

By using a Eurobarometer survey, McLaren tried to see if general hostility against other cultures could predict attitudes against European integration. He states that countries within Europe could be seen as a threat by inhabitants of another country. In the study he found the negative relationship between threat perception from within the EU and support for EU, for the reason that *"people who claim to be disturbed by other nationalities and by other races tend to be more hostile toward the EU than those who claim to be not disturbed by other nationalities and races,"* (McLaren, 2002).

Not only McLaren's research, but also multiple others find that attitudes towards the EU are not always positive. On the first impression these results might not look very positive for the emergence of a European identity but LSE researcher Michael Bruter (2008) proposes a different view on this. He argues that studies on European identity and Euroscepticism are not always properly measured. And although Euroscepticism is a problem for the EU, it does not per se mean that European identity is decreasing. On the contrary, Bruter (2008) explains that these different trends can go hand in hand because they can be explained by the trend that European citizens become more involved and concerned about the EU. The increase in attachment increases concerns which leads to being more citizens critical of the Union while at the same time being more attached.

2. Research question

2.1 Research question

Since the introduction of the concept identity in science it has been a contested subject. Some researchers even say it is to diffuse and dependent on time and context to properly use as a variable. Others claim that identity has lost its value because of the characteristics of the (post/late) modern times. Despite the critiques around the concept there has been popularity boost leading to an increasing amount of identity research in many disciplines. Political scientist for example, saw the function of including the variable of identity in their studies. It is commonly used to explain complex political behaviors like phenomenon of identity politics or to investigate national identities in relation to politics.

A relative new and emerging concept in this field is the concept of European identity. Just as with identity there is a lot of discussion in the scientific and non-scientific communities about the definitions of European identity. Scientist and policymakers argue about its history, current formation, predictors, indicators and many more. Despite the many conflicting opinions and a lot of research is being done, leading to a lot of information available. We know for example that it is emerging and that the level of 'self-perceived European identity' across Europe is a 7.09 out of 10, and that "even in Europe's most Eurosceptical countries, a majority of citizens feel European. For instance, in the UK, 55.2% of Britons and 68% of Northern Irishmen have an identity score of 5 out of 10 or above" (Bruter, 2012).

Supporters of the paradigm of Constructivist see these numbers as results of the process of active identity building, which is among others, performed by European commission through their identity promoting projects (European Commission, 2012). But there are other streams in the social sciences that explain that the formation of common identity as a multi factor process. Social Identity Theory and Integrated Threat Theory for example, attribute a great role to external factors as creators and amplifiers of common identity. The founding of this have afterwards been proven in many context and on different levels from small groups to entire federal states (Feinstein, 2010; Kazun, 2016; Stephan, Ibarra, Morrison, 2009)

The previously described studies are very well-grounded but there still are a lot of discussions, different paradigms, conflicting literature and vagueness around the subject of threat in European context (Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2009). That is why this research will focus on finding more information about the relation between threat and identity in a European context. This study does not pretend to end the debate, but it does aim to produce more information around the topic which might eventually lead a more clarified view on how these theories apply to European identity. In order to reach this goal, the research question in this study will be: *"To which extend is there a relation between Perceived External Threat and European Identity in the Netherlands?"*.

When formulating the main research question the choice was made to use the broad concept of external threat because it is one of the first in its kind and this concept can include many things. In this study, four variables that can be perceived as threats have been selected on the basis of literature. All have specific arguments to be there and all are external to the European Union. By measuring the variables individually, it is possible to study the link between perceived threat and European identity. The four predicting variables that are included are: Russia, the United States of America, China and the Climate. Of which each is to be accompanied by one sub question.

2.1.1 Sub question one: The Russian Federation

The relation between perceived threat from Russia and European identity will be studied by answering the sub question: *"To which extend is there a relation between perceived threat from the Russian Federation and European Identity in the Netherlands"*. The Russian Federation has been chosen as a variable because this has been proven to be an important factor in earlier studies. Matonyte & Morkevicuis (2009) for example write that: *The respondents indicated that Russia was perceived as the biggest threat to internal European coherence because of the interference in the European Union's affairs"*.

Another argument for this choice was is the recent developments in the relationship between Russia and Europe. And because this might be a factor that can influence European citizens' opinion and feelings of identification. Especially the field of international relations

between the Netherlands and Russia has experienced a lot of recent developments. First there is the MH17 case, where Russia refuses to give full cooperation (Volkskrant, 29-05-2018). Then the invasion of Crimea which led to a negative reaction from Dutch and European media. In addition, it led to all EU governments adoption of UN Resolution 68/262. Which means that they recognize the territorial integrity of Ukraine and do not recognize the referendum which legitimated the decision to join Russia (UN Resolution 68/262. 68st session, 80st sitting). The most recent controversy was sparked with the poisoning of the former spy Sergei Skripal which was broadly reported in the media.

These factors (among others) have led to consequences in Dutch reports on Russia. Multiple studies find that media reports on Russia are mostly negative and sometimes stereotyping, they are speaking of a negative overall discourse. Stereotyping happened mostly on state level (authoritarian regime, corruption, or Russia as unreliable energy partner), and on individual level (Russian culture or church) (Hendrikx, 2014; Koopmans, 2015; Van Wijk-Wouters, 2014).

The development in the relations between the Europe and Russia did not only have effects in the media, but also on state level. In 2018 there has been an official message from the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security that they possess knowledge that Russian State funded hackers try to breach networks and ICT throughout Europe. The ministry warns governments and individuals to be careful and keep their software updated (NCSC, 2018). In addition to this the president of the Dutch Military Intelligence and Safety Service, general major Otto Eichelsheim explained during a presentation of the yearly safety report that "Russia after terrorism biggest threat to the Netherlands" (NU.nl, 24-04-2018). This has to do with the increased threat from Russia concerning digital attacks and secret interference (NOS, 04-04-2017).

According to Soroka (2003) media has an influence on people's perception of international relations. In the case of Russia, the media does not only have a negative overall discourse but there also seems to be stereotyping. When linked Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Threat Theory, stereotyping plays an important role in creating and maintaining distinction between groups, which defines terms of 'us and them' (Ybarra et al, 2009; Esses et

al, 1993; Stangor et al, 1996). Especially when noted that the stereotyping happens also on cultural grounds, this may have an effect on the values and identity.

In addition to this, research shows that elites play a leading role in threat perception are also seen as promotors of ideas and "identity structures" (Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2009). In the previously described cases there was a strong message coming from national and European elites concerning this issue. If the logic of Matonyte & Morkevicius is followed than this might have an impact on threat perceptions and therefore European identity.

Beside stereotyping and the opinion of elites, interference in a group's internal affairs has been proven to have a positive effect on the creation of group boundaries and identity formation (Esses, Haddock & Zanna, 1993; Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2009). The allegations that Russia has tried to interfere in the democratic process of multiple European countries might be a good example of this. According to PEW research center 44% of Dutch respondents indicate that Russia's power and influence is a major threat to the country and in 2016 only 16% of respondents did not see Russia as not a threat at all (PEW, 2017; PEW, 2016). If the previously mentioned incidents are interpreted and linked to previously explained literature on group identity, they give indications that lead to adoption of the following, one-sided hypothesis for sub question one:

H0: There is no positive relation between perceived threat from Russia and European identity in the Netherlands.

H1: There is a positive relation between perceived threat from Russia and European identity in the Netherlands.

2.1.2 Sub question two: United States of America

The relation between perceived threat from United States and European identity will be studied by answering the second sub question: "*To which extend is there a relation between perceived threat from the United States of America and European Identity?*". The United states have been chosen as a variable because this has been done in earlier studies on a relationship between European identity and threat perception (Matoyte & Morkevicius, 2009). In a recent research

33% of respondents in the Netherlands view the Unites States' power and influence as a major threat to the country (PEW, 2016).

A second argument for this choice is coming from the recent developments in the relationship between the United States and Europe. Because these developments might be a factor that can influence European citizens' opinion and feelings of identification. The first development in this relation is the proposed introduction of tariffs and import restrictions on goods coming from the European Union. Some renowned newspapers are already speaking of "being on the brink of a trade war" or simply "a trade war" (Guardian, 31-05-2018; Washington Post, 30-05-2018). As previously described by Feinstein "*international crises activate the nationalistic schema and bring it to the fore of people's cognition, thereby fostering a sense of "groupness" (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004)*" (in Feinstein, 2010).

Now the introduction of trade barriers in itself might not be an international crisis but the relation is also supported by similar findings in the Social Identity Theory, which sees "*situations of competition as a major trigger for identification with the ingroup (Brewer, Weber, and Carini 1995)*" (In Feinstein, 2010). As a result, this competition "*tends to increase the salience of national identities, leading individuals to perceive reality through a nationalist schema.*" (Feinstein, 2010). As the economic situation and the protection of jobs by protectionism is a competitive situation by nature. The introduction of trade barriers might emphasize this and have effects on views and opinions.

Another argument for including the USA is the recent retreat of the USA out of the Iran deal. This move resulted in a strong negative reaction of Europe, for example from the president of the European Council Donald Tusk who said quotes like: "*with friends like this, who needs enemies*", (Independent, 16-05-2018). This study does not try to prove that this creates some rally 'round the flag effect as a result of the "trade war". Nor does it try to find a similarity between effect that have seen before in Russia, or America where national identity was boosted (Kazun, 2016; Mueller, 1970). And although previously, the USA "*were not explicitly viewed as an external threat*" (Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2009) the recent tensions received a lot of media attention and may be part of a bigger phenomenon. The examples are included because they show changes in the relation between the US and the EU. This is something that

might be interesting for the development of European identity. The above stated information, seen in the light of, and linked with the earlier described theories makes this study adopt the following one-sided hypothesis for sub question one:

H0: There is no positive relation between perceived threat from the United States of America and European identity in the Netherlands.

H1: There is a positive relation between perceived threat from the United States of America and European identity in the Netherlands.

2.1.3 Sub question three: China

The relation between perceived threat from United States and European identity will be studied by answering the third sub question: *"To which extend is there a relation between perceived threat from the United States of America and European Identity?"*. During a study in 2017 73% of the interviewed people in the Netherlands indicated that they viewed China forming some kind of threat (major or minor) (PEW, 2017) although only 19% viewed them as a major threat, which makes it less than for example from Russia or the Climate.

The research does not exactly show why and on what aspects people are afraid of China but other studies that the rise of China as a global super power can threaten the balance of power, which on itself can be experienced by people as threatening (Stein, 2013). If this is true than it might be related to an increase of European identity because international instability and threatening situations are shown to be related to in-group favoritism and strengthened group identity *(Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; Feinstein, 2010).*

This factor has been included for the same reason as the previous variables. And especially because the economic rise of China or the cheap labor can be seen by people as a threat to their personal or group stability. It might also be that people see the recent activity of China as an interference in internal affairs because of the increasing influence in the world, the buying of European ports, building of roads and other factors.

It is largely unknown why people find China threatening but research does provide us with the data that people are experiencing a small form of threat. If this threat follows

intergroup literature, it might cause an increase in European identity, but on the other side the percentages threats perceived by China are much smaller than those for America, Russia or the Climate (PEW, 2016). Because there are many uncertainties around this subject the following neutral hypothesis has been formulated.

H0: There is no relation between perceived threat from China and European identity in the Netherlands.

H1: There is a relation between perceived threat from China and European identity in the Netherlands

2.1.4 Sub question four: The Climate

The relation between perceived threat from the environment and European identity will be studied by answering the second sub question: "*To which extend is there a relation between perceived threat from the environment and European Identity?*". First of all, this variable is included because it can be seen as a common threat, it is of course not only a threat for the European union but for everyone. Within this frame however, the European Union has shown a strong leading role in the mitigation of climate problems (Boydell, 2009). In addition to this, scientific research provides this study with other important clues for a possible relationship between perceived threat by the environment and European identity.

First there is the mention that people whose concern are taken into account by European governance are more likely to identify with the "remote political community" of Europe (Duchesne, 2008). As a specific example, the environment is mentioned here, stating that people who feel that climate change is a problem can show more identification with the European Union because the Union approaches their concerns. A positive factor in this theory is the fact that Europe has shown a strong leading role in the mitigation of the climate problem (Boydell, 2009).

In addition to this Boydell (2009) also claims that Europe's climate approach has an influence on the external identity of Europe. With external identity he does means the way outside-EU actors view EU. This can have an influence on the strength European identity because if others will view a group to be a group, that individuals in the group are more likely to

behave and adopt behavior and identity according to the expected behaviors of this group. Alexander Wendt describes very detailed how this process can happen on an international level (Boydell, 2009; Wendt 1999; Wendt, 1994).

Hooghe, Marks & Wilson (2002) also find a relation that might be relevant for predicting the effect of perceived threat from climate change on European identity. They propose a new division of the European parties in the categories of GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) and TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalism). The researchers argue that TAN parties are more likely to have nationalistic and traditional ideas. As an example of GAL parties' specific goals, she mentions environmental regulation. People who are more concerned about climate change might be more likely to fall into the GAL corner. Since GAL is linked with less focus on the nation state and nationalism they might be also experience a larger degree of European identity because decreased levels of national identity can be linked to increased level of international identification (Arelie, 2012; Henderson & Ewen, 2005).

Research by Duchesne (2008) also shows that **"*the impact education has on the propensity of individuals to identify with a remote political community suggests that as highly educated people, those of the higher socio-economic classes, are more likely to identify with a post-national narrative of Europe"*. Not only are education levels linked to higher levels of identification with a post-national identity, they are also found to be linked with perceptions and concerns about climate change (Clary & Rhead, 2013). Perceptions of climate change and European identity seen to have a many common factors.

Naturally the previously described case does not provide direct proof of a relation between perceived threat from climate change and European identity. But the combination of earlier described studies on environment, the EU and identity give enough clues to build a case for a positive hypothesis. That is why, when answering the fourth sub question, the following one-sided hypothesis will be used.

H0: There is no positive relation between perceived threat from the environment and European identity.

H1: There is a positive relation between perceived threat from the environment and European identity.

2.2 Scientific relevance

Where in a lot of studies on identity there is a focus on defining identity, this research focusses not so much on defining the concept of identity but takes it as a variable which people can indicate themselves (self-perceived European identity). Identity, and especially the relatively new concept of European identity is a concept which the scientific community has not explained totally. Although some things are already known, for example relations between European identity and mobility of citizens (travelers or migrants), income, gender and education, a big part of the factors creating European identity are still unknown (Kaina et al. 2016).

This research will try to define other factors that can have an influence on European identity. From external threat for example is known that it should have an influence on identity, as has been shown in many theories (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al. 2002; Tausch, et al., 2007; Ybarra & Stephen, 2009). But how these effects work out the context of European identity and which perceived threats are responsible for creating differences in identity are still partly unknown or sometimes conflicting that is why more research on this topic is required (Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2009).

The interdisciplinary approach is another factor that makes this study special. Not only is the theoretical framework made up of diverse range of literature on European identity. Also, the approach and the addition of recent geopolitical events can be a valuable addition. By including some of variables that are given by previous studies and combining these with topics that have had a lot of attention lately, this study is unique.

Something that most academic articles agree on is that (European) identity is a difficult concept to cover. This has in combination with the fluidity of the modern (some scholars might argue postmodern or late-modern) world (Bauman, 2000) makes identity more fluid than it was before. Not only identity is a fast-changing subject, also threats are fluid. Because of the nature of international politics subjects that can be seen as a threat on year can be perceived in another way the next year. That is why an up-to-date and adequate study on this topic is always relevant.

2.3 Societal relevance

Knowledge about European identity is always relevant. Especially when looking at the important role the Europe Union plays as an economic and political factor in the world nowadays. More knowledge about the European identity is always desirable because some form of positive identification with Europe is essential for the long-term success of this European project. And although the Commission is actively persuing this, a proper positive European identification for all citizens has yet been imperfectly realized (European Commission, 2012).

The knowledge that might arise after this study might be useful for policy makers because more knowledge about the target group can increase the effectiveness of policy (Van de Graaf et al., 2001). In addition, the Netherlands can be seen as a test case for the rest of the European Union. If results that emerge from this study are interesting enough, it might give an indication to study more countries of Europe in order to find how the effects function throughout the rest of Europe.

3.   Methodology

3.1 Strategy

In this study, with research question: "*To which extend is there a relation between Perceived External Threats and European Identity in the Netherlands?",* the choice has been made to use a quantitative strategy. This has to do with the previous studies on the topic of identity and European identities of which many have a quantitative approach. The trend in quantitative research on this topic is showing that this is a valid and proper way to study the subject (Bebic, Erakovic & Vuckovic, 2017). In addition to studies on identity, also many studies in the field of threat perception have been measured and studied using quantitative strategies.

On the other hand, the choice for a quantitative approach has been made because the research question asks for a relation between independent and dependent variables. A study

where dimension and variables are quantified gives clear insights in which predictors will show effects. The fact that each independent predictor will get its own scores on regression coefficients, significance etc. makes it possible to make a comparison between the several effects. This can be used to give detailed insight in specific relations. The quantitative approach gives an objective tool to compare the predictors among themselves and see which predictor has a bigger explanatory value.

In addition to this, previous research shows that many of the dimensions often relate with each other. Not only the studied concepts can influence the effect but also many other social variables must be accounted for. That is why, in this research there will be a check for commonly known predictors of group differences in social sciences. This will happen by including variables of age, education and gender. By checking for these effects quantitative analysis can provide the study with more 'pure' effects.

The above standing is linked with the conviction that a positivist epistemological approach is best when studying this topic. Because these variables have been proven to be measurable to an extend in which the quantitative research creates valuable results (Bryman, 2008). The ontological stream that is assumed in this study is objectivism and is supported by literature on the topic (Abdelal et al, 2001). Finally, this study can be seen as deductive. Grand theories and previously acquired research on group identity and threat are tested to see how they perform on European identity. After the research cycle has been finished, this study might add to the existing theories and literature on the subject. Meaning that the study also has an inductive aspect (Bryman, 2008).

3.2 Design and Instrument

The study will make use of raw collected data that is gathered in a cross-sectional research design. A cross-section design means that the quantified data of participants will be collected in one moment of time (Bryman, 2008). The data on the measured variables can be set off against each other in order to find patterns or trends. Just like in many previously done studies on European identity, real world data will be used to analyze the possible relation. In the specific

case of this study, data about perceived threats and European identity will be gathered and tested for correlations between variances using an Ordinary Least Squares Regression.

To test the hypothesizes, data will be gathered using structured questionnaires. The first reason to use a questionnaire is because it is recommended to measure identity and its intensity according to articles specific on the measurement of identity (Abdelal etc al. 2001). Besides that, questionnaires are an often-used instrument in measuring European identity. Many previous studies used this research method before to study European identity or threat perception (Bruter, 2005; Ybarra, 2009).

Another positive aspect of using a questionnaire is that it provides a practical and standardized way to get information about the variables. Questionnaires increase the time efficiency of data gathering because multiple questionnaires can be answered at the same time. In addition, it minimized the influence of the researcher, increasing objectivity of the overall study. The third benefit of questionnaires is the avoidance of socially-desirable answering. Furthermore the questionnaire design will be saved and therefor can be used again in future research which promotes homogeneity in the academic community. This also makes it possible to repeat the research which increases the reliability and validity of the study.

When designing the questionnaire some important aspects have been taken into account. First the questionnaire is mainly based on literature and earlier used questionnaires that have been proven to be reliable, as will be described in the operationalization. Second the questionnaire will include some contra indicative questions to reduce acquiescent bias. In this way respondents are not steered into a direction and in addition it functions as a check for coherency in answers (Bryman, 2008). The third adjustment comes from literature specifically on designing questionnaires about European identity. The literature provides this research with the knowledge that: *"When respondents are asked about European identity immediately after questions about the EU, then European identity appears rarer overall, and especially weak among anti-EU respondents. However, if the European identity measures are located prior to, or a long way after, the EU questions, then European identity is relatively strong, even among respondents who are EU-sceptic, anti-immigration and supporters of extreme right parties."*

(Johns, 2008). To prevent unwanted answering bias, the statements about identity and threat will be randomly spread. To measure the concepts there will be made use of a five points Likert-scale, which has been used before in research to threat and identity and gives the possibility to later execute regression analysis on the data (Bryman, 2008; Field, 2013).

3.3 Population and sampling

The research population this study tries to cover is the Dutch population from over 18 years who live in the Netherlands and can speak Dutch. The sample design that will be aimed for is random sampling (probability). In order to achieve this several random cities, spread out over the country will be visited. There will be tried to reach small cities as well as big cities which will be located in the centre as well as the more rural areas in order to get a good view of the country. An effort will also be made to properly sample other social factors like gender, income class and age as random as possible. In order to create insight in the situation in the Netherlands this study will aim to analyze results of N=400 respondents which will have a confidence level of 4.9 (Bryman, 2008).

3.4 Operationalization

3.4.1 European identity

By going deeper into the definitions of the concepts, the indicators that make up the concept can be exposed. This is required in order to convert the difficult concept into measurable items and questions. The decomposition of the concepts is made possible by using previously applied methods. Instead of reinventing the wheel the choice here has been made to use operationalizations of concepts that have been used before and have been proven in the field of research. This gives more credibility to the research and promotes homogeneity and continuity in the scientific community. In addition, using previously tested operationalization makes it easier to compare the research with other studies or repeat it.

That is why the choice has been made to measure the concept of European identity using one of the grand theories around the concept of identity, named the Social Identity

Theory. This theory that is also recommended to be implemented when studying European identity (Ongur, 2010). Turner and Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (1979) distinguishes three cognitive states of identification. Known as Social Categorization, Social Identification and Social Comparison. Social categorization here means that simply someone is able to recognize different groups. This has not yet anything to do with involvement but simply categorizing. For example, an individual is able to recognize differences into where a person or multiple persons belong to, this can be a football team, a country or a job depending on the context.

Social identification goes a little deeper, in this stage a person not only acknowledges the existence of groups but can also categorize oneself in a group. This means a person knows that it is part of a football team, a country or a job. In this phase one also starts to identify more with the in-group more overtly. The individual sees many similarities between the group and oneself and views norms and values as compatible with their own norms and values. The group identity becomes a part of the individual identity.

After an individual has categorized groups and defined to which they belong, they start rating these groups in a stage called; the social comparison stage. Their perception of self and their individual identity is now closely linked to the groups perception and identity. This means that to keep one's own worth up, they must keep a positive value of the group up. This value of the group is determined in relation to other groups. Competition is assumed, in order to keep these views positive out-groups can be discriminated and stereotyped and there will be positive views towards the in-group.

3.4.2 Threat perceptions

The broad concept of threat will be split up in four dimensions, which according to earlier done studies, cover the types of threat people can experience. Threat in this thesis will follow the conceptualization of a previously done study on threat in intergroup relation as used by Stephen, Ybarra & Rios (2009) that distinguish four types of threats: Realistic *group* threats; Symbolic *group* threats; Realistic *individual* threats; Symbolic *individual* threats.

Because in some cases it is better to follow the existing definitions the concept, the definition used in this research follow exactly those as proposed in the study by Stephen,

Ybarra & Rios (2009) meaning that: "*We refer to concerns about the integrity or validity of the ingroup's meaning system as symbolic threats. The essence of symbolic threat is that the ingroup's system of meaning could be challenged, changed, supplanted, or destroyed by the outgroup. The mere existence of outgroups with different value systems is a potential challenge to the ingroup's morals, beliefs, and norms. But if the outgroup threatens to impose its system of values on the ingroup, it faces the possible destruction of its system of meaning*" (Stephen, Ybarra & Rios, 2009).

We refer to concerns about physical harm or a loss of power and/or resources as realistic threats. Realistic threats include the threat of warfare, terrorism, genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture, aggression, starvation, bullying, discrimination, harassment; loss of political power (e.g., disenfranchisement), economic power, territory, or valued resources (e.g., natural resources); theft, destruction of property, exposure to infectious diseases, and pollution (e.g., across borders), and lack of access to education, health care or the necessities of life (Stephen, Ybarra & Rios, 2009)*.*

Realistic group threats are threats to the ingroup's power, resources, and general welfare. Symbolic group threats are threats to the ingroup's religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview. Realistic individual threats concern threats of actual physical or material harm to an individual group member such as pain or death, as well as economic loss, deprivation of valued resources, and threats to health or personal security. Symbolic individual threats concern loss of face or honor or undermining an individual's self-identity or self-esteem (Stephen, Ybarra & Rios, 2009)*.*

3.5 Ethical accountability

Whenever doing social scientific research the researcher must always be on the watch out for potential ethical issues. That is why, this research has been designed to be as open and clear as possible towards potential respondents. Firstly, this happens by making clear to the respondents that all data will be gathered and processed anonymously. This is also intended so that that they will not experience any negative consequences from participation in the research. Secondly before the beginning of the questionnaire there will be a little introduction

so people know what is being studied and that their data is not being used for anything other than this research.

This study aims to gather a sample from respondents that over 18, meaning all respondents are able to give legal consent. People are told that they are free to quit the questionnaire whenever they want and in case respondents have concerns or questions at the moment they are filling in the questionnaire, they can ask the researcher. If the respondents have questions or concern afterwards they can come in contact through email because the email address is added to the questionnaire.

3.6 Pilot

To test the research instrument, a test group filled in the questionnaire and gave feedback that has been used to optimize the final questionnaire. The first remark was that some people found it hard to focus and properly answer the different question on threat because the sentences looked alike. To solve this problem some changes were made to emphasize the differences between questions. In the updated version of the questionnaire important differences are now in italics so that people who fill in the questionnaire will notice the difference fast. Furthermore, one person from the test group forgot to fill in the last page. In response the preface has been changed, now explicitly stating that the questionnaire is double sided.

4. Results

4.1 Process description

Spread over the days between May 20 and May 30 data has been gathered throughout the Netherlands. The goal to get decent a sample including the different regions of the Netherlands has been accomplished and a properly spread geographical representation has been acquired (differing rural, urban, neighborhoods etc.). Spread over the Northern region, in the cities of Harlingen, Franeker and Groningen respondents have been found. For the middle region (Randstad) respondents from the cities of Haarlem, Utrecht and Amsterdam added data to the

collection. For the southern region the cities of Breda and 's-Hertogenbosch have been sampled.

The final total amount of participants is N=264. This number is lower than originally intended, something which had to do with the amount of days it took to gather data and the underestimation of the travel time which took a big part of some of the days that were originally planned to gather data. Nevertheless, the sample still gives an insight the Netherlands. N=264 is a proper sample size, especially if it is compared to other studies on European identity. For example, a standard study, done by Eurobarometer on Germany includes N=1000 respondents (Standard Eurobarometer 88, 2017). Germany is more than four times as big as the Netherlands (Population wise), when looking at this, N=264 can be seen as proportionally. So, despite not reaching the initial amount, the gathered data should still give valuable view of the Netherlands.

4.2 Data preparation

4.2.1 Dimension reduction techniques

The first step when preparing the data for analysis is entering the data in the statistical computer program SPSS and reversing the items that were stated in a negative way (contra indicative statements) so that all items display the right value. After this a Factor Analysis has been executed, in which the first step was to execute a Direct Oblimin test to determine whether factor reduction techniques might be useful and meaningful.

On the Kaiser, Meyer, Olkin test data scored KMO= 0.724, this is successful because a score above .7 is considered good and useful (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett's test of Sphericity gave a significance of Sig=0.001. All values give good indications to continue the Factor Analysis (Annex 6.3.1). None of the values in the Component Correlation Matrix are bigger than 0.32 which means that the second dimension-reduction technique can be adopted (Annex 6.3.2; Field, 2013).

A score of <0.32 means that varimax is allowed to be applied as second dimension-reduction technique. When analyzing the Rotate Component Matrix, the test revealed six variables with an eigenvalue bigger that one (the Kaiser criterium) (Field, 2013). The dimensions

found using this dimension-reduction technique should together explain 61.133% of the variance (Annex 6.3.3). The first five values correspond fully with the values as made up before and have been construed out of the theory, that is why they will be preserved.

The sixth factor gives a small reason to reconsider the previously constructed variables. Nevertheless, the choice has been made not to adopt this new variable for two reasons. First, theory and logical deduction do not give proper explanations for the sixth variable because the items seem random and not coherent. There is no obvious new underlying category visible when combining the three items and the indicators that should make up the new variable are already a part of other factors. Second, the previously proposed variables are steadily grounded in literature. These variables have been tested in relevant studies as has described in the theoretical framework. That is why it has been decided to continue with the previously drafter variables.

4.2.2 Cronbach's alfa

Now it has been concluded that the previously constructed variables are valid to use it is key to check the internal consistency of the constructed scale using Cronbach's alfa. Cronbach's alfa is also sometimes called the true score variance because it explains the internally consistent reliable variance. Although there is still a debate going on whether which value can be fully determined to be needed for a valid scale, recommendation in the most frequently cited literature states that a score above α = 0.7 is best. Although this is not a hard line because evidence for a constructed variable grounded in literature is does also create validity and reliability (Field, 2013).

With a value of Cronbach's α = .683 the four items making up the variable of perceptions on Russia are consistent and valid to use (Annex 6.3.5). The same counts for the four items that form perceptions on the USA, together scoring Cronbach's α= .754 (Annex 6.3.6). The four items making up perceptions of China are also fit to make up the variable with a score of Cronbach's α= .678 (Annex 6.3.7). Cronbach's α score for the three combined items making up Climate Change perceptions is α=.792 which means that they can be combined into a variable (Annex 6.3.8). The five items measuring European identity have also proven to be

consistent and can continue making up the variable because of the Cronbach's α score of .701 (Annex 6.3.9).

4.2.3 Assumptions and conditions

When checking the conditions for Multiple Regression (Ordinary Least Squares), the first check is for outliers. When testing Cook's Distance, the formula gives a maximum value of Cook's D=.135, with N=264. This gives a small indication for possible influential outliers but not per se enough to remove cases (Stevens, 2002; Annex 6.3.10). Influential cases and outliers have also been checked manually and it has been concluded that there were no major violations influencing the total amount of data, so all data will be kept and used for the regression.

When checking for multicollinearity, one problem was diagnosed for the dummies making up the controlling variable Gender because they extremely exceeded the recommended VIF value of VIF<5 (Annex 6.3.11: Ringle et al., 2015). As a response this control variable has been removed from the model. Further analysis of the variables did not find any other multicollinearity problems because none of the values exceeded VIF>5 or had a tolerance smaller than 0.2 (Annex 6.3.11)

There was no clear sign of a curve in the scatter plot, which indicates that linearity of the data is not extremely non-normally distributed. In addition, homoscedasticity also does not seem to be a problem because there is no clear triangle pattern visible in the plot (Annex 6.3.12; Field, 2013). Last, the Durbin-Watson test, testing for uncorrelated errors, has been executed. The scores of the gathered data on this the test are DW=2.052, which means that, given the criteria of DW >1 or <3, all data can be used to continue with the test (Annex 6.3.13; Field, 2009)

4.3 Descriptive statistics

The dataset consists of 264 respondents of which 156 women (59.1%), 104 men (39.4%) and four respondents (1.5%) who preferred to not reveal their gender or did not identify with the given dichotomic categories. Eight people of the group only finished primary school (3%), 61 last finished high school (23.1%), 57 finished MBO (translates into; Secondary Vocational

education) (21.6%), 86 graduated from an HBO (Higher professional education) (32.6%) and 52 respondents finished university education (19.7%). Age groups have been divided in groups of 10 years. From age 10-20, 48 respondents have been found (18.2%), from age 20-30, 81 respondents have been found (30.7%), from are 30-40, 38 respondents (14.4%), from age 40-50, 33 (12.5%) from age 50-60, 22 respondents (8.3%) from age 60-70, 21 (8%). from age 70 to 80, 17 (6.4%) and from 80-90, 4 (1.5%).

Gender

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Man	104	39.4
	Woman	156	59.1
	Prefer not to answer	4	1.5
	Total	264	100.0

Source: Own data

Education

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Primary school	8	3.0
	High School	61	23.1
	MBO	57	21.6
	HBO	86	32.6
	University	52	19.7
	Total	264	100.0

Source: Own data

Ages

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	10-20	48	18.2
	20-30	81	30.7
	30-40	38	14.4
	40-50	33	12.5
	50-60	22	8.3
	60-70	21	8.0
	70-80	17	6.4
	80-90	4	1.5
	Total	264	100.0

Source: Own data

For the variable: threat perceptions on Russia the mean was 11.670 with a standard deviation of 4.099. For the variable: threat perceptions on The United States the mean was 10.585 with a standard deviation of 4.497. For the variable: threat perceptions on China the mean was 8.9481 with a standard deviation of 4.057. For the variable: threat perceptions on the Climate the mean was 15.283 with a standard deviation of 4.668. For the variable: European identity the mean was 14.851 with a standard deviation of 3.845. All variables had a minimum score of four and a maximum score of twenty where ten is neutral.

Descriptive statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Threat Russia	.00	20.00	11.6698	4.09920
Treat USA	.00	20.00	10.5849	4.49772
Threat China	.00	20.00	8.9481	4.05728
Threat Climate	.00	20.00	15.2830	4.66847
Identity EU	.00	20.00	14.8511	3.84528

Source: own data

4.4 Regression

4.4.1 Model

Now that the requirements of the test are checked and the descriptive statistics have been analyzed the regression can be executed. A multiple regression was calculated to predict self-perceived European identity based on Perceptions of threat in The Netherlands. A significant regression was found ($F_{(9,252)} = 5.274$ $p < 0.001$ with an Adjusted R^2 of 0.128. This result can be interpreted as a low to medium effect size in social sciences (Cohen, 1992; Field, 2013).

Participants predicted score on European identity is equal to 10.520 + 0.159 (Threat perceptions on Russia) + 0.119 (Threat perceptions from the Climate) + 1.415 (University), where threat perceptions are measured from four to twenty with neutral being ten, and University is coded as 1=university, 0=non-university.

Meaning that participants self-perceived European identity increased 0.159 point for each point of perceived threat, participants self-perceived European identity increased 0.119 for each point of perceived threat from the Climate, and University alumni scored 1.415 higher than non-university alumni (Annex 6.3.14, -15 & -16).

4.4.2 Sub questions

On the basis of the regression sub question one can be answered which is: "*To which extend is there a relation between perceived threat from Russia and European Identity in the Netherlands*". For the variable Threat perceptions on the Russian federation B=0.159 (t = 2.585; df 261), p (0.010) <0.05. This means that the H0 will be rejected and the H1 will be accepted, which is: "*H1: There is a positive relation between perceived threat from Russia and European identity in the Netherlands*".

On the basis of the regression sub question two can be answered which is: "*To which extend is there a relation between perceived threat from the United States of America and European Identity in the Netherlands?*". For the variable Threat perceptions on the United States of America B=0.066 (t = 1.258; df 261), p (0.213) >0.05. This means that the H0 will not be rejected, which is: "*H0: There is no positive relation between perceived threat from the United States of America and European identity in the Netherlands*".

On the basis of the regression sub question three can be answered which is: "*To which extend is there a relation between perceived threat from China and European Identity in the Netherlands?*". For the variable Threat perceptions on China B=0.002 (t = 0.38; df 261), p (0.970)>0.05. This means that the H0 will not be rejected, which is: "*H0: There is no positive relation between perceived threat from China and European identity in the Netherlands*".

On the basis of the regression sub question four can be answered which is: "*To which extend is there a relation between perceived threat from the Climate and European Identity in the Netherlands?*". For the variable Threat perceptions on the Climate B=0.119 (t = 2.320; df 261), p (0.021) <0.05. This means that the H0 will be rejected and the H1 will be accepted, which is: "*H1: There is a positive relation between perceived threat from the Climate and European identity in The Netherlands*".

Coefficients

	B	t	Sig
(Constant)*	10.520	9.545	.000*
Threat Russia*	.159	2.585	.010*
Threat USA	.066	1.248	.213
Threat China	.002	.038	.970
Threat Climate*	.119	2.320	.021*
Primary School	-2.539	-1.730	.085
Middle School	-.810	-1.312	.191
MBO	-.161	-.257	.797
University*	1.415	2.223	.027*
Age	-.018	-.141	.888

Dependent variable: European identity

* = Significant on 0.05 level

Source: own data

This study investigates a possible relation between threat perceptions and European identity. When the variable 'Climate perceptions' and the control variable 'university' were both found to be significant a second model has been designed. The significant results of both factors, in combination with the literature, give indication for a possible mediation or interaction effect. A second model including the interaction was created but did however not give any significant results (Annex 6.3.17). Because there was no previously made hypothesis about this relation, and because of the non-significant result, there will be no further elaboration on this.

Conclusion

5.1 Conclusion

In the recent decades a big amount of research has been done on the topic of identity, and although it is perceived as a difficult concept to work with, the research has not been

unrewarded. A lot of relations, predictors, consequences and aspects of identity have been found. One relatively new development in the field is the increase of research on a European identity.

Although an increase in research in this field is observed, many aspects about the European identity remain unexplained by previous studies. Some commonly respected theories on identity like Intergroup Threat Theory and Social Identity Theory ascribed a great role to threat as being an influencer in the formation of common identity (Pettigrew, 1999; Stephan et al., 2009; Stephen & Renfro, 2016; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This relation between perceptions of threat and identity has been proven on many different levels, ranging from small artificially created groups in an experimental setting, till real world data from entire federal states (Kazun, 2016; Feinstein, 2010; Teper, 2015; Mueller, 1970).

That is why, in this research the goal has been to find out if this theory is applicable in a European context. To study this, four variables, inspired by literature and logical deduction, have been distinguished and tested for their effects using quantitative regression. The variables, Russia, USA, China and the Climate have been tested on their influence on European identity using the following research question: "*To which extend is there a relation between Perceived External Threat and European Identity in the Netherlands?*".

For this study, data has been gathered through a questionnaire done in the Netherlands. The results add to the already existing scientific literature on this specific topic and case. In addition is important to gather more information about the existence and causes of European identity because some form of positive identification with Europe is essential for the long-term success of the European Project. And although the Commission is actively supporting it, a proper positive European identification has yet been imperfectly realized (European Commission, 2012).

For the first sub question, on perceived threat from Russia and European identity, a significant relation on $p < 0.05$ was found. That is why the H0 has been rejected and the following H1 has been accepted: "*H1: There is a positive relation between perceived threat from Russia and European identity in the Netherlands*". The relation was expected on the basis of multiple

theories and statistics. Previous studies showed that threat perceptions on Russia were relatively high, something that might have been created because of recent tensions between the EU and Russia, which to official warnings from governments to the citizens and strengthening an already existing negative discourse in the media (NCSC, 2018; Hendrikx, 2014; Koopmans, 2015; Van Wijk-Wouters, 2014; UN Resolution 68/262. 68st session, 80st sitting; NOS, 2017).

The relation between perceptions of threat and strengthened European identity can be explained using the Integrated Threat Theory and Social Identity Theory, which state that threats perceptions are linked to an increase in in-group favoritism. An important factor that might have contributed to this effect is the accused and perceived interference of Russia in the European Union's internal affairs (Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2009; Esses, Haddock & Zanna, 1993). For previous research already found that interference from the out-group in the in-groups internal affairs has positive effect on in-group identification (Esses, Haddock & Zanna, 1993; Stephan et al. 2009).

For the second sub question, on perceived threat from the United States of America on European identity, the following H0 was not rejected: *"H0: There is no positive relation between perceived threat from the United States of America and European identity in the Netherlands"*. One possible explanation for this non-significance is provided by the Contact hypothesis which states that contact, media, electronic contact and even imagined contact can influence stereotypes, threat perceptions and intergroup relations (Schiappa et al. 2005; Crisp & Turner, 2009; White & Abu-Rayya, 2012). Also, Hobsbawm and Anderson, see that media plays a big role in the creation of imagined communities and as a link for to intergroup relations, threat perceptions and identification.

Something that may have influenced this explanation is the process of Americanization. In which Western Europe came under the sphere of influence of America after the second World War, resulting in a society that has been highly influenced by the United States stretching from social and economic aspects to media (Hilger, 2012). Because intergroup biases, threat perceptions and identity can be influenced in many ways, contact hypothesis might

explain how the degree of Americanization played a role in the non-significant relation between threat and identity in the case of the USA

Another explanation is provided by a study that finds previous conflict to be a significant influencer for threat to function as an amplifier of identity. Although there might have been some recent tensions between the USA and the EU, they do not have a history of tension. On the contrary, the USA has for a long time been seen as one of Europe's biggest partners. This history might have mediated the effect and explain why no relation was found.

Also, the third sub question, on the relation between perceived threat from China and European identity, resulted in a non-rejected H0 *"H0: There is no positive relation between perceived threat from China and European identity in the Netherlands"*. Some of the same factors that might have had an effect on the non-significant relation between threat from the US and European identity might also explain this for China.

China was included as a variable because of the exceptional change that is has gone through in recent years. Observed that changed the role of China both economically and as a major political actor in world politics. Nevertheless, although it is seen as a special case, it was not found to be a common threat in this study, nor in previous studies, especially not compared to Russia or the climate. Yet it was an important and relevant to include this actor in the because public opinions are subject to constant change. Especially in a fast-developing and unique case like China which has shown to be able to influence the world. Conditions under which identity effects occur are not always clear. Especially in the relatively new field of European identity many aspects still require further specification.

For the fourth sub question the following H1 has been accepted: *"H1: There is a positive relation between perceived threat from the Climate and European identity in The Netherlands"*. The relation between perceived climate threat and European identity does not seem to run via the theories that were proposed to explain the other three variables. The effect does not happen though Intergroup Threat effects or Social Identity Theory but rather through other indirect relations that are based in common factors.

The first of these common factors is level of education, which is found to be linked with both concerns about the climate and European identity. This means that people who are higher educated seem to perceive the climate more as a threat, and higher levels of education are found to be linked with a higher degree of identification with the European Union. This relation is strengthened because people who are heard by the EU are more likely to identify with the EU. In this specific case people who care about the climate are heard by the EU because the Union is an important factor in fighting climate change and plays a leading role in the global approach (Dushesne 2008; Clary & Rhead, 2013; Boyell, 2009).

Another reason for the significant relation between perceived threat from the climate and increased European identity can be explained by looking at a person's position on the political spectrum. Individuals who are concerned about the climate are more likely to identify with GAL parties (Green, Alternative, Libertarian), and in return, people who identify with GAL parties are more likely be less nationalistic and traditional. Because this ideology puts less emphasis on the importance of the traditional nation, it leaves more space for a European identity which may work as a mediator for the discovered relationship (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002).

5.2 Discussion

The results found in this study correspond to a certain extend with those found in previous studies. For example, that Europeans view Russia and the Climate as the biggest threats and America and China in a lesser degree, and that these threats gave an prediction for European identity. But one must keep in mind that even though these effects are very interesting, data does not say anything on itself. It is must be critically interpreted and linked with literature. Even though literature, in this case, gives good grounds to explain the significant relation between predictors and dependent variables, the results must be interpreted with caution. For it is known that the complexity of social reality is difficult to capture, and that is why more research on this topic should be done.

One critique that can be given is regarding the sample. Although sample size has been sufficient and the sampling methods provided a good spread throughout the country the descriptive statistics show an unbalanced gender division of 39% man and 59% woman. Another aspect of this is the relatively high percentage of people under 50. Both of these slight sampling deficiencies are probably to blame on the amounts of these people that are reachable and willing to give a response in public places. Although this is always hard in social scientific research, and the study still gives valuable outcomes, good sampling stays a factor that is important for future research.

More research on this topic must be done because effects have been shown to sometimes be intertwined. Previous research found that attitudes and cognitions (like threats), are predictors of in-group strengthening (identification). But strong in-group identification is also found to explain attitudes and threat perceptions by other groups. It is interesting to go deeper into these relations and find out how this can be explained on European level. Another factor that might be interesting to include in future research on this topic is the role of media consumption. For literature gave indications that media consumption can influence perceptions on threat. At last, where this research only focused on threats to explain the intensity of identity. For future research it is interesting to take into account the various types of threat (symbolic, realistic) to study their specific effects on different dimensions of identity.

17590 WORDS

<p style="text-align:center">**6. Annex**</p>

6.1.1: operationalization scheme

Concept	Literature	Indicators (measured using a five-point Likert-scale)
European identity	- Tajfel & Turner (1979) - Ongur (2010)	-Social Categorization -Social Identification -Social Comparison
Perceived threat	- Stephan, Diaz-Loving and Duran (2000) -Stephan & Renfro (2002) -Stephan, Ybarra & Rios (2009) -Ybarra et al. (2009)	-Perceived realistic group threats -Perceived symbolic group threats -Perceived realistic individual threats -Perceived symbolic individual threats

6.2.1: questionnaire Dutch

Beste participant,

Bedankt voor je participatie in dit onderzoek! Voor je ligt een vragenlijst met 4 vragen en 20 stellingen. Ik vraag je deze volledig en naar waarheid in te vullen. The vragenlijst wordt anoniem opgehaald en zal volledig anoniem worden verwerkt.

De stellingen gaan over waargenomen dreiging en identiteit. Met deze vragenlijst probeer ik data te verzamelen over hoe identiteit wordt geconstrueerd. Dit een onderzoek dat ik doe voor mijn master scriptie.

Voor meer informatie of als je geïnteresseerd bent in de resultaten van het onderzoek, kan je met contacteren via email op: Jessebruijnzeels@hotmail.com

Je kunt nu beginnen met de (tweezijdige) vragenlijst.

1. Wat is leeftijd?

   …………………..

2. Wat is je geslacht?
   0 Man
   0 Vrouw
   0 Geen antwoord

3. Wat is je hoogste, behaalde scholingsniveau?
   0 Basisschool
   0 Middelbare school
   0 MBO
   0 HBO
   0 Universiteit

Beste participant,

Het volgende schema bestaat uit stellingen. Je kan duidelijk maken tot in hoeverre je het eens bent met de stellingen door het hokje aan te kruisen dat het dichtst bij je mening komt. Vraag gerust als er onduidelijkheden zijn.

De hokjes betekenen het volgende.

1. Volledig oneens met de stelling

2. Gedeeltelijk oneens met de stelling

3. Neutraal/ geen mening over de stelling

4. Gedeeltelijk eens met de stelling

5. Volledig eens met de stelling

Stelling	Volledig mee oneens	Deels mee oneens	Neutraal /geen mening	Deels mee eens	Volledig mee eens
In mijn opinie vorm *Rusland* een bedreiging voor de Europese Unie (bijv. economisch, politiek, door schaarsheid van goederen, cyber-attacks etc.)					
Ik zie de *Verenigde Staten* as een bedreiging voor de normen, waarden en identiteit van de Europese Unie					
Ik heb het gevoel dat *China* een bedreiging vormt voor mijn persoonlijke situatie (bijv. economisch, politiek, schaarsheid van goederen, cyber-attacks etc. etc.)					
Stelling	Volledig mee oneens	Deels oneens	Neutraal /geen mening	Deels mee eens	Volledig mee eens

Ik voel me Europees				
Ik zie *China* niet als een bedreiging voor mijn normen, waarden, geloof etc. etc.				
Ik heb het gevoel onderdeel te zijn van de Europese Unie				
In mijn opinie vormen *de Verenigde Staten* een bedreiging voor de Europese Unie (bijv. economisch, politiek, door schaarsheid, cyber-attacks etc.)				
Ik heb het gevoel dat *Klimaat Verandering* een bedreiging vorm voor mijn situatie (nu of in de toekomst)				
Ik zie *Rusland* als een bedreiging voor de normen, waarden en identiteit van de Europese Unie				
Klimaatverandering vormt een bedreiging voor de Europese Unie, nu of in de toekomst				
Ik erken de Europese Unie niet als een actor in de wereld				
Ik zie *De VS* niet als een bedreiging voor mijn normen, waarden, identiteit				

Stelling	Volledig mee oneens	Deels oneens	Neutraal /geen mening	Deels mee eens	Volledig mee eens
Ik zie *Rusland* niet als een bedreiging voor mijn normen, waarden, geloof etc. etc.					
Ik zie *klimaatverandering* als een bedreiging (nu of in de toekomst)					
Ik zie *China* als een bedreiging voor de normen, waarden en identiteit van de Europese Unie					
Ik ben *niet* trots om Europeaan te zijn					
Ik heb het gevoel dat *de Verenigde Staten* een bedreiging vormen voor mijn situatie (bijv. economisch, politiek, cyber-attacks etc.)					
In mijn opinie vormt *China* een bedreiging voor de Europese Unie (economisch, politiek, cyber attacks etc.)					
Ik heb het gevoel dat *Rusland* een bedreiging vormt voor mijn situatie (economisch, politiek, cyber-attack et)					
Europees zijn is belangrijk voor mij					

6.2.2 translated questionnaire

Dear participant,

Thank you for participation in this study. In front of you is a questionnaire with 4 questions and 20 statements. I ask you to answer these completely and in all honesty. The list will be collected anonymously and all data will be processed anonymous. You are free to stop at any time.

The statements and questions are about threat perception and identity. With this questionnaire I try to gather data in order to get insights into how identity is constructed. This is a research I do for my master thesis.

For more information or if you are interested in the results of this study, you can contact me by email on: Jessebruijnzeels@hotmail.com

You can start now start double sided the questionnaire.

1. What is your age?

   …………………..

2. What is your gender
   0 Male
   0 Female
   0   Prefer not to answer

3. Which town/village do you live?

   …………………..………………………..

4. What is your highest, finished level of schooling?
   0 Elementary school

0 High school

0 MBO

0 HBO

0 University

Dear participant,

The next scheme is made up of statements. You can make clear to what extend you agree with the statements by filling in the box that comes the closest to your opinion. Please come to the researcher if you have questions.

1. I fully disagree with the statement

2. I partly disagree with the statement

3. I feel neutral/ have no opinion on this with the statement

4. I partly agree with the statement

5. I fully agree with the statement

Statement	Fully dis-agree	Partly dis-agree	Neutral	Agree partly	Fully agree
In my opinion *Russia* poses a threat to the European Union now or in the future (economic, political, scarcity of goods, cyber-attacks etc. etc.)					
I see *the United States* as a threat to the norms, values, identity etc. of the European Union (now or in the future)					

I feel as if *China* poses a threat to my situation (economic, political, scarcity of goods, cyber-attacks, etc. etc.)					
I feel European					

Statement	Fully dis-agree	Partly dis-agree	Neutral	Agree partly	Fully agree
I do not see *China* as a threat to my identity, norms & values, beliefs, religion etc.					
I feel like I am part of the European Union					
In my opinion *the United States* pose a threat to the European Union now or in the future (economic, political, scarcity of goods, cyber-attacks etc. etc.)					
I feel as if *Climate Change* poses a threat to my situation					
I see the *Russia* as a threat to the norms, values, identity etc. of the European Union (now or in the future)					
Climate Change poses a threat to the European Union now or in the future					

Statement	Fully dis-agree	Partly dis-agree	Neutral	Agree partly	Fully agree
I do not recognize the European Union as an actor on the world					
I do not see Russia as a threat to my identity, norms & values, beliefs, religion etc.					
I do not see *the United States* as a threat to my identity, norms & values, beliefs, religion etc.					
I see *Climate Change* as a threat					
I see the *China* as a threat to the norms, values, identity etc. of the European Union (now or in the future)					
I am not proud to be European					
I feel as if Russia's poses a threat to my situation (economic, political, scarcity of goods, cyber-attacks, etc. etc.)					
I feel as if America does not pose a threat to my situation (economic, political, scarcity of goods, cyber-attacks, etc. etc.)					

In my opinion *China* poses a threat to the European Union now or in the future (economic, political, scarcity of goods, cyber-attacks etc. etc.)					
It is important for my identity to be part of Europe					

6.3.1 Outcomes Kaiser Meyer Olson & Bartlett's test of Sphericity

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.724
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	1502.558
	df	190
	Sig.	.000

6.3.2 Outcomes Principal Component Analysis: Oblimin test

Component Correlation Matrix

Component	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1.000	-.001	.170	-.148	-.182	.082
2	-.001	1.000	.122	-.229	-.164	.031
3	.170	.122	1.000	-.171	-.185	.059
4	-.148	-.229	-.171	1.000	.237	-.039
5	-.182	-.164	-.185	.237	1.000	-.086
6	.082	.031	.059	-.039	-.086	1.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

6.3.3 Outcomes Factor Analysis: Varimax Rotation

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4.406	22.032	22.032	4.406	22.032	22.032	2.433	12.165	12.165
2	1.994	9.969	32.000	1.994	9.969	32.000	2.211	11.055	23.221
3	1.782	8.911	40.912	1.782	8.911	40.912	2.208	11.039	34.260
4	1.552	7.760	48.672	1.552	7.760	48.672	2.039	10.196	44.456
5	1.338	6.689	55.361	1.338	6.689	55.361	2.024	10.120	54.576
6	1.154	5.772	61.133	1.154	5.772	61.133	1.311	6.556	61.133
7	.954	4.771	65.904						
8	.939	4.694	70.597						
9	.793	3.967	74.565						
10	.730	3.652	78.216						
11	.663	3.315	81.532						
12	.560	2.802	84.334						
13	.553	2.765	87.099						
14	.524	2.618	89.717						
15	.462	2.310	92.027						
16	.400	2.002	94.029						
17	.368	1.838	95.867						
18	.350	1.750	97.617						
19	.267	1.334	98.951						
20	.210	1.049	100.000						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

6.3.4 Rotated Component Matrix with values >0.3

Rotated Component Matrix^a

	Component					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
VSREU	.833					
VSSEU	.808					
VSRIndividueel	.748					
NewVSSymIndividueel	.540					.519
CC1		.842				
CC3		.835				
CC2		.771				
ChinaSymEU			.744			
ChinaREU			.733			
ChinaRIndividueel			.657			
NewChinaSymIndividueel			.636			
EU1				.770		
EU5				.687		
EU4New				.643		
EU2				.447		
RusSEU					.815	
RusREU					.732	
RusRIndividueel		.373			.668	
NewRusSymIndividueel					.396	.667
EU3New				.326		.621

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

6.4.5 SPSS output Cronbach's α, on combined items making up variable: perceptions on Russia

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.683	.691	4

6.4.6 SPSS output Cronbach's α, on combined items variable: perceptions on USA

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.754	.757	4

6.4.7 SPSS output Cronbach's α, on combined items making up variable: perceptions on China

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.678	.685	4

6.4.8 SPSS output Cronbach's α, on combined items variable: Perceptions on Climate Change

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.792	.796	3

6.4.9 SPSS output Cronbach's α, on combined items variable: European Identity

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.701	.697	5

6.3.10 Cook's Distance values

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	9.5888	18.6241	14.8511	1.53052	262
Std. Predicted Value	-3.438	2.465	.000	1.000	262
Standard Error of Predicted Value	.401	1.458	.641	.174	262
Adjusted Predicted Value	9.7271	18.5708	14.8498	1.53921	262
Residual	-11.94896	8.11236	.00000	3.52756	262
Std. Residual	-3.335	2.264	.000	.985	262
Stud. Residual	-3.448	2.479	.000	1.005	262
Deleted Residual	-12.77021	9.72115	.00134	3.67646	262
Stud. Deleted Residual	-3.525	2.504	-.001	1.010	262
Mahal. Distance	2.274	42.198	7.969	6.174	262
Cook's Distance	.000	.135	.005	.013	262
Centered Leverage Value	.009	.162	.031	.024	262

a. Dependent Variable: NEWEU

6.3.11 VIF and Tolerance values.

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	10.464	1.025		10.210	.000		
	TotalRus	.159	.062	.170	2.586	.010	.767	1.305
	TotalVS	.066	.053	.077	1.248	.213	.863	1.159
	TotalChina	.002	.060	.002	.028	.977	.820	1.220
	TotalClimate	.119	.051	.145	2.351	.020	.872	1.147
	PrimarySchool	-2.577	1.440	-.108	-1.789	.075	.908	1.101
	MiddleSchool	-.798	.610	-.088	-1.307	.192	.736	1.358
	MBO	-.149	.620	-.016	-.240	.810	.748	1.337
	University	1.413	.635	.147	2.226	.027	.764	1.309

a. Dependent Variable: NEWEU

6.3.12 Scatterplot

Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: EUTotal

6.3.13 Durbin Watson

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.369^a	.136	.126	3.59540	.224

a. Predictors: (Constant), University, TotalClimate, TotalRus

b. Dependent Variable: NEWEU

6.3.14 model summary

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.398^a	.158	.128	3.58986

a. Predictors: (Constant), Leeftijd, TotalVS, University, TotalClimate, PrimarySchool, MBO, TotalChina, TotalRus, MiddleSchool

6.3.15. ANOVA

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	611.649	9	67.961	5.274	.000^b
	Residual	3247.546	252	12.887		
	Total	3859.195	261			

a. Dependent Variable: NEWEU

b. Predictors: (Constant), Leeftijd, TotalVS, University, TotalClimate, PrimarySchool, MBO, TotalChina, TotalRus, MiddleSchool

Annex 6.3.16 Coefficients

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	10.520	1.102		9.545	.000
	TotalRus	.159	.062	.171	2.585	.010
	TotalVS	.066	.053	.078	1.248	.213
	TotalChina	.002	.060	.002	.038	.970
	TotalClimate	.119	.051	.144	2.320	.021
	PrimarySchool	-2.539	1.467	-.107	-1.730	.085
	MiddleSchool	-.810	.617	-.089	-1.312	.191
	MBO	-.161	.627	-.017	-.257	.797
	University	1.415	.636	.147	2.223	.027
	Leeftijd	-.018	.126	-.009	-.141	.888

a. Dependent Variable: NEWEU

Annex 6.3.17 New model with UniversityXClimate as interaction

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	10.464	1.025		10.210	.000
	TotalRus	.159	.062	.170	2.586	.010
	TotalVS	.066	.053	.077	1.248	.213
	TotalChina	.002	.060	.002	.028	.977
	TotalClimate	.119	.051	.145	2.351	.020
	PrimarySchool	-2.577	1.440	-.108	-1.789	.075
	MiddleSchool	-.798	.610	-.088	-1.307	.192
	MBO	-.149	.620	-.016	-.240	.810
	University	1.413	.635	.147	2.226	.027
2	(Constant)	10.139	1.083		9.364	.000
	TotalRus	.156	.062	.168	2.540	.012
	TotalVS	.068	.053	.079	1.279	.202
	TotalChina	.007	.060	.008	.119	.906
	TotalClimate	.138	.055	.168	2.528	.012
	PrimarySchool	-2.543	1.441	-.107	-1.765	.079
	MiddleSchool	-.786	.611	-.087	-1.288	.199
	MBO	-.137	.621	-.015	-.221	.825
	University	3.390	2.215	.352	1.530	.127
	UniversityXClimate	-.123	.132	-.214	-.931	.352

a. Dependent Variable: NEWEU

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