Institut européen
European Institute

Master in Advanced European and International Studies

European Integration and Global Studies

The Impact of India's SCO Membership on its Security Cooperation within the SCO, with the US and the EU

Supervised by dr. George Tzogopoulos

Senne De Kort

2023

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BCE	Before the Common Era
BECA	Basis Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CAR	Central Asian Republic
CBI	Central Bureau of Investigation
CBMs	Confidence-building measures
COMCASA	Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organisation
DRO	Democratic regional organisation
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
GSOMIA	General Security of Military Information Agreement
HEALTH	Healthcare cooperation, Economic cooperation, Alternate energy, Literature and culture, Terrorism-free society and Humanitarian cooperation
JAP	Joint Action Plan
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LEMOA	Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
LoC	Line of Control
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDRO	Non-democratic regional organisation
NSSP	Next Steps for Strategic Partnership
OTS	Organisation of Turkic States
PASSEX	Passing exercise

PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
Quad	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RATS	Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
RO	Regional organisation
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SECURE	Security of citizens, Respect for sovereignty and integrity and Environmental Protection
SP	Strategic Partnership
STA-1	Strategic Trade Authorisation-1
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP	World Food Programme
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

1. Introduction

Over recent years, the Asian continent has faced various security threats. Not only domestic threats, such as the violent Taliban regime in Afghanistan or the military dictatorship in Myanmar, but also cross-border conflicts, such as frequent skirmishes between India and China, India and Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, raise security concerns over Asia. In addition, long-standing tensions over the Korean peninsula and the impending Chinese unification with Taiwan add fuel to the fire. The use of nuclear weapons can also not be ruled out, as Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea all possess them and these states are involved in at least one cross-border conflict, whether with each other or not. Asian states are, on top of that, challenged by several non-traditional transnational security threats, the so-called 'three evils' (religious extremism, separatism, and terrorism) (Aris, 2009). Concerning extra-regional presence in the region, the military presence of the United States (US) in the region has substantially decreased since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021: the US military is only left in the Middle East and North East Asia, leaving Central and South Asia without US military bases and shifting its focus to the Indo-Pacific (Hussein & Haddad, 2021). Since the 2021 conclusion of the Resolute Support Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Afghanistan, also European states are not military present on the Asian mainland anymore, shifting their focus to the Indo-Pacific to be alert to the rise of China. This has left a power vacuum in continental Asia amid the emergence of China, India, and Russia.

In light of these regional security challenges and interstate conflicts, Asian states have undertaken efforts to cooperate in the security realm, albeit no regional organisation (RO) comes close to the organisational structures of the European Union (EU) or NATO. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has established a regional forum to resolve conflicts between member states peacefully in Southeast Asia, but the organisation lacks NATO-like collective troops to militarily intervene in case a member state's security is at stake. Moreover, the bloc lacks a cohesive position on various regional security issues, such as terrorism, relations with China, and the military regime in Myanmar (CFR.org Editors, 2022).

Another Asian RO is the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which includes Russia and five other former Soviet states. Unlike ASEAN, the Russian-dominated CSTO has the mandate to deploy collective military troops to its member states when one of them is under threat. This NATO-like notion of collective defence has been defined in Article 4 of the CSTO founding treaty (CSTO, 1992). Only in 2022, twenty years after its creation, CSTO troops were deployed for the first time to its member state Kazakhstan to ease domestic unrest, but before, during the 2010 Kyrgyzstan crisis or the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict involving member state Armenia, the CSTO failed to take action to assist its member states (Guliyev & Gawrich, 2020; Vaal, 2022). Despite operations against drug trafficking and terrorism, the CSTO has not become an effective security organisation in Eurasia. This is mainly due to the CSTO's lack of organisational capacity, the highly-respected principle of non-intervention, mutual mistrust and the authoritarian nature of its member states (Kropatcheva, 2016).

Another regional security organisation in Asia is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), originally consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan at its foundation in 2001. The initial purpose of the organisation was to regulate borders and to stabilise the region by fighting against the 'three evils', but soon, especially China pushed the SCO to widen its agenda into the economic and cultural domain (Porshneva, Rakhimov & Razinkov, 2022). In 2017, the SCO also expanded territorially with the accession of India and Pakistan, making it the largest RO in terms of territory and population. Soon, also Iran will become a full member state, which would ease the country's international economic isolation (Ruehl, 2022). Besides full members, the SCO also has nine dialogue partners, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Türkiye. With its growing membership, the SCO serves both China's and Russia's policy of transforming the international system into a multipolar one and weakening the US-dominated unipolar world (Sarsembayev & Bezborodov, 2022). Moreover, all member states are non-democratic regimes, except for India and Pakistan, albeit being respectively a flawed democracy and a hybrid regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023).

As the world's largest democracy and most populous country (Wright, 2023), India not only cooperates with the SCO but also with other democracies in the security realm. For example, India is part of the Quad alongside the US, Japan and Australia to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific, which is criticised by China. India has been a long-time security partner of the US and the country also has a Strategic Partnership (SP) with the EU. Thus, it is interesting and relevant to examine how India's SCO membership has not only impacted security cooperation with the SCO member states but also with the US and the EU, hence the following research question of this master's thesis:

How has India's SCO membership impacted its security cooperation within the SCO, with the US and the EU?

The structure of the thesis will be as follows. First, an introduction with the presentation of the topic and relevance of the thesis will be given. Second, the theoretical framework will be presented with a focus on theories of regionalism. Third, the scope will be narrowed to Asian regionalism. The fourth chapter will deal with the research design and the methodology of the thesis. The thesis has a comparative case study design to examine how SCO membership impacted on India's security cooperation within the SCO, with the US and the EU; these three cases will be compared to see if there are remarkable trends in India's security cooperation since its SCO membership. Fifth, the SCO will be presented with a focus on India's interests in the organisation. Sixth, the three case studies follow, which include India's security cooperation before and after full SCO membership with (1) fellow SCO member states, (2) the US, and (3) the EU. Finally, the conclusion will assess the key findings and present avenues for future research.

2. Theoretical framework: Regionalism

This chapter is devoted to the theoretical framework of the master's thesis, namely theories of regionalism. Theories of regionalism explain how and why regional organisations (ROs) are formed and which factors unite members of the RO. In this regard, it is interesting to investigate why India has opted for membership in the SCO since it is the only democracy in the predominantly authoritarian RO since Pakistan is considered a hybrid regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2022). First, this chapter attempts to define a region and regionalism. Then, an overview of theories of regionalism will be given. Finally, as most theories relate to Western democratic ROs, the final section will discuss Asian regionalism.

2.1 What is a Region?

The definition of a region has always been a point of contestation: up to today, there is still no agreement on what a region is. On the one hand, early theorists argue that regions are geographically defined. Therefore, regions often correspond to continents that are visualised on maps. Regions are additionally institutionalised through formal ROs that align with these geographically pre-given regions (Söderbaum, 2012). This is the case for the Americas through the Organization of American States, Africa through the African Union and Europe through the Council of Europe.

On the other hand, post-Cold War theorists argue that regions are socially constructed based on a socio-cultural regional identity. Therefore, regions are dynamic ideational constructs, not merely geographical static entities. The interpretation of regional identity can be based on various grounds: social (ethnicity, language, culture, history), political (ideology, domestic regime type) and economic (trade openness) similarities between states (Hurrell, 1995). For example, the Commonwealth of Nations is based on historical ties between the United Kingdom (UK) and its former colonies and the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) is based on a shared Turkic culture and language. Moreover, the existence of non-continental ROs undermines the early theorists' definition of a pre-given

geographically demarcated region. Subcontinental ROs include the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia and transcontinental organisations include NATO across Europe and North America. The same theorists also argue that ROs and identities can overlap with one another (Adler & Greve, 2009; Haftel & Hofmann, 2019; Heywood, 2011). For example, Türkiye's NATO membership does not impede Türkiye's Turkic identity within the OTS, nor does it displace its national identity. Scholars have attempted to define a region but their definitions differ depending on the specific problem or inquiry being examined (Söderbaum, 2012). This master's thesis will base itself mainly on a region's geographical demarcations, otherwise, it would be difficult to discuss regionalism and its theories.

2.2 What Is Regionalism?

Whereas a region is a geographical socio-cultural unit as defined above, regionalism refers to the process and "practice of coordinating social, economic or political activities within a geographical region comprising a number of states" (Heywood, 2011, p. 482). Heywood (2011) distinguishes three areas of regional cooperation between states: economic, political and security regionalism.

First, economic regionalism experienced a surge after the Cold War through the establishment of regional trade blocs and regional trade agreements. Economic regionalism is reflected in regional free trade areas (e.g. ASEAN), customs unions (e.g. Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)) and common markets (e.g. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) (Mariadoss, 2018). Thus, economic regionalism comprises the facilitation of trade and capital flows within a region to stimulate economic growth. Second, Heywood (2011) distinguishes political regionalism, which refers to regional interstate institutions that aim to protect the member states' shared norms and values, enhance cooperation between the member states and unite their interests on the international stage. For example, the SCO is united in its member states' compliance with the principle of non-intervention and respect for territorial sovereignty, both within the organisation and in the international system (Weiffen, Gawrich, & Axyonova, 2020). Third, security

regionalism aims to enhance security cooperation between states to prevent aggression within the region. Security regionalism also provides protection against a common external security threat. As such, NATO was initially established to protect the US and its European allies against the communist threat from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Herd, Kriendler, & Wittmann, 2013). Although Heywood (2011) makes a distinction between these different categories of regionalism, some ROs focus indeed on one domain but others have a functional overlap and thus deal with all domains at once, such as the EU (Adler & Greve, 2009).

Regionalism also differs in the depth of the integration. On the one hand, most ROs opt for an intergovernmental institutional design, in which the member states retain their sovereignty, reflected in unanimous decision-making (Cini, 2019). On the other hand, supranationalism accounts for a deeper level of regionalism, as there exists a supranational body – i.e. an authority above the state – to which states transfer powers and competencies. This process is also called 'pooling of sovereignty' and takes place in the EU through the European Commission (Hurrell, 1995). The latter is examined by neofunctionalist theorists, which will be further discussed in the section below.

2.3 Theories of Regionalism

Just as there are contesting definitions of a region, so are there contesting theories of regionalism. The literature on regionalism can be divided into two generations: old regionalism and new regionalism. Within old regionalism, neofunctionalism and neorealism will be discussed. The focus will be on neorealism and the role of hegemons in ROs because this is more relevant to the objective of the thesis. Within new regionalism, institutionalist and constructivist theories will be discussed.

2.3.1 Old Regionalism

The school of old regionalism has to be understood in the context of the aftermath of the Second World War. The international system was bipolar and most ROs

covered only one domain. Regionalism occurred primarily between neighbouring states and most research was devoted to the European continent (Söderbaum, 2003).

2.3.1.1 Neofunctionalism

In the 1950s and 1960s, regionalist theorists conducted mainly research on the European integration process. Ernst Haas was one of the neofunctionalist scholars that argued that European integration was a process of spillovers. Economic cooperation between states in one domain would soon spill over into other functional domains and at the same time lead to deeper political integration, as economic cooperation between political actors creates the need for a new political community (Heywood, 2011; Hurrell, 1995). For example, the EU is a result of a spill-over from a free trade area into a customs union into a common market. However, critics of neofunctionalism argue that the theory only applies to the EU and thus fails to predict integration processes in other parts of the world. In addition, intergovernmental critics posit that neofunctionalism downplays states' restraint to shift power to the supranational level and give up some national sovereignty. According to theorists of intergovernmentalism, such as Stanley Hoffman, states are not keen on the delegation of powers to supranational institutions unless they are in the states' own national interests, which is in line with neorealist thinking (Chakma, 2020; Söderbaum, 2012).

2.3.1.2 Neorealism

Neorealism is based on four fundamental assumptions, which are accepted across all realism schools. These assumptions are statism, anarchy in the international system, survival, and self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014; Hyde-Price, 2016). First, statism means that states are the primary actors on the international stage. States are rational actors and they aim to preserve their power and security in the anarchic international system. "In the absence of a legitimate governing authority to regulate conflicts and enforce agreements between states or other actors", as Levy (2002, pp. 352-353) notes, the survival of the state is always at stake. Therefore, the most crucial national interest of every state is its survival, which is achieved through

power or security maximization, relying on its resources and practising self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014).

Concerning regionalism, neorealist scholars argue that the distribution of power in the international system determines whether or not states cooperate or form alliances. Thus, external systemic forces have an impact on the regional integration process, not inside forces, which is asserted by the neofunctionalists (Söderbaum, 2012).

The first set of neorealist ideas about regionalism are based on the anarchic structure of the international system and the balance-of-power theory. In the bipolar international system during the Cold War, both superpowers established ROs to balance against the other superpower and consolidate their own power (Chakma, 2020). An example of this is the establishment of NATO to balance the USSR that formed the Warsaw Pact afterwards in response to balance NATO. Therefore, both superpowers aimed to prevent the other from achieving dominance in Europe, which is the basic principle of the balance-of-power theory (Levy, 2002). Relatedly, some ROs consisting of smaller states conduct a strategy of soft balancing against a hegemon, i.e. using concerted diplomacy, economic sanctions, international institutions and law to limit a (potential) hegemon's power (Paul, 2018). For example, ASEAN conducts this soft balancing strategy against emerging China. Alternatively, smaller states can also join an alliance led by a hegemon to maximise their security, which is referred to as bandwagoning. By doing so, they get material benefits from cooperation with the hegemon: for example, protection by the hegemon's modern weapon system (Hurrell, 1995). Therefore, the main difference between soft balancing and bandwagoning is that the former does not include the hegemon, while the latter does (Levick & Schulz, 2020).

A second neorealist assumption about regionalism derives from the hegemon stability theory. This theory posits that both a systemic and regional hegemon can establish a RO for their own interest to maintain or strengthen their power in the region (Chakma, 2020). The hegemon's economic and/or geopolitical interests

range from ensuring access to markets and resources to strengthening military alliances (Börzel, 2016). In that case, the hegemon is "willing to assume the role of regional paymaster, easing distributional tensions and thus smoothing the path of integration" (Mattli, 1999, p. 56). When the power of a hegemon is declining, a RO benefits the hegemon as a body for burden-sharing, conflict resolution and legitimacy for the hegemon's policy (Hurrell, 1995).

Some realist authors have argued that regions might replace the state as the primary unit in the international system. However, this would not change the conflictual nature of international relations. In that case, not states but regions would seek to ensure their survival and security through power politics. Consequentially, 'fortress regionalism' or hegemonic regionalism may emerge (Heywood, 2011).

2.3.2 New Regionalism

The revitalisation of regionalism started with the Single European Act establishing a European single market and prolonged after the Cold War in a substantially different international structure than the bipolar one of the Cold War. Right after the Cold War, regionalism was taking place in a unipolar world and since recent years in an increasingly multipolar world order. The post-Cold War era is also marked by globalisation and transnational challenges. Therefore, both states and non-state actors have engaged voluntarily in regionalism to deal with these transnational issues. ROs are thus often multidimensional, in that they are designed to deal with issues across the economic, political and security domains. Additionally, regionalism was not only limited to Europe but occurred across the globe in various forms (Söderbaum, 2003).

2.3.2.1 Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neoliberal institutionalists consider regionalism and the establishment of ROs as consequences of globalisation and the increasing interdependence between political actors. As such, increasing interdependence creates the demand for more cooperation, which would automatically stimulate peaceful relations within the region and the institutionalisation of that cooperation (Chakma, 2020; Hurrell,

1995). In contrast to neorealists claiming that security threats coming from the anarchic international system drive states to engage in regional institution-building, neoliberalists argue that the mutual benefits of ROs are the real drivers for regionalism. Those benefits include "the provision of information, the promotion of transparency and monitoring, the reduction of transaction costs, the development of convergent expectations, and facilitation of the productive use of issue-linkage strategies" (Hurrell, 1995, p. 350). For example, Hurrell (1995) argues that ASEAN does not stem from balance-of-power considerations but because the organisation would facilitate communication, decrease mutual threat perceptions and stimulate trust-building.

ROs not only provide the abovementioned mutual benefits for the member states but also mitigate the risk of a rising intraregional hegemon. This is institutional binding, i.e. the inclusion of the hegemon into a RO so smaller states can constrain the hegemon's power, while the hegemon can still maintain its influence in the region (Jesse et al., 2012; Levick & Schulz, 2020). In this regard, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established after the Second World War to monitor German coal and steel production since both resources were needed to produce war materials. In that way, Germany would not be able to start military aggression again and was thus institutionally bound by the ECSC (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2008).

2.3.2.2 Constructivism

By the end of the Cold War, constructivist scholars argued that regions and political actors' interests and identities are not pre-given but socially constructed by an interactional process between actors (Flockhart, 2016). Constructivism rejects the neorealist and liberal notion that the international system is static and the theory emphasises the evolving interests, norms, beliefs, and identities of actors and regions. Thus, ideational factors, such as common culture, history, norms and values, shape a regional identity that forms the basis for regionalism (Mansbach & Taylor, 2018). Deutsch et al. (1957) defined such security regionalism based on a regional identity as a security community, "in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some

other way" (p. 5). When states share the same symbols, history, culture, norms and values, which all constitute a regional identity, these states will be less prone to use force against each other (Barnett & Adler, 1998). As such, the EU relies on a regional identity based on democratic and liberal values, which promote peaceful conflict resolution without the use of force. In that regard, low levels of institutionalisation around the world might be explained by a lack of a collective identity, for example in South Asia regarding India and Pakistan (Chakma, 2020). On the other hand, realists object to constructivists, in that states might still get involved in violent conflicts because of material interests and power politics despite a regional identity (Hurrell, 1995).

It is important to take these different theories of regionalism into account, but the neorealist theory is the main theoretical lens for this thesis. This master's thesis will focus on India's security cooperation in the context of security threats coming from Pakistan and China, so the survival of the state and India's security interests are central notions. In that regard, India's membership in the SCO may ensure the survival of the state and India's security. Internally, clashing material interests and great power politics between Russia, China and India within the SCO may also play a role. Externally, the SCO could be considered as a balancing mechanism against the West, since both Russia and China seek to transform the US-led unipolar world order into a multipolar one. The SCO serves as a tool to achieve that goal and to increase Russia's and China's power in the region and the international system. Therefore, neorealism is chosen as the main analytical perspective of this thesis, as it explains both the internal and the external balance of power.

3. Asian Regionalism

The issue with the classic theories of regionalism is that they predominantly describe how regionalism is in Europe and the EU and how regionalism *should* be: covering multiple policy domains and being highly institutionalised. However, in other parts of the world, regionalism can take other forms, depending on the region's position in the international system and its members' different state forms (Söderbaum, 2012). Therefore, Asian regionalism with a focus on security cooperation will be discussed below.

3.1 What Is Asia?

Relating to the question discussed above on what a region is, it is necessary to define what this thesis considers as 'Asia' since the SCO is an Asian RO. Just as with defining regions in general, definitions of Asia have been contested in academic literature since Asia can be defined in different ways depending on the definition's purpose. Most definitions of Asia focus on the central role of waterways and the Indian and Pacific Oceans, excluding the Russian Far East, Central Asia and the Middle East from the region's definition (Frost, 2008). Generally, Russia is a dubious case because the country has profiled itself more as a European state based on the fact that 77% of the Russian population lives in the European part of Russia west of the Ural Mountains and that 84% of the population is white. These demographic figures may suggest that Russia is rather a European state. Yet, the Russian government has conducted yearlong anti-Western rhetoric, thus further distancing itself from Europe. The current war in Ukraine has also highlighted the importance of democracy in the European identity, which is absent in Russia, but the war has also pushed Russia economically more to Asia due to the Western sanctions against the country (Su, 2022). In addition, Russia is predominantly located on the Asian continent. Therefore, this thesis considers Russia as a transcontinental state that can be both considered European and Asian. Regarding Asia, this thesis considers it as the geographical region, consisting of several subregions, that stretches from the Ural and the Red Sea in the west to New Guinea

and the Pacific in the east, excluding Australia, New Zealand and the archipelagos in the Pacific (Frost, 2008).

3.2 Regionalism in Asia

In Integrating Asia[1], regionalism has occurred simultaneously with a rapid economic development that started after the Second World War. At the beginning of this economic growth, Asian countries mainly exported labour-intensive manufactured goods to extra-regional countries instead of trading goods within the region. As the Asian countries, especially China and India, were economically growing, their economies became increasingly interdependent and the region's share in the world economy increased considerably. This trend can be observed in the increasing volume of intraregional trade, investment and labour flows in Asia. In addition, innovations in technology and communication, a reduction of trade barriers and decreased transport costs have facilitated regional integration in Asia (Petri, 2008).

Economic motives are the main drivers of Asian regionalism. Therefore, one might observe parallels with the European integration process that started with economic cooperation that spilled over into political integration. However, the reality in Asia is different from the one in post-war Europe. Asia is more diverse in culture, ethnicity, religion, political regimes, socioeconomic factors and conceptions of human rights, making it difficult to define common interests and construct a regional identity for a regional community (Drysdale, 2008; Frost, 2008). This diversity has been fortified by Asian contemporary history in two ways. On the one hand, Asian countries have been colonised by several Western powers, including France, the UK, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands, each leaving a specific legacy behind in their former colonies after decolonisation. On the other hand, the Cold War divided the continent into a group of pro-communist countries and a group of pro-Western countries. These two tendencies have eventually created anti-colonial

[1] Integrating Asia is a term given by the Asian Development Bank to the group of states that is comprised of Brunei, Cambodia, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (Petri, 2008).

and anti-Cold War sentiments, which are reflected in the strong commitment of Asian states to the principles of respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Therefore, Asian regionalism is characterised by a bigger emphasis on cooperation instead of integration, thus limiting the role and scope of an RO since it might encroach on member states' sovereignty. This partly explains the low institutionalisation of Asian ROs compared to European ROs. (Beeson & Stubbs, 2012).

Regionalism in Asia is flexible and adaptable to the needs and desires of the Asian states, which explains the rather low institutionalisation of Asian ROs. Such a pragmatic understanding of regionalism is beneficial because it avoids unnecessary costly bureaucratic structures and it can experiment with new approaches and practices in the RO. On the other hand, a low institutionalisation of an RO might make national governments reluctant to commit themselves to an institution that provides little benefit for them. Whereas regionalism has set off slowly in Central and South Asia, ASEAN[2] has become the most institutionalised RO in East Asia. Established in 1967, ASEAN has developed into an RO with 10 member states that focuses on deeper regional economic cooperation with the establishment of a free trade area in 1992 and thus the liberalisation of trade. The ASEAN Charter in 2007 further institutionalised the organisation by transforming its consensus-based framework into a rules-based one and expanding its role in the future. ASEAN has also established formal relations with international actors, including China, Japan and South Korea (in the ASEAN Plus Three/Six Framework); India, Australia and New Zealand (in the ASEAN Plus Six Framework); the EU (in the Asia-Europe Meeting); the US and Russia (bilateral summits) (Drysdale, 2008). The approach that ASEAN conducts is often referred to as the 'ASEAN Way'. The ASEAN Way can be explained as "relatively unstructured discussions, informality and discreetness, pragmatism, expediency and a search for a practical minimum solution that all parties can live with" (Beeson & Stubbs, 2012, p. 3).

[2] ASEAN is comprised of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (1967); Brunei (1984); Vietnam (1995); Laos and Myanmar (1997); and Cambodia (1999)

Other Asian ROs have adopted and adapted the ASEAN Way as their approach to regionalism. For example, the SCO has defined the 'Shanghai Spirit' as "equality, mutually beneficial cooperation, mutual respect and trust, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs […] principles of equality and consensus in decision-making" (Porshneva et al., 2022, p. 15). The Shanghai spirit and its principle of consensus have often prevented the SCO from responding adequately and timely to regional crises, such as Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Chinese border skirmishes in the Kashmir region (Porshneva et al., 2022). Other ROs in Asia include the SAARC, the CSTO and the SCO but because of the scope of this thesis, all attention will be devoted to the SCO in the chapters that follow.

3.3 Security Cooperation in Asia

As this thesis focuses on security cooperation, it is important to shed light on what security cooperation entails in Asia. Contrary to Europe, there is considerable mutual mistrust among Asian states, illustrated by the territorial disputes between China and India, India and Pakistan, China and Southeast Asian states over territories in the South China Sea and border skirmishes between some Central Asian Republics (CARs). This explains the Asian states' reluctance to create an alliance. An alliance is a group of states that has a legal provision for collective defence. That means that an attack against one or several members of the alliance triggers actions from the other alliance members (Heywood, 2011). NATO and the CSTO are examples of existing alliances. With regard to security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, the SCO, SAARC, ASEAN, and the Quad[3] are not alliances, as these ROs and groupings do not have a collective defence mechanism.

Despite mutual mistrust, Asian states deem a full-scale war with a neighbouring country highly unlikely, so there *is* a basis for security cooperation, especially in the non-traditional fields of security. Asian security cooperation has been active in fighting against piracy, terrorism, extremism and illegal trafficking, which is also

[3] The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is a grouping of democracies in the Indo-Pacific that is comprised of the US, India, Japan and Australia. Quad is active in security and economic cooperation in the context of the rising influence of China in the region (Smith, 2021).

reflected in the SCO's goals and principles (Aris, 2009; Frost, 2008). Energy security – "an adequate and reliable supply of energy that can be safely transported and freely purchased at a reasonably affordable price" (Frost, 2008, pp. 193-194) – has also become a domain where Asian countries cooperate, albeit to a lesser extent. All these non-traditional security threats can have significant economic consequences and can pose a threat to national sovereignty and the domestic political stability of a country. Because Asian economies have become increasingly interdependent, Asian states acknowledge the risk of spillovers of these non-traditional security threats, hence their incentives to engage in security cooperation in these domains (Frost, 2008).

4. Methodology

A comparative case study design has been chosen for this thesis to examine what impact India's SCO membership has had on its security cooperation within the SCO, with the US and the EU.

Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991) define a case study as "an in-depth, multi-faceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon. The study is conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of several data sources" (p. 2). Therefore, these three cases will be analysed qualitatively and compared with one another to find whether there have been any tendencies in India's security cooperation since it joined the SCO. The thesis has a small-N study design because of limited time and space, making it possible to gain sophisticated knowledge about the selected cases. The limited number of cases increases the internal validity of the master's thesis as opposed to large-N quantitative studies (Hopkin, 2010; Vromen, 2010).

This thesis sheds light on India since it might seem unusual that a close security partner of the West and the world's largest democracy joins the SCO, which is mainly comprised of authoritarian regimes. In that regard, also Pakistan could have been chosen as the research focus because it joined the SCO at the same moment as India, but this thesis has chosen India because of its emerging status as a new superpower in the international system.

The three cases that have been chosen are India-SCO, India-US and India-EU security cooperation. Because of the intra-SCO Indo-Chinese and Indo-Pakistani rivalries, it is in the first place relevant to examine how the SCO has impacted Indian security cooperation with these actors in addition to India's security cooperation with Russia and the CARs. Second, the US remains a superpower in the international system and an important security partner of India, hence the second case study on India-US security cooperation. A final case study will be conducted on India-EU security cooperation since the focus of this master's programme is the EU. It has to be noted that bilateral cooperation between India and EU member

states is not taken into account. Because of the variety in nature of the cases, selection bias has been avoided. In the academic literature, there has not been conducted a comparative analysis yet of India's security cooperation with these actors since its SCO membership. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill that gap.

Concerning the data collection, the thesis uses primary and secondary sources gathered from online academic databases, such as EBSCO, Taylor & Francis Online, Google Scholar, and the CIFE Library. Primary sources are gathered from archives from the Indian and US ministries, the SCO, the European External Action Service (EEAS), and EUR-Lex. Secondary sources include peer-reviewed academic papers and newspaper articles. A limitation of the thesis is that sources in Hindi are not considered, only sources in English, Russian, French and Dutch. By consulting academic literature, official statements and high-quality newspaper articles, this research can thus be considered credible and reliable. This data triangulation also increases the validity of this thesis.

With regards to the data analysis, this master's thesis conducts a textual analysis of primary sources such as official documents and a literature review of secondary sources such as peer-reviewed academic papers and newspaper articles. The results of the data analysis will then be interpreted from a neorealist perspective, for which the justification is given on p. 16. The results will then be tested against the hypotheses for the following research question: how has India's SCO membership impacted its security cooperation within the SCO, with the US and the EU? The first hypothesis states that India's SCO membership will enhance security cooperation within the SCO, as the SCO will build trust and confidence among its members. The second hypothesis expects that India's security cooperation with the US and the EU will stagnate or worsen, as India has found now new partners to ensure its security and survival.

To answer this question, it is important to have a clear understanding of what 'security cooperation' means. This thesis considers 'security cooperation' as cooperative actions by two or more actors to counter shared traditional security

threats (e.g. military aggression from third states) and non-traditional security threats (e.g. terrorism, organised crime, piracy, energy insecurity, climate change, and economic crises) (Racine, 2012). Security cooperation includes intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and training, joint command, and supplies of military equipment, which can all occur bilaterally or within a (regional) organisation. All these activities aim to foster the collective security of the cooperating actors as well as to foster confidence and trust among them (McCarthy, 2007). This thesis will focus on the aforementioned variables in particular. It has to be noted that the main focus will be traditional security threats and some non-traditional ones, such as terrorism, piracy, and cybercrime, excluding energy security, climate change and economic crises.

5. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

The foundations for the SCO were laid in 1996 when the 'Shanghai Five' was formed between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It was a consultation forum to develop confidence-building measures (CBMs) and resolve border issues without using force between China and the Eurasian post-Soviet states after the dissolution of the USSR. Because of this effective border management, the 'Shanghai Five' was transformed into a full-fledged intergovernmental organisation on 15 June 2001, the SCO, with additional membership for Uzbekistan (Ahmad, 2018). The newly-established organisation broadened the 'Shanghai Five's original aim of border dispute settlement to a more comprehensive vision, i.e.

> strengthening mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the member states; encouraging effective cooperation between them in the political, trade, economic, scientific, technical, cultural, educational, energy, transport, environmental and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region and establishing new, democratic, just and rational international political and economic order. (SCO, 2001, pp. 1-2).

Porshneva et al. (2022) distinguish four periods in the SCO's evolution. During the first period (2001-2004), the SCO was focused on institutional development. The SCO Charter set out the SCO's goals – primarily fighting the 'three evils' (extremism, separatism, and terrorism) –, principles and policy areas. In practice, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was established to coordinate member states' actions in the fight against terrorism. In RATS, member states share information on terrorism, coordinate actions to counter terrorism and hold joint annual anti-terrorist exercises (Danilovich, 2013). By 2006, RATS managed to prevent 250 terrorist attacks within the borders of the SCO (Ayusi & Nurhasanah, 2019).

The second period (2005-2008) is marked by agenda development. China sought to broaden the SCO's mission to the economic and cultural domains. In addition to security cooperation to combat non-traditional security threats, the SCO started to

focus on economic cooperation with the creation of the Business Council and the Interbank Consortium (Aris, 2011). Meanwhile, Western military presence in Afghanistan started to concern China and Russia (later referred to as 'the Two'), driving the Two to request the West to limit its presence in the country. Consequently, the SCO established the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group in 2005, aiming to foster stability in Afghanistan without interfering in the country. Despite the lack of a roadmap for peaceful development in Afghanistan, NATO states have recognised the SCO as a potential partner in Afghanistan (Mikhaylenko, Ospanova & Lagutina, 2022).

Third, between 2009 and 2014, the divergence between China and Russia on the SCO's agenda increased: China aimed for a more economic and cultural agenda and a decision-making role for the SCO, while Russia considered the SCO rather as an organisation for security matters. For example, China's 2010 proposal to establish an SCO Development Bank that was rejected by Russia because Russia feared a more controlling China. Additionally, China undertook several initiatives to increase its soft power in Central Asia, such as giving Chinese scholarships to SCO members and establishing the SCO University. After Russia was severely affected by the 2008 financial crisis and as SCO members grew increasingly dependent on China, China's economic clout within the SCO has outweighed Russia's. To illustrate, SCO member states approved of China's aggressive actions against the mass protests in the Xinjiang region, while Russia's aggression against Georgia in 2008 was not supported by the SCO (Danilovich, 2013).

The fourth period started in 2015 with the Ufa Summit, during which a long-term vision of the SCO until 2025 was formulated and the membership procedure for India and Pakistan was initiated. The Development Strategy of the SCO until 2025 included closer strategic, trade and economic cooperation and coordination of Russia's EAEU and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) within the SCO format (Kulintsev, 2020). In June 2017, India and Pakistan formally acceded the organisation. India's and Pakistan's accession considerably changed the scope and nature of the SCO.

First, the SCO now represents 42% of the world's population and 20% of the world's GDP, almost doubling the SCO's population (Xue & Makengo, 2021). Second, the SCO's focus shifts from Central Asia towards South Asia. To preserve the agency and relevance of the smaller founding member states, India and Pakistan have the same number of representatives as Tajikistan despite their bigger populations (Seiwert, 2023). At the same time, both India and Pakistan contribute less than the other member states to the SCO budget (each 5.9% of the total budget) (Porshneva et al., 2022). Therefore, the demographic features of new member states and hence their political power in the SCO are underplayed by the founding members, although the SCO emphasises equality among member states in its charter (SCO, 2001). Third, the enlargement alters the internal balance of power: now three big powers aim to exert their influence within the SCO and Russia and India may use the SCO to restrain the rising power of China. These dynamics will be discussed below more thoroughly. Finally, with the new members, the SCO takes in more territorial conflicts among its member states, namely the India-Pakistan and China-India conflicts over the Kashmir region, which may weaken the organisation's cohesion and unity. On the other hand, the SCO could serve as a diplomatic platform to solve these border disputes peacefully, just like China and the Eurasian post-Soviet states did during the Shanghai Five era (Rowden, 2008).

Figure 1 shows the basic features of the SCO after the enlargement, exposing the large share of India's and Pakistan's population and armed forces in the SCO (the data on Russia includes the illegitimately annexed territory of Crimea). Since 2015 Afghanistan moved higher on the SCO agenda after the US withdrawal. Despite concerns about spillovers of terrorism and drug trafficking into the SCO, both the SCO and Russian-led CSTO have failed so far to deal effectively with these security challenges (Mikhaylenko et al., 2022).

SCO member states	*Date of membership*	*Area, sq km*	*Population*	*Human development index (in 2020)*	*GDP per capita, US$ (in 2020)*	*Armed forces personnel, thousand persons (in 2017)*
India	2017	3 287 (7)	1 380 004 (2)	0.645 (131)	1 877 (148)	3 031 (1)
Kazakhstan	1996*	2 725 (9)	18 733 (63)	0.825 (51)	8 782 (72)	71 (61)
PRC	1996*	9 597 (4)	1 402 667 (1)	0.761 (85)	10 839 (64)	2 695 (2)
Kyrgyzstan	1996*	200 (85)	6 565 (110)	0.697 (120)	1 148 (161)	21 (104)
Pakistan	2017	796 (36)	220 892 (5)	0.557 (154)	1 349***	936 (6)
Russia	1996*	17 125** (1)	144 810** (9)	0.824 (52)	9 972 (66)	1 454 (4)
Tajikistan	1996*	143 (94)	9 538 (94)	0.668 (125)	834 (171)	17 (113)
Uzbekistan	2001	447 (56)	34 074 (42)	0.720 (106)	1 763 (151)	68 (64)
		34 320	**3 217 283**			**8 293**

Figure 1. Basic information about SCO member states (including positions in international ratings). Porshneva et al., 2022, p. 18.

We may observe the start of a fifth period in 2022 during the Samarkand Summit. This period is characterised by Russia's and China's increasing efforts to create a multipolar world order as an alternative to the Western-led order (Yussupzhanovich & Tulkunovna, 2019). The SCO serves this objective as the organisation is expanding its territorial scope beyond its original borders. Thus, the SCO creates a considerable counterweight to equalise the global balance of power against the West, although the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO declares that the SCO "is not an alliance directed against other states and regions" (SCO, 2001, p. 2). At the Samarkand Summit, the SCO granted Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia the status of dialogue partner and it agreed with Bahrain, the Maldives, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Myanmar on a future dialogue partner status. Iran's full membership is also expected to be finalised in 2023 and Belarus's admission procedure for full membership has been started (Seiwert, 2023). In addition, Russia's invasion of Ukraine made the split between the West and SCO member states even more apparent since none of the SCO member states formally opposed Russia's aggression (Masih, 2023). The current territorial outreach of the SCO can be observed in Figure 2.

Although observer states and dialogue partners could become full members eventually, their status and importance should not be overstated (Aris, 2011). Observers can participate in SCO summits and ministerial meetings but do not have any vote or power in the decision-making process. On the other hand, dialogue partners have an agreement with the SCO that determines their domains of



Figure 2. The SCO in 2022. Seiwert, 2023, p. 4.

collaboration. The dialogue partner can then participate in working groups and expert meetings related to these domains. Any country situated in Eurasia that respects the principles and actions of the SCO can apply for observer or dialogue partner status. Only one country has been denied observer status, namely the US in 2005 because the country is geographically not proximal to the organisation (Seiwert, 2023). Regarding external relations, the SCO has signed memoranda about mutual understanding with the UN, ASEAN and Russian-led ROs, such as the CSTO and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (SCO, n.d.). The EU has no formal relations with the SCO because both ROs lack the political will for deeper cooperation with each other. Although the EU is open to dialogue with the SCO to counter regional terrorism, the SCO's norms, values and especially SCO member states' violations of human rights prevent the EU from closer cooperation with the SCO (Grieger, 2015).

4.1 The SCO and Authoritarian Regionalism

In contrast to democratic regional organisations (DROs), the SCO can be considered as an instance of authoritarian regionalism, i.e. "regional organizations that are created by strong autocracies either acting as leading states or constituting the core membership" (Obydenkova & Libman, 2019, p. 34). Although India and

Pakistan are democracies[4], this thesis considers the SCO as a non-democratic regional organisation (NDRO) because the core membership of the SCO consists of non-democracies. Obydenkova and Libman (2019) argue that non-democracies are keener on joining an NDRO than a DRO because non-democracies are more likely to favour the same undemocratic and nontransparent decision-making process as in their domestic politics. Moreover, NDROs tend to have lower levels of member states' commitment to the NDRO, thus making the NDRO less credible for the public and the international community (Obydenkova & Libman, 2019). Related to the low level of commitment is the SCO's low level of institutionalisation: there are no legally binding agreements between SCO member states to provide military support to each other. Therefore, the SCO lacks a provision for collective defence, so the SCO is not an alliance like NATO (Mikhaylenko et al., 2022). Adding to that, the leading state in any kind of RO has the capability to exert more power on the RO than other member states, but leading states in NDROs tend to engage more in the practice of manipulation because of the lack of institutional restrictions. In the SCO, both Russia and China are leading states but the possibility for them to manipulate is limited by the presence of the other (Obydenkova & Libman, 2019).

According to Obydenkova and Libman (2019), NDROs benefit autocracies in several ways. First, following the success of the EU, ROs enjoy more legitimacy, including NDROs. They rely on the rhetoric of EU-like regionalism but NDROs have often served their member states to consolidate their authoritarian regime. For example, the SCO aims to battle the 'three evils', hence the SCO's support for member states' autocratic actions against these security threats. However, in a broad interpretation, member states can use this rhetoric to suppress domestic political opposition, leading to more frequent human rights violations in the SCO. As such, China has repeatedly taken violent actions against Uyghur dissidents under the guise of counterterrorism (Saini & Jacob, 2022). Second, smaller autocracies benefit economically from the redistribution of resources within the NDRO, which

[4] The 2022 EIU Democracy Index categorises India as a flawed democracy with a democracy index of 7.04 and Pakistan as a hybrid regime with an index of 4.13 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023).

generates in its turn more public support from the domestic population. As such, China has provided $10 billion in aid to the Central Asian SCO member states in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008, making the CARs more dependent on China and more prone to be manipulated by China (Libman & Obydenkova, 2018). Finally, relating to the concept of manipulation, NDROs enable the leading states to increase their power and status not only regionally but also internationally. Leading states do not fear direct opposition from other NDRO member states (Libman & Obydenkova, 2018). For example, all SCO member states abstained or voted against a United Nations General Assembly resolution urging Russia for an immediate end to the war in Ukraine (Masih, 2023). However, this tendency should not be exacerbated since SCO member states remaining silent does not necessarily mean that they fully support Russia's actions. Smaller SCO members remain silent and 'neutral' to find a balance between Russia and the rest of the world: outright support for Russia could mean exclusion or sanctions invoked by the rest of the (democratic) world, while opposition to Russia could cut the smaller SCO member from Russia, on which they are highly dependent for economic and security reasons (Obydenkova & Libman, 2019).

Then why did the SCO allow democratic India and Pakistan into the organisation? Obydenkova and Libman (2019) argue that the presence of democracies within an NDRO can increase economic benefits, the reputation and the credibility of the autocracy-dominated RO. The inclusion of India and Pakistan, two nuclear powers and democracies, and thus the SCO's expansion into South Asia increases the international weight of the SCO as well as China's and Russia's global power (Ahmed, Ahmed, & Bhatnagar, 2019). Because China and Russia remain the dominant member states, India and Pakistan are unlikely to exert much influence and could even adopt some authoritarian traits from the more dominant NDRO members (Obydenkova & Libman, 2019). Moreover, the SCO's status of an NDRO is irrelevant for India, since is not interested in promoting democracy to the other SCO member states (Kronstadt & Pinto, 2013; Obydenkova & Libman, 2019).

4.2 Internal Balance of Power in the SCO

Although the SCO might be seen as 'an anti-Western bloc' or a 'NATO of the East', the RO lacks internal cohesion because member states struggle with one another to turn the regional balance of power in their favour. Russia and China share common interests in the region and the international system but also diverge in their approach to the SCO. With SCO membership for India and Pakistan in 2017, the organisation incorporated two lethal conflicts into its structure. Therefore, the SCO can be considered as a structure for member states to balance and check one another so that no member state would dominate the region.

4.2.1 The Sheriff and the Banker – Russia's and China's role in the SCO

It is crucial to understand the Chinese and Russian approaches towards the SCO because primarily these Two determine the development of the SCO. Despite their rivalry during the Cold War, China and Russia have found each other in their common interests in the region and their shared concerns about US hegemony on the international stage. Both states have been concerned about regional security and stability amid security threats coming from the 'three evils'. Russia is concerned about Chechen terrorists, China about the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region, and both fear terrorist spill-overs from Afghanistan into other parts of Central Asia. This incentivises the Two to cooperate for collective security in their region in accordance with respect for territorial sovereignty and international law, which means not intervening in third's countries' domestic affairs (Li, Dongchen & Kolotova, 2020).

Also in the economic domain, Russia and China benefit from cooperation, strengthened by Russia's invasion of Ukraine: Russia's trade was 30% higher in 2022 than in the year before and its exports to China increased by 43% since trade with the EU plummeted following the invasion (BBC News, 2023). China and Russia also aim to counter US military presence in the region, which ended with the withdrawal of US troops in August 2021 from Afghanistan, and the international system, driving them to create a multipolar world order. For example, China and Russia are dissatisfied with US unilateralism in the past in Iraq and Kosovo without

UN approval (Li et al., 2020). All these shared interests and concerns have been the foundations of the Sino-Russian partnership in the SCO.

However, there is also some divergence between the Two's interests in the SCO. Russia is mainly interested in retaining its dominance in Central Asia, thus restoring its former superpower status. The SCO enables Russia to check and prevent other great powers, such as China and now also India, from gaining dominance in Russia's 'backyard' (Kaukenov, 2013). Accordingly, Russia exerts power on Central Asia with the CSTO in the security realm and the EAEU in the economic realm, excluding China from these ROs (Obydenkova & Libman, 2019). Russia's policy to maintain dominance over Central Asia is related to the concept of 'Eurasianism'. As proclaimed by Alexander Dugin, Eurasianism sets Russia against Western decadence and colonialism, the US-led world order and Eurocentrism. Influencing Putin, Alexander Dugin calls on Russia to focus more on its Eurasian identity and strengthen its partnership with China against the West (Burbank, 2022). NATO's eastward expansion and Western sanctions against Russia after its annexation of Crimea in 2014 have pushed Russia further towards the East (Rowden, 2018). Putin concretised his focus on Eurasia in his initiative to establish the Greater Eurasian Partnership that would include the SCO, ASEAN, CIS and EAEU member states and coordinate EAEU projects with the BRI (Kulintsev, 2020).

On the other hand, China's interests in the SCO are more economic because it believes that extreme poverty leads to people joining terrorist and extremist organisations. Therefore, economic development would lead to regional stability and trade facilitation (Khan & Sultana, 2021). However, economic projects proposed by China, such as an SCO Development Bank or an SCO Free Trade Area, have been repeatedly blocked by Russia out of fear of China's uncontrolled economic dominance in Central Asia (Mikhaylenko et al., 2022). This has driven China to stimulate economic development in the region outside the SCO framework with the BRI and bilateral relations with SCO member states (Rowden, 2018). China is also interested in the energy resources in Central Asia to meet the demands

of China's booming economy. As such, China has invested in oil and gas pipelines from several CARs to China, reducing Russia's control over energy transfers in the region (Obydenkova & Libman, 2019). As a result, China has the upper hand over Russia in economic cooperation in Central Asia, while Russia remains the security guarantor of Central Asia through the CSTO. However, as China's global and regional power is growing, this may also spill over into the security realm, incentivising China to assert its own security interests more within the SCO instead of merely focusing on its economy (Raghavan, 2021).

To conclude, Russia and China share the same discontent about the US-led world order, but their interests in Central Asia have sometimes clashed: Russia favours security cooperation, while China wants to integrate Central Asian economies with the Chinese economy. Despite their partnership, the divergence between China's and Russia's approaches towards the SCO has hampered the SCO's development. Therefore, the SCO serves as "a buffer structure, which is in a position to coordinate the actions of two large states in Central Asia, where their interests intersect" (Danilovich, 2013, p. 18).

4.2.1 India's Rivals in the SCO

With the simultaneous entry of India and Pakistan in 2017, the SCO absorbed a long-standing ideological and territorial conflict between its newest member states. Their membership is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, their rivalry can weaken the SCO's efficiency and functioning, just like it did in the SAARC (Ahmed et al., 2019). For example, under India's SCO presidency in 2023, the Pakistani delegation did not attend a meeting in India. It is unclear whether Pakistan was not invited by India or whether the country did not want to attend, but fact is that it was not present (Putz, 2023). However, Ahmed et al. (2019) argue that the SCO would not suffer from their rivalry as much as the SAARC since China and Russia remain the dominant members. On the other hand, the SCO could favour improving bilateral relations between the two new members. The SCO may increase positive interaction between the two countries through cooperation on counterterrorism and energy, which may drive them to seek rapprochement with

each other (Ahmed et al., 2019). However, some scholars deem a settlement of the Indo-Pakistani conflict unrealistic, especially because India favours conflict resolution in a bilateral framework (Yefremenko, 2019).

China and Russia have stakes in the mitigation of conflict between India and Pakistan within the SCO. The Two acknowledge the fact that Indian and Pakistani participation is needed for peaceful development in Afghanistan. At first, SCO and BRI projects avoided Afghan involvement but now the country would play a pivotal role to connect Central Asia to the Indian Ocean with projects, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline that would transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to India through Afghanistan and Pakistan (Rowden, 2018). As India's biggest supplier of weapon systems and military capabilities and a large energy supplier, Russia has sought to balance between India and Pakistan. India remains a key military and economic partner for Russia but Pakistan's membership enables Moscow to advance its strategic and economic partnership with Pakistan as leverage against India, especially in the context of India's closer security cooperation with the US (Yefremenko, 2019). While being Pakistan's traditional strategic ally, China approved of rivalling India's SCO membership since China can then control and prevent India from becoming a regional competitor (Obydenkova & Libman, 2019). Yet, conflictual Indo-Chinese relations remain because of several border disputes, including in the Kashmir region.

The Kashmir region is a disputed territory between India, Pakistan, and China. A part of the Muslim-majority region is governed by Hindu-majority India, which has evoked conflict with Pakistan and separatist sentiments within the region. The region has been demarcated by the highly-militarised Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan, but this demarcation has not always been respected. Since India's SCO membership, deadly attacks have repeatedly occurred between India and Pakistan, after India ended the special autonomous status of the Indian-controlled part of the Kashmir region in 2019 (Center for Preventive Action, 2023; Maizland, 2019). Also China claims a part of the region, resulting in overlapping

territorial claims by India and China. The Sino-Indian border dispute not only involves the Kashmir region but also the border between the Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh and China's Tibet. Along the demarcated border between China and India, the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC), Chinese and Indian troops have repeatedly engaged in violent clashes over the last years (Ramachandran, 2022; Singh, 2022a). Thus, there is considerable mutual mistrust between China and India, leading the latter to object to the BRI because of concerns over transparency and possible debt traps for smaller states (Mudiam, 2018). Although the SCO claims to strengthen mutual trust between its member states, the SCO has faced lethal conflicts between its member states since its enlargement in 2017 and failed so far to achieve regional peace within its borders (Porshneva et al. 2022). Therefore, the SCO should not be identified as a unified 'anti-Western bloc' or a 'NATO of the East' since it lacks internal cohesion, common conventional forces and the provision of collective self-defence (Aris, 2009; Özer, 2018). This is due to the regional balance of power, mutual mistrust, and the clashing interests of member states.

4.3 What Is in it for India?

India has long been driven by its non-alignment legacy but during the last decade, it has sought a more prominent role in the international system. The SCO serves this purpose and India's three core security interests: sustaining the current international order, balancing Pakistan and China, and expanding regional power in competition with China (Mayfield, 2022).

First, India aims to sustain the current international order, as it "helped give rise to Indian power and influence and allows India to address internal economic and societal development through cultivating foreign investment, implementing infrastructure projects, and securing the energy resources necessary for growth" (Mayfield, 2022, pp. 29-30). A multi-aligned foreign policy serves India's first core security interest because it benefits more from diversifying its partnerships than from being overly dependent on one partner. The SCO is just another tool of this multi-alignment foreign policy. As the world's largest democracy, India has joined

an NDRO like the SCO despite rivalrous relations with China and Pakistan and cooperation with the West. On the one hand, India balances China in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad, and on the other, India aims to counterweight China in Eurasia in collaboration with Russia through the SCO. As relations between Russia and the West are deteriorating after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, India finds itself more often trapped between these two partners. Yet, India manages to sustain this multi-aligned foreign policy, based "on the fact that neither the US in the Indo-Pacific nor Russia in Eurasia has an alternative to supporting India in order to counter China's expanding influence in these two crucial geopolitical spaces of the 21st century (Mudiam, 2018, p. 459). India realises that it does not (yet) have the clout and military capacity as big as the US or China, and therefore, it seeks to forge partnerships with various actors to increase its power and attain strategic autonomy (Raghavan, 2021). This multi-aligned foreign policy is a concretisation of India's past of neutrality and non-alignment, aiming not to choose sides between the US and the USSR/Russia and to keep a foot in each camp (Rao, 2023).

As India seeks sustainable partnerships with both the West and SCO members, India is not interested in transforming the SCO into an anti-Western NATO-like alliance with shared military capabilities, since that might strain relations with its Western security partners (Pant, 2022). Therefore, India is interested in the SCO's policies towards non-traditional security, such as the three evils, energy security and also environmental protection. In particular, India wants to put the alleged 'Pakistan-sponsored' cross-border terrorism in the Kashmir region on the SCO agenda (Mudiam, 2018). However, due to Pakistan's alignments with Russia and China, India has not received much support from the Two against Pakistan-sponsored terror against India (Saini & Jacob, 2022). The impact of SCO membership on India's security cooperation with SCO member states will be examined in the following chapter.

Second, the SCO helps India to pursue its second core security interest, namely to balance and check on China and Pakistan. In the SCO, India can strengthen its cooperation with Russia and the CARs to balance the Sino-Pakistani axis without

risking a nuclear escalation (Mayfield, 2022). However, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Russia has struggled to uphold its regional and global power, which turned the internal balance of power in the SCO in favour of China. A China-dominated SCO and a weaker Russia make it more difficult for India to push for its own interests within the SCO (Marjani, 2023).

Third, India can expand its regional power with the SCO in competition to prevent Chinese domination over energy resources and trade routes. In the context of its 'Connect Central Asia Policy', India is interested in improving its relationship with the Central Asian member states, looking for access to their markets, energy security and enhanced transport connectivity through SCO membership (Rehman & Faisal, 2015; Ahmed et al., 2019). On their part, the CARs welcome India as a new partner to diversify their strategic and economic ties from Russia and China because of the former's invasion of Ukraine and the latter's aggression against the ethnic-related Uyghurs in Xinjiang. They also aim to become economically less dependent on the Two (Pant & Wani, 2021). Within the SCO, India aims to pressure Pakistan to allow connectivity between Central Asia and South Asia through the TAPI gas pipeline and to promote trade through the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Indian-funded Chabahar Port in Iran (Wani, 2022). These projects provide cost-effective trade and energy routes for India and the CARs that avoid passage through Chinese territory (Raghavan, 2021). As such, India decreases the region's dependence on China and provides alternatives to Chinese regional projects such as the BRI and the CPEC. Additionally, India increasingly acts as a soft power towards the CARs, as it promotes mutual mobility for students between India and Central Asia (Saini & Jacob, 2022).

Some scholars argue that India's benefits from the SCO are limited. First, the presence of China and Pakistan in the organisation impedes effective cooperation in the SCO (Iwanek, 2020; Marjani, 2023). India's rivalry with these states is structural since its strategic policy has been influenced for long by the realist Mandala theory written by Kautilya in the Arthashastra (3rd C. BCE), a collection of documents on statecraft and military strategy. The Mandala theory posits that

“immediate neighbours are ‘natural’ enemies, and any state on the far side of the neighbouring state is a ‘natural’ ally. Thus my enemy’s enemy is a friend.” (Struye de Swielande, 2012, p. 170). Accordingly, China and Pakistan are natural enemies, while the other SCO member states and Iran are not (Mayfield, 2022). Therefore, the SCO is by some scholars considered as merely another dialogue platform between India, China, and Pakistan (Iwanek, 2020; Marjani, 2023). Second, increasing cooperation between India and other SCO member states outside the SCO framework may imply that India does not even need the SCO. For example, India has strengthened its relations with CARs over the last years through the India-Central Asia Dialogue and India-Central Asia Summit. India’s bilateral ties with Russia also remain strong, as Russia is India’s biggest arms supplier and India has not taken a side in the conflict between Russia and the West (Iwanek, 2020).

5. Case Studies

5.1 Partners or Rivals? India – SCO Security Cooperation

This chapter will first briefly analyse India's security cooperation within the SCO in general and with the CARs and Pakistan. Then, the focus will be on India's security cooperation with China and Russia, the two largest SCO member states and whether India's SCO membership has had an impact on Indo-Chinese and Indo-Russian security cooperation.

5.1.1 India – SCO

Since India's SCO membership, India's focus has been more on the economic and cultural domains, exemplified by the speech of Indian Prime Minister Modi at the 2019 SCO Summit. In the speech, Modi sets out his vision for the SCO with the acronyms HEALTH (i.e. Healthcare cooperation, Economic cooperation, Alternate energy, Literature and culture, Terrorism-free society and Humanitarian cooperation) and SECURE (i.e. Security of citizens, Respect for sovereignty and integrity and Environmental Protection) (Dwivedi & Bawa, 2022). This shows that India is more interested in combatting non-traditional security threats, especially because the country does not often participate in SCO joint military exercises (Saini & Jacob, 2022). India believes that these exercises primarily serve China's and Russia's security concerns. And *if* India participates in joint military exercises, the engagement is fairly low, exemplified by the 2021 Pabbi-Antiterror exercise which India only sent a three-member team to (ET Online, 2021). Therefore, when taking directorship of the RATS in 2021, India broadened the RATS agenda so it would also serve India's security concerns. As such, India put an emphasis on cyberterrorism by strengthening security cooperation with regard to ransomware and digital forensics. India also participated in the joint anti-cyberterrorism 'Xiamen' exercises in 2017 and 2019 to increase interoperability between SCO members to enhance online security (Mikhaylenko et al., 2022). Nevertheless, the SCO security agenda has remained Sino- and Russian-centric over the past years (Saini & Jacob, 2022).

With the CARs, India has scaled up its security cooperation since SCO membership through the joint production and development of military capabilities, the appointment of Defence Attaches in all the CARs, joint military exercises and the establishment of the India-Central Asia Dialogue. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan only reinforced India's incentive for enhanced security cooperation with the CARs, since the US would no longer have to be in the region to counter China's increasing influence. However, most of the security cooperation with the CARs has been on a bilateral basis beyond the SCO framework; the SCO has mainly served India to "bring uniformity and continuity to India's Central Asia engagement. […] India's rationale regarding the SCO and Central Asia is that limited immediate benefits of joining the SCO will be compensated by improved bilateral cooperation with CARs" (Saini & Jacob, 2022, p. 16).

Overshadowed by a long history of war, mutual distrust and ineffective dialogue for conflict resolution, Indo-Pakistani security cooperation has not taken off since their SCO membership in 2017. They both still accuse the other of cross-border terrorism and there have been repeatedly deadly incidents between the two states along the LoC despite an informal ceasefire announced in 2003 (Ahmed et al., 2019; Center for Preventive Action, 2023; Gilani, 2022). Therefore, there are clear parallels between Indo-Chinese and Indo-Pakistani security relations: the SCO is a tool for India to internally balance China and Pakistan within the SCO, while also being a tool for dialogue. However, this opportunity for dialogue has not (yet) resulted in a sustainable resolution for their border conflict or an improvement in their security relations.

5.1.2 India – China

The security relations between India and China are marked by a mix of tensions repeatedly flaring up along the LAC, geopolitical rivalry and converging strategic interests on the one hand, and security cooperation efforts, CBMs and joint military exercises on the other hand. Since 2017, they are both full members of the SCO but that has not brought a big change in their unstable security relations.

Against the backdrop of the 1962 Sino-Indian war and subsequent violent incidents between the two parties, India and China concluded an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC in 1993. This agreement called for peaceful dialogue between the two to settle the territorial disputes along the LAC. The document was followed by the 1996 Agreement on CBMs in the military field that called for reducing military troops, limiting the number of large-scale military exercises along the LAC, and scaling up communication across the LAC. Indo-Chinese relations reached a positive high in 2006 when the two countries signed the first Memorandum of Understanding, aiming for more frequent exchanges between leaders and high-level officials of the Defence Ministries. Additionally, the Memorandum created a framework for joint military exercises and training to enhance mutual trust and understanding between the two. The Memorandum has materialised in the Hand-in-Hand joint military exercises held since 2007, thus giving a positive impulse to Indo-Chinese security cooperation (Das, 2010). Throughout this period, trade between India and China constituted the main domain of Indo-Chinese cooperation, as China had become India's largest trading partner, thus making India highly reliant on China (Roy-Chaudhury, 2018). Despite this revival in Indo-Chinese relations, at the same time, aggressive stand-offs between Indian and Chinese border guards increased throughout this period. According to India, annual violations of the LAC by China increased from 90 in 2000 to 140 in 2007 to 411 in 2013 (Kalyanaraman, 2021).

At the beginning of India's full membership in the SCO, it was hoped to divert Indo-Chinese relations from the border dispute and to de-escalate the situation through the SCO. However, not even one month after India's entry into the SCO, the Chinese and Indian militaries faced each other for more than two months in the Doklam plateau in the Himalayas. After China started infrastructure works in disputed territory between the two states, India deployed troops to the area to halt China's construction works (Wuthnow, Limaye & Samaranayake, 2018). Since 2020, there have been repeatedly deadly clashes between India and China in the Kashmir region and military troops are still heavily deployed across both sides (Singh, 2022a; Shukla, 2023). According to Indian intelligence services, China has

already occupied almost 1000 km² of de facto Indian land since the resurgence of violence in 2020 (Sridhar, 2023). This is a stark difference from the relatively peaceful relations in the 1990s and 2000s.

Apart from aggressive incursions along the LAC, India's strategic partnerships with the US, Japan and Australia – both bilaterally and within the Quad – have also strained relations with China. While the SCO facilitates joint military operations with China and deepens cooperation with Russia and the CARs, the aim of India's cooperation with its Western partners is to soft-balance China in Asia. These partnerships are needed, since India is not (yet) capable of guaranteeing its survival amid security threats from China and Pakistan: India's defence expenditure accounted for only 26% of China's in 2018 (Bekkevold & Kalyanaraman, 2021).

Because of mutual security concerns about each other, effective security cooperation between India and China is unlikely in the foreseeable future, despite both being full members of the SCO. The emergence of India in the multipolar international system makes it challenging for the two states to find a balance between cooperation and competition as their mutual security concerns have "expanded from subversion to territorial integrity to geopolitical interests in South Asia and now to the Asian order itself" (Kalyanaraman, 2021, p. 67). Thus, the SCO has not had an impact on Indo-Chinese security cooperation; it is rather another policy tool to soft balance and keep each other in check in the new multipolar world order (Saini & Jacob, 2022).

5.1.3 India – Russia

Right after the implosion of the USSR, Indo-Russian security cooperation was on a low level since Russia was domestically struggling with the shift from a communist to a capitalist economy and Russia's focus was more on the Western. In India, the 1991 financial crisis was exacerbated by sudden expiring economic arrangements with the USSR and plummeting arms imports from Russia. But since Putin took the presidential office in Russia, Indo-Russian security cooperation was reinvigorated by signing the Declaration on Strategic Partnership in 2000. The SP set up annual

bilateral summits and inter-governmental ministerial commissions, including one for defence cooperation. This defence cooperation materialised in India's purchases of Russian "Su-30MKI aircraft, a range of helicopters, T-90 tanks, armoured vehicles, missile systems, stealth frigates, and diesel-electric submarines" (Raghavan, 2021, p. 230). They also established a joint initiative 'Brahmos' to develop and manufacture military capabilities together. Defence cooperation with Russia was further strengthened by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi from 2014 on: the two states envisioned long-term security cooperation, including joint military training and exercises, visits of high-level officials and India's purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system among other military material (Raghavan, 2021). Modi and Putin also agreed to produce Russian Kamov-226 helicopters in India, as part of Modi's 'Make in India' defence policy to make India more self-sufficient and strategically autonomous (Meena, 2017).

Since 2003, India and Russia have held the INDRA joint military exercise every two years to enhance security cooperation between the two militaries. Even during the war in Ukraine, the INDRA exercise is scheduled in 2023, showing India's independent foreign policy and its non-compliance with the Western sanctions against Russia (TASS, 2023). Another example of India's multi-aligned foreign policy is its participation in the Russian military exercise 'Vostok' for the first time in August 2022. While the war in Ukraine was going on and Western states imposed sanctions against Russia, India cooperated with Russia in the military exercise. However, India's participation has to be nuanced, as the 50 000 participating troops included 'only' 75 Indians. Additionally, India did not send any Navy vessels since that would strain relations with its Quad partner Japan (Menon & Rumer, 2022).

Indo-Russian security cooperation has for long been based on the supply of military capabilities and advanced military technologies from Russia to India. During the Cold War, the USSR was already India's biggest arms supplier, accounting for 66% of Indian arms imports from 1955 to 1991. Since the implosion of the USSR, Russia continued this trend by supplying 65% of India's arms from 1992 to 2021 (Menon & Rumer, 2022). However, India's dependence on Russian arms has declined since

its SCO full membership in 2017. Between 2012 and 2016, 69% of India's arms were imported from Russia, whereas between 2017 and 2021, 46% were Russian-made, marking a drop of 23% between the two periods. To diversify its arms imports, India has relied more on France, the US and Israel, as their share in India's arms imports in 2021 was double that in 2017. The decline in Russian imports is due to Russia's strengthening partnership with China, India's rival, and India might import even less following the poor performance of Russian defence material in the war in Ukraine (The Economist, 2022). Nevertheless, because of the high reliance on Russia for arms supplies in the past, today's military arsenal of India consists primarily of Russian-made materials.



Figure 3. Arms imports to India by country, %. (The Economist, 2022)

Regarding geopolitics, India was the USSR's main partner against the US-China-Pakistan axis during the Cold War but Indo-Russian relations have changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. While India has drawn closer to the US in the security realm, Russia has sought a more enhanced partnership with China. Yet, a closer Sino-Russian relationship does not exclude close Indo-Russian relations, just like the US-Pakistan partnership does not exclude India's close ties with the US (Iwanek, 2023). The closer Sino-Russian partnership has urged India to keep relations with Russia stable "to ensure that Russia retains a sufficiently strong stake in relations [with India] to withstand pressures from China to act against India's political and security interests" (Raghavan, 2021, p. 244). Therefore, India has been reluctant to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as New Delhi has abstained from all UN declarations against Russia. In its Annual Report, India called "for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an end to the violence and

urged both sides to return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue" (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2023a, p. 96). At the same time, Russia wants to prevent China from becoming the ultimate hegemon on the continent, especially in Central Asia, thus sharing a common objective with India. In that regard, it was Russia that supported SCO membership for India "as a way to diminish the outsized role of China's economic power within the group" (Rowden, 2018, p. 7). Therefore, Russia is India's most important partner for security cooperation within the SCO amid security threats from China and Pakistan and to balance China's power in the region (Menon & Rumer, 2022).

5.1.4 Evaluation of India-SCO Security Cooperation

Full SCO membership did not have a large impact on India's security cooperation with the SCO as a whole, as India's security cooperation in the SCO has been focused on combatting non-traditional security threats. Yet, SCO membership did have an impact on bilateral security cooperation, depending on with which SCO member state.

India uses the SCO as a platform to strengthen its bilateral security cooperation with the CARs and to expand its influence in Central Asia. As such, India gains access to strategically important energy resources and trade routes. Based on the hegemony stability theory, India has taken more often the role of a regional hegemon within the SCO in relation to the CARs to expand its power in Central Asia. India's bilateral security cooperation with Russia has also been strengthened by arms purchases and joint military exercises. From a neorealist perspective, Russia and India are crucial for each other in the SCO to have the regional balance of power in their favour. Yet, it is not only SCO membership that has strengthened bilateral security cooperation with the CARs and Russia. Also India's multi-aligned foreign policy under the Modi presidency and the new regional security environment with the rise of China have driven India to strengthen its partnerships with the CARs and Russia.

On the other hand, the SCO has failed to ease the Indo-Chinese and Indo-Pakistani tensions. Before India's full membership, relations with its two rivals were marked by a mix of confidence-building and conflicts along the LAC and the LoC. This tendency continued, even though India, Pakistan, and China are all SCO members. Therefore, the SCO did not have any considerable impact on Indo-Chinese and Indo-Pakistani security cooperation; it can be considered as another CBM to enhance mutual trust, while conflicts are still ongoing.

5.2 The Long and Winding Road for India – US Security Cooperation

This chapter discusses the evolution of Indo-American security cooperation and it examines whether India's full SCO membership in 2017 has impacted bilateral security cooperation.

5.2.1 Security Cooperation before India's SCO Membership

In the years after India's independence in 1947, Indo-American security ties were strained because of mainly three reasons. First, the US was the ally of neighbouring Pakistan, up to the extent that the US sent military naval troops to the Indian coast to support Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, ready to attack India if necessary. Second and relatedly, despite India's leading status in the Non-Aligned Movement, the country had more favourable relations with the USSR, as shown by the military assistance by the USSR during the same 1971 war to India and the arms supplies from the USSR to India. Third, India's aspirations to obtain nuclear weapons, which are driven by threat perceptions from Pakistan, also strained relations with Washington: India's first nuclear tests in 1974 led the US to impose sanctions on India (Singh, 2022b).

But with the end of the Cold War, India no longer enjoyed financial support from the USSR and was urged to find new economic and security partners. Therefore, India started to engage more with the US, as it accepted the 1991 Kicklighter proposals from the US. These proposals aimed for enhanced military-to-military

cooperation, concretised by the first joint naval 'Malabar' exercises in 1992 (Khattak, 1992; Sood, 2020). By June 2023, the Indo-American Malabar exercises have been held 26 times with additional permanent participation from Japan since 2015 and Australia since 2020. Japan's and Australia's participation in these former bilateral naval exercises fit in the broader picture of the Quad (Indian Ministry of Defence, 2022).

However, the nuclear issue overshadowed closer security cooperation between India and the US in the 1990s, as the US disapproved of India's status as a non-signatory party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. India's 1998 nuclear tests escalated these tensions even more and caused the US to impose sanctions and halt the Malabar exercise. Yet, the Clinton administration managed to ease tensions by lifting the sanctions fairly quickly and arranging a presidential visit to New Delhi in 2000, during which President Clinton called India a 'natural ally' of the US (Kronstadt & Pinto, 2013). Since then, Indo-American security cooperation improved considerably by signing the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002 and launching the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative in 2004. The GSOMIA is the first foundational defence agreement with the US that enhances intelligence-sharing between the US and Indian military, whereas the NSSP expanded security cooperation in missile defence and the exchange of technologies between the two states (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2005; Singh, 2022b).

In 2005, India and the US entered a new phase of their security cooperation with the 'New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship'. This framework aimed to expand cooperation in military exercises and operations, defence and technology trade, missile defence, peacekeeping operations, intelligence-sharing, and exchanges of defence strategies (US Government & Government of India, 2005). The common values of India and the US "– democracy, mutual respect, individual liberty, rule of law, and an appreciation for the strength we derive from being pluralistic societies –" form the fundaments of the India-US security cooperation to battle global security challenges (US Department of State, 2010,

para. 4). In practice, the framework aimed to foster the stabilisation process of Afghanistan, the war against terror, and a nuclear-free world (US Department of State, 2010). Soon after the 2005 framework for defence cooperation, India and the US resolved their nuclear issue with the 2006 Civil Nuclear Deal, clearing the way for further security cooperation.

Despite their increasing security cooperation, India and the US share divergent opinions on several issues, which hindered closer security ties from time to time. The first issue is Pakistan. Right after the Cold War, the US tried to conduct a balanced policy towards India and Pakistan, but it soon realised that supporting both sides would impede further security cooperation with India. Therefore, the US recalibrated its policy more towards India in the late 1990s, despite India's nuclear tests in 1998. However, in the wake of 9/11, the US named Pakistan a Major Non-NATO Ally because the country is crucial for fostering regional stability and combatting terrorism in Afghanistan (Pande, 2022). But since 2011, the US has grown more aware of Pakistan's low effort in counterterrorism, especially after NATO troops were attacked by Pakistani-based terrorists. Second, the nuclear issue and, relatedly, India's stance on Iran are also issues on which the US and India diverge in opinion. India has supported Iran's right to the use of nuclear energy for long, thereby withstanding pressures from the US to impose severe sanctions on the country. On the contrary, India maintains good ties with Iran and has continued imports of goods and products from the country. Third, India and the US share the same democratic values but the priority given to them and their application diverge between the two. As such, still marked by its colonial history, India prioritises non-interference in domestic affairs by foreign countries above liberal and democratic values. Therefore, India did not support the US intervention in Iraq and the international sanctions regime against Iran, Myanmar, and today Russia (Kronstadt & Pinto, 2013).

5.2.2 Mid 2010s as a Catalysator

At the beginning of 2015, India and the US published their Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, marking the US pivot shift to Asia.

One of the provisions in their vision is to safeguard maritime security in the South China Sea; a direct reference to China's growing aggression in this area (The White House, 2015). Thus, the US considers sees India as a natural defence partner in the Asian security architecture to contain the rise of China.

Later in 2015, India and the US renewed their 2005 defence framework, adding co-development and co-production of military material under the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative to the existing security cooperation (Express News Service, 2015). The renewal came one month before India's application for full membership in the SCO. Thus, India's renewed long-term security cooperation with the US came simultaneously with its application for full SCO membership. That shows that India seeks security partnerships with various actors at the same time, enabling India to develop and retain its strategic autonomy.

In 2016, fourteen years after GSOMIA, the second fundamental defence agreement was signed between India and the US: the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). This agreement "allows for exchange of logistics support, supplies and services between the two countries' armed forces. This includes food, water, fuel, spare parts, repair, transportation, communication and medical services" (Lakshmi, 2016, para. 11). In addition to the renewed defence framework and LEMOA, India and the US conducted more joint military exercises in 2015-2016: the 'Yudh Abhyas' bilateral army exercises, and India's participation in the multinational 'Red Flag' air force exercises and 'Rim of the Pacific' naval exercises (Pande, 2022). This marks the reinvigoration of India-US security cooperation, which will be further expanded after India's SCO full membership.

5.2.3 Security Cooperation after SCO Membership

Despite becoming a member of the SCO that includes China and Russia, which are the main competitors of the US, India continues to enhance security cooperation with the US because of their shared security interest to counter China. In 2018, a year after its SCO membership, India was granted License Exception Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 (STA-1) by the US, making India the third Asian country –

after Japan and South Korea – to receive this status. An STA-1 status enhances supply chain efficiency for military and high-tech products (Singh, 2022b). Shortly afterwards during the first '2+2' dialogue (i.e. a meeting between India's External Affairs Minister and Defence Minister and the US Secretary of State and Secretary of Defence), the two states signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), the third foundational defence agreement after GSOMIA and LEMOA. COMCASA provides "a legal framework for the transfer of communication security equipment from the United States to India which would facilitate encrypted communication between their forces" (Singh, 2022b, p. 121). This enables India and the US to engage in real-time information-sharing and enhance interoperability. Additionally, India and the US agreed to hold their first 'Tiger Triumph' joint exercise in 2019, involving the three branches of their armed forces (i.e. land, air, and naval forces) (Mason, 2021).

Finally in 2020, the last of the four fundamental defence agreements was signed: the Basis Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). BECA enables the sharing of "geospatial information on maps and satellites for defence purposes" between India and the US (Javaid, 2020). Having signed GSOMIA, LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA, India is now able to acquire high-tech weapons and communication systems from the US (ET Online, 2018). These developments serve both US and India's geopolitical interests. On the one hand, the US benefits from a militarily stronger India, as it can balance China in Asia. India, on the other hand, becomes strategically autonomous, being able to face regional security threats and ensure its survival. However, India's closer security ties with the US do not exclude closer ties with other partners, such as Russia, as shown in the previous chapter. Therefore, it is crucial to understand that India diversifies its security cooperation to ensure its strategic autonomy and not only puts its bets on one security partner.

Despite being created in 2004, the Quad – the multilateral security dialogue consisting of the democratic states US, India, Japan, and Australia – has started to enhance its security cooperation from 2017 amid the rising power of China. The Quad was created to promote the liberal and democratic rules-based international

order in the Indo-Pacific region and to balance China's regional and global power. These driving factors are still the Quad's priorities, as shown in the Quad Leaders' Joint Statement of May 2023 with their vision on the Indo-Pacific. This excerpt highlights the importance of a rules-based world order and refers implicitly to China as a regional coercer:

> We believe all countries have a role in contributing to regional peace, stability, and prosperity, as well as upholding international law, including the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the rules-based international order. We seek a region where no country dominates and no country is dominated – one where all countries are free from coercion, and can exercise their agency to determine their futures. Our four countries are united by this shared vision. (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2023b, para. 2).

Yet, India usually refrains from promoting democratic and liberal values to third states because of its non-alignment legacy and respect for the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. Related to the non-alignment legacy, India is still not keen to join a formal alliance with other states, which makes the Quad a suitable platform for India since the security grouping does not have a legally binding provision of collective defence or collective security. For India, balancing China was the most important driver for its renewed engagement with the Quad in 2017, as China had become economically and strategically more powerful with the BRI and its growing aggression in the South China Sea and along the LAC. The timing of India's renewed interest in the Quad is remarkable, as it came a few months after it became a full member of the SCO. This is another sign of India's multi-alignment foreign policy to ensure its strategic autonomy and regional hegemony (Miller, 2021).

5.2.4 Evaluation of India-US Security Cooperation

The Indo-American partnership has come a long and winding road since India's independence in 1947. During the Cold War, diverging security interests, the US alliance with Pakistan, and India's aspirations to obtain nuclear weapons impeded effective security cooperation between the two states. The end of the Cold War gave

both states the incentive to engage with each other in the security realm by conducting joint military exercises and signing important legal agreements, such as the GSOMIA and the 2005 New Framework for their security cooperation. However, disagreements over Pakistan and nuclear weapons were still ongoing in the decades after the end of the Cold War. One decade later, Indo-American security cooperation gain momentum, as they see their security interests converge in countering the rise of China. India and the US scale their security cooperation up by holding more joint exercises and signing LEMOA.

At the same time as India's full SCO membership in 2017, India's engagement in the Quad increases as well as its bilateral security cooperation with the US by signing COMCASA and BECA. Therefore, it can be concluded that India's full SCO membership did not have a negative impact on India's security cooperation with the US, thus dismissing the second hypothesis. On the contrary, Indo-American security cooperation has accelerated since 2017. From a neorealist perspective, the security cooperation between India and the US is primarily based on balancing China, both regionally and globally. Security cooperation with the US is thus strategically crucial for India, as the country can increase its military capacities to ensure its survival amid the Chinese and Pakistani threat. However, Indo-American security cooperation could be impeded by India's strengthening partnerships with undemocratic SCO member states, such as Russia. These tendencies are part of India's multi-aligned foreign policy, as the country does not fully rely on the US but also diversifies its partnerships with full membership in the SCO.

5.3 India – EU Security Cooperation

This chapter discusses the security cooperation between India and the EU and it examines the potential impacts of India's full SCO membership in 2017 on India-EU security cooperation.

5.3.1 Security Cooperation before India's SCO Membership

After India and the European Community established diplomatic relations in 1962, they upgraded their relationship in 1994 with the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development that aimed to enhance cooperation in trade, energy, science, development and other domains, excluding the security and defence sector. Democracy, human rights and India's economic development have stood central in this partnership since its beginning. The EU considers India as a democratic partner in South Asia, as the country has been a democracy with free press, separation of powers and the same values and beliefs as the EU since India's independence in 1947 (Council of the EU & Government of India, 1994; European Commission, 1996).

Bilateral summits have been held annually since 2000 and the EU established a Strategic Partnership[5] with India in 2004 to expand their economic and development cooperation into the political and strategic domains (European Commission, 2004). "In contrast to alliances and security pacts, SPs promote close cooperation without forcing any of the partners to choose a side in any current or prospective conflict that each one of them might be involved" (Kavalski, 2021, p. 203). In the 2004 Joint Press Statement for the 5th India-EU Summit in the Hague, India and the EU announced a dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and strengthened security cooperation in countering terrorism. However, this security cooperation against terrorism is rather rhetorical (EU & Government of India, 2004). They were also reluctant to cooperate on conflict resolution and peace operations, as they "consider regular exchange of views on possibilities for co-operation on themes like resolution of conflicts, peace operations and reconstruction" (EU & Government of India, 2004, p. 2).

The rhetoric of the SP was concretised in the 2005 India-EU Joint Action Plan (JAP). Identifying their shared security concerns about terrorism and WMD, the

[5] As of May 2023, the EU has ten SPs with third states: Brazil (2007), Canada (2017), China (2003), India (2004), Japan (2018), Mexico (2008), South Africa (2007), South Korea (2010), Russia (informal SP since 1994), and the US (1990) (Ferreira-Pereira & Smith, 2021).

JAP calls for an expanded dialogue on these issues between India and the EU, as it establishes a bilateral India-EU Security Dialogue "to increase mutual understanding and identify possible areas of cooperation" (Council of the EU & Government of India, 2005, p. 5). Also with regard to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, the JAP calls for increasing the exchange of views to explore potential avenues for security cooperation and supports effective multilateralism of the UN to deal with these issues. Apart from the rhetoric of expanding dialogue, India and the EU call for security cooperation in intelligence sharing between, on the one hand, the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Europol, and on the other, the Anti-Terrorist coordinators of India and the EU, which would be the first concrete instances of security cooperation between the two (Council of the EU & Government of India, 2005). However, as of 2018, the intelligence sharing between Europol and the CBI was still not in function (European Commission & EEAS, 2018a).

In 2010, India and the EU expressed their shared concerns over terrorism in the Joint Declaration on International Terrorism, calling for enhanced cooperation to counter terrorism (EU & Government of India, 2010). The EU had such a declaration on terrorism only with the US at the time, showing the importance of India as an international partner to counter terrorism (Khandekar, 2012). Contrary to counterterrorist cooperation, there was no cooperation to counter piracy between the two before 2012, even though India and the EU had been both militarily present in the Indian Ocean since 2008 (Racine, 2012). But since 2012, cybersecurity and also cooperation in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia have been included in the India-EU security dialogue. As such, India and the EU have agreed to share piracy-related intelligence in the framework of the European Union Naval Force's (EUNAVFOR) 'Atalanta' mission in the Gulf of Aden (Council of the EU & Government of India, 2012). The mandate of Operation Atalanta includes the protection of the World Food Programme (WFP), humanitarian aid and vulnerable shipping, the prevention of piracy and armed robbery and the monitoring of fishing activities in the area (Struye de Swielande, 2012).

Before India entered the SCO in 2017, India-SCO security cooperation had been limited to *mere* dialogue on non-traditional security threats, as they aim to counter terrorism, the proliferation of WDM, piracy and cybercrime. It was believed that exchanges of views and dialogue would reduce divergences and create incentives for more cooperation.

5.3.2 2016 as a Turning Point

Following the start of India's SCO membership procedure in 2015 and in the context of the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the EU scaled up its security cooperation with India at the 2016 EU-India Summit in Brussels by renewing the 2005 JAP in the EU-India Agenda for Action-2020 and reinforcing the fight against terrorism with a new joint declaration. The Agenda for Action-2020 sets out a long-term vision of bilateral cooperation, aiming to enhance the existing working groups on counterterrorism, disarmament/non-proliferation of WMD, cybersecurity and counterpiracy, to reach tangible results. The Agenda calls to explore new areas of cooperation, such as peacekeeping, peacebuilding and countering international organised crime (EU & Government of India, 2016a).

The 2016 Joint Declaration on the Fight against Terrorism calls for enhanced cooperation against terrorism and emphasises the importance of multilateral fora to counter this international security threat. In practice, India-EU security cooperation against terrorism would entail blocking financial flows and arms supplies to terrorist organisations (EU & Government of India, 2016b). During a speech in 2016, Tomasz Kozlowski, the EU Ambassador in India from 2015 until 2019, links the enhanced security cooperation with India to the rise of China and the increasingly multipolar international system, in which India is a democratic regional partner of the EU. Both India and the EU look for partners abroad to gain power in the changing multipolar international system to prevent China from becoming an outspoken (regional) hegemon, as the power of the US is declining (Kozlowski, 2016).

5.3.3 Security Cooperation after India's SCO Membership

Since India became a full member of the SCO in June 2017, India-EU security cooperation has strengthened, especially in the maritime security domain. The Indian Ocean is a common interest of the EU and India since more than one-third of European exports pass the Indian Ocean and almost 90% of Indian energy flows through this ocean (Winn, 2021). In October 2017, India and EUNAVFOR conducted their first joint naval manoeuvre, a naval passing exercise (PASSEX) (EU & Government of India, 2017). A PASSEX requires "cooperation, communication and interoperability between two or more navies, testing advanced ship maneuvring and tactics […] to develop a greater trust, understanding and respect for each other's unique capabilities" (US Navy, 2020, para. 2). Additionally, India escorted for the first time a WFP shipment through the Indian Ocean to Somalia in support of the Atalanta mission in 2018 (EEAS, 2019).

India's growing importance for the EU can be traced in the 2018 first-ever EU Strategy on India, which emphasises that security cooperation with India is based on their common democratic values, respect for human rights, and effective multilateralism within the UN and other international fora (e.g. G20, World Trade Organisation). The 2018 Strategy on India aims for closer security cooperation with India, consisting of the development of military capabilities, military-to-military relations, and joint missions in the EU framework of the newly-established Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017. The strategy also calls to deepen technical cooperation between India and the EU in the four existing security domains (i.e. counterterrorism, counterpiracy, disarmament/non-proliferation of WMD and cybersecurity) and widen cooperation to crisis management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (European Commission & EEAS, 2018a).

The new strategy is part of the new EU's 'Connecting Europe and Asia' strategy as both continents are growing more interdependent: Asia accounted in 2018 for 45% of the EU's imports and 35% of its exports (European Commission & EEAS, 2018b). This growing interdependence creates more incentives to engage in security cooperation more actively with each other since instability in Asia could also affect

the EU: the South China Sea, the Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Aden are important waterways for EU trade. Therefore, India is a crucial Asian partner for the EU, since the country could form an alternative democratic security provider to China and foster a peaceful and stable environment in the Indo-Pacific (European Commission & EEAS, 2021). From a neorealist perspective, the 2018 Strategy on India considers India as "a crucial geopolitical pillar in a multipolar Asia, crucial for maintaining the balance of power in the region" (Mohan, 2022, p. 255).

At the 15th EU-India Summit in 2020, a common roadmap to 2025 was set up, showing the EU's and India's long-term engagement in their partnership. That contrasts with the period prior to 2016 when there was a lack of a common long-term vision since the 2005 JAP. The roadmap to 2025 includes the already existing domains of security but also explicitly calls for deeper cooperation between the EUNAVFOR and the Indian Navy in support of the Atalanta mission. The roadmap also replaces the counterpiracy dialogue with a maritime security dialogue to broaden the scope of future maritime cooperation, including countering maritime drugs and arms smuggling (EU & Government of India, 2020). This enhanced maritime security cooperation is also highlighted in the EU's 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy and its 2022 Strategic Compass. In practice, the EUNAVFOR and the Indian Navy conducted a joint exercise in June 2021 which "included cross-deck helicopter landings, complex tactical evolutions at sea, live firing, a night-time joint patrol and a naval parade in the high seas off the coast of Somalia" (EEAS, 2021). It is crucial to note that the EU did not only enhance maritime security cooperation with India but also with Japan, Djibouti, Oman, Pakistan and South Korea over recent years (Fiott & Cullman, 2022).

However, countering piracy and other non-traditional maritime security threats is not necessarily the most important objective of this enhanced EU-India maritime security cooperation. From a neorealist perspective, geopolitical powers act according to the theory of Mahan: "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided upon its waters…" (Mahan in Struye de Swielande, 2012, p. 167). The increased deployment of

counterpiracy vessels in the Indian Ocean is a display of power and most states (including China, Russia, and Iran) initially act alone because of mutual mistrust among one another. Their ultimate goal is to decrease US dominance of the seas and to expand their power in the international system. As the results of unilateral counterpiracy efforts have been disappointing, states have started to appreciate the benefits of cooperation with each other, which explains the shift from initial unilateral efforts of the EU and India since 2008 to the start of their cooperation in 2012 (Struye de Swielande, 2012).

5.3.4 Evaluation of India-EU Security Cooperation

Prior to India's SCO membership in 2017, there has not been big progress in terms of India-EU security cooperation. This can be explained by several factors. First, the fragmentation of defence cooperation within the EU leads India to consider the EU not as a unified entity, but rather as a group of separate states. India still looked at Europe from a Cold War perspective, i.e. divided between Western and Eastern Europe, and not as a collective (Mohan, 2022). Therefore, India was for joint exercises and arms supplies more bilaterally engaged with EU member states instead of collectively with the EU. As such, France and the UK were India's biggest EU defence partners in the period before 2014 (Lisbonne de Vergeron, 2015). Second, the EU lacked a clear and effective strategy for the Indo-Pacific region at the time, which came only in 2021. Third, the EU's response to the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks came across in India as uncompassionate, as the EU increased aid funds to Pakistan, a breeding ground for terrorism according to India. The EU had always been reluctant to criticise Pakistan, while some member states (i.e. the UK, France and Germany) *have* expressed criticism towards Pakistan and support for India (Khandekar, 2012). Pakistan is an important partner of the West in order to create a stable situation in neighbouring Afghanistan, hence the EU's reluctance to criticise the country (Price, 2016). Fourth, priorities diverged between the EU and India: the EU considered piracy as its main challenge, whereas for India, it was Pakistan, China and the related terrorism that formed the biggest security challenges (Struye de Swielande, 2012). This explains closer security cooperation with the US that shared the same security concerns (Kavalski, 2021). Fifth, India

strongly abided by the legacy of the Non-Aligned Movement and was hence reluctant to deepen military cooperation with any actor in the international system (Sakhuja, 2012).

India-EU security cooperation has gained momentum since 2016 because of shifted perceptions of each party about the other. First, India started to consider Europe as a collective and tightened relations with EU member states that the country had previously un(der)explored. Bilateral ties between India and the Scandinavian, Central and Eastern member states were reinvigorated, which benefited relations with the EU as a whole (Mohan, 2022). Regarding security cooperation, the establishment of PESCO has integrated defence cooperation among EU member states, which would facilitate EU security cooperation with third states, such as India. As of May 2023, Norway, Canada and the US already cooperate with PESCO, while India's participation in PESCO is being discussed (Outlook Web Desk, 2022). Second, India has been interested in enhancing cooperation with the EU because India realises that the EU could be a crucial partner to reach its foreign policy objectives, especially to compete with China in Asia. From the EU perspective, tensions with China have led the EU to diversify its relations with democratic partners, such as India, to bring the regional balance of power in favour of the EU.

Additionally, since the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU has realised that it should reduce its dependence on autocratic regimes, such as China and Russia, incentivising the EU to strengthen its ties with India (Mohan, 2022). Moreover, the EU shifted its position on Pakistan, as it has taken action against Pakistani terrorists and terrorist organisations, following several terror attacks in Europe (Jain & Sachdeva, 2019). This EU action in solidarity with India "sent a strong political signal that Pakistan was harbouring a terrorist and helped in further isolating Pakistan on the world stage" (Mukherjee, 2020, p. 143). As such, the EU's security priorities have converged with those of India, compared to the period before 2016.

The effect of India's SCO membership is limited, as India-EU security cooperation has considerably improved since 2016, as shown by the enhanced maritime security cooperation between the two. This tendency dismisses the second hypothesis. It may be the case that the start of India's full SCO membership process signalled the EU to take steps to tighten security ties with India to prevent India from choosing the NDRO over its democratic partners in the West. Although the EU has not explicitly referred to India's full membership in the SCO, the timing of the EU Strategy on India is remarkable: it comes one year after India became a full member of the SCO. India's SCO membership is part of the bigger picture: the multipolar international system, in which India aims to balance between its neighbours and the democratic West. In this new world order, the EU considers India as its democratic regional partner in Asia, incentivising the EU to tighten relations with India so China will not be able to fully dominate the Asian continent. Therefore, the regional and global emergence of China may be the biggest driver to enhance India-EU security cooperation after 2017, not India's full SCO membership.

6. Conclusion

This master's thesis has aimed to examine whether India's full SCO membership since 2017 has had an impact on India's security cooperation within the SCO, and with the US and the EU. These three analysed cases of India's security cooperation show India's increasing efforts to diversify and strengthen its security partnerships as part of India's multi-aligned foreign policy.

First, India's security cooperation within the SCO as a whole has remained limited since 2017. That is mainly because India's clashing security perceptions and mutual mistrust with China and Pakistan prevail over the SCO's possible institutional benefits for security cooperation, which confirms the existing literature (Iwanek, 2020; Marjani, 2023). Yet, the SCO has been a platform for India to enhance bilateral security ties with Russia and the CARs. As India develops partnerships with these SCO members, it may turn the regional balance of power to India's favour at the expense of the China-Pakistan axis. Second, although India acceded the SCO as a democracy, the country was not impeded to enhance its security ties with its democratic partners in the West: the US and the EU. After 2017, India concluded the four fundamental defence agreements with the US and increased its cooperative efforts with the EU to enhance maritime security. Therefore, the India's full SCO membership did not have any considerable impact on security cooperation with the US and the EU.

Since 2017, India has more often played on its multi-aligned foreign and security policy. The South Asian giant enhanced security cooperation simultaneously with the US, the EU and its neighbourhood, so it does not become too dependent on one partner. India can, for example, side with the SCO on cybersecurity, while it can cooperate with the EU for maritime security, depending on which partner serves India's interest the best. Therefore, the SCO is just another tool for India's multi-aligned foreign policy, as SCO membership does not exclude security cooperation with the US and the EU. By diversifying its security partnerships, India manages to retain its strategic autonomy in today's more complex multipolar international

system. Especially the rising power of China and the ongoing conflicts with China and Pakistan have driven India to strengthen its security ties with its partners.

Concerning avenues for future research, the SCO will soon include Iran. It might be thus interesting to examine Iran's position in the RO. Future research could also examine the impact of India's SCO membership on other domains of cooperation with the US and the EU, such as environmental, energy, and economic cooperation.

7. Bibliography

7.1 Primary Sources

Council of the EU & Government of India. (1994*). Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on partnership and development* (No. 21994A0827(01)). EUR-Lex. Retrieved April 4, 2023, from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A21994A0827%2801%29

Council of the EU & Government of India. (2005). *The India-EU Strategic Partnership: Joint Action Plan* (No. 11984/05). Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/india/eu_india/political_relations/strategic_partnership/index_en.htm

Council of the EU & Government of India. (2012). *India-EU Summit – Joint Statement* [Press release]. Retrieved April 4, 2023, from https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/india/eu_india/political_relations/strategic_partnership/index_en.htm

CSTO. (1992, May 15). *Collective Security Treaty, dated May 15, 1992*. Collective Security Treaty Organization. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/

EEAS. (2019, January 25). *European Union Naval Forces - Port visit to Mumbai*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/57118_en

EU & Government of India. (2004). *Joint Press Statement for 5th India-EU Summit* [Press release]. Retrieved April 4, 2023, from https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/india/eu_india/political_relations/strategic_partnership/index_en.htm

EU & Government of India. (2010). *EU-India Summit: Joint Statement* [Press release]. Retrieved April 4, 2023, from https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/india/eu_india/political_relations/strategic_partnership/index_en.htm

EU & Government of India. (2016a). *EU-India Agenda for Action-2020.* Retrieved April 4, 2023, from https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?53/Bilateral/Multilateral_Documents

EU & Government of India. (2016b). *India-EU Joint Declaration on the Fight against Terrorism*. Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/3538_en

EU & Government of India. (2017). *India-EU Joint Statement: 14th India-EU Summit, New Delhi, 6 October 2017.* Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/10/06/

EU & Government of India. (2020). *EU-India Strategic Partnership: a Roadmap to 2025.* Retrieved April 6, 2023, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-india-strategic-partnership-roadmap-2025_en

European Commission. (1996). *EU-India Enhanced Partnership* (No. 51996DC0275). EUR-Lex. Retrieved April 4, 2023, from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A51996DC0275&qid=1686250906787

European Commission. (2004). *An EU-India Strategic Partnership* (No. 52004DC0430). EUR-Lex. Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52004DC0430&qid=1686251151623

European Commission & EEAS. (2018a). *Elements for an EU Strategy on India* (No. 52018JC0028). EUR-Lex. Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018JC0028&qid=1686251973076

European Commission & EEAS. (2018b). *Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy* (No. 52018JC0031). EUR-Lex. Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018JC0031&qid=1686291399984

European Commission & EEAS. (2021). *The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific* (No. 52021JC0024). EUR-Lex. Retrieved April 6, 2023, from

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021JC0024&qid=1686292911611

Fiott, D., & Cullman, L. (2022). Yearbook of European Security 2022 (QN-AJ-22-001-EN-N). European Union Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved May 4, 2023, from https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b94e0437-ab4e-11ed-b508-01aa75ed71a1

Indian Ministry of Defence. (2022, November 16). *Malabar 22 Culminates* [Press release]. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1876424

Indian Ministry of External Affairs. (2005, July 18). *India and United States Successfully Complete Next Steps in Strategic Partnership* [Press release]. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6789/India+and+United+States+Successfully+Complete+Next+Steps+in+Strategic+Partnership

Indian Ministry of External Affairs. (2023a). *Ministry of External Affairs: Annual Report 2022*. Ministry of External Affairs. Retrieved April 6, 2023, from https://mea.gov.in/Annual_Reports.htm?57/Annual_Reports

Indian Ministry of External Affairs. (2023b, May 20). *Quad Leaders' Joint Statement*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36571/Quad_Leaders_Joint_Statement

Kozlowski, T. (2016, November 3). *A closer EU-India partnership – The potential for closer EU-India cooperation in the security and global governance domains* [Speech].

SCO. (2001). *Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.* Retrieved April 5, 2023, from http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/

SCO. (n.d.). *General Information*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from http://eng.sectsco.org/cooperation/

US Department of State. (2010, June 14). *U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement* [Press release]. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/142645.htm

US Government & Government of India. (2005). *New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship.*

US Navy. (2020, October 7). *USS Gabrielle Giffords, Salvadoran Forces Conduct Passing Exercise*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2375103/uss-gabrielle-giffords-salvadoran-forces-conduct-passing-exercise/

The White House. (2015, June 30). *U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian* [Press release]. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asia-pacific-and-indian-ocean-region

7.2 Secondary Sources

Adler, E., & Barnett, M. (1998). Security communities in theoretical perspective. In E. Adler, & M. Barnett (Eds.), *Security Communities* (pp. 3-28). Cambridge University Press.

Adler, E., & Greve, P. (2009). When security community meets balance of power: overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance. *Review of International Studies*, *35*(S1), 59–84. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210509008432

Ahmad, I. (2018). Shanghai Cooperation Organization: China, Russia, and Regionalism in Central Asia. In H. Loewen, & A. Zorob (Eds.), *Initiatives of Regional Integration in Asia in Comparative Perspective* (pp. 119–135). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1211-6_6

Ahmed, Z., Ahmed, S., & Bhatnagar, S. (2019). Conflict or Cooperation? India and Pakistan in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. *Pacific Focus*, *34*(1), 5–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12134

Aris, S. (2009). The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A Regional Response to Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc? *Europe-Asia Studies*, *61*(3), 457–482. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130902753309

Aris, S. (2011). *Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*. Springer.

Ayusi, R., & Nurhasanah, S. (2019). Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Eurasia Regionalism: New India-Pakistan Membership and Regional Security. *Jurnal Sentris KSMPMI*, *1*, 165–180. https://doi.org/10.26593/sentris.v1i1.4175.165-180

Barnett, M., & Adler, E. (1998). Studying security communities in theory, comparison, and history. In E. Adler, & M. Barnett (Eds.), *Security Communities* (pp. 413-441). Cambridge University Press.

BBC News. (2023, March 20). Ukraine war: What support is China giving Russia? *BBC News*. Retrieved April 9, 2023, from https://www.bbc.com/news/60571253

Beeson, M., & Stubbs, R. (2012). Introduction. In M. Beeson, & R. Stubbs (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism* (pp. 1-7). Routledge.

Bekkevold, J., & Kalyanaraman, S. (2021). Indian Strategies on China: past, present, and future. In J. Bekkevold, & S. Kalyanaraman (Eds.), *India's Great Power Politics: Managing China's Rise* (265-275). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003136767

Börzel, T. (2016). Theorizing Regionalism: Cooperation, Integration, and Governance. In T. Börzel, & T. Risse (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism* (pp. 41–63). Oxford University Press.

Burbank, J. (2022, August 21). Opinion | Aleksandr Dugin and the Grand Theory Driving Putin to War. *The New York Times*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/22/opinion/russia-ukraine-putin-eurasianism.html

Center for Preventive Action. (2023, April 25). *Conflict Between India and Pakistan*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan

CFR.org Editors. (2022, April 12). *What Is ASEAN?* Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved January 18, 2023, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean

Chakma, B. (2020). International Relations Theory and South Asian Regionalism. In *South Asian Regionalism* (pp. 155-167). Bristol University Press.

Cini, M. (2019). 5. Intergovernmentalism. In *Oxford University Press eBooks* (pp. 69–82). https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198806530.003.0005

Danilovich, M. (2013). Approaches to SCO: China and Russia. In A. Rozanov (Ed.), *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Central Asia's Security Challenges* (pp. 15-36). The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Retrieved April 21, 2023, from https://www.dcaf.ch/shanghai-cooperation-organisation-and-central-asias-security-challenges

Das, R. (2010). India-China Defence Cooperation and Military Engagement. *Journal of Defence Studies*, *4*(4), 108–121. https://idsa.in/jds/4_4_2010_IndiaChinaDefenceCooperationandMilitaryEngagement_rndas

Deutsch, K., Burrell, S., Kann, R., & Lee, M., Jr. (1957). Introduction. In *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (pp. 3–21). Princeton U.P.

Drysdale, P. (2008). Creating an architecture for cooperation. In P. Petri (Ed.), *Emerging Asian Regionalism: a Partnership for Shared Prosperity* (pp. 236-259). Asian Development Bank. Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://www.adb.org/publications/emerging-asian-regionalism-partnership-shared-prosperity-0

Dunne, T., & Schmidt, B. (2014). Chapter 6: Realism. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens (Eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations* (6th ed., pp. 99-112). Oxford University Press.

Dwivedi, K., & Bawa, A. (2022). Prospects of the evolving SCO mandate: From a Security Focus towards an Increased Economic and Strategic Partnership with India. In S. Marochkin, & Y. Bezborodov (Eds.), *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Exploring New Horizons* (pp. 197-213). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003170617-17

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2008). Uneven Power and the Pursuit of Peace: How Regional Power Transitions Motivate Integration. *Comparative European Politics*, *6*(1), 102–142. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110122

ET Online. (2018, September 7). Seven reasons why COMCASA is so important for India. *The Economic Times*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/seven-reasons-why-comcasa-is-so-important-for-india/articleshow/65707682.cms

ET Online. (2021, September 30). India likely to send three-member team to SCO's anti-terror exercise in Pakistan. *The Economic Times*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-likely-to-send-three-member-team-to-scos-anti-terror-exercise-in-pakistan/articleshow/86635408.cms?from=mdr

Express News Service. (2015, June 4). India, US signed documents to renew defence pact. *The Indian Express*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-us-renew-defence-pact-2/

Feagin, J., Orum, A., & Sjoberg, G. (1991). Introduction: The Nature of the Case Study. In J. Feagin, A., Orum, & G. Sjoberg (Eds.), *A Case for the Case Study* (pp. 1-26). The University of North Carolina Press.

Ferreira-Pereira, L., & Smith, M. (2021). Introducing the European Union's Strategic Partnerships: Global Diplomacy in a Contested World. In L. Ferreira-Pereira, & M. Smith (Eds.), *The European Union's Strategic Partnerships: Global Diplomacy in a Contested World* (pp. 1-17). Palgrave Macmillan.

Flockhart, T. (2016). Understanding NATO through constructivist theorising. In A. Hyde-Price, & M. Webber (Eds.), *Theorising NATO* (pp. 140–160). Routledge.

Frost, E. (2008). *Asia's New Regionalism.* Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Gilani, I. (2022, March 20). *A timeline of India-Pakistan military confidence building measures*. Anadolu Agency. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/a-timeline-of-india-pakistan-military-confidence-building-measures/2540743

Grieger, G. (2015). *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation* (PE 564.368). European Parliamentary Research Service. Retrieved April 18, 2023, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2015)564368

Guliyev, F., & Gawrich, A. (2020). NATO vs. the CSTO: security threat perceptions and responses to secessionist conflicts in Eurasia. *Post-Communist Economies*, *33*(2–3), 283–304. https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2020.1800316

Haftel, Y., & Hofmann, S. (2019). Rivalry and Overlap: Why Regional Economic Organizations Encroach on Security Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *63*(9), 2180–2206. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719832057

Herd, G., Kriendler, J, Wittmann, K. (2013). NATO's Genesis and adaptation: from Washington to Chicago. In G. Herd, & J. Kriendler (Eds.), *Understanding NATO in the 21st Century* (pp. 16–32). Taylor & Francis.

Heywood, A. (2011). Regionalism and Global Politics. In *Global Politics* (pp. 480-506). Palgrave Foundations.

Hopkin, J. (2010). The Comparative Method. In D. Marsh, & G. Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (3rd ed., pp. 285-307). Palgrave Macmillan.

Hurrell, A. (1995). Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics. *Review of International Studies*, *21*(4), 331–358. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500117954

Hussein, M., & Haddad, M. (2021, September 10). Infographic: US military presence around the world. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved January 18, 2023, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/10/infographic-us-military-presence-around-the-world-interactive

Hyde-Price, A. (2016). NATO and the European security system: a neo-realist analysis. In A. Hyde-Price, & M. Webber (Eds.), *Theorising NATO* (pp. 41–60). Routledge.

Iwanek, K. (2020, January 1). *Does India Gain Anything From the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?* The Diplomat. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/does-india-gain-anything-from-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/

Iwanek, K. (2023, March 28). *Why India Can't Stop Russia's Growing Cooperation with China*. The Diplomat. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from

https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/why-india-cant-stop-russias-growing-cooperation-with-china/

Jain, R., & Sachdeva, G. (2019). India-EU strategic partnership: a new roadmap. *Asia Europe Journal*, *17*(3), 309–325. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-019-00556-0

Javaid, A. (2020, November 2). What is the difference between BECA, LEMOA and COMCASA? *Jagran Josh*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/difference-between-beca-lemoa-comcasa-1603451693-1

Jesse, N., Lobell, S., Press-Barnathan, G., & Williams, K. (2012). The Leaders Can't Lead When the Followers Won't Follow: the Limitations of Hegemony. In K. Williams, S. Lobell, & N. Jesse, *Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow, or Challenge* (pp. 1-30). Stanford University Press.

Kalyanaraman, S. (2021). India's Response to the China Threat since 1949. In J. Bekkevold, & S. Kalyanaraman (Eds.), *India's Great Power Politics: Managing China's Rise* (49-74). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003136767

Kaukenov, A. (2013). Internal contradictions of the Shanghai cooperation organization. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, *14*(2), 7–17. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/internal-contradictions-of-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization.pdf

Kavalski, E. (2021). The European Union and India: A Reluctant Partnership between Aspiring Global Powers. In L. Ferreira-Pereira, & M. Smith (Eds.), *The European Union's Strategic Partnerships: Global Diplomacy in a Contested World* (pp. 199-220). Palgrave Macmillan.

Khan, J., & Sultana, R. (2021). Sino-Russia Strategic Partnership: The Case Study of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). *FWU Journal of Social Sciences*, *15*(2), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.51709/19951272/

Khandekar, G. (2012). EU-India Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism. In L. Peral, & V. Sakhuja (Eds.), *The EU-India Partnership: Time to Go Strategic?* (pp.

111-124). European Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-india-partnership-time-go-strategic

Khattak, M. (1992). Indo-US Naval Exercises. *Strategic Studies*, *15*(1), 7–10. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45182074

Kronstadt, K., & Pinto, S. (2013). *U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues*. Congressional Research Service. https://www.amazon.com/U-S-India-Security-Relations-Strategic-Issues-ebook/dp/B00C015I40

Kropatcheva, E. (2016). Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation: Multilateral Policy or Unilateral Ambitions? *Europe-Asia Studies*, *68*(9), 1526–1552. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1238878

Kulintsev, Y. (2020). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Structure of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. *The Review of International Affairs*, *71*(1180), 27–44. https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_ria.2020.71.1180.2

Lakshmi, R. (2016, August 30). India and U.S. deepen defense ties with landmark agreement. *Washington Post*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/india-and-us-deepen-defense-ties-with-landmark-agreement/2016/08/30/2e7e045b-e3c3-49ff-9b2c-08efaa27b82b_story.html?noredirect=on

Levick, L., & Schulz, C. (2020). Soft Balancing, Binding or Bandwagoning? Understanding Institutional Responses to Power Disparities in the Americas. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, *53*(3), 521–539. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423920000220

Levy, J. (2002). War and Peace. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, & B. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (pp. 350-368). Sage.

Li, W., Dongchen, Z., & Kolotova, A. (2020). China and Russia in the SCO: Consensus & divergence. *Human Affairs*, *30*(2), 189–198. https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2020-0018

Libman, A., & Obydenkova, A. (2018). Understanding Authoritarian Regionalism. *Journal of Democracy*, *29*(4), 151–165. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0070

Lisbonne De Vergeron, K. (2015). India and the EU: what opportunities for defence cooperation? (QN-AK-15-024-2A-N). European Union Institute for

Security Studies. Retrieved May 4, 2023, from https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/india-and-eu-what-opportunities-defence-cooperation

Maizland, L. (2019, August 7). *Kashmir: What to Know About the Disputed Region*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/kashmir-what-know-about-disputed-region

Mansbach, R., & Taylor, K. (2017). Theoretical approaches to global politics. In *Introduction to Global Politics* (3rd ed., 2-29). Routledge.

Mariadoss, B. (2018). *Core Principles of International Marketing – Simple Book Publishing*. Pressbooks. https://opentext.wsu.edu/cpim/

Marjani, N. (2023, May 1). *What Does India Gain From the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?* The Diplomat. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/what-does-india-gain-from-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/

Masih, N. (2023, February 24). U.N. resolution to end Ukraine war: How countries voted and who abstained. *Washington Post*. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/24/un-ukraine-resolution-vote-countries/

Mason, M. (2021). Less than meets the eye: a critical assessment of the military-to-military dimension of the U.S.–India security partnership. In S. Ganguly, & M. Mason (Eds.), *The Future of U.S.-India Security Cooperation* (pp. 19-37). Manchester University Press.

Mattli, W. (1999). Explaining regional integration. In *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (pp. 41-67). Cambridge University Press.

Mayfield, T. (2022). Indian Perspectives: Insights for the Indo-American Partnership. *Parameters*, *52*(4), 27–42. https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3185

McCarthy, M. (2007). Introduction. In *The Limits of Friendship: US Security Cooperation in Central Asia* (pp. 1–12). Air University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13987.8

Meena, B. (2017). India-Russia Cooperation in The SCO and Central Asia. *International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews*, *4*(2), 136–144.

Menon, R., & Rumer, E. (2022). Russia and India: A New Chapter. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/20/russia-and-india-new-chapter-pub-87958

Mikhaylenko, E., Ospanova, A., & Lagutina, M. (2022). The SCO and security cooperation. In S. Marochkin, & Y. Bezborodov (Eds.), *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Exploring New Horizons* (pp. 38-52).

Miller, M. (2021, October 13). *The Quad, AUKUS, and India's Dilemmas*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.cfr.org/article/quad-aukus-and-indias-dilemmas

Mohan, G. (2022). The Evolution of Indian Foreign Policy Towards Europe. India Quarterly, 78(2), 248–260. https://doi.org/10.1177/09749284221091869

Mudiam, P. (2018). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Gulf: Will India Prefer a Further Westward Expansion of the SCO or its Consolidation? *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, *12*(4), 457–474. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2018.1564859

Obydenkova, A., & Libman, A. (2019). *Authoritarian Regionalism in the World of International Organizations: Global Perspective and the Eurasian Enigma*. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198839040.001.0001

Outlook Web Desk. (2022, June 12). *India, EU Hold First-Ever Security, Defence Consultations*. Outlook. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.outlookindia.com/national/india-eu-hold-first-ever-security-defence-consultations-news-201915

Özer, A. (2018). Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A NATO of The East. *E-Journal of Law*, *4*(2), 1–21. https://www.academia.edu/41193083/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organization_A_NATO_of_The_East

Pande, A. (2022). Natural allies: The growth of the Indo-American relationship since the Cold War and its implications for the Trump administration. In S. Dhaliwal (Ed.), *Indo-US Relations: Steering through the Changing World Order* (pp. 10-35). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003093466-2

Pant, H. (2022, September 22). India and the SCO: A Parade of Disconnect. *ORF*. Retrieved March 10, 2023, from https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-the-sco-a-parade-of-disconnect/

Pant, H., & Wani, A. (2021, October 25). India's Central Asian outreach. *ORF*. Retrieved March 10, 2023, from https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-central-asian-outreach/

Paul, T. (2018). Restraint by Other Means. In *Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era* (pp. 20-45). Yale University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv5cg9s2.6

Petri, P. (2008). Asian Regionalism : Context and Scope. In P. Petri (Ed.), *Emerging Asian Regionalism: a Partnership for Shared Prosperity* (pp. 26-56). Asian Development Bank. Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://www.adb.org/publications/emerging-asian-regionalism-partnership-shared-prosperity-0

Porshneva, O., Rakhimov, M. & Razinkov, S. (2022). The formation and institutional development of the SCO: Historical and legal aspects. In S. Marochkin, & Y. Bezborodov (Eds.), *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Exploring New Horizons* (pp. 9-24). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003170617

Price, G. (2016). Counter-Terrorism and Radicalisation. In S. Saran, E. Pesjova, & G. Price (Eds.), *Prospects for EU-India Security Cooperation* (pp. 33-40). Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/prospects-for-eu-india-security-cooperation-2/

Putz, C. (2023, March 29). *India-Pakistan Tensions Flare Up Within SCO*. The Diplomat. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/india-pakistan-tensions-flare-up-within-sco/

Racine, J.-L. (2012). The EU, India and non-traditional security: convergences and challenges. In L. Peral, & V. Sakhuja (Eds.), *The EU-India Partnership: Time to Go Strategic?* (pp. 25-38). European Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-india-partnership-time-go-strategic

Raghavan, P. (2021). The Changing Geopolitical Landscape of India-Russia Relations. In J. Bekkevold, & S. Kalyanaraman (Eds.), *India's Great Power Politics: Managing China's Rise* (227-246). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003136767

Ramachandran, S. (2022, December 13). *India and China Face off Again, This Time at Tawang*. The Diplomat. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/india-and-china-face-off-again-this-time-at-tawang/

Rao, N. (2023). The Upside of Rivalry: India's Great-Power Opportunity. *Foreign Affairs*, *102*(3), 17–23. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2023/102/3

Rehman, H., & Faisal, M. (2015). SCO and India-Pakistan Conflict. *CISS Insight Quarterly Journal*, *3*(3), 24–38. https://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/144

Rowden, R. (2018). *The rise and rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation* (Global Political Economy Brief No. 11). Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI).

Roy-Chaudhury, R. (2018). India's perspective towards China in their shared South Asian neighbourhood: cooperation versus competition. *Contemporary Politics*, *24*(1), 98–112. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2017.1408173

Ruehl, J. (2022, October 8). Iranian, Turkish moves to join SCO raise its profile. *Asia Times*. Retrieved January 18, 2023, from https://asiatimes.com/2022/10/iranian-turkish-moves-to-join-sco-raise-its-profile/

Saini, G., & Jacob, H. (2022). *India, China, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Bilateral Relations, Geopolitical Trends, and Future Trajectory*. Council for Strategic and Defense Research.

Sakhuja, V. (2012). India-EU Cooperation in the Indian Ocean: Strategic Thinking, Policy Framework and Challenges Ahead. In L. Peral, & V. Sakhuja (Eds.), *The EU-India Partnership: Time to Go Strategic?* (pp. 173-183) European Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-india-partnership-time-go-strategic

Sarsembayev, M., & Bezborodov, Y. (2022). International legal background and aspects of the SCO member states intercommunication. In S. Marochkin & Y. Bezborodov (Eds.), *The Shanghai Cooperation. Exploring New Horizons* (pp. 25–37). Routledge.

Seiwert, E. (2023). *Expanding the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: mechanisms, perspectives, and challenges for the region and beyond* (Policy Brief #83, January 2023). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved April 20, 2023, from https://osce-academy.net/en/research/publication/policy-briefs/

Shukla, A. (2023, May 1). *The Sino-Indian Border After Galwan*. The Diplomat. Retrieved June 10, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/the-sino-indian-border-after-galwan/

Singh, S. (2022a, December 23). *Border Clashes With China Show Indian Deterrence Is Failing*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/23/india-china-border-clash-arunachal-pradesh-deterrence/

Singh, A. (2022b). India-US Defence Partnership. In S. Dhaliwal (Ed.), *Indo-US Relations: Steering through the Changing World Order* (pp. 118-129). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003093466-9

Smith, S. (2021, May 27). *The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know

Söderbaum, F. (2003). Introduction: Theories of New Regionalism. In F. Söderbaum (Ed.), *Theories of New Regionalism* (pp. 1-21). Palgrave Macmillan.

Söderbaum, F. (2012). Theories of Regionalism. In M. Beeson, & R. Stubbs (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism* (pp. 11-21). Routledge.

Sood, R. (2020, October 30). *The India-US defence partnership is deepening*. ORF. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-india-us-defence-partnership-is-deepening/

Sridhar, S. (2023, March 2). *India's Key to Keeping the Status Quo on Its Border With China*. The Diplomat. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from

https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/indias-key-to-keeping-the-status-quo-on-its-border-with-china/

Struye de Swielande, T. (2012). Piracy in the Indian Ocean: an Area where the Interests of the European Union and India Converge?. In L. Peral, & V. Sakhuja (Eds.), *The EU-India Partnership: Time to Go Strategic?* (pp. 163-172). European Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-india-partnership-time-go-strategic

Su, X. (2022, March 29). *Will the War in Ukraine Turn Russia Into an 'Asian' Country?* The Diplomat. Retrieved March 11, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/will-the-war-in-ukraine-turn-russia-into-an-asian-country/

TASS. (2023, January 1). Eight international military exercises to take place at Russian training ranges in 2023. *TASS*. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://tass.com/defense/1558379

The Economist. (2022, April 15). India is cutting back its reliance on Russian arms. *The Economist*. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/04/14/india-is-cutting-back-its-reliance-on-russian-arms

The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2023). *Democracy Index 2022: Frontline democracy and the battle for Ukraine*. Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/

Vaal, T. (2022, January 11). Russian troops to quit Kazakhstan, says president, taking aim at the elite. *Reuters*. Retrieved May 17, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kazakhstan-detains-almost-10000-over-deadly-unrest-2022-01-11/

Vromen, A. (2010). Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches. In D. Marsh, & G. Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (3rd ed., pp. 249-266). Palgrave Macmillan.

Wani, A. (2022, October 17). India's SCO presidency: Leveraging opportunities. *ORF*. Retrieved March 10, 2023, from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-sco-presidency-leveraging-opportunities/

Weiffen, B., Gawrich, A., & Axyonova, V. (2020). Reorganizing the Neighborhood? Power Shifts and Regional Security Organizations in the

Post-Soviet Space and Latin America. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, *6*(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz080

Wuthnow, J., Limaye, S., & Samaranayake, N. (2018, June 13). *Doklam, One Year Later: China's Long Game in the Himalayas*. War on the Rocks. Retrieved June 9, 2023, from https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/doklam-one-year-later-chinas-long-game-in-the-himalayas/

Winn, N. (2021). Between Competition and Cooperation: The EU Global Strategy as Means to Reinvigorate EU-Indian Cooperation?. In P. Gieg, T. Lowinger, M. Pietzko, A. Zürn, U. Bava, & G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (Eds.), EU-India Relations: The Strategic Partnership in the Light of the European Union Global Strategy (pp. 291-310). Springer.

Wright, B. G. (2023, April 24). India's population to surpass China this week - UN. *BBC News*. Retrieved May 7, 2023, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65380148

Xue, Y., & Makengo, B. (2021). Twenty Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects. *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, *09*(10), 184–200. https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2021.910014

Yefremenko, D. (2019). Transformation of the Mission of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and New Political Dynamics in Greater Eurasia. *Russia and the Moslem World*. https://doi.org/10.31249/rmw/2019.03.04

Yussupzhanovich, R., & Tulkunovna, Z. (2019). Role of SCO in the Eurasian Continent. *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, *75*(1), 43–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928418821487