



What Impact can Small States really have on the United Nations Security Council? A Case Study of Ireland

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PLAGIARISM STATEMENT

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Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have composed the present thesis autonomously and without use of any other than the cited sources or means. I have indicated parts that were taken out of published or unpublished work correctly and in a verifiable manner through a quotation. I further assure that I have not presented this thesis to any other institute or university for evaluation and that it has not been published before.

Abstract

The structure of this thesis will be as follows. Following the initial introduction there will be a section explaining what the United Nations Security Council is and its proceedings. This section will be followed by a review of the literature which firstly uncovers the role of small states within the council. The literature review will then discuss the identified mechanisms for effectiveness for small states on the Council before focusing specifically on the Irish case. It shall focus on Irelands role on past security councils and at present. Following the literature review the paper will explore the methodology, of which the data collection followed a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach was in the form of interviews. The results from the data collection will then be displayed through a thematic analysis. The discussion section is where this paper presents the findings from the interviews and relates it to the current literature, as presented in the literature review. Following the discussion, a brief section will present some recommendations for small states on the UNSC and further areas of research. The conclusion will sum up the main points of the thesis. The bibliography and annexes will be presented at the end of the paper, after the conclusion.

Introduction

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six main organs of the United Nations (UN). It has 15 members, with each member having one vote. The SC determines a threat to peace or act of aggression. It then requires the groups to settle their conflict by peaceful means and recommends paths to peace and terms of settlements (UN.org, 2022). The United Nations charter deems the security council main responsibility as ‘the maintenance of international peace and security’ (Article 24, UN Charter). This immense responsibility also comes with immense powers, such as the ability to make decisions that are legally binding on all UN members states (Langmore & Farrall, 2016). Although, there are a few limits to the councils there has never been other body in history with such potential power (David, 2009).

The working of the security council is widely recorded, with various bodies of literature examining the different roles of member states, the actual negotiations and how influential the Elected 10 can really be (Gifkins, 2021)(Langmore & Farrall, 2016). Thus, looking at these aspects is not new in the literature. What this thesis paper intends to add is the comparison between the present literature and the views of current and previous UNSC members or civil servants working with or on the council and the ability of small states, such as Ireland, to have an impact, on the UNSC. This paper will firstly review the literature focusing on the obstacles for small states on the SC, how small states can have an impact, the power of the P5, the different roles on the SC, and a specific examination of Ireland’s current and previous successes on the council.

The next section describes the research methodology. This is organised in subsections: namely the research question and study design, the data collection and the analysis of the data. This section introduces the types of questions and interviews formulated in order to derive answers in line with my research question. The findings are presented followed by the discussion in which the paper will compare the findings to the literature reviewed and interpret the meaning of these findings. The conclusion will then sum up the main points

made throughout the paper and the effectiveness of this approach in eliciting new information that contributes to the literature in this field.

Firstly, it is important to define the research question clearly before looking at the literature and the data. The research question ‘What Impact can Small States really have on the UNSC?’ centralizes around the notion of impact or success. As this paper intends to compare the literature and the lived experienced of people working with or on the council, it was important for the researcher not to impose their own notion of success on the research participants. Recognising that each state or permanent representative may deem success for their state or delegation differently, the researcher has allowed a degree of latitude in order to incorporate different interpretations. States are on the SC to have a voice and bridge a gap between the General Assembly and the Permanent 5 on the UNSC (Dorr, 2011). Therefore, this paper will interpret success or impact to mean influence with an outcome. This idea is what carries throughout this paper. Although some participants may deem it differently, it is important that their own perception of what is achievable and what impactful means as a small state on the UNSC is accurately captured and reflected in the findings of this work.

The Workings of the UNSC

Security Council membership and election process

The UNSC charter deems the SC's primary purpose is to hold the responsibility for the maintenance of international security and peace. The UNSC is the most powerful body of the UN and arguably 'the most powerful international organization ever known to the world of states' (Hurd, 2007: 12). Upon taking a seat at the SC members accept this as their main task and agree to carry out the decisions made by the council (UN Charter, Article 24/25, 1945). The membership was originally eleven. After an amendment to the Charter in 1965, it is now 15. It has five permanent members, The UK, USA, Russia, France, and China. These members were the major allied powers after the Second World War. Each of these permanent members has the ability to veto any proposal in the council. The additional 10 members (E10) are elected through the General Assembly. This is carried out through secret ballot, with each elected member serving a two-year term. However, being elected a member is slightly more complex than it seems. Within the UNSC, under informal proceedings the 10 elected seats are divided between regional groups of Member States. One such group is Western European and Other Group (WEOG) which is allowed two seats on the SC. This is the grouping which Ireland or Norway, would be included. Every member on the council is allowed the chance to hold the Presidency of the council, essentially acting as the council chair for a month. This rotation of the role of the chair happens automatically each month, and in alphabetical order. Through this system each member will hold the presidency for at least one month during their two-year term (Dorr, 2011).

The temporary seats are highly desired by all potential members, entailing long campaign processes. These seats are so desirable as they are considered as an opportunity for small states to have a say and play a role in international peace and security that they might not otherwise have the chance to (Dorr, 2011). In order to be elected a security council member must receive a nomination from its regional members (such as WEOG) and then have this approved by two thirds of the General Assembly (GA). Five new members of the E10 are

elected every year, with the departing members not eligible for re-election in the same year (Article 23: 2, UNSC). There is a certain intension to elect a range of members from across the globe, but the GA are instructed to prioritize UN members who are contributors to upholding global peace and security (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006).

Security Council role and mechanisms of action

The role of the UN Security Council to put it briefly is to use three key tools to resolve international disputes and conflicts. Firstly, conflict resolution mechanisms are used. The council has the power to call on parties to find resolution through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or any other peaceful means. These peace operations are a prime example of the conflict resolution work the UN undertakes. The SC has the authority to demand resolutions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Secondly, under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the SC can inflict sanctions. These sanctions are imposed in order to maintain peace and security globally. This tool is used the most often. Finally, if the previous two mechanisms fail or are ineffective, Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows direct military intervention in an effort to restore international peace and security (IIEA, 2021).

Different Roles on the UNSC

In order to answer the research question, it is important to look at the different roles on the security council and if or how they impact small states' ability to work effectively. One of these roles is the penholder, this role is given to a member of the Council. The penholder must lead the negotiation and drafting of resolutions on a specific agenda item for the Council (SecurityCouncilReport, 2021).

Generally speaking, France, the UK and the US (P3) are self-appointed penholders, specifically on conflict- related situations. The P3 are the most legislatively active of the permanent members. However, there are no official arrangements on the allocation of responsibilities such as convening or drafting. Different delegations take the lead on different issues, often states will focus on issues located in their regions or with which they have

particular interest in. In recent years, there have been instances where China and Russia have served as co-penholders with the US on non-proliferation of nuclear issues. Elected members have also served as penholders on certain issues such as Afghanistan (SCR, 2018)

The ability or inability of small states and temporary members to act as the *penholder* on the council is relevant to the amount of power or influence, they can exert on the council. The function of the penholder involves drafting outcome texts, chairing negotiations and at times taking full initiative on all council activities in relation to that particular issue. These activities can extend to holding emergency meetings, the organization of debates and initiating leading missions. The penholder is also able to address the council first on a set issue (SCR, 2018). In recent years, there have been greater attempts to alter the penholder system, more in favour of non-permanent E10 states. In 2014, the president of the council issued a note specifying that any council member could act as a penholder. The note emphasised the need for increased participation of all members in the drafting process. Little changed in practice until the note (507) was updated in 2017. The new note built upon this initiative and also critiqued the ‘silence procedure’ used by the P5. This practice is where a draft is circulated via email, the draft includes a deadline for objections to be brought forward. If no objections are made the draft becomes final. The note added that any council member shall now be allowed to request an extension to the draft if they feel that further consideration is needed. This aids smaller states with more limited resources and capacity to act effectively. However, irrespective of all these efforts the P3 still hold the pen in the vast majority of situation-specific issues. (SCR, 2018). Thus, a small state does not require a penholder position to make an impact, however, it is a very useful mechanism through which states can push their agenda forward. By creating barriers or disincentives for smaller states to act as penholders, it may hinder their ability to work effectively and bring real change.

As mentioned previously, every state, both E10 and P5 have the chance to be the *president of the council* for one month. The designation of each states time is given in alphabetical order. The president coordinates the actions of the council, decides policy disputes, approving the provisional agenda. This is often quite a resource intensive period as presidential statements, notes, and declarations of intent need to be drafted. Holding the presidency can also mean the state acting as a diplomat or intermediary between different conflicting groups on the council (UNSC, 2012)(Pogany, 1982). The Security Council Report on how to be effective as an elected member of the security council, prepared for Ireland following its successful election campaign for its 2021-2022 seat, explains that holding the presidency can be ‘one of the most

challenging aspects of council membership' but also the 'most rewarding' (SCR, 2019: 13). A political coordinator from the P5 described the presidency as the 'centre of the world' (SCR, 2019: 13). The presidency is an opportunity for states to highlight their priority issues and adhere to their campaign objectives. Thus, the president can decide to hold meetings and discussions on issues they consider to be of interest. A presidential term should not be overrun with additional meetings just for the purpose of pushing that states agenda, the council must continue to respond to the happenings and crises of the international realm (SCR, 2019).

Literature Review

There is a vast body of literature on the United Nations Security Council. It ranges from highly critical academic pieces to in-depth analyses of specific cases involving very specific members. For the purpose of this thesis, the literature review will focus on knowledge that relates to the role of small states and temporary membership on the UNSC. The literature review will also address the obstacles and opportunities for small states on the UNSC.

Small states

To address the research question effectively it is important to clarify what a small state is. At present, the UN does not have a formal definition for small states. The definition used by the Forum of Small States, an informal grouping of the UN which gives a specific platform to small states, is that of a state with a population of 10 million or less (UN, 2012). However, other literature, such as Armstrong & Read deems small states to be 10 to 15 million (Armstrong & Read, 2002). Both can be seen as a working definition, so in the face of the SC a state with a population of 10million plus can still be deemed a small state. In the context of the security council, a small state is relative. Thorhallsson categorizes small states by their GDP or economic capabilities (Thorhallsson, 2011). For the purpose of the SC and this thesis, the economic position of a country is not, or at least should not be that relevant, as each E10's vote has the same power. Due to outside proceedings this is not always the case (Thorhallsson, 2011). Norway, Cyprus, and Ireland are small states, but which have brought and can bring specific expertise and experiences to the SC. Levels of conflict, neighbouring alliances, and GDP per capita vary across small states which can play into their ability and influence on the SC and in the international arena (Tarp & Bach, 2013).

Obstacles for Small Nation States

One would not be able to discuss the UNSC without discussing the continuously questioned issue of the veto. The very voting system of the SC hinders small states abilities. For procedural issues, such as rules of the council or council membership, each of the 15 members has a single vote, for a resolution or decision to be adopted there must be 9 votes in

favour. On all other issues, the nine votes in favour must include the consensus of the 5 permanent members (P5) (UN Charter, Article 27, 2013). Thus, permanent members have a veto on all matters that are not procedural, even if the 14 other members vote in favour. Permanent members also decide if a decision is procedural or not (Dorr, 2011). Once a P5 vetoes a resolution it cannot be passed. Parts of the literature, such as Weiss discuss the utility of the 'sixth veto' for small states. This is when the elected members can prevent a resolution from passing even if all P5 members agree to it. The P5 alone cannot pass a resolution (Weiss, 2003). Bouranonis argues that this is an effective way for small states to be impactful on the council. This works because even with the five P5 votes, the resolution still needs four more votes from the E10 to pass and therefore E10 members need to be persuaded to vote with the P5. The increase of E10 members in 1965 from six to ten has increased the E10s ability to utilise the sixth veto (Bouranonis, 2005)(Weiss, 2003).

Thorhallsson considered that small states are inherently disadvantaged due to their limited economic, administrative and military capacity and strength. This limited capacity is due to small states having smaller populations and thus smaller economies and often geographical space (Thorhallsson, 2017). Some academics such as Luepel & Malksoo are of the view that small states need to recognise their limited capacity, whilst others namely Thohallsson argue that a small state should still have huge capabilities despite their lack of economic leverage (Thohallsson, 2017)(Lupel & Malksoo, 2019). Thohallsson argues that one way to overcome the capacity defect is by relying on flexible and informal strengths of their diplomatic forces. His paper also focuses on smaller states advantage in being able to be more flexible and autonomous than larger states – this flexibility is in the form of acting quickly, curating alliances, and building coalitions (Gron and Wivel, 2011). Thus, arguing that they can hold power, even if it cannot be measured in the traditional sense. The power of a state is often measured by its population size, territorial size, GDP and Military Capacity (Archer & Nugent, 2002). These factors can mean that small states are seen to have very limited influence in international affairs (Keohane, 1969). In international relations some of the literature, such as Mearsheimer believes that “the fortune of all states – great powers and small powers alike- are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 20). Small states also rely on their image and reputation, which can thus give them influence (Jakobsen, 2009).

Thohallsson states that from 1991 to 2017, there have been 37 small states elected on to the UNSC (Thohallsson, 2017). Dreher et al believe small states are at a disadvantage to even

being elected onto the council as the E10. For example, Dreher explains that in 2017 no state had been elected with a population of less than 500,000. A large population size, peacekeeping activity, foreign aid power, political affiliation and economic capacity are associated with elected membership. The tradition of ‘turn-taking’ giving preference to countries that haven’t before held a seat on the SC is one of the only mechanisms which can really help a small state be elected (Dreher et al, 2013)

Whilst on the council smaller states and the E10 generally are often left out of negotiations due to many decisions being made at informal or private negotiations between different subsets of members or the P5. Although the ‘sixth veto’ as mentioned above may aid small states power, the increased number of the elected members allows the P5 to access greater support amongst the E10. Thus, this decreases the ability of the E10 and smaller nonaligned states to block certain procedures and resolutions and makes it harder to coordinate outside of the P5 (Thorhallsson, 2017).

How can Small States make an Impact on the UNSC?

Many papers, such as Thorhallsson and Kuziemko & Werker, discuss the link between a small state’s commitment and impact on the council. The more a small state decides to commit to the SC, the more influence a small state should have. If small states prioritise their role as a E10 and utilise their two-year term effectively they can influence proceedings on the council. (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). Ingebritsen discusses the successes of Nordic small states on the council and how their ideology and values also aid their ability. This is prevalent in Nordic states foreign policy (financial support to UN organisations) and the capabilities of their politicians and representatives. Thus, the national unity and dedication to the UN by Nordic small states (such as Norway, Sweden) is seen to enable their effectiveness on the council (Ingebritsen, 2006)(Thorhallsson, 2006). The Nordic states aim to influence by active participation and consistently contributing to humanitarian issues, peace, and overall burden sharing (Ingebritsen, 2006). In this way, it seems that a state government’s objectives and ideas about the utility of the UN, greatly impacts the success of a small state on the SC. Part of this prioritization, is utilising the UN Secretariat and other members of the council for information collection and analysing, in order to formulate an objective. Thus, preparation and prioritization is deemed important for being effective (Thorhallsson, 2017).

A second point that Thorhallsson raised was the importance of the individual leading the small states delegation in New York. Diplomatic skills and general knowledge of the UN and its workings are evidently important if one looks at the number of times a country has asked to attend the UNSC meetings. This can be done under Rule 37 in which states which are particularly invested in an issue can request to attend the council discussions without the right to vote (United Nations, 1983). Ireland had been invited fifty-four times between 2000 and 2007, Norway 156 times and for comparison, Namibia 52 times (UNSC, 2007). In this way it is interesting to note that small states, even not on the council can exert certain influence in the discussions. Due to the more frequent publication of the provisional council agenda, Rule 37 is more frequently being used. Thorhallsson suggests a linkage between a state's Human Development Index (HDI) ranking and thus, its international image and prestige, and the number of times a state is invited to the council (Thorhallsson, 2017).

A country's image can play a huge role in its' ability to exert influence on the council. Ulriksen identifies that small states that were previously colonies are deemed more neutral and better mediators. Historical neutrality is also considered to aid a country's position, examples of this are Ireland, and up until recently, Sweden. Other small states such as Belgium and the Netherlands have their objectives tainted by their colonial histories (Ulriksen, 2006). However, neutrality alone does not equate to credibility as it must be strongly accompanied by knowledge and skills (Thorhallsson, 2017). Hasson argues that a country which is seen to actively be involved in humanitarian and human rights issues is also deemed more important for coalition building and influential on the global stage. This can allow coalitions and networks to form organically from shared values. Small states are also seen to have more success in achieving their goals if they are able to bring other actors and states on board (Hasson, 2007) Although, this is deemed to be an incredibly taxing and time-consuming task that due to limited resources can be very difficult for small states to achieve (Hansson, 2007)

The opportunity which holding the presidency can offer a small state is deemed very important for a small state's influence. Small states can use their month-long role as president to raise certain themes that aren't already on the agenda or ensure things remain on the agenda (Thorhallsson, 2017). An example of this presented in the literature, by Ross is the case of New Zealand holding the presidency on the council during the time of the Rwandan genocide. During this time NZ's Permanent Representative believed that the E10 were not being adequately informed on the happenings in Rwanda and thus submitted a draft statement to the council ensuring access of the E10 to information gathered by the P5. Following severe

backlash from the council (including Rwanda at this time) a final, albite watered-down version of the resolution with certain words remitted, was passed. This is an interesting example, as although Rwanda is infamous for being a severe failure of the UNSC, a small state's (i.e New Zealand) ability and initiative was the main reason that any statement was released on the matter. This showed how small states can be crucial and have real influence at a critical moment (Ross, 2001)

The Power of the P5

Due to the nature of the UNSC, the E10 (elected 10) are able to have their views heard and considered for the success of a resolution. The P5 look for the support from the E10 members in order to ensure a draft resolution goes through. However, much of the literature, such as Bosco, discusses the common practice of the P5 states deliberating a draft between themselves, often for long periods, before presenting it to elected members. This tends to happen when a P5 member is particularly invested in an issue. This would entail one of the P3 members drafting an agreement, whilst convincing the other P3 members to agree to it. The P3 member of the Council are known as the UK, France and the USA. They are often grouped together as they tend to align on certain issues and have similar democratic values. The P3 could then go to Russia and China to negotiate the issue. Once all P5 members agree the draft is then circulated amongst the E10, but often incredibly close to the intended date for adoption. This is to deter the E10 from making amendments. Which would cause further time delays to an already tediously long process. This technique tends to work, as the E10 do not want to disrupt the achievement of having all P5 members agree to a draft (SCR, 2018) (Bosco, 2014).

The power of the P5 and their veto is frequently referred to throughout the literature. Certain authors such as Davis & Bellamy believe that the veto is inherent to the workings of the council whilst others, especially more recently have called for a reform of the veto. (Davies & Bellamy, 2014) (Sterio, 2020). The institutional structure of the council can feed into the disparities between the E10 and P5, more so than is evident from their formal distinctions (Schia, 2013). Apart from the veto, Schia considers the P5 to have more leverage due to their

long institutional memory, alliances and relationships and extensive knowledge of the workings of the UNSC system (Schia, 2017). Their institutional power increases their power beyond the veto. This is not always the formal veto that is publicly displayed in press releases, or the security council reports. The use of the informal veto is far more common practice. This entails the P5 using the threat of a veto rejecting certain provisions or resolution during informal negotiations. Thus, giving an example of the P5's institutional power and power over participants can mould both the information practices of the council and further influence the ability of those other participants to even be able to vote on a decision (Gifkins, 2021). In this way, Siever and Daws amplify the influence of the P5 and their veto, because even if they never have to use it, the threat of the veto is as effective in holding power as the veto itself (Siever and Daws, 2014). An example of this was in 2019 in a resolution debate on the Women, Peace and Security, the US threatened the use of the veto if provisions on sexual and reproductive health of sexual violence survivors were removed. The resolution did pass but with key aspects included by the drafters being removed. Thus, the veto or power of the veto can not only stop resolutions passing but also limit their effectiveness in relation to output and results (Allen & Shepard, 2019) (Gifkins, 2021).

This veto power also extends to agenda setting on the council. The P5 are seen to determine the Council's agenda (Boulden, 2006). Although veto powers do not apply to procedural questions, it is incredibly rare that an item is added to the agenda without the approval or wishes of the P5. This mainly concerns the very active P3, as, according to some authors, China and Russia are not historically interested in the agenda (von Einsiedel, Malone & Stagno Ugarte, 2015). Kapila & Lewis argue that the ability of the P5 to influence the agenda means that they can ensure that debates are only brought up which are in line with their values and are in line with their own state's global agenda (Kapilila & Lewis, 2013). This dangerously extends to conflicts in which a P5 member is involved. We have seen a recent example of this with Russia, a P5 member being able to dictate the moves of the SC in relation to aiding the Ukrainian people in the war in Ukraine and generally how the councils response to it (Hovell, 2022) Beardsley & Schmidt make the point that conflicts are not as likely to have extensive UN involvement if one or more of the P5 members is involved in it (Beardsley & Schmidt, 2012). This can be seen as dangerous to the effectiveness of the council.

Several authors such as Davis & Bellamy celebrate the utility of the veto stating that the veto allows SC members to not get consumed by certain issues and to engage with a broader range

of concerns. Although the veto seems unjust it is thought that ‘the world order is better served by working through the great powers rather than by alienating them’ (Davies & Bellamy, 2014).

The question has been raised of the efficacy of the UNSC and the relationship between the P5 and E10. When on the security council E10 members’ US aid increases by 59% and its U.N aid by 8%, with these statistics rising during pressing diplomatic events (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). This equates to an average of 16 million dollars from the US and 1million dollars from the UN for a ‘developing country’ , rising to 45 million and 8 million respectively during diplomatic turmoil (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). An example of this that Renfrew gave was during the 2003 Iraq invasion when the US were deemed to have promised ‘rich rewards’ to the E10 members who supported them on the security council in the resolutions surrounding the invasion (Renfrew, 2003). However, there is limited research on this or how it might impact the council’s workings. Nonetheless, this is a concerning allegation considering the purpose of the council’s membership is to ensure that it acts for the global good and protects world peace, not that members should forward their own country’s position (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). The Shapley- Shubik power index was applied by O’Neill to the UNSC. This measures in percentages the total power given to a member purely based on voting rules in the Council. From this he derived that each P5 holds 19.6% of the power, whilst each elected member holds less than 0.2 %. This could be interpreted as a reflection of the true international system (O’Neill, 1996). This may not be a true reflection of the power distribution of the council, as not all E10 are equal and as influential (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). However, it is a simplified systematic way to understand power differentials.

A Case Study: Ireland’s Role and Influence in the Security Council

Prior to Ireland’s current term on the UNSC, Ireland has served 3 previous terms. Two full terms in 1981-2, 2001-2 and a half term in 1962 (Doyle, 2004). Ireland as a small nation has always been hugely committed to the UN, sending many UN peacekeeping troops and peace support missions. Ireland has continuously served in peacekeeping missions since 1958 and is

the sixth largest EU troop contributor to the UN. Ireland stands for the inclusion of women and larger community participation in peace building and peacekeeping operations (DFA, 2022).

The foreign policy of small states has been overly focused on alliances with other larger states. Much of the literature, such as Doyle sees small states are victims of the larger system, fighting to protect themselves from the more powerful states and the international system. There is a need for a larger focus on the capacity of small states to pursue proactive international frameworks and policies that exist outside their individual perceived 'threats' (Doyle, 2004) (Keohane, 1969). There is the argument that small states support for multilateralism is based on the assumption that they have very little hope in making any international impact acting alone. Thus, small states should better focus their efforts on acting within international alliances and playing a systemic role, in an effort to shape codes and narratives (Keohane, 1969) Ireland has been seen to do this in previous and current terms on the council. Ireland's previous terms of the council were deemed successful by scholars such as Thorhallsson and Gillissen because of its pragmatism. Ireland was seen to understand their capacity and due to this focused its' efforts on specific areas where it believed it would be able to have influence (Thorhallsson, 2017). Ireland was also seen to take advantage of some specific characteristics of small states such as their diplomatic flexibility and autonomy. Post 9/11 the Irish delegation were able to utilise their abilities and persuade the apprehensive US to bring the 9/11 attack to the UNSC. This added in the strengthening of the SC (Gillissen, 2006). During Ireland's presidency in their 2001 term on the council, it was able to keep focus on peace processes in the face of the 9/11 discussions. Ireland ensured that the peace building in the DRC, Burundi and Somalia were continued despite outside distractions. Ireland maintained and affirmed the shaping of the policy and agenda on this by the SC. (Gillissen, 2006) (Thorhallsson, 2017).

Eritrea – Ethiopia

During Ireland's term in the early 2000s, The US posed to lift the arms embargo imposed by the UN on Ethiopia and Eritrea. Initially this position held broad support on the council before Ireland took the stance that the embargo should not be lifted as the conditions for it had not been met. Doyle explains that Ireland's position was seen as influential in persuading the other temporary members, at the time Colombia, Mauritius, Norway and Singapore to adopt the same position. Britain and France then also shifted their position, from support to

abstinence, thus the draft resolution to lift this embargo did not receive sufficient votes to pass (Doyle, 2004). During Ireland's current term on the UNSC, the Irish delegation also took a strong stance against the present conflict in Ethiopia and Tigray. The Irish delegation drafted a statement and continued to insist on the November 5th statement seeking a ceasefire in Ethiopia. Even without the full backing of the council, Ireland continued to publicly push for action. Ireland's Permanent Representative to the UN, Geraldine Byrne Nason, publicly stated that 'Ireland firmly believes that the Council should speak publicly and with one voice on the situation in Ethiopia' (Georgetown Summit, 2021). Following this the Ethiopian government expelled four of the six Irish diplomats working in the embassy in Addis Ababa (Pogatchnik, 2021). Ireland succeeded in taking on a leadership role on this issue, despite being a small state, and the damning response by the Ethiopian government. Ireland succeeded through ensuring that the Ethiopian/Tigray crises remained on the agenda, even as larger states and the P5's interests waned. According to the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA), Ireland was seen as a legitimate leader on this issue due to its' continuous commitment to enabling humanitarian access for NGOs in conflict zones, knowledge in conflict resolution and strong stance on human rights (IIEA, 2021). Ireland's largest bilateral development programme is in Ethiopia with the Irish government sending 2.4million euro to aid organizations in Tigray in 2020. Ireland has a reputation of an honest member on the UN, something which aids its diplomatic ability on issues historically dominated by the P5 (IIEA, 2021).

Syrian Border Crossing

The UN resolution 2165 ensured the utilization of the cross-border aid delivery mechanism adopted in July 2014. It permits humanitarian agencies partnered with the UN accessibility to four border crossings, to transfer humanitarian supplies across into Syria in the face of the conflict. The resolution was renewed annually. In 2017, China and Russia began to abstain from voting with the council, failing to reauthorize the mechanism in 2019. Through tough negotiations and compromises, Ireland aided the passing of resolution 2585 which extended the use of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing for humanitarian aid delivery for another six months (July 2022) (SCR, 2021). Ireland and Norway, two small states led the negotiations on the border crossing as co-penholders. They drafted the initial resolution and facilitated the negotiations on the much-disputed text (Sweeney, 2021). (Gov.ie, 2021). Although the

resolution underwent much compromises because of Russia and only one border crossing was secured, this was deemed as ‘our biggest achievement’ on the UNSC by Ireland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Simon Coveney (Sweeney, 2021). This provides an illustrative example of how small states can impact the SC proceedings.

Iraq

During the UNSC discussions on Iraq and the US’s sanction regime, Ireland sought to reform the system to enable a flow of civilian goods to Iraq whilst the military sanctions remained. Ireland was unsuccessful in their argument that Iraq should be able to operate in the global economy as normally as possible, considering the imposed sanctions (UNSC, 2002). Ireland also supported the adopted of resolution 1441 in November 2002 which allowed Iraq the opportunity to show compliance with prior resolutions on the disclosure of its weapons programme. Although, Ireland received criticism for its’ support of this, it reiterated its’ position that the UNSC should remain the centre of decision making in relation to concentrated actions against Iraq and opposition to armed intervention without UN approval (Doyle, 2004)

Western Sahara

In 2001, The US secretary of state James Baker produced a draft framework agreement on Morocco and Western Sahara. Ireland took a strong position against this draft citing its’ support to the Sahroai people for self-determination. Ireland played an influential role in the blocking of this draft agreement through the council, which was recognised broadly in New York. Even following the end of Ireland’s term, Baker had rewritten a new plan in 2003 which was more sensitive in protecting Sahroai self- determination (Doyle, 2004).

Climate Peace and Security

Ireland held a high-level open debate on climate and security, one of its campaign objectives on the 23rd of September 2021. Ireland co-chaired this informal Expert Group of Climate & Security with Niger. Following this in December, Niger and Ireland drafted a thematic resolution integrating climate-related security risks into the conflict prevention, management, and peacebuilding work on the UNSC. The draft was put to a vote and co-sponsored by the support of 113 UN Member States. Although the council rejected the vote due to India and Russia voting against with an abstention from China. This is an example of a small state

championing widescale support from the UN community even if the veto had blocked its implementation (Climate Security Expert Network, 2022). This displays how even if a small state such as Ireland can champion such widescale support, it is still powerless to the P5 veto.

In relation to the potential impact Ireland was able to have during this term (2001-2003) Irish diplomats decided to forge a more tactical approach rather than simply raising issues which there was little hope of making progress on (Doyle, 2004). Doyle argued that during Ireland 2001 term on the UNSC there is little evidence that Ireland was pressured to vote in a certain manner, from the EU or the USA. Ireland was seen to have acted in line with other EU members and EU values. However, Ireland did brief EU states, not present on the council. This was because the delegation was open to bilateral intervention from EU states. This was not common practice at the time or something carried out by either France or the UK as permanent members. Thus, Ireland expended a policy of openness while serving on the council that its other EU states did not. (Doyle, 2004) During that term Ireland also did not succumb to the pressure of the US to follow its position on the council. In fact, Ireland clearly opposed the US on issues such as sanctions in Iraq and Palestine as well as the Ethiopia Eritrea embargo and the policy of Western Sahara, as mentioned above (Doyle, 2004). These examples are illustrative of the potential power and influence of small states acting with courage and conviction during their membership of the Council. The empirical aspect of this paper seeks to broaden the scope beyond Ireland and gain the perspectives of security council members on the potential of small states in general to exert influence on the Council.

Methodology

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the rationale for conducting qualitative empirical research to answer the question posed by this thesis. This paper explain why a semi-structured interviews as the primary research approach was chosen: describe the preparatory work and documents designed for the purpose of the interviews, as well as the follow up documents. The thesis paper discusses how different mediums of interviews (i.e. in-person Vs Zoom) may influence responses, as well as the ethical issues that arose and how they were addressed. The paper describes how the sample was selected, the sample size and scope, and how they were accessed. The methodology for data collection, being snowball sampling is also described; and how this helped to identify participants across SC member states, as well as current and former civil servants associated with the SC.

Qualitative Methodology

One of the aims of this thesis is to compare the present published research on the workings of the security council with real lived experiences of working with the Council, both today and in the past. This was fundamental to my research to gain in depth knowledge of the workings of the security council and how this impacts small states. Qualitative research focuses on the collection and analysis of verbal and visual data as a means to improve understandings of a social phenomenon and human behaviour (Robson, 2011). Thus, it can allow us formulate theories on people's lived experiences (Bryman, 2008). For the purpose of my research, a qualitative approach has the potential to provide more insightful information, particularly as the thesis is trying to understand the real lived experiences of the individuals working in the field. The ideology of qualitative research is associated with postmodernism and the idea that meanings are not fixed entities but rather a product of place and time (Snape and Spencer, 2003). While the use of quantitative data can be informative it does not afford the insight to subjective experience which less structured, explorative qualitative methods do. Although qualitative research does not provide a generalized view, it can still produce conceptual and theoretical insights that reach beyond

their immediate context. In addition, interview data collection and qualitative analysis can identify concepts that extend beyond the original scope of the study. Thus, this paper hopes that the insights arising from this research may be relevant to other similar situations too.

Research Methods

Interviews

A large part of the material in this thesis has been gathered through interviews with security council members, ambassadors, and diplomats. The interviews conducted used a semi-structured approach, in which 5 main questions formed the focus but interviewees were encouraged to expand on areas they felt were important, in ways which they thought were relevant. This too afforded the flexibility to probe and continue a line of questioning when certain ideas were mentioned and developed as the interview progressed (Charmaz, 2006).

A radical social constructionist view may suggest that interview data is not wholly reliable in the sense that it portrays the content of those specific interviews, at that specific time. (Koro, 2008). This research is not claiming that the data collected is the experience of all UNSC or Ex UNSC members. Rather the premise of the research is to understand the real-life experiences and opinions of individuals from small states working in the context of the Security Council, to understand how this compares or deviates from other accounts (Robson, 2011).

The determination of the interview questions/topic areas was influenced by the main points that emerged from desk research and gaps identified from the literature review. This included the views of the Permanent 5 members of the SC towards small states, systemic procedures of the council and the resource challenges of small states on the SC. Thus, the use of semi-structured questions, ensured that each of the interviewees addressed these focus areas, whilst allowing for the researcher the freedom to expand and create new lines of questioning. An example of this was a question that developed out of the early interviews i.e. what was the interviewee's opinion on the need for a reformation of the council, especially with reference to recent events including the war in Ukraine. In order to respect the time of the interviewees, interviewees were requested to provide between 30-45 minutes of their time. The duration varied with the specific requirements and time availability of each interviewee. The questions were designed in the manner that interviewees could give

shorter and simpler answers or expand as much as they felt necessary. Such was the interest in the research topic that most interview lasted over an hour (ranging from 33 minutes to 1hour 54 minutes).

Question Design

The questions asked of the interviewees were broad, to give freedom to the participants to interpret and respond to them as they saw fit. Certain questions used words such a ‘challenges’, ‘successes’ ‘ability’, which were intended to be interpreted by the interviewees dependent on their experience and what their respective states felt these terms meant for them. The interview questions started quite broadly and gradually became more funnelled (Turner, 2010). As the case study within this research was Ireland, most questions firstly addressed the wider context of small states and then explored more in depth in relation to the case for Ireland.

Conducting Interviews

Although face-to-face interviews were the preferred medium for data collection, it was not a viable option in most cases as some interviewees lived in diverse locations such as New York, Addis Ababa and Dublin. Whilst the researcher mainly conducted these interviews from Nice, France or Berlin, Germany; it was possible to hold one interview face-to-face, conducted in the interviewee’s home in Dublin. The other interviewees were conducted via Zoom as video calls. Following the signing of consent forms, interviews were recorded either via the function on Zoom or on a mobile device.

In terms of interview technique, the focus was on being responsive to interviewees’ answers while enabling them to elaborate as much as they felt necessary. It was important to be mindful of the time frame given to the interviewees. Therefore, at times it was necessary to move them on from questions in order to not run too far over time. Due to the sometimes very long answers, a technique of summarising and feeding back to the interviewees the responses was adopted to ensure their views had been accurately captured. An awareness of the roles of these individuals and their objectives in supporting their country and government and ensuring the questions were sensitive to this was also a key consideration. The questions ranged from procedural to context specific. They were structured in the same way for each participant, and each was asked the same questions using the exact same

wording. However, the wording of the questions provided latitude for a more open-ended response (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2003). Thus, each participant was enabled to contribute as much or as little information as they felt necessary; allowing more probing questions to follow up. (Turner, 2010). This style of interviewing was intended to allow the participants to more fully express their experiences on the council, than would have been possible with a more tightly structured approach led by the interviewer.

Ethics

Although for the purpose of this master's thesis ethics approval was not a requirement, to ensure academic integrity and fully informed consent, a decision was made to develop and use participant information leaflets (PIL) and participant consent forms. The PIL, was sent to the participants the day prior to the interview to explain the context of the research and to give them prior warning of the five intended interview questions. This gave the interviewees the opportunity to review the questions prior to the interview in order to save time and allow them to formulate efficient answers. The PIL also contained information regarding the interview process, the purpose of the study, how and where their information would be used and their rights in relation to ceasing their participation in the study if they so wished.

Participants were informed about the study procedures regarding anonymity, quotation and recordings following the interview discussion, at the end of the Zoom calls. While verbal consent was given prior to the calls being recorded, once the call concluded participants were emailed a consent form which allowed them to tick/mark their preferences and sign and return the completed form. This allowed them to withdraw their consent if they felt they had mentioned anything during the interview which on reflection they felt may be compromising or unwise and preferred not to share. This allowed participants to decide on how they wanted their information/ data utilised. All participants were fully informed of the purpose of the interview and that their participation was completely voluntary. There was no interview in which the participant was unable to consent, and nobody sought to revoke their consent.

Participants were also assured that once the interviews were coded and analysed the recordings would be destroyed. The recordings have now all been deleted.

To protect the anonymity of participants, specific comments have not been attributed in a way that could lead to any possible identification of individuals. Interviewee profiles are

provided in Appendix A and their contributions are labelled with an interviewee number (e.g. Int 1) in the main body of the thesis.

Sampling Type for Interviews

For this research, snowball sampling (Parker, Scott & Gedds, 2019) was the method used to identify participants. Snowball sampling is a very popular method in qualitative research, that relies heavily on networking and referrals. The data collection began with an initial small number of contacts or “seeds”. These seeds fitted the research criteria in that they were people working centrally in the field and they were then sent emails requesting their participation in the research (Parker, Scott & Gedds, 2019). Following these initial interviews, participants were asked if they could recommend other contacts who fit the research criteria and would be willing to participate. This cycle continued with the newly recommended participants and so on. Sampling concluded when a sufficient number of participants had been researched, judged on data saturation (a diminishing number of new ideas arising from additional participants, until the final participant provided similar but not additional ideas to previous participants).

Interviews began in October 2021. A number of 8 interviewees was initially chosen, however, given the long response time and busy schedules of some participants only 6 interviews were completed. This was due to time pressure in relation to the submission date of the thesis. There is evidently a large variety of potentially suitable participants that could contribute to this topic, however a purposive sampling approach was adopted, focusing mainly on Irish UNSC members and civil servants, as this thesis is a case study of Ireland (Robson, 2011)

Sample Size

Table 1 outlines the Sample used for the research.

Table 1:

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Face to Face | 1 |
| Zoom/ Microsoft Teams | 5 |

Timings

The lengths of interviews varied greatly depending on the participant. The face-to-face interviewee was happy to be interviewed for longer due to less time constraint. Some participants were more willing to give longer answers and have follow up discussions. Whereas other participants indicated their incredibly tight schedule and answered the questions briefly. The limited time of certain interviews did not seem to hinder the quality of the content as often times the answers were more relevant and direct.

Accessibility Issues

The initial sample group was contacted through intermediary contacts; after which it became easier to contact potential participants. although, there were times that participants referred new potential participants just through their name and did not have up to date contact details for them. Some contact details were difficult to source online. Four potential interviewees which were contacted indicated that they were not willing to participate or did not respond. The sampling focused on Irish (ex) civil servants as the research was a case study of Ireland and on the experience of representatives from one example of a small state, although not all the sample group were Irish. It may have been possible to interview more individuals but after conducting the six interviews there was considerable saturation of data due to the interview style and this coupled with limited time suggested it was pragmatic to conclude the study with 6 interviews.

Client Profile

As mentioned, previously, interviews were conducted with individuals who work on the SC, previously worked on the SC and civil servants and ambassadors with great knowledge of Ireland's past and present role on the SC. As well as this one participant from another small state who served on the SC was also interviewed. Due to concerns identified by participants that they should not be identifiable in the research or that quotes should not be attributable to them, participant profiles cannot be provided in detail within this thesis. Such information might jeopardise their anonymity and which the participants may not want due to their active roles in the civil service and global politics. It is important to acknowledge that the individuals who agreed to be interviewed, were referred from other interviewees, and they were self-selecting in agreeing to be interviewed.

Data Analysis

Data analysis was conducted using thematic analysis. This entailed continuously going back and reading the data in order to generate the first stage of codes. Then grouping these into broader themes to answer the research question. Following every interview, the main points from the interview were summarised. An inductive approach was applied to the coding. This was done to ensure that the themes accurately reflected the data collected. Due to the standardised open-ended interview design, the data was incredibly rich. The open-ended nature of the questions meant that it was at times difficult to extract similar themes or codes (Turner, 2010).

Coding refers mainly to the categorisation and labelling of various sections of the data (Charmaz, 2006). Coding aims to identify threads in the data that can be sewn together to present a story or number of stories (Emmerson et al, 1995). Thus, it is the coding of information that allows the collected data to become an emergent theory (Flick, 2009). The data was coded at several stages. It began with open coding in which the data was categorised in segments using labels and themes which directly arose from the data. These codes were first documented on a question-by-question basis for each participant.

Through such open coding one can identify major emergent themes arising from the data (Emersin et al, 1995). These themes encompassed the power of the P5 and the importance of alliances. This was followed by more focused coding through which segments were condensed to the major themes that occurred in the data. The data was sorted into various thematic clusters depending on their context (Ritchie et al, 2003). Through the comparative process of the focused coding, similarities and differences were identified as well as outliers that were particularly informative. Another important aspect was discovering where one interviewee or participant's view contradicted the common view that had arose in other interviews. At times, it was challenging to avoid focusing in on or looking for data that was in line with the researcher's preconceptions or expectations. This is often a difficulty of qualitative analysis (Robson, 2011) and requires the vigilant researcher to adopt a degree of reflexivity during the coding and interpretation process. Utilising both open and focused coding to analyse interview by interview, and then across the entire body of data enabled the construction of the major themes emerging from the data. The focused coding then allowed for further elaboration and refinement of these major themes. The findings are presented according to these major themes in the next chapter.

Results

In the following chapter we will present the findings from the interviews conducted. The chapter aims to examine the experience of each interviewee in their workings with or on the UNSC, in reference to the research question. The four key findings that were deduced from the inductive analysis were

1. The Power of the P5: their overall power on the council and how it can **inhibit** small states' effectiveness
2. Small States Power and Utility: what **power** smaller states could be granted and how smaller states can be seen to or have a larger impact.
3. Mechanism to Effectiveness: what specific **procedures** enable small states to work effectively on the council and increase their impact.
4. Legitimacy of States and the Irish Case: how certain historical or present ongoings in a state can affect their **legitimacy** on the SC. This ideology aligned with the data on the Irish case and how it might be somewhat unique as a small state on the SC

Power of the P5

Perhaps predictably the power of the P5 was a major theme that arose in the interviews. The unlimited power that the P5 hold was mentioned repeatedly as one of the major obstacles for allowing small states to be effective on the SC. All participants spoke of their overriding power and how the P5 truly '*dominate the SC*' (Int 2). It was suggested that the P5 also hold certain privileges, such as penholdership rights. The relationship between the P5 solidifies their power, as the P5 meet between themselves once a month for certain pre negotiations that the E10 are not permitted to be involved in.

Participants mostly agreed that the P5, although holding strong power, very rarely agree on issues raised. This in turn can be seen to hinder their power and lead them to look to the E10 for support and alliances. One interviewee explained that the P5 often '*swoon*' the E10 by going to their home capitals and '*feeling out*' the states objectives and expectations. In this way the P5, pay attention to the pre-elections in order to see who would be beneficial for

them to align with or who might be more likely to follow their agenda. However, this interviewee also noted that this can work both ways and extend beyond the P5, so that potential E10 members scrutinise each other and the P5 similarly.

All participants agreed that the P5 were very aware of their immense power on the SC and how to best utilise it. They are also seen to deem the E10 as their subsidiary body of power. This awareness of power was identified by 3 interviewees as '*lack of respect*' at times. This lack of respect for the E10 referred to the specific tactics used by the P5 to undermine the E10. Such tactics including presenting drafts that the P5 have agreed upon in private, at the very last minute so that the E10 would not have the resources or confidence to object to the draft, especially as it is so difficult to derive a consensus amongst the P5. One interviewee explained how this is often a tactic used by the P5 to forward their own agendas and frequently try to 'slip things past' the E10, which in turn means the E10 must be more prepared for the agenda of the council.

Two interviewees reasoned that the power and responsibilities of the P5 outside the council can affect how much importance they give to their position on the council. One explained that many of the P5 are '*actively involved in the conflicts that the SC are trying to resolve*'. Thus, the P5 have other priorities and concerns, either nationally or internationally, which sometimes hinders their ability to cooperate due to certain trust alliances and economic and trade ties. When speaking about the presidency of the council and the influence one has as the president, two interviewees stated that the P5 would not want to hold all the presidencies as it entails a lot of paperwork, not because they would want the E10 to have the opportunity.

The P5 were deemed the main penholders on the council by the interviewees, again projecting their influence. Due to the immense power of the P5, interviewees underlined the importance of understanding the P5 and the power play between them, as well as understanding the alliances between the P2 and P3. This was deemed important by many of the interviewees for understanding how to further their own agenda and which members it would be helpful to align with. Another point that arose was the need to appease the P5 or modify language in draft resolutions to appear less threatening to the P5.

In relation to requiring the P5s support it was presented across the board that having P5 support was incredibly important for forwarding a state's agenda on the council. One interviewee amplified the importance of this, especially for smaller states. This is because when a smaller state is lacking in resources, such as personnel on the ground or independent links to the country which is on the SC's agenda, they can gather information from a P5 member which often can afford to invest far more resources in gathering information in this country and from their embassy there. The P5 are seen to be very aware of this power they hold both off and on the council. One interviewee spoke of the immense pressure that the P5 and larger states place on smaller states on the council for not following their agenda or going against it. An example given was the expulsion of a smaller states' diplomats from a larger state for going against the Government of the larger state. The example used by the interviewee was Ireland and Ethiopia when Ireland raised the Ethiopian/Tigray conflict in the hopes of a ceasefire and humanitarian access (Int 5). These pressuring and bully tactics send a clear message to other small states on the council who may not want to risk the repercussions of going against larger members agendas as they may not be able to absorb the shocks well. Thus, also displaying that the smaller states are clearly not respected by the larger states in the council when they feel that they can bully them economically, politically, and diplomatically to follow the larger states' agendas. This scenario was described as 'bullying' by several interviewees.

As one might expect, a major theme that arose was the Veto and the power of the Veto held by the P5. Int. 1 spoke of how the veto has been somewhat corrupted. The veto is and was created as a means of last resort. There is not deemed to be as much need to publicly use the Veto as there is such extensions behind the scenes negotiations and '*colluding*' between the P5 that often '*a P5 will threaten the use of a veto in private negotiations*' thus the states that are trying to push through a resolution are then deterred from presenting it in the public SC agenda, as they have already been warned that it will be vetoed and thus would not want to waste the Council's time (Int, 1). In light of this, Int.2 believed that there is a '*deeply held view that the P5 drive the agenda and permanent business*' of the SC and the UN.

All the interviewees spoke of the need for a reformation of the power of the P5 but agreed that it would be almost impossible for the P5 to agree to do this. Interviewee 1 did deem the Veto to be '*necessary*' and by opening the UNSC to a larger group it becomes less effective and more like the General Assembly. Int 4. called for more ethical use of the veto, only being used in extreme circumstances with a clear and credible explanation. However, another participant felt that the power play within the council- due to the Veto – no longer makes sense in today's world. Int 1 zoned in on the fact that the SC was not created to be equal- '*Roosevelt founded the idea on the 4 policemen (UK, USA, USSR, China) as an end of old diplomacy and to protect the world in the face of new wars*' (Int 1), pointing out that it was only adapted to include smaller states later. The SC was really a '*wartime alliance*' against a common enemy and not meant to represent all states. At the time the SC was formed it had a special role as the strongest powers in 1945 and therefore represented the major powers of the times, which are no longer the major powers of today (Int 1). Although it was stated that the SC has changed and developed it is still important to understand where its origins lie in order to understand its current workings.

Small States' Power and Utility

The topic of this thesis regards what impact small states can have on the SC. Many barriers to small states' ability to exert power were identified by the interviewees, however several were of the opinion that there are some elements of power that the small states of the E10 can harvest. The perceived utility of small states varied throughout the participants responses.

The data indicated that small states can be viewed as either a hindrance or an opportunity by larger states and the P5. However, the '*P5 do not hold a block view*' of smaller states entering the council (Int,1). Some P5 view smaller states coming on to the council as irritating, seeing them as raising issues that they themselves deem to be juvenile or amateurish. However, this view varied, with some participants noting that the P5 or larger states see utility in smaller states through opportunity to form alliances and persuading them to adopt their agendas.

Although not all participants felt that a lack of resources was an issue for smaller states and their ability to exert power, many listed it as a considerable limitation to small states' power. The economic and political size of smaller states on the SC doesn't allow them to '*pressure*' other states in the traditional sense, such as withholding aid. Thus, it was identified that at times, in order to have influence or power, small states may have to make 'practical considerations and shift agendas' (Int. 5). It must be noted that some participants completely disagreed with this and explained that small states could not be seen to be malleable as it would hamper their credibility (Int, 4). The lack of resources (e.g financial or human capacity) was considered to hinder small states' diplomatic relations with states both on and off the council. Small states do not have embassies or people on the ground in all states, meaning that they do not have the same ability to verify or collect information. Small states may be intimidated or cowed into following the agenda of a large state or P5 in order to acquire information or personnel (Int, 6). These smaller states also do not have the same amount of experience as the P5, on the council and thus do not have apparent lines of communication developed prior to their election (Int., 3).

Small states can also be useful to push resolutions or discussions forward when the P5 is particularly polarized on an issue. Smaller states are more able to '*focus and give attention to the SC*' as they '*are not as hampered by complex relationships*' with '*less national interests at play*' (Int 2). Although any such power that small states derive from these 'advantages' is still 'checked power' by the P5 (Int.5). Thus, on certain issues a small state alliance or any E10 member may be a penholder for a successful resolution. Every participant emphasised the need for a reform of the council, as it was apparent to them that small states have limited power in comparison to larger states of the P5. Interviewee 1 also pointed out that in doing this, if the UN were to create a larger SC it would become less effective and more so like the GA. Nearly all participants felt that small states, in of themselves have very little influence and power. Whether it be due to their exclusion from decision making or lack of resources all participants felt that they could exert the most power and influence when in pragmatic alliances.

Mechanisms for Effectiveness

An important aspect of this thesis is understanding not only if but how small states can have an impact on the SC. Thus, the mechanisms which enable or aid a small state's effectiveness on the SC was an important theme throughout the data and interviews. Certain specific mechanisms were repeatedly mentioned by the majority of the participants. According to the interviewees, collaborating with other states, one's home government and civil society as well as preparedness were key considerations small states need to focus on to be effective. Certain procedural aspects were also deemed important such as penholdership and presidency of the council.

A system of buddying up or *forming coalitions* was evident across the data. "*P5 have their own interests and they buddy up if the narrative is beneficial*" (Int 2). The E10 are seen to have a particular cooperative ability due to their short 2-year terms on the council and need to be pragmatic in that time in order to progress their agendas and meet their campaign promises. It was frequently reiterated that this alignment with other members or the P5 should not allow smaller states to be seen as "*pawns*" (Int 4). This buddying up system of smaller states to other members and larger states also can happen naturally with favourable outcomes. An example of this was given by Int. 5 where Ireland aligned with the US on the previously mentioned issue of Tigray/Ethiopia due to them having similar interests and foreign policy objectives in relation to humanitarian aid and sanctions. Naturally, certain states align with other members, for example the P3 often align with states such as Ireland, or states within the EU, or with liberal democracies due to similar values and institutional structures. Another interviewee emphasised the importance of alignment within your region, such as the A3 (African 3) or the EU states elected to the council. Going in on a resolution as a unified group was deemed to be one of the most influential ways to make an impact on the council. One interviewee drew the important distinction between small states being co-opted by larger states versus buddying to form a coalition on an agenda of mutual interest to the large and small state (Int 5).

These alliances also extend to the General Assembly. Int.3 spoke of the '*cooperation with other states generating security in numbers*' and when pushing a resolution through how it is important '*to reach back into the GA for more weighted support*'. The support of the GA was mentioned by multiple participants as the E10 are often seen to '*bridge the gap between the GA and the P5*' (Int. 1). Committing to the motives of the GA allows small states to push

certain agendas more effectively as the Council is aware that they have considerable backing from other states even not on the council. These alliances and support are something that need to be continuously worked on and renewed to ensure the success of agreements. However, alliances within the GA, and SC are not the only cooperative efforts that were deemed to be important for effectiveness. Having strong support from one's government and minister is also vital for effectiveness. '*Political buy-in*' and '*Civil society buy-in*' were deemed incredibly important for small states' effectiveness. A united front from a state or group of states can aid in minimising the pressure exerted by the P5.

Preparedness was another issue that was prevalent throughout the data as an impactful mechanism for effectiveness. One interviewee stated that nearly 90% of the SC's agenda is known in advance and thus small states must ensure that they prepare for these drafts and discussions effectively. Being impactful on the council is deemed to require '*huge knowledge and expertise*' (Int. 6). This falls into the need for small states to be active- many participants acknowledged that there is not the same level of enthusiasm across the board. In order to be effective and have an impact all interviewees spoke of the importance of strategy and focus. Due to the limited time each E10 state has on the council. Having a 'clear vision' and 'creating space for their agenda' was deemed very important (Int,3). A part of this was also sticking to one's campaign promises and curating a brand or position in the world which other members can see as credible and reliable. This preparedness can also begin prior to being seated on the council, Int 4 accredited the reinforcement of embassies, increasing of human capacity and creation of strong bonds with civil society prior to and throughout the time on the council as an important way to ensure that states have the resources to be prepared for all agendas that are presented on the council (Int4). Also being aware of the dynamics of the council and understanding the lines of communication was included in this idea of preparedness. Thus, having strategy and being tactical in your moves on certain files or missions was seen as essential for the success of small states. It is seen as more influential to work intensely on a few issues than try to expand your reach beyond your resource capacity. As a small state, its '*what you do and how you do it*' (Int.3).

Another important distinction drawn between larger and smaller states was a domestic vs international focus. "*Larger states are more domestically focused*" (Int 3), whereas smaller

states have greater scope to “*think of the long-game*” and may be happy to progress an issue and then hand on to the next E10 members to continue to pursue this agenda. Small states can be effective in progressing issues of global importance e.g. geopolitical or climate issues, if they adopt this long-term strategy.

Penholdership and *Presidency* are two mechanisms which some deemed important tools of influence on the council. Int.2 deemed penholdership to be important but not often something easily accessible to the E10. ‘*Penholders are mainly the P5*’ (Int.3). Hosting the presidency, which every state will do at least once is an opportunity for a small state to hold a signature event. Presidency more so involves the ‘coordination of the work’ than any real power (Int.5). It was raised that these mechanisms, although they may help, are really just procedural and are not designed to give smaller states and the E10 power. The power that small states hold through the presidency was labelled by one interviewee as “*checked power*” for the reason that even when holding a signature event, the agenda still needs the approval of the P5. In addition, smaller states are fearful of proposing discussions or agendas which will be objected to and thus lead to embarrassment (Int.5).

An issue that one participant brought up was the inability to have open dialogue on the council. States are often apprehensive about what they say in open or even private negotiations as it can and would be used against them in the media or by other states. (Int. 3). An additional check on power that another interviewee mentioned demonstrates the constraints on smaller states to voice their opinions “*Even press elements need consensus – cannot speak outside your capacity even in the presidency position*” (Int 5).

Small State Legitimacy and The Irish Case

A theme which occurred throughout the interviews was how a country’s reputation and history could give them greater influence. This was often raised when participants spoke about their experience of Ireland on the council, but it also did extend to other states.

When being elected to the council, all states are seen to have some ‘*inherent bias*’ towards other states, due to their reputation, previous standing on the council or other such factors

(Int. 2). Each state approaches the council differently, this is also the case for small states. Int 3 flagged that not all states go onto the council to try to end/ deter conflicts but instead to increase their global standing, something which is often apparent to other council members. A small state such as Ireland, Norway or NZ is seen to have more influence if they are a member of an external alliance, such as NATO or the EU. These alliances can lead states to be less domestically focused and align with other members of these international bodies (Int 2). It was deemed that membership of these international bodies also often means that smaller states have connections and backing from other states, perhaps not on the council but within the EU for example.

The participants view of Ireland on the SC was very positive and perhaps unique amongst small states. Ireland is seen by other countries to have a certain 'brand' as 'friends of all' and a representative of other small states such as the Small Island States (SIS) alliance (Int 5/ Int 1). Ireland's brand was also seen to extend to its very principled positions and continuous focus on the humanitarian impact of a conflict. Ireland's principled approach on the council is also seen to align with its overall foreign policy objectives (Int 4). Again, legitimising the small state.

An issue that arose was the inability to have open dialogue on the council. There are many private negotiations, between teams and individuals. However, the data displayed those states are often apprehensive about what they say in open or even private negotiations as it can and would be used against them in the media or by other states. (Int. 3). The present workings of the council do not allow for real negotiations as the media, other states have such power, and a country's image is so important to their effectiveness, that a state would not want to risk being demonised or tarnishing their reputation in the chance that a comment was misinterpreted (Int.3). Thus, this fear can impede a small state's ability to really be involved in the discussion and have an impact.

A country's history of conflict, struggle for independence or with humanitarian crises can aid their leverage on the council. If a country has overcome a conflict, experienced migration or dealt with any issues first hand that are on the security council agenda then they may have more influence and credibility because of this. Despite this, *'larger states still have more influence / respect than a small state'* (Int.5). A country's successes or failings on issues raised in the council can really undermine or amplify their agenda. If a small state is seen to

be proactive in its domestic struggles and form strategic alliances with other small states it gives it much more leverage. Thus, *'Ireland's history of conflict, famine and migration gives it legitimacy'* in negotiations (Int 5). Ireland also has *'65 years'* experience of peacekeeping missions' within the UN, which again adds to its brand and legitimacy (Int 4). Consistency was also deemed to be a part of building a brand as a small state on the council. If a country is seen to have strong morals and principals on certain issue, such as humanitarian intervention, then this consistency also may enable them to be more highly respected. This approach is exemplified in Ireland's consistency on raising issues of human rights and *"Ireland's strong stance and unwilling to dilute their bottom line"* (Int 3). Many Irish representatives focused on the importance of this for Ireland, i.e sticking to their principles and not compromising on issues they felt important, such as Climate and Security and Women, Peace and Security. The data also displayed that certain happenings within the council can make a state more legitimate. An example of this (given by Int 5) was Ireland's success with the Syrian Humanitarian border crossing. This *'elevated'* Ireland's importance and respectability on the council.

Ireland was also deemed to be somewhat unique or perhaps fortunate by interviewees due to the immense support Ireland has from its government and in particular its Minister for Foreign Affairs- Simon Coveney (Int, 2,3,5). Another source of support that lends to Ireland's effectiveness, is its' connection with civil society and its' public i.e. *"the ability of a country to relate to civil society and involve them and keep the public informed"* (Int 4). This domestic support again increases Ireland's legitimacy on the council. One interviewee felt that due to Ireland's previous seats on the council and general global standing in the world that it is somewhat different to other small states. Ireland has curated and maintained lasting alliances with states around the world and has dramatically extended its network and HR capacity (examples of this *"13 Irish embassys in Africa – Ireland has well-staffed mission in NY"* (Int 6), in order to be most effective on the council. Many of the interviewees spoke of Ireland as a proactive, inclusionary, and principled member of the SC who used its time effectively.

Discussion

The data collected portrays the interviewees experiences and interpretations of small states on the security council and their potential to have impact. This chapter will interpret these findings in relation to the literature and conclude with some recommendations that arise from this research.

The Power of the P5

Throughout my data collection and the literature, the power of the P5 has been consistently raised as the primary reasons for the inequality of the SC (Lupel & Malksoo, 2019)(Bosco, 2009)(Langmore & Farrall, 2016). All participants spoke of the immense power the P5 held on the SC. Most of the literature reviewed also argues this. The permanent standing as well as the veto represents a very significant power asymmetry between the P5 and E10 members of the SC.

No one disputes the power of the veto and how it impacts the council proceedings however, Bouranonis's paper focuses on the use of the 'sixth veto', in which the E10 can align and stop the passing of a resolution even if the P5 have agreed, due to the requirement of nine votes for a resolution to pass (Bouranonis, 2005). However, the interviewees in this study were of the opinion that this rarely happens. Instead, small states are deterred from rejecting/ voting against a resolution, as it is so rare for the P5 to agree, that an E10 would not want to hinder further proceedings. As previously discussed, P5 are also seen to be aware of this and often negotiate in secret on a resolution or statement and only reveal it at the very last minute to the E10 in order to further deter them from having the capabilities to fully review the document and/or form alliances to object to it. (Int 3/Int5/ Int1). None of the interviewees mentioned the 'sixth veto', nor accredited it as a means of influence. The data also uncovered that many E10 or small states choose to align with P5 members to aid their agenda or acquire information on a country they do not have the capacity to source for themselves (Int 3/2). Thus, through comparing both the data and the literature it is apparent that the 'sixth veto' although

technically making sense, in reality is not used and thus is of little benefit to small states (Bournanois, 2005).

The interviewees were of the strong opinion that small states must earn the respect of their counterparts on the council. They do not come onto the council as equals and are not afforded the same influence. For the E10 and especially smaller states “it’s about what you do and how you do it” (Int.2). Small states must be strategic and plan carefully in order to have the most effect. This idea of strategic planning, preparation, coalition building and overall preparedness was deemed by both the literature and the data collected in this study to be the most effective way to have an impact on the Council and achieve one’s goals. A consistent finding in this study that is also reflected in the literature is that it is undeniable that the E10 must work much harder and utilize many more resources than the P5 in order to obtain even a fraction of their power (Thorhallsson, 2006).

Mechanisms to Effectiveness

There was surprising consistency between the data and the previously reviewed literature in the identified mechanisms for effectiveness. However, one aspect in which the data differed was on the matter of holding the presidency of the council. Much of the literature spoke of the importance of holding the presidency for a small state. How a small state can be much more influential and further its’ agenda when in this position for the month. The literature identifies the presidency as a key mechanism which allows small states to be impactful (Thorhallsson, 2017)(SCR, 2019)(Bellamy & Dunne, 2012) (Arceneaux, 2021).

The Security Council report that was prepared for the Irish case following their successful election campaign, the importance of the presidency for effectiveness is highlighted (SCR, 2019). However, the data in this thesis offers a different opinion. Interviewees did recognise that the presidency could be helpful, but it was not really a very influential mechanism to push forward a small state’s agenda. Looking at the data collected from individuals with both recent and past experiences on the council, it appeared the presidency was a lot of work with sometimes very little reward. When speaking with participants about whether it was intended to ensure small states were delegated some power, the common response was that this was not an intentional power shift, instead the P5 were too preoccupied to host every presidency

and welcomed the opportunity to pass the burdensome role to the E10. Thus, in reality the rotation of the presidency could be seen as a sharing of duties (Int. 5/4). This could be an example of where the literature is delayed in understanding the reality of the bully tactics used by the P5 on the council and how they have resulted in an increasing power imbalance that to some extent suffocates the power of the E10.

States Legitimacy and the Irish Case

A result that arose from the data which was incredibly interesting and relevant in our current climate was the idea of ‘cancel culture’ on the council. This idea had not been presented anywhere in the literature reviewed. Cancel culture is defined as a way of behaving in society, most of the time referring to social media, in which someone/group is completely rejected or shunned because of something they have done or said that offends you/ a group (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022). The idea that this phenomenon most commonly seen in the world of social media has infiltrated into the fear of states on the council is very telling about the influence of media in our time. The fear of being cancelled or demonized is incredibly harmful to small states ability to influence. Smaller states already feeling intimidated due to P5 tactics are even less likely to take a stand against the issue if they fear the cancel culture of the council as well. The inability for states to feel secure in public and private debates on the council is dangerous for the democracy of the council.

During the interview process, interviewees gave examples of how and where a small state had aided in legitimising itself and thus having a real impact on the council. Multiple participants brought us the Syrian cross-border access as an example of Ireland curating its brand and adding to its legitimacy. Interviewee 5 explained that the success of the Syrian border crossing, discussed in the literature review, elevated Ireland’s reputation in international terms and across the council (Int5) (Sweeney, 2021) Thus, having successes on the council allow small states to continue to impact proceedings. Both the literature and interviewees addressed how a state’s reputation and history aids its ability to be influential. Thus, as the literature also spoke of the alignment between the Nordic states and the SC and how this aided their success so too did it speak of Ireland’s history of conflict resolution enabling its influence (Norway and the African Union, 2019). In this way, it is interesting to see how small states, who obtain certain credentials, such as experience and humanitarian involvement are perhaps better able to achieve their goals and once again raise their position

on the council through this credibility boost (Int 5/ Ingebritsen, 2006). This is undeniably a beneficial cycle for Ireland; however it raises the question of whether this type of small state power, is only to be held by a few small wealthy western states. Ireland's historical past and international reputation as well as its' ability to form a coalition with Norway enabled this resolution to stay on the agenda. However, much of the literature covering this resolution revolved around the success of deriving a consensus from the P5 and especially Russia. In this sense, although Ireland's role was deemed a success, it is exactly this power and success that some interviewees deemed as 'checked power', and relative to the P5, minimal (Int 5) SCR, 2021).

Through the data collection and literature review, it became evident that although certain proceedings were deemed as very impactful, successful and important by the interview participants, the literature mainly focuses on the P5 and their involvement on SC proceedings whereas the interviewees amplified the involvement of the small states in these successes (INT 3,4 6)(Climate Security Expert Network, 2022) (SCR, 2022). An example of this was Ireland's role in The Climate, Peace and Security vote or the Syrian border crossing. Although, the literature reviewed provided some information regarding Ireland's involvement, it was mainly just one of two lines of text, whereas the interviewees really focused on how Ireland and other states drove these processes or successes/failures (Sweeney, 2021)(Climate Security Expert Group, 2022).

This perhaps downplayed role of small states and focus on the P5 by a vast amount of press releases and literature can lead to an underestimation of the potential impact a small state can have on the council. This allows individuals not working on the council or directly with the council to have a skewed view of the proceedings and credit successes mainly to the P5. It was found that although the data collected through the interviewees considered the vote on the Climate, Peace and Security resolution as a great success for coalition building and small states power, it was still overshadowed by the ability of a P5 to block its passing with a veto (CSEG, 2022). Looking at these variations objectively, raises the question of the validity of the power which small states feel they sometimes have or can achieve, when relative to the P5 it appears minimalistic.

Bode (2018) explored the reflective practices used by members of the UNSC. She suggests that those with a secure place in the established order (i.e. P5 members) perform "*strategic*

practices”(p.276) that are to do with “arranging and controlling spaces in order to capitalize on their advantages” (p 276), while those outside the established order resort to “*tactical practices*”, which seek to create space for themselves using practices which must be well-timed and linked to a historical-normative context (Bode, 2018). This relates back to the interviewee’s ideas around ‘what you do and how you do it’ (Int 2). The data collected portrays the idea that the P5 are automatically given respect due to their established position on the council. Whilst the E10 are required to earn this respect through effective mechanisms (In 2,3,5). While strategies can produce, tabulate, and impose spaces; tactics use, manipulate, and divert within these spaces. Thus, the approach of a small state may need to vary over time, as their legitimacy and standing changes among both P5 and other E10 members. Small state needs to be more flexible in shifting between strategic and tactical diplomatic modalities depending on how they are positioned at any point in time (Bode, 2018).

Recommendations

Through reviewing the pervious literature and uncovering the empirical evidence regarding small states and the security council, the researcher would like to suggest some future recommendations for small states on the security council and for future research on this topic.

Small states wanting to make an impact on the Security Council should try to:

- 1. Align current issues which they wish to focus on with the history, track-record and reputation of the state.*
- 2. Form alliances with other E10 countries and with P5 members who may be considered easy allies, who may in turn influence other P5 members.*
- 3. Encourage the General Assembly to establish greater Working Groups on specific issues which can feed into the SC with greater authority, due to the number involved in the Working Groups.*
- 4. Promote a right-based approach to SC participation by highlighting the inequity in marginalizing some states relative to others.*
- 5. Continually refresh the country's 'brand' by growing initiatives or alliances out of previous successes.*

Future research in this area:

- 6. Needs to look at comparing small states successes and their methods to effectiveness*
- 7. More independent academic research into the academic operating principles of the council and highlight the importance of its democracy.*
- 8. More empirical research from the experiences of those working on or closely with the council – an inside out approach rather than the outside in approach of the current literature.*

Reflexivity

In all research, but especially qualitative research, it is important for the researcher to be reflexive. Reflexivity requires the researcher to review their own interpretations and belief systems, their positionality, and how this might affect interpretation of the data (Corlett and Mavin, 2018). As a white middle-class, Irish woman, I recognise that my expectations for the role of a small state on the UNSC may be different from someone with another background, and this may influence how I interpret ambiguities in interviews. It may also influence how interviewees respond to my questions, as compared to another person from a different background asking similar questions. During the research process I kept field notes of my own or others reactions, during or after the interviews, as way of being more aware of my own positionality. By being deliberately reflexive the researcher recognises that they are a dynamic part of and influence on the research process. This awareness allows for interpretation which is more aware of potentially biasing perspectives.

From the perspective on my own reflexivity, it was important to remain aware throughout the interviews that participants - especially those actively working with the SC – may have felt constrained in the extent to which they could answer some of the questions. I felt that this was the case with some participants, who may have followed a Pro-Eu, Pro-Government narrative but for the majority this was not the case. This was also a reason for including ex civil servants who were not longer activity working in the field. Some participants were defensive of their position or countries position were asked about their countries position and bargaining leverage. It is important to remember that this is empirical research, and participants working in this realm may be incredibly patriotic of their state and its place in global affairs, as one might expect, and thus, answered the questions following this narrative.

Certain strengths and weaknesses of qualitative research and interviews for data collection.

Strengths:

1. in-depth interviews with people whose work involves to differing degrees work with the UNSC.
2. The current situation in Ukraine has made the role of the UNSC very salient and may have helped participants reflect more meaningfully on it.

3. A focus on participants from one country has allowed for a variety of perspectives and roles to be taken into account, providing a more rounded view on a particular state.

Weaknesses

1. The number of participants is relatively small and does not allow generalization to other small states. However, other research adopting similar methodology has used similar sample sizes, where the emphasis is on understanding the quality of the conversation rather than undertaking any quantitative analysis.
2. Focus on a single country may mean that the results are particular to the context and relationships helped by that country. However, research cited in the literature review would suggest that the findings here are relevant outside the context of Ireland.
3. Participants may have been somewhat guarded in their comments given current sensitivities regarding the Ukraine war, and given Ireland is currently occupying a seat on the UNSC. However, that at least some of the participants were quite forthright is evident from the nature of the comments that were made and have been referred to in this thesis.

Conclusion

The UNSC has evolved in at least some ways since its creation in 1946, such as the addition of more elected members (Vicente, 2013). However, in other ways, the SC has failed to reflect the new world order and the new global powers at play (Thekiso & van Wyk, 2019). The calls for a reformation of the council, although in no way a new phenomenon, are beginning to grow and take more ground. We see this especially since the war between Russia and Ukraine, where the Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya has highlighted the need for a new architecture of the UNSC that the international community can trust with security (United Nations, 2022). Such an architecture would undoubtedly need to address the issue of the veto and the power of the P5.

However, even in the face of potential reform, that may not occur for many years as stated by the interviewees in this study, it is vital to understand and leverage the power small states can have (Int 3) (Gifkins, 2021). This paper has identified some of the effective mechanisms for small states to have an impact on the SC during their 2-year elected term, through empirical research and comparing this to the current literature. Based on what has been learnt this paper has made a number of recommendations on what small states can do during or prior to their seat on the council, to ensure they utilise their position effectively.

This paper has identified that the P5 are not the only threat to the functionality of the council. Another threat to democratic processes is a fear amongst the E10 of what might this paper has referred to as ‘cancel culture’, evident in both the interviews and extant literature (e.g. Int 3)(e.g. Bode, 2018). This ‘cancel culture’ fear arises where a country is concerned that its credibility (and power) will be undermined if for instance it champions a cause that other UNSC members do not recognize as legitimate, is not in their interests to support, or is directly contrary to their interests. In such circumstances these ‘failures to convince’ may be shared on social media and the general media and be humiliating both within the UNSC and with domestic audiences. This finding is concerning and threatens the proper functioning of the voting system and system of deliberation. The idea that popular culture and the threat of social media has infiltrated the most powerful body of the UN, both shows how the world has developed, and the need to understand the new role of the media and social media in politics, peace, and security (Sanyaolu, Sanyaolu & Oni, 2017). As mentioned in the

recommendations, this finding should be further explored in the better understood through academic literature and studies.

In relation to the Irish case, the research has shown Ireland to be a unique case. Although it is seen as a small state due to its population size, it has been and continues to be very impactful on the SC in relation to forwarding a principled agenda (Dorr, 2011)(UN, 2012). The literature has portrayed many examples of this: Ireland's leadership role on the Syrian border crossing (Sweeney, 2021), its principled approach to the Ethiopian conflicts both now and in the 2000s (IIEA, 2021), the dedication Ireland showed towards humanitarian assistance in Iraq (Doyle, 2004) and its determination and ability to mobilise states in favour of the Climate, Peace and Security draft (Climate Security Expert Network, 2022). Through the empirical research conducted, it is clear that Ireland's history, brand and diplomatic capabilities allows it to be impactful, even if this power – as with other small states and E10 members - is still 'checked' by the P5 (Int 4, 5). The more successes a small state like Ireland has on the council, the more credibility it will be given in the future and the more leverage it will enjoy in forming alliances with other members of the council.

This thesis has uncovered the ability of small states to have an impact on the UNSC and how Ireland has and continues to influence the Council and its proceedings. The need for reform and the cultivation of democratic values within the council is ever present and requires more empirical research in this area to ensure the proper and successful functioning of the UNSC. The United Nations Security Council is a vital body for upholding world peace. It's efficiency and democracy are of the utmost importance to ensuring that conflicts do not occur or are not prolonged and that citizens all over the world are protected from the horrors of conflict. We must ensure that the Security Council works and works in a way that protects all people, everywhere. By understanding how all players on the council can be effective, we can work towards global peace.

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Glossary of Acronyms

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

NZ- New Zealand

P3- Permanent three members of the security council which are often grouped together for following similar trajectories (France, UK, USA)

P5 – Permanent five members of the Security Council (Russia, China, France, UK, USA)

PIL- Participant Information Leaflet

SC- Security Council

SIS- Small Island States

UK- United Kingdom

UN- United Nations

UNSC- United Nations Security Council

USA- United States of America

WEOG- Western European and Other Group

Annexes

Annex A:

List of Interviewees backgrounds:

- i. Irish Ambassador
- ii. Permanent Representatives to the UN Mission in New York for their
respective state
- iii. Previous Permanent Representatives to the UN Mission in New York for their
respective state
- iv. Political Coordinators to the UN Mission in New York for their respective
state
- v. Previous Political Coordinators to the UN Mission in New York for their
respective state
- vi. Ambassador of the European Union delegation to the United States