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The Impact of Covid-19 on Refugee's Education (*The Case of Jordan*)

BY

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My grandfather Mohammad Saeed Abu Zarour (1936-2015) was a politician and writer concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and democracy in the Arab world; whom his father Sahu, was the leader of the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt against the British administration in Palestine. Hence, I owe him my interest in politics and humanitarian studies.

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Finally, and foremost, I owe this degree to my parents, since they believed in me after the pandemic and losing my previous job in Aviation, showing full support all throughout these two years.

I wish to raise more awareness toward the Middle East and conflicted areas with my dissertation, to the youth society around the world. I believe letting go of propagandas and listening to the other side is the best way of knowing the truth in politics.

I hereby declare that I have composed the present thesis autonomously and without use of any other than the cited sources or means. I have indicated parts that were taken out of published or unpublished work correctly and in a verifiable manner through a quotation. I further assure that I have not presented this thesis to any other institute or university for evaluation and that it has not been published before.

31-July-2021, Rakan Abu Zarour.

INTRODUCTION

“When I met president Obama, I shared three things with him. Firstly, if the money we are spending on weapons and wars, be spent on education instead, it can change the world, and the best way to fight against terrorism, is to invest in education.”- Malala Yousafzai.

Following the outbreak of SARS-Cov-2 in December 2019, Major challenges faced every sector from public health, economy, to education. Furthermore, to stress on developing countries with less resources and weaker infrastructure in facing such challenges, we have witnessed an expanding gap between modernized states in the west, and other civilized others in the Middle East in combatting the crisis.

Narrowing the topic to the Levant and the Syrian refugee crisis, there have been over 700,000 displaced Syrians seeking asylum in Jordan. More than 85% of them reside in rural areas with the least available basic needs, of which mostly are children under 16 years, as reported by the UNHCR in 2019.

As a country that hasn't signed the 1951 Refugee Convention by the UNHCR, and despite the Government of Jordan contributing to the crisis with a shortage of resources and counter challenges on its own, refugees will still be facing many barriers regarding basic rights of asylum, policies and residing in the country.

One of the efforts by the international community in the kingdom is the strategy of Non-Formal Education, followed by many NGOs such as the Middle East Children's Institute MECI, which will be later elaborated in the third chapter.

This dissertation is based on 9 months of qualitative research to further address the impact of the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic on refugee education in Jordan. Beginning with a historical overview of the Kingdom, going through the events shaping the country's current policies and relations with the west, in the first chapter. Further elaborating on the history of refugees from 1945 to 2016, as Jordan is considered a peace keeper in the region.

The second chapter will spot the light on the Jordanian approach in refugee education, keeping in mind barriers faced by educational institutions in refugee camps, such as

Za'atari, and Azraq. Later mentioning the role of the international community, and civil society in supporting the government with regards.

The topic in the final chapter will be further narrowed mentioning the current pandemic, crisis management plans and strategies followed by Jordan for the past two years. Further elaboration will take part on the gap between refugees and the unvenerable groups in Jordan on one hand, and the right to education on the other.

Lastly, and in order to be aware of real-world challenges, I have interviewed the Regional Director of the Middle East Children's Institute (MECI), Lina Farouqi. In the interview she explained the day-to-day tasks in refugee education, in depth details about the Non-Formal Educational strategy, and furth details on the efforts on tackling the pandemic in the educational sector.

METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I represent the methodological dimensions I have followed in the dissertation research, and the research design. The nature of my research aims to address the current public health crisis of SARS-Cov-2 virus in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Through the research method, I have measured the quality education for refugees in Jordan, by stating the available literature review, despite it being very few, and addressing the gap where growth is needed in the educational sector for refugees. Such gap is defined by analysing the current efforts by both the Jordanian government, and the international community, then comparing results with the growing challenges due to the pandemic in the field of refugee education.

The data collection process followed was online, starting in the month of December 2020, ending in July 2021. An outside collection took part as an interview with the Regional Director of the Middle East Children's Institute, a non-governmental organization in Amman, Jordan, in the context of addressing challenges, and elaborating about daily tasks made by the organization.

1 Chapter I: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a crossroad

1.1 Historical overview of the Levant

The Ottoman Empire forces took over the Levant and gained sovereignty of Jordan in 1516. prosperity and flourishing did not last later than the 16th century, where the region was faced with abandonment by the Ottomans. Visits to the region were limited to the annual tax collection.¹ The 19th century however, with the construction of the Hejaz Railway, linking Istanbul to Mecca, led to development of the towns passing through the kingdom.²

Later, the first experience of modernization in the Middle East was during the Ottoman Empire in the last two decades of the dynasty. The Ottoman era brought reforms, and a complex of both modern and rational institutions. Later on, with the British and French administrations after the WWI, the region was introduced to a different recognition to the western model.

As a result of such limited modernization, a new territorial state of Jordan was born with national boundaries and a medieval system of reshaped authorities, with a westernized image slowly being injected in different nations. This new introduction of a new authority during the last decade of the empire did not abolish the old authorities, but surely weakened them.

The newly formed Arab states in comparison with Europe, followed a different nation-building process, leading to the Westphalian inheritance problem in the Middle East.³ Arab states were created under the umbrella of colonization with formalities being only on paper, with a reality of domestically weak states. Such western regulations and

¹ Eugene Rogan, Tariq Tell, *Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan* (Cambridge: British Academic Press, 1994), .37-47.

² Daly, M. W., ed. *The Cambridge History of Egypt*. Vol. 2. The Cambridge History of Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521472111.

³ Soltan, Gamal A. G. "State Building, Modernization and Political Islam: The Search for Political Community(s) in the Middle East." *Revista CIDOB D'Afers Internacionals*, no. 37 (1997): 29-38. Accessed July 22, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40585642>.

attempts of a new authoritarian system however, created problems that affected statehood.⁴

The fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the Balfour Declaration

Being called the “Sick Man of Europe”, the Ottoman Empire seemed less likely to survive in western European discourse. After the fall of the Empire in 1922 and the new British administration forming the protectorate of Transjordan, a new form of state had been established in the region on the British instigation.⁵ However, during 1914, and before the WWI, the Ottoman Empire was too powerful to even imagine its end, yet a few years later, such imagination came to reality. With the end of WWI being in favour of The United States and European powers, they had increasingly been involved with emerging nationalist movements in the Empire, resulting in fluctuation of regional dynamics. The two outsider regions became strongly convinced of the Empire’s powerful geographical and strategic value.

During the last decade of the Empire and with minor reforming attempts, the Middle East had all the components of a modern state. The Arab region was in between a hybrid system of authorities, national borders and modern administration. They were members of the international system of states, but far from being realized as modern and sovereign ones.⁶

There are different opinions in the Arab world, about the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Many believe *Al-Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī* (1 May 1854 – 4 June 1931), the Arab leader in Mecca, have betrayed the Ottomans when promised an Arab Kingdom if the Empire falls. With the help of Thomas Edward Lawrence CB DSO (16 August 1888 – 19 May 1935), whom helped in exploding the trainline of supplies from Istanbul to Palestine, and

⁴ Howard, Harry N. “*Michael C. Hudson. Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. Pp. Xi, 434. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977. \$22.50.*” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 441, no. 1 (January 1979): 205–205. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000271627944100123>.

⁵ Anderson, Lisa. "The State in the Middle East and North Africa." *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 1 (1987): 1-18. Accessed July 22, 2021. doi:10.2307/421917.

⁶ Mathew F. Jacobs, *World War I: A War (and Peace?) for the Middle East, 2014*, *Diplomacy history* 38, no. 4 (2014): 776-784

the WWI events, the Empire fell, but *Al-Ḥusayn bin 'Alī al-Hāshimī* was not given his promise, which therefore led him not to sign the Treaty of Versailles.⁷

The other point of view, shared in the Levant, is that *Al-Ḥusayn bin 'Alī al-Hāshimī* broke free the Arabs from the Ottoman colonization, and therefore found Transjordan following the leadership of his son *Abd Allāh Al-Awal ibn Al-Husayn*, (2 February 1882 – 20 July 1951).

Prior to 1918, it was not expected for a state to emerge beyond the Jordanian border, The province of Amman never witnessed any sustainable prosperity before 1870, and was a deserted village, there was however a collective community on which a state might have been built from its ideologies; Bedouins coming from Hijaz.

“The modern history of Jordan is the story of the creation of a state and the attempt to mould a political community that would render allegiance to that state.” (Phillip Robins, 2019) The state of Jordan can seem as a convincing entity, if we are to look at the existence of the capital Amman as a political power centre, and the attempts of the capital in elaborating a formal set of structures and processes.

Thinking of the political community, there are more chapters to be mentioned. Engaging and reconciling between Palestine and Jordan, liberal and Islamist, and the tribal and post tribal communities amongst the other countries could for once, challenge the Jordanian political bodies.⁹

1.2 History of refugees in Jordan (1948-2011)

The legal status of the MENA region after WWI, and new control spreading in the region influenced foreign control in the Middle East to be more nationalist, especially after a decade of the great war. There has been a complete change of political boundaries and internal political dynamics, and the region started to have a significant role in expanding the international oil industry.

⁷ Niḍāl Dāwūd al-Mūminī. *الشریف الحسين بن علي والخلافة / ash-Sharīf al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī wa-al-khilāfah* (in Arabic). ‘Ammān: al-Maṭba‘ah aṣ-Ṣafadī. (1996)

⁹ Robins, Philip. *A History of Jordan*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. doi:10.1017/9781108605373.

One region that had a highly nationalist post-World War I atmosphere, was Palestine. The state with more Jews immigrating to the country, and Zionism offering a mixture of a nationalist and religious identity.

During the times when Palestine was under the Ottomans, and after the First Aliyah¹⁰, Constantinople, the Ottoman government began applying restrictions on immigrations.¹¹ Despite the growing tension between Jews immigrating from Europe and the locals, the Ottoman central government granted Jews the same rights as Palestinians in 1901, resulting in the Jewish population increasing to 7% by 1914.¹² With growing populations of Jewish nationals, as well as more young Turks being disturbed, there occurred a Palestinian national movement against Zionism as a political ideology, but not Semitism as a belief.¹³

The movement and resettlement of Jews in Palestine came out to be a very well-planned strategy. By the year of 1917, the case gained enough attention to persuade the British government to issue the Balfour Declaration, pledging support to the creation of a “national home for the Jewish people” in the state of Palestine.¹⁴ As a result, a revolution by the Arab states was considered as a nationalist uprising by Arabs in the region revolting against the British administration. Its main demands were independence, and the end of the unrepresented Jewish migration taking part, as well as purchase of land by the Zionists, all serving the bigger image of establishing the state of Israel as an oppressed state.¹⁵

One of the first revolutions taking part as showing dissatisfaction by the Palestinians, was the Arab Revolt (1936-39), later coming to be known as (*The Greatest Arab Revolt*) or

¹⁰ Bernstein, Deborah S, *A Zionist immigration to the state of Palestine. Pioneers and Homemakers: Jewish Women in Pre-State Israel* State University of New York Press, Albany. (1992) p.4

¹¹ Friedman, Isaiah, *Germany, Turkey, and Zionism 1897–1918* (1997).

¹² Tessler, Mark. *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009. Accessed July 22, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1d10hf6>.

¹³ Neff, Donald *The Palestinians and Zionism: 1897–1948. Middle East Policy*. 4 (1) 1995: 156–174.

¹⁴ Mathew F. Jacobs, *World War I: A War (and Peace?) for the Middle East, 2014*, *Diplomacy history* 38, no. 4 (2014): 776-784

¹⁵ Kelly, K. “A Different Type of Lighting Research – A Qualitative Methodology.” *Lighting Research & Technology* 49, no. 8 (December 2017): 933–42. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1477153516659901>.

(*Thawrat Filastin al-Kubra*).¹⁶ The aim was to revolt against the British administration, demanding the end of illegal Jewish migrations and their land purchases, and the goal of their new home establishment.¹⁷

During the revolt, the British army and police killed more than 2000 Arabs in combat, of which 961 were exiled because of “gang and terrorist activities.” The British authorities were inhumane in their response to the revolt, by not operating the rule of law, and the servicemen avoiding any human rights by the modern means.¹⁸ After full support of the British army forces to the Jews, and more than 5000 Palestinians being killed, the British forces had begun to show results by the spring of 1939.¹⁹

Transjordan, and the British administration coming to an end

The inhabitants of Transjordan never thought of a nation state before the fall of the Ottoman Empire, yet ever since, they started to think in broader and more nationalistic ways. Later after the fall of the Empire, the locals demanded to be ruled by an Arab prince, with a national council to lead the area. With the country having different ideologies and backgrounds from Palestinians, to tribal inhibitors, the question arose that, what state and nation would be constructed. With all these players in the game, the mandate of Palestine was assigned to the British, after it being given by the United Nations. Nonetheless, no party had a clear idea what or how the new nation would ultimately become.

The first challenge facing the new state was in 1922, where construction of the new nation took place, cutting the Palestinian Mandate into two, along the Jordan River, with the new Emirate of Transjordan on the eastern shore.²⁰

¹⁶ Hazran, Yusri. "The Druzification of Arab Christians in Israel in The Wake of the “Arab Spring”." *Israel Studies* 24, no. 3 (2019): 75-100. Accessed July 22, 2021. doi:10.2979/israelstudies.24.3.04.

¹⁷ Kelly, Matthew Kraig. *The Crime of Nationalism: Britain, Palestine, and Nation-Building on the Fringe of Empire*. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2017. Accessed July 22, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1vjqpc4>.

¹⁸ Hughes, Matthew. “Palestinian Collaboration with the British: The Peace Bands and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–9.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, no. 2 (April 2016): 291–315. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009415572401>.

¹⁹ Allport, *Britain at Bay*, (London: Profile Books Limited, 1938) P. 66.

²⁰ Betty S. Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, (University of Texas Press, 2005) 15-20

By the end of 1920's, there was no longer any hostility about the existence of a regime in Transjordan. Britain was the ruler in the state, watching over the chosen ruler Prince Abdullah, being the head of the regime, resulting in a combination of the British officials being highly overwatching the government, and Amman slowly growing as the power centre of the country.

The British administration was in charge for the oversight of the political development in the new formed country of Transjordan, having the obligations to administer its mandate, the administration reported an annual progress to the Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva. The signed agreement on February 1928 between the British authorities and Abdullah, describing the power gap between the two, was faced with a strong opposition from the locals.²²

The new king Abdullah, and his tribe having forced to flee from Hijaz, benefited from the agreement the most, having a new government under his rule. However, benefits and financial aid to the Kingdom did not just stop there, but continued to cover expenses of the new administration, including military findings and aid; Such supports resulted in economic development of the new state.²⁴

The post WWII era, with the creation of the new world order, was a period of flourishing to King Abdullah I (1882-1951). The British support acted as a win from both sides,; supporting Transjordan gives to the British a stronger influence in the region. In addition, more support was delivered in the early 1940s, with the independence of Syria and Lebanon.

The year of 1948 had a crucial impact in defining the identity of Jordan. The kingdom that has been artificially created as a state, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the First World War. After short-term and temporary agreements between Amir Abdullah and the British Adminstrating in 1921, Transjordan acted as a state aiming to sustain peace in the region, after the various tensions rising against its existence. Prince Abdullah and his willingness to reach independence made him negotiate with the ingenious groups of the state, of which are the Palestinians, Syrians and Circassian elites. The new state

²² Report by HMG to Council of the League of Nations on 'Palestine and Transjordan, 1928' (HMSO, London, 1929), p. 99.

²⁴ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998) 1-6

however, never stopped to rely on the financial, and military support of the British administration of London.²⁵

Therefore, the new government, established a redefined treaty with the British, achieving greater independence for its people. The year of 1948, the state witnessed a transformation both demographically and territorially into the new Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, through immigration of half a million refugees and the assimilation of the West Bank. Although before Abdullah being invested with the title of emir of Transjordan by the British, the area had been divided by many factors, such as geography, socioeconomic, and politics, and was never represented as a one nation.

Five years after ascending the throne, the 20th of July 1951, on a Friday afternoon, , King Abdallah I was assassinated by a Palestinian while visiting *al-Haram al-Šarīf* in Jerusalem with his nephew Ḥusayn, accused of being too lenient with the Zionist enemy and its European ally, the British. Views on the assassination took two sides, one being empathic with the assassination and, the other being on the favour of Palestine and against the Jewish settlement. One of the events believed to have been responsible of the assassination was the different political ideologies, and people believing he would have signed a peace treaty with Israel.²⁷

The slow construction of Transjordan during the wartimes of 1920's and 1930's, was followed by tremendous prosperity, after the new British trade policy in the Middle East. In 1946, Jordan became an independent state initially known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, and renamed in 1949 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. With the Palestinian immigrants settling in Amman, more economic growth and prosperity was emerging in the region, the new city was slowly growing as the new hub of the state.

²⁵ Kingston, Paul W. T. *Britain and the Politics of Modernization in the Middle East, 1945–1958*. Cambridge Middle East Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511563539.

²⁷ Man Abu Nuwar, *Fi sabil al-quds [On the Road to Jerusalem](Amman: Jordanian Military Forces, 1968)* 44-79

Jordan under King Hussain, and the challenges of the holy land (1935-1999)

Hussain bin Talal gained the title of crown prince of Jordan on the 9th of September 1951. He was the eldest son of Talal and Princess Zein Al-Sharaf.²⁸ The new king started his life on the throne with the Arab Cold War in the 1950s, resulting in the conflict between Nasserist of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Later, as a result of a dual unification between Egypt and Syria forming the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, Hussain and his cousin King Faisal II of Iraq established the Arab Federation later in the same year.

The two federations led to wars in the region, leading to Jordanian and Syrian forces clashing on the border, with a Jordanian officer being arrested for plotting to assassinate King Husain. The events emerged to the UAR planning to overthrow both Jordan and Iraq's Hashemite monarchies in July 1958.²⁹

The upcoming challenge took shape as a Six-Day war between the Kingdom and Israeli settlements in 1967. Later and after the war being in favor of the oppression, there emerged the name "Naksah" meaning The Catastrophe in Arabic the term describes the second forced migration of Palestinians out of their lands. The result was Israel capturing the Sinai desert, West Bank, Gaza strip, Jerusalem, and the Golan heights of Syria.

In the mid1970's, Jordan's stability witnessed a downfall, with less effective support of the United States. The kingdom lost its influence in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The major aspects shaping the challenges of that period against king Hussain were the growing politicization and the Muslim Brotherhood, an extremist socialist movement started in Egypt.

Within the ongoing tensions between the two states, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded. Followed by the events of Black September, a civil war between Jordan and the PLO military occurred, a war that ended by taking the lives of thousands of citizens from each side.

The so called "Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty" was followed by governments taking steps forward in peace negotiations between Israel, the PLO and Syria. In Jordan however,

²⁸ Chris Evans, "*Hussain of Jordan*", The Telegraph. (February, 1999).

²⁹ Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine*, 1st ed. (Tel Aviv, 2010) 153–159.

business owners and elites were optimistic about such a step, as of the benefits of a better and more prospect economy.³⁰

Another challenge faced by King Hussain later on was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, believing the situation would only worsen towards a catastrophe. The Hashemite king was losing control over the country, believing the west should intervene saving him from his county's extremists on one hand and Israelis on the other. Later during the early 1990s Hussain was dependant on Saddam's security for protection.³¹

King Hussain left the scene in 1999, with his son Abdullah II taking over the throne instead of the previous crown prince Hamza Bin Hussain. Yet the challenges of the region have only been escalating with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab Spring and pressures from the west.

History of refugees in Jordan

The kingdom faced different transitional periods, from an emirate of Transjordan, to a Hashemite Kingdom shaped by refugees., Later on an identity perspective, from the Arab tribes in Hijaz, to Palestinians and Syrians in 1948 and 2011. The history of refugees in Jordan has been affected by major political aspects, and each refuge movement had its political position in the kingdom. This section spots the light on a historical review of refugees in the kingdom, focusing on the anchoring of Syrian refugees. Later with a deep focus on how the pandemic reshaped the daily challenges faced by refugee students.

For over seventy years, Jordan has been hosting refugees, despite its weak formal policies towards them. Starting with the displaced Palestinians in 1948, Annexing the West Bank two years later. Welcoming more than 300,000 Palestinians shortly after, with the population of the Kingdom rising by almost 300% by then.³²

³⁰ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Six-Day War." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, June 8, 2021. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War>.

³¹ *Jordan in the Middle East 1948-1988, The making of a pivotal state*, Joseph Nevo and Ilan Pappé. (1994)

³² Minkin, Shana. *The Arab Studies Journal* 9/10, no. 2/1 (2001): 142-45. Accessed July 25, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27933817>

When comparing Palestinian refugees to other asylum seekers, the kingdom's policy against other refugees such as Syrians overlaps policies towards Palestinians. Therefore, the country is against the apartheid state of Israel, and against any occupation by force.

The kingdom's borders have agreed to be open welcoming refugees, despite not signing the 1951 Geneva Convention. Borders are only open when security reasons and actions are needed to be taken.

In the times of the late King Hussain during the 1960s, Jordan's treatment to Palestinian refugees had its ups and downs, taking different shapes by the political situation between the two states. The Palestinians demanded certain changes in the government of Jordan, wanting to be included in its account of national identity.³³

Today, the Palestinians in the Kingdom form more than half of the population, leaving a challenge on the Kingdom's identity.³⁴ Through its history, Jordan has welcomed refugees from more than 40 countries, deeply affected by the so-called Arab Spring, and mainly from Iraq, Syria and Yemen.³⁵ On the other hand, and during the Gulf War of 1990-91, many Iraqi refugees fled to the kingdom, yet many other Jordanians of which are locals going back home for safer environments. Later in 2003, and with the invasion of the Iraq by the United States, there grew the numbers of Iraqi refugees in the Kingdom.³⁶

In 2014, 60,000 more Iraqis entered the Jordanian territories with the UNHCR, with Yemeni refugees as well of 14,000 and Sudanese of 6,000 hoping for a safer environment.³⁷ The ongoing relocations of refugees from different Arab states did for sure have its perks on the country, with rising tensions between locals and refugees. Such

³³ Quilliam, Neil. *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 4 (2004): 692-94. Accessed July 25, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330080>.

³⁴ United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). *"The situation of Palestinian children in The Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon."* (2010)

³⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). *Fact sheet: Jordan.* (2010).

³⁶ Mason, V. *The Immobility of Iraqi refugees in Jordan: Pan-Arabism, "hospitality" and the figure of the "refugee."* *Mobilities.* (2011), 353-373.

³⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). *Fact sheet: Jordan.* (2019).

tensions took shape in political concerns splitting citizens to groups according to their political identities.³⁸

To elaborate more on the Gulf war, it was one of the main refugees movements aside from the 1948 Israeli-Palestinian crisis in Jordan. A war led by the United States against Iraq, as a response to the Kuwaiti invasion by Saddam Hussain's regime. The war ended with three million refugees seeking humanitarian assistance. The main groups seeking refuge being Kurds and Shi'a Muslims fleeing the Iraqi regime to countries such as Jordan, not to mention the Palestinians which were the largest group of 300,000 in late 1990s.³⁹

As a result, the United Nations started its efforts and responses to Iraqi refugees and their needs with growing numbers of refugees. However, the burden on the kingdom started to unveil with needs for a specialized response, and by 1995, over 20,000 refugees registered in Jordan under UNHCR.⁴⁰

Aside from the Palestinian refugees, the second biggest wave of refuge came from Syria starting in 2011. Conflicts resulting in displaced citizens, resulting in more than four million Syrians being displaced and having forced to leave to the neighbouring countries of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, with more than 670,000 residing in Jordan mostly of school children.⁴¹

Jordan has maintained a clear policy of not intervening in the conflict between the Syrian government and opposition organizations since the Syrian refugee flow began in March of 2011. A diplomatic solution to Syria's crisis and an ending to Syrian forced migrations towards neighbouring nations are demanded by the Kingdom. (Federal Agency for Civic Education, 2020) They seek asylum in Jordanian homes near Jordan's border with Syria at the onset of the conflict.

³⁸ Lenner, K., & Schmelter, S. *Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Between refuge and ongoing deprivation*. (IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2016) 122-126.

³⁹ Galbraith, P.W. "Refugees from war in Iraq, what happened in 1991, and what might happen in 2003" (2003) <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPIPPolicyBriefIraq.pdf>

⁴⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). "UNHCR marks 30 years of protecting refugees in Jordan" (2020) <https://www.unhcr.org/jo/14293-unhcr-marks-30-years-of-protecting-refugees-in-jordan.html>

⁴¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR "636,040 registered Syrian refugees as of March 16, 2016".

This is especially widespread in the Al-Ramtha region in Jordan's far northwest, where Jordanians and Syrians with roots in Daraa' region in southern Syria have deep historical links and tribal affiliations.

Thus, "Jordan Response to the Syrian Crises Plan"-JRP 2016-2018-was established in this respect, and the international community has contributed 700 million dollars to assist it.⁴² "UNICEF supported us with \$45,000 in 2020 during the pandemic, to provide internet cards for students in remote areas where transportation is difficult to almost impossible."- Lina Farouqi.

Despite the Jordanian government welcoming refugees, it is of an importance to mention that they have limited rights, and difficulties granting the citizenship. Refugees willing to work were not able to do so until 2016, leaving to rising numbers in poverty among them. As a response, the Jordanian government welcomed Syrian children to schools, those whom have missed one to three years of schooling due to the war.⁴³

The number of Syrian refugees as of 2016 was 1.6 million, of which only 817,000 school-aged children with access to education. On the other hand, there was 739,000 out of any educational system.⁴⁴ One main reason of a high number of school dropouts is the bullying and harassment refugees face, as well as different educational materials, creating a burden leading to them seeking a life out of education.⁴⁵

1.3 *Refugees' policies in the Kingdom*

As per the Convention on the Status of Refugees by the UNHCR, a refugee is an individual that, due to fear of persecution, had to flee outside his/her country, with no

⁴² Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, "Jordan Response to the Syrian Crises" JRP 2016-2018, 2016. (2016)

⁴³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR, *Regional Refugees and resilience plan 2015-2016*.

⁴⁴ United Nations Development Program (UNDP) & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). . *Regional refugee and resilience plan 2015- 2016, in response to the Syria crisis: Regional strategic overview. (2015)* Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/3RP-ReportOverview.pdf>

⁴⁵ CARE Jordan. "Five years into exile: The challenges faced by Syrian refugees outside camps in Jordan and how they and their host communities are coping". (2015) Retrieved from <http://www.alnap.org/resource/20591>.

discrimination regarding religion, or nationality or is a member of a particular social group.⁴⁶

Article 21 of the Jordanian Constitution provides that “political refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or for their defence of liberty.” However, it has been proved the opposite, since Jordan never enacted any legislation regarding the status of refugees regarding their asylum for political reasons.⁴⁷

Jordan is dedicated to improving the business climate and recruiting international and local firms through a number of legislative, legal, and structural changes and incentive measures.

The Government of Jordan requires Syrian refugees to register with the UNHCR, and those who have not done so, aren't considered as refugees. This registration process collects the needed data of children, in order to issue an identification card to each one to deliver them the air needed for education.

Those whom register and get their identification cards issued, are obliged to stay in their geographical location, or else will not receive aid. Furthermore, the registration process includes a fee payment to the Jordanian government, resulting in some Syrians being left out, as of the high costs. However, the fees were lowered in 2016.

Since the 2011 events of the so-called Arab Spring in Syria, refugees in the kingdom were addressed by their nationality, and therefore registered as Syrian citizens, which resulted in a conflict when comparing their numbers to the ones registered by the UNHCR. The registered refugees in the United Nations were lower than those whom are registered by the government, which resulted as a burden on the government and their amounts of financial aids being received.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ United Nations. *Convention relating to the status of refugees*. (1951) Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>.

⁴⁷ *The Jordanian Government Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as amended*, <http://www.parliament.jo/node/137> (in Arabic), archived at <https://perma.cc/4D2K-CYDL>.

⁴⁸ Lenner, K 2016 'Blasts from the past: Policy legacies and memories in the making of the Jordanian response to the Syrian refugee crisis' EUI Working Papers, Max Weber Red Number Series, no. 32, vol. 2016, European University Institute.

The living conditions of Syrian refugees remained challenging, with rising poverty and unemployment levels, and scarcity of medical assistance. Further in Jordan, and before the refugee movement, the kingdom was already on the edge of an economic and financial destruction with 14.4 percent of the population earning less than \$2 per day in 2010.⁴⁹

With the rising numbers of refugees, Jordan's infrastructure was dramatically affected in providing the expected services to its citizens. Syrian refugees, as of the high expenses, live below poverty line, with 69% of them considered as poor, as mentioned in an article by the World Bank.⁵⁰ The effects on the infrastructure were of fallen wages, rising prices of basic commodities, and a surge in housing prices, resulting in a financially difficult situation being lived by the citizens. It also resulted in Jordanians showing less empathy to their fellow refugees, blaming them for the new challenging lifestyle.⁵¹

A major player in more adult refugees dropping out of school has been the difficulties these adults have been facing, and their families relying on them for income. As per a study made by UNICEF, almost half of the refugee families in Jordan depend on their children for income, and one in ten refugees work in services, farming, retail, or sectors such as barbershops, carpentry and restaurants.⁵²

In order to tackle the refugee crisis, after WWII, as a commitment by the United Nations to protect the most vulnerable people, established the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the 1951 Geneva Convention. Sixteen years later in 1967, one hundred and fourth eight countries signed one of the conventions.⁵³

⁴⁹ Jalbout, M. "*Opportunities for accelerating progress on education for Syrian children and youth in Jordan.*", (London, UK, 2016).

⁵⁰ Abu Hamad, B.A., Jones, N., Samuels, F., Gercama, I., Presler-Marshall, E., Plank, G., . . . Sadjji, J. "*A promise of tomorrow: The effects of UNHCR and UNICEF cash assistance on Syrian refugees in Jordan*". (2017) Retrieved from <https://www.odi.org/publications/10978-promise-tomorrow-effects-unhcr-andunicef-cash-assistance-syrian-refugees-jordan>.

⁵¹ Education Sector Working Group. "*Access to education for Syrian refugee children and youth in Jordan host communities: Joint education needs assessment*" (2015). Retrieved from <https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=8570>.

⁵² United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Jordan. (2013). "*Syrian refugee children in Jordan: Assessments desk review on the situation of Syrian refugee children living in Jordan*". Retrieved from <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/180-syrianrefugee-children-in-jordan-desk-review.pdf>.

⁵³ UNHCR, "*The 1951 Geneva Convention*", (1951), <https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html>

Jordan has not signed the 1951 Geneva Convention, despite it hosting more than two million refugees since the Israeli-Palestinian crisis till date. Therefore, Syrian refugees in the kingdom have restricted rights, regarding their access to education, healthcare, and social sectors, making their living conditions more difficult day by day.⁵⁴

Therefore, The Jordanian policies have never been clear, with the absence of any legal framework dealing with refugees, despite the UNHCR issuing the Geneva convention in 1951 and its 1967 protocol, which Jordan has never signed.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Federal Agency for Civic Education, country report, “*Jordan*”, (2016)
<https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/234478/jordan>

⁵⁵ *UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Jordan*. (2015)

2 Refugees' Education, the Jordanian Approach

2016 was the year of the highest level of displacement since 1945 and the WWII, with growing numbers of forced migrations since then (UNHCR, 2017). A total number of 68.5 million have been forcibly out of their countries by December 2017, of which were 25.4 million asylum seekers outside their borders (UNHCR, 2018). Education in the hosting countries of refugees acts as the only hope for children out of the crisis (Dryden-Peterson, 2011, p.9). Despite these facts, only half of the refugees around the world are attending schools (UNHCR, 2018).

For the past ten years, especially during the Arab Spring in 2011, tensions have been rising in Jordan due to the vast immigration movements, with rising conflicts in the neighbouring countries, and Jordan being the safest destination for refuge seekers.⁵⁶ Since the very foundation of the Kingdom and during the 19th century, refugees have always been a part of Jordan's society.

The government has been following different models in their refugee crisis management from granting citizenships to Palestinians, to creating refugee camps for Syrians, on the periods of 1945 and 2011 respectively. On the other hand, many refugees were welcomed by temporary absorption, where they were neither granted citizenship, nor legal protection and public services in the country.

An important aspect, which has negatively affected the refugee crisis management in Jordan, is that the Kingdom never signed the "1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees", nor the 1967 refugee protocol. Such events contradict with the fact that Jordan is one of the countries with the highest refugees and ingenious people rates in the world, and sharpens the edges of refugees' challenges. The only memorandum signed by the Jordanian government is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) by the UNHCR with Amman in 1988.

One refugee movement in 2003, with the Iraqis seeking asylum in the kingdom, have lacked attention from the Jordanian officials, since Iraqi settlers were more likely to fill

⁵⁶ Al Khatib, B., & Lenner, K.. "Alternative voices on the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan: An interview collection" (2015).

the upper-middle class than be in need of shelter. Thus, there was less light spotted on the vulnerable ones in need of humanitarian aid.

Due to the 2003-armed conflict in Iraq, and later Syria in 2011, the results were not promising to Jordan, especially on its economy and demographics. One of the social effects however was the changing perception of the “Palestinian-Jordanian” and the image of “Jordanian-Jordanians”, Since the Jordanians compared the new Syrians migrants to the Palestinians who migrated in 1948, stating them as the new enemy. This image has been shared by a local minority in Jordan, mostly Bedouins living in the suburbs.

The reaction of the Syrian regime during the Arab Spring, have caused Syria a devastating humanitarian crisis, resulting in the displacement of half of the population.⁵⁹ The Syrian Revolution, started as a civil uprising inspired by the Arab Spring events taking place in Tunisia. The events, starting with protests, were immediately faced with force by the Syrian Arab Republic and the administration of Bashar Al-Assad.⁶⁰

Aside from the tragedy of deconstruction, and forced migration the civilians were facing, refugee education was not a priority. Millions of children had to drop out of schools for the sake of work and financing. Therefore, the international community had increasing concerns regarding the matter, asserting education is a fundamental human right, and prioritising refugees.⁶¹

Concerns were rising not only because displaced children benefit when being educated from the future career perspective, but education has been proven to improve their psychological, emotional and physical protection.⁶²

The body of literature addressing refugee education is considerably small, especially under the coronavirus pandemic. The approach by scholars has been more critical than

⁵⁹ Shelly Culberston, Louay Constant, *Education of Syrian Refugee Children, Managing the crisis in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan*. (2015).

⁶⁰ Omri, Mohamed-Salah. "A Revolution of Dignity and poetry" (2015).

⁶¹ United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR) “*Refugees Education, A Global Review*” (2011) 40-55

⁶² Loughry M, Eyber C. *Psychosocial Concepts in Humanitarian Work with Children: A Review of the Concepts and Related Literature*. (Washington DC: National Academies Press 2003).

normative, focusing only on what effects does refugee education have on society and economy.

2.1 The educational system in Jordan, and barriers faced by refugees

The international community assisted the government of Jordan (GoJ) in making education accessible to Syrian refugees. Hence, new teachers have been recruited, and school infrastructure expanded. Furthermore, the government signed the Jordan Compact in February 2016, ensuring all children to have access to education in 2017.⁶⁴

In order to target more refugee students, and putting in consideration the difficult work circumstances, the GoJ allowed students to attend afternoon shifts in 98 public schools around the country. Later, further 102 schools were opened to enforce the second shifts, extended training for educational personnel and providing more equipment to enrich the educational experience. These efforts were not made possible without the government working with international partners in the field of education.⁶⁵

The first promising results of the efforts by the GoJ and educational partners, as well as international community was the increase in Syrian refugee students from 145,454 in 2015 to 167,820 in the year of 2017 (UNICEF Jordan, 2017). Such result was due to the extension of the second afternoon shift.

However, students in refugee camps still face barriers between them and education, as mentioned by CARE International and Human Rights Watch in a report in 2015, three main barriers exist as finance, transportation, and school capacity. A later survey conducted on vulnerable refugees held by CARE international, stressing more than 35% of asylum seekers faced financial barriers, despite annual fees being free, but some other expenses including books, registration fees, and clothing were difficult to clear. (Educational Sector Working Group, 2015).

⁶⁴ Reliefweb, “The Jordan Compact, A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with Syrian Refugee Crisis.”, (2016).

⁶⁵ The Government of Jordan, “*The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis*” (Relief Web, 2019).

Aside from transportation and long distance travelling for schools, some parents raised concerns about safety for their children in attending their classes, with more focus on girls. Concerns were rising as well since many refugee students face challenges such as physical harassment, discrimination and bullying from their fellow students and teachers. Furthermore, and due to the double shifts, it was mentioned by teachers that they often over work, with lack of necessary training to cover the overcrowded.

According to a study done by UNHCR, one in every three Syrian refugees dropped out of school, resulting in almost 83 thousand children without education.⁶⁶ Another burden on students is the registration process since, and the sanctions on teachers with no work permits, leading to higher poverty rates in the refugee camps, with children seeking jobs to cover their family expenses.

The registration process for students also requires a birth certificate, which many children lack, due to war and displacement, and losing of documents. As a result, those who reach the age of school enrollment, and cannot proof their documents, will not be allowed to enter schools. Not to mention that children who skipped three years or more of education face a bigger burden. In fact, they are not allowed to get back to schools by law of the Jordanian Ministry of Education. This three-year gap burden prevented more than 77000 Syrian children from enrolling in schools. (Human Rights Watch, 2020). “Our Non-Formal Education program is aimed at drop-out students whom are not allowed to enter public schools, since they assed the third year of not studying.”- Lina Farouqi.

The requirements to register Syrians with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and to obtain the Syrian Community Service Card (ID) is essential for Syrian students to benefit from free education and reciprocity as Jordanian students.

According to an interview broadcasted on the Syrian Television in 2020, by Asem Al Zoubi, that revise in detail the enrollment procedure, Syrian students receiving aid from the international community and are not residing in camps, are enrolled in government and private schools, and they are usually given a full month to complete the registration

⁶⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2017a). Global trends: Forced displacement in 2016. Retrieved from <https://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf>.

procedure, and to bring in the missing papers or papers from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).⁶⁷

However, for Syrian students registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who are in the camps, educational opportunities are provided in coordination with international organizations within the camps to ensure their educational needs and to pay for them. (Asem Al Zoubi, 2020).

Obstacles to education rise with refugee children reaching secondary school, as this vulnerable age-group never got the needed attention by the humanitarian organizations. Despite the fact that donors have given Jordan more than \$300 million in support for education since 2016, under the United Nations aid response, the aid strategy lacked enrollment targets or any other goals aiming at refugee education (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

Discrimination and differences inside and out of refugee camps

There are no administrative or financial difficulties in enrolling students at all levels, according to Omar al-Hawrani, a former teacher at the Saudi school in Zaatari camp for the Syrian television site. He adds that enrolment is open to all students in the camp and free of charge, and that even books and stationery are distributed with no costs.

According to UNICEF statistics at the beginning of the current school year of 2020, the number of Syrian students in the Zaatari camp was around 18,000. They are spread across 29 schools, covering 12 sectors of the camp (UNICEF, 2020).

However, since the only free education is primary school, and secondary education is not, families' abilities to continue their children's educations limit with time. Another reason rather than financing is transportation for secondary school students. Not to mention the higher transportation costs as a result. All these factors have shown negative impacts on children, with their concentration due to the stress of dropping out of school, or losing financial support.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Retrieved from “*Syrians Education in Jordan, Stability and Challenges*” Syria Television website site. <https://www.irfaasawtak.com/idps-and-refugees/2020/03/25>

⁶⁸ The Guardian, “*WFP Revives Food Vouchers for Syrian Refugees*” (December 10, 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/dec/10/world-food-programme-vouchers-syrian-refugees>.

Dropping out of school, and negative impacts on refugee students

Escaping from the unaffordable costs of education, families have been taking two different paths, child labor or early marriages (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

The 24 % of the refugee girl in the 15-17 age-range are married. Even though before the Syrian crisis, child marriage was not as common in the country. A survey done by the United Nations show that child marriage is four times higher amongst Syrian refugees after the crisis than before, resulting from of financial instability and poverty.⁶⁹

Among the vulnerable refugees, there are also children with disabilities, of which only a small percentage is enrolled in schools. The percentage is 1.9%, making a number of 20,000 students. According to the latest statistics by the Ministry of Education, half of the disabled students cannot access schools, of both Syrians and Jordanians, due to lack of infrastructure, limiting their mobility, which makes it more challenging for those with disabilities.⁷⁰

As efforts to improve circumstances to disabled children, actions have been taken by the Jordanian government as in introducing a law in 2017, addressing the rights to comprehend protections for those with disabilities not only for refugee children, but all layers of society. The new law guarantees disabled children to be admitted in schools. Furthermore, the government, with Ministry of Education supported the disabled minorities, which will be discussed later in this chapter.⁷¹

Although most students want to continue their education, some choose to drop out for many reasons, one of which is the low quality of education. 20% of Syrian children told the Human Rights Watch in interviews in 2020, that poor quality of education was the reason behind their decisions.⁷² Furthermore, poor quality education was often linked to second shift schools.⁷³ Due to many children being in the job market, and working in the

⁶⁹ United Nations, Office of The Secretary General's Envoy on Youth, "*New study finds child marriage rising among most vulnerable Syrian refugees.*" (2017).

⁷⁰ Jordan profile, Qudra, (2021) <https://www.qudra-programme.org/en/qudra-1/countries/jordan/>

⁷¹ Law No. 20 for the Year 2017: Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/66679>

⁷² Norwegian Refugee Council, "*Evaluation of NRC's Host Community Education Programme in Jordan*" (2018), 2.

⁷³ Unheard Voices: *What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home, Policy Framework for Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon*, (April 16, 2018), <https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy->

morning, nearly 70% of children attend afternoon shifts, resulting in a disproportionate number of students being exposed to poor quality education.

When investigated about the reason of lower quality of education during afternoon shifts comparing to mornings, the hypothesis was that early morning shifts were taught by Jordanian government employees, with mostly Jordanian students. While second shifts were taught by freshly graduated and first time employed teachers, with lower benefits such as lacking health insurance, and no job satisfaction, resulting in low performance, which therefore affects children with low quality education.⁷⁴

As a result of displacement, war and tragedy, many children experienced traumatizing events while the crisis took place in Syria, which eventually was carried on their shoulders to their migration to Jordan. Such negative mental experience affected children's personalities, which in some cases, affected their will and ability to enrol in schools, as a report by The Human Rights Watch in 2016.

Humanitarian aid was delivered by Mercy Corps, and United Nations with physiological support to thousands of refugees after their settlement in Jordan in the refugee camps. However, a report by UNICEF in 2015 stressed that the support centres were over populated, and doctor lacked professionalism in dealing with students and their families.

2.2 Actions taken by the Government of Jordan, and the civil society

As the Palestinian crisis being the first of its kind in the kingdom, Jordan's policies have given a huge attention to Palestinians and their concerns. Since most Palestinians in Jordan hold the citizenship, they have been resembling Jordan since culture and demographics are close.

The first action taken by the Jordanian government in support of refugee education was in 1948, and the Palestinian refugees. The Government of Jordan (GoJ) established an educational system, that now covers 13 refugee camps consisting of 174 schools, funded by the United Nations for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). Nowadays more than 60

framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058; Hamad, Jones, and Samuels et al., A Promise of Tomorrow, p. 4.

⁷⁴ University of Sussex, "*The Education of Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Summary of Demand-Side Constrains and Interventions.*" (2019).

percent of Palestinians attend Jordanian government schools (UNICEF, 2010). The second refugee support action, taken by the Jordanian government was in 2011, reacting to the Syrian crisis.

Jordan follows an educational system that contains both theoretical, and practical approaches, allowing humanitarian organizations and the non-governmental sector to deliver support and educational programs. Furthermore, Amman plays a major role in the educational system, since it's not only the capital, but is the core functioning region in education, approving budgets and training teachers.⁷⁶

The government of Jordan's main point of contact with the NGOs is The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), present in the country since 1952. In 2020, the number of NGOs exceeded 40. Furthermore, UNICEF financially aids many NGOs working with regards education implementation programs, operating public schools in refugee camps such as Zaatari and Azraq.⁷⁸

The Jordanian educational system is structured as follows:

- Primary school (6 – 16 years)
- Secondary school (16 – 18 years)

Secondary school is where student specialise in one of the majors preparing for their bachelor's degrees, such as Science (e.g. medicine, engineering) or humanitarian (e.g. poetry, social sciences).⁷⁹

⁷⁶ World Bank Group, “*Jordan School Autonomy and Accountability SABER Country Report*” (2015).

⁷⁸ The United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF Jordan, *About Us*, <https://www.unicef.org/jordan/about-us>.

⁷⁹ Ministry of Education, *Education Strategic Plan 2018-2022*, (2018) (UNICEF interview in October 2019 in Amman).

At the end of the last year of school students must take “Tawjihi”, a maturity exam determining their university track upon their score.⁸⁰ The Ministry of Education operates 3,729 public schools, throughout 2,617 primary, and 1,175 secondary high schools.⁸¹

Refugees are only allowed to enrol in “integrated” schools,. Most of these integrated schools are working with morning shifts of both nationalities, whereas afternoon shifts are only for Syrian students. The total number of schools with an afternoon shift, around the country is roughly 200.

Both refugee camps, have 45 schools operating in two shifts only for the refugee students, of which are 5 secondary schools in Azraq, and 5 in Zaatari, resulting in a total of only 10 secondary schools, compared to 35 primary schools.⁸²

Challenges on Syrian refugees in schools, lack of funding, and inequality

Enrolment of refugee students in secondary schools depends on their previous type of education, whether integrated, second shifts, or refugee school camps. According to the latest report by the United Nations and data covering the last quarter of 2019, 32,000 students from classes 1 to 10 enrolled in morning shift schools, and nearly 5,122 others enrolled in classes 11 and 12.⁸³

On the other hand, the afternoon shifts had 62,500 students from primary schools, and 568 students continued to secondary school of class 11 and 12. The data shows a burden on refugee students in secondary schools, as of the smaller number of schools with the capacity to occupy them.

The Ministry of Education, alongside international organizations have created an educational program for drop out students, or those who skipped two to three years. The

⁸⁰ The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO, *International Standard Classification on Education, ISCED*, (2011) <http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/international-standard-classification-of-education-isced-2011-en.pdf>.

⁸¹ Delprato, M. Morrice, L. and Al-Nahi, S., “A Summary of Key Patterns in the Jordanian Education System by School Type, Gender and Region”, Centre for International Education and Development, University of Sussex, (2019).

⁸³ Relief Web, “Education Quarterly Dashboard, Q4 2019 (Oct - Dec 2019),” Inter-Sector Working Group Jordan, (2019) p. 2.

two different programs are the “catch-up” program for children of 9 to 12 years old, then later if they succeed, they may enrol in basic education.⁸⁴

The second program is “drop-out” for the ages of 13 to 18 for boys, and 13-20 for girls, with the aim of obtaining a class 10 certificate. Afterwards, they have the option of home schooling for the “Tawjihi”, the last year of high school, through online examinations,⁸⁵ Which will be further elaborated in chapter III, with the case of the NGO *Middle East Children’s Institute* (MECI), and the interview with their regional manager that took place in Amman, on April, 2021.

Challenges on secondary school refugees are not only limited to enrolment and registration, but the bigger challenge is lack of donor funding. Even though primary teaching has been the top priority for the international organizations, as well as Jordanian government, secondary schools have been facing a gap in adequate funding and proper attention. “One challenge we face is that some students live in rural areas, which makes it difficult for them to reach schools, and with the impact of the pandemic, education is of a bigger burden since most of them do now have access to internet.”-Lina Farouqi.

The amount requested by Jordan’s funding since 2013, by the regional humanitarian response was \$800 million, Later from 2016 to 2019, only an amount of \$356.4 million have been given by donors, out of \$522.5 million in educational funds.

Aside from the regional humanitarian response and the funding reported by the Jordanian Response Fund (JRP), direct aid has been received by additional donors supporting the ministry of education. These donations include £65.3 million on a six-year plan, from the United Kingdom, and another €60 million in 2019-2020 in budget support to Jordan.⁸⁷

However, it has been reported by donors that their support was to the non-formal “drop-out” program, targeting children from 13 years old and above, and home study for upper-

⁸⁴ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF “*Annual Report 2017: Jordan*”, (2017) https://www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Jordan_2017_COAR.pdf; No Lost Generation blog post, <https://www.nolostgeneration.org/page/i-came-here-and-i-felt-happy-my-dream-be-doctor-ibrahim-10-year-old-syrian-refugee-azraq-0>.

⁸⁵ Save the Children, Jordan Country Spotlight, (2016), <https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/10036/pdf/jordanspotlight.pdf?embed=1>, p. 8.

⁸⁷ Development Tracker, UK Government “*Jordan Compact Education Programme - Transforming life chances of a generation of children through education*,” Project GB-1-205200, (2020) <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-205200> (accessed June 8, 2020).

secondary school; without them having identifiable programs in support to quality secondary school education.⁸⁸

The importance of learning, and Jordan's obligation to quality education

Quality education is a fundamental right for all children without discrimination, all students should have equal access to education, as a human right, as per The International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights.⁸⁹ Jordan is obliged to provide foreign nationals the same rights to education as its own, since the country is member of the convention against discrimination, set by The UNESCO.

The convention obliges Jordan to assure quality of education is being delivered equally in all public institutions for locals as well as refugees, ensuring the continuation of study for children still in primary schools. The Hashemite Kingdom ratified the Convention and was among the first states to do so in 2008.⁹²

⁸⁸ USAID Agency Financial Report, “*Empowering Communities on Their Development Journey*”, Foreign Aid Explorer, “Jordan,” (2018).
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/JOR?fiscal_year=2018&implementing_agency_id=1&measure=Obligations (accessed June 8, 2020).

⁸⁹ University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library, “*International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*”, (1966).

⁹² United Nations Human Rights, “Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities considers the initial report of Jordan,” (2017),
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21460&LangID=E>; UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

3 COVID-19, and the challenges of a pandemic

Governments around the world, as well as the international health organizations took preventive measures to curve the impact of the virus, such as social distancing, and obligatory face masks in public. Further isolation for those exposed or in contact with carriers of the virus.

Authorities introduced travel restrictions, workplace control and quarantines, to further control the outbreak, therefore the results on the social and economic sphere were disruption, including the greatest and worse global recession since the 1930 Great Depression.⁹³

3.1 *The Pandemic in Jordan, restrictions, and efforts by the government*

After imposing travel restrictions and shutting down Queen Alia's International Airport on the 15th of March, 2020; The Kingdom implemented a restricted curfew, which is believed to be one of the toughest worldwide. The Ministry of Interior introduced Defence Order No. 2, confining all citizens to stay at their homes, and fines if rules were not obeyed, reaching to jail sanctions.⁹⁴

Jordan highly depends on tourism for its income, and the decision to ban international flights to and from its main airport had its harsh circumstances on the economy, but had its promising results in accommodating the virus.⁹⁵ Passengers coming from specific countries had to face tougher restrictions, such as Italy, Iran and South Korea during the first wave of the virus in March 2020, with exceptions to Jordanians wishing to be repatriated back home, under the condition of a 14-day quarantine upon arrival.

⁹³ International Monetary Fund, "The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression". (IMF, 2020).

⁹⁴ Gender and Adolescence Global Evidence, "*Exploring the impacts of covid-19 on adolescents in Jordan's refugee camps and host communities*", 2020.

⁹⁵ Jordanian Ministry of Health. *COVID-19 in Jordan*. (2020).
<https://corona.moh.gov.jo/ar> (2020)

Later on, the 17th of March 2020, a total country lockdown was announced, with all sectors shut down, until further notice.⁹⁶

The first five days of lockdown, being the toughest with no movement of citizens allowed, the government later eased restrictions allowing them to visit the nearest supermarkets for basic needs. However, Governmental institutions and enterprises were remained closed, as well as educational institutions. When compared to the neighbouring countries, it was obvious that Jordan had the toughest regulations, extremely limiting people's lives.

As in any other country during the Covid-19 pandemic, Jordan imposed a national lockdown starting March 2020, with travel restrictions, as well as lay-offs of employees and wages. All these events were in order for the government to mitigate the spread of the virus.⁹⁷

The Pandemic caused significant economic and social devastation in the Kingdom. However, the negative impact on Jordan's economy is increased since this country was already on a weak growth, with high youth unemployment and millions of refugees.⁹⁸

By mid-2020, Jordan faced a second and third wave of Covid-19, with the economy continuing to fall due to lockdown restrictions. Effects also contained in higher debt levels and unemployment. However, the fall-out on the kingdom's economic growth, when compared to neighbouring countries, remains modest. (The World Bank, 2021)

In order to estimate the economic impact, The International Food Policy Research Institute released a study on the Jordanian economy, stating that National GDP fell by 23 percent during the first seven months of lockdown starting March 2020. The sector hit the most was the service, with almost a 30 percent drop (IFPRI, 2020).

⁹⁶ Prime Ministry of Jordan. *Official Reports*.

<http://www.pm.gov.jo/category/7603/?????.html> (, 2020)

⁹⁷ Relief Web, “*Impact of COVID-19 on Enterprises in Jordan: One year into the pandemic*”, (UNDP, 2021). <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/impact-covid-19-enterprises-jordan-one-year-pandemic>

⁹⁸ The World Bank, “*Jordan, COVID-19 Pandemic weighs heavily on the Economy, as it does on the region.*” (World Bank, 2020) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/07/14/jordan-covid-19-pandemic-weighs-heavily-on-the-economy-as-it-does-on-the-region>

However, the Government of Jordan (GoJ) has followed a strategic plan to encounter the health crisis in the Kingdom, regarding the socioeconomic impacts. Firstly, by launching two social protection programs protecting vulnerable households, and secondly by assisting businesses with measures such as delayed taxes, and special load programs. In January 2021, the Kingdom introduced the Covid-19 vaccine program, including all Jordanian citizens and refugees. (World Bank, 2021).

Jordan assigned a coordinated team of specialists in the process of managing the pandemic, in order to lead the battle against the virus in the most effective way.⁹⁹ The crisis task force consists of professional personnel from different backgrounds and ministries.¹⁰⁰

As a way to involve its citizens in the fights against COVID-19, the government made daily data about the number of cases, recoveries and fatalities available online, and on the daily news channels live from the Ministry of Health. Further, on the digital sphere, the government collaborated with Facebook to raise awareness about the virus, since the social media platform is the most accessed by Jordanians

On the social sphere, the Jordanian community is known as being highly social, and many daily events occur such as handshaking, and other mandatory greeting forms, that were threatening of worsening the public health crisis in the country. Therefore, there were many implementations to limit all social contact to control the disease.¹⁰¹

In education, starting on the 15th of March 2020, all academic institutions were shut down until further notice, with learning switching to the online platforms, depending on what each institution prefers for its students.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Prime Ministry of Jordan. *Official Reports*. (2020)

¹⁰⁰ National Center for Security and Crises Management. *COVID-19 in Jordan*. (2020).: <http://ncscm.gov.jo/index.php>

¹⁰¹ Jordanian Ministry of Health. *COVID-19 in Jordan*. (2020). <https://corona.moh.gov.jo/ar>

¹⁰² Prime Ministry of Jordan. *Official Reports*, (2020) <http://www.pm.gov.jo/category/7603/?????.html>

The Ministry of Health, as part of managing the crisis and a reopening plan, followed a five-level evaluation of the pandemic. The goal, as stated by the MoE is “to methodically allow businesses, services, and activities to resume, while avoiding a resurgence of Covid- 19 that could overwhelm our healthcare system and erase the progress we’ve made so far” (Ministry of Health, 2020).

The levels consisted of (Critical Risk, High Risk, Medium Risk, Moderate Risk, and finally Low Risk “New Normal”). Every level lasted for a minimum of 1 to 2 weeks, depending on the infection rates, with every level having limited allowed activities to be practiced by citizens. A challenge resulting from extreme curfew restrictions and lockdowns, is mental health, which has been faced by both Jordanians and Syrian refugees. The society has faced an increasing psychological impact accompanied by the new Covid-19 lifestyle.¹⁰³

Despite all difficulties, the Jordanian society showed commitment and resilience, with the majority of citizens implying updated curfew rules, and preventions to limit the spread of the virus.¹⁰⁴ A country as any other in the MENA region, Jordan and its response strategy had a lot of space in growth, especially it being a leading country in terms of strict lockdowns.¹⁰⁵

However, if one thing the pandemic proved, it would be that governments around the world, as well as, public health sectors were not ready for such a challenge. There is a huge place for improvement in the health sector that needs to be taken, especially in the developing countries.¹⁰⁶

Vaccine hesitation is defined as refusal or unacceptance of vaccination, despite the availability of it.¹⁰⁷ The phenomenon roots back to the history of epidemics, that have

¹⁰³ Commons, C. U. "*Understanding the Mental Health and Psychosocial Needs, and Service Utilization of Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Nationals: A Qualitative & Quantitative Analysis in the Kingdom of Jordan.*" (International Medical Corps, 2017).

¹⁰⁴ Lawton, Graham. "How do we leave lockdown?" *New scientist* (1971) vol. 246,3277 (2020)

¹⁰⁵ World Health Organization. "Strengthening health-system emergency preparedness." *Toolkit for assessing health-system capacity for crisis management. Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe* (2012).

¹⁰⁶ High Health Council. "*The National Strategy for Health Sector in Jordan 2016-2020.*" (2016).

¹⁰⁷ MacDonald, N.E.; SAGE "Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy. *Vaccine hesitancy: Definition, scope and determinants.*" (2015)

lived with vaccinations.¹⁰⁸ The pandemic left many people with states of anxiety, fear and uncertainty, which is why conspiracies were born regarding the origin of the virus, and whether or not vaccines are safe.¹⁰⁹

A study conducted by the Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, states that Jordanian society was reported amongst the high countries with vaccine hesitations in the region. Therefore, the prevention of the spread of the virus was under a threat. When asked the Jordanian society, there was a strong association of their decision with conspiracy theories regarding the origin of the virus, not being aware that their decisions might have imminent consequences on public health.¹¹⁰

3.2 The Impact of COVID-19 on Refugee Education, and latest efforts by the government

According to a report issued by UNHCR, the Coronavirus poses a serious threat on refugee education worldwide. The "Together for Refugee Education" report notes that half of refugee children are out of school and calls on the international community to act urgently and boldly to overcome the catastrophic effects of the Coronavirus (UNHCR, 2020).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grande, said: "Half of the world's refugee children were originally out of school. After all they have suffered, we cannot take away their future by depriving them of education today. " He added: "Despite the enormous challenges posed by the epidemic, and with increased international support for refugees and their host communities, we can expand innovative ways to protect the vital gains made in refugee education over the past years." (Filippo Grande, 2020)

The report by UNHCR stresses that while children worldwide were dramatically affected by the pandemic, it is of a higher impact on refugees and their education. The latest figures

¹⁰⁸ Poland GA, Jacobson RM. "The age-old struggle against the antivaccination." (N Engl J Med, 2011) 97-9

¹⁰⁹ Uscinski, J.E.; Enders, A.M.; "Why do people believe COVID-19 conspiracy theories?" (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Misinf. Rev, 2020).

¹¹⁰ Robertson T, Weiss W; Jordan Health Access Study Team; Lebanon Health Access Study Team, Doocy S. "Challenges in Estimating Vaccine Coverage in Refugee and Displaced Populations: Results from Household Surveys in Jordan and Lebanon" (2017).

by the United Nations show that 1.6 billion students globally have been suspended from the opportunity to learn, including millions of refugees.¹¹¹

The challenges mentioned in chapter II, such as financial difficulties, uniforms and reading materials are still to be faced after the pandemic by refugees, but on a bigger scale. Many children still tend to drop out, as a way to support their families with the burden of expenses.

School, university, and technical and vocational training institute closures have also impacted refugee learners and students. Displaced and refugee students are particularly vulnerable during these difficult times, and there is a danger that gains toward greater enrolment may be lost. Furthermore, not all regions have the resources and technical infrastructure to roll out digital learning, which further stretches the gap between refugees and the right to learn. Further statistics by the UNHCR show that it was twice as likely for a refugee child to drop out of school before the pandemic, although it is expected to worsen with the current challenges.

The spread of the Coronavirus in Jordan was a major concern for all students in the country, namely after school and university attendance were suspended, and later led to curfew. Syrian refugees in Jordan have also suffered from school stoppages in camps and cities, with approximately 145,000 students in Jordanian schools, according to the spokesperson of the Jordanian Ministry of Education, in an interview with “Irfa’a Sawtak” institution in 2020.¹¹²

“Syrian students in camps and cities can use this online platform for free, from 6 a.m. to 4 p.m.” (Walid Jalad, Ministry of Education). As efforts The Ministry of Education, the Jordanian sports channel has been transformed to broadcast television classes to high school students, as well as opening two new channels for students from grade 1 to 11, as an additional plan for students without smartphones, and internet connection.

¹¹¹ UNHCR, “*Coronavirus a dire threat to refugee education*”, 2020
<https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2020/9/5f508f5b4/coronavirus-dire-threat-refugee-education.html>

¹¹² See article “*Jordan, distance learning for Syrian refugees, due to COVID-19.*”
<https://www.reverso.net/translationresults.aspx?lang=EN&direction=arabic-english>

To further tackle lack of electricity in refugee camps, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has extended the hours of electricity to 8:30-6:00 p.m. and 8:00-10:00 p.m., so that students can study on television and the Internet. The Zaatari camp, after the pandemic, has 12 distance education centres close to the refugees, and three centres in the Al-Azraq camp.

However, it is important to ensure that providing these new learning platforms will not intensify inequities that existed before the pandemic. Many children still lack access to educational content, due to limitations of internet connection, as well as resources such as mobile phones and laptops. (UNHCR, 2021).

3.3 The Case of Middle East Children's Institute (MECI):

“The Middle East Children’s Institute (MECI) is an internationally recognized NGO addressing the needs of children, young adults and women in war-torn and conflict areas in the Middle East. By creating safe havens for learning, healing and development, MECI empowers individuals most affected by conflict to become catalysts of positive change and agents for peace in their own communities.” (MECI, 2021) The Institute worked with many different partners since its establishment in the United States in 2005, as a public charity. Two years later in 2007, MECI had launched innovative educational programs in the Palestinian occupied territory of the West Bank. In 2012 the institute was established as a public charity in Switzerland.

MECI reached Jordan in 2013, registering as an international NGO, in partnership with the Ministry of Education. The first project in Jordan started a year later, with 9 Jordanian schools partnering with UNESCO and UNICEF. Since 2013, MECI Jordan has worked in partnership with UNICEF to create and administer its non-Formal education program for Syrian refugee and underprivileged Jordanian youth. Later through a partnership with UNESCO.

In 2020, In response to the COVID-19 crisis, MECI had launched online learning for over 1500 students, using social media platforms. Their efforts were not only limited to education for vulnerable people, but also by organizing weekly food packages distributed to 300 families around the country.

Interview with Lina Farouqi, Regional Director of MECI:

Interviewee: Lina Farouqi

Interviewer: Rakan Abu Zarour

Date of Interview: 28-April-2021

Location of Interview: Amman, Jordan.

Rakan: What are the main challenges you face in refugee education, on a daily basis?

Lina: The problems mainly with enrolling in schools for refugees in Jordan, are that educational institutions don't check on which grade students have finished, but at their age. Let's say you're 10 years old and you've never been to school, they'll put you in fourth grade, so there is a gap of three years. You have skipped the first three years in school, but the school put you in fourth depending on your age instead of class and knowledge. The efforts by NGOs and the international community come by preparing these refugee students, whom skipped years of education, and prepare them for the right class they should be in.

One way of NGOs to attract students, which is the case of the Middle East Children's Institute (MECI), is relabeling grades as "Levels", so when a ten-year-old student is in Level 1, instead of Grade 1, age will no more be connected to grades, but levels. This renaming helped students feel more connected and wanting to learn. Children felt a burden when told they'd have to start from an early grade at school, but when the new phrase of Level was introduced, they felt more comfortable.

Most parents of these students come from villages and remote areas where education was not delivered to them the proper way, which makes it difficult for them to assist their children in education. Therefore, they wish to send their kids to schools, yet are not able to do so, since transportation is a burden on them. In our first year, we had a target of 900 students, however, following the new labeling strategy we were able to accommodate 1250, for three schools in the kingdom.

Rakan: How do you convince students and their parents about the new learning method?

Lina: I speak to the parents and give them a personal example of me learning French, so they understand the labeling strategy in a better way. If I enroll in a language course as a beginner, the institution will definitely put me in grade 1, despite me being at this age. We should understand that the traditional way or labeling school levels will contradict with our strategy, which is why we chose to rename grades with levels.

To tell you frankly, on the personal perspective, I am not able to help my second-grade daughter in her education, unless I'm there in the class. Quality education did really denigrate comparing to the times when I was brought up.

Rakan: How do you get students to schools, from villages and remote areas around the kingdom?

Lina: First step is to choose a person that can connect us to families in villages and rural areas, and therefore new students. We go to these areas, visit schools, sometimes mosques, and ask for someone that is well known in this village, and willing to help in our mission.

We call them "Mobilizers", which are locals from these remote areas and villages, mostly people that are well known in their regions and have connections with most of the families. We later ask them to go around the houses and ask if there are any kids out of schools.

The first step of these mobilizers, is to take history of the family, by filling a form with the number of children, how many are currently enrolled and how many dropped out, which grades are they, and so on.

Rakan: How did things change with COVID-19, and the transition to online education?

Lina: "It actually took me one week to decide and know what to do, It's Covid, it's closing down, the shock of everything and I had to take action."

The first step we did, was creating groups on social media with the teachers of these schools depending on gender, with a staff member from my office, and I am on every single group of the schools, that's why my phone is never silent. This is a way of me checking all their work, and be updated and keep records.

The platforms we use are WhatsApp and Facebook, with all materials updated daily on both. I once, had a staff member asking me how do I keep up with all the different 45 schools, I simply told him I enter each online group randomly, and check their work, for example “Omar Bin Al Khattab” school hasn’t been teaching in the last three days, and so on.

In order to tackle the obstacle of connection and making sure that internet will be available, we give internet cards to all students and their teachers on a monthly basis, fully charged with data. However, some students do not have access to neither a mobile device not a computer, what we do is that we print out all materials for a month in advance, consisting of all the different courses, and send them to our students in these rural and remote areas. We also have monthly tests for students online, and those in rural areas are delivered paper print outs of the tests by our mobilizers. Our online tests for students take part every mid of a month, preferably on a Monday, which gives teachers the time to prepper students for the exam.

Rakan: What are the organizations that fund your NGO, and how have the costs been affected by Covid?

Lina: We started in 2013 with UNESCO, then later had a contribution with Malala Fund, and now we are with UNICEF. Regarding the finds and financial challenges, Covid for sure affected our budget and costed us around \$45,000 in the previous year, for supporting students and teachers with internet cards for example, thankfully UNICEF and the international community is supporting. Our programs with all our partners have the same program, as the current one with UNICEF.

Rakan: There are many online portals by the government such as “Edraak”, does MECI work with any of them?

Lina: No, our current program is the non-Formal Education Program, which is targeting dropout students, that passed over three years of not studying, and therefore cannot enroll in public schools since the government will not allow them to do so. We take these students, enroll them in our schools for a minimum of 24 months.

In order for a student to graduate from our schools, they go through three cycles, 8 month each, where students go through a “Post Exam, and if they pass, they go to the next level, then to the third one with an exam in each.

Rakan: How many schools does MECI cover, and where are the locations?

Lina: We started with 30 schools then decreased to 24, as a cutting cost attempt by the government and international community. By the end of 2020 however, we added 25 more schools to our project, that were being run by Mercy Corps before, reaching to 49 schools around the country. We cover the kingdom from north to south, starting from Ramtha, Irbid, Ajloun, Zarqa’a, Balqa’a, Amman, Karak, Southern Valley, Tafila, Petra, to Ma’an and Aqaba. A total of ten governates out of 12.

CONCLUSION

" I believe that if we want our children to understand the world beyond their classroom, we must bring the world into their classrooms."- Queen Rania of Jordan.

Concluding a paper about refugee education and their challenges, while they are still being lived is itself a challenge. Lina Farouqi mentioning stories of success of her students, despite the rising obstacles on a daily basis, and how proud do students feel when continuing their education, gives us hope.

I mentioned the value of education, and how it is a right to every child, wishing to deliver the utterly important role of the international community in helping refugee students reach their dreams, the only dreams that are achieved through learning.

Jordan, despite pressures from all four borders and being surrounded by warzones, has welcomed millions of refugees. The country is poor in resources but rich on the humanitarian perspective, and I wish to see more developed countries following Jordan’s steps in this regard.

Treating the cause is always of more value than treating symptoms, and regarding refugee challenges, it is without a doubt that political agreements and end of conflicts will not

only lead to less refugees, but limit them with time. Those vulnerable people whose lives have been dramatically affected by war and displacement.

I wish to see improvement in the educational system for refugees in Jordan, regarding public schools and the afternoon shifts, where teachers must grant their rights in order to deliver the best outcomes to students, such as vacations, health insurance and job security.

Further improvement is encouraged in the psychological support in refugee camps, where there rose complains about unprofessional doctors, not being able the treat anxieties and trauma, which are two of the main symptoms of displacement.

Much awareness is needed in the local community about Protection Against Sexual Abuse (PSEA). Such topics are looked at as taboo in Jordan and the neighboring countries, therefore people lack knowledge about it, and many fall as victims without realizing. The international community tried to engage the topic in Jordan through UNICEF, but attempts did not meet expectations in the civil society, such as MECI and other NGOs.

Lastly, the topic of the impact of SARS-Cov-2 on refugee education is relatively new, and there aren't enough data nor previous researches regarding it. Therefore, I wish, through my dissertation, to give it more attention and encouraging further research to be done, not only in Jordan or the Levant, but around the world.

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