



**Comparative case study of terrorism in France during the
Algerian War (1954-1962) and today (2015-2021): The security
response to counter terrorism**

An islamophobic narrative since decolonization

by,

Loeka Dannau

**A thesis submitted for the Joint Master degree in
Global Economic Governance & Public Affairs (GEGPA)**

Academic year
2020 – 2021

July 2021

Supervisor: Erik Jones
Reviewer: Moritz Krämer

Plagiarism Statement

I certify that this thesis is my own work, based on my personal study and/or research and that I have acknowledged all material and sources used in its preparation. I further certify that I have not copied or used any ideas or formulations from any book, article or thesis, in printed or electronic form, without specifically mentioning their origin, and that the complete citations are indicated in quotation marks.

I also certify that this assignment/report has not previously been submitted for assessment in any other unit, except where specific permission has been granted from all unit coordinators involved, and that I have not copied in part or whole or otherwise plagiarized the work of other students and/or persons.

In accordance with the law, failure to comply with these regulations makes me liable to prosecution by the disciplinary commission and the courts of the French Republic for university plagiarism.

19/07/2021 Dannau Loeka

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Dannau Loeka', with a stylized, sweeping flourish at the end.

Abstract

From January to November 2015, France was hit by a series of terrorist attacks that shook the country in the face of a new phenomenon to the French population and governments. The government of François Hollande and then Emmanuel Macron implemented a series of policies that will be integrated into the fight against terrorism and radicalization. They will be pointed out and strongly criticized by the media and the public opinion, qualified as a security turn and islamophobia policies. If this phenomenon seemed new, France has been challenging and long affected by the terrorism of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Secret Army Organization (OAS) during the Algerian War between 1954 and 1962.

This proposal aims to study the political response to terrorism during the Algerian War and today. It will seek to ascertain whether the implementation of security policies is a new phenomenon described as a security shift or whether it is part of a long security tradition since the Algerian War and the beginning of the Fifth Republic.

Keywords: Terrorism, Security Policies, Algerian War, Fifth Republic, Law Enforcement, France, Counterterrorism, Legislation, Public Opinion, Political Communication

Acknowledgements

I want to thank all those who contributed to the development of this thesis.

First of all, I want to warmly thank my supervisor advisor, Erik Jones, Director of European and Eurasian Studies and Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.

Then, I would also like to warmly thank my revision advisor Moritz Krämer, Chief economist at CountryRisk.io and professor in Global and local regulation, sustainable finance: the governance of sovereigns and sovereign risk analysis at CIFE.

Both of them brought me their expertise and knowledge, which allowed me to understand the running issues better and have been valuable both in how my research question was formulated and how it has been elaborated. I thank them for their investment and dedication to my research paper.

Finally, I thank all the professors at LUISS Guido Carli and CIFE who have given me over this year the skills and knowledge necessary to complete this end-of-cycle research paper.

I also have a thought for my parents, family, and friends to support me and always be by my side.

Thank you to each and every one of you.

Table of contents

• Preface.....	6
• Introduction / Research Question.....	8
• CHAPTER 1: STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SECURITY.....	15
1.1 State of Law to State of Security: The State of Emergency an exceptional measure to face a historical narrative.....	18
1.2 Administrative searches.....	24
1.3 Prohibition to demonstrate.....	27
• CHAPTER 2: POLICIES AGAINST RADICALIZATION.....	31
2.1 The Surveillance Act: An invasion of privacy.....	33
2.2 Separatism Act: Terrorism becoming an islamophobic security discourse.....	36
2.3 The colonial approach to the discourse.....	41
• CHAPTER 3: THE FAR-RIGHT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF A SECURITY DISCOURSE	45
3.1 The Theory of the Great Replacement	48
3.2 Decolonization and the end of French primacy.....	51
3.3 Terrorism and the last decadence	55
• Conclusion.....	57
• References.....	61

Preface

This research studies the security character of anti-terrorist policies in France and their impact on society. Throughout this work, we will use a qualitative and explanatory approach by empirically studying the policies and discourses of the fight against terrorism.

In the introduction, we will define the different concepts, the history of terrorism in France and the evolution of its discourses.

In chapter 1, through a comparative case between modern terrorism (2015-2021) and the terrorism of the Algerian war (1954-1962), we will try to see if the government's security response is a new phenomenon or if it is a phenomenon that previously existed during the Algerian war.

We will analyze the law of the State of emergency provided by Law n° 55-385 of April 3, 1955. The State of Emergency was put in place during the Algerian War and from 2015 onwards. We will compare the repercussions of this law during these two periods of history and if it has a security aim restricting citizens' freedom.

Moreover, this chapter will allow us to understand the relationship between the concepts of freedom and security.

Chapter 2 will focus on the concept of radicalization, and we will try to understand the impact of the fight against radicalization within French society. We will analyze the Intelligence Act to understand how the government has seized the new means of communication as a control source. Then we will analyze the Law on Separatism to understand how the fight against radicalization is interfering in the very heart of society in the name of respect for secularism. We will develop the hypothesis that these laws limit the freedoms of individuals and target an entire community of society, the Muslim

population. Through security policies to fight terrorism, the government is developing an islamophobia policy rooted in colonial history.

Finally, in the last chapter, we will understand the importance of the far-right in the security and islamophobia discourse. Using a deductive method, we will use the great replacement theory to understand the far-right discourse. We will study the evolution of the theory within history to understand its influence and impact on the fight against terrorism.

Introduction /Research Question

On October 16, 2020, history-geography teacher Samuel Paty was beheaded by an Islamist terrorist. The aggressor accused him of Islamophobia, following a moral and civic education course he dedicated to freedom of expression¹. During his class, he presented the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed that had been published by the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, which provoked the terrorist's attack in 2015, causing 17 victims². Many French people felt this terrorist attack was a declaration of war on the Republic's foundations, particularly on secularism of French schools.

A few months after the teacher's death, a set of laws were presented by the government of Emmanuel Macron, such as the law against separatism, the law for global security. They had many repercussions within public opinion and the media. Macron's policies were pointed out, denouncing a securitarian turn as opposed to public liberties and a threat to democracy.

If terrorism seems to be at the heart of the political and media subject these last years, for Jean-François Gayraud and David Sénat in their book Le terrorisme, the phenomenon is not new in France. For these two authors, modern terrorist attacks or State terrorism are :

« un acte qui cherche à imposer une réforme, une situation ; c'est un geste d'attaque, qui vise davantage un état de fait qu'un personnage qui n'en est que le symbole » (an act that seeks to impose a reform, a situation; it is a gesture of attack, aimed more at a state of affairs than at a person who is merely its symbol)³.

¹ Violaine Morin, Mattea Battaglia, 2020. Après la mort de Samuel Paty, l'« enchaînement des faits » détaillé par l'inspection générale. Le Monde.fr.

² Attentats de janvier 2015 : un procès pour les 17 victimes 2020 . Franceinfo.

³ Gayraud, J. & Sénat, D. (2006). Le terrorisme. In: Jean-François Gayraud ed, Le terrorisme (pp. 12-47). Paris cedex 14, France: Presses Universitaires de France.

Terrorism differs from the tyrannicide that strikes a man more than a system as a whole. During the French Revolution, terrorism was born with the attack of the rue Saint-Nicaise, as an attempt of assassination towards Bonaparte, which caused eight dead and twenty-seven wounded⁴.

There are many definitions of terrorism, and they vary from region to region because this concept is attached to many legal elements. In France, terrorism first appeared in dictionaries at the end of the 18th century to designate the policies conducted by Robespierre during the French Revolution. However, the meaning of the word evolved quickly⁵.

Today, terrorism is defined by the French State, in its 2013 Livre Blanc on Defense and National Security, as :

« un mode d'action auquel ont recours des adversaires qui s'affranchissent des règles de guerre conventionnelle pour compenser l'insuffisance de leurs moyens et atteindre leurs objectifs politiques » (a mode of action used by adversaries who break the rules of conventional warfare to compensate for their lack of resources and achieve their political objectives).

In addition, the Livre Blanc states that terrorism :

« frappe sans discernement des civils et que la violence qu'il déploie vise d'abord à tirer parti des effets que son irruption brutale produit sur les opinions publiques pour contraindre les gouvernements » (strikes indiscriminately at civilians and that the violence it deploys is primarily intended to take advantage of the effects that its brutal irruption produces on public opinion in order to force governments).

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Raflik, J., 2017. La France face au terrorisme d'hier à aujourd'hui. Outre-Terre N° 51, 202-214.

However, it is essential to note that terrorism can also be state-based⁶.

France identifies within its history several significant periods of terrorism. For the authors of the book Le Terrorisme, he differentiates five different periods. The «carbonariste » took place in the middle of the 19th century; the second « anarchiste » between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century; the third « balkanique » in the 1930s; a fourth, specific to France, with the Algerian War and then finally a fifth « proteiform » since the end of the 1960s.

The fourth period or the terrorism of the Algerian War (1954-1962), was rooted in decolonization. Algeria became a French colony on July 5, 1830, through the expedition of Algiers⁷. King Charles X decided to launch a prestigious operation to pretend to possess a solid power to impose a more authoritarian government. This operation was not enough to maintain his power as he was overthrown a few days later, but Algeria remained colonized. Under the third Republic, colonization developed, despite the hostility of the population towards this occupation. According to France Info⁸, from 1880 to 1900, the number of colonists increased from 100,000 to 700,000. The French presence in Algeria lasted 132 years. On January 8, 1961, 74% of the French people voted “Yes” to the self-determination of Algeria. Then, on March 18, 1962, France finally granted independence to Algeria during the Evian Agreements, putting an end to 8 years of confrontations.

During the Algerian war, attacks were widespread. Several groups were opposed, the National Liberation Front (FLN), which were Muslims for the independence of Algeria; the Algerian National Movement (MNA), which were independents and the Organization of the Secret Army (OAS). The OAS was against Algeria's independence and was created during Algeria's self-determination in 1961. On March 20, 1962, the

⁶ Comprendre le terrorisme, n.d. . Gouvernement.fr.

⁷ Catherine Le Brech, 2018. Algérie: de la conquête française à la colonisation. Franceinfo.

⁸ Ibid

newspaper *Le Monde* gave the following figures for the total duration of the Franco-Algerian conflict until the cease-fire: 4,300 killed and nearly 9,000 injured due to attacks⁹. However, these figures varied according to the different sources and did not consider the number of victims on Algerian soil, which was the region most affected by terrorism.

The « proteiform » period is a period of terrorism with multiple motivations, of internal origin (independentist) and external. The external or international terrorism of Salvationist Islam is the one that has had the most repercussion these last years. It appeared in 1986 on French soil with the attack on the Rue de Rennes in Paris, killing seven people and injuring fifty-five¹⁰.

On June 29, 2014, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi established a Caliphate controlled by Daesh and invited all Muslims to join the Islamic State (IS)¹¹. His fundamentalist project of the IS was, by all possible means including extreme violence, to unify the Muslim world and its believing community, establishing an Islamic regime on territory and respect for the sharia. It relied on weakened territories and populations to establish its power, such as in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, the IS adopted a strategy of exporting itself outside its territories, including a territorial conquest dimension by constituting transnational networks.

Through its networks, its terrorist action affected the whole world but particularly France.

However, this terrorism took another turn in France, from 2015 until today, with what would be called a new wave of terrorism claimed by the terrorist organization Islamic State or Daesh. It began in January 2015 with the terrorist attack against the editorial office of the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, killing 17 people, and the

⁹ Ageron, C.-R., 2005. *Les Français devant la guerre civile algérienne. Histoire du Maghreb* 495–512.

¹⁰ Amghar, S. (2008). *La France face au terrorisme islamique : une typologie du salafisme jihadiste*. In: Bernard Rougier ed, *What is Salafism* (pp. 243-255). Paris cedex 14, France: Presses Universitaires de France.

¹¹ Moine, A., 2017. *Les aspirations à l'État et au califat de l'« organisation État Islamique »*. *Civitas Europa* N° 38, 127–152.

Jewish supermarket Hyper Cacher, killing five people. In December of the same year were the attacks on the Bataclan, the terraces of coffee, and the Stade de France, resulting in 130 deaths and 413 injured. Six months later, an attack on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice on July 14th, the national French holiday, killed 87 people and injured 434. By attacking France, jihadist terrorism attacked the country of human rights and freedom of expression.

Terrorism was conceived as a new way of waging war and prompts States to react and defend themselves internationally and within their territory. They adopt special legislation and put in place policies to fight against terrorism. These policies aim to guarantee national security: the security of the territory and its population. However, the fight against terrorism establishes a complicated relationship between the concept of security and freedom.

The Fifth Republic was created in the middle of the Algerian war. Its constitution was adopted on September 28, 1958. Established by Charles de Gaulle, this regime is described as semi-presidential. The election of the President of the Republic is henceforth made by direct universal suffrage. One of its many particularities is that it grants many powers to the President of the Republic, establishing a strong presidential power. If this constitution gives many powers to the President, it seemed necessary for De Gaulle at that time to grant the necessary competencies and a margin of manoeuvre to the President of the Republic. These powers were, for him, fundamental to settle the Algerian situation, the confrontations, and bring stability to the country. The special abilities of Article 16 of the State of emergency are examples of the President's provisions to reinforce his authority. During the Algerian War and to deal with the attacks of 2015, the State of emergency was used as a response to terrorism.

The fight against terrorism also settles many means against radicalization. Radicalization is collectively defined through an individually held moral obligation to

participate in direct action, often textually described (Githens-Mazer, 2012, p. 563). The fight against radicalization is different from the fight against terrorism. The State no longer seeks only to punish terrorists for their acts but aims to prevent these acts by infiltrating the heart of society through the implementation of means of surveillance and censorship within society. It seems to be explicitly aimed at the country's Muslim population, hiding an islamophobia discourse.

Chronologically, the use of the term Islamophobia spread in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and other attacks worldwide. These acts generally result in reactions of rejection and violence towards Islam and Muslims, particularly in the West. Etymologically, Islamophobia was built from the word 'Islam' and the suffix 'phobia,' from the Greek Phobos, which mean fear, fright¹². It referred to the powerful, irrational, and instinctive aversion to Islam and its followers, as well as the anguished obsession with them. By extension, Islamophobia refers to the detestation of Islam, marked by attitudes of fear and animosity, the extent of which varies according to time and context. These attitudes remain reflected in the press or the work of anti-discrimination associations. Although there are a few other occurrences of the word in the 1960s and 1970s, the first appearances of the term Islamophobia date back to the turn of the 20th century as part of French colonial history¹³. Today Islamophobia in France is primarily present in the discourse of the far-right.

In France, the far-right encompasses different movements such as the New Right, Revolutionary Nationalism, National Catholicism and royalism, Traditional Catholicism, Clerical Fascism, Petainism (...), and the Front National FN (now National Rally, RN).

Political scientists and the broader scientific community have long debated the definition of the extreme right. According to Jean-Yves Camus, political scientist and

¹² Houda Asal, 2014. Islamophobie : la fabrique d'un nouveau concept. État des lieux de la recherche | Cairn.info. Sociologie 13 à 29.

¹³ Ibid

director of the Observatory of Political Radicalities of the Jean Jaurès Foundation, there are several dozen definitions of the extreme right. For Cas Mudde, the extreme right combines the formations of nationalism, exclusivism (thus racism, anti-Semitism, or ethnocentrism), xenophobia, the cult of the leader, populism, and the anti-party spirit¹⁴.

The historical roots of the FN are in the extreme right. The historian Christophe Bourseiller, details that in :

« 1972, le Front national est fondé à l'initiative d'un mouvement néo-fasciste, donc d'extrême droite, qui s'appelait Ordre nouveau, dans le but de disséminer ses idées à travers le style politique qu'est le populisme » (1972, the National Front was founded on the initiative of a neo-fascist movement, therefore of the extreme right, which was called Ordre nouveau, with the aim of disseminating its ideas through the political style that is populism)¹⁵.

The party's ambition was to unite all the extreme right-wing groupings of the time, to give them a common denominator, even though they could not agree among themselves.

The far-right plays a significant role in the diffusion of the security and islamophobia discourse influencing the fight against terrorism. It has a considerable influence on the electorate and the public agenda today.

Is the implementation of security policies in response to terrorism in France a new phenomenon, or is it part of a long tradition of fighting terrorism since the Algerian war and the construction of the 5th Republic?

¹⁴ Verbeke, L., 2018. Le Front national est-il un parti d'extrême droite ?. France Culture.

¹⁵ Ibid

Chapter 1: State of Emergency: The opposition between freedom and security

The concept of security is not a modern concept specific to our time. It appeared long before the birth of the State. For example, in the Middle Ages, in Western Europe, with the development of feudalism between the tenth and second centuries, the notion of protection was already present. The feudal system was born from the administrative difficulty of the territories and the difficulty of protecting them. The hierarchy of powers did not work well, and the royal authority could no longer defend its subjects locally. Power was therefore shared between several lords who exercised their authority over a specific territory. They had to guarantee the protection of the territory and of the individuals who lived there. They organized themselves around the notion of security.

On October 24, 1648, the Treaties of Westphalia were signed, which put an end to the Thirty Years' War and gave rise to the nation-states' primacy at the expense of imperial domination imposition of a religious order or conquest. States exercised sovereignty and authority, through their regalian functions, over a given territory and population. They took over the legitimate use of force in order to base security on the defense of territories. Therefore, the concept of security is at the heart of the principle and foundations of the State.

The importance of security is also visible in the theories of the social contract. Thomas Hobbes, in the Leviathan, says that man in the State of nature presupposes mutual fear and the war of all against all. Through the contract, men end this State of war by transferring their powers and liberties to the sovereign. In return, he has to guarantee their security. The sovereign becomes the only legitimate source of constraint. There is thus an ambiguous relationship between liberties and security. On the one hand, security is necessary to achieve liberty, but security also constrains it.

In France, the concept of liberty takes a fundamental place in history. Following the French revolution and the end of the absolute monarchy, liberty was inscribed in La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen and later became one of the preamble of the French constitution :

« Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits » (Men are born and remain free and equal in rights).

Today, it is part of the three fundamental terms of the motto of the French Republic :

« Liberté, égalité, fraternité. » (Liberty, equality, fraternity).

It states a set of natural individual and common rights (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to demonstrate...), as well as the conditions of their implementation.

However, the State's role is to guarantee citizens' safety and prevent risks. Ceyhan in his article Analyser la sécurité : Dillon, Waever, Williams et les autres, analyses Buzan's definitions of security :

« Il a affirmé que la sécurité ne se réduisait pas à la seule sécurité nationale (ou la sécurité de l'Etat), mais qu'elle s'élargissait à de nouveaux objets et secteurs. Ces secteurs sont le militaire, le politique, l'économique, l'environnemental et le sociétal. » (He argued that security is not only national security (or state security), but that it is extended to new objects and sectors. These sectors are military, political, economic, environmental and societal)¹⁶.

¹⁶ Ceyhan, A., 1998. Analyser la sécurité : Dillon, Waever, Williams et les autres. Cultures & Conflits.

If the concept of security expands to new sectors, it is because society presupposes new threats. For a long time, the main threat was invasions of the enemy, and State's role was to defend the citizens and guarantee their safety through war. Since the emergence of terrorism, this concept has been equated with the enemy. There has been a shift in the idea of the enemy away from being associated with a particular state. For example, in the governmental authorities' discourse, they continually evoke terrorism as a political and strategic enemy of democracies. The emergence of terrorism is understood as an act of violence and a threat to use violence. In reaction, there have been essential transformations in the practices and apparatuses of security and defense. If the threat of terrorism attacks democracy and freedoms, the fight against it has also strengthened security.

We can see that within history, men had gathered to protect themselves from the enemy. Security was fundamental; it was, for them, an element of survival. However, the French revolution came to put the concept of freedom in the center of society. The citizens went as far as cutting off the head of the king. It was a powerful symbol that showed the critical will of the people to access freedom. This concept has since been at the heart of the French State and society. However, this new terrorist enemy disturbs this concept. The State put in place concrete measures to guarantee the security of their citizens by sacrificing certain freedoms.

Terrorism is an illustration of the difficulty of incorporating these two concepts together. The way a country fights against terrorism illustrates the stability of its democracy and the respect of individual liberties. François Thuillier, in his book *La Révolution Antiterroriste*, page 31, says :

« Après tout, dis moi comment tu combat le terrorisme je te dirai qui tu es. » (After all, tell me how you fight terrorism and I will tell you who you are).

1.1 State of Law to the State of Security: the State of Emergency an exceptional measure to face a historical narrative

The French constitution provides two regimes to be applied in a severe crisis: granting exceptional powers to the President of the Republic (Article 16) and a State of siege (Article 36). The purpose of the State of emergency is to provide more legal means for periods of insurrection. It was created in the Algerian war, and it is an exceptional regime decreed eight times since its creation and six times during the Fifth Republic.

The State of emergency was therefore created mainly for political reasons. Edgar Faure was Prime Minister in 1955, and he had to find solutions to the Algerian rebellion. According to the constitution, there was the possibility of a State of siege :

« C'est un régime sous lequel les libertés publiques sont restreintes et les pouvoirs de police sont exercés par les autorités militaires avec des compétences accrues. De même, la compétence des juridictions militaires est accrue, elles peuvent juger les crimes et délits contre la sûreté de l'État, portant atteinte à la défense nationale qu'ils soient perpétrés par des militaires ou des civils. » (It is a regime under which public freedoms are restricted and police powers are exercised by the military authorities with increased competence. Similarly, the jurisdiction of the military courts is increased, and they can judge crimes and offenses against state security, undermining national defense, whether they are perpetrated by military personnel or civilians.) ¹⁷

¹⁷ État d'urgence et autres régimes d'exception (article 16, état de siège) | Vie publique.fr, n.d.

However, putting in place, a State of siege during the Algerian war presupposed that France was at war. The country was under the spotlight of the international scene and was attracting the UN's attention. Edgar Faure wanted at all costs to keep the Algerian affair an internal affair, proper to France. So he decided to create the state of emergency to avoid the international media attention that a State of siege would bring.

Article 1 of the Law of April 3, 1955, similar to the Law on the State of siege, authorizes the proclamation of a State of emergency :

« soit en cas de péril imminent résultant d'atteintes graves à l'ordre public, soit en cas d'événements présentant, par leur nature et leur gravité, le caractère de calamité publique » (either in the event of imminent danger resulting from serious attacks on public order or in the event of events which, by their nature and seriousness, have the character of a public disaster).

He would later acknowledge that there was no difference between a State of siege and a State of emergency :

« la simple vérité étant que le terme état de siège évoque irrésistiblement la guerre et que toute allusion à la guerre devait être soigneusement évitée à propos des affaires d'Algérie » (the simple truth being that the term 'State of siege' irresistibly evokes war and that any reference to war should be carefully avoided in relation to Algerian affairs)¹⁸.

There was a strategic need to vote for a State of emergency that allowed for the suspension of the usual right to public freedoms in a part of the Republic's territory without provoking external interference.

¹⁸ Rousseau, D., 2006. L'état d'urgence, un état vide de droit(s). *Revue Projet* n° 291, 19–26.

However, such as the State of siege, the State of emergency limits democracy and individual liberties. According to the Articles of the Law of April 3, 1955, the most significant restrictions of public liberties resulting from the State of emergency are the following :

« d'interdire la circulation des personnes ou des véhicules dans les lieux et à l'heure fixés par arrêté ; d'instituer, par arrêté, des zones de protection ou de sécurité où le séjour des personnes est réglementé ; d'interdire le séjour dans tout ou partie du département à toute personne cherchant à entraver, de quelque manière que ce soit, l'action des pouvoirs publics » (to prohibit the movement of persons or vehicles in the places and at the time fixed by order; to institute, by order, protection or security zones where the stay of persons is regulated; to prohibit the stay in all or part of the department of any person seeking to hinder, in any way whatsoever, the action of the public authorities)¹⁹.

These measures directly interfere with the freedom of individuals to ensure their protection. Security is therefore paramount for the State.

During the Algerian War, the State of Emergency was implemented three times between 1954 and 1962²⁰. On April 3, 1955, Edgar Faure put it in place for the first time in French Algeria for six months, following a succession of attacks perpetrated from 1954 onwards by the National Liberation Front (FLN). The State of Emergency was then extended for another six months.

In 1958, the state of emergency was declared for three months on the metropolitan territory starting on May 17, after the coup d'état in Algiers on May 13.

After, four generals and career soldiers of the French army in Algeria tried to take power against Charles de Gaulle's policy to maintain French Algeria. Finally, decreed

¹⁹ Pascal Dupont, 2016. L'état d'urgence face au terrorisme. Revue Défense Nationale pages 17 à 21.

²⁰ État d'urgence et autres régimes d'exception (article 16, état de siège) | Vie publique.fr, n.d.

on April 22, 1961, the State of emergency was placed a third time on the whole metropolitan territory after the generals' putsch in Algiers. It was extended several times until May 31, 1963.

On November 13, 2015, following the attacks in Paris claimed by the Islamic State organization, the State of Emergency was declared for the sixth time during the fifth republic by the President of François Hollande's presidency. The State of emergency proclaimed in 2015 was extended six times and maintained for almost two years until the Law of November 1, 2017. The attacks of 2015 opened a new space legitimizing globally the measures of democratic exception already adopted in the name of anti-terrorist effectiveness. For Dominique Rousseau, in L'état d'urgence, un état vide de droit(s), she criticized its implementation and its representation vis-à-vis the Law :

«si l'État de droit est, définition minimale, un équilibre entre respect des droits fondamentaux et sauvegarde de l'ordre public, l'état d'urgence, c'est le déséquilibre revendiqué au profit de la sauvegarde de l'ordre public. L'état d'urgence, c'est la violence pure de l'État qui entretient une relation ambiguë avec le Droit. » (If the Rule of law is, by a minimal definition, a balance between respect for fundamental rights and the safeguarding of public order, the State of emergency is the imbalance claimed in favour of the safeguarding of public order. The State of emergency is the pure violence of the State which maintains an ambiguous relationship with the law)²¹.

The legal link between the State of emergency and terrorism is not clear. The law on the State of emergency do not make terrorism a reason for the declaration.

According to the assessment established by the Ministry of the Interior, its use has been essential :

²¹ Rousseau, D. (2006). L'état d'urgence, un état vide de droit(s). *Revue Projet*, 2(2), 19-26. <https://doi.org/10.3917/pro.291.0019>

« 45 attentats ont été déjoués, 4 469 perquisitions administratives ont été effectuées qui ont permis 625 saisies d'armes dont 78 armes de guerre ; 754 assignations à résidence ont été prononcées, 41 étaient encore en vigueur au 31 octobre 2017 ; 75 zones de protection et de sécurité ont été mises en place et 19 lieux de culte ont été fermés » (45 attacks were foiled, 4,469 administrative searches were carried out resulting in 625 weapons seizures, including 78 weapons of war; 754 house arrest orders were issued, 41 were still in force on 31 October 2017; 75 protection and security zones were set up and 19 places of worship were closed).

Meanwhile, the question of respect for democracy and individual freedoms still arises²². The State of emergency is an exceptional measure that must be implemented under particular conditions. Indeed, the necessary means must be put in place to fight terrorism. However, terrorism, unfortunately, does not seem to be exceptional, and it seems to be a long-term phenomenon.

The State of emergency and the action of Francois Hollande did not allow to eradicate terrorism inside the territory or the Islamic State organization outside the territory. The history of France showed us that terrorism is not a new phenomenon: it existed during the Algerian war and had more or less important repercussions at specific periods but, unfortunately, has always existed. According to Professor of Public Law Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche in *Le Monde* :

« Les états d'exception doivent par définition être exceptionnels. Or, selon moi, ce n'est pas le cas des attentats du 13 novembre. On en a eu d'autres en janvier et il faut aussi regarder ce qui s'est passé à Beyrouth ou, ces dernières années, à New York, à Madrid, à Londres. Par conséquent, les actes terroristes ne sauraient être appréhendés comme des faits ponctuels demandant de recourir aux outils de gestion de l'exceptionnel. (...) Utiliser les moyens offerts par les états d'exception pour mener la

²² État d'urgence et autres régimes d'exception (article 16, état de siège) | Vie publique.fr, n.d.

lutte contre le terrorisme risque de conduire durablement à des atteintes aux équilibres institutionnels et aux droits fondamentaux qui frapperaient non seulement les supposés terroristes, mais bien tous les citoyens. » (States of exception must by definition be exceptional. In my opinion, this is not the case with the attacks of 13 November. There were others in January and we must also look at what happened in Beirut or, in recent years, in New York, Madrid and London. Consequently, terrorist acts cannot be understood as one-off events requiring the use of exceptional management tools. (...) Using the means offered by states of exception to fight terrorism risks leads to lasting damage to institutional equilibrium and fundamental rights, affecting not only the alleged terrorists but also all citizens)²³.

Terrorism strikes the whole world and is not a purely national affair like the war in Algeria. France is constantly reinforcing its legislative arsenal to defend itself better. Still, if this does not seem to be enough, it forces the population to give up its freedoms in the long term through a so-called exceptional power to protect itself better.

However, protection seems to have been an exhausted argument; in practice, the usefulness of the State of Emergency is difficult to demonstrate. Instead, the State appears to take advantage of terrorism to lower freedoms citizens and fully occupy the power.

²³ Raphaëlle Besse Desmoulières, 2015. Etat d'urgence : « une marge de manœuvre bien trop large est offerte aux autorités ». Le Monde.fr.

1.2 Administrative searches

One of the leading practices implemented by the State of emergency that has raised many questions is the use of administrative searches. They are authorized within the Law n° 55-385 and article 11 of April 3, 1955, relating to the State of emergency :

« Le décret déclarant ou la loi prorogeant l'état d'urgence peut, par une disposition expresse, conférer aux autorités administratives mentionnées à l'article 8 le pouvoir d'ordonner des perquisitions en tout lieu, y compris un domicile, sauf dans un lieu affecté à l'exercice d'un mandat parlementaire ou à l'activité professionnelle des avocats, des magistrats ou des journalistes, lorsqu'il existe des raisons sérieuses de penser que ce lieu est fréquenté par une personne dont le comportement constitue une menace pour la sécurité et l'ordre publics. » (The decree declaring or the law extending the State of emergency may, by an express provision, confer on the administrative authorities referred to in Article 8 the power to order searches in any place, including a home, except in a place used for the exercise of a parliamentary mandate or the professional activity of lawyers, magistrates or journalists, where there are serious grounds for believing that this place is frequented by a person whose behaviour constitutes a threat to public security and order.)²⁴.

A search is, therefore, a police search of a home by judicial order. Four thousand four hundred sixty-nine administrative searches were carried out during the implementation of the State of emergency. They have been questioned first by their actual usefulness and second by their often racial character.

The effectiveness of administrative searches was not clear. According to lawyer William Bourdon, some of the :

²⁴ Article 11 - Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence. - Légifrance, n.d.

« 3 594 perquisitions administratives ordonnées sous ce régime depuis le 14 novembre (pour l'essentiel réalisées le premier mois) n'ont donné lieu à l'ouverture d'enquêtes judiciaires pour des faits liés au terrorisme que dans cinq cas. (...)En revanche, le principal attentat déjoué en France depuis le 13 novembre, à savoir celui (ou ceux) que semblait préparer Reda Kriket, arrêté le 24 mars à Argenteuil (Val-d'Oise), l'a été grâce aux méthodes judiciaires et policières classiques, sans relation avec l'état d'urgence. » (Only five of the 3,594 administrative searches ordered under this regime since 14 November (most of which were carried out in the first month) have led to the opening of judicial investigations for terrorism-related acts. (...) On the other hand, the main attack foiled in France since 13 November, namely the one (or those) that Reda Kriket seemed to be preparing, arrested on 24 March in Argenteuil (Val-d'Oise), was foiled thanks to classic judicial and police methods, unrelated to the State of emergency.)²⁵.

Searches did not seem to result in any actual prosecutions or to have any real impact on terrorism. Moreover, the main attack avoided did not require the exceptional measures of the State of emergency. In summary, the searches launched by the State of emergency did not lead to the dismantling of any terrorist structure nor the discovery of any, particularly radicalized person. They were mainly carried out around a question of identity. Malik Salemkour, president of the League of Human Rights said:

« L'état d'urgence s'est focalisé sur une certaine catégorie de personnes en fonction de leur religion, musulmane, ou de leur apparence, étrangère » (The State of emergency has focused on a certain category of people based on their religion, Muslim, or their appearance, foreign)²⁶.

²⁵ Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, 2016. Un état d'urgence permanent, mais pour quel résultat ? Le Monde.fr.

²⁶ Julia Pascual, Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, 2017. Un an, 11 mois et 18 jours d'état d'urgence. Le Monde.fr.

The identity-based character of the State of emergency had previously been witnessed during the Algerian war. According to Emmanuel Blanchard in État d'urgence politique et spectres de la guerre d'Algérie, in metropolitan France, the repression was above all directed at French Muslims from Algeria, subjected to facial checks, being taken to the police station, and joint raids, concentrating on particular areas (impoverished and stigmatized suburbs, immigrant housing areas). However, the French Muslims in Algeria were not the only ones to perpetrate terrorist acts; there were also non-Muslim Frenchmen who were part of the OAS. The State, therefore, attacked a community and not terrorism directly.

If searches were carried out within the State of emergency framework, they should have to respect the Rule of law.

1.3 Prohibition to demonstrate

Secondly, the State of emergency and the right to demonstrate do not go hand in hand. One provision of the law on the State of emergency concern the prohibition of demonstrations, precisely, article 5-3 of the text of 1955, which give the power to the prefect :

« d'interdire le séjour dans tout ou partie du département à toute personne cherchant à entraver, de quelque manière que ce soit, l'action des pouvoirs publics » (to prohibit the stay in all or part of the department of any person seeking to obstruct, in any way whatsoever, the action of the public authorities)²⁷.

In November and December 2015, many climate protests were banned: on Sunday, November 29, for the Global Climate March and on December 12 on the sidelines of the Paris climate conference (COP21). While in contrast, there was a strong international mobilization around the world²⁸. In France, they were forbidden in the name of terrorist attacks and to guarantee the protection of the citizens. Then, on March 9, 2016, the Minister of Labor presented the El Khomri bill or the labour law. It entailed crucial changes to the labour code²⁹. However, it raised many consternations and opposition among the French population. According to an Elabe poll for BFMTV, on May 4, 2017, 74% of those surveyed said they were « opposed » to the reform, with 37% saying they were « somewhat opposed » to the text and 37% « completely opposed»³⁰. In the name of the terrorist threat, many demonstrations were repeatedly banned, and later, specific individuals were banned from demonstrating. According to

²⁷ Julia Pascual, n.d. Quand l'état d'urgence rogne le droit de manifester. LeMonde.fr.

²⁸ Loi travail : plusieurs opposants interdits de manifester, 2016. Le Monde.fr.

²⁹ Bertrand Bissuel, 2016. Temps de travail, licenciement, prud'hommes : ce que contient le projet de loi d'El Khomri. Le Monde.fr.

³⁰ Loi Travail: le projet rejeté par 74% des Français - L'Express, 2016.

Amnesty International's report, 90% of the arrests during the State of emergency were made during the mobilization against the labour law, and 639 measures restricting the right to travel were taken « explicitly » to « prevent people from participating in demonstrations »³¹. On July 5, 2017, in a challenging context, where demonstrations were limited, Prime Minister Manuel Valls finally implemented the law, using Article 49.3 of the constitution for the fifth time³². It was a procedure that allowed adopting a text by engaging the government's responsibility unless a censure motion was voted under the 24 hours following. In 2006, Francois Hollande, when he was the first secretary of the Socialist Party, declared :

« Le 49.3 est une brutalité. Le 49.3 est un déni de démocratie. » (The 49.3 is brutality. The 49.3 is a denial of democracy).

The use of the 49.3 to pass the El Khomri Law has been much criticized. Notably, to pass a law, surveys showed that the French were not in favor, especially during a State of emergency where the right to demonstrate was limited. The ban on demonstrations was seen as a tool to serve broader objectives, notably maintaining public order.

During the Algerian war, the ban on demonstrations was usual during the State of emergency. On October 17, 1961, there was a repression of an Algerian protest that had been previously banned for not respecting the curfew (prohibiting going out from 8:30 pm to 5:30 am). Organized by the FLN, it decided to maintain it despite the ban. According to the different sources, the repression caused between 10 and 100 deaths, and more than 12.000 people were arrested and led to detention centers³³. Four months later, a similar situation was repeated. On February 8, 1962, the French Communist Party and the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) organized a demonstration against

³¹ Julia Pascual, n.d. Quand l'état d'urgence rogne le droit de manifester. LeMonde.fr

³² Benjamin Bruel, 2016. Qu'est-ce que l'article 49.3 ?LeMonde.fr

³³ Laurent Ribadeau Dumas, 2015. 17 octobre 1961: la «sanglante répression» d'une manifestation d'Algériens. Franceinfo.

the Secret Armed Organization (OAS) and the Algerian War. It was ban again by the government. Following the protest, the prefect of Paris police, Maurice Papon, ordered to repress it, making nine dead and 200 injured³⁴.

Thus, the State of emergency was put in place in France to deal with terrorist attacks. It was a situation that inevitably recalls the context in which the State of emergency was created, the Algerian War. In theory and practice, the State of emergency faces many criticisms concerning the respect of the law, democracy, and individual liberties. History seemed to be repeating itself, whether in the circumstances of administrative searches or the ban on demonstrations. The democratic limit appeared to be crossed in the name of terrorism, despite two periods that all seemed to oppose them historically.

Since 1986, France has equipped itself with a powerful arsenal of anti-terrorist legislation that has continued to grow, becoming one of the European countries best equipped legislatively to deal with terrorism. In this context, the necessity of the State of emergency was even more surprising. The State of emergency has proven to be more than a protective measure against terrorism. It is seen as a way for the President to strengthen his power by using the legitimacy given by the terrorist attacks. The State of Emergency depriving citizens of certain freedoms appear to be an unprecedented opportunity for the government to have a wider margin of manoeuvre without the necessity of consent.

The use of the emergency policy seems to be more and more recurrent. During the Algerian War and terrorist attacks of 2015, the State of Emergency carried its legitimacy on violence and a demand for protection. However, following the appearance of the Covid 19 pandemic, a new form of State of emergency is put in place. A health emergency was created on March 23, 2020, which differed from the State of emergency and granted exceptional powers to the civil authorities³⁵. It is the first time in the history

³⁴ Chloé Leprince, Pierre Ropert, 2016. De Charonne à la loi Travail, une brève histoire du droit de manifester.

³⁵ Michel Lascombe, 2020. DALLOZ Etudiant - Actualité: Les états d'urgence : l'état d'urgence et l'état d'urgence sanitaire.

of the Fifth Republic that a state of emergency has been put in place for health reasons. The threat was not embodied by individuals but by a virus.

The recurrence and ease off the establishment of this power without the agreement or legitimacy of the people is surprising. Today, any cause seems legitimate to establish this power. This is a danger for the population, which is getting used to less and less democratic power.

Moreover, the French State does not stop there. If the fight against terrorism is fundamental, it includes the battle against radicalization, a set of measures that leads to the infiltration of the State directly into the heart of society, illustrating a divided and forgotten part of the society.

Chapter 2: Policies against radicalisation

The concept of radicalization emerged in the international field around 2001, following the September 11 attacks in the United States. It is a concept that has become part of media and political discourse. It is not easy to define this term today because it gives rise to numerous debates. For Farhad Khosrokhavar, he defines radicalisation as the :

« processus par lequel un individu, un groupe, adopte une forme violente d'action, directement liée à une idéologie extrémiste à contenu politique, social ou religieux qui conteste l'ordre établi sur le plan politique, social ou culturel » (the process by which an individual or group adopts a violent form of action directly linked to an extremist ideology with political, social or religious content that challenges the established political, social or cultural order).

The fight against radicalization, which is part of the fight against terrorism, appeared in France in 2014, when the government introduced the first plan to combat radicalization and terrorist networks. It was a plan that was strengthened over the years with more and more political and financial resources. Although the term radicalization is not new in the French political language, it marked a turning point in an anti-terrorist policy that was justified above all by the judicial approach, although primarily based on administrative measures.

Today, the fight against radicalization act as a practical discourse to legitimize police action beyond its usual competence areas. The importance of counter-terrorism is at the forefront, to be one step ahead of the terrorists. Counter-terrorism, not only aims to punish the perpetrators but also to prevent attacks. It is a precautionary principle; states go beyond punishing terrorists. It allows the government to justify the introduction of a

precautionary principle applied to people. The fight against radicalization looks today to have become a system of surveillance aiming at tracking down future terrorists by integrating the heart of society's and its structural problems: secularism and Islamophobia.

2.1 The Surveillance Act: an invasion of privacy

The Internet is considered one of the greatest innovations of the late 20th century and is now one of the foundations of modern society. According to the Live Stats' website, more than 4.79 billion people worldwide had access to the Internet by the end of 2020. There were 53 million Internet users in France, or more than 80% of the country's population. The Internet is a free space for the circulation of information, facilitating almost instantaneous communication between users.

There are many scientific studies and theories on the modes of radicalization. Some of them mention different places of radicalization; the university, the street, the prison, the mosque, or the Internet... The Internet have become a privileged space for radicalization. This theories alert us to the fragility of young people in the period of adolescence in the face of fake news, conspiracy theories, radical, sectarian, and extremist discourse.

Surveillance policies are put in place to monitor what happens on the web and limit the field of radicalization. In this view, database technology, combined with biometric identifiers of individuals and profiling software, is applied to prevent terrorist actions. This method purpose is to identify the malign intentions of individuals through the minute traces of their behavior. Counter-terrorism is to be able to extract information from anywhere and about anyone to be effective. It does not work if it is blocked by state sovereignties and by the usual legal and judicial mechanisms for protecting liberties.

On July 24, 2015, the Surveillance Act was enacted as the final step in establishing a new technological surveillance regime in France. A parliamentary report had been initiated in 2013, but the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks accelerated the process in Parliament. The text intends to strengthen internet surveillance because the government believe that the intelligence services lack resources and data.

The surveillance law allows for the use of black boxes. They are supposed to allow intelligence services to analyze large amounts of data retrieved from the Internet to detect a possible terrorist threat. Intelligence services can install these black boxes to monitor traffic. Equip with algorithms that detect weak signals of radicalization or a change of heart; the boxes are installed at key points in the network by web hosts and Internet service providers. This device is intended to detect terrorist actions about to be committed, particularly by looking for patterns of online activity that are very characteristic of jihadists' communication patterns. Jean-Jacques Urvoas, the rapporteur for the intelligence law, stressed in 2015 :

« L'objectif poursuivi est de pouvoir recueillir, traiter, analyser et recouper un grand nombre d'éléments techniques anonymes pour détecter des signaux de faible intensité sur les données brutes qui témoigneraient d'une menace pesant sur la sécurité nationale » (The objective is to be able to collect, process, analyse and cross-check a large number of anonymous technical elements in order to detect weak signals in the raw data that would indicate a threat to national security)³⁶.

Then, on 30 June, 2016, the Law on intelligence was reinforced by a new circular which enshrined the automatic registration of persons convicted of offenses related to terrorism in an automated national judicial file of perpetrators of terrorist offenses³⁷. By compiling their biographical information, this entry also means that adults and minors convicted of terrorist offenses are required to notify the police of any change of address for twenty years and are obliged to inform the competent authorities fifteen days in advance of any international travel.

³⁶ H. B., 2021. Lutte contre le terrorisme : C'est quoi la surveillance par algorithme que souhaite mettre en place le gouvernement ?

³⁷ Sakhi, M., 2018. Terrorisme et radicalisation | Cairn.info. Journal des anthropologues 161–181.

The surveillance Law is seen as an invasion of privacy and an overall loss of security in communications. The UN Human Rights Committee, along with dozens of others, had expressed concern two days before the Council's decision about a law that grants :

« pouvoirs excessivement larges de surveillance très intrusive aux services de renseignement sur la base d'objectifs vastes et peu définis, sans autorisation d'un juge et sans mécanisme de contrôle adéquat et indépendant » (excessively broad powers of highly intrusive surveillance to the intelligence services on the basis of broad and ill-defined objectives, without judicial authorization and without adequate and independent oversight)³⁸.

The arrival of the Internet has been an upheaval in our societies through the development of a free and open network for all. Today, in the name of terrorism, the government has succeeded in taking control of the private lives of French citizens, shared through the Internet. In the name of the fight against terrorism and, more specifically, against radicalization, the government has set up a surveillance system through the Internet that aims to track down terrorists and attacks all French individuals' freedoms. It is a system inspired by Jeremy Bentham's panopticon, where the government constantly monitors citizens. The massification of media and the digitalization of society has facilitated these surveillance practices, developing Surveillance Capitalism, as the author Shoshana Zuboff theorizes.

³⁸ Franck Johannes, 2015. Loi sur le renseignement : le Conseil constitutionnel « filtre le moustique et laisse passer le chameau ».

2.2 Separatism Act: terrorism becoming an Islamophobic security discourse

In 1905, the law on the separation of church and State was promulgated, a principle maintained in the Fifth Republic constitution. Secularism implies the State's neutrality and imposes equality before the law without distinction of religion or belief.

Secularism guarantees believers and non-believers the same right to freedom of expression of their beliefs or convictions. It guarantees the right to have or not have a religion, change it, or not have one. It guarantees the free exercise of worship and freedom of religion, and freedom from religion: no one can be forced to respect religious dogmas or prescriptions.

Secularism implies, among other things, the separation of the State and religious organizations. The political order is based solely on the sovereignty of the people, and the State, which does not recognize or pay tribute to any religion, does not regulate the internal functioning of religious organizations. This separation deduced the neutrality of the State, the territorial authorities, and public services, not of its users. Thus, the secular Republic imposes equality on citizens concerning the administration and public service, regardless of their convictions or beliefs.

Institutions such as schools, hospitals, and public institutions must respect this principle of separation. In schools, for example, the law on "conspicuous religious symbols in schools" of 15 March 2004 prohibits the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols by anyone working in the education system, including pupils, teachers...

However, there is increasing difficulty in elaborating the limits of secularism, which is a constantly recurring debate. For example, the law of 2004 had caused many debates because it mainly attacked the country's Muslim community by prohibiting the wearing of the veil in school. After all, the law was initially elaborated around this issue. In 2016, there was notably a prolonged debate around the burkini. The controversy rages

on, raising the question of religious signs in French society and the public space. However, this debate stigmatises and discriminates against Muslims, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights considers that the ban on this garment tends to fuel religious intolerance³⁹. The controversy raises the question of the place of religious symbols in French society and the public space.

In 2006, the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo published in its pages cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed. On January 7th, 2015, the editorial office was targeted by a bloody attack that killed 12 people⁴⁰. Charlie Hebdo's attack launched a national controversy on the freedom of the press and opinion.

On October 16th, 2020, teacher Samuel Paty was beheaded. The history geography teacher had shown his pupils cartoons of Mohammed published by Charlie Hebdo.

In response, President Emmanuel Macron tabled his bill on separatism aimed at reinforcing the principles of the Republic, which was adopted on April 12th, 2021, by the Senate. This law aims to fight against radical Islamism by reinforcing the principles of secularism. The Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin pronounced in a discourse, on February 1st 2021;

« Notre pays est malade d'un séparatisme, dont le premier d'entre eux, l'islamisme, gangrène notre unité nationale » (Our country is sick with separatism, the first of which, Islamism, is eating away at our national unity).

Designed to impede the ability of Muslims to act in all aspects of their social life, the law against separatism is an apparent attack on the rights and freedoms of this minority in France. Muslim separatism thus targets activities and initiatives as banal as practising a sport, creating an association, organizing language courses, opening a place of prayer, etc. The text thus introduced a series of more or less controversial measures that

³⁹ Les arrêtés anti-burkini pris en France favorisent la « stigmatisation » des musulmans, selon l'ONU.

⁴⁰ Assassinat de Samuel Paty dans les Yvelines, n.d.Franceinfo

reinforced discrimination against people already stigmatized by xenophobia, racism, and Islamophobia.

Worship is prohibited in universities, except for chaplaincy. The Senate wishes to prohibit religion in the entirety of public higher education establishments, excluding chaplaincies. The senators also prohibits proselytizing or propaganda activities likely to disrupt teaching and research activities⁴¹.

A provision aims to allow the dissolution of associations that prohibit a person's participation in a meeting because of their color or origin. The Unef, one of the leading student unions, recently founded itself at the heart of controversy for organizing open meetings reserved for specific categories of students (women, people who are victims of racism, etc.). Prohibiting open racial meetings is once again a violent denial of the strength of racism and its roots in French society and institutions. It is also a rejection of those who experience it to organize themselves to respond to it and developed collective means of self-defense.

The Senate authorizes mayors to prohibit the display of flags other than those of the French Republic or the European Union regarding the celebration of marriages or the registration of civil partnerships⁴².

It also decides to prevent the issue or renewal of residence permits in France to foreigners who manifestly reject the principles of the Republic⁴³.

The Senate also provides a ban on the submission of political lists whose title would call into question the principles of national sovereignty, democracy, and secularism.

The wearing of the veil is prohibited for accompanying adults on school outings. Conspicuous religious symbols, including the veil, are also prohibited in competitions

⁴¹ Loi contre les séparatismes : le Sénat serre la vis à l'université, 2021. OuestFrance

⁴² Séparatisme : le Sénat souhaite donner la possibilité aux maires d'interdire les drapeaux étrangers. RT en français, 2021.

⁴³ Projet de loi "Séparatisme" : comment les sénateurs ont durci le texte, entre "amendement Unef" et port du voile limité, 2021. Franceinfo.

organized by sports federations and for minors in the public space. An amendment also allows the internal regulations of swimming pools to ban the burkini⁴⁴.

Today, the debates around secularism continue and is reinforced. Once again, the attacks have reignited the "Islam-secularism" debate with violence, inflated by mutual prejudice. Stéphane Pinon in Laïcité, que d'erreurs on commet en ton nom!, speaks of a secularism of obstruction :

« La raison conjuguée à la science doit permettre de fonder une morale sociale, presque une philosophie séculière officielle. La pleine liberté de conscience retrouve son lustre, et avec elle la liberté de croire, de douter, et surtout de ne pas croire. En purgeant la société d'une trop forte immixtion religieuse, on affranchit en somme l'individu de la transcendance et de l'obscurantisme. Dans cette perspective, la liberté de culte tendrait à être placée sous un régime de liberté surveillée. La neutralité de l'État corollaire de la séparation prend les contours d'une neutralité-vigilance... » (Rationale combined with science should make it possible to found a social morality, almost an official secular philosophy. Full freedom of conscience regains its lustre, and with it the freedom to believe, to doubt, and above all to disbelieve. By purging society of too much religious interference, the individual is freed from transcendence and obscurantism. In this perspective, freedom of religion would tend to be placed under a regime of supervised freedom. The neutrality of the State, a corollary of separation, takes the form of a neutrality-vigilance...).

Republican laws of various freedoms are then undermined in the name of the defense of the republic. This reaction is being built in France against people assimilated to Muslim identity.

⁴⁴ Ibid

To protect themselves from radicalization, the reinforcement of secularism and so-called Republican values are often good motives for passing laws attacking one part of society. The radicalized indeed show behavior that goes against the values of Western society. However, radicalization is not a religious problem, but it results from a deep structural problem in society in France. The report of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC) on the factors of creation or modification of violent radicalization processes, especially among young people, written by Selma Belaala, in 2008, shows that Islamist radicalization is not a religious phenomenon but a politico-ideological one, as it expresses a new modality of political and cultural belonging of uprooted young people in Europe. Similarly, Chala Chafiq states that :

« le radicalisme islamiste, loin d'être porteur d'une intensification de la foi religieuse, constitue en réalité une identité politique » (Islamist radicalism, far from being the bearer of an intensification of religious faith, is in fact a political identity) (2010, p. 20)⁴⁵.

According to the government's doctrine, there is a continuum between the radical practice of Islam and the attacks. It is why it should be interrupted at its origin. The French government shifted from the fight against terrorism to the fight against radicalization; the focus has shifted from policing the act to policing the behaviors. As a result of this policy, a stigmatizing discourse has been adopted towards French Muslim citizens.

⁴⁵ Lacroix, I., 2018. Radicalisations et jeunesse 94. injep.

2. 3 The colonial approach to the discourse

The fight against radicalization aims to arrest individuals showing potential signs of radicalization. Governments are trying to find individuals who could potentially go and fight for the Islamic State, Daesh, by doing their jihad in Syria or Iraq or by acting directly on French soil by committing terrorist attacks. These signs are generally ostentatious; they look for an individual who shows a strong affiliation to the Islamic religion, close to a particular mosque with a shocking discourse towards terrorism... It is not necessarily an individual who will show a sign of direct affiliation to a specific terrorist network. These signs are therefore very subjective and lead to the conflation of Islam and terrorism. The fight against radicalization, therefore, targets a particular part of society.

In Chapter 1.1, the administrative searches of the State of emergency targets mainly Muslims. The Muslim community living on French soil is regularly stigmatized by political elites and experts and identified as a threat associated with terrorism, trafficking, or religious fundamentalism. This tendency has become more pronounced since the first debates on the headscarf in schools. Today the Maghrebi population is considered a real internal enemy, stigmatization that testifies to the prevalence of assimilationist policies.

Today, in France, the issue of radicalization is linked to the broader question of the integration of Muslim populations in Europe, and more generally, to the choice of integration models. Farhad Khosrokhavar's definition of radicalization speaks of a «contestation de l'ordre établie ». This contestation presents a structural problem in French society. The government's current focus on the fight against radicalization is linked to Islamism and, therefore, on religion. At first glance, policies to combat radicalization seem to fit easily into the principle of the separation of church and State and the differentiation between the public and private domains to which religion belongs.

Islamophobia discourse in France is not new, but it is rooted in the colonial history of France. According to official sources, in 1954, when the Algerian war began, France had 211,000 Algerians in metropolitan France. In 1962, there were nearly 350,000⁴⁶. In this very particular context, where the war for independence claimed thousands of victims on Algerian soil, France set up real repression on its territory to try to muzzle Muslims who might have claims. With this massive arrival of French Muslims, racist statements multiplied, legitimizing discrimination against Algerians. For example, in a book devoted to the history of the Harkis, the writer and journalist Pierre Daum reports a scathing sentence by General De Gaulle :

« harkis ou pas harkis, ce sont des musulmans et la France, qui est un pays chrétien, n'est pas faite pour accueillir des musulmans » (harkis or not harkis, they are Muslims and France, which is a Christian country, is not made to welcome Muslims).

These attacks indicated how the political elites in particular and the bourgeoisie, in general, viewed the populations of post-colonial immigration. This cultural imperialism was a factor in stigmatizing formerly colonized peoples, who were considered dehumanize, giving up their identity attributes, and being summoned to submit to the laws of the Republic.

An ever-increasing fraction of the population believes that Muslims now constitute an existential threat to the Republic, its principles and secularism. From this point of view, the multiple debates on the veil or secularism have had the effect of normalizing Islamophobia and marking the advent of state racism that has become institutionalized with laws banning the wearing of headscarves and burqas (in the latter case, the offender is liable to a fine of 150 euros and is obliged to follow a citizenship course).

For Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, Islamophobia in France has its origins in the colonial period. In an interview for Mediapart, in 2019; he says:

⁴⁶ Esma Ben Said, 2017. De la guerre d'Algérie à l'islamophobie, histoire d'un racisme à la française

« Au-delà de cette conjoncture, les origines de cette islamophobie sont coloniales. L'histoire impériale de la IIIe République, à la fin du XIXe et au début du XXe siècle, est essentielle pour mieux comprendre ce qu'il se passe aujourd'hui. En effet, on assiste à cette époque à la construction d'une islamophobie savante, élaborée au sein d'institutions prestigieuses et productrices de « science » : le Collège de France, nombre d'universités françaises réputées comme la Sorbonne et des grandes écoles comme l'École libre des sciences politiques, aujourd'hui appelée SciencesPo. » (Beyond this context, the origins of this Islamophobia are colonial. The imperial history of the Third Republic, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, is essential to better understand what is happening today. In fact, we are witnessing the construction of a scholarly Islamophobia, developed within prestigious institutions that produce "science": the Collège de France, a number of renowned French universities such as the Sorbonne, and grandes écoles such as the École libre des sciences politiques, now called SciencesPo)⁴⁷.

Numerous racial theories were developed and brought up to date by the intellectual elite, such as Ernest Renan, with his theory of the good tyrant. It considered the "natives" inferior on all levels for ethnic-racial reasons and, in the particular case of the Muslim "natives", for reasons related to Islam as a religion and civilization. The colonies had to effectively ensure the defense of France's colonial order on the conquered territories and the subjected populations. This theory had much influence on French public opinion.

Moreover, unlike other former colonial powers that have acknowledged some of the crimes committed in their overseas possessions, the highest authorities of the French State still refuse to do so. After 130 years of colonization and a long war period in Algeria, the French State has erased history by hiding behind Republican laws. The Arabization of society was suppressed to make way for the French language. The

⁴⁷ Azzouzi, P.R.E., 2019. En France, «les origines de l'islamophobie sont coloniales». MédiaPart.

history and memory of the Algerian war have never really been worked. There is no museum on the colonies in France, and students are not dealt with in history lessons at school. It was only on 9 March 2021 that the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron decided to facilitate access to classified archives that are more than fifty years old, a measure that concerns the period of the Algerian War (1954-1962)⁴⁸.

This rejection of the Muslim community takes the form of stigmatization of its religious identity attributes, particularly the Islamic veil, which has been the subject of numerous media campaigns since the late 1980s. Today, alarmist and racist discourse are relayed by the extreme right-wing who lobby governmental bodies to tighten immigration control measures and reinforce the protection of the population, sometimes launching actual campaigns for the expulsion of illegal immigrants. Each time, they are an opportunity to reactivate the figure of the socio-ethnic enemy within.

This colonial and Islamophobia past is not a past. On the contrary, it is a present past that is updated and mobilized by those who believe that the Muslim religion and its followers are significant threats to France and republican institutions. Since Islam is constructed as a political and security problem, it is not surprising that the same people are led to use rhetoric and arguments previously mobilized in a different context.

⁴⁸ Frédéric Bobin, 2021. En « facilitant » l'accès aux archives de la guerre d'Algérie, Macron poursuit sa politique des « petits pas » sur la réconciliation mémorielle.

Chapter 3: The far-right and the importance of a security discourse

Retired generals signed, in *Valeurs actuelles*, the ultraconservative extreme right-wing news magazine, a first tribune, published on April 21, 2021, under the title « Pour un retour de l'honneur des gouvernants ». France, they explained, would know a disintegration of which Islamism and the hordes of suburbs would be the first response. They described France as a fallen country, a civil insurrection, promised chaos and violence and doomed to sink into civil war. This column was a call to order. The meaning was shocking but also because the armed forces have a duty of strict neutrality. They were legally prohibited from expressing political opinions in the course of their duties.

This article was all the more surprising since it appeared on the anniversary of the Algiers putsch of April 1961. Precisely, when four army generals, Jouhaud, Salan, Challe and Zeller, made a putsch and took control of Algiers to oppose what they then described as General de Gaulle's policy of abandoning Algeria. At the time, the threat of a military coup had played a central role in the return to power of General de Gaulle and the advent of the Fifth Republic. This episode played a significant role in redefining the balance of power between civilian and military powers. It consecrated the pre-eminence of political authority over military command and the submission of the army to civilian control. Indeed, Article 15 of the constitution states that the President of the Republic is the head of the armed forces, and so the military has to obey him. It was, therefore, this hierarchy that the military forum seemed to challenge.

The authors, retired generals, called for an awakening of political power and envisaged the intervention of their comrades in active service to stop the disintegration of society and protect the civilizational values of the French nation. In other words, they envisaged a military takeover of power, as it was 60 years ago. This article revived the memory of the Algerian war and especially of the colonial period. However, a few days

later, the public opinion learned that it was a personal choice of the magazine to publish the column on the anniversary of the Algiers putsch. A way to make the letter even more polemical. A new column of Valeurs actuelles was then published, on May 9, under the title, « La survie de notre pays »⁴⁹.

What is extremely serious in these two consecutive forums is the real state of a fraction of the military society, which, disregarding its duties of neutrality, preaches the fracture of the civil society. However, it is also the supposed state of French society. According to the Harris Interactive survey for LCI, 58% of the French support the open letter authors. Worse: 86% believe that in certain cities or neighborhoods, the laws of the Republic no longer apply, 73% that French society is disintegrating, and 45% agree with the military that France could soon experience a civil war. As for sanctions against the military, 64% of respondents disapprove of them⁵⁰. In other words, the military tribune brought to light the deep malaise that the country is experiencing. This malaise is illustrated in politics. When we see that Marine Le Pen, President of the extreme right party, the National Rally (the former name of the party was the National Front, but in 2018 the party decided to change it to the National Rally) arrived at the second round of the French presidential election of 2017. She is one of the main favorites for the election of 2022.

These two tribunes called for an insurrection to face the so-called communitarianism that allegedly threatened the security of French citizens. In this case, the magazine Valeurs Actuelles decided to publish these two tribunes and published one of them on the anniversary of the Algiers putsch. It put forward the importance of the media that relayed the information.

The extreme right plays a significant role in this discontent of civil society. These two forums show in particular the importance of the extreme right in contributing to the

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Harris Interactive, 2021. Réactions des Français à la tribune des militaires dans Valeurs Actuelles. Paris.

security discourse. According to Waeber, in his book, Societal security: The concept, he states that security is achieved through discourse⁵¹. For him, security is not the consequence of a threat but the consequence of the discourse. When State officials call it a security problem, they modify the nature of the problem and raise the stakes by giving it a character of urgency and necessity by allowing them to take exceptional measures. For Waeber ;

« Le discours sécuritaire est donc un acte de langage, une labellisation dotée d'une force illocutoire. L'intérêt d'une telle démarche est de focaliser l'attention sur les règles d'énonciation et de montrer la force de la labellisation comme forme de pouvoir symbolique. Cette labellisation du discours sécuritaire passe par la mobilisation de l'opinion publique et les médias. » (The security discourse is, therefore, an act of language, labelling with an illocutionary force. The interest of such an approach is to focus attention on the rules of enunciation and show the strength of labelling as a form of symbolic power. This labelling of the security discourse involves the mobilization of public opinion and the media).

The far-right has succeed in imposing a security discourse on the political agenda by mobilizing public opinion around issues such as terrorism and immigration.

⁵¹ Ceyhan, A., 1998. Analyser la sécurité : Dillon, Waeber, Williams et les autres. Cultures & Conflits.

3.1 The Theory of the Great Replacement

The theory of the Great Replacement is a theory developed at the end of the 19th century by Maurice Barrès, a French nationalist intellectual and anti-Dreyfusard. This theory is fundamentally racist since it is based on skin color and ethnicity as a criterion of belonging. According to an article of *le monde* called La théorie du « grand remplacement », de l'écrivain Renaud Camus aux attentats en Nouvelle-Zélande⁵², Barrès theorized in a membership article for the Nationalist Youth Association (ANJ) published in *Le Journal* in 1900, that :

« Aujourd'hui, parmi nous, se sont glissés de nouveaux Français que nous n'avons pas la force d'assimiler [...] qui veulent nous imposer leur façon de sentir. ». L'auteur de *L'appel au soldat* (1900) y évoque « l'abaissement de notre natalité, l'épuisement de notre énergie depuis cent années » comme des facteurs déterminants dans « l'envahissement de notre territoire et de notre sang par des éléments étrangers qui aspirent à soumettre les éléments nationaux ». « Le triomphe de leur manière de voir coïnciderait avec la ruine réelle de notre patrie », conclut Barrès». (Today, among us, new Frenchmen have crept in whom we do not have the strength to assimilate [...] who want to impose their way of feeling on us. The author of *L'appel au soldat* (1900) evokes there "the lowering of our birth rate, the exhaustion of our energy since one hundred years" as determining factors in "the invasion of our territory and our blood by foreign elements which aspire to subject the national elements". "The triumph of their way of seeing would coincide with the real ruin of our fatherland", Barrès concluded)⁵³.

⁵² Vaudano, M., Laurent, S., Dagorn, G., Maad, M., 2019. La théorie du « grand remplacement », de l'écrivain Renaud Camus aux attentats en Nouvelle-Zélande. *Lemonde*.

⁵³ Ibid

This theory is then taken up by Renaud Camus, who brought it up to date for the first time in the book L'Abécédaire de l'innocence, published in 2010 and then developed in a second book called Le Grand Remplacement published in 2011⁵⁴.

For Renaud Camus, the theory of the Great Replacement, it is the substitution of European peoples by non-European immigrants, the French people cannot cohabit with so-called allogeneous peoples, non-Europeans, without losing their identity.

For him, if France continues to welcome immigrants, it is the end of the French population, culture and identity. The French people will therefore be "replaced" by immigration. Renaud Camus has revived it by adding an anti-Islamic component that has been fashionable since the attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States and those of November 13, 2015, in France.

From Barrès to Camus, the notion of the great replacement has gone, from anti-Semitism to Islamophobia. Like much of the French far-right.

The great replacement is a theory supported by many French far-right wing figures, such as Marion Maréchal-Le Pen (granddaughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen), Eric Zemmour (polemicist), Alain Finkielkraut (philosopher), Michel Houellebecq (writer). Jean-Marie Le Pen, creator of the National Front, the french far-right political party, said in 2014 :

«Les Noirs et les Arabes vont remplacer les Français de souche; ils veulent saper la civilisation française; il suffit d'ouvrir les yeux pour s'en rendre compte mais les élites nient cette réalité.» (Blacks and Arabs are going to replace the native French; they want to undermine French civilization; you only have to open your eyes to realize this, but the elites deny this reality)⁵⁵;

or Eric Zemmour stated in 2019 :

⁵⁴ Vaudano, M., Laurent, S., Dagorn, G., Maad, M., 2019. La théorie du « grand remplacement », de l'écrivain Renaud Camus aux attentats en Nouvelle-Zélande. Lemonde.

⁵⁵ La rédaction numérique de RTL, 2014. FN : Jean-Marie Le Pen se rallie à la thèse du "Grand remplacement." RTL.

« La question qui se pose à nous est la suivante : les jeunes Français vont-ils accepter de vivre en minorité sur la terre de leurs ancêtres ? » (The question we have to ask ourselves is: will young French people accept to live in a minority on the land of their ancestors?)⁵⁶.

This theory shocks by its racist discourse which is not even valid in the sense that French immigration has the lowest rates in Europe. Christophe Dumont, head of the International Migration Division at the OECD, reminds us :

« en terme de flux récents d'immigration, on est parmi les pays occidentaux où les niveaux sont les plus bas, rappelle-t-il : avec moins de 250.000 entrées permanentes en 2012, dont 100.000 Européens, le nombre d'immigrés qui s'installent durablement en France représente moins de 0,4% de la population totale, contre une moyenne de 0,6% dans l'OCDE » (In terms of recent immigration flows, we are among the Western countries with the lowest levels, he recalls: with less than 250,000 permanent entries in 2012, including 100,000 Europeans, the number of immigrants who settle permanently in France represents less than 0.4% of the total population, compared to an average of 0.6% in the OECD)⁵⁷.

If the public success of Renaud Camus is to be relativized, his influence on the French public debate is undeniable.

⁵⁶ Joel Saget, 2019. Le polémiste Eric Zemmour reprend la thèse complotiste du « grand remplacement ». OuestFrance.

⁵⁷ La rédaction numérique de RTL, 2014. FN : Jean-Marie Le Pen se rallie à la thèse du "Grand remplacement." RTL.

3.2 Decolonization and the end of French primacy

There is a specific period in French history that strongly contributed to the influence of the theory of Grand Replacement within the public debate. The period of decolonization, and particularly the end of the Algerian war, marked for many French people the end of imperialism and the primacy of the country.

In 1954, it was still out of the question to abandon a territory attached to France. Algeria was an essential territory for French economic and political development. The discovery of oil, the choice to use the Saharan immensity for the beginning of nuclear or space experiments were additional reasons to understand the duration and the intensity of the Algerian war. The Algerian war had an enormous political impact. The conflict led to the fall of six presidents of the Council and the collapse of a Republic. The contingent was sent to Algeria; most of the young people were born between 1932 and 1943⁵⁸. A whole generation found itself embarked on this war. A large part of them did not always understand what was at stake. When Charles De Gaulle returned to France in 1958, he decided to put an end to the Algerian War by abandoning the territory.

Algerian independence is highly symbolic for many French people because it is seen as a betrayal of the Republic, as a betrayal of French citizens living in Algeria, and as a betrayal of the moral and territorial integrity of France. For Catherine Fieschi, in the article, Muslims and the secular city: How right-wing populists shape the French debate over Islam, she says :

« For someone like Jean Marie Le Pen who — before founding Front National in 1972 — was an army officer fighting against Algerian independence, this was further proof that the Republic did not provide France with the strength and international clout

⁵⁸ Stora, B., 2021. L'onde de choc des années algériennes en France: L'« Algérie française » et le Front national. Editions Esprit 13–28.

necessary for remaining a world power. For him, the Republic's concern for human rights, egalitarianism and, now, self-determination would lead to the decline of French greatness »⁵⁹.

Within the thesis of the great replacement, immigration is central. If decolonization is for many a failure of French power abroad, it is notably the beginning of a very symbolic migration. France has experienced many waves of migration throughout its history. After the end of the Second World War, France called upon workers from the colonies to participate in the reconstruction work. In 15 years, 1 million additional foreigners settled in France⁶⁰. Despite the difficulties of integration and the formation of shantytowns at the gates of major cities, the economic prosperity of the post-war period provided employment for the vast majority of them. However, the Algerian war marked the fracture between France and its former colonies. Algerian immigrants continued to settle, but they were now foreigners. They are looked at with resentment and mistrust. Catherine Fieschi, adds:

« Given the sizable wave of migration from Algeria into France from the start of the conflict in 1958 and onward, Algeria's eight-year war for independence was set to play a major role in the perception of Islam in France, as well as in the expectations of integration or assimilation of France's Muslims. Algerian migration to France began long before, but it was this final migratory wave and the privileges granted to Algerians in France in the war's aftermath that would fuel far-right hatred and racism (through the 1962 Evian Treaty, any Algerian residing in France or choosing to reside in France was automatically granted the same protections and rights as a French citizen)»⁶¹.

⁵⁹ Fieschi, C., 2020. Muslims and the secular city: How right-wing populists shape the French debate over Islam. Brookings.

⁶⁰ FranceCulture, n.d. Le grand remplacement, un virus français (2/5) : le Front National. Mécaniques du Complotisme.

⁶¹ Fieschi, C., 2020. Muslims and the secular city: How right-wing populists shape the French debate over Islam. Brookings.

The back wave of migration coming from the end of the Algerian War, created an islamophy towards its migrants. They symbolize the defeat of France in the Colonial War. For the defenders of the theory of the great replacement, it is a first decadence for the country. France has not been able to keep its colonies and this is a victory for the foreigner. The French far right has always developed within a discriminatory discourse. Previously, its discourse had anti-Semitic roots, thus attacking the country's Jewish population. However, the end of colonization marked a turning point in his discourse becoming anti-Arab, then anti-Islam. Catherine Fieschi, explains how the discourse of the extreme right-wing party, the National Front, is easily integrated into the population, such as through the case of the suburbs :

« At this point, FN was still a mix of old far-right and a new more inchoate “populist” sensibility. The fate of the banlieues — the marginalized and multi-ethnic suburbs— was becoming increasingly contentious as race-based riots erupted in Vaulx-en-Velin in 1979 and in Venissieux in 1983. In Algeria itself, the country’s main Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was rapidly gaining popularity, culminating in the Algerian civil war of 1992. These factors led to a growing focus on the lack of integration of Algerian youth, and fears that violence would spread from the banlieues to the heart of the cities, and from Algeria to France — indeed it did in 1995 with the Paris metro bombing by Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA). RN admits to, and sometimes boasts of, having coldly debated these issues, opting to move away from its initial dual strategy of focusing on law and order and anti-Semitism, to one focused on law and order and immigration. From there, the leap from fear of the banlieues, to fear of Muslims in the banlieues was an easy one »⁶².

In the propaganda and action of the extreme right, the importance of the link between the Muslim presence in France and the persistence of a colonial memory is decisive.

⁶² Fieschi, C., 2020. Muslims and the secular city: How right-wing populists shape the French debate over Islam. Brookings.

The haunting of the past of French Algeria becomes for the movement a force to mark its identity and its Islamophobia and security discourse. There is a permanent need to protect oneself from the foreigner. The definition of Islam as the religion of the immigrant offers the Rassemblement National the opportunity to dramatize its favorite "immigration" issue, perpetuating the identity-based reading that was that of the Front under Jean-Marie Le Pen. Thus, Marine Le Pen denounces the danger of a migratory submersion, a factor destroying national identity, stirring up the fear of new barbarian invasions and going so far as to predict a replacement of the constitution by sharia. The thesis of the Great Replacement is nourished throughout the periods of French history. Decolonization illustrates for the discourse of the extreme right a decadence for the power of France. However, this decadence does not stop there. The terrorist attacks of 2015 open a new period, that of the ultimate decadence. France is directly attacked by the enemy on its soil.

3.3 Terrorism and the last decadence

For the defenders of the theory of the great replacement, terrorism is the latest decadence of France. The country has lost its colonies and its global power. It is now being attacked on its soil by the enemy. Terrorism aims at destabilizing the country and reducing the greatness of France and immigration leads to chaos within the population through growing communitarianism. For Erik Zemmour, this terrorist wave is the continuation of the Algerian war through the « revenge » of the descendants of the colonized people. For him, this terrorism will lead to a civil war. He draws a parallel between the battle of Algiers and the attacks of 2015 :

« Les assassinats de Charlie et de l'Hyper Cacher de Vincennes, les massacres du Bataclan sonnent le retour des méthodes terroristes qui ont ensanglanté la bataille d'Alger. (The murders of Charlie and the Hyper Cacher of Vincennes, the massacres of the Bataclan sound the return of the terrorist methods which bloodied the battle of Algiers) »⁶³.

This idea brings us back to the two open letters published in the magazine, Valeurs Actuels, which notably defended the idea that France is doomed to « civil war ». The announcement of a civil war is implicit in the « great replacement » theory stated by Renaud Camus in 2010.

For the extreme right, terrorism is essential in its discourse and has become inseparable from its security discourse. For them, France can no longer defend itself from the enemy that is developing and becoming radicalized directly on its territory. Catherine Fieschi develops the following idea :

⁶³ Fourquet, J., Lebourg, N., 2017. "La nouvelle guerre d'Algérie n'aura pas lieu". Le Point.

« From the 1990s onward — especially in light of the 1995 attacks on public transport in Paris and Lyon, as well as a school in Villeurbanne, by the Armed Islamic Group — Islam and Muslims began to be depicted as a security threat, a trend which intensified after terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Lack of integration and incompatibility of values on the one hand, and security on the other, began to play a fundamental role in RN's rhetoric regarding Islam. This became even more pronounced once Marine Le Pen took over the party's leadership in 2011. Culture and insecurity are treated as two sides of the same coin, and as an assault on the universalist values of the Republic. The lack of integration — and lack of a desire to integrate on the part of young Muslims — was portrayed as a security threat. FN became quite effective at seamlessly shifting from one to the other as evidenced by Marine Le Pen's 2017 presidential election manifesto »⁶⁴.

However, the discourse of the extreme right-wing influences the French population around the issue of terrorism. It is an issue that mobilizes the public opinion. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on January 7 and November 13, 2015, the National Front, an extreme right-wing party, won roughly 30% of the national vote in local French elections in December 2015, compared with 11 per cent in 2010 election⁶⁵. The FN is the primary political vector of the identity and security movement. The rejection of immigration, which is closely linked to terrorism, and the fear of the Islamization of French society remain the main drivers of its political dynamics. The FN now wants to be the defender of a French way of life insofar as it is threatened by a Muslim population that is excessively attached to its particularities. The fight against violence and insecurity has occupied an important place in the French political debate for several years. The extreme right has played an essential role in structuring these debates.

⁶⁴ Fieschi, C., 2020. Muslims and the secular city: How right-wing populists shape the French debate over Islam. Brookings.

⁶⁵ Koehler, D., 2016. Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Current Developments and Issues for the Future. PRISM 6, 84–105.

Conclusion

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. France has been affected at several periods in its history by terrorism of various motivations. During the Algerian war, between 1954 and 1962, the country was strongly affected by the terrorism of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the secret armed organization (OAS). In 1955, the government, to guarantee the security of its citizens, created and implemented the State of Emergency. However, this form of state of exception restricts the freedoms of individuals through the implementation of various prerogatives, such as excessive administrative searches and prohibition to demonstrate.

Since the attacks of Charlie Hebdo in 2015, France is affected by what is called a new wave of terrorism, with motivations very different to that of the Algerian War. The State of Emergency is again put in place by the government and is extended six times. If there is an opposition between freedom and security, what marks today is that the State of emergency and the restriction of freedoms no longer seems to be justified. Contrary to what Francois Hollande said in his speech in 2015 before the Congress in Versailles, France is not at war. However, the prerogatives put in place in France are the same as during the Algerian War, and they strongly restrict the freedoms of individuals. In addition, since the 1980s, France has developed a specific legal system derogating from ordinary criminal law, which is still used today as a basis for anti-terrorism.

The French legislation sets up laws of exceptions in front of each new terrorist wave. These exceptions, which concern the means of investigation and prosecution dedicated to them, are generally based on a limitation of the exercise of public freedoms, both individual and collective. These policies are accused of restricting democracy and individual liberties. One cannot speak about a security turn from the moment when in France, since the creation of the 5th Republic, the individuals' security always seemed to prevail on their liberties. It is a Semi-Presidential Regime created during the war period and gives much power to the President. However, today a set of security policies are put in place in the name of terrorism but seem to hide a malaise of the French

society, attacking a specific community, the Arab and Muslim community of the country.

Radicalization has become the new obsession in the fight against terrorism; the government tries to prevent attacks by finding potential terrorists within society. It is considered that terrorism must be defeated at its origin. Therefore, the fight against radicalization must be implemented in the deepest part of society to prevent citizens from becoming radicalized. The government, therefore establish a surveillance system within society. For example, the surveillance act in 2015 aims to control the information shared on the Internet through black boxes to find signs of radicalization in individuals. This law is once again an invasion of the privacy of French citizens, and it is unclear whether the government will use the information gathered only in the fight against terrorism. The surveillance Law illustrates how the fight against radicalization intrudes into all areas of society, depriving individuals of some of their freedoms. While it is a law that targets all French people using the Internet, the government is implementing policies that attack the freedoms of some individuals.

Today, terrorism is an Islamic terrorism. However, through the fight against terrorism, the government makes the amalgam between Islam and terrorism. Within the fight against radicalization, the State will look for signs of radicalization, making the connection between Islam and terrorism. The Law against separatism aims to fight any form of communitarianism. France is a secular country, and religion must be manifested within the limits of the respect of public order. However, the approach of secularism is today used to harden a discourse stigmatizing the country's Muslim community. The Law against separatism attacks the associative, sporting, political domains (...) of society by attacking the freedoms of Muslims.

The Islamophobia discourse in France is not new but is rooted in the colonial discourse of France. It is a racial discourse that the French intellectual elite propagated to justify, among other things, the French presence abroad. However, this colonial discourse persists because the French government has still not apologized to the

formerly colonized countries and has still not put in place a work of memory that would allow for the change of the colonial imaginary and transform the discourse.

Moreover, today the Islamophobia security discourse is relayed by the extreme right. The extreme right ideas are firmly taken up, and the party of the extreme right, the Rassemblement National, gains ground at each new election. It manages to mobilize public opinion and influence the political agenda.

Many emblematic figures of the extreme right take up the theory of the Great Replacement. It is a racist theory re-popularized by Renaud Camus, who defends France's idea of living through a substitution of the French population by a non-European population, primarily from sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb. This population change would imply a change of civilization, destroying France's history, culture, and values.

A critical historical element of this substitution is decolonization and the end of the Algerian war. It is the beginning of the loss of influence of France abroad and, therefore, the end of its primacy. At the end of the Algerian war, the last migrations coming from the former colony are pointed out and lived with mistrust. The end of the Algerian War was a defeat for the extreme right and the beginning of mobilizing a more virulent discourse towards Arab migrants. The relationship between the Muslim presence in France and preserving a colonial memory is essential in the extreme right's rhetoric and actions.

Terrorism marks for the extreme right the last decadence of the theory of the Great Replacement. France is being targeted directly on its grounds. These attacks are viewed as retaliation by formerly colonial countries. They foresee a civil war between immigrants and the French.

If the theory of the Great Replacement is not taken back explicitly by all the adherents of the extreme right, their speech is strongly influenced by this theory.

The fight against terrorism has continually deepened the power of the government, taking over the freedoms of citizens. It is a situation that we find between the period of the Algerian War and from 2015. However, the true discourse does not revolve around terrorism and security but around the issue of Muslims. The fight against terrorism shows us the failures of French society. It has become a viral diffusion of hate. The notion that terrorism is an attack on our "values" can be accepted or rejected. However, French ideals are threatened by the response to these attacks, not by the attacks themselves.

References

- Abdelkhalek, H., Saidani, Y., 2020. Attentats de janvier 2015 : un procès pour les 17 victimes. Franceinfo.
- Agamben, G., 2015. De l'Etat de droit à l'Etat de sécurité | Global Research. Le Monde.
- Ageron, C.-R., 2005. Les Français devant la guerre civile algérienne. Histoire du Maghreb 495–512.
- Ageron, C.-R., 1976. L'Opinion française devant la guerre d'Algérie. Outre-Mers. Revue d'histoire 63, 256–285.
- Amghar, S., 2009. L'Europe, terre d'influence des Frères musulmans. Politique étrangère Eté, 377–388.
- Amghar, S., 2008. La France face au terrorisme islamique : une typologie du salafisme jihadiste, Qu'est-ce que le salafisme ? Presses Universitaires de France.
- Antiterrorisme : les députés étendent les motifs de fermeture administrative de lieux de culte, 2017. Le Monde.
- Article 11 - Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence. - Légifrance, n.d.
- Auffret, S., 2021. La loi « sécurité globale » définitivement adoptée par l'Assemblée nationale. Le Monde.
- Azzouzi, P.R.E., 2019. En France, «les origines de l'islamophobie sont coloniales».
- Bancel, N., Blanchard, P., Boubeker, A., 2015. 9. Les réactionnaires médiatiques : de la théorie du déclin à celle du « grand remplacement ». Cahiers libres 141–152.
- Benjamin Bruel, 2016. Qu'est-ce que l'article 49.3 ?
- Benraad, M., 2018. « C'est l'islamophobie qui alimente le jihadisme. ». Idées reçues, Jihad : des origines religieuses à l'idéologie 105–113.
- Bertrand Bissuel, 2016. Temps de travail, licenciement, prud'hommes : ce que contient le projet de loi d'El Khomri. Le Monde.

- Bigo, D., Hermant, D., 1986. Simulation et dissimulation. Les politiques de lutte contre le terrorisme en France. *Sociologie du Travail* 28, 506–526.
- Camus, C., 2007. La lutte contre le terrorisme dans les démocraties occidentales : État de droit et exceptionnalisme. *Revue internationale et stratégique* N°66, 9–24.
- Carte. Le terrorisme islamiste a tué 167 000 personnes en 40 ans, 2019. . Ouest-France.
- Catherine Le Brech, 2018. Algérie: de la conquête française à la colonisation. Franceinfo.
- Cécile Chambraud, 2021. Les sénateurs adoptent un « amendement UNEF » permettant de dissoudre les associations faisant des réunions non mixtes racisées.
- Ceyhan, A., 1998. Analyser la sécurité : Dillon, Waever, Williams et les autres. *Cultures & Conflits*.
- Chassignolles, P., 2016. Contre la radicalisation. *Archives de politique criminelle* n° 38, 137–148.
- Chemin, A., Johannès, F., Vincent, E., 2021. Derrière les tribunes de militaires, une opération politico-médiatique et un emballement. *Le Monde*.
- Chevallier, J., 2019. L'État de droit au défi de l'État sécuritaire, in: Bailleux, A., Bernard, D., Cartuyvels, Y., Dumont, H., Hachez, I., Misonne, D. (Eds.), *Le Droit Malgré Tout : Hommage à François Ost*, Collection Générale. Presses de l'Université Saint-Louis, Bruxelles, pp. 293–312.
- Chloé Leprince, Pierre Ropert, 2016. De Charonne à la loi Travail, une brève histoire du droit de manifester.
- Codaccioni, V., 2015. Justice d'exception. La cour de sûreté de l'Etat sous la Ve République: L'État face aux crimes politiques et terroristes. CNRS Editions.
- Davezac, R., 2003. Le terrorisme et l'évolution de l'opinion publique dans l'agglomération algéroise, 1er juin 1958-30 avril 1961, *Des hommes et des femmes en guerre d'Algérie*. Autrement.
- De Barros, F., 2005. Des « Français musulmans d'Algérie » aux « immigrés ». *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 159, 26–53.

- Derder, P., 2012. L'Humanité censuré. 1954-1962, un quotidien dans la guerre d'Algérie | Musée national de l'histoire de l'immigration
- Dubuisson, F., 2017. La définition du « terrorisme » : débats, enjeux et fonctions dans le discours juridique. *Confluences Méditerranée* N° 102, 29–45.
- Elise, Vincent, 2020. Une menace terroriste désormais plus « endogène » que « projetée » de l'étranger. *Le Monde*.
- Esma Ben Said, 2017. De la guerre d'Algérie à l'islamophobie, histoire d'un racisme à la française
- Fieschi, C., 2020. Muslims and the secular city: How right-wing populists shape the French debate over Islam. *Brookings*.
- Fourquet, J., Lebourg, N., 2017. “La nouvelle guerre d'Algérie n'aura pas lieu” - *Le Point*.
- FranceCulture, n.d. Le grand remplacement, un virus français (2/5) : le Front National. *Mécaniques du Complotisme*.
- Franck Johannes, 2015. Loi sur le renseignement : le Conseil constitutionnel « filtre le moustique et laisse passer le chameau ».
- François, S., 2016. L'extrême-droite et la violence politique. *Humanisme* N° 313, 51–56.
- Frédéric Bobin, 2021. En « facilitant » l'accès aux archives de la guerre d'Algérie, Macron poursuit sa politique des « petits pas » sur la réconciliation mémorielle.
- Fressoz, F., 2020. « Le quinquennat d'Emmanuel Macron est, depuis son origine, marqué par l'agressivité ». *Le Monde*.
- Gagné, D., 2019. La réponse sécuritaire à la radicalisation islamique : Étude de cas en France (Essai). Université de Sherbrooke.
- Geisser, V., 2021. Un séparatisme « venu d'en haut ». *Migrations Societe* N° 183, 3–15.
- Gouvernement, n.d. Comprendre le terrorisme
- Harris Interactive, 2021. Réactions des Français à la tribune des militaires dans *Valeurs Actuelles*. Paris.

- Heymann-Doat, A., 2016. L'état d'urgence, un régime juridique d'exception pour lutter contre le terrorisme ? Archives de politique criminelle n° 38, 59–74.
- Houda Asal, 2014. Islamophobie : la fabrique d'un nouveau concept. État des lieux de la recherche | Cairn.info. Sociologie 13 à 29.
- Hubert, N., 2012. 1. Éditer pour contrôler : littérature nationaliste, littérature parapublique et littérature militaire dans les années 1950. Histoire du Maghreb 23–64.
- Janisch, W., Roger, P., Wieder, T., Ulrich, S., 2016. « L'Etat de droit reste le fondement de l'Union européenne ». Le Monde.
- Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, 2016. Un état d'urgence permanent, mais pour quel résultat ? Le Monde.
- Jean-François, G., David, S., 2006. Le terrorisme, Presses Universitaires de France. ed, Que sais-je ?
- Joel Saget, 2019. Le polémiste Eric Zemmour reprend la thèse complotiste du « grand remplacement ». OuestFrance.
- Julia Pascual, 2017. Quand l'état d'urgence rogne le droit de manifester. Le Monde.
- Julia Pascual, 2016. Les interdictions de manifester jugées sur le fond pour la première fois. Le Monde.
- Julia Pascual, Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, 2017. Un an, 11 mois et 18 jours d'état d'urgence. Le Monde.
- Julien Bouissou, 2020. La France s'oppose à l'accord entre l'Union européenne et le Mercosur. Le Monde.
- Kellner, A.M., 2017. Democracy and Terrorism – Experiences in Coping with Terror Attacks 48.
- Koehler, D., 2016. Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Current Developments and Issues for the Future. PRISM 6, 84–105.
- Kourliandsky, J. J., 2016. Attentats de 2015 en France: sécurité globalisée et repli diplomatique. Desafios 28, 413–424.

- La rédaction, 2019. État d'urgence et autres régimes d'exception (article 16, état de siège). ViePublique.
- La rédaction numérique de RTL, 2014. FN : Jean-Marie Le Pen se rallie à la thèse du "Grand remplacement." RTL.
- Lacroix, I., 2018. Radicalisations et jeunesse 94.
- Laurent Ribadeau Dumas, 2015. 17 octobre 1961: la «sanglante répression» d'une manifestation d'Algériens.
- Le Monde, 2016. Loi travail : plusieurs opposants interdits de manifester. Le Monde.
- Legros, C., 2020. « Après les attentats de 2015, on a vu une opinion publique de plus en plus ouverte à l'égard des minorités ». Le Monde.
- Les arrêtés anti-burkini pris en France favorisent la « stigmatisation » des musulmans, selon l'ONU, 2016. Le Monde.
- Loi contre les séparatismes : le Sénat serre la vis à l'université, 2021. Le Figaro.
- Loi Travail: le projet rejeté par 74% des Français - L'Express, 2016.
- Lutte contre le terrorisme : C'est quoi la surveillance par algorithme que souhaite mettre en place le gouvernement ?, 2021. 20 Minutes.
- Martin, V., Simonin, A., Vo-Ha, P., 2021. « Que des militaires en mal de pouvoir prennent leurs désirs pour une réalité renseignée sur l'état d'une partie de l'armée ». Le Monde.
- Michel Lascombe, 2020. DALLOZ Etudiant - Actualité: Les états d'urgence : l'état d'urgence et l'état d'urgence sanitaire.
- Moine, A., 2017. Les aspirations à l'État et au califat de l'« organisation État Islamique ». Civitas Europa N° 38, 127–152.
- Muelle, R., 1994. La guerre d'Algérie en France: 1954-1962. FeniXX.
- Olivier Roy : « Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste », 2015. Le Monde.

- Pascal Dupont, 2016. L'état d'urgence face au terrorisme. Revue Défense Nationale pages 17 à 21.
- Patrick Pesnot, n.d. Le Putsch d'Alger et la CIA. Rendez vous avec X...
- Pervillé, G., 2012. Les accords d'Evian (1962). Armand Colin.
- Pinon, S., 2021. Laïcité, que d'erreurs on commet en ton nom ! Pouvoirs N° 177, 143–151.
- PLENEL, E., 1986. La France et le terrorisme: la tentation du sanctuaire. Politique étrangère 51, 919–936.
- Pouthier, J.-L., 2015. La démocratie face au terrorisme. Etudes mars, 4–6.
- Projet de loi “Séparatisme” : comment les sénateurs ont durci le texte, entre “amendement Unef” et port du voile limité, 2021. France Info.
- Raflik, J., 2017. La France face au terrorisme d'hier à aujourd'hui. Outre-Terre N° 51, 202–214.
- Raphaëlle Besse Desmoulières, 2015. Etat d'urgence : « une marge de manœuvre bien trop large est offerte aux autorités ». Le Monde.
- Rousseau, D., 2006. L'état d'urgence, un état vide de droit(s). Revue Projet n° 291, 19–26.
- Séparatisme : le Sénat souhaite donner la possibilité aux maires d'interdire les drapeaux étrangers — RT en français, 2021.
- SOW, P.D., 2018. Contribution : Le terrorisme et l'impératif sécuritaire dans les démocraties occidentales. Teranga News.
- Stora, B., 2021. L'onde de choc des années algériennes en France: L'« Algérie française » et le Front national. Editions Esprit 13–28.
- Tournyol du Clos, S., 2008. L'étude du terrorisme en France : une recherche encore embryonnaire | Cairn.info 97–108.
- Truc, G., Le Bart, C., Née, É., 2018. L'attentat comme objet de discours : problématique et enjeux. Mots. Les langages du politique 9–18.

Vassallo, A., 2005. Introduction. Medias-Recherches 7–9.

Vaudano, M., Laurent, S., Dagorn, G., Maad, M., 2019. La théorie du « grand remplacement », de l'écrivain Renaud Camus aux attentats en Nouvelle-Zélande. Le Monde.

Vaurs-Chaumette, A.-L., 2014. DAECH, un « État » islamique ? Annuaire Français de Droit International 60, 71–89.

Violaine Morin, Mattea Battaglia, 2020. Après la mort de Samuel Paty, l'« enchaînement des faits » détaillé par l'inspection générale. Le Monde.

Vu de l'étranger. Pourquoi la France reste “la cible n°1” du terrorisme en Occident, 2018. . Courrier international.

Vu du Royaume-Uni. Cette France condamnée à l'état d'urgence permanent, 2017. Courrier international.