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Security and Climate Change linkage: Analyzing the European discourse until the Defence Roadmap

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INTRODUCTION

The field of security has been under redefinition since the early 1990s with the rise of new challenges and threats for the global community. Traditionally security is associated with military intervention in questions related to inter-state issues, but now societies and human collectives have become subjects of security policies. This shift has happened because concerns as climate change effects, illegal traffic of drugs, irregular movement of people, cybersecurity, and infectious diseases started to be considered a threat for the individuals and the society, requiring the states' intervention through adequate policies. These issues are characterized by the fact that they are non-military by nature, which does not mean that they cannot lead to war or armed conflict. They are not directly considered a threat to a state's existence, but they call into question the ability of a state to protect its citizens. Moreover, they tend to be transboundary, which makes it hard to define who should manage the issue and how.

Part of the literature on NTS has focused on "securitisation", a political process whose definition was given by the Copenhagen School, one of the most essential and controversial contributors. The members of the School mainly focused their theory on the role of the speech act "through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan & Waever, 2003). In this way a threat is the term of negotiation between the "securitising actor" and the "audience": while the former can only propose a specific representation of the issue, it is the audience that has the power to accept or not the proposal.

Nowadays, climate change is widely recognized as a NTS threat. A recent study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute revealed that 10 out of 21 UN Peace Operations were activated in countries with the highest exposure to climate change (SIPRI, 2021). In countries characterized by weak institutions, environmental disruption can exacerbate already existing conflicts. However, there are conflicts whose roots are directly identified in the climate change effects, as in the case of Darfur, for which the former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon officialized the link with climate.

Even though we are achieving a general recognition of the issue, the integration of climate change in security policies is still underdeveloped worldwide. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the position adopted by the European Union towards the inclusion of climate change in its security policy in light of the last development as the Green Deal and the Defence Roadmap. Therefore, the aim is to answer the following research question: To what extent does the EU address a non-traditional security threat as climate change in its security policy?

The question will be addressed by using securitisation theory to understand how climate change has been categorized, what policies have been proposed and which ones are adopted. In particular, the analysis will be focused on the two-stage process according to which a specific matter from being non-politicized becomes first politicized, so the state takes action to solve the issue and then securitized, that is when the state decides to take extraordinary actions for it (Emmers, 2010).

The thesis is structured according to the research question; the first chapter devolved to analyse how the concept of security has changed over time due to the rise of new challenges categorized as NTS. The focus is then shifted to the securitisation theory, through which the paper explains the process of framing a particular issue as a security threat able to require urgent measures to deal with it. The third and fourth chapters are dedicated to answering the research question by analysing the securitizing process in the European context through the two-stage process.

1. BACKGROUND

Nowadays, it is increasingly recognized the impact that climate change has on the security of the states and in the global order. It has the power to exacerbate already existing conflicts and give input to contestations between countries over the control of scarce natural resources.

Through the "climate security" concept, there is an attempt to capture the risks and threats to both humans and states that emanate from the adverse effects of climate change (Bremberg, Sonnsjö, & Mobjörk, The EU and climate-related security risks: a community of practice in the making?, 2019). The complexity is mainly because the climate effects are transboundary and can affect geographical, political, and sectoral boundaries. Among the regional organizations, the EU is one of the most active in seeking to address climate security to promote peace and security (Youngs, Climate Change and European Security, 2014).

The EU can be considered as the basis of peace and stability in Europe, connecting and coordinating 27 different Member States and at the same time is recognized by many as a promoter of international security outside its border. Concerning the external action, the EU's importance had expanded significantly after the Cold War between 1993 and 1999 when the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were established. The CSDP is included in the CFSP, and it concerns missions aimed at improving the rule of law, supporting third countries in the fight against terrorism and organized crime and strengthening police, and judicial authorities.

When the EU relates to climate change, not only it plays the role of an intergovernmental organization, but it is also a supranational entity since it can adopt and implement policies that can supersede national policy (Bremberg, 2018).

In 2011, the EEAS was established [1], and for the first time, a single institutional setting was created, putting together the Commission, the Council, and the Member States to carry out the CFSP (of which the CSDP is part) and to push for greater coherence in the

[1] Based on the *Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service.*

EU foreign and security policy. Because in terms of competence, the CFSP sees limited participation of the Commission and the EP in decision-making and legislative activity. Policies are implemented by the European Council (consisting of the Heads of States or Governments of the EU countries) and by the Council (consisting of a representative of each EU country at ministerial level). At the same time, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is the head of the EEAS while serving as vice-president of the EU Commission and is the permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council[2].

Looking at the internal development of climate security, at the time of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the environmental issue was not yet discussed. The first significant development came with an ECJ decision in 1971 known as the ERTA decision[3] which established that when the EU acquire competence to legislate internally, it also has the right to act externally in those subject that can affect the internal legislation.

From 1973, a series of Environmental Action Programmes (EAP) were released as non-binding plans. Through them, strategies and priorities were set for the EU environmental policymaking. However, officially a legal basis for the environmental policy in the primary legislation happened with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 together with the provision of Art. 130 of a legal basis for negotiating international environmental agreements[4]. Nevertheless, in 1990, with the Maastricht Treaty, the EU gained the competence to conclude international environmental agreements making them bind for the Member States.

Since 2009, according to Art. 4 of the TFEU, the competence is shared between the EU and the Member States. This sharing can become a weakness when, as in environmental negotiations, procedures take much time because several interlocutors can change since the EU presidency lasts only six months, and there is a risk of losing credibility. However, as will be widely illustrated in the paper, the European presence in climate negotiations is highly recognized, evidences can be found by looking at the numerous agreements reached until now.

[2] Today the position is held by Joseph Borrell, who succeeded Federica Mogherini in 2019.
[3] Addressed cross-border transportation policy issues inside the EU: Case 22/70 Re the European Road Transport Agreement: EC Commission v. EC Council 1971 ELR 60-79
[4] Art. 130r (5) SEA: "Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with the relevant international organizations".

All this development and implementation of the legal basis helped establish environmental policy within the EU and increased the authority of the supranational European Commission (Damro, Hardie, & MacKenzie, 2008).

As an authoritative regional point at the national and international levels, the overall position provides the Union with significant opportunities to influence climate change policy, explaining the prominent role in national, regional, and international climate change policymaking (Damro, Hardie, & MacKenzie, 2008).

Even if the climate issue entered the political agenda nearly a decade ago it was never a priority for the Union due to the financial crisis and the institutional changes that occurred with the Lisbon Treaty. In the last years we can see how European policymakers started to focus more on the security, stability, and migration challenges of neighbouring countries (Stang & Dimsdale, 2017). The environment is now at the centre of the political agenda, as proved by the programme of the new Commission lead by Ursula von der Leyen, who made the new EU Green Deal the base for her mandate. The EU is putting itself as a promoter of the fight against climate change and the relative security challenges as indicated directly by the text with the following words:

"The EU also recognises that the global climate and environmental challenges are a significant threat multiplier and a source of instability. […] The EU will work with all partners to increase climate and environmental resilience to prevent these challenges from becoming sources of conflict, food insecurity, population displacement, and forced migration, and support a just transition globally. Climate policy implications should become an integral part of the EU's thinking and action on external issues, including in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy." (European Commission, The European Green Deal, 11 December 2019)

2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

To talk about climate security is first necessary to explore how security discussion has changed over time to include new challenges and concepts. An analysis of this new set of issues is necessary to see how the traditional definition of security was enriched by their presence.

Therefore, this chapter will explain how and when the security concept changed, followed by a focus on the definition and identification of NTS. The analysis will continue with an overview of the theory of securitisation, starting from the origins of the Copenhagen School and highlighting which are the main subjects and factors involved. The core of the analysis is then shifted to the individuation and analysis of the stages through which a securitising process is developed, which is fundamental for answering the research question focused on climate change in the third paragraph.

2.1 The changing concept of security

Security is defined as "the state of being free from danger or threat; […] a state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear and anxiety"[5]. Since threats and danger can have different natures, there are several dimensions in which security can be conceptualized. Generally, security is associated with "the alleviation of threats to cherished values; especially those which, if left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future" (Williams P. D., 2012).

During the Cold war, security was mainly perceived, if not exclusively, in terms of military security to maintain a balance among the European superpowers. Therefore, economic issues were considered only as a supplement to the pressure given by military threats until the 60s, when economic relations between the members of the Atlantic Alliance gained importance. This period was so signed by decreasing importance of military threats overtaken by economic issues that became the priority of the diplomatic discourse.

[5] Oxford English Dictionary

The core conception of traditional security was eliminated from the international system according to the absence of a traditional enemy and the necessity to redefine the concept of security after the end of the bipolar world (Khan, 2011). The formation of the United Nations signed the "outlawing" of the use of offensive military forces by UN member-states by limiting their use only for self-defence and collective security. The frequency of inter-state and civil wars has decreased compared to the 20th century, but according to the World Bank, in 2016, more countries experienced violent conflict than in the last 30 years[6] (World Bank, 2018), and the conflicts are becoming more fragmented. For example, looking at the Syrian civil war, the number of armed groups has increased exponentially since the beginning of the conflict. Furthermore, the new century has been characterized by the rise of the power of non-state actors (organized crime networks and terrorist groups) posing a more significant threat to national security than external military pressures (Divya, 2014). Since the start of the 21st century, it has been estimated that organized crime is roughly the same number of killings as all armed conflicts across the world combined[7] (UNODC, 2019).

The presence of nuclear weapons is a constant global threat, and even if the effective number of these arms has dropped after the Cold War[8], the new generation is more powerful. At the same time, the relation between nuclear-armed countries is increasingly fragile. As expressed last September by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres during the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, there is a fear of slipping back into bad habits that can lead the world "hostage to the threat of nuclear annihilation."

[6] The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 2017 covers the years 1946 to 2016, records all state-based conflicts in which at least one side is a government of a state resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. UCDP data that record nonstate and one-sided violence that results in at least 25 conflict-related deaths in a calendar year cover 1989 to 2016.

[7] It is estimated that an average of roughly 65,000 killings every year were related to organized crime and gangs over the period 2000–2017 and that up to 19 percent of all homicides recorded globally in 2017 were related to organized crime and gangs (Global Study on Homicide, 2019. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf)

[8] From a peak of approximately 70,300 in 1986 to an estimated 13,100 in early-2021. Of these, nearly 9,600 are in the military stockpiles (the rest are awaiting dismantlement), of which some 3,800 warheads are deployed with operational forces, of which up to 2,000 US, Russian, British and French warheads are on high alert, ready for use on short notice. (Update May 2021: https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)

Although these are only a part of the global armed challenges faced today, other factors can come up with the ability to cause armed conflicts between or within states, or that can affect a state's values and interests. Since the early 80s, together with the recognition that military threats remain the core of international security concerns since they affect all the essential functions of a state, other four sectors of security started to be involved: political (political issues can lead to a weakening of a state making it more vulnerable to a coup), economic (possible consequences on the security of a country in the presence of a declining economy), societal (contact with more prominent cultures or religions can be a threat for the security), and ecological (nature degradation can affect the physical part of a state). Therefore, the state must be recognized as the main subject to be secured, but the value of individuals and the international system must be included as well (Buzan B. , 1991).

Therefore, globalisation and the increasing number of international organizations can be considered as the reason why the historical security debate from being focused on traditional military threats has shifted towards the inclusion of non-traditional ones.

2.1.1 Non-Traditional Security threats

A broad consensus on a unique definition of the difference between traditional and non-traditional threats does not exist since they are often decided based on the context in which they manifest (Caballero-Anthony, 2016). According to Terriff et al., non-traditional threats have no geographical boundaries and are non-state centred, but most importantly, they cannot be faced through traditional security policies (Terriff, 2007). Though these threats are non-military by nature, it does not mean that they cannot lead to armed conflicts or, in some cases, to wars (e.g., conflicts for lack of water or oil). It is fundamental to consider that nowadays, destabilizing events can arise not only from other states but also within them or through non-state actors. A nation's security and sovereignty require more than territorial control: protecting citizens' basic rights has become fundamental.

Following the definition given by M. Caballero-Anthony[9], NTS are characterized by several common elements here listed, which makes them different from the traditional ones (Caballero-Anthony, 2015):

- Non-military for nature
- They are not consequences of states competition or power shifts.
- Threats gather from the impact of humans on the environment, causing imbalances that affect states and societies.
- Consequences originated from these threats are usually difficult to reverse.
- The adoption of solutions at the national level is generally ineffective, a reason why multilateral cooperation must face them.
- The states are flanked by the respect of individuals, making it one of the objectives of security.

In the face of the events occurring in the last decades, it is no longer possible to talk about "national sovereignty" since most threats have transboundary effects. The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) identifies three essential pillars for the new global challenges: "today's threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels." (UN H.L.P., 2004). Following this definition, the report went on by stating that "No State, no matter how powerful, can by its efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today's threats" (UN H.L.P., 2004). By only looking at the spread of COVID-19, considered as the single largest security disrupter of this century in a non-traditional sense (Chakrabarti, 2021), it is possible to understand how boundaries do not exist anymore.

Several NTS threats are affecting all the countries in the world nowadays: climate change, cybersecurity, food and water scarcity, pandemics, and irregular movement of people. We can consider these as NTS Threats since not only do they transcend national boundaries, go beyond the military sphere, are unpredictable and unexpected, with both internal and external elements and ramifications but also, they are frequently interwoven with traditional security threats (Craig, 2007).

[9] Caballero-Anthony, M. (Ed.). (2015). An introduction to non-traditional security studies: a transnational approach. Sage.

The trade of illicit drugs is another example of a non-traditional transboundary threat to security able to affect "hard" and "soft" security carrying the most considerable economic, societal, and political consequences in many areas (Swanström, 2010). Not only it impacts society through addiction, crime, and disease, but it also requires the intervention of traditional military assistance since it can lead to terrorism and insurgency. The Greater Central Asian region is particularly affected by illicit drugs traffic mainly caused by the opium production in Afghanistan and heroin traffic from post-Soviet Central Asia to China, Europe, and Russia. The region suffers from a weak state composition, enabling organized crimes and extremism to interfere and grow preventing any attempt to tackle the problem.

These examples explain the necessity for cooperation and coordination among the states and between the state and non-state actors since only working together tackle the effect of these new challenges becomes possible. During the Asian financial crisis, Southeast Asian countries had to ask the international community for assistance in stabilizing their currencies. Countries like China and Japan, and international financial institutions, contributed to slow the deterioration of the situation. The crisis led to the establishment of various arrangements aimed at strengthening the financial security in the region, like the Chiang Mai Initiative[10] (Caballero-Anthony, 2016).

2.2 Securitisation

The conceptualization of security politics known as "securitisation" was first presented in the Working Paper "Security the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of the World" in 1989 by Ole Wæver. Based in the Copenhagen Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Wæver, together with other members as Buzan and de Wilde, developed a constructivist

[10] Lunched in May 2000 by the ASEAN+3 countries represent the first regional currency swap arrangement with the aim to solve the short-term liquidity difficulties in the region and to sustain the existing international financial arrangements.

approach to security, publishing a series of works[11] with the aim to expand the conceptual understanding of securitisation as well as its practical application. The Copenhagen school (CS) is not the only one focusing on security studies: the general approach to the theory comes from encounters with other two leading schools and several scholars. The first contact was between the CS and the Aberystwyth scholars, followed by the encounter with the Paris School, these two sets of meetings have resulted in an increasingly institutionalized platform for discussing security issues (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006). While development between the Aberystwyth School and the CS was mainly within the international relations field involving the voice of experts in strategic studies and peace research, the works of Paris's researchers varied, including political sociology, law, and criminology. What bound them together was an interest in the politicization of societal insecurities and for the internal security field.

2.2.1. The Securitisation in the literature and the definition of Threat

The idea of securitisation is based on Wæver's argument that a security issue does not normally exist objectively out there but is constructed discursively (Haacke & Williams, 2008). Furthermore, based on the Buzan concept, the application of security should be widened beyond the military sector to include the political, economic, societal, and environmental fields (Buzan B. , 1991). These two exponents of the Copenhagen School, together with de Wilde, defined the process of securitisation as: "when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is "normal politics," we have a case of securitisation" (Wæver, Buzan, & de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1998). Therefore, security does not emerge as a consequence of objective circumstances but because an authoritative actor decides to activate to identify the issue as such. Generally, securitisation theory addresses three main questions: What makes something a security issue? What kind of responses does this call for? What are the specific consequences of agreeing that something is a threat? (Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka, 'Securitization' revisited: theory and cases, 2016).

[11] Including a book on societal security in Europe, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda (1993) and Security: A New Framework of Analysis (1998).

The issue of migrants can be considered as an example of applying this theory in terms of the type of approach assumed towards immigrants and asylum seekers by democratic states. Following the previous analysis about NTS, although the immigrants' issue can be evaluated as a non-traditional issue for a state, the attempts to solve the issue require traditional practices as military intervention. Since 2001 immigrants and asylum seeker started to be considered a threat to the sovereignty and identity of the states, and the securitisation approach helps to understand the occurring dynamics. Generally, there is a choice to characterise them as a threat; from one side, it is part of the communication of political leaders to domestic audiences, and from the other, it is used as a justification to use emergency measures and to suspend settled rules (McDonald, 2008). The securitisation of migration emerges from the correlation of successful speech acts of political leaders, the consequent mobilization they create for and against defined groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals (policeman, intelligence services, providers of technologies) (Bigo, 2002).

Despite the Copenhagen School's has been fundamental for the development of security studies, its approach to securitisation has often been criticized for being too limited, too focused upon the speech act and thus not serving a useful purpose in studying of real-world situations (Does, 2013). Balzacq categorizes the Copenhagen school as a "philosophical" one, where the language is the core concept, and just by saying something is enough to have it done, this makes the security a speech act. The author proposes another form of securitisation oriented towards a "sociological" vision where securitisation is considered as a strategic process that cannot be disconnected by "practices, context and power relations that characterize the construction of threat images" (Balzacq, 2011).

The reliance only on the language by the Copenhagen School is considered a burden by many scholars, mostly because by focusing only on words, other forms of bureaucratic practices or physical actions that are part of the process but not of the speech, are excluded (McDonald, 2008). Several authors have proposed including images as instruments for the securitisation process, asking if a theory based only on words can address security problems in a world where political communication is constructed on images and televisual communication. Williams, consider the images from the terroristic attack of 11 September as fundamental for the development of security

perceptions and threat in the US environment, and raised questions about how the role of images has been involved in structuring understandings of the appropriate response. Any theory based on the social impact of communicative action must analyse the impact that different mediums of communication can have on the acts, their impacts, and their influence on the securitisation processes (Williams M. C., 2003).

Another link between images and security has been provided by Hansen, who considers political cartoons as the visual genre most explicitly linked to textual political discourse. A consideration that is confirmed by the fact that cartoonists are not considered artists but journalists or columnists and because cartoons are expected to articulate a political message not a document (Hansen, 2007). The author focused on the example of the 2005 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in the Danish newspaper *Jyllandsposten*, after which Danish politicians were surprised by the violent reaction with embassies attacks in Damascus, Beirut, Teheran, and Kabul and the boycott of the Danish products. *The New York Times* defined the situation as "one of the hottest issues in international politics" and commentators started to ask if it could be considered as the premonition of a civilizational war.

It must be said that the Copenhagen School acknowledges that the consideration of only the language is too narrow. For example, the three funders stated that it is not the word "security" that makes a speech a security one, but the broader rhetorical performance of which is part and the definition of a threat requiring emergency actions and the audience acceptance. However, this aspect of securitisation theory remains almost wholly undeveloped.

Another criticism about the School regards the excessive focus on finding the moment when an issue becomes important for the securitisation: it may be the point when a speech act is held, or when the audience agrees with the designation of the issue as a threat, or even when extraordinary measures are taken. The definition of the exact moment can be primarily problematic because there are cases where the securitisation occurs after a long time and not because of a dramatic event. The School's theory tends to avoid the analysis of the general context in which the securitisation process happens, while often these discourses on security are the product of historical structures and processes, of conflicts between powers and groups of the society (Lipschutz, 1995).

2.2.2. Actors

At this point, it is possible to identify several concepts that are involved in the process starting from the securitizing actor, which is the agent through which a securitizing move presents a particular issue as a threat; the referent subject (entity in object causing the threat); the referent object that is the entity subjected to the threat; the audience to which is addressed the message in order to obtain an agreement. A deeper analysis of these actors involved will be given in the next section.

Referent Object

According to the theory, the referent object is the subject currently threatened, whose survival is challenged. In this context, is necessary to define how a threat, according to the definition above, becomes the object of securitisation, considering that security does not involve only military issues problems but every sector of social life. According to the theory, an issue to become object of a securitisation process does not need to respect certain features but derives from the interaction between the securitizing actor and the audience (Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka, 'Securitization' revisited: theory and cases, 2016). Buzan and Waever established that to be the object of securitisation, a threat must pose a danger to the survival of the referent object (Buzan & Waever, 2003). By using the word "survival", a high level of importance is given to the issue since it allows the use of "extraordinary means", but as pointed out by the authors, the essential quality of existence varies among the sectors as well as the nature of existential threats (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). Furthermore, the object of securitisation is not to push the adoption of extraordinary measures to save the referent object but to give resonance to a platform from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures that otherwise would not be adopted (Buzan & Waever, 2003). Also, the securitising actor may decide to adopt political solutions rather than extraordinary ones, but it does not mean that the securitising process has failed or that the issue is less threatening (Collins, 2005).

Therefore, considering Buzan' 5 sectors of security for what concern the political sector, the sovereignty and ideology of the state can be "existentially threatened" by the recognition and legitimacy of the governing authority while in the economic sector, is

not easy to define the effect of a threat since a negative trend does not necessarily constitute a threat. While in the societal sector, it is difficult to differentiate existential from lesser threats; nevertheless, when collective identities are the referent object, like migrants, identities may be seen as posing possible existential threats.

Securitising actor

Following Waeber the securitising actor is defined as the subject that makes the argument about a threat to the referent object. Actorness is simply a property deducible from the speech act (Webber, 2019); usually, politicians have the authority because they occupy positions in the government with the power to speak on behalf of the state.

We talk about collective securitisation when the actor in question acts on behalf of other empowered actors who may have individual securitising imperatives. This means that it is necessary aggregation of the multiple securitisations and give them authoritative articulation, which is typical of international organisation (Sperling & Webber, The European Union: security governance and collective securitisation, 2018). According to Sperling and Webber it is possible to identify two forms of collective securitisation: the first is a "thin variant" where a state or a small number of states presents its/their security issues within an international organisation. By doing so, the aim is to find a receptive audience among other regional actors so that more than one government claiming the same development for a security issue that will empower the international organization to give a general voice about the issue and to take the needed actions but without leaving any autonomy or agency. This is the case of the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian National.

Nevertheless, the audience for collective securitisation in these cases remains limited to state representatives (ministries, leaders and senior officials) because of the lack of public spheres in many regions involved (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The second variant is defined as "thick", and unlike the first one, the international organisation not only is separate from the member states, but it also has a degree of autonomy. In this case, the international organization has legal and political authority that allows the formulation of standard policies and can establish a common security idea.

Therefore, NATO can be used as an example to show that not only the single states can play the role of securitising actor, but collectives as well. The Alliance played the role

of collective securitisation agent in the context of the Ukraine question. Since Russia's annexation of Crimea, in spring 2014, NATO started to consider Russia a threat in its speeches and consequently found the justification to adopt measures in response. The annexation was seen as a danger for the European international order, order for which NATO positioned itself as a guardian. Therefore, the Ukraine crisis ended up with Russia being explicitly identified as a source of threat triggering a process of collective securitisation by the Alliance (Sperling & Webber, 2017).

Audience

While the actor can only propose a certain recognition and representation, the audience decides whether this proposal is accepted as a common narrative (Stritzel, 2007).

Audience identification is a case-specific consideration: it varies across different instances of securitisation. Therefore, it is possible to define the audience as "the individual or group that has the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practice" (Côté, 2016). This definition allows the contextualization of the audience within different environments and highlights the characteristic of "capability". Capability because the audience can execute two main functions: provision of moral support and the supply to the securitising actor with a formal mandate (Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka, 'Securitization' revisited: theory and cases, 2016). According to Balzacq (2005), the more congruent the moral and formal supports are, the more likely the securitisation process will be successful, but the two should not be conflated. Their distribution is unequal and depends on the target audience, so for example, if the object of securitisation is a war against another country in response to a perceived/real threat, moral support is needed from the public and the institutional bodies. However, even if moral support is necessary alone, it is not enough since, without proper support by the institutions that have the power to approve the use of force, policies cannot be adopted. Nevertheless, securitising agents always push to convince as much as possible a wide audience since they need to maintain a social relationship with the targeted group. Political officials are aware that winning formal support by breaking social bonds with constituencies can affect their credibility (Balzacq, 2005).

To this purpose, Roe provides evidence using the example of the decision by the British government to invade Iraq in 2003 to explain the different roles played by formal and moral support in the process. Even if the danger of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was recognized by both the securitizing actors (Tony Blair government and several securitizing audiences), an initial platform from which it was possible to legitimize the kind of emergency measures that Blair beloved necessary was not built. The general public was against the use of military force to invade Iraq and depose Saddam. The approval of emergency measures was only taken following the subsequent intersubjective establishment with both the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and opposition parties. Consequently, when it came down to actually 'doing' security in this way, although the masses did not matter too much, Parliament certainly did (Roe, 2008). This suggests that further reflection is needed to know if and how threats can become prevalent in society without explicit approval by the audience.

2.2.3. Stages of securitisation

The theory sees the securitisation process characterized by a security act, through which the adoption of extraordinary measures is asked, and by a political act that is a proper decision. This explanation of the securitisation process by the Copenhagen School can be analysed through a two-stage process (Figure 1): a specific matter from being non-politicized (the state is not involved at all) becomes first politicized, so the state takes action to solve the issue and then securitized, that is when the state decides to take extraordinary actions for it (Emmers, 2010).

Figure 1: Securitisation spectrum



Source: Emmers (2011)

Roe defines the first step as the "stage of identification" (rhetorical securitisation) and the second one as the "stage of mobilization" (active securitisation) (Roe, 2008). The separation is given because the author sustains that even if a given audience can agree with the securitising actor about the necessity to securitize a specific issue, it can be against the type of extraordinary measures taken to tackle it. In this way, the relationship between the audience and securitizing actors is based on defining if there should be formal or moral support and which aspect the audience should agree on. This can bring the securitising actor to rephrase the threats so that the audience can accept more easily, and policies can be adopted.

Referring to the above-mentioned invasion of Iraq, the first stage corresponds to Blair's successful politicization, while the second stage is characterized by the division of the public on the actualization of the policy. This is proof that even though the first stage is fundamental for the process, the stage of mobilization is the one that defines the success or failure of a security policy.

During the first stage, state or non-state actors identify an issue, a person, or a group as existential threats for a certain referent object, and they take it up to a national or international level so that it gains relevance. The essence of the first stage is the presentation of an issue as urgent and existential, so crucial that it should not be exposed to the normal dynamics of the politic but it should be tackled firmly by top leaders and presented as a "supreme priority" in order to enable securitising actors to

deal with them prior to other matters (Does, 2013). This is why, as already explained, the theory considers security a "self-referential practice" since an issue simply by being transformed into a threat becomes a security question without any objective analysis of its effective existence.

Non-state actors have gained importance during the years, elites within the general population can initiate the securitising move and push for public revolts, but the process seems to remain in the hands of the governments since they have the privilege to influence the audience. This privilege is used, for example, in authoritarian regimes through the control, by the government, of the information coming from the elite: the securitising move is received by an uncritical audience, and alternative actors do not find a space where express themselves. Meanwhile, in a democratic government, governing elites are privileged since the people elect them, and they can decide to adopt extraordinary measures, but this does not mean that the audience must accept the government's interpretation (Collins, 2005).

The second step is fundamental because it requires the persuasion of the individuals about the relevance and the urgency with which the issue should be solved through extraordinary measures. This is when security does not emerge as a consequence of objective analysis but because an authoritative actor has identified the issue as such (M.Webber, 2019).

If the securitising move is rejected, the securitisation process fails. Therefore, securitisation requires an audience to accept that the presence of an existential threat justifies breaking existing rules or applying an emergency solution. Securitisation is thus intersubjective and distinct from the mere politicization of an issue (Haacke & Williams, 2008).

2.2.4. The Role of the Speech

In Waever first concept, security is equated with a speech act, while the process of securitisation refers to how an issue is linguistically portrayed as an existential threat (Does, 2013). The author argue that a security issue does not just exist objectively, but it is constructed discursively; therefore, a "speech act" is required to make something a security issue. Lately, Buzan started to evaluate audiences' role by considering speech

acts as “securitising moves” that became securitisations through audience consent. The emphasis in the framework is shifted from speech acts as productive of security to speech acts as one component of the inter-subjective construction of security (McDonald, 2008).

Securitising actors use speeches as a tool to convey the message of emergency, and as explained by Bourbeau: “speech acts do not simply describe an existing security situation; through their act or practice component, they actually (re)define a given issue as a security question” (Bourbeau, 2014). Furthermore, according to the author, security speeches are not the only initiators of securitisation process since there are occasions during which speech acts only seek to legitimise established security practices.

Buzan defines two conditions through which a speech or a securitisation move can be successful and accepted by an audience. The first one belongs to an internal context since it refers to the linguistic-grammar form used, which defines how an existential threat is presented. According to the author, the speech must follow a security form and construct a plot that includes existential threats, point of no return, and possible way out. The second condition is external and refers to speakers’ authority and to the threat itself. The speaker that possesses the right power can affect the likelihood that the public will approve the speech and its consequences. Another external condition is linked to the threat, which should be generally recognized and perceived as such to be easily accepted, i.e., tanks or polluted waters. For these reasons, a successful speech is a combination of language and society (Buzan, 1998). Security speech acts must follow the grammar of security, securitising actors must possess social capital and power to legitimise their securitising moves, and the audience of a security speech act must accept proposed securitising moves as legitimate.

For utterances to lead to specific actions, the hearer must deliberate first between the sentence’s meaning and the speaker’s meaning (Balzacq, 2005). By “sentence’s meaning” the reference refers to the semantic aspect associated with the words expressed, while “speaker’s meaning” includes those aspects of the language as metaphors, images and metonymies used by the speaker. According to Balzacq, securitisation is better understood as a strategic practice that occurs following a series of circumstances as the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience and the ability of the

speaker and listener to stimulate interaction. Indeed, securitisation includes much more than language strictly understood as a speech act, including "various artifacts" such as emotions, stereotypes, gestures, and silence.

These conditions were never fully developed and remain undertheorized (Baele & Thomson, 2017). Although the acceptance by the audience remains the primary condition for a successful securitisation, there is a lack of demonstration that proves the effects that securitizing discourse has on the targeted audience (Guzzini, 2011).

2.3 Methodology

This chapter will explain the methodology used for the thesis by explaining the chosen research design and how the materials and information were collected and analysed.

2.3.1 Research Design

After a general overview of the process of securitisation applicable to non-traditional challenges, the study proceeds to consider the European Union security policy for climate change as a case study, based on qualitative research of material.

The study aims to evaluate the securitizing process of climate change in the EU through policy analysis by looking at the different types of policies proposed and eventually adopted and their effects.

The choice of the EU is mainly given by the fact that it recognized that climate change is a prominent issue of concern nowadays. The Union has become an agent of securitisation during the years by engaging in multiple speech acts where climate change was presented as a security threat. Furthermore, the actual Commission programme is particularly focused on the EU Green Deal, a plan that made the Union a leading promoter of a change towards a more sustainable future at global level, with the ambitious objective of a carbon-neutral Union by 2050.

2.3.2 Material Collection and Analysis

Mainly the material used for the thesis comes from primary sources like official reports released by the EU and international organizations. Among these documents, there are public statements and policy documents to define the inclusion of climate change in them. These primary sources are implemented by secondary ones, like research papers, books, and articles, for a more critical vision of the process.

The analysis will be structured following the above-mentioned two-stage process proposed by Emmers. Therefore, the documents will be firstly analysed to determine how the issue from being non-politicized has become the object of interest and policies of the Union. The inclusion of climate change in these documents/speeches will define how progressively the issue has become part of the European agenda, but most importantly will be the evaluation of the way the issue has been treated, how the actors talked about it and with which emphasis. The aim is not to study the gap between the practical policies and solutions adopted following these acts but essentially to evaluate if a securitisation process occurred in the European context. This means that the research is focused on knowing if policies like the EU Green Deal can be considered the successful outcome of a securitisation process of climate change.

The collected material will be analysed by using qualitative methods with the support of the theoretical framework. The theory of securitisation included in the theoretical framework will explain how the climate change issue entered the European picture. Principles proposed by Wæver, Buzan, and de Wilde about how security is modelled around the power of a speech will be used to analyse this case study. However, the Copenaghen School theory will not be the only source of analysis, the general literature of securitisation theory will be the tool to study the European case.

3. STAGE OF IDENTIFICATION

The Copenhagen School made clear the risk of securitisation by making a distinction between politicization and securitisation. The former where "the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations" (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998) and the latter as the issue presented as a threat and used to justify the use of extraordinary measures. When the process is about environmental security, the School suggest considering the "side effects of applying a mindset of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization", this is why the authors suggest more politics rather than security (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998).

The result of securitisation cannot be considered synonymous with an issue becoming security; it is more than this because it also reveals that the securitising actor wants to respond with measures outside the normal political process (Collins, 2005). This justifies the division between the politicization stage, where an *issue* is defined as a security one and securitisation.

3.1 Global recognition of climate change as a threat

The global climate securitisation has been traced back to 1988 when a conference about "The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security" was held in Toronto (Davoudi, 2014), during which climate change consequences were judged to be second only to nuclear war. From then on, the issues have always been presented as a global crisis and existential threat for individuals.

The UNFCCC, adopted during the Rio Conference in 1992, is the first global treaty on climate change that provides a framework for build international cooperation to fight climate change. It directly responded to the first assessment report proposed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)[12]. The UNFCCC established as objective the stabilization of the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) to a level that would

[12] IPCC is an independent body of the UN, formed in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). The IPCC provides Assessment Reports about the state of scientific, technical and socio-economic knowledge on climate change, as well as its impacts and risks.

"prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system," (Sands, 1992) setting different responsibilities for each of the Parties of the Convention.

The Kyoto protocol was officially adopted in December 1997 at COP3 (Conference of the Parties). It represents the application of the UNFCCC provisions since it commits OECD countries and the economies defined as "in transition" to reduce the GHG emission respecting the individual targets provided. The adoption of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol are generally considered the result of a securitisation speech process. Since then, securitising moves have increased recognising that these initiatives were insufficient due to the limited ratification and poor implementation (Dupont, 2019). Furthermore, starting from the Kyoto ratification, the EU leadership started to be seen as a relatively successful case of managing globalization since under the European stimulus, key countries, such as Russia, decided to sign the Protocol (Kelemen, 2010).

Globally, heads of government have regularly described climate change as an existential threat (Oels, 2012), and during the 2000s a relevant proliferation of reports highlighting the security dimensions of the issue came out. The UN Secretary-General's report *Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications* in 2009 is considered one of the most authoritative political declarations on the climate issue (Oels, 2012). In addition, highlighting the security implication of climate change marked the UNFCCC as the central UN body for climate change negotiations.

Indeed, from the mid-2000s it was possible to recognize the elevation of climate change to the domain of high and securitised politics also signed by the conferment, in 2007, of the Nobel Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC for their contribution to combating climate change (Dupont, 2019). This public recognition has been considered one the many factor that led to the fifteenth Conference of the Parties in 2009, where the aim was the definition and approval of a new agreement, a successor of Kyoto Protocol. The Conference ended up without a concrete result, and only after six years, the international community was able to agree on a shared plan known as the Paris Agreement with a specific proposal towards climate change (Oberthür, 2016). This Paris Agreement exceeded any expectation, and it is still considered one of the main achievements for multilateralism and climate governance: together with the establishment of limits for the emission of GHG, it gave a pattern for implementing the

cooperation on climate change. For the first time, all the countries were willing to act through nationally determined action plans the achieve the objective settle by the protocol.

The protocol has been object of many critics, negotiations and debates as in the US example where the Trump administration decided to left the Paris Agreement, followed by the Biden administration to get back to the Paris Climate Agreement in 2021. Nowadays, most of the population around the world share the vision of climate change as a threat to their life; result that can be partially attributed to the large amount of security statements spoken by authoritative actors, which in parallel led to an increase in the belief that governments are not doing enough to tackle the effects.

3.2 The EU as a climate security actor

The European Union is generally considered as an international actor, but with some peculiarity like the policy autonomy shared with its member states in trade, environment, and development policy. In terms of defence and foreign policy, this autonomy lacks due to the member state's prerogatives. The authoritative power of the EU can be found in the treaty's provisions (Maastricht, Nice, Lisbon and Amsterdam), where the necessary competencies to play the role of securitising actor are defined.

The new security issues mentioned in the second chapter demonstrates the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach when the EU is defined as an international security actor. The introduction of climate change reinforced the "human security" aspect, which has characterized the EU's official documents in the last years; likewise, it found itself facing illegal migration and terrorism as a new form of security challenges. For this reason, it has become fundamental to take account of non-CSDP instruments and policies to face these issues as the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the European Development Fund, which are external assistance instruments.

The recognition of these new threats not only pushed towards a redefinition of security concepts, but it made clear the need to establish new cooperation areas with other global and regional actors (di Floristella, 2013). The EU by using its soft power resources, diplomacy, and persuasion has pursued a "soft" leadership strategy since it cannot rely on its political and economic power to push other countries to fight climate change. This

approach reflect the vision of the EU as a civilian power in pursuit of rule-based global governance based on soft measures (Oberthur & Kelly, 2008).

In order to play the role of international security actor, the EU must obtain recognition by other states and non-state actors. An example to prove the influence of the EU as a security actor leading the discourse on climate change fight is the relationship with South-Eastern Europe. This area is considered one of the planet's "warming hot spots" [13], countries like Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro are encouraged to align with the EU targets and the EU actorness since it is part of the accession process. During the EU-Western Balkans Summit on May 2020, the parties agreed on the Zagreb Declaration where climate change has been explicitly mentioned considering that a prominent role must be given to the association of the region to the EU's climate-related ambitions (Rüttinger, van Ackern, Gordon, & Foong, 2021).

The European action towards climate change can be analysed by differentiating the internal action from the external one in international climate politics. For this reason, two are the possible audience to which the EU can address securitisation moves. From the internal point of view, the audience can be constituted by European citizens, organisations, and member states, while for the outer side, the receiver securitising speech is the international community of states. These states upload their security concerns to the international level and exercise their policy formulation power (Sperling & Webber, 2018). The distinction between the two cannot be too strict since a level of interdependency is clear: external acceptance will be reached only if the EU is able to act internally.

In a context like the EU, the interaction between an international organisation and its members can be a two-way type, which means that the international organisation can speak on behalf of the member states and vice versa. Specifically, security can be spoken by the European Institutions (Commission, EEAS or the European Central Bank) as well as by national actors, case where the EU becomes the object of security. Since they are recognized as legitimate and authoritative, international organizations as the EU have the power to speak effectively and be accepted by those to whom the

[13] In a business-as-usual scenario, temperatures could rise by 4°C by 2100, with precipitation levels falling by 20-50% and the number of drought days increasing by 20% across the region.

speech is addressed, which are the organization members (Williams M. , 2007). Furthermore, organizations like the EU, possess the power to speak from an authoritative position and as experts, using proper language and the necessary accreditation to be heard by the audience.

The securitisation of climate change was already recognized as a particular case by Buzan et al. since they noted how different the process is from other sectors (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). One difference can be found in the fact that generally, the process of securitisation requires the presence of a visible threat that attempt the survival of a referent object, however in the case of the environment to secure civilization from environmental threat, much of civilization must be reformed entirely or even be pulled down (De Wilde, 2008).

Nevertheless, the role of the EU as a global actor is subjected to several limitations on the capacities to outreach; a burden, for example, is the long time required before and during international negotiations where member states must coordinate their vision on the policies. Furthermore, the system of EU expert groups under the Council working group is mainly a burden for smaller member states with limited resources. The EU coherence on the international plane remains fragile every time it is linked to sensitive issues for which common internal policies remain still underdeveloped (Oberthur & Kelly, 2008).

3.3 EU speech securitisation and the 2007 turning point

At the "World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere – Implications for Global Security" in June 1988, the Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland claimed that "the impact of world climate change may be greater than any challenge mankind has faced, with the exception of preventing nuclear war." (Shabecoff, 1988). This can be considered the launch of the politicization and securitisation processes of climate change that reached a crucial point in 2007.

The Council, who at the time among all the institutions was dominating the discourse on climate change, did not employ a securitisation language towards climate change until mid-1990s. From 1995, the issue started to be described as a "risk" focusing on the global reach relieving the EU of specific responsibilities through unilateral actions

(Dupont, 2019). On other occasions, it was defined by the Council as a possible cause of "significant damage and disruption"[14] and as one of the "main global environmental challenges"[15]. Alongside, the EU Council mentioned for the first time the issue in 1997, asking for a "strong response to the risk"[16] and from here the climate issue remained on the agenda of the council that recognized it as "one of the most challenging environmental problems" [17] for the future that requires coordinated and common action among the members of the community.

The active participation in the Kyoto Protocol gave a boost to the adoption of new measures inside the European framework, and Member States started to give the appropriate importance to the issue. The main event that changed the course of the process was the announcement by George W. Bush of the rejection to sign the Protocol. The EU took the chance to lead the situation and pushed for the entry into force of the Protocol influencing the other participating countries. This new position was transposed in the discourse held in 2001 by the European Council. While it urged for the ratification by all the partners after the Bush opposition, it signed the shift from the definition as a "risk" to "threat" of the issue by stating: "The European Council, recognising climate change as a global threat to future well-being and economic progress, recalls the necessity of efficient international action to reduce emissions" (European Council, 2001).

The American decision can be interpreted as a shift of attention from identifying climate change as a threat to consider environmental policies as a threat. Bush stated that "the American way of life is not up for negotiation" (Bush, 1993), since he considered the acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol measures a threat to the American economy. The same position was lately adopted by some developing countries who argued against the imposition of rules for the reduction of emissions which were harmful to their development process.

[14] Council of the European Union (1995). Community Strategy on Climate Change: Council Conclusions, 12841/95 (December).
[15] Council of the European Union (1999). Community Strategy on Climate Change: Council Conclusions, 11654/99 (October).
[16] European Council (1997). Conclusions: Amsterdam European Council (June).
[17] European Council (1998). Conclusions: Vienna European Council (December).

It was the Bush decision combined with scientific knowledge proving the seriousness of the climate change issue that spurred decisive EU action, which means that it was more due to a political decision rather than the direct effect of global warming that the EU started to get involved in the fight of it. The EU pushed the ratification for several reasons mainly because it needed to ratify the Protocol in the shortest time to claim the moral high ground, but the opposition to the US was a goal in itself (Kahn, 2003).

From here, the European Council, while continuing in a similar way, with the same language and key definitions, started to mention the impact on *security* that climate change can have [18]at national and international level as well as on food production, the achievement of sustainable development, ecosystems, and human health [19]. In 2003 the EU published the *European Security Strategy*, where the EU expressed directly its concerns relating to the non-military dimension of security. The document recognized the complexity of security, and although it was mainly focused on the fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, and organised crime, it considered among the challenges of the modern world the hunger and malnutrition as well as the spread of infectious diseases as the AIDS[20]. Global warming was only mentioned once, without any analysis, explaining the problem of fights for limited natural resources that could lead to "turbulence and migratory movements" (European Council, European Security Strategy, 2003). Overall, the document responds to the need to adapt to "more diverse and unpredictable" threats because "no single country is able to tackle on its own" (European Council, 2003).

This new vision was later consolidated by the Council in 2008 through the "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy". The report enlarged the list of new challenges affecting the EU, including not only climate change but also cybersecurity, energy security, and piracy. It also called attention to an EU responsibility to face these threats by asking for the development of more strategic decision-making, the building of appropriate and command structures, and most importantly, to detect and address the origin of the instabilities through a "coherent use of political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade

[18] Council of the European Union (2006). Conclusions, 16941/06 (December).
[19] Council of the European Union (2007). Conclusions, 14632/07 (November).
[20] "AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies" (European Council, 2003).

cooperation and civilian and military crisis management" (EU Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy — Providing Security in Changing World, 2008). The document also refers to the report released by the High Representative Solana and the European Commission in March 2008, "*Climate Change and international security"* which constituted a fundamental step for developing a more holistic approach to security by the EU. Fundamental has been the linkage to security according to which "Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability" (Council of the European Union, 2008). In this way, Solana made a strong correlation between international, national, and human security. The report can be summed up in three main proposals: first, the improvement of the monitoring and early warning system of conflicts and mass migration; second, it pushed for the introduction of a post-Kyoto protocol to make the target of 2°C internationally binding; third, the improvement of cooperation with third countries.

Between 2000 and 2010, several reports about the security dimension of climate change were commissioned by governments like Germany and United Kingdom to support their case for solid adaptation and mitigation action in international climate negotiations (Oels, 2012). In particular, the German Advisory Council on Global Change published a report "*Climate change as a Security Risk*" where the fight against climate change was seen as an opportunity to unite the international community around a common and coordinated climate policy. However, this depended on the global acceptance of the issue as a threat because otherwise, as stated by the report, climate change would deepen the division and conflict in international relations (WBGU, 2009). The report considered "climate-induced inter-state wars" as unlikely but argued that climate change could trigger national and international distributional conflicts together with the aggravation of already existing problems as state failures and social erosions. Indeed, the report claimed that "these dynamics threaten to overstretch the established global governance system, thus jeopardizing international stability and security" (WBGU, 2009).

Even before, Germany and UK started to threaten a public concern, aiming to push it to the centre of the political agenda. For example, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, during the debate on the programme of the German Presidency of the Council in

January 2007, talked about climate change and energy access as "the two great challenges that the human race will have to face in the twenty-first century" (European Parliament , 2007). In the meantime, in April, the UK's request to hold an open debate at UN level, and a paper[21] was released to address the debate at the Security Council in which the UK asked to focus on the potential impact on security such as border disputes, migration, humanitarian crisis, and resource shortages rather than the physical impact of climate change (UNSC S/2007/186). This shows how the U.K. has taken a leadership position towards the internationalization of the climate policy, trying to push it at high-level international meetings (Sindico, 2007). In May 2007, the Foreign Secretary of the UK Margaret Beckett, during her speech at RUSI on "the case for climate security", argued that a new approach is needed to how we analyse and act on security. She highlighted the fact that "the threat to our climate security comes not from outside but from within: we are all our own enemies", the request was indeed a collective security, which did not imply traditional "bombs and bullet" (Beckett, 2007).

Thus, the year 2007 can be considered as the turning point in the EU securitisation process with the IPCC becoming the main securitizing actor although its mandate has so far excluded security issues, and in the fourth assessment report, there is no reference to security among the first three volumes (Brauch, 2009). Nevertheless, the power of the IPCC was the ability to spread the sense of urgency of the issue at the global level through a high scientific and political reputation.

3.4 On the way to the EU Green Deal

Another crucial move towards politicization was the publication in November 2008 of a report about the Arctic region situation by the European Commission. The area was described as "increasingly at risk from the combined effects of climate change and human activity" (European Commission, Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The European Union and the Arctic Region., 2008). The effects of climate change on the Arctic are not only endangering the global ecosystem but also is threatening the cohesion and solidarity of the European Union since it will have cross-border effects together with changes in land

[21] Letter dated 5 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

use and the fishery system (Chuffart & Raspotnik, 2019). Therefore, two main threats can be identified with the melting of the Arctic: the dangerous race for natural resources by major powers and the effects on the local population and indigenous people. The EU attempts to position itself as an actor in addressing these challenges by building dialogue with Norway and Russia to explore hydrocarbon resources (European Commission 2008).

Since 2008 the discourse on climate change was aimed at keeping the issue as a securitised and high political issue even though other pressing issues came out during the '10s: the financial and economic crisis in 2007, the migration crisis, Brexit, and terrorism are only a part of the multiple challenges for the EU during these years. The rise of these new issues came with a loss of unified consensus among the Member States about the targets and tools to use. For example, the refusal of Poland of the low-carbon economy roadmap that settled the objective of reducing domestic production by 80% by 2050 (European Commission, 2011).

Already in 2007, the UNFCCC Parties, to push all the countries towards a reduction of emissions, started a series of negotiations to reach the previously settled objectives. The Paris Climate Change Conference was expected to be a conclusion for these negotiations, by establishing emission reduction targets for all the Parties involved (Savaresi, 2016). Before the Paris agreement, the EU engaged in multiple bilateral climate diplomacy and pushed towards national climate action plans while reaching the US to find common ground. All this aimed to form a "high-ambition coalition" at the Paris Summit that made the Agreement highly ambitious (Oberthür, 2016).

The EU's Joint Reflection Paper on Climate diplomacy, published in July 2011, addressed the need to start with the engagement in a systematic way on the foreign policy dimension of climate change by improving the relationship with partner countries who play a relevant role in the international level but also with developing countries in order to assist them in the process (Council of the European Union, 2011).

In 2016, the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, guided by the HR Federica Mogherini, promised a more "comprehensive approach" towards conflicts and crisis by acting at "all stages of the conflict cycle acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding

premature disengagement" (European Union Global Strategy, 2016). Different, from the previous European Security Strategy released in 2003, where global warming was only mentioned once as above explained, here climate change was cited at least 26 times which means that a step towards the construction of a more effective external climate action has been taken. However, while it dedicates a part specifically to energy security, it is missing a section specifically related to climate challenges. However, the strategic importance of climate security has been given, with a constant reference to the "threat multiplier" characteristic of the issue and asking for pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy and enhancing energy and environmental resilience.

In February 2018, the European Council's conclusion on climate Diplomacy highlighted the necessity of cross-border cooperation on environmental issues between the Member States and partner countries with particular attention to transboundary environmental impact assessments (Council of the European Union, 2018). The new HR, Josep Borrell, started his mandate in December 2019, and since the beginning he declared his intention to implement the Global Strategy plan focusing on strengthening resilience through sustained and cooperative actions. It was in one of his first apparitions in public during the COP25 in Madrid that he linked climate change to "multifaceted" problems and asked for collective action and committed to "do[ing] everything at my disposal to reinforce our impact and generate truly global cooperation on climate action" (Borrell, 2019).

A few weeks later, the European Green Deal (EGD) was announced by the Commission; it consists of a strategy plan to transform the 27-country bloc from a high carbon economy to a carbon-neutral one by the year 2050. The Commission's President Ursula von der Leyen, during the speech for the presentation of the Green Deal, stated: "This is Europe's man on the moon moment. The European Green Deal is very ambitious, but it will be very careful in assessing the impact of every single step we're taking" (European Commission, 11 December 2019). In the third section of the Communication of the European Green Deal, devoted to the "EU as a global leader" the Commission speaks about the link between security and climate change. The text repeats the concept of global climate as a "significant threat multiplier and a source of instability" (European Commission, 11 December 2019) since, as explained, it can affect the current geopolitics in terms of economy, trade and security interests.

In early 2020 the Council continued to propose in its conclusion the need to use foreign policy engagements to tackle the climate change effects on security, considering the CSDP as one of the possible instruments (Council of the European Union, January 2020). In the meantime, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management[22] decided to increase the effort to develop of climate assessments inside the EU civilian missions.

3.4.1 The Climate Change and Defence Roadmap

The European External Action Service (EEAS) has submitted in 2020, almost a year after the publication of the EGD, a roadmap with the aim to integrate climate change into the defence actions while contributing to the wider Climate-Security Nexus. In December, a virtual event on "Climate change, Defence and Crisis Management: from Reflection to Action" was held. The focus was on the implications of climate change on crisis management and defence with the aim of finding a way to improve the level of cooperation. The opening of the meeting was executed by HR Josep Borrell, who presented the "Climate Change and Defence Roadmap" by saying: "As European Union, we have a strong record when it comes to protecting the planet. Now, this ambition also needs to extend to the defence sector to address the increasing links between climate change and defence, both abroad and at home" (Borrel, December 2020). The Roadmap offers the opportunity to implement the practical application of the strategies proposed until now since there are limitations in how far the EU has implanted a comprehensive strategy in practice (Meyer, Vantaggiato, & Youngs, 2021).

The roadmap is focused around three main key areas: first of all, the operational dimension through which the aim is to increase the awareness about the climate effects. According to this, early warning systems and strategic foresight will be developed as well as the inclusion of environmental aspects on the CSDP civilian and military missions. Secondly, the area of capability development where the aim is to ensure that the military equipment is effective even under extreme conditions together with the objective of developing new technologies and practices that reduce carbon emissions of

[22] CIVCOM composed of representatives of the EU member states is an advisory body within the European Union that manage the civilian aspects of crisis management. The activities are part of the CFSP of EU, and the civilian side of the CSDP.

the defence sector. Third area is about diplomacy since the objective is to enlarge the multilateral fora and partnerships to tackle climate change as much as possible, for example, with NATO and the UN.

4. STAGE OF MOBILIZATION

The second stage of the process, which is the most important, can be defined as the stage of active securitisation. It concerns the success of securitisation, which depends on the acceptance by an audience of the existence of a threat that can affect the existence of a specific referent object. Only through the acceptance by a relevant audience (which can be constituted by public opinion, politicians, or military officers) that political measures with an extraordinary character can be imposed to solve the threat.

To study whether an issue has been successfully securitised is necessary to analyse two aspects: firstly, elite speech acts need to define an issue as an "existential threat to a designated referent object," and only then it can "justify the use of extraordinary measures to handle" it (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). Secondly, an audience must be outlined and should show a "sign of […] acceptance" (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). The Copenhagen School do not exclude the possibility that the process can be used just as an instrument to mobilize resources under the specific and urgent situation, and therefore Wæver was highly critical of framing issues in terms of security (Taureck, 2006). He stated that "security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics" (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998), and he considered as a better option the *"desecuritisation",* where issues are moved out of the threat and get back to the "normal" politic under the principles of a democratic political system.

Indeed, according to the Copenhagen School, success does not depend on the adoption of these extraordinary measures itself but simply on acknowledging the existence of a threat by the audience (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). In this case the audience, is not given by the whole population but by political elites and state institutions as the military (Emmers, 2010). This is because, as explained above, even though the general population can reject the adoption of certain extraordinary measures, the process can still be valid if a specific smaller audience accepts it (Collins, 2005).

Even if the academic community is largely convinced of an evident existence of climate change, there is a part of the public who sustain that it is an issue not already present among the population and that in case it appears, it can be mitigated simply through a particular course of action (Warner & Boas, 2017). An explanation to this can be found

through the work of Buzan et al., according to which environmental securitisation is an uncertain domain for securitisation process since the provision of evidence in these cases is tricky. Climate change effects cannot be seen directly, while events such as hurricanes and floods started to be considered symbols of a looming worldwide catastrophe (Hamblyn, 2008). Images like oil spills or floods are more effective than an abstract concept as "global warming".

Another characteristic of climate change, apart from the intangibility of its effect, is the impossibility to identify a "saviour". In this way, whenever an environmental issue is presented and there is no way out presented, the audience will feel insecure and will leave the recipient without hope for improvement. An alarmist articulation of the issue can depict a situation where the political actor cannot respond to the threat, moving the responsibility and trust of governance with piecemeal and technocratic policy measures (Warner & Boas, 2017).

There are cases where the securitisation process ends up with a counterintuitive result; it happens when the threat is perceived too apocalyptic that it distrusts political actors and exceptional measures, and as a consequence, the political measure will be smaller and technocratic (Methmann & Rothe, 2012). Climate change has been considered one of these cases where the security discourse led to "routine and micro-practices of risk management", for example, measures aimed at reducing carbon emissions.

Based on the analysis provided in Chapter 3, it is clear that the articulation of climate change as an existential threat is nothing new; already in the 90s, heads of government and newspapers were talking about it. What can be found is that the security actors involved did not call for extraordinary measures; they mainly highlighted the importance of the "normal" political process of international negotiations under the UNFCC (Oels, 2012).

An important consideration is that there is a significant implication of using a particular discourse to understand the link between security and the environment, so according to the type of speech, different types of policies can come out (Detraz & Betsill, 2009). The discourse about climate security can be divided between speakers from developing countries and IPCC, more focused on human security considering the issue under the light of sustainable development, and speakers from military sections and from the US

who talk more about national security[23]. This distinction was not considered by the Copenhagen School, which means that no difference was mentioned between national security and human security perspective.

One way to assess the efficacy of the securitisation process in terms of rising awareness among the audience can be the use of public pools. A new Eurobarometer survey published in July 2021 shows that European citizens consider climate change as the single most serious issue that the world is facing. More than nine out of ten people surveyed consider climate change to be a severe problem (93%), with almost eight out of ten (78%) considering it to be very severe (European Commission, 2021). The consideration as a threat has been under a continuous increase in the past 20 years; in 2007, for example, the German Marshall Fund (GMF) found that majorities in 12 European countries plus the United States believed they would probably be directly affected by climate change.

This can be interpreted as the fact that climate change effects are not considered anymore only by scientists, governments, and international organizations as an urgent security danger, but from the majority of the population as well. Nevertheless, the acceptance as a threat by the audience does not mean that the same people will accept extraordinary measures to tackle it.

It is fundamental the presence of a link between the securitising move and the chosen action; therefore, the action can be discreet, but it does not necessarily end up with the creating new institutions: existing institutions and policies may gain new dimensions (Floyd, 2015). What matters is that there is a change in the behaviour connected to the securitizing move; securitizing actors can consider an action as exceptional because they did not act in this way before.

Wæver claims that security brings with it "history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape" (Wæver, 1995). Among these connotations, we find the vision of the issue as a threat requiring the adoption of defence measures, which means that the responsibility relapse on the state. In this case, it is easy to think that military

[23] An example is the speech of the former Vice-President Al Gore during the ceremony for the Nobel Prize in December 2007 when he stated: "We must quickly mobilize our civilization with the urgency and resolve that has previously been seen only when nations mobilized for war" (Gore, 2007).

intervention can be a solution, but it is not a direct implication, as Wæver defined: it is just a coincidence that military means have been used as the ultima ratio (Wæver, 1995). About this, the next session will analyse the misleading connection between extraordinary measures of the securitising process and military deployment.

4.1 Fear of a militarization

The debate on the link between security and climate change is considered by those who fear an unnecessary securitisation that leads to increased military presence. They fear the transformation of the situation in an excuse to send military personnel in areas which are the object of interest of a state who wish to take the control of the land, while others think that security actor can be interested in the funds for climate mitigation preventing the distribution to those who need them (Van Schaik, Von Lossow, Yassin, & Schrijver, 2020).

Another big fear given by the use of military personnel is the possibility to use it as an excuse to repress any protests of the people who suffer from the effect of climate change and conflicts. For example, when the protests started in Syria in 2011, President Assad used the recognition of the effect on food availability due to the precedent drought to justify the oppression of the people who were demonstrating for the price increase (Van Schaik, Von Lossow, Yassin, & Schrijver, 2020).

The military approach to climate change is not aimed either able to address those social structures that perpetuate environmental degradation, such as oil dependency and the global inequality gap between rich and poor. The focus is directed to long-term defence plans to face potential disasters where the military intervention is seen as the only institution able to deal with the issue (Gilbert , 2012).

There is a relevant difference between the securitisation process of climate change developed in the United States and the one in EU. First of all, while in the EU the discourse is focused on scientific findings and possible opportunities, the scientific opinion is disputed in the US, and often climate change skeptics have access to the policy-making process. In the EU instead, there is space between policymakers and the

public, which enables short-term policies without resorting to security politics (Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014).

The heavy reliance on security discourses in the US shifted the security process and empowered traditional security actors like the military section. The quadrennial defence review[24]in 2010, after recognizing the link between climate change and conflict, started to address military intervention towards climate issues and for a "*greenification*" of the military equipment (Broder, 2012). In response, every branch of the U.S. military has launched projects to reduce the carbon "bootprint" and cut the dependence of this industry on fossil fuels by shifting to electric vehicles (Gardner, 2010).

For what concerns the EU, even though military interventions will probably play a relevant role in the future, there are few signs that show the attempt of member states to militarise climate change per se (Youngs, Climate Change and European Security, 2014). In 2012 a report was released by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs on "The role of CSDP in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters". The focus has been placed on the militarisation risk of the EU's climate policy and the role of the CSDP by saying that since the effects of climate change can destabilize states and the Union itself, any possible crisis should be prevented by "applying a comprehensive approach including the CSDP" (European Parliament C. f., 2012). The report goes on by calling the HR to mainstream the potential effect on security into the most important strategies and policy documents as it was already done with human rights and gender issues. In response to the report, three MEPs belonging to the GUE/NGL[25], opposed the report judging it as an attempt of militarisation because they feared the start of a systemic implementation of a military element in the climate policy rather than focusing on finding the roots of the problems. However, having a look at the last CSDP mission, as the Horn of Africa or Sudan, it is possible to see how modest they have been since they mainly included security sector training, while other crises as the one in Libya did not involve the CSDP at all (Sonnsjö & Bremberg, 2016). For this reason, generally, for what concerns the EU the risk of militarisation of the climate change issue is still far.

[24] The Quadrennial Defense Review was a report stipulated by Section 923 of the National Defense Authorization Act. The QDR was produced every four years from 1997 to 2014 by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[25] European United Left/Nordic green Left, European Parliament Group

Using military resources cannot be considered the only solution, because in many cases military tools are not adequate to respond to the different socio-economic and political factors that climate change can bring. For instance, if we consider conflicts caused by the contention of a water source, the presence of militaries is not sufficient alone. It is needed a good governance, economic development and education to manage scarce natural resources. However, in any case, the military plays a key role and cannot be excluded by the process since in many cases is the only actor that can bring peace and stability in a situation where climate factors affect the security of a country. For example, they can assist civil authorities, face emergencies, and provide necessary goods and services. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the latest European moves to address the links between Climate change and defence is given by elaborating the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap. The Roadmap intends to mainstream climate change and environmental aspects into the planning and implementing CSDP mandates (European External Action Service, 2020). The Roadmap has the possibility to announce climate-related operations, although for the moment, it is mainly about equipping EU militaries for extreme climate conditions and finding ways to reduce the dependence of the operations on local resources (Youngs, 2021).

4.2 A successful securitisation?

Define if a securitisation process has been successful or not is a considerable debate among the scholars who studied this theory. The standard position of the Copenhagen School asserts that successful securitisation is “not decided by the securitizer but by the audience” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). Indeed, as already mentioned, the objective is the persuasion of the audience rather than the extraordinary measures themselves.

Allowing the securitisation of something like climate change, whose real effects are hard to measure and evaluate, can be challenging to accept. Mostly because the adoption of a precautionary approach in the climate security field based on a traditional security vision and the need for emergency measures has been judged to justify actions like preventive military interventions, measures for the protection of the territory

against immigration and sea-level rising, and imposition of emission targets (Trombetta, Environmental Security andClimate Change: Analysing the discourse, 2008).

The securitisation process in the EU not only has been characterized by fear of militarization but it has created an expectation of effective policy change since security issues prioritize. The analysis of the Climate Change and International Security (CCIS) process shows that, although securitisation is ongoing in EU, the designed actions are not traditional security measures. However, they focus on dialogues, co-operations, and disaster-response (Rodrigues De Brito, 2012).

Nevertheless, most European efforts to tackle climate change seem to be more process-oriented rather than output-oriented, which means that it is more concerned with institutional mandates and agenda-setting than practical actions. Indeed, the European approach is considered a reactive type: more focus on emergency response rather than on prevention (Bergamaschi, Mabey, Born, & White, 2019).

According to Youngs, the EU has developed an "indirect" climate security policy since it has focused on the definition of preparatory principles and the contextual factors around climate geopolitics, leaving behind a direct action of security nature (Youngs, 2021). Analysing the discourses and the statements released over the years, according to the author, the EU seems to use the security narrative mainly as a tool to highlight the importance of achieving the settled targets and the multilateral coordination linked to them. In this way, while the EU was engaged in building a link between climate and security, it made the emission targets a kind of security policy by default rather than integrating elements of a security-oriented approach.

The leadership model of the EU is based on the principle of "leading by example" (Bergamaschi & Sartori, 2018). This is because many domestic policies as the 2020 and 2030 packages and the ongoing climate finance support addressed to the most vulnerable countries are the proof that the EU wants to play the role of the leader in climate action. The EU aims to demonstrate that the energy transition is possible without affecting the economy and the level of competitiveness. To this purpose, since the late 2000s, a programme of climate finance addressed to developing countries has been set up by the European Union to support the energy transition of these countries.

In 2019, the EU, its Member States, and the European Investment Bank were the largest contributor with €23.2 billion[26] (European Commission, 2020).

The Copenhagen School retains that the securitisation of climate change has failed since the articulation as a security issue in several elite speech acts has not passed the critical threshold of exceptionality (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). However, due to the underspecified nature of extraordinary measures, it is possible to debate whether agreements as the UNFCCC or the Kyoto protocol can be considered as such. The debate on these measures divides those who retain they do not have extraordinary features and those who consider them the result of a successful process. What can be seen as extraordinary, or generally as successful securitisation, depends on the specific context; for example, there are differences in the application of the process between a country advanced in terms of climate change mitigation and "climate laggard countries".

Therefore, the appeals to climate security proposed over the past years have resulted in several actions, even if not characterised by emergency features. It is possible to consider these measures as the result of a proper securitisation rather than a failed one (Trombetta, 2008). For example, a successful securitisation process would legitimize measures involving a progressive increase in energy efficiency and decarbonization of the energy system (Brauch, 2009). That is what happened in the EU with the development of a common energy policy[27], where member states were committed to increasing the share of renewable energy, increasing the energy efficiency and the developing a common external energy policy.

The European Green Deal can be seen as the final formulation of various foreign policy strategies proposed until now around the climate action issue. Together with the promotion of a "green deal diplomacy", aimed at building alliances to improve the level of resilience, the text proposes to include climate policy in the European thinking with a particular reference to the CSDP. It was in line with this last vision of the EGD that the

[26] The amount includes the contribution of UK, without taking it into account the amount is €21,9 billion
[27] The energy union strategy (COM/2015/080) was published on 25 February 2015 with the aim of building an energy union that gives EU consumers secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy.

Climate Change and Defence Roadmap was proposed one year later in the attempt to include climate factors fully into the design of external actions.

CONCLUSION

According to the definition of "security" as the condition of being protected from dangers, climate change can be considered a security issue for those countries and individuals more exposed to the phenomenon's effects. Signs of escalating climate change cannot be ignored anymore on any continent and region. Nowadays, the effects of climate change are becoming more visible and widely recognized by society and by political elites, which in some cases are using the subject as an instrument to get the electorate. An example is the most recent flood that hit Germany in July 2021, putting climate change at the centre of the Germany's politics within the election campaign.

The thesis is developed around the consideration of climate change as part of a new understanding of threats for the states that are defined as non-traditional, characterized by a non-military nature. The analysis shows, it is clear how difficult it is to define and require different strategies to tackle these non-traditional issues. They rely on the relationship between human civilization and the environment rather than states' relationship.

Climate change is nowadays recognized as an accelerator of instability and able to exacerbate other drivers of insecurity that will involve the environmental, economic, social, and political fields of any modern society. This means that climate change alone hardly can lead to trigger conflicts but can increase their chance of happening. In the literature, the link between environmental and climate security in the European context has developed heavily since the end of the Cold War, and from being a general concept, it became a proper political debate as widely illustrated in the paper.

This process through which climate has become a security issue has been analysed in the paper using the securitisation theory. Through this theoretical approach, the work demonstrates the fact that there are no objective threats that should be discovered, but rather various issues can be transformed into security issues from the moment that a political community considers them as such through a successful speech act able to establish a way of dealing with them. In this way if the process is successfully securitized is not a condition anymore but a form of social practice.

The analysis was developed through the two-stage theory of securitisation formulated by Emmers, to highlight that climate security discourse itself does not automatically make an issue a security matter since the approval from a specific audience is necessary. We have seen how specific climate security frames have brought climate change in the European political agenda among the highest priority and how they had the power to legitimise particular measures.

An important aspect that was taken into account about the securitisation is that if from one side it can push the sense of urgency speeding up the process and the adoption of actions, from the other it can justify the use of military responses to address the impact of climate change. The fear of militarisation comes from the effects that climate change can have on scarce resources, exacerbating the already fragile situation and pushing so the rise of violent conflicts. In the European context, there is no evidence of a militarization process, unlike the US where the military actor has been commissioned to be the responding institution of climate change, with the task to release reports about security implications and to activate a process towards a "greenification" of the military equipment.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that climate security is not included in the defence sector, as inferred from the speeches analysis. More than once, the question about the CFSP's role in addressing climate change has been raised, and repeatedly it has been seen as a solution if inserted in a "comprehensive approach" to prevent a possible crisis. Several times the Commission and the European Parliament declared the need for tighter coordination between the CSDP and civilian crisis management through by implementing tools like the Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level and Military Rapid Response. There are instruments as the Copernicus monitoring system, already used as a support to the external action of the Union in peacekeeping operations, which can be seen as a change in how military acts, but it cannot be considered as a move towards military intervention in climate issues.

The last fundamental development in terms of climate security and defence linkage is the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap publication, which promised to incorporate climate factors fully into the CSDP. Although it should be promising in terms of pushing EU mission and operations planning and implementation towards a climate

change approach, it has been judged to be excessively focused on the greenification of the military equipment. The carbon footprint of the military industry is among the highest, even though the estimation is difficult due to a lack of data since they are protected by national interest; for this reason, the effectiveness of the policies proposed by the Roadmap can be limited if a full GHG emission reporting is not provided.

The Roadmap adoption and the European Green Deal can be interpreted as the result of a long successful securitisation process of climate change. A process that allowed the climate security matter to rise up the EU's external agenda leading to adopting these measures through which the EU seeks to prepare generical principles for climate action at the international level. It is not the object of this analysis to determine if the actions taken until now have been successful towards a concrete action on the fight against climate change. Rather, the objective is evaluating the importance gained by the climate change over the years that have led political actors, at national and international level, to make the issue a fundamental part of their activity.

The choice, communication and adoption of policies related to climate security must face the intersection with other policies and security measures that can be adopted only by leaving behind the climate aspect. An example is the policies to cut emissions, as the case of EGD where while the EU pushes for a progress in environmental standards it can lead to tensions and imbalances between the countries. While pushing for decarbonisation targets in developing countries, often the EU pretends to increase and expand the growth and the trade with the same countries, this inevitability constitutes an incompatibility of the adopted measures. Indeed, securitisation process of climate change seems to have led the EU to focus excessively on making the emission reductions policies, overlooking the actions that it should take in adapting the military, development and geoeconomics policies. Due to their newness, the European Green Deal and the Defence Roadmap have room to be expanded and show the results in strengthening the climate security, but it is necessary to see the climate instability as an issue that the EU's external policies contribute to and not only as a threat outside its borders.

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