Master in Advanced European and International Studies (MAEIS) Trilingual Studies

Academic year 2019-2020

The Role of International Mediators in the Havana Peace Process (2011-2016)

Fabienne Moser

Date of Submission: 3 July 2020

Research Director: Dr. Soeren Keil

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Soeren Keil for his kind support and guidance as well as his valuable comments and constructive feedback, which really helped bring this thesis to fruition.

A special thanks goes to my dear friend Sandra for always showing support and genuine interest in my work as well as for taking the time out of her busy schedule to proofread this paper. You truly are the best.

I also wish to thank all my fellow students – and the residents of the "Upper house" in Canterbury in particular – for their moral support and the many fun memories we shared.

I would also like to give my warmest thanks to my boyfriend Kevin who constantly motivates me to go one step further and, from the very beginning, supported my decision to pursue this programme. It is whole-heartedly appreciated that you provided words of encouragement, laughs, hugs and chocolates when I most needed them and also gave me enough freedom and space in our apartment during the crazy times of quarantine to study and work on my thesis without distractions.

Last but not least, I owe more than thanks to my family, especially my parents, for their love and endless encouragement, without whom I would never have enjoyed so many opportunities and gotten to where I am today. Mama and Papa, I am greatly indebted to you for always providing me with unconditional support, advice and reassurance, for teaching me that only the sky is the limit and, of course, for funding this programme. I dedicate this thesis to you as a small token of my appreciation for all that you have done for me.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Abbreviations

ABC	Attitude, Behaviour, Contradiction
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
CNMH	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSVR	Implementation, Monitoring, Verification and Dispute Resolution Commission of the Final Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
ELN	National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)
ELP	Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación)
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
FARC-EP	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo)
GMH	Grupo de Memoria Histórica
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
IDP	Internally displaced person
IEP	Institute for Economics & Peace
IFIT	Institute for Integrated Transitions
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bi, Trans and Intersex

LGBTQI+	Lesbian, Gay, Bi, Trans, Queer and Intersex
M-19	April 19 Movement (Movimiento 19 de April)
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NOREF	Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
RQ	Research question
SQ	Sub-question
U.S.	United States of America
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
vs.	versus
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

Introduction

The conflict between the Colombian government and the country's largest guerrilla movement, the *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – The People's Army,* in Spanish *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (hereinafter FARC-EP or FARC) lasted for more than five decades and caused the death of approximately 220,000 people (CNMH 2012). Moreover, it forcibly displaced about seven million Colombians, 'generating the world's largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs)' (HRW 2020). It was only after three failed peace initiatives between 1982 and 2002, decades of violence and a failed attempt to crush the guerrillas with hard military power that the belligerent parties agreed to get back to the negotiation tables in 2012, thus embarking on a four-year effort to settle 'the longest running armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere' (ICTJ 2009) once and for all. This fourth peace process between the Government of Colombia under President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC became known as the Havana peace process and formally ended with the signing of a peace agreement on 24 November 2016.

Given the longevity and complexity of the dispute, the hardened positions between the two parties due to numerous failed expectations, and that international mediation has increasingly been used to settle armed conflicts around the globe over the past few decades (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014, p. 315), 'outside' (Bercovitch et al. 1991, p. 8) actors were involved in the Havana peace process to help the disputants put an end to more than fifty years of warfare. Since 'who mediates [and] how they mediate […] affect the nature of the settlement', as Bercovitch and Gartner (2009a, p. 39) note, it is the aim of this Master thesis to analyse the role of the external mediators in the Havana peace process that took place between 2011 and 2016.

In order to find out in which ways the international mediators contributed to the Havana peace process, the thesis first provides an overview of the methodology used in the course of this study. Once the research questions and hypotheses guiding this paper have been presented, the focus will be shifted to qualitative research and the process of data collection and analysis.

Subsequently, chapter 2 presents the field of conflict resolution, before attention will be paid to the field of mediation as it is necessary to define and comprehend a concept before it can be analysed. The second chapter thus begins with defining the notions of "conflict" and "peace". Furthermore, it examines the structure and dynamics of conflicts as well as the concepts of "positions" and "interests", before discussing elements typically included in sustainable peace agreements. This provides a framework for the analysis of the contributions of international mediators in the Havana peace process.

Chapter 3 focusses on the Havana peace process. Following an overview of the conflict background, the structure and agenda of the peace process will be outlined. Subsequently, all actors involved in the peace negotiations will be mapped out and the interests and positions of the conflicting parties will be examined, before attention is directed to the third-party mediators. Once the disputants' motives for choosing Norway, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela as mediators have been discussed, the interests of the mediators in accepting the mediator role will be assessed.

Chapter 4 deals with the main analysis of the international mediators' contributions to the Havana peace process by outlining the research findings and discussing them with regards to the research questions.

Chapter 5 summarises the aim of the thesis and provides a conclusion of the research findings. In addition, it reflects on the limitations of the study and identifies areas for potential future research on this topic.

1. Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodology used in the present thesis. Firstly, the guiding research questions and hypothesis will be discussed to set the scene for the rest of the paper. Secondly, the qualitative research approach will be presented given that an unobtrusive method of qualitative research was used to find answers to the research questions and verify the hypotheses. Subsequently, the processes of data collection and data analysis will be examined.

1.1. Research Questions and Hypotheses

The Colombian government and the FARC were engaged in an armed conflict for more than half a century (CNMH 2012). Three efforts to settle the conflict were undertaken between 1982 and 2002. However, they all failed, each time leading to a hardening of the positions. It was only in 2012 that the warring parties officially agreed to re-engage in a fourth peace initiative known as the Havana peace process. In view of the complexity of the long-lasting dispute and negative past experiences, the belligerents decided to strategically involve a limited number of international mediators (Norway, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile) in the peace process to help bring sustainable peace to Colombia. After many arduous rounds of negotiations over a period of four years, the conflicting parties finally managed to reach a historic peace accord in November 2016, *inter alia* due to the involvement of third-party mediators. It is the aim of this thesis to analyse the role of external mediators in the resolution of the conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC, which is why the overarching research question is the following:

> ➤ RQ: In which ways did the international mediators Norway, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile contribute to the successful outcome of the Havana peace negotiations held between 2012 and 2016 in the form of the peace agreement, and thus to the creation of sustainable peace?

To better answer this main research question, it was divided into three sub-questions:

- SQ1: What contributions did the four international mediators make to the Havana peace process in order to help settle the conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC?
- SQ2: Which mediation strategies did the international mediators adopt throughout the peace process to help broker peace between the Colombian government and the FARC?
- SQ3: How did the international mediators' steps and actions contribute to sustainable peace?

Based on a comprehensive literature review, it was assumed that given the diverse nature of the international mediators (some were from the region, others were from further afar; some shared more historical, linguistic, cultural or ideological ties with Colombia than others; some had been involved in previous peace efforts in Colombia, while others had not; some had more experience in brokering peace than others, some were more involved in the negotiations than others, etc.) various mediation strategies were adopted throughout the peace process. It was further hypothesised that this allowed the mediators to take on a more flexible role since they were able to adapt their strategies and tactics to specific situations and issues, which contributed to the conflicting parties finally being able to settle the highly complex conflict by reaching a peace agreement.

In order to provide answers to the aforementioned research questions, a qualitative analysis of secondary data was conducted based on an unobtrusive research method. The following subchapter briefly discusses what qualitative research is before explaining how relevant data was gathered and how the analysis was carried out.

1.2. Qualitative Research

The analysis conducted in the framework of the present thesis is based on qualitative research. According to Corbin and Strauss (2015),

> [q]ualitative research is a form of research in which the researcher [...] collects and interprets data, […] [as well as a form of research that] utili[s]es an open and flexible design and in doing so stands at odds with the notion of rigor so important when doing quantitative research (p. 4).

In principle, qualitative research thus refers to a range of approaches based on the analysis, description and interpretation of a variety of 'social realities[,] […] processes, meaning patterns and structural features' (Flick et al. 2004, p. 3). According to Flick et al. (2004), these social realities and processes can be studied '[b]y analysing experiences of individuals or groups[,] […] [b]y analysing interactions and communication in the making [or] […] [b]y analysing documents (texts, images, film or music)' (p. ix). Hence, different methods can be used to conduct qualitative research. What is important in any case, though, is that the method chosen is appropriate to the subject matter at hand (Flick 2007, p. 2).

A key advantage of qualitative research is, as Corbin and Strauss (2015) note, that – thanks to its flexible nature – it provides for 'a holistic and comprehensive approach to the study of phenomena' (p. 5). Moreover, '[q]ualitative research takes into account the natural contexts in which individuals or groups function to provide an in-depth understanding of real-world problems' (Krostjens and Moser 2017, p. 274). These aspects played a decisive role in why a qualitative research approach was deemed most appropriate in the framework of this thesis.

Since it is the objective of this thesis to study the role of international mediators in the Havana peace process by analysing existing textual data, an unobtrusive approach to qualitative research – as outlined by Liamputtong (2013) – seemed to be most suitable because '[u]nobtrusive research refers to methods of collecting data that don't interfere with the subjects under study[, i.e.] […] unobtrusive methods […] do not require the researcher to interact with the people he or she is studying' (Blackstone 2012, p. 137). As there is no direct interaction with the research objects, it does not matter whether they can still be contacted or whether they are even still alive. Therefore, unobtrusive research 'enable[s] researchers to investigate events and processes that have long since passed' (ibid., p. 139), which is in fact a major asset of this approach and one of the main reasons why it was used in the present paper.

As so often, there are, of course, some drawbacks as well. One weakness to unobtrusive research is that '[t]he topics or questions that can be investigated are limited by data availability' (ibid.). Moreover, unobtrusive methods might also face problems of validity given that relevant data might possibly have been generated for completely different purposes

than the one an unobtrusive researcher has in mind. Another disadvantage is that it might 'be difficult to see or account for social context' (ibid.).

Despite these shortcomings, however, an unobtrusive research method is considered to be the most appropriate approach for this thesis, especially when compared to other research methods, as it provides a means of analysing textual and visual data that was produced several years ago in a qualitative way without the need of direct involvement of the research subjects.

1.3.   Data Collection

The body of data essential for finding answers to the research question guiding this thesis was gathered from secondary sources. Secondary sources refer to 'data collected by other researchers […] [or] official statistics – that is, statistics collected by government departments' (Bryman 2012, p. 311) and are thus readily available. According to Bryman, the analysis of secondary data 'should be considered a serious alternative to collecting new data' (ibid., p. 312) since it is time-saving and very-cost-effective compared to other forms of data collection. In addition, secondary data 'are [often] of extremely high quality' (ibid., p. 313) due to the fact that they have been compiled by researches with extensive experience in data collection and 'are based on large reasonably representative samples' (ibid.). This is why 'it is worth giving serious consideration to doing a secondary analysis, because it will allow [the researcher] […] to spend more time on the analysis and interpretation of data' (ibid., p. 311).

In the course of this study, secondary data regarding the role and contributions of the international mediators to the Havana peace process were gathered from both English-language and Spanish-language sources. All sources were obtained through a comprehensive but simple search engine query for various combinations of the keywords "Norway", "Cuba", "Venezuela", "Chile", "Colombia", "guarantor(s)/guarantor countries", "accompanier(s)/accompanying countries", "peace process", "FARC", "armed conflict", "Havana peace process", "peace talks", "(international) mediators", "(international) facilitators", "role", "contribution" and "efforts". The same comprehensive data search was conducted with the Spanish equivalents of the keywords.

To decide which data were actually relevant for the present study, several selection criteria were applied. First, sources had to provide some insight into the role of one or several of the international mediators in the Havana peace process or information about the measures taken by them during at least one of the phases of the peace process. As mentioned above, despite secondary sources often being of high quality, caution should be exercised in the selection process to ensure that the sources used truly do provide quality data. Therefore, the second criterion concerned the quality of the sources. Hence, a critical approach was employed in the data collection process by carefully assessing the authors and/or sources of potential secondary data as well as the original purpose for which data had been generated and whether other sources contained the same or similar information. The third criterion was that access to full-text documents had to be given. Lastly, all data also had to be freely accessible online.

Based on these criteria, textual secondary data were compiled from official government documents, articles from Colombian and foreign academic journals as well as from public reports from international research institutions. Several sources included testimonials by some of the international mediators who had directly participated in the Havana peace process. The table below illustrates the twelve texts analysed with regards to the research questions.

Text	Title	Published in	Published by	Type	Language	Main content
1	Designing peace: the Colombian peace process	2018	NOREF (Nylander, Dag, Sandberg, Rita and Tvedt, Idun)	Report	English	Structure and important elements of the talks
2	Peace and Gender: The Colombian Peace Process	2018	demos (Daşlı, Güneş, Alıcı, Nisan and Poch Figu, Julia)	Report	English	Gender emphasis in the Havana peace process
3	The peace process in Colombia	2019	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Article	English	Norway's involvement in Colombian peace talks between government and the FARC and the ELN
4	Towards an inclusive peace: women and the gender approach in the Colombian peace process	2017	NOREF (Salvesen, Hilde and Nylander, Dag)	Report	English	Inclusion of gender in the Havana peace process and the Sub-commission on Gender
5	Diplomacia preventiva (¿y ciudadana?) y cooperación para la paz en América Latina: Los grupos nacionales de amigos de Colombia	2017	Estudos Internacionais: Revista De relações Internacionais (Guerrero Soto, Nestor)	Article	Spanish	Chile's contribution to the Havana peace process and the Groups of Friends
6	Venezuelan crisis, regional dynamics and the Colombian peace process	2016	NOREF (Smilde, David and Pantoulas, Dimitris)	Report	English	Venezuela's contribution to the Havana peace process
7	"Hombres de Estado": La contribución de Chile a la paz	2017	Revista de estudios políticos y estratégicos	Paper	Spanish	Chile's contribution to the Havana peace process

	de Colombia		(Guerrero, Néstor, Matamoros, Rodrigo and Guerrero, Álvaro)			
8	Percepción de la mediación internacional en el acuerdo de paz (2016) en el ámbito de los funcionarios de la Gobernación de Antioquia	2018	Revista Integritas (Herrera Ruíz, Juan Carlos and Efraím Antonio Buitrago Echeverry, Juan Carlos)	Article	Spanish	The international community's role in the Havana peace process
9	A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010-2016	2018	Norad	Report	English	Structure of the Havana peace process and Norway's involvement
10	Exmiembros de las FARC viajan a Cuba para estudiar medicina con becas entregadas por la isla	2018	EFE	Article	Spanish	Cuban scholarships for former FARC combatants
11	Former FARC Members Head to Cuba for Medical Scholarship	2018	teleSUR	Article	English	Cuba's Medical Scholarships granted to former FARC fighters
12	Coferencia de embajador Luis Maira sobre Proceso de paz de Colombia	2016	Universidad Miguel de Cervantes	Video	Spanish	Conflict background and structure and content of the Havana peace process

Table 1: Analysed Secondary Data

Data regarding the accompanying countries were mainly collected from the Chilean academic journal *Revista de estudios políticos y estratégicos*, the Colombian academic journal *Revista Integritas* of the *Public Ministry's Institute of Studies* (*Instituto de Estudios del. Ministerio Público*) and a special edition of the Brazilian academic journal *Estudos Internacionais Revista de Relações Internacionais*. To analyse the role of the guarantor countries, a comprehensive evaluation report published by the *Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation* Norad, which is 'a directorate under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (Norad 2020), was used along several reports published by the *Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution* NOREF – some of which were authored by members of the Norwegian mediation team in the Havana peace process. Moreover, articles published by the international news agencies *teleSUR* and *Agencia EFE*, an article by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a report published in *demos Research Center for Peace, Democracy and Alternative Politics* were selected for analysis.

In addition to these written sources, a visual source in the form of a one-hour video published by the Chilean *Universidad Miguel de Cervantes*, in which Luis Maira Aguirre, Chile's

representative in the Havana peace negotiations, talks about the peace process and Chile's contribution to it, was also used.

1.4. Data Analysis

Data analysis describes the on-going process of organising, structuring and interpreting collected data to obtain the information necessary to draw conclusions regarding the research topic (Judd et al. 2015). As it is the aim of data analysis to allow researchers to find answers to research questions, data gathered are typically reduced, sorted and grouped into different categories so as to be able to identify any trends or patterns that might be relevant for the study at hand.

The analysis conducted in the course of this thesis was carried out in several steps: As a first step, administrative information regarding each source text was gathered. For this purpose, the author created a table in a Word file listing the title of the documents to be analysed, their date of publication, the type of document, what language they were written/presented in, where they had been published, as well as the main content. The second step consisted of carefully reading through all the different texts line by line. In each text, passages dealing in some way or another with the guarantor countries' and/or accompanying countries' role, tasks and actions in as well as contributions to the Havana peace process were highlighted. Moreover, a note containing two or three keywords that spontaneously came to mind was added to each highlighted section. In case of the video, handwritten notes were taken at all relevant points in the speech to which a few summarising keywords were added as well. As a third step, all texts were read and/or listened to again to make sure that no relevant information had been left out. The fourth step was to go through all notes and the different keywords in order to try to group them into various provisional categories, which were then refined and narrowed down by identifying the themes that seemed to be related and merging them wherever possible. As a result, seven categories were established:

- Capacity building
- Confidence building
- Crisis management

- Gender inclusion
- Logistics
- Rural development
- Support

After rereading all texts and replaying the video to ensure all pertinent information was included, the final categories were analysed and interpreted with regard to the research questions. Moreover, they were assigned to the various variables which, according to Caspersen (2017), are essential elements to achieve sustainable peace (see chapter 2.1.4.). This allowed drawing conclusions regarding the international mediators' contributions to establishing lasting peace in Colombia. The research findings will be presented and discussed in chapter 4.

2.Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides a theoretical framework which forms the basis of the empirical study discussed in chapter 4. Following the definition of two key concepts in the field of conflict resolution, the structures and dynamics of conflicts as well as the relevance of positions and interests of conflicting parties in conflict resolution will be examined. Subsequently, a closer look is paid to elements that – more often than not – are included in some form or another in peace agreements settling armed intrastate conflicts in order to render them more sustainable. Firstly, four content-related variables, *viz.* the questions of territory, security, power and justice, will be discussed. Secondly, three contextual elements that typically have an impact on the outcome of peace negotiations will also be examined, namely the moment of ripeness, the existence of spoilers as well as externalities in the form of third-party mediators. These elements will later be used as framework to analyse the peace agreement reached between the Colombian government and the FARC as well as to discuss to what extend and in which areas the international mediators contributed to the outcome of the Havana peace process.

Subchapter 2.2. addresses the field of mediation in more detail. Once the term has been defined, determinants influencing the conflicting parties' decision to accept the involvement of third-party mediators as well as the mediators' decision to provide or offer mediation will be examined. Lastly, different mediation strategies and the question of mediator bias will be explored before a brief conclusion will be drawn.

2.1. Conflict Resolution

In order to understand the concept of conflict resolution which 'focuses on preventing, decreasing, stopping or transforming violent conflict using peaceful, non-violent methods' (Woodhouse et al. 2008, p.3), the concepts of conflict and peace need to be understood first. This is why this subchapter starts with defining these two notions before a mutually interlinked framework model explaining the relationship between the aforementioned concepts will be discussed.

2.1.1. Definitions

In the following, the terms "conflict" and "peace" will be defined as they form the basis of the concept of conflict resolution and will be used multiple times throughout this paper.

2.1.1.1. Conflict

It should be noted at the outset that there is no universal definition for this term, as different researchers and practitioners interpret it slightly differently. Bercovitch (1983), for example, defines "conflict" as 'a situation in which two or more parties have incompatible objectives and in which their perceptions and behavio[u]r are commensurate with that incompatibility" (p. 105). Based on Fisher's definition (1990) the term "conflict" refers to 'a social situation involving perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two or more parties, attempts by the parties to control each other, an antagonistic feelings by the parties towards each other' (p. 6). Folger, Poole and Stutman (1995) support this understanding of a 'conflict [being] the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals' (p. 404).

When looking at these definitions, it becomes apparent that despite a lack of a common understanding, three elements seem to be essential to conflict: (a) It usually involves two or more people or groups of people that are (b) interdependent, and it (c) encompasses differences and incompatible goals – be them either real or imagined – between these parties. Interaction, interdependence and incompatible goals are thus three key features of conflict.

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005) further specify that a conflict can either be 'pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force. […] [C]onflicts where parties on both sides resort to the use of force' (p. 27f) can be defined as 'armed conflicts'. Given that the conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC is an armed conflict, it should be noted that when the term "conflict" is used hereinafter, it refers to an armed conflict between a state government and insurgent groups from that same state.

2.1.1.2. Peace

Johan Galtung, one of the founding fathers and most prominent scholars of Peace studies, distinguishes between two different forms of peace: *negative peace* and *positive peace*.

The former denotes 'the cessation of direct violence' (Ramsbotham et al. 2005, p. 11). The adjective 'negative' is used as the notion describes the ending or absence of something negative and undesirable. Hence, *negative peace* encompasses, for instance, the result of a ceasefire given that this signifies the end of 'direct violence between states – engaged in by military and others – in general and the absence of massive killing of categories of humans in particular' (Galtung 2012, p. 758f). Nonetheless, Galtung points out that even though 'this situation is better than violence, […] it is not fully peaceful because positive peace is missing in this conceptuali[s]ation' (ibid.).

Positive peace, on the other hand, can be understood as 'the overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well' (Ramsbotham et al. 2005, p. 11). Moreover, this aspect of peace comprises the concepts of 'legitimacy' and 'justice'. 'An unjust structure or relationship in this terminology is not a peaceful one. In order to achieve positive peace, therefore, injustice must be removed' (ibid., p. 12). The notion of *positive peace* is thus characterised by positive elements such as equity and equality, the rebuilding of relationships and cooperation as well as the (re-)establishment of dialogue and social systems beneficial to all levels of the population and favourable to the constructive settlement of conflict.

According to Galtung, peace does not equate with the complete absence of all conflict. Instead, it indicates a state in which there is no violence of any form and in which conflicts are resolved in a constructive way. Therefore, peace is to be understood as a combination of negative and positive peace (Galtung 2012, p. 759).

2.1.2. Conflict Structure and Dynamics

Apart from coining the concepts of positive and negative peace described above, Galtung is also known for his ABC triangle of conflict, which provides a specific approach to analysing the structure and dynamics of conflict. Galtung's conflict analysis model depicted in Figure 1 includes symmetric as well as asymmetric conflicts. Each corner of the triangle refers to one of the three key features of conflict: attitude (A), behaviour (B) and contradiction (C), which is why it is also known as the ABC triangle of conflict.

The first element, attitude, encompasses the warring 'parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative,' (Ramsbotham et al. 2005, p. 9f) although they usually become more hostile the more the conflict intensifies, especially as they are often 'influenced by emotions such as fear, anger,


Figure 1: ABC triangle of conflict adopted from Galtung 2009, p. 105.

bitterness and hatred. Attitude [thus] covers emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (desire, will) elements' (ibid.). For a dispute to be settled, the conflicting parties need to first realise what their attitudes and perceptions of and towards each other are.

The second variable of the triangle is the parties' behaviour, which 'can involve cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characteri[s]ed by threats, coercion and destructive attacks' (ibid.). In order to end a conflict, it is necessary for the parties involved to overcome their negative and demeaning behaviour as offences, insults and provocations hinder the disputants from perceiving the mutual benefits of settling the conflict.

The core component of conflict is contradiction, which forms the tip of the triangle. Ramsbotham et al. (2005) define contradiction as 'the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived "incompatibility" of goals between the conflict parties' (ibid., p. 10). The authors note, however, that depending of the type of conflict (symmetric or asymmetric), contradiction is prompted by different aspects: In symmetric conflicts, i.e. 'conflicts between relatively similar parties' (ibid., p. 24) in terms of position and power, it is the parties themselves, their wishes and desires and their discrepant interests that induce contradiction, whereas in asymmetric conflicts, i.e. conflicts 'between dissimilar parties, such as between a majority and a minority or an established government and a group of rebels' (ibid.), contradiction results from the disputants, 'their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship' (ibid., p. 10).

According to Galtung, a full conflict is a characterised by all three variables and constitutes 'a dynamic process in which structure, attitude and behaviour are constantly changing and

influencing one another' (Ramsbotham et al. 2005, p. 11). Consequently, peace needs to be made from within, which is why various dynamic shifts need to occur in order for a conflict to be able to be resolved. These include de-escalating conflictual behaviour, altering hostile attitudes, as well as transforming contradicting relationships between or colliding interests of the conflicting parties, which underlie the structure of the conflict (ibid.). Therefore, peace can be understood as the transformation of conflict.

2.1.3. Positions and Interests

A prevalent tool in the field of conflict resolution is differentiating between the positions and interests of the conflicting parties, which helps 'opening communication channels' (Ireness 2011) by allowing for the distinction 'between the statements of each party and the emotions that are behind them' (ibid.).

Positions are statements about a party's stance on a certain issue or specific demands expressed by each party. Positions, which hardly ever shed light on underlying motives and values, belong to the field of 'communication and interaction as they are the articulation by the conflict parties of the often complex factors that make up a conflict' (ibid.). By defining a conflict based on positions, it often seems intractable given that, in such cases, one party demands something that the other party rejects completely. Consequently, it has proven to be helpful to look beyond surface statements and focus on the reasons underlying those positions given that this tends to make conflicts more solvable.

Interests are desires, values and concerns that motivate people to do and say certain things, i.e. to take on certain positions. They are thus 'the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions. […] Your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what cause you to so decide' (Fisher et al. 2012, p. 43). In many cases, reconciling interests is easier than reconciling positions as there are often multiple positions capable of accommodating them. By 'look[ing] behind opposed positions for the motivating interests, you can often find an alternative position that meets not only your interests but [the opposing party's] as well' (ibid., p. 44).

It should be noted, however, that the positions conflicting parties take on do not always correspond to their underlying interests. Sometimes, especially in armed conflicts, emotions appear to be an important factor as well, 'along with misconceptions that affect logical attempts to resolve conflict peacefully' (Ireness 2011).

2.1.4. Designing Sustainable Peace

Given that the analysis presented in chapter 4 examines the role of international mediators in helping to end the Havana peace process with the signing of a peace accord, this chapter provides an overview of elements typically included – albeit to various extents – in agreements ending violent internal conflicts. The variables presented hereinafter relate to the content as well as the context and process of peace agreements and are based on the results of a comprehensive analysis of 20 peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2010. These determinants outlined by Caspersen (2017) will provide a framework for the analysis of the mediators' role in shaping the peace agreement resulting from the Havana peace process.

First, the focus will be placed on the content of peace agreements and it will be briefly discussed how 'contentious issues relating to territory, security, power and justice' (Caspersen 2017, p. 10) may be addressed, before examining how these elements relate to the internal and external context of peace agreements.

2.1.4.1. Territory

According to Caspersen (2017)

> [t]he importance of territory does not depend simply on its material value. Territory is symbolically important as the home of the imagined community. […] Territory goes to the heart of statehood; it matters both for legitimacy and identity, and for security and political power. (p. 15)

This explains why 'the preference for autonomy arrangements is clearly pronounced [and why] the large majority of peace agreements analysed […] include some form of autonomy and [why] this is in most cases territorially defined' (p. 19).

Apart from mainly being outlined in territorial terms, autonomy is typically also 'ethnic, in the sense that it empowers a particular group with in the region' (p. 187). This popular form of 'ethnic autonomy' can also be referred to as

"simple" autonomy in the sense that [political] power-sharing is rarely included. Power is disaggregated and dislocated […], but central governments will seldom view autonomy as signifying a change in the basis of state sovereignty (p. 37).

The degree of autonomy granted, which tends to be contingent on 'the strength of the separatist position, including the degree of international support, and the intensity of the conflict' (ibid., p. 22f), the number of autonomous units established, the guarantees provided to ensure the autonomy as well as the level of power-sharing included in an agreement vary from one case to the other and may lead to frictions and instability, if not adjusted to the specific situation.

2.1.4.2.   Security

Even though ending the use of violence and arms constitutes an important step in the conflict resolution process, for peace to be lasting, more actions are required. Oftentimes new security structures need to be build, for instance, by reforming the armed forces of the country in conflict, by maintaining separate coercive forces, or by establishing more representative armed forces with either former rebels being integrated in the national army or by creating joint forces with shared command. Moreover, to address the issue of security, law and order typically need to be (re)imposed after an armed conflict 'and former rebels will in most cases have to be demobili[s]ed, disarmed and reintegrated into civilian society' (Caspersen 2017, p. 39). Especially the last aspect, however, can be quite problematic as the warring parties often tend to distrust each other, in particular following a full-scale war. In order to overcome this lack of trust and commitment, some form of security guarantee is generally necessary.

2.1.4.3.   Power

Including some form of power-sharing arrangements in peace accords aimed at ending intrastate conflicts seems to be the 'international community's preferred remedy for building peace and democracy after civil war' (Rothchild and Roeder 2005, p. 5). According to Caspersen (2017), there are different types of power-sharing mechanisms: territorial, military or political, depending on 'both the conflict context and the rest of the agreement' (p. 64). While the first two kinds of power-sharing mentioned tend to be preferred by central governments to '[reduce] the need for power-sharing at the centre' (ibid., p. 87), political power-sharing is generally more sought after by insurgent movements 'as it provides for

stronger guarantees against recentrali[s]ation (and possibly more prestige for the leaders)' (ibid.).

Even though Caspersen comes to the conclusion that political power-sharing is less frequently included in peace agreements than one might suspect, there is a dominant model: the consocialtional model. This approach seems to be the most popular as it 'addresses many of the demands of the parties to a separatist war; it guarantees them a share in power, it recogni[s]es the legitimacy of ethnic demands, and it accommodates claims to self-determination' (ibid., p. 67). Nonetheless, Caspersen also argues that including a consociational approach in peace agreements is 'associated with both short-term and longer-term negative consequences, including a lack of rights for "Others". […] However, in many conflicts it is the best that can be hoped for, if the state is to be maintained' (ibid., p. 88).

2.1.4.4. Justice

Caspersen's comprehensive analysis of multiple peace agreements revealed that most peace accords 'include references to human rights, and many also list rights and freedoms that are to be protected' (Caspersen 2017, p. 90). This usually serves as a means of 'confer[ing] international legitimacy onto an agreement' (ibid.). Nevertheless, Caspersen argues that the references made are oftentimes only of a very general and vague nature, thus 'remain[ing] rhetorical in many cases' (ibid.).

Furthermore, Caspersen notes that in the majority of cases, sizable non-dominant groups will 'find themselves excluded from the peace process and their interests and needs largely ignored in the resulting settlement' (ibid., p. 97), even though it would be crucial to include them to ensure sustainable peace. The rights of women and gender equality are thus seldom included despite the fact that 'women are disproportionately affected by the consequences of war' (ibid., p. 98). Similarly, the rights of children and the rights of victims as well as the issue of reparation rarely find their way into peace agreements given that individual rights are typically less important in separatist conflicts than group rights. What can, however, often be found in peace agreements are amnesty provisions since they

are justified as a necessary trade-off. Without them, combatants would be more reluctant to disarm, some leaders would refuse to sign peace agreements, and subsequent prosecutions would threaten, what is at best, a fragile peace (ibid., p. 103).

Another right that is likely to be included in peace agreements – albeit often rather flawed – is the right of refugees and IDPs to return to their homes.

All of the aforementioned contentual elements relating to territory, security, power and justice are interconnected. As a result, how successful each element is in ensuring sustainable peace, depends on the agreement as a whole. It is thus the entire agreement that needs to be considered when gauging the sustainability of peace since it is the "package deal" that decides whether the accord is accepted, recognised as legitimate by the public and sustainable or not. Therefore, there is no universal blueprint for a successful and sustainable peace agreement since it always depends on the specific conflict situation.

2.1.4.5.   Ripeness

While the content of peace settlements is often regarded as the cornerstone of successful conflict resolution, there is another equally important factor relating to the context of the dispute that needs to be taken into consideration: the 'timing of peace initiatives' (Zartman 2001). Campbell notes that '[r]ipeness is one of the absolute essences of diplomacy' and that '[y]ou have to do the right thing at the right time' (1976, p. 73). Zartman (2001) echoes this idea that

> [p]arties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At the ripe moment, they grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive (p. 8).

This means that '[g]etting an agreement is not about suddenly finding the magic formula that no one else had previously considered. The dynamics of the conflict have to change; the timing has to be right' (Caspersen 2017, p. 137) for parties to be able to see different possible solutions apart from their preconceived ones. A ripe moment thus marks 'a window of opportunity; the time when the de-escalation of a conflict can begin' (ibid., p. 139) and 'when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others' efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiation' (Zartman 2007, p. 232).

At the centre of Zartman's theory of ripeness lies the disputants' 'perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe' (Zartman 2001, p. 8). This concept is based on the idea that when belligerents are stuck in a conflict that they cannot possibly win, and when this deadlock becomes too painful to all sides (albeit not always to the same extent or for the same reasons), they seek a way out. In other words, if no military victory is in sight for either party but both suffer from the high costs of the conflict in terms of loss of life and/or financial strains, for example, they will look for a way to break the impasse and settle the conflict.

The other key component of a ripe moment – besides the MHS – is the parties' perception of a way out. This does not mean that they need to come up with a precise solution as to how to settle the conflict; they only 'have to perceive that […] a negotiated settlement is possible and less costly than the current status quo' (Caspersen 2017, p. 139). Based on these key factors Zartman established the following definition of a ripe moment:

> *If the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution to begin)* (Zartman 2000, p. 228f, emphasis in original).

To also take possible changes within the conflicting parties or contextual shifts into account, Caspersen names some factors that may add to the moment of ripeness of a conflict. These sources of ripeness include 'an external and internal legitimacy crisis, […], [t]he loss of external support, […] and the change in power' (Caspersen 2017, p. 140ff) or leadership within one or all of the conflicting parties as well as regime transitions.

2.1.4.6. Spoilers

Another contextual factor that impacts the process of conflict resolution is the existence of spoilers. Spoilers are 'leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it' (Stedman 1997, p. 5). As a result, they reject any agreement on principle and try to obstruct or nullify it. Stedman argues that peace processes inevitably lead to spoilers since it is seldom the case in armed conflicts 'for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even

if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace' (Stedman 1997, p. 7).

In order to eliminate the risk of spoilers potentially ruining the efforts of trying to settle a conflict, several strategies can be applied. While some note that spoilers need to either 'be marginali[s]ed, rendered illegitimate or undermined' (Ramsbotham et al. 2005, p. 174), Caspersen (2017) observes that as a first step, parties often try to bring potential spoilers on board of the peace agreement by 'address[ing] their demands [and trying to] find a solution that all negotiating parties consider acceptable' (p. 149). This is why appeasing tactics in the form of trade-offs, inducements and reassurances often find their way into peace accords.

Another strategy for dealing with spoilers is 'to insulate the negotiating leaders from societal pressures' (ibid., p. 151). This is typically done by organising secret peace talks involving only a very limited circle of people in often rather remote locations to make it easier for the negotiating parties to make concessions given that they are not exposed to the public's verdict.

In some cases, however, it might be more useful to eliminate the risk of spoilers by 'broaden[ing] the process and ensur[ing] a popular mandate [as] […] successful outbidding is *less likely* in a more democratic setting, since it is harder for spoilers to contest the legitimacy of elected signatories' (ibid., p. 154, emphasis in original). Such legitimacy may be achieved by putting a peace agreement to a public referendum which piles the pressure on the negotiating parties to adhere to the provisions made in the settlement. Since peace negotiations in most cases only seem to involve representatives of dominant groups, another option to broaden a peace process and to increase legitimacy is to include less powerful minority groups as well. By allowing non-dominant groups to be part of the negotiation process and by incorporating their interests and needs in the peace accord, 'it may be possible to build a stronger peace constituency' (ibid., p. 156) and reduce or even redress the risk of spoilers.

Apart from internal spoilers, external state or non-state spoilers can also endanger sustainable peace settlements. Intrastate wars are, according to Caspersen (2017),

> often fuelled by the involvement of external actors such as patron states, who may have an interest in ongoing conflict and contribute to its continuation, either directly (through military action) or indirectly (through support for leaders adopting maximalist positions) (p. 179).

To defuse an external spoiler '[s]uch external involvement will also often need to be reflected in the peace agreement, for example by including a trans-border dimension' (ibid.:184), even if this could lead to instability given that central governments tend to reject such measures.

2.1.4.7. External Involvement

Involving external actors in a peace process can potentially help the parties overcome existing obstructing differences and see more eye to eye. Furthermore, it may have a positive impact on the content of the negotiated deal and the way in which the different mechanisms and institutions that have been set up or are envisioned by the parties work. Consequently, third-party involvement 'has the potential to provide assurances and allay fears, provide much needed resources, reduce the risk of immobility, introduce flexibility, broaden the process and promote human rights' (Caspersen 2017, p. 161).

When intervening in a conflict, international actors have several options to do so. While international armed peacekeeping missions constitute one option – albeit not a very common one – non-military intervention is a much more common form of third-party involvement, which, as Zartman (2005) underlines, can help a conflict to become ripe by shaping the belligerents' perceptions which are essential for 'ripe moments': 'parties at conflict need help. They are too taken up with the business of conducting conflict to see the need and opportunities for a way out, unless someone helps them' (p. 13). External actors can thus assist in bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiating tables. For more details regarding the field of international mediation see the subsequent chapter.

2.2. Mediation

Since it is the objective of this thesis to analyse the role of the international mediators who participated in the Havana peace negotiations, this chapter brings the field of mediation into focus as

> [i]n civil war environments, bilateral negotiations are difficult because it is hard to make and keep commitments […]; therefore mediated negotiations become much more central to the achievement of negotiated outcomes (Greig and Regan 2008, p. 760).

In the following, the concept of mediation is defined, before different mediation strategies and determinants as well as the notion of mediator bias are discussed.

2.2.1. Definition

Despite much research on the subject of mediation, no universally accepted definition of the term exists to date. Instead, various researchers have put forward a variety of definitions. A rather broad definition was provided by Zartman and Touval (2007), who view mediation as 'a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution that they cannot find themselves' (p. 438). Other authors focus their attention towards the fact that mediation constitutes an instrument of peaceful conflict resolution and describes as such '[...] a conscious decisional and behavio[u]ral process whereby parties to a conflict [...] take steps to transform, de-escalate, or terminate a conflict in an acceptable way' (Bercovitch and Diehl 1997, p. 300). Along similar lines though focussing more on the non-coercive nature of the concept, Bercovitch et al. (1991) define mediation as

> a process of conflict management where the disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organi[s]ation to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical violence or invoking the authority of the law (p. 8).

Kleiboer (1996) provides a similar definition according to which '[i]nternational mediation [is] a form of conflict management in which a third party assists two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force' (p. 360). Greig and Regan (2008) note that

> [m]ediation […] involves a process of using an outside party to help antagonists find what purports to be a small set of possible solutions among an otherwise wide range of unacceptable alternatives. […] Mediation is voluntary, requiring both the willingness of one party to offer to bring the warring parties together and the agreement of all warring parties to participate (p. 761).

Some scholars indicate that despite mediation being 'a voluntary process in which the parties retain control over the outcome (pure mediation), […] it may include positive and negative inducements (mediation with muscle)' (Ramsbotham et al. 2005, p. 29f) as well.

In summary, eight key features of international mediation can thus be listed: In international mediation, (a) a third party, (b) who is not itself part of the conflict relationship, (c) intervenes from the outside in a negotiation process (d) between two or more conflicting parties (e) with the intention of achieving a balance of interests through appropriate strategies in order to be able to (f) fully or partly resolve a conflict. In doing so, a mediator (g) does not use coercion;

however, a mediator may (h) bring his or her own resources into the negotiation process in order to directly or indirectly apply pressure on one or more of the conflicting parties.

2.2.2. Determinants of Mediation

In order for mediation to take place, two conditions must be met: On the one hand, the warring parties need to seek or accept mediation; on the other hand, a third party needs to be willing to provide mediation (Wall et al. 2001, p. 371). With regards to 'the conditions under which parties to a conflict accept third-party mediation' (Zartman and Touval 2007, p. 438.), Greig and Diehl (2012) argue that possessing the ability to negotiate an agreement fairly and effectively together with holding some kind of 'leverage, that is, resources or influence' (p. 118) are important parameters that a mediator should meet. Furthermore, Greig and Regan (2008) note that 'the reputation of a potential mediator' (p. 767) also plays a crucial role for disputants when selecting a mediator. This reputation can derive

> from direct prior experience [, meaning that t]he more involved a particular mediator has been within a specific conflict, the more likely that the warring parties will trust that mediator to be impartial and work toward successful outcomes, increasing the likelihood that disputants will accept future offers of mediation from that party (Greig and Regan 2008, p. 676).

In case belligerents have no previous first-hand experience with an external party offering mediation, examining the mediator's past mediation efforts in other disputes can give the conflicting parties an indication of their reputation, expertise and credibility, and thus help them '[decide] whether to accept an offer of mediation' (ibid., p. 768). According to Greig and Regan 'those mediators who are "tried" and have been successful will potentially provide a better foundation for facilitating a settlement from the perspective of the disputants' (ibid.). Shared '[c]olonial heritage, cultural affinities, and prior political or religious affiliations' (ibid.) are also aspects that may cause disputants to accept an offer of mediation.

For a mediator, providing mediation in an internal dispute is associated with certain costs, such as 'reputational, political, and strategic liabilities that can result from offers that are not accepted and/or mediations that fail to achieve desired results' (Greig and Regan 2008, p. 762). Hence, any third party providing mediation needs to have a certain interest in the country at war to be prepared to bear these expenses, regardless of the outcome. The interests of a mediator in settling an internal conflict in a foreign country can, amongst others, be of an

economic, strategic or altruistic nature. In fact, '[m]ultiple factors influence the willingness to act, including but not necessarily limited to, trade, formal alliance partnerships, and historical ties between warring parties and potential mediators' (ibid., p. 762). The determinants influencing third parties to accept a mediating role or to offer to mediate are thus – similar to those of the belligerents – often grounded on geographical proximity to, ideological affinity or political inclination with the conflict country, on prior involvement in the dispute or on their linguistic, cultural or historical affiliation with the disputants.

2.2.3. Mediation Strategies

Mediators can employ different styles of mediation or mediation strategies. A popular categorisation (which will also be applied as part of the analysis carried out in chapter 4) was provided by Beardsley et al. (2006), who distinguish between three different forms of mediation strategies: *communication/facilitation*, *formulation* and *manipulation*.

When it comes to the first strategy, some researchers, notably Zartman and Touval (1985), favour the use of 'communication', whereas others, such as Bercovitch (1996), give preference to 'facilitation' because 'it encapsulates a broad range of low-level activity better than Touval and Zartman's […] communication' (Beardsely et al. 2006, p. 63). The first mediation strategy is frequently employed in situations where parties to a conflict do not interact and/or speak directly with one another. When adopting a *communicative* or *facilitative* approach, mediators act 'as a channel of communication' (ibid.) to '[ensure] continued discussion and dialogue' (ibid.) between disputants. It is therefore the role of the *communicator/facilitator* to initiate dialogue between conflicting parties, to convey messages between them, to forge relations and provide clarifications, if needed. In addition, *communicators/facilitators* help conflicting parties overcome possible 'information gap[s]' (Druckman and Iaquinta 1974) by offering them access to resources required to 'best estimate the range of mutually preferable outcomes' (Beardsely et al. 2006, p. 6).

Formulation comprises different mediation techniques, including the suggestion of innovative solutions in case negotiations are gridlocked. Moreover, procedural tactics, such as deciding

on where to hold negotiations, setting up the negotiation agenda or overseeing the discussions, belong to the second strategy as well, as Bercovitch and Houston (2000, p. 175) point out.

A key feature of the third mediation strategy is that manipulators use power 'and other resources' (Zartman and Touval 1985, p. 39) as a means of altering the expectations of the conflicting parties or coercing them into finding an agreement. To this end, mediators commonly resort to carrot-and-stick tactics, meaning that they either allure the conflicting parties with promises of benefits or gratifications (i.e. "carrots") to find a mutually accepted solution, or use punitive measures (i.e. "sticks") to trigger a certain kind of action (ibid., p. 40). Following Beardsely et al. (2006),

> [c]arrots may include direct compensation, the enactment of favourable economic policies toward the actor(s), or other diplomatic concession, [whereas] [s]ticks might include economic and/or diplomatic sanctions, as well as the threat of direct military intervention (p. 64).

Manipulation therefore entails 'a substantive contribution to negotiations' (ibid.).

These three mediation strategies are often used in combination. Given that '[b]alance and context are the keys' (Gartner 2014, p. 286), however, a mediator should always take the conflict situation at hand into consideration when choosing a mediation strategy.

2.2.4. Mediator Bias

The question of mediator bias is also a divisive issue in conflict resolution literature. On the one side, some scholars hold the view that impartiality is an essential prerequisite for mediators as neutrality is crucial for building and fostering trust between the conflicting parties and the mediator. Bercovitch and Gartner (2009b) argue that in order for belligerents to perceive third parties as credible, and thus mediation as effective, mediators need to display 'impartial [behaviour], acceptable to the disputants, and deserving their trust' (p. 26). Similarly, Jackson (1952) claims that 'it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a single mediator who was distrusted by one of the parties, to carry out any useful function' (p. 129). Young (1967) also finds that

> the existence of a meaningful role for a third party will depend on the party being perceived as an impartial participant (in the sense of having nothing to gain from aiding wither protagonist and in the sense of being able to control any feelings of favo[u]rism in the eyes of the principal protagonists (p. 81).

Assefa (1987) supports this view stating that there is broad consensus that neutrality regarding the conflict matter and 'independence from all parties to the conflict [are indispensable] requisites for the successful mediator' (p. 22). According to these arguments, the legitimacy of mediation 'is [thus] contingent on the neutrality of the third-party' (Gartner 2014, p. 278).

On the other side, Touval (1975), notes that 'impartiality is neither an indispensable condition of their [mediators'] acceptability, nor a necessary condition for the successful performance of an intermediary's function' (p. 53). Hence, mediator bias does not necessarily need to be an impediment to effective mediation outcomes. Some scholars even contend that 'mediator bias is […] an important positive determinant of the outcome of mediation efforts' (Gartner 2014, p. 279). Svensson (2009) argues that mediators who are close to one of the belligerents 'can manipulate this special relationship – for instance, by withholding or increasing the resources that they give to "their" side' (p. 448f). Hence, partial third parties, i.e.

> mediator[s] from within the conflict, whose acceptability to conflictants is rooted not in distance from the conflict or objectivity regarding the issues, but rather in connectedness and trusted relationships with the conflict parties (Wehr and Lederach 1991, p. 87),

oftentimes possess more leverage than impartial mediators, as Touval (1975), Touval and Zartman (2001), and Zartman (1995) point out as well. Leverage allows biased mediators to exert influence over the disputants and 'press the parties to make concessions' (Svensson 2009, p. 448). Therefore, bias is often seen as 'a more important asset for mediators than their neutrality' (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014, p. 6).

Although researchers are still divided over the role of mediator bias in the field of international conflict resolution, it can be said that the impact of mediator bias is both complex and dependent on the specific circumstances of and the warring parties to the conflict.

2.3.   Conclusion

The second chapter discussed various theoretical aspects of the field of conflict resolution and mediation that are essential to the analysis presented in chapter 4. Following an overview of the definitions of key terms, i.e. conflict and peace, attention was paid to the structure and dynamics of conflicts. The role of positions and interests in conflict resolution was then explained briefly, before emphasis was placed on elements typically included – albeit in

different forms and to varying degrees – in peace agreements aimed at settling intrastate conflicts and establishing sustainable peace. These variables outlined in subchapter 2.1.4. will be used to frame the analysis of the role of the international mediators presented in chapter 4.

Subsequently, the focus was placed on the field of mediation given that the role of the international mediators will be at the centre of the empirical analysis. After defining the term mediation, factors influencing whether mediation is accepted by the conflict parties or offered by third parties in the first place were presented. Furthermore, different strategies available to mediators were examined, which will also be part of the analysis outlined in chapter 4. Lastly, the aspect of mediator bias was discussed and the two opposing camps that exist among mediation scholars were presented.

3. The Colombian Conflict – State vs. FARC

This chapter focuses on the Havana peace process. Following an overview of the conflict background, the structure and agenda of the Havana peace process will be outlined and the actors involved in the peace process will be mapped out. Moreover, the interests and positions of the conflicting parties will be examined before attention will be paid to the international mediators engaged in the peace process.

3.1.   Conflict Background

Colombia is marked by a long history of violence that can be traced back to the end of its Spanish colonial history and the unfair land distribution that followed. After declaring its independence in 1810, the country went through a centuries-long power struggle between its main political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, which eventually culminated in a civil war known as "La Violencia", lasting from 1946 to 1958 (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p. 5). This period was marked by intense fighting between various non-state armed groups as well as by the persecution of members of peasant organisations and workers. In order to end this war, the two parties created the *National Front Agreement*, 'a constitutionally sanctioned power sharing agreement between the conservative and liberal parties, which meant that they alternated power' (UCDP 2020). This accord eliminated political competition by prohibiting all other political parties from participating in the political sphere. Moreover, the National Front aimed at fighting communism which it perceived as a major threat. Following the triumphant Cuban revolution in 1959, the then conservative Colombian government feared a similar fate, which is why the government started to '[attack] the "communist enclaves"' (ibid.) in Colombia to prevent them from potentially overthrowing the government.

In the wake of these assaults, neglected and oppressed communities in remote rural areas turned into leftist insurgent groups determined to fight for the rights and interests of peasant people, particularly a fair distribution of land and reduction of poverty. It was in this context that the guerrilla movement FARC was formed in 1964 with the aim of toppling the government and reforming the agricultural sector. Apart from the FARC, other left-wing

insurgent groups rose as well, namely the *National Liberation Army* ELN (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*), the *Popular Liberation Army* EPL (*Ejército Popular de Liberación*), and the *April 19 Movement* M-19 (*Movimiento 19 de April*). The FARC, however, became the most influential guerrilla group (ibid.).

As a result of Colombia's highly diverse landscape, encompassing mountain regions, remote areas and tropical rainforests, the central government struggled to gain full control of all of the vast and complex territory, thereby making it easier for the FARC to expand its presence and activity (GMH 2013, p. 119). Moreover, due to their engagement in unlawful practices, such as drug trade and rent extraction, the guerrillas managed to gain sufficient money and power to threaten the state's supremacy (Hanratty and Meditz, 1990).

In order to achieve their goals of overthrowing the regime and achieving socio-economic reforms, they

> carried out bombings, murders, mortar attacks, sniper attacks, kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military acts against Colombian political, military, civilian, and economic targets […] [and] used landmines extensively (UNHCR 2014).

As a means of protection against guerrilla attacks, large-scale landowners and drug lords started to assemble private right-wing paramilitary squads towards the end of the 1970s. Even though it was the objective of these private armies to fight the insurgents, they soon also got involved in narco-trafficking. The conflict in Colombia, which had originally started out as a politically and socially motivated one, thus developed into narcotised violence leading to thousands of casualties and saw several levels of intensity over the years.

In 1982, the FARC decided to add the suffix EP (*Ejercito del Peublo, People's Army*) to its official name as well as to reorganise its structure by establishing a command and control mechanism. At the same time, the FARC also began to recruit a growing number of militants from urban areas, and henceforth grew increasingly more aggressive in terms of military action. After years 'of widening and worsening conflict' (Arnault 2014, p. 21), the Colombian government and the FARC attempted to settle the conflict three times between 1982 and 2002. However, in view of the parties' absence of credible commitment and numerous violations of trust, none of their endeavours succeeded. Only about twenty years later did the dispute seem

ripe enough at last to be settled in a peaceful way as both parties suffered from a 'mutually hurting stalemate' (Zartman 2000, p. 228) for the first time since the outbreak of the conflict. Hence, given that they perceived peace as sole viable alternative to continuing an unwinnable but painful conflict, the parties agreed to come back to the negotiation tables 2011.

3.2.   Paving the Way to Havana

Juan Manuel Santos took office as President of Colombia in 2010. Initially, Santos continued his predecessor's hard-line policy towards the FARC and maintained military pressure on the guerrillas which led to the assassination of 53 high-ranking FARC members (Delgado 2015, p. 829). Despite this notable victory, however, the government became aware of the impasse it found itself in since a complete military triumph over the guerrillas was highly improbable. Moreover, Santos experienced increasing pressure from civil society and the international community, who called for the end of the deadly attacks and violations of human rights, and for finally 'bring[ing] economic and social stability in the State' (Savonitto 2018, p. 20). As a result, Santos eventually decided to change his approach towards the FARC and was willing to re-engage in peace talks.

To prove his commitment, he not only publicly recognised the existence of an armed conflict for the first time in history but also started to refer to the FARC as a full and equal party to the conflict rather than just a 'terrorist group' (Brodzinsky 2016). Moreover, he publicly acknowledged that the government had committed various mistakes in past negotiations and – since the government had allegedly learnt its lessons – Santos vowed that he was 'bound not to repeat them' (Gomez-Suarez and Newman 2013, p. 820) this time around.

Following the assassination of several important guerrillas under "Plan Colombia", an 'extensive and controversial security, military and development policy programme […] backed and financed by the U.S.' (Franz 2017), and the natural death of the FARC's leader, the FARC's offensive capacities were drastically reduced and 'their sphere of action [limited] to geographically far-flung areas' (Herbolzheimer 2016, p. 2). Subsequently, the FARC's ultimate aim of defeating the Colombian government using military power became elusive. In addition, various left-wing politicians and former guerrilla fighters from other Latin American

countries had proven that it was possible to become a leading political figure by playing by the rules of politics instead of by relying on warfare: Evo Morales, a former guerrilla fighter, became president in Bolivia; Dilma Rousseff, the first female president in Brazil, was part of a left-wing and Marxist guerrilla movement; José "Pepe" Mujica, former President of Uruguay, as well as Daniel Ortega, the current President of Nicaragua since 2007, also used to be guerrilla fighters; Rafael Correa, a left-wing politician became President of Ecuador; and in El Salvador, ex-combatants of the *National Liberation Front Farabundo Martí*, an umbrella organisation of leftist guerrilla movements, also managed to come to power (Hennigan 2013).

All of these developments ultimately led to a shift in the FARC's way of thinking and added to the 'moment of ripeness' (Zartman 2000, p. 228). Therefore, and because the FARC acknowledged the Santos administration's new approach, the guerrilla group's new leader Rodrigo Londoño eventually accepted Santos' proposal to re-open negotiations.

3.3. The Havana Peace Process

Given that the Havana peace process is at the centre of the present thesis, this chapter deals with it in more detail. Following an overview of the structure and agenda of the peace talks, the actors involved as well as the interests and positions of the disputants and the mediators will be discussed.

3.3.1. Structure

The Havana peace process can be divided into three stages: secret preparatory meetings (2011), secret exploratory talks (2012) and formal, public peace negotiations (2012-2016).

In the wake of the moment of ripeness described in the previous chapter, the Havana peace process began with indirect contact between the belligerents in the form of a secret correspondence between a member of the FARC's 'secretariat and Henry Acosta, a Colombian economist who was the contact between Bogotá and the FARC-EP for many years' (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p. 10). Shortly after Santos took office in August 2010, Acosta approached the president to tell him about the secret exchange of letters with the guerrillas, whereupon Santos reached out to FARC leaders, suggesting that two government

officials meet with two FARC representatives to confidentially re-open a peace dialogue. With Venezuelan facilitation, four secret preparatory meetings between envoys from the Colombian government and the FARC were organised 'between March and October 2011, first along the border between Colombia and Venezuela and then on a Venezuelan island' (ibid.).

In order to increase their level of credible commitment and the international standing of the negotiations, the parties decided to include external actors in the peace process (Gomez-Suarez and Newman 2013, p. 820). Trying to avoid past mistakes when too many international actors had been involved (some of which had also been very powerful and strongly biased against the FARC, such as the U.S.), the government was adamant to reduce the number of third parties. Even though no formal mediator was designated to 'oversee the peace process, there were international actors, which engaged in the process formally' (Baysal 2019, p. 156): Cuba and Norway were asked to act as guarantors, while Venezuela and Chile were asked to accompany the process.

Moreover, the disputants appointed their delegations during the preliminary meetings. Each delegation was to comprise up to 30 people, ten of whom would be allowed to actively take part in the negotiations. Both delegations also had experts advising them on specific issues. In addition, the conflicting parties decided on where to hold the formal negotiations. While past peace talks had taken place in demobilised zones in Colombia, Santos was keen to not follow suit out of fear that the FARC was to use the demilitarised zones to train new fighters again. Hence, Havana and Oslo were chosen as venues. Furthermore, unlike his predecessor Pastrana, who had agreed to a ceasefire during the negotiations, Santos refused to do so to eliminate a potential breach of trust.

The second phase of the peace process began in February 2012 in Havana and lasted until August 2012, consisting of ten sessions in total, with 'each lasting between four and eight days' (Nylander et al. 2018, p. 2). Cuba had been chosen as location for the secret exploratory meetings as it 'offered the seclusion and privacy required for talks that had confidentiality as one of their key principles' (ibid.). It was during this second phase that the parties decided that Norway and Cuba 'had to be present at [all] meetings, listening to the discussions without

intervening' (Norad 2018, p. 25). Venezuela and Chile, on the other hand, were expected to solely act as accompanying countries. Instead of constantly being present in Havana, the accompaniers were to only attend the last session of each round of negotiation. At the end of the second phase, 'a General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, providing a framework and agenda for the talks' (ibid., p. 21) was signed. This agreement comprised issues that had to be discussed (see chapter 3.3.2. for more details).

Public negotiations were launched in Norway in October 2012, but were soon relocated to Havana 'where they continued for more than 50 rounds' (CRS 2016, p. 15). The fact that negotiations were officially initiated outside Colombia showed that the peace process was not only supported by countries from within the region, but also by the international community in other parts of the world. Moreover, given that the FARC was still considered to be a terrorist organisation by the U.S. and the European Union (EU), launching negotiations in Oslo further attested to the strong international commitment to finally bringing an end to the conflict.

Due to the fact that the Colombian government and the FARC wanted a peace process 'for Colombians, by Colombians' (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p. 4) all meetings were chaired and directed by the two conflicting parties, thus allowing them to retain full ownership over the negotiation process. Even though the disputants were in charge of steering the negotiations, different sub-commissions were established in the course of the third phase to allow for more effective progress. There was, for instance, a *Sub-commission on Gender,* a *Sub-commission on Ending the Conflict* and a *Sub-commission on Security Guarantees.* Additionally, several working groups were established (Norad 2018, p. 5f).

Following a four-year negotiation process, the disputants finally agreed on a peace accord in August 2016. This peace agreement was subjected to a public vote as a means of securing popular acceptance and increasing its legitimacy. Since Colombians narrowly opposed the accord, another round of negotiations had to be organised to amend the agreement so that it addressed the "No" side's concerns and critiques. A new and improved peace agreement was signed in November 2016 and promptly approved by the Colombian Congress (UCDP 2020).

Amongst others, this final accord stipulated a definitive ceasefire, the 'demobilisation and disarmament of the FARC and the measures put in place to help the reintegration of the guerrilla organisation's lowest ranks' (Colombia Reports 2016).

In June 2017, the guerrillas started to lay down their arms and the ex-combatants vowed to – from then on – pursue their objectives through political engagement. In order to ensure that the disputants complied with the provisions of the final peace accord – especially those regarding the reintegration of the former guerrillas into civilian life and security guarantees –, the United Nations (UN), which had already been involved in a technical sub-commission during the formal phase, set up a mission in Colombia to monitor and verify the correct implementation of the peace deal in the post-settlement phase (UCDP 2020).

3.3.2. Agenda

The framework agreement signed by the parties at the end of the second phase included the following six-point agenda: (a) rural development and land policy, (b) political participation, (c) cessation of conflict, (d) illicit drug trafficking, (e) victims' rights and reparations, and (f) implementation, verification and ratification of the agreement (Norad 2018, p. 22), which addressed both the root causes as well as the consequences of the conflict. Furthermore, the agenda provided a schedule for the post-negotiation phases, which comprised the setting up of procedures and bodies required to implement and assess the agreement. The different items on the agenda were not tackled in chronological order, but were rather approached in terms of complexity, with the most controversial and sensitive matters (i.e. victims' rights, ending the conflict and implementation) only being discussed at the end as they required a lot more confidence in the opposing party (Nylander 2018, p. 3).

Rural Development and Land Policy

The first agenda item was to find a solution for rural development, which had been one of the FARC's initial motivations to take up arms. It was the parties' aim to bring about a comprehensive reform of rural areas to ensure the equal distribution of land as well as to

reduce rural poverty and the disparities between the countryside and urban areas. A mutually acceptable solution to this issue covering an array of measures, such as the creation of

> a Land Pool to provide free access to land to peasants, priority[s]ing women and displaced people; […] [ensuring] the formali[s]ation of properties, officially assigning lands to owners who were not registered as such, [and] […] allow[ing] for land restitution for displaced people (Daşlı et al. 2018, p. 20)

was reached in May 2013. Apart from measures relating to land rights, the disputants agreed on improving infrastructure as well as access to financial aid and social services in rural areas, with the purpose of enhancing the quality of life of Colombians living in the countryside.

Political Participation

Regarding the issue of "political participation", which had also been one of the key interests of the guerrillas from the outset of the conflict, the belligerents reached an agreement in November 2013. The goal of their solution was to make the political system in Colombia more democratic and pluralistic by ensuring that people living in rural areas participated in elections and by increasing 'the status and rights of opposition parties and various social groups that had been especially marginalised by the conflict' (IFIT 2018, p. 8f). Moreover, the agreement aimed at safeguarding the security of political figures, promoting women's participation in the political field and fostering the role of civil society organisations.

Illicit Drugs

Regarding the subject of illicit drugs, the parties managed to come to an agreement in May 2014 which focused on eliminating the cultivation of illicit coca crops and the production of illegal drugs in remote areas by offering financial aid to peasants in return for them replacing their illicit crops with other agricultural products. To address the issue of drug consumption, the parties agreed to establish a *National Programme against Drug Consumption* as well as a *National Programme for Drug Consumers* (Daşli et al. 2018, p. 20).. Moreover, the accord included stricter prosecution of organised crime and drug trafficking 'through the mapping, investigation, and judicial procedures against corruption and illegal trade' (ibid.)

Victims' Rights and Reparations

While the parties managed to compromise on the first three matters fairly quickly, negotiations regarding the sensitive issue of "victims' rights and reparations" went on for more than a year and a half. The agreement reached in December 2015 following numerous victim hearings and the consultation of the Sub-commission on Gender set up a comprehensive system of transitional justice, comprising four principal institutions: (a) a Truth Commission, i.e. 'an extra-judicial mechanism ensuring the rights of victims and access to truth' (Daşli et al. 2018, p. 20); (b) a *Special Unit for the Search for Disappeared People*; (c) a *Comprehensive Reparation Programme for Victims*; and (d) a *Special Jurisdiction for Peace* (ibid.).

Cessation of Conflict

An agreement regarding the end of the conflict and disarmament was reached in August 2016 and stipulated the conditions of a bilateral ceasefire. Moreover, the parties agreed on the process of disarmament which was to be carried out under UN supervision and also monitored by the belligerents. Moreover, former FARC soldiers were to be relocated 'temporarily in 22 Transitory Zones of Normali[s]ation […], and six smaller ones, to facilitate demobilisation' (Daşli et al. 2018, p. 20). The agreement also specified the terms of the political and socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

Implementation

In order to ensure that all provisions and terms of the final peace agreement were implemented as envisioned, the parties agreed to establish a special Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement in August 2016, thereby formally bringing the negotiations to a close (Daşli et al. 2018, p. 20).

3.3.3. Actors Involved

Even though the belligerents and most of the other actors involved in the Havana peace process have already been mentioned, this chapter helps to better understand their relations with each other. For this purpose, a conflict map was drawn up.

Figure 2: Conflict map (Moser 2020). The conflict map key was adapted from Fisher et al. 2000, p. 21.

The Colombian government and the FARC were the two conflicting parties. The smaller blue circles encased by green circles represent the international mediators involved in the Havana peace process: Cuba and Norway acted as guarantors, while Venezuela and Chile took on the role of accompanying countries. The Colombian civil society and the UN d also played a role in the peace process, although they were only included in the third negotiation phase as well as the post-negotiation stage.

As can be seen above, the FARC's circle in Figure 2 is marginally smaller than the government's, meaning that the guerrillas were a little less powerful in the negotiations (especially in terms of information and support). This is why third-party involvement was crucial for the FARC as it helped the insurgents surmount 'information gaps' (Druckman and Iaquinta 1974). Given that the mediators made relevant documents as well as technical and legal experts available for consultation to the FARC, two arrows were added between these actors in the conflict map to indicate the prime direction of influence.

Cuba and Norway had a close alliance with each other as well as strong relations with Venezuela and Chile, resulting from the fact that the mediators had to collaborate closely throughout the process, thus reconciling their different interests and measures in order to drive the negotiations forward (Norad 2018, p. 50). Relations between the international mediators and the conflicting parties were also strong.

While the UN enjoyed fairly strong relations with all the actors depicted in the conflict map above, in particular the Colombian civil society, ties between the Colombian population and the guerrillas were broken and/or blocked after decades of random assaults on members of the Colombian civil society, which for their part had long been pressing for the conflict to be resolved using military power. These frictions and the distrust on the part of the population persisted to a certain degree throughout the entire negotiations. Conversely, the relationship between the Colombian civil society and the Santos administration was mostly positive, with Colombian backing the government's policies by and large (Norad 2018, p. 45). Due to the population's rejection of the initial final peace agreement, however, a thinly dotted line was used in Figure 2 to show the public's discontent with the agreed terms. The revised final peace agreement contained solutions for all six conflict issues depicted in orange boxes.

Due to the fact that the U.S. had previously been a prominent actor in the armed conflict and provided considerable support to former administrations in their military campaigns against the guerrillas within the framework of 'Plan Colombia' (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p. 79), which had ultimately contributed to the 'moment of ripeness' ripeness' (Zartman 2000, p. 228) and the belligerents' decision to reopen peace talks, the U.S. was added to the conflict map as an external actor. It must be mentioned, though, that the U.S. did not play a direct role in the actual negotiation process.

The subsequent chapter outlines the conflicting parties' interests and positions in the peace negotiations based on Moser's (2020) findings, before the interests and positions of the international mediators will be examined.

3.3.4. Interests and Positions of the Conflicting Parties

As mentioned in chapter 2.1.3., parties to a conflict usually have different interests in the dispute. This was also the case in the Havana peace process. From the very outset of the conflict, the guerrilla movement's interests

> reflected [its] overwhelmingly peasant origins. Since its founding, the FARC-EP has focused on issues of political exclusion, access to state resources, and national security strategies such as the role, orientation, and structures of the military and the police (Chernick 2009, p. 66f).

Due to the fact that the 1958 National Front Agreement had prohibited any and all parties outside the scope of the two power-sharing parties, i.e. the Liberals and the Conservatives, to be active in politics, opening up the political sphere had thus historically been a major driving force in the FARC's struggle to defeat the government. One of the FARC's main interests was therefore to achieve political participation and be recognised as a legitimate political actor. Given that the FARC feared attacks on (former) guerrillas engaging in politics, the insurgents persisted in their demand for adequate and comprehensive safety guarantees and security measures. Moreover, the FARC was interested in improving access to land as well as in eliminating poverty in rural areas. With regard to the equal distribution of land, the FARC took on a fairly hard-line position and requested 'increased access to land, the formali[s]ation of land rights, and the provision of inputs and credit to increase land productivity for small farmers' (Kaplan and Albertus 2012). Additionally, the FARC demanded to have the authority over '9 million hectares of land […] [by establishing] autonomous "peasant reserve zones"' (Beittel 2016, p. 21). Furthermore, the guerrillas held the position that a ceasefire should be introduced from the start of the peace process.

Regarding the interests of the Colombian government, it can be said that Santos' utmost priority was to end the armed conflict (Herbolzheimer 2016, p. 3). Apart from reaching a negative peace (see chapter 2.1.1.), the Santos administration was, however, also interested in achieving a positive peace (see same subchapter). This is why the government's position was to address and tackle the root causes of the armed conflict as well. While former administrations had primarily been concerned with solving the issue of illicit narco-trafficking, the Santos administration endeavoured to not only end the conflict but also to achieve

structural changes in the field of rural development as well as the political and socio-economic reintegration of former FARC fighters into society. As a result, the government's interests moved closer to the interests of the guerrillas (Beittel 2016).

Seeking to avoid errors made by his predecessors in previous peace negotiations, Santos decided not to succumb to the FARC's demands unless the government received any kind of concessions or safeguards in exchange. The government's position was thus to not embark on a peace process by declaring a bilateral ceasefire. This meant that hostilities continued throughout the negotiations. It was only in the context of the national elections in 2014 that the fighting stopped for a certain period of time following the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by the FARC and the ELN. However, this ceasefire ended in 2015, when the FARC assassinated eleven military officials. Moreover, Santos was adamant 'that the Colombian military would not cede any territory for a demilitari[s]ed zone nor roll back its operations against illegal armed groups' (ibid., p. 16). While the FARC adopted a rather unyielding position on land distribution, the government was less rigid in its stance. In fact, it was even prepared to 'compensate […] victims of the conflict with economic reparations and provide land restitution to victims of forced displacement and dispossession' (ibid., p. 15).

At first glance, the belligerents' positions seem rather different. In this regard, however, Fisher et al. (2012) point out that oftentimes 'behind opposed positions lie shared and compatible interests' (, p. 44). Consequently, it is important in negotiations to focus on 'reconciling [the conflicting parties'] interests rather than positions' (ibid.). Since 'look[ing] behind opposed positions for the motivating interests' (ibid.) can be difficult, international mediators were asked to participate in the Havana peace process to support the warring parties in 'find[ing] an alternative position that meets […] [both their] interests' (ibid.).

As mentioned in subchapter 2.2., third parties are usually motivated by their own interests when accepting to 'manage an on-going conflict' (Greig and Regan 2008, p. 761). This is why the subsequent chapter focusses on the international mediators, i.e. Norway, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile, all of whom contributed – albeit to varying degrees – to settling the conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC.

3.4. International Mediators

This chapter examines the reasons why the two conflicting parties chose Norway, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile as mediators in the Havana peace process as well as the external actors' own interests in the resolution of the conflict. First, attention will be paid to the two guarantor countries before the focus is placed on the accompaniers.

3.4.1. Interests in and of the Guarantor Countries

Norway

One of the reasons why the conflicting parties offered Norway the guarantor role was that the Scandinavian country enjoyed a good international reputation and possessed extensive experience in conflict resolution. '[P]eace diplomacy [is] a feature in Norwegian foreign and development policy' (Norad 2018, p. 74) and the reason why Norway has already mediated in many armed conflicts around the world after the end of the Cold War: Norway assisted in brokering peace between Israel and Palestine, North and South Sudan as well as in Afghanistan, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Somalia, to name a few disputes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019a). As mentioned in chapter 2.2.2., Greig and Regan (2008, p. 767) argue that reputation is an important determinant for conflicting parties to choose a particular mediator. Hence, following Greig and Regan's observations, Norway's expertise and reputation as well as its 'credibility in the international community' (Norad 2018, p. 74) represented some key factors in the decision of the warring parties to involve the Scandinavian country in their peace process. In addition, several '[i]ndividuals with first-hand experience of other peace talks facilitated by Norway vouched for its professionalism' (ibid., p. 24). The fact that an unbiased, impartial mediator oftentimes makes it easier to generate a climate of trust and confidence between conflicting parties (see chapter 2.2.4.) was also one of the reasons why Norway was asked to participate in the Havana peace process.

Moreover, Greig and Regan (2008) and Melin (2011) argue that another common criterion for asking a third party to participate in a conflict settlement process is the existence of a shared history with one or all of the disputants. Of course, this reasoning does not apply regarding

Norway and Colombia given that the two countries have no common past. Nonetheless, it was in spite of – or rather because of – the absence of shared colonial ties that the Colombian government and the FARC considered 'Norway's peace and reconciliation efforts […] as sincere in that they [were] […] not motivated by political or economic self-interest' (Norad 2018, p. 74). The belligerents thus assumed that Norway would remain neutral 'when acting as facilitator in a peace process' (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019b). Out of fear of potentially being at a disadvantage in the negotiation process given its status of a non-recognised non-state actor, the FARC, in particular, advocated for an impartial mediator. This mind-set supported Kleiboer's (1996) observations outlined in chapter 2.2.4. according to which an unbiased mediator may foster an environment of mutual trust.

Moreover, the conflicting parties felt comfortable with having Norway present at the negotiation tables due to its prior engagement in past peace talks and the fact that 'Norway had had a humanitarian and peace-making presence in Colombia for a decade or so before the election of President Santos in 2010' (Norad 2018, p. 24).

Another important factor why Norway was offered the opportunity to act as guarantor was that Norway is not a member state of the EU: Due to the fact that the EU regarded the FARC as a terrorist organisation, it was neither in the position to finance the peace process nor to 'provide funds to the FARC-EP delegation' (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p. 11). Thanks to its independence, however, Norway was not only able to publicly disassociate itself from the EU's stance but, on top of that, also to provide '[flexible funding mechanisms and a significant amount of development assistance' (Norad 2018, p. 74). Therefore, Norway's ability to bear a substantial share of the costs of the Havana peace process was another reason for involving Norway as guarantor country.

In addition, the fact that Norway is not part of the EU enabled the country 'to perform the role of a mediator without being encumbered by the slow process of reaching internal consensus within European states' (Haspeslagh 2011, p. 174), thus making it much easier to '[tackle] legal matters regarding FARC's status as a proscribed organisation' (Norad 2018, p. 24). In light of these parameters (i.e. international reputation, comprehensive expertise in conflict

resolution, non-alignment and the ability to provide funding), it was no surprise that the disputants offered Norway a mediating role.

Norway's own interests in participating in the Havana peace process can be explained from two possible standpoints: On the one hand, there is the perspective taken on by, amongst others, the *Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation* according to which Norway agreed to act as mediator due to its core values of altruism, neutrality and solidarity. On the other hand, Norway is said to having acted as mediator based on its interest in fostering sustainable peace in its own region, especially in the North Atlantic. This perspective promoted by the international media, *inter alia*, is grounded in the belief that settling conflicts anywhere on earth is conducive to creating 'a more peaceful and well-regulated world order' (Norad 2018, p. 74). By extension, putting an end to the armed conflict in Colombia and establishing peace between the Colombian government and the FARC would consequently also have positive effects on Norway's direct neighbourhood, which is why the Scandinavian country accepted the mediation offer (ibid.).

Cuba

As outlined above, Norway was chiefly asked to act as mediator due to its objective and neutral 'outsider' position. Cuba, by contrast, was able to bring more of an insider's perspective to the process because of its close geographical location and its many parallels with Colombia. This falls into line with Greig and Regan's (2008) and Melin's (2011) observations concerning a mutual colonial history and shared cultural and/or linguistic elements between disputants and their mediators (see chapter 2.2. for more details). Until the 19th century, both countries belonged to the Spanish Empire, and therefore share the same history of colonialism, traditions, cultures and language. It was due to these commonalities that the warring parties felt close to Cuba and comfortable enough to have the island nation take on a guarantor role during the peace process.Apart from this sense of familiarity, the belligerents also asked Cuba to act as guarantor since it had already 'played a critical role in bringing the FARC-EP to the table and because its involvement heightened the process's credibility with the FARC-EP and neighbo[u]ring countries' (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p.10f).

Furthermore, Cuba benefitted from first-hand experience regarding the conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC as it had been involved in previous peace processes, thus underlining Greig and Regan's (2008) observations mentioned earlier, according to which conflicting parties tend to appoint third-party mediators based on 'previous historical interactions between [them]' (ibid., p. 773).

Another reason why Cuba was invited to perform mediating tasks was that Santos and his administration felt connected to the Castro brothers given that the former Cuban presidents had urged different guerrilla movement in various Latin American countries to refrain from using violence and 'use more peaceful means to gain power' (Gomez 2016) instead. On top of that, the Castro brothers had expressly called on the FARC to resume talks with government to finally put an end to the deadly conflict. It should be mentioned, though, that not only the Colombian government felt 'alliance ties' (Melin 2011, p. 703) with Cuba. The FARC felt close to Cuba as well, which it saw as 'the ultimate revolutionary icon in Latin America […] [and as] the country with the greatest credibility among guerrilla movements in the region' (ibid.). The FARC's alliance to Cuba was thus rooted in ideological ties, especially considering that the founding fathers of the guerrilla movement had strongly been inspired by the Cuban revolution.

Cuba's geographical location was also a decisive factor: As mentioned earlier, Santos rejected the FARC's demand to host the negotiations in special demilitarised areas throughout Colombia out of concern that the guerrillas could exploit such zones and use them as a potential site for regrouping, rearmament and training new fighters (as the guerrillas had done in the past). Therefore, Cuba was chosen as venue for the fourth peace process since the 'island with [its] state-run media apparatus provided the perfect setting for delicate peace talks' (Gomez 2016) given that it was 'far enough away to remove the negotiations from the daily occurrences of politics and war but close enough that the government delegation and others could fly back and forth with relative ease' (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p. 32). Being the host country, Cuba played a role in the logistics of various stages of the negotiations by default. Given this automatic involvement in the peace process and considering all the aspects mentioned above, offering a mediating role to Cuba seemed to be a logical step.

When it comes to Cuba's interests in settling the Colombian conflict, several aspects are worth mentioning: Firstly, Cuba was willing to act as a mediator since this role allowed the country to help bring sustainable peace, stability and security to Colombia as well as to the entire region. Secondly, Cuba was interested in improving its reputation as peace promoter among the international community. Since the country was aware that helping to end 'the longest running armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere' (ICTJ 2009) would certainly have a positive impact on its image, Cuba was more than happy to take on the guarantor role.

Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the decision of the FARC's founding fathers to take up arms to fight for their interests had been strongly influenced by Cuban guerrillas (UDCP 2020). Therefore, Cuba had always been implicated in the Colombian conflict – at least in some ideological ways. Given that Cuba thus felt responsible for the outbreak of the conflict to a certain extent, it was keen on playing a role in settling the dispute as well (Gomez 2016). On top of that, Cuba was interested in strengthening its economic links internationally and aware of the fact that enhanced trade relations between Colombia and Cuba would derive much benefit from sustainable peace in the region. Hence, Cuba accepted the offer to participate as guarantor country in the Havana peace process.

Following this overview over the reasons why Norway and Cuba were appointed as mediators and their interests in the resolution of the Colombian conflict, the focus will now be shifted to the accompanying countries.

3.4.2. Interests in and of the Accompanying Countries

Venezuela

Venezuela was asked to act as accompanying country since it had already been involved in bringing the FARC to the negotiation tables with former 'Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez […] [pressuring] the guerrillas to engage in peace negotiations' (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p. 10). By and large, both conflicting parties had good relations with Venezuela given that 'Venezuela and Colombia share historical ties and both consider Simon Bolivar to be their liberator' (Smilde and Pantoulas 2016, p. 3). The guerrillas trusted Venezuela because Chávez had shown solidarity with the FARC on several occasions in the past and had provided support

and shelter to the guerrillas. '[S]everal members of [the FARC's] […] leadership [had even] […] liv[ed] in Venezuela' (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p. 10) for a certain period of time. Furthermore, Chávez refused to list the FARC as terrorists, which is another reason why the FARC wanted to see their "ally" involved in the Havana peace process. 'Due to its influence over the FARC-EP and its role during the secret phase, there was consensus [among the parties] that Caracas needed to have a role in the public phase' (ibid., p. 11).

Despite the fact that Colombia had fairly good economic relations with Venezuela given that the country had historically been one of Colombia's major trading partners and generally exercised a lot of influence over Latin America,

> [t]he government […] did not want to give them a role as a guarantor, which would have put president Chávez at the core of the process – something unpalatable to many Colombians. The parties, therefore, created the role of an "accompanying country" (ibid.).

Given its ideological and economic influence over the disputants, Venezuela had a significant amount of leverage to bring to the peace process, which was instrumental in keeping the conflicting parties engaged. The belligerents were aware of the fact that if the Colombian government was to violate the ground rules and agreements reached during the peace talks, Venezuela would 'commercially isolate the country and shelter the guerrillas' (Zuleta et al. 2013, p. 109). In turn, if the FARC showed a lack of commitment, the Venezuelan government could threaten to list the group as terrorist organisation and refuse to protect or shelter them, if need be (ibid.). Venezuela's capability of applying this carrot-and-stick principle was thus also an asset both sides valued.

Venezuela agreed to act as accompanying country because it knew that a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Colombia would benefit itself as well given that it would 'significantly improve issues of governance along the [shared] border' (Smilde and Pantoulas 2016, p. 4). Moreover, the Venezuelan government was interested in enhancing 'social, political and economic development' (ibid.) in Venezuela, which, however, was hindered by illegal drug trade, kidnappings, extortion and violent attacks resulting from the Colombian conflict. Settling the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government and finding a solution for the problem of illicit drug cultivation and trafficking was thus a key interest of

Venezuela. Furthermore, Venezuela was aware that being involved in the Havana peace process would

> [confound] [its] […] "the-enemy-of-my-friend-is-my-enemy-" relations with the U.S. [b]ecause […] positively engaging Colombia in a way that the U.S. value[d], […] [would reduce] the latter's ability to portray Venezuela as a rogue state and an international pariah (ibid.).

This thought also motivated Venezuela to participate in the Havana peace process as it allowed the country to improve its international reputation.

Chile

In contrast to the other three international mediators, Chile had no prior engagement in any peace talks in Colombia and only got involved in the Havana peace process as of August 2012 (Norad 2018, p. 50). The reasons why Chile was asked to act as accompanying country are based on a strategic combination of principles, values and interests (Guerrero et al. 2017, p. 40). Like Cuba and Venezuela, Chile shared a similar historical background with Colombia. All countries were once part of the Spanish Empire, and hence share close cultural and linguistic connections.

However, whilst Cuba and Venezuela are the founders of the *Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America* (ALBA), an intergovernmental organisation based on the principles of solidarity, justice, cooperation and complementarity that acts as a 'political, economic, and social alliance in defence of independence, self-determination and the identity of peoples comprising it' (Servicio Nacional de Aduana del Ecuador 2020, translated from Spanish by the author), Chile – like its neighbouring country Colombia – is part of the *Pacific Alliance* that defends deep regional integration based on 'the free mobility of goods, services, resources and people' (The Pacific Alliance 2020). Hence, it was important for Colombia to involve Chile in the peace process in order to establish some form of political-regional balance between the two models possibly located at the antipodes of regional integration (Guerrero Soto 2016, p. 123). The ideological affinity that existed between President Santos and the then President of Chile, Sebastián Piñera, was thus an important aspect explaining why the Colombian government wanted Chile to be involved in the peace process (ibid.).

Another reason why Chile was asked to act as accompanying country was that, similar to Norway, it benefited from a certain prestige in peace-building, justice and international law: After all, it is the highest ranked Latin American country in the *Global Peace Index* (rank 27 out of 163 in 2019) (IEP 2019, p. 8f) and has historically sought peace in the region and in the world (Guerrero Soto 2016, p. 124). Given that Chile also possessed first-hand experience regarding the settlement of an internal conflict made it an even more logical choice as it allowed 'the parties […] [to] take advantage of its experience on transitional justice to enrich their conversations' (Segura and Mechoulan 2017, p. 12).

On the other hand, putting an end to the armed conflict in Colombia was also in Chile's own interest: Given the interrelations between trade, economic agreements, peace and security, Chile was interested in settling the conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC as political and social stability in Colombia would entail economic/commercial benefits for Chile as well (Guerrerro Soto 2016, p. 124). Moreover, Chile hoped that peace in Colombia would improve conditions for foreign investments and foreign trade, and thus foster the creation of new business opportunities (ibid.). In addition, Chile agreed to act as accompanying country because being involved in the Havana peace process also boosted its multilateral foreign policy through its active diplomacy for peace and international security, and hence strengthen its position in the international arena (ibid.).

Furthermore, a geopolitical factor played a role in Chile's decision to act as accompanier. The mediation offer extended to Chile in 2012 was made at a time when Chile and Peru were involved in a maritime dispute before the *International Court of Justice*, and when Bolivia was announcing its intend to file a similar lawsuit against Chile before the same body. This context also explains Chile's interest in the Havana peace process as Chile saw the need to strengthen its relations with like-minded countries in the region in order to counteract the particularly adverse relations with its other neighbours (ibid., p. 124f).

When looking at the two accompanying countries it becomes apparent that the conflicting parties decided to appoint the international mediators for different reasons and that the external actors themselves also had different interests in participating in the resolution of the

conflict. Thanks to the various determinants, however, the international mediators were able to bring different assets to the negotiation table, and even though

> [d]uring the public peace negotiations, Venezuela and Chile played less direct roles than Norway and Cuba[, given that] […] these accompanying countries were not continuously present at the negotiations, […] [their roles were] complementary to that of the guarantors (Norad 2018, p. 50).

3.5.   Conclusion

The third chapter focussed on the Havana peace process. First, an overview of the conflict background was given which explained how the FARC managed to become the strongest guerrilla movement in Colombia. Subsequently, the structure of the peace process was discussed in more detail by elucidating the three different stages (i.e. the secret exploratory talks, the secret preparatory talks as well as the formal public meetings). Additionally, the six-point negotiation agenda was presented, together with a brief outline of what the belligerent parties agreed upon in the final peace accord in relation to each issue. Chapter 3.3.3. provided a conflict map illustrating the actors involved in the peace talks and their relations to each other, before chapter 3.3.4. discussed the interests and positions of the Colombian government and the FARC. Lastly, the international mediators took centre stage as the conflicting parties' reasons for choosing Norway, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile as mediators as well as the external actors' own interests in settling the Colombian conflict were examined.

Following this theoretical part, the subsequent chapter will focus on the empirical analysis conducted by the author in order to find out in which ways the international mediators contributed to the successful outcome of the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC.

4. Analysis of the International Mediators' Role

This chapter focuses on the qualitative analysis of secondary sources conducted by the author. As outlined in chapter 1, twelve texts were analysed to identify the role of the international mediators in the Havana peace negotiations. First, the research findings will be presented with regards to SQ1 (see chapter 1.1.), before they will be discussed in relation to SQ 2 and SQ 3.

4.1. Results

In order to provide answers to the first research sub-question, the results obtained from the secondary analysis of the twelve texts depicted in Table 1 (see chapter 1.4.) will be presented in the following. As mentioned in chapter 1.1., SQ1 tries to identify the international mediators' contributions to the Havana peace negotiations. In the course of the analysis, the collected data were assigned to seven categories (see chapter 1.4.), which will subsequently be discussed one after the other. It should be noted that not all mediators contributed to all of the categories. Where applicable, the findings relating to the guarantors will be presented first.

4.1.1. Capacity Building

Given the asymmetry in knowledge and resources that existed between the two conflicting parties (with the FARC as insurgent group being much more limited in terms of capacity), Norway and Cuba made it their mission to provide the disputants with access to information and technical experts on various matters, and especially to increase awareness among the FARC delegation regarding relevant stipulations of international law. In fact, transitional justice became one of the focus areas of the Norwegian mediators. Hence, the guarantors – and Norway in particular – provided the necessary funding to invite experts on transitional justice and international law to Havana so that they could assist and advise the members of the FARC's negotiation team, thus helping the guerrillas overcome the knowledge imbalance that existed between the disputants (Norad 2018, p. 32ff).

Moreover, Norway initiated the "New York Group" in early 2013, an expert seminar and ideas factory where justice issues were explored before officially being addressed by the conflicting

parties in Havana. The New York Group, named after the location of its first meeting, thus served as a form of informal back channel in the context of which Colombian and international experts, in the presence of representatives of the guarantor countries, were able to discuss the issue and challenges of transitional justice, exchange experiences and best practices as well as test new models in a confidential setting (Nylander et al. 2018, p. 6; Norad 2018, p.32ff). The New York Group convened more than ten times in the course of the Havana peace process. Not only was it 'a Norwegian idea […] [but it] was [also] supported financially and technically by Norway throughout its lifetime' (Norad 2018, p. 32) and '[t]wo of its members were legal advisors to the FARC delegation in Havana' (ibid.).

Despite the New York Group not being formally linked to the official peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC, some of the proposals established during the expert meetings '(such as transitional justice perspectives, which later became part of the special jurisdiction for peace or the truth commission) did find their way into the negotiations in Havana and eventually into the peace agreement' (ibid., p. 34). As noted in text 9, a high-ranking FARC member and several people closely affiliated with the guerrilla delegation therefore regarded the New York Group as having been instrumental in bringing a number of proposals to the formal negotiation table. Furthermore, the New York Group was also praised for helping the FARC reconsider its views regarding transitional justice and understand the scope of international law (ibid.).

Given that the experts of the New York Group explored relevant justice issues from different perspectives before these topics were on the negotiating parties' agenda, the Colombian government and the FARC were able to profit from the experts' findings, thus making it easier for the disputants to reach an agreement on the highly sensitive subject of transitional justice. It can therefore be said that the guarantors promoted capacity building by ensuring that the conflicting parties had access to relevant information and expert advisors in the field of transitional justice and international law to help them overcome information gaps, level the playing field. This helped negotiations to move forward.

Another capacity-building measure was taken by Norway in the context of reaching a bilateral ceasefire and the process of disarmament. To find a mutually acceptable solution regarding the end of direct violence and the laying down of arms, the Sub-commission on Ending the Conflict was established by the conflicting parties as a means of including military experts from the national armed forces as well as FARC combatants in the peace talks. According to text 1, Norway had prepared the Colombian security forces 'for their participation in the talks in a [special] training programme stretching over more than 15 years' (Nylander et al. 2018, p. 5). Despite the fact that this programme had been launched several years prior to the beginning of the Havana peace process, its aim had been to equip the national military forces with the competencies necessary for participating in peace negotiations, which is why it can also be regarded as a Norwegian contribution to the peace process in terms of capacity building.

4.1.2. Confidence Building

During the secret preparatory talks in Havana the delegations of the Colombian government, the FARC and the Norwegian mediators were accommodated in close proximity to one another. Given the high level of distrust between the disputants during this early stage in the peace process, the Norwegian delegation regularly offered its accommodation known as '[t]he "Norwegian House" or Casa 23 […] [as] space for informal and immediate exchanges' (Nylander et al. 2018, p. 2). This provided the conflicting parties with the opportunity to meet on neutral ground outside the formal negotiation setting, thus fostering the creation of trust. Since this proved to be an easy yet fairly successful confidence building measure, the Norwegian residence served as neutral and informal meeting point during the official negotiation phase as well. As mentioned in text 1, this informal setting was not only used by members of the core negotiation teams to create a closer rapport, but also by other members of the government's and the FARC's delegations to foster relations (ibid.).

Apart from providing a neutral meeting space, Norway took other confidence-building measures as well. For instance, Norway designated the issue of demining as a further priority area given that Colombia

is one of the most landmine-contaminated countries in the world [with] […] 10,189 people in Colombia […] [having been killed by] landmines – 3,885 (38%) of whom were civilians, including 995 children and youths [between 1982 and 2012] (Norad 2018, p. 36).

As part of this focus area and on request of the conflicting parties, Norwegian mediators closely collaborated with the Norwegian humanitarian organisation *Norwegian People's Aid* (NPA) on a pilot programme aimed at demining two Colombian states in central and north-western Colombia between May 2015 and December 2016. The belligerents commissioned the NPA to lead this project due to the restricted number of international civilian demining experts, the organisation's many years of experience in the field of 'indigenous rights land distribution and marginalised groups in […] [Colombia and Ecuador]' (ibid., p. 37) as well as due to Norway's tireless lobbying.

During the project proposal phase, Norwegian mediators facilitated meetings on the technical details of the demining process between the NPA and the conflicting parties in Havana. Amongst others, it was the Norwegians' task to make sure that the NPA was up to date regarding the progress of negotiations, the dynamics between the disputants as well as possible political and operational challenges. Moreover, Norway had to ensure that all demining talks were in line with existing arrangements between the belligerents and upcoming discussions on the implementation of the final peace agreement. Norwegian mediators remained involved during the entire duration of the demining project and even accompanied the parties on field visits.

As noted in text 9, in one of the discussions regarding

> the shape and form that a demining pilot project could have, one member of the Norwegian facilitation team pointed out that the pilot project was a form of "mini-disarmament", and that the model agreed at that point might develop a precedent and relevant experience for disarmament in general (Norad 2018, p. 38).

This was indeed the case, as the project later served as model for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, particularly with regard to cooperation between the conflict parties and some practical aspects. Given that Norway was strongly involved in the organisation of this project as well as the fact that the project was used as point of reference for certain aspects of the final peace agreement and helped improve confidence between the conflicting parties in Havana and 'FARC members and army officers on the

ground and beyond' (ibid., p. 39), it can be regarded as a successful contribution of the international mediators to the peace process. According to text 3, Cuba and the *International Committee of the Red Cross* (ICRC) supported this project as well.

The accompanying countries' behaviour and actions also contributed greatly to the creation of trust between the belligerents. According to one of the Chilean chief mediators, Milenko Skoknic, at the beginning of the peace process

> the general perception was that Chile was [...] [participating] because Colombia [had] asked it to, and Venezuela was going because the FARC wanted it to. [...] But what [the accompaniers] had to [do] [...] was to destroy that perception with [their] [...] work [...] [and show through their actions] that [they] [...] both had a duty to both sides in the same way. And that [they] [...] were not going to be the transmission belts of what one party wanted or what the other party wanted (Skoknic 2016, as quoted in Guerrerro et al. 2017, p. 53).

To make clear that 'Chile [was] [...] not the accompanier of Colombia and Venezuela [was] [....] not the accompanier of the FARC' (Guerrerro et al. 2017, p. 47, translated from Spanish by the author), the representatives of Chile and Venezuela took care to always appear together at meetings and act jointly to eliminate any doubts about their impartiality. Moreover, as Luis Maira, the second key representative of the Chilean mediation team, points out in text 12, the Venezuelan and Chilean mediators even stayed in the same residence in Havana to pre-empt any secret meetings or phone calls with one of the conflicting parties. They thus made great conscious efforts to position themselves as neutral and unbiased mediators which allowed the disputants to quickly trust in the sincerity of the accompaniers' support.

Whenever the accompanying countries arrived in Havana towards the end of each negotiation cycle, they met with the two conflicting parties – one after the other – to hear about the latest developments from both sides individually. In these meetings, the disputants also informed the accompaniers about their demands and expectations regarding the issue at hand. After having listened to both perspectives and the interests of both sides, the accompanying countries then tried to help the parties find common ground by suggesting points of rapprochement to move negotiations forward. Thanks to their close relations with each other and their clearly demonstrated impartiality, the accompaniers' input was perceived as positive and helpful (Universidad Miguel de Cervantes 2016, Guerrerro et al. 2017, p. 53f).

4.1.3. Crisis Management

The Colombian peace process went through several moments of crises in which the guarantors assumed an important and active part in defusing the tensions between the disputants as well as in encouraging their efforts to move negotiations forward. The deepest crisis occurred from April to July 2015 as a result of a FARC attack on 15 April 2015 that led to the killing of eleven Colombian army soldiers. In response to this attack, President Santos ordered an air strike against the guerrillas which killed 26 members of the FARC, including a former member of the FARC's delegation in Havana. Thereupon, the FARC suspended the unilaterally proclaimed ceasefire of the previous year. To prevent negotiations from being broken off and to help the belligerents overcome this crisis, Cuba and Norway had to cooperate even more closely to keep the conflicting parties focused on the peace negotiations in Havana. In order to help the parties rebuild trust and stay committed in their peace efforts, the guarantors initiated a series of informal meetings and suggested that the belligerents shift their attention to 'issues that could be easily resolved, in order to bring them back on track, make progress and inspire confidence in the peace process' (Norad 2018, p. 42). This is why Cuba and Norway suggested, *inter alia*, that the disputants issue a joint statement on the demining project, which was carried out successfully in two Colombian states at the same time. In addition, the guarantors also decided to publish a joint communiqué aimed at de-escalating the crisis by helping the Colombian public understand the scale of the crisis and calling on the disputants to end the armed conflict and agree on a bilateral ceasefire, thus '[allowing] the parties to save face and return to the peace talks as responsible parties' (ibid.).

Another moment of crisis followed in the wake of the plebiscite in autumn 2016, when the initial final peace agreement was put to a public vote and rejected. Prior to this plebiscite, the guarantors had supported the O*ffice of the High Commissioner for Peace* and other civil society organisations in carrying out information strategies and campaigns to better inform the Colombian public about the contents of the final peace agreement. After the rejection of the peace deal, the guarantors continued to support civil society organisations in explaining the peace deal to the public as well as the conflicting parties in their renegotiations to help them overcome this setback. Even though Norway and Cuba were not present at all 'post-plebiscite

sessions due to the fast pace and parallel nature of the renegotiations[, t]hey were […] available for informal and bilateral discussions at the parties' request' (ibid., p. 44). This signalled the international mediators' continuous and on-going support for the Havana peace process, 'a factor that helped prevent the peace deal from collapsing' (ibid., p. 44).

4.1.4. Gender Inclusion

As mentioned in text 9, Norway is a strong supporter of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, one of the UN's most important resolutions with regards to peace and security. As such, it has placed a lot of emphasis on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in both its domestic gender policy and foreign policy for years. It is thus hardly surprising that the Norwegian mediators defined the issue of gender as another focus area of the Havana peace process to ensure that a gender perspective was taken into account in the negotiations by inviting women to participate in the peace process. Norway had not only made sure to achieve a gender balance in its own mediation team but also pushed the disputants from the beginning of the secret preparatory phase 'to include women in their delegations [as well] and promoted the gender perspective as an integral part of the peace process' (Norad 2018, p. 26f). One of the Norwegian mediators even reiterated 'the centrality of victims and that women's voices had to be heard as part of an effort to ensure ownership of the peace process' (ibid.) in her speech at the formal opening of the public negotiations in Oslo.

Apart from supporting UN Women, the UN's entity for gender equality and women empowerment, in Colombia, Norway also collaborated with various Colombian civil society organisations in the field of women's and LGBTQI+ (Lesbian, Gay, Bi, Trans, Queer and Intersex) rights. Cooperation between the Norwegian mediation team and UN Women was carried out on a political as well as on a programmatic basis. As pointed out in text 9, UN Women and Norway jointly developed strategic initiatives to increase awareness in relation to the significance of the WPS agenda. 'There was an exchange of information between UN Women and both Norway's embassy in Bogotá and its Special Envoy for the Peace Process, and between the Norwegian team and […] UN Women […] in New York' (Norad 2018, p. 28). This channel of communication and information exchange remained active and open

throughout the entire peace process and emphasised the needs and interests of women in Colombia.

As noted in texts 2 and 9 (Daşlı et al. 2018 and Norad 2018), UN Women organised two National Summits of Women and Peace in Colombia in 2013 and 2016 thanks to Norway's financial and political contributions. At the first summit, approximately 450 women from across the country came together to translate their demands into concrete proposals which the UN entity subsequently forwarded to the parties in Havana with the help of the Norwegian mediators (Norad 2018, p. 28). Moreover, the successful outcome of the first summit strengthened the disputants' decision to include women in their negotiation teams (ibid.).

Following the formal inclusion of the gender issue in the peace talks, the two guarantors also offered technical assistance relating to women's participation. A major milestone in the guarantors' endeavours to promote a gender perspective in the negotiations as well as in the final peace accord was the establishment of a special Sub-commission on Gender in September 2014 (see texts 1 and 4, i.e. Nylander et al. 2018, Salvesen and Nylander 2017). A similar commission had been set up in the course of the Sri Lankan peace process in the early 2000s, which had also featured Norwegian mediation. As part of their efforts to show the disputants possible ways of including a gender perspective in the Havana peace process, Norwegian mediators presented the gender mechanism used in the Sri Lankan peace process to the belligerents, which the conflicting parties in Colombia agreed to adopt in a slightly adapted form. This Sub-commission on Gender was charged with examining 'with the support of national and international experts, that the agreements reached and an eventual final agreement will have an appropriate gender approach' (Norad 2018, p. 28f).

In addition to encouraging the creation of this body, Norway, together with Cuba, provided technical assistance to the Sub-commission in the form of a national gender expert. These two experts assisted the Sub-commission, amongst others, in the organisation of a visit of former female guerrilla fighters to Cuba so that they could 'share their experiences of the laying down of arms and the transition to civilian life' (ibid.) with the disputants. Furthermore, Norway provided an international gender specialist, who contributed to the peace process as advisor by

writing notes about lessons learned from other peace processes and making recommendations for 'gender-sensitive text[s] or supporting the reviews of the partial agreements' (ibid., p. 29).

On top of that, Norway also provided funding for '[t]hree delegations of women's groups and lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex (LGBTI) representatives [that] were invited to the peace negotiations during the autumn of 2014 and spring of 2015' (ibid).

4.1.5. Logistics

Handling logistical aspects of the peace process was also one of the international mediators' tasks. Given that Norway and Cuba hosted the negotiations, they were automatically charged with providing logistical support to the conflicting parties. Since the FARC was regarded as an illegal armed movement in Colombia and since several members of the guerrilla group 'were wanted for crimes in many counties around the world' (Nylander et al. 2018, p. 4), leaving Colombia posed some legal difficulties for the FARC's delegation. To ensure a maximum level of security and discretion, the guarantors – with the help of the ICRC and 'diplomatic and legal guarantees from the Colombian government' (ibid.) – were thus assigned to organise the FARC delegation's transport to Cuba.

As mentioned in text 1 (Norad 2018) and chapter 4.2.4., women's and LGBTQI+ delegations were brought to Havana to give these non-dominant groups a voice in the formal negotiations and in relation to the issue of transitional justice. In this context, the guarantors provided logistical support as well by assisting in the organisation of the delegations' visits to Cuba.

Moreover, following an impasse regarding the subject of reparations for the conflict victims, the Colombian government and the FARC recognised – thanks to the input of the guarantors – that giving victims a voice in the negotiations as well was instrumental to reaching sustainable peace. Therefore, the belligerents issued invitations to victims' representatives to come and participate in the peace talks in Cuba. As a result, 'five groups of 12 victims (more than 60% of whom were women) [...] met with the peace negotiators in the second half of 2014' (Norad 2018, p. 35). These visits were organised by the UN, the Colombian National University and the Episcopal Conference. The task of the guarantors not only consisted of acting as informal

conduit between the organisers and the belligerents, but also of accompanying the victims' delegations on their journey to Cuba and of 'facilitat[ing] encounters – for example, between some women victims and women from both negotiation delegations' (ibid.).

Dealing with logistics was not an exclusive responsibility of the guarantors though. As noted in text 6, Venezuela was also entrusted with some logistical tasks at the very beginning of the peace process given that it facilitated the initial direct meeting between representatives from the Colombian government and the FARC near the Venezuelan border and also hosted some of the first secret exploratory meetings (Smilde and Pantoulas 2016, p. 3f).

4.1.6. Rural Development

As noted in texts 10 and 11, shortly after the signing of the final peace accord, the Cuban government announced a scholarship programme aimed at providing former FARC fighters and young adults from low-income families in rural areas in Colombia with the opportunity to study medicine in Cuba free of charge as a means of helping them reintegrate into society and improving access to health care in remote areas. Moreover, Cuba's idea behind the programme was to continue to support Colombia in the post-settlement phase and offer young people a promising future away from drug trafficking and other illegal activities to ensure a more stable society and rural development. Over the course of five years, 1,000 scholarships were to be rewarded, most of which have already been granted (EFE 2018, teleSUR 2018).

Furthermore, the demining pilot project mentioned in chapter 4.2.2., which was partly launched due to Norway's lobbying efforts and strongly supported by the Norwegian mediation team throughout its implementation, also contributed to rural development in the two Colombian states concerned as it led to the removal of '66 landmines and one item of unexploded ordnance [...] [on 40,723 square metres of land]' (Norad 2018, p. 38).

4.1.7. Support

Regional / International support

To promote the international community's support for the Havana peace process, the guarantors agreed to host the negotiations and co-operated with UN Women, the ICRC as well

as other international and Colombian non-governmental organisations on various issues. Norway further underlined its commitment to the post-settlement phase by jointly launching 'a global anti-landmine initiative in Colombia' (Norad 2018, p. 39) with the U.S. that was aimed at making 'Colombia mine-free by 2021' (ibid.). This multilateral project was supported by more than 20 countries and the EU which pledged more than 105 million U.S. dollars in total for the project's implementation. It was strategically launched towards the end of the Havana peace process to emphasise the international community's support for the final negotiation phase, and especially Norway's on-going support.

In addition, the guarantors sought to increase the Colombian population's level of support for the peace talks by making public announcements in case of major developments, e.g. when partial agreements were reached, to ensure that significant breakthroughs were clearly and coherently communicated to the Colombian population and the international community. Given the conflicting parties' oftentimes diverging perspectives on what messages to communicate to the public and how to best do so, press statements issued by the disputants were a little incoherent at times. Hence, as mentioned in text 9, the guarantors were asked to communicate important advances to the public from an impartial stance, thus increasing the likelihood of enhancing the population's understanding and support for the peace process.

Providing and raising regional support for the peace talks was also one of the principal tasks of the accompaniers: As outlined in texts 5, 7 and 12 (Guerrero Soto 2017, Guerrero 2016, and Universidad Miguel de Cervantes 2016), Chile proposed the formation of 'national groups of friends for the peace in Colombia' (Guerrero Soto 2016) in several countries as support mechanism and regional network of cooperation and preventive diplomacy. The first national group of friends was established in Chile in September 2015. By April 2016, seven Latin American countries (El Salvador, México, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Costa Rica) had established similar bodies, which comprised 80 members in total. The novelty of this initiative lay in the fact that groups (or committees) of friends were formed within several countries of the region and were composed of influential national figures of each country, occupying strategic political, social, academic, diplomatic and cultural positions, such as ministers, MPs, diplomats, and other government officials as well as former presidents.

Traditionally, groups of friends encompassed several nation-states that came together around themes of common interest to promote them in the international sphere. However, Chile was convinced that the construction and consolidation of peace in Colombia could not solely be based on the roles played by states and the international organisations they formed, but that the role of non-state actors and civil society was indispensable for providing legitimacy to and ensuring sustainability of the peace process. This is why Chile started to encourage the creation of national groups of friends throughout the region.

While some national groups (in Brazil, Paraguay and Costa Rica) had more broad objectives, such as to 'support the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC' (Guerrero Soto 2016, p. 128, translated into English by the author), others had more specific ones: El Salvador, for instance, placed emphasis on showing solidarity with the Havana peace process, thus adding a more regional dimension, whereas the Argentinian objective took it even a step further and explicitly mentioned the provision of support during the final negotiation phase and the post-agreement period as well. Chile's aim was to closely monitor the peace dialogues and issue statements or opinions in support. Even though the national groups of friends' contributions to the Havana peace process were rather limited during the formal negotiation phase (amongst others, the national groups published statements of support and organised seminars or briefings with senior authorities in their respective countries), they were important as they had the capacity to communicate with the conflicting parties in Colombia and help them overcome difficulties and build mutual trust.

Moreover, Chile emphasised its continued support for Colombia post-settlement, by developing a project called Chile's *Experience in Truth and Reconciliation and its potential for the Colombian post-conflict* in 2015, whose members had played key roles in Chile's transition to democracy, and were thus able to provide first-hand advice and support to Colombia. Once the final peace agreement had been signed between the disputants, Chile even made a formal commitment at government level to provide on-going support to the Colombian society in the post-conflict period and to ensure that the conflicting parties adhered to the final terms, particularly in the areas of transitional justice and support for the victims of the conflict (Guerrero et al. 2017, p. 51).

Furthermore, Chile contributed to the Havana peace process on a multilateral level by supporting the *Multi-Donor Trust Fund of the United Nations for Post-Conflict in Colombia* (Guerrero et al. 2017, p. 52). Similarly, Chile reaffirmed its commitment to peace in Colombia through its support for the *Global Demining Initiative for Colombia*, announced in February 2016, which sought to help Colombia fulfil its obligations under the Ottawa Convention. Chile also showed its commitment by supporting regional initiatives, such as the *Organization of American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia*, of which it is a member, as well as global initiatives, such as the *UN Verification Mission* in Colombia (ibid.).

Venezuela also played an important role with regards to regional support of the peace process as shown in text 6. Especially in the beginning of the peace process, Venezuela had been instrumental as it had helped initiate peace talks between the Colombian government – one of Venezuela's key trading partners – and the guerrilla group – which hoped for shelter and protection from its neighbouring country, if need be. Thanks to the leverage and influence Venezuela had over the conflicting parties due to the close political-ideological relations between former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and the FARC and the economic ties between the two countries, it was able to keep the disputants at the negotiation tables. With regards to the FARC, Venezuela's support had been particularly crucial as it not only provided the guerrillas with the backing of an internationally recognised democratic state, but also brought left-wing legitimacy to the fact that the FARC engaged in a formal peace process. Even when Chávez fell ill and was hospitalised in Venezuela and Cuba in 2013, he still continued to meet with the FARC leadership to show his on-going support for the peace process. Chávez' successor, President Nicolás Maduro, met with President Santos in early 2016 to reiterate Venezuela's continuous support for the peace process and the post-settlement phase (Smilde and Pantoulas 2016, p. 4).

Financial Support

Apart from providing international support to the peace process, rendering financial assistance was another crucial contribution of the guarantors to the peace talks. Cuba and Norway, in particular, were not only financially involved in the negotiation phases, but were also officially involved in the *Implementation, Monitoring, Verification and Dispute Resolution*

Commission of the Final Peace Agreement (often referred to by its Spanish acronym CSVR). In this regard, the guarantor countries' key contribution consisted of providing considerable funding for the implementation of the final peace accord by financing various projects in the field of education, gender equality, health, and demining.

To sum up it can be said that the analysis of the twelve carefully selected texts revealed that the international mediators contributed to the Havana peace process in various ways. Norway, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela played important roles in enhancing relations between the disputants and in allowing them to overcome asymmetries in knowledge and resources as well as various crises. In addition, the mediators kept the belligerents engaged in the discussions by providing regional, international, logistical and financial support to the peace process. Moreover, they promoted the issue of transitional justice by ensuring that a gender perspective was incorporated in the peace process.

4.2.   Discussion

While the previous chapter provided answers to SQ1 by showcasing the contributions of the international mediators to the Havana peace process, this sub-chapter discusses the research findings in relation to SQ2 and SQ3 (see chapter 1.1.).

Sub-Question 2

With regards to the three mediation strategies outlined in chapter 2.2.3. and based on the third parties' contributions described in the previous chapter, it seems fair to assert that the four international mediators mainly adopted the first mediation strategy developed by Beardsley et al. (2006), i.e. they primarily acted as communicators/facilitators. This strategy is often used when relations between conflicting parties are tense and characterised by a lack of trust and direct communication. Communicative or facilitative mediators typically try to help disputants to communicate with each other in an effective manner, to stay engaged in the conflict resolution process as well as to overcome communication and information barriers by fostering trust between them and evening the level playing field.

Especially in the early stages of the Havana peace process, the guarantors and Venezuela –in particular Hugo Chávez – played a crucial role in initiating contact between the Colombian government and the FARC by serving as a channel of communication between the disputants.

Thanks to the capacity-building measures mentioned in chapter 4.1.1. (i.e. the provision of access to information and technical experts on various issues, *inter alia*, through the establishment of the New York Group or Norway's multiannual training programme for Colombian military officials), negotiations were able to move forward. Therefore, the guarantors can be regarded as partly responsible for keeping the disputants engaged in the peace process and helping them overcome asymmetries in knowledge, thus making negotiations fairer and more efficient.

Moreover, the international meditators were instrumental in the creation of trust between the disputants, e.g. through their impartial behaviour as well as more concrete steps such as the demining pilot project. This also speaks for the communication/facilitation strategy as the mediators' contributions promoted dialogue between the warring parties and kept them committed to the peace talks, subsequently ensuring progress by allowing them to overcome even moments of crisis. The fact that the guarantors were charged with issuing press statements following important breakthroughs in the negotiations to convey a coherent and clear message of the developments to the public, can further be understood as an indicator for the mediators' communicative/facilitative role given that the tasks of transmitting and clarifying messages also fall under the first mediation strategy.

As a result of their regional and international support and their display of neutrality throughout the negotiations, the international mediators were able to provide legitimacy and credibility to the Havana peace process. On the one hand, this helped strengthen the level of trust between the disputants. On the other hand, it increased the belligerents' confidence in the peace process since they saw the mediators as a form of security guarantee that would prevent potential breaches of trust, procedural irregularities or attempts at corruptions.

Upon arriving in Havana at the end of each negotiation round, Chile and Venezuela were brought up to date regarding the status of the talks by each conflicting party, and then helped the belligerents understand each other's perspective by clarifying potential misunderstandings

or points of contention between them. This links the accompaniers' contributions to the first mediation strategy as well.

Despite the pre-eminence of the communicative/facilitative strategy, some of the measures taken by the international mediators can also be attributed to formulation. As noted in chapter 2.2., formulation encompasses logistical and organisational tasks as well as the provision of creative ideas (see Beardsely et al. 2006). One of the prime examples of a formulative approach during the Havana peace process refers to the establishment of the Sub-commission on Gender. As mentioned in chapter 4.2.4., Norway inspired the creation of this special sub-commission by sharing best practices from the Sri Lanka peace process in which Norway had also acted as mediator. The conflicting parties took up the Norwegian suggestion of creating a special gender commission in the hope that the implementation of such a body would be beneficial to the peace process and push negotiations forward. Norway thus provided the disputants with a new impetus, which greatly benefitted the negotiations and helped the warring parties reach mutually acceptable solutions in this field.

Moreover, regarding the issue of gender, the guarantors – and notably Norway –advocated for the inclusion of a gender perspective by calling on the belligerents to include women in their negotiation teams and by strongly encouraging them to give women and LGBTQI+ a voice by inviting delegations representing these non-dominant groups to participate in the peace process. When negotiations on victims' reparations came to a standstill, Norway and Cuba further proposed to invite victims' representatives to Havana in order to take their interests and concerns into account as well. On top of that, the guarantors occasionally also used procedural tactics, e.g. when assisting in the organisation of the visits of victims' and women's delegations. All of these actions can be regarded as formulative mediation strategies.

The third mediation strategy was also adopted, though less frequently: At the beginning of the peace process, Venezuela applied more manipulative mediation tactics to entice the FARC to re-open the channel of communication with the Colombian government by threatening to deny shelter or protection to guerrilla leaders and to potentially list the FARC as a terrorist movement, should they refused to re-enter into peace talks.

A similar strategy was used with regards to the Colombian government when Venezuela pushed the Santos administration to re-engage in peace negotiations by threatening repercussions on Venezuelan-Colombian trade relations. This carrot-and-stick approach, which clearly falls under the category of manipulation, turned out to be useful as it helped push the conflicting parties to show more commitment to the peace process and make a serious attempt at finding a peaceful solution to the conflict.

In relation to SQ2, it can thus be concluded that the international mediators applied different mediation strategies. Even though they mainly served as communicators/facilitators by enhancing communications between the disputants, providing support to the peace process, ensuring access to information and technical experts and fostering the building of trust, they occasionally acted as formulators as well. This was especially the case when assisting in various logistical aspects of the peace process or when Norway suggested the creation of a Sub-commission on Gender. Moreover, Venezuela acted as manipulator from time to time – notably at the beginning of the peace process – to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiation tables. All in all, the mediation strategies adopted by the international mediators throughout the Havana peace process depended on the situation at hand, the pace of the talks as well as on the degree of tension between the conflicting parties. The role of the mediators can thus be described as a flexible and situation-dependent one.

Sub-Question 3

In order to provide answers to SQ3, the research findings were further analysed with regards to the various criteria typical for sustainable peace agreements. As mentioned in chapter 2.1.4., the first element mentioned by Caspersen (2017) is territory. Despite the fact the final peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC did contain stipulations regarding territory – amongst other they dealt with access to land and land use, special development programmes and the alleviation and eradication of extreme poverty – the international mediators did not play a decisive role in this context. Nonetheless, they did contribute in two ways: Firstly, it was largely thanks to the guarantors that the conflicting parties decided to include the aspects of gender equality and respect for minority groups in the different terms: Amongst others, the final accord foresaw the establishment of a Land Fund to grant land to

landless or land poor individuals in rural areas with priority given to women and disabled people (see chapter 3.3.2.). The inclusion of women's rights in the final agreement also links to two other criteria for sustainable peace: justice and the alleviation of internal spoilers. Secondly, the final agreement focused on rural development by enhancing the access to social services and infrastructure in remote areas. In this respect, the guarantors contributed to reaching stable and lasting peace by strongly supporting demining projects in Colombia. Moreover, as noted in chapter 4.1.6., Cuba provided scholarships to former FARC fighters and youth from remote areas in Colombia to study medicine in Cuba in the hope that this would improve access to health care in rural areas once the trained doctors and medical staff resettled in their Colombian hometowns.

In addition, Cuba's scholarship programme aimed at facilitating the reintegration into society of former guerrilla combatants, which falls under the element of "security" as pointed out in chapter 2.1.4.2. Norway also contributed to the element of security by preparing Colombian military staff for their participation in the peace negotiations as part of the Sub-commission on Ending the Conflict in a multiannual training programme (see chapter 4.1.1.). On top of that, all of the trust-building measures taken by the international mediators throughout the peace process – including their practised neutrality as well as the different actions taken in order to provide support to the negotiations and the post-conflict phase, such as the creation of national groups of friends, the provision of financial means or other formal commitments to support Colombia post-settlement – can be seen as security guarantees to ensure that the disputants complied with the provisions of the final agreement, thus promoting sustainable peace.

Another variable of sustainable peace agreements is power. Similar to the element of territory, the international mediators were not directly involved in the establishment or implementation of any concrete measures in this context. However, the terms regarding political participation (which relates to power) also included a gender perspective. Hence, Norway can be regarded as having contributed to this element as well – at least to a certain degree.

Regarding the issue of justice the following can be noted: The guarantors contributed to this aspect by encouraging the disputants to include women in their delegations as well as a gender perspective throughout the entire peace process. Furthermore, they collaborated with various

Colombian and international civil society organisations to ensure that the voices of marginalised groups, i.e. women, victims and the LGBTQI+ community, were taken into consideration as well, thus allowing for a more inclusive, fair and sustainable peace. In addition, Norway played a major role regarding justice by suggesting the creation of a Sub-commission on Gender to provide the conflicting parties with on-going expert advice on gender matters.

In addition, the international mediators contributed to the creation of sustainable peace in Colombia thanks to their impartiality, expertise in conflict resolution and crisis management as well as their strong continuous support for the negotiations, which provided the peace process with legitimacy and sincerity. This helped alleviate the risk of external spoilers, which could have potentially jeopardised the successful conclusion of the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC. Moreover, the inclusion of non-dominant groups (such as women and victims) in the negotiations added legitimacy to the peace process as well and reduced the risk of internal spoilers by making sure that the interests of various marginalised groups of Colombian society were respected as well.

When weighing up the elements that tend to be included in sustainable peace agreements (see chapter 2.1.4.) against the results of the analysis conducted in the course of this paper to find answers to SQ3, it becomes apparent that the international mediators contributed – at least to a certain extend – to all of the contentual variables favouring stable and lasting peace (i.e. territory, security, power and justice) as well as to the contextual element of spoilers. In the context of the Havana peace process, the international mediators' greatest contribution to the conflicting parties finally managing to reach a peace agreement can be seen in the field of transitional justice by promoting gender equality and the active participation of non-dominant groups (women, victims, disabled people, and members of the LGBTIQ+ community) in the peace process. This contribution had a positive impact on the other elements of sustainable peace agreements as well and helped the conflicting parties find a mutually acceptable peace accord.

5. Conclusion

5.1.   Meeting the Aim

The present thesis focused on the role of international mediators in the Havana peace process and their contributions to the historic peace agreement reached in November 2016 between the Colombian government and the FARC. The overarching research question guiding this paper was "In which ways did the international mediators Norway, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile contribute to the successful outcome of the Havana peace negotiations held between 2012 and 2016 in the form of the peace agreement, and thus to the creation of sustainable peace?". Underlying the secondary analysis conducted to find answers to this question was the hypothesis that the international mediators played a flexible role throughout the peace process due to the fact that they applied different mediation strategies based on their different nature, which helped tackle the root causes of the decades-long conflict, and thus contributed to the conflicting parties reaching a peace agreement.

In order to verify this hypothesis, an overview of the methodology used was given at the beginning of this thesis. Following the presentation of the research questions, the hypothesis as well as the processes of data collection and analysis, attention was given to the field of conflict resolution to provide the reader with an insight into various aspects relevant for this study. Two key concepts – i.e. "conflict" and "peace" – were defined first, before the structure and dynamics of conflicts as well as the notions "positions" and "interests" were discussed briefly. Subsequently, different variables that tend to be included in sustainable peace agreements were presented. Then, the focus was shifted to the field of mediation. A definition of the concept was provided along with an outline of the determinants of mediation, different mediation strategies and the notion of mediator bias. The third chapter dealt with the background of the conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC and described how the Havana peace process came into existence. Then, it examined the structure and agenda of the Havana peace process in more detail, before discussing the actors involved in this fourth peace initiative as well as their interests and positions. Following this necessary

background information, the secondary analysis of the role of the international mediators in the Havana peace process was presented and the research findings were discussed.

On the basis of the results outlined in chapter 4, it is now possible to draw the following conclusions: The international mediators' contributions to the Havana peace process and the resulting peace agreement were on-going and diversified. Throughout the second and third negotiation phase – and in some cases also in the post-settlement phase – the mediators adopted different mediation strategies depending on the specific situation, the issue at hand, the relations between the conflicting parties at the given moment and the mediators' own interests in the relevant context. For most of the peace process, the mediators acted as communicators/facilitators and provided support in terms of access to information and technical experts as well as of confidence and capacity building. At certain points throughout the process, they also applied formulative mediation strategies with regards to logistics and the provision of creative methods of conflict resolution, or used manipulation in order to keep the conflicting parties dedicated to ending the armed conflict. Thanks to the afore-demonstrated situation- and context-dependent use of different mediation strategies, it can thus be confirmed that the international mediators had a flexible role to play in the Havana peace process.

Given that the measures taken by the mediators related to and benefitted – in some form or another – all contentual elements of sustainable peace agreements outlined in chapter 2.1.4., and helped alleviate the existence of internal and external spoilers that could have potentially led to the failure of the peace process, the international mediators can further be said to having contributed to the successful outcome of the Havana peace process, and hence also to the creation of peace in Colombia.

Based on the research findings outlined in chapter 4, it is therefore possible to verify the hypothesis that, given the diverse nature of the international mediators, various mediation strategies were adopted throughout the Havana peace process, which allowed the third parties to take on a more flexible role since they were able to adapt their strategies and tactics to specific situations and issues, which, in turn, contributed to the conflicting parties finally managing to settle the decades-long conflict in a peaceful manner.

5.2.   Limitations and Further Research

Although it was possible to confirm the hypothesis put forward at the beginning of this thesis, it should be mentioned that there have been some limitations to this study. One of the constraints to this research was that only a limited amount of applicable secondary data focussing on the contributions of the Cuban mediators to the different phases of the Havana peace process could be found. Years of isolation, a state-run media apparatus and strict censorship controlled by the Cuban Communist Party have '[set] Cuba['s scientific community] back years from where it could be' (Reardon 2016), which may have contributed to the lack of country-specific information regarding the Cuban mediators' role in the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC. However, since several sources mentioned that Cuba acted jointly with Norway for the most part and since ample information was available regarding Norway's contribution, this limitation was overcome.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the study conducted by the author was limited in its scope in the sense that it only used secondary sources for analysis due to time and space constraints. Even though the research findings were sufficient for the purpose of this paper, more comprehensive results could possibly have been obtained by using a combination of several research methods. Analysing the role of international mediators in the Havana peace process by combining different research methods (e.g. expert interviews with secondary analysis) could thus be an interesting area for further research as it might provide additional insights into the contributions third parties can make to help settle armed conflicts.

Despite the fact that the Havana peace accord signed in 2016 'had led to significant progress towards disarmament, with over 7,000 weapons handed in to the UN Mission in Colombia, as well as nearly 7,000 fighters entering a demobilisation programme' (Sampaio 2019), several former FARC fighters announced their return to arms in autumn 2019. As a result of this 'heavy setback' (ibid.), further research regarding the ways in which international mediators can provide (more) effective support in the post-settlement phase to ensure lasting peace would be desirable. Given that there are still numerous conflicts around the world, broader insights in this area could be of future benefit as it could help establish a more peaceful world.

6.Reference List

Amy Blackstone (2012) *Principles of Sociological Inquiry: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*. Boston, MA: FlatWorld.

Arnault, Jean (2014) "Legitimacy and peace processes", in: *Accord - An international review of peace initiatives*, 25, pp. 21-25.

Assefa, Hizkias (1987) *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies: The Sudan Conflict*. London: Westview.

Baysal, Başar (2019) *Securitization and Desecuritization of FARC in Colombia: A Dual Perspective*. Lanham/Boulder/New York/London: Lexington Books.

Beardsley, Kyle C., Quinn, David M., Biswas, Bidisha and Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (2006) "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes", in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(1), pp. 56-86.

Beittel, June S. (2016) "*Colombia's Peace Process Through 2016. Congressional Research Service, 2016. CRS Report*". Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20161231_R42982_d2b40a2ffeabe81c835bb7dc96a46ee436c606cc.pdf [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Bercovitch, Jacob (1983) "Conflict and Conflict Management in Organizations: A Framework for Analysis", in: *The Asian Journal of Public Administration*, 5(2), pp. 104-123.

Bercovitch, Jacob (ed.) (1996) *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner.

Bercovitch, Jacob and Diehl, Paul F. (1997) "Conflict management of enduring rivalries: The frequency, timing, and short-term impact of mediation", in: *International Interactions*, 22(4), pp. 299-320.

Bercovitch Jacob and Gartner, Scott Sigmund (eds.) (2009a) *International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings*. London/New York: Routledge.

Bercovitch, Jacob and Gartner, Scott Sigmund (2009b) "Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation", in: Bercovitch, Jacob and Gartner, Scott Sigmund (eds.) *International Conflict Management: New Approaches and Findings*. London/New York: Routledge.

Bercovitch, Jacob and Houston, Allison (2000) "Why Do They Do It Like This? An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts", in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(2), pp.170-202.

Bercovitch, Jacob, Anagnoson, J. Theodore and Wille, Donnette L. (1991) "Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations", in: *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1), pp.7-17.

Bouvier, Virginia Marie (ed.) (2009) *Colombia: Building Peace in Time of War*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Brodzinsky, Sibylla (2016) "Colombia's peace deal rejection returns Álvro Uribe to political limelight". Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/07/peace-deal-rejection-returns-alvaro-uribe-to-political-limelight [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Bryman, Alan (2012) *Social Research Methods*. 4th edn., Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

Campbell, John C. (1976) *Successful Negotiation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Caspersen, Nina (2017) *Peace Agreements*. Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press.

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH) (2012) "Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia". Available at: http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/estadisticas.html [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Chernick, Marc (2009) "The FARC at the Negotiating Table," in Bouvier, Virginia (ed.) *Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, pp. 66–67.

Colombia Reports (2016) "Colombia's 2012–2016 peace talks | Fact sheet". Available at: https://colombiareports.com/colombia-peace-talks-fact-sheet/#agenda [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Congressional Research Service (CRS) (2016) "Colombia's Peace Process Through 2016". Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20161231_R42982_d2b40a2ffeabe81c835bb7dc96a46ee436c606cc.pdf [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2015) *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*. 4th edn., London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Daşlı, Güneş, Alıcı, Nisan and Poch Figueras, Julia (2018) *Peace and Gender: The Colombian Peace Process*. Ankara: Research Center for Peace, Democracy and Alternative Politics.

Delgado, Jorge E. (2015) "Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002-2014", in: *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38(6), pp. 826-851.

Donais, Timothy (2012) *Peacebuilding and Local Ownership.* London/New York: Routledge.

Druckman, Daniel and Iaquinta, Leonard (1974) "Toward bridging the international negotiation/mediation information gap", in: *International Studies Notes*, 1, pp. 6-14.

EFE (2018) "Exmiembros de las FARC viajan a Cuba para estudiar medicina con becas entregadas por la isla". Available at: https://www.efe.com/efe/america/portada/exmiembros-de-las-farc-viajan-a-cuba-para-estudiar-medicina-con-becas-entregadas-por-la-isla/20000064-3739356 [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Fisher, Roger, Ury, William L. and Patton, Bruce (2012) *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In.* 2nd edn., New York: Penguin Books.

Fisher, Ronald J. (1990) *The social psychology of intergroup and international conflict resolution*. New York: Springer.

Fisher, Simon, Ludin, Jawed and Williams, Sue (2000) "Understanding Conflict and Tools for Conflict Analysis", in: Fisher, Simon et al. *Working With Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action*. New York: Zed Books, pp. 3-35.

Flick, Uwe (2007) *Designing Qualitative Research*. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Flick, Uwe; Kardorff, Ernst von and Steinke, Ines (2004) *A Companion to Qualitative Research*. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Folger, Joseph P., Poole, Marshall Scott and Stutman, Randall (1995) "Conflict and Interaction", in: Stewart, John (ed.) *Bridges Not Walls*. 6th edn., New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 402-410.

Franz, Tobias (2017) "The Legacy of Plan Colombia". Available at: https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-legacy-of-plan-colombia [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Galtung, Johan (2009) *Theories of Conflict. Definitions, Dimensions, Negations, Formations*. Oslo: Transcend.

Galtung, Johan (2012) "Peace, Positive and Negative", in: Christie, Daniel J. (ed.) *The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology*. 1st edn., Malden/Oxford, West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 758-762.

Gartner, Scott Sigmund (2014) "Third Party Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Actors, Strategies, Selection, and Bias", in: *Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation*, 6, pp. 269-294.

Gomez, Alan (2016) "Cuba plays critical role in Colombian peace deal". Available at: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/08/25/cuba-colombia-farc-peace-deal/87432410/ [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Gomez-Suarez, Andrei and Newman, Jonathan (2013) "Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: have Santos and FARC learnt the lessons from the past?", in: *Third World Quarterly*, 34(5), pp. 819-837.

Greig, J. Michael and Diehl, Paul F. (2012) *International Mediation*. Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press.

Greig, J. Michael, and Regan, Patrick M. (2008) "When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars", in: *International Studies Quarterly,* 52 (4), pp. 759–781. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/29734263 [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Grupo de Memoria Histórica (GMH) (2013) *¡Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad*. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional.

Guerrero Soto, Nestor (2016) "Diplomacia preventiva (¿y ciudadana?) y cooperación para la paz en América Latina: Los grupos nacionales de amigos de Colombia", in: *Estudos Internacionais Revista de Relações Internacionais*. E*dição Especial – Dossiê Cooperação Sul-Sul*, pp. 113-134.

Guerrero, Néstor; Matamoros, Rodrigo and Guerrero, Álvaro (2017) "'Hombres de Estado': La contribución de Chile a la Paz de Colombia", in: *Revista de Estoduos Políticos y estratégicos*, 5(2), pp. 38-59.

Hanratty, Dennis M. and Meditz, Sandra W. (1990) *Colombia, A Country Study*. 1st edn., Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Haspeslagh, Sophie (2011) *The effect of proscription on pre-negotiation: a comparative analysis of making peace with Colombia's FARC before and after 9/11*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0da6/02131cce650f0456006193847503fc7af31a.pdf?_ga=2.253824077.43271784.1585143822-167903574.1577876216 [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Hennigan, Tom (2013) "Are the days of Latin America's guerrillas over?" Available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/are-the-days-of-latin-america-s-guerrillas-over-1.1470417 [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Herbolzheimer, Kristian (2016) "Innovations in the Colombian peace process. NOREF Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Report 2016". Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NOREF_CR_Report_Colombia %20Innovations_final.pdf [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Herrera-Ruíz, Juan Carlos and Buitrago Echeverry, Efraím Antonio (2018) "Percepción de la mediación internacional en el acuerdo de paz (2016) en el ámbito de los funcionarios de Gobernación de Antioquia", in: *Integritas: Revista de Ètica*, 1(1), pp. 95-112.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2020 "Colombia. Events of 2017". Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/colombia [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) (2019) *Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World.* Available at: http://visionofhumanity.org/reports [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) (2018) "The Colombian Peace Talks. Practical Lessons for Negotiators Worldwide". Available at: https://www.ifit-transitions.org/files/documents/colombia-peace-talks-final-web.pdf/view [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) (2009) "An Overview of Conflict in Colombia". Available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Colombia-Conflict-Facts-2009-English.pdf [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Irenees (2011) "Positions, Interests and Needs". Available at: www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-experience-770_en.html [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Jackson, Elmore (1952) *Meeting of Minds: A Way to Peace through Mediation*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Judd, Charles. M., McClelland, Gary H., and Ryan, Carey S. (2015) *Data analysis: A model comparison approach*. 2nd edn., New York/Oxon: Routledge.

Kaplan, Oliver and Albertus, Mike (2012) "Colombia's Rebels and Land Reform". Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/opinion/colombias-rebels-and-land-reform.html [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Kleiboer, Marieke (1996) "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation", in: *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(2), pp. 360-389.

Korstjens Irene and Moser Albine (2017) "Series: Practical guidance to qualitative research. Part 2: Context, research questions and designs", in: *European Journal of General Practice,* 23(1), pp. 274-279.

Liamputtong, Pranee (2013) *Qualitative Research Methods*. 4th edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Melin, Molly M. (2011) "The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs", in: *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(3), pp. 691-715.

Moser, Fabienne (2020) "International Mediators in the Havana Peace Negotiations". Canterbury: University of Kent, student paper.

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) (2018) "A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010-2016". Available at: https://norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2018/a-trusted-facilitator-an-evaluation-of-norwegian-engagement-in-the-peace-process-in-colombia/ [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) (2020) "About Norad". Available at: https://norad.no/en/front/about-norad/ [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019a) "Norway's engagement in peace processes since 1993". Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/innsiktsmappe/peace_efforts/id732943/ [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019b) "Hallmarks of Norway's peace and reconciliation work". Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/innsiktsmappe/norway-peace-work/id446704/ [Accessed 3 July 2020].

Nylander, Dag, Sandberg, Rita and Tvedt, Idun (2018) "Designing peace: the Colombian peace process. NOREF Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution. Report". Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nylander_Sandberg_Tvedt_NOREF%20REPORT_Designing%20peace_the%20Colombian%20peace%20process_Feb18.pdf [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Putnam, Linda L. and Poole, Marshall Scott (1987) "Conflict and negotiation", in: Jablin Frederic M., Putnam, Linda L., Roberts, Karlene Hahn and Porter, Lyman W. (eds.), *Handbook of organizational communication: An interdisciplinary perspective.* Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 549-499.

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom and Miall, Hugh (2005) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*. 2nd edn., Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press.

Reardon, Sara (2016) "Can Cuban Science Go Global?" Available at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-cuban-science-go-global/ [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Rothchild, Donald and Roeder, Philip G. (2005) "Dilemmas of state-building in divided societies", in: Rothchild, Donald and Roeder, Philip G. (eds.) *Sustainable Peace, Power and Democracy after Civil War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-25.

Salvesen, Hilde and Nylander, Dag (2017) "Towards an inclusive peace: women and the gender approach in the Colombian peace process". Available at: https://noref.no/content/download/169143/766109/version/9/Salvesen_Nylander_Towards%20an%20inclusive%20peace_July2017_final.pdf [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Sampaio, Antônio (2019) "FARC dissidents exploit Venezuela's turmoil". Available at: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/09/csdp-farc-dissidents-venezuela [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Savonitto, Chiara (2018) W*ar and Peace in Colombia: A Legal Assessment under International Law*. Rome: Edizioni Nuova Cultura.

Segura, Renata and Mechoulan, Delphine (2017) *Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War*. New York: International Peace Institute. Available at: https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Made-in-Havana.pdf [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Servicio Nacional de Aduana del Ecuador (2020) "Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra Améric (ALBA-TCP)". Available at: https://www.aduana.gob.ec/alianza-bolivariana-para-los-pueblos-de-nuestra-america-alba-tcp/ [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Smilde, David and Pantoulas, Dimitris (2016) "The Venezuelan crisis, regional dynamics and the Colombian peace process". Available at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/NOREF-Venezuela%20and%20Colombian%20peace%20process.pdf [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Stedman, Stephen John (1997). "Spoiler problems in peace processes", in: *International Security,* 22(2), pp.5-53.

Svensson, Isak (2009) "Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral Versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars", in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(3), 446-469.

teleSUR (2018) "Former FARC Members Head to Cuba for Medical Scholarship". Available at: https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Former-FARC-MembersHeadto-Cuba-for-Medical-Scholarship-20180906-0016.html [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

The Pacific Alliance (2020) "What is the Pacific Alliance?" Available at: https://alianzapacifico.net/en/what-is-the-pacific-alliance [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Touval, Saadia (1975) "Biased intermediaries: Theoretical and historical considerations", in: *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 1(1): 51–69.

Touval, Saadia and Zartman, I. William (2001) "International mediation in the post-Cold War era", in: Crocker, Chester A, Hampson, Fen Osler and Aall Pamela (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 427–443.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2014) "Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 – Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia". Available at: https://www.refworld.org/category,COI,USDOS,,COL,536229717a,0.html [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Universidad Miguel de Cervantes (2020) "Conferencia de embajador Luis Maira sobre Proceso de paz de Colombia". Available at: https://vimeo.com/181527309 [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Uppsala Conflict Data Progarm (UCDP) (2020) "Colombia". Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/country/100 [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Wall Jr, James A., Stark, John B. and Standifer, Rhetty L. (2001) "Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development", in: *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(3), pp. 370-391.

Wallensteen, Peter and Svensson, Isak (2014), "Talking peace: International mediation in armed conflicts", in: *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(2), pp. 315-327.

Wehr, Paul (1979) *Conflict Regulation*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Woodhouse, Tom/ Duffey, Tamara/ Langholtz, Harvey J. (eds.) (2008) *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution.* Williamsburg: Peace Operations Training Institute.

Available at: https://www.peaceopstraining.org/es/courses/peacekeeping-and-international-conflict-resolution/preview/ [Accessed on 3 July 2020].

Young, Oran R. (1967) *The intermediaries: Third parties in international crises.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, I William (1995) "Dynamics and constraints in negotiations in internal conflicts", in: Zartman, I William (ed.) *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 3–29.

Zartman, I. William. (2000) "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond", in: Stern, Paul C. and Druckman. Daniel (eds.) *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War.* Washington, DC: National Academy Press, pp. 225-250.

Zartman, I. William. (2001) "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments", in: *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics.* 1(1), pp. 8-18.

Zartman, I. William. (2005) *Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Zartman, I. William (2007). *Negotiation and Conflict Management. Essays on Theory and Practice.* London: Routledge.

Zartman, I. William and Touval, Saadia (1985) "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics", in: *Journal of Social Issues*, 41, pp. 27-45.

Zartman, I. William and Touval, Saadia (2007) "International mediation", in: Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, Fen Olser and Aall, Pamela (eds.) *Leashing the dogs of war: conflict management in a divided world.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 437-454.

Zuleta, Hernando, Villaveces, Marta Juanita and Andonova, Veneta (2013). "Conflict and negotiation in Colombia: Are pre-donations useful?", in: *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, 47, p. 105-117. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535713001340 [Accessed on 3 July 2020].