



**ENERGY DISCOVERIES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN:
IMPACT OF THE CYPRUS ISSUE AND RELEVANCE FOR THE EU ENERGY
SECURITY**

BY

Beliz Küçükosman

**A thesis submitted for the Joint Master degree in
Global Economic Governance & Public Affairs (GEGPA)**

Academic year

2019 – 2020

July 2020

Supervisor: Giulio Venneri

Reviewer: Lorenzo Liso

PLAGIARISM STATEMENT

I certify that this thesis is my own work, based on my personal study and/or research and that I have acknowledged all material and sources used in its preparation. I further certify that I have not copied or used any ideas or formulations from any book, article or thesis, in printed or electronic form, without specifically mentioning their origin, and that the complete citations are indicated in quotation marks.

I also certify that this assignment/report has not previously been submitted for assessment in any other unit, except where specific permission has been granted from all unit coordinators involved, and that I have not copied in part or whole or otherwise plagiarized the work of other students and/or persons.

In accordance with the law, failure to comply with these regulations makes me liable to prosecution by the disciplinary commission and the courts of the French Republic for university plagiarism.

Table of Contents

Glossary of Acronyms.....	3
Introduction.....	5
Literature Review.....	8
Chapter 1: Historical Overview of the Cyprus Issue	10
1.1: Historical Background Between mid-1950s to 1974	10
1.2: 1974 Military Intervention of Turkey.....	12
1.3: Times of Deadlock: The Unilateral Act of Turkish Cypriots.....	13
1.4: The EU Involvement into the Problem	14
Chapter 2: Energy Researches at The Eastern Mediterranean Region	18
2.1. Position of the Cypriots.....	19
2.1.1. The Position of the Greek Cypriots	19
2.1.2 The Position of the Turkish Cypriots	22
2.2. Stances of the Guarantor Countries	25
2.2.1. The Stance of Greece	25
2.2.2. The Stance of Turkey.....	28
2.3. The Approach of Regional Actors.....	31
2.3.1. Egypt.....	31
2.3.2. Lebanon.....	32
2.3.3. Israel.....	32
2.3.4. Syria.....	33
2.3.5. Libya	33
2.4. The Role of the International Actors.....	34
2.4.1. The UN	34
2.4.2. The EU	34
Chapter 3: The Importance of the Energy Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean Within the Framework of the EU Energy Security Policy and Possible Scenarios	35
3.1 EU Energy Policy	36
3.1.1 Import Dependency.....	37
3.1.2 Diversification of Supply	39
3.2 Prospects of the EastMed Pipeline to the EU Energy Security and Alternative Projects	44
3.2.1. Alternative Projects to the EastMed Pipeline Project.....	47
Conclusion.....	49
Bibliography.....	52

Glossary of Acronyms

bcf/d: billion cubic feet per day

bcm: billion cubic meters

BP: British Petroleum

CS: continental shelf

EC: European Community

EEA: European Economic Area

EIA: U.S. Energy Information Administration

EEZ: exclusive economic zone

EMGF: EastMed Gas Forum

EOKA: National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών - Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston)

EU: European Union

IEA: International Energy Agency

IGI: Italy-Greece Interconnection

LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas

MMBtu: millions British Thermal Unit

MoU: Memorandum of Understanding

PCI: Project of Common Interest

RoC: Republic of Cyprus

SCPx: South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion

TANAP: Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline

TAP: Trans-Adriatic-Pipeline

tcf: trillion cubic feet

tcm: trillion cubic meters

TMT: Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı)

toe: tonnes of oil equivalent

TPAO: Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Türk Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı)

TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UN: United Nations

UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

UNGS: United Nations Secretary-General

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNFCYIP: United Nations Force in Cyprus

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change

Introduction

Energy is one of the driving forces of economies and a key aspect of development. As the level of development increases, energy consumption increases in parallel due to the level of production made by industry and consumption by the society. However, not all countries have diverse natural energy sources so that they tend to import energy sources from other countries, to establish routes that would transfer energy for domestic or regional consumption. The natural resources consumed much in Europe are oil and gas whereas to meet the high levels of demand, the EU heavily relies on imports coming from energy rich countries, predominantly Russia. However, the energy dependency on other countries has side effects as well, it puts EU and some of its Member States in a position where they must accommodate Russia's interest over themselves. After experiencing several natural gas supply shocks, most notably after the annexation of Crimea which once again highlighted the EU's heavily dependent position on Russia, the EU has opted for alternative routes to secure its need for energy and put an end to their vulnerability, by shaping its energy policies in a way that favors diversification. Therefore, establishing alternative routes that is not centered around Russia becomes a priority for the EU and its Member States, eastern Mediterranean emerged as a promising alternative. Despite the promising facet of the region, it has its own problems that stand in the way of becoming an "energy hub", the number of actors present in the region, their interests towards the region and the relationship they share with each other makes it hard for them to cooperate, hence the EU must operate in a delicate environment where EU must create balance and contribute to the stability through compromise, and cooperation.

The EastMed Pipeline project is considered as one of the projects that has a potential to be well-served to energy security vision, however not only formulating a policy but also implementing a policy towards establishing an energy hub, and transferring the energy sources to Europe is challenging primarily because of the Cyprus issue, and the involvement of Turkey. The contestation among the actors derives from the exploitation of the resources and be a political power in the region where there has been an enduring competition and confrontation especially between Turkey, Greece, Israel and Egypt. The exploration activities in the region mainly revolves around the island of Cyprus and the neighboring countries to the island, thus the issue of Cyprus and prospects for a solution have been outlined by some of the parties, namely European Union, TRNC, and Turkey. Even though there has been a glimpse of hope for the political settlement on the island of Cyprus fostered

and desired by various actors, promising hydrocarbons reserve explorations of Israel and Egypt directed RoC reevaluate its potential on natural gas resources so that several International Oil Companies such as ENI, Noble Energy and Total got exploration and drilling rights for different fields which escalated tension and further destabilize the region. The collaboration made by RoC with other actors invested in the region have not been success stories despite the high expectations, only the resources in Aphrodite field found economically viable so far, thus RoC signed cooperation agreement with Israel for further collaborations, *de jure*. However, the reflections of the Cyprus issue are visible on delimiting the maritime jurisdiction areas that hinders further collaboration *de facto*. Furthermore, it has been and most likely will remain at the very center of contestation and confrontation since Turkey consider both itself and TRNC enjoy possible economic benefits, and believe that possible exploration and exploitation of energy resources would be a stepping stone in solving the Cyprus issue by making two communities to cooperate and share the energy resources, thus ultimately stabilizing the region. However, Turkey's desire and actions prove to be a destabilizing factor in the region, therefore placing the EU in a difficult position where it must not only compose a solution for the stability, and cooperation in the region which all actors can agree on but also meet the needs and demand of its energy need.

This study aims to find an answer to what extent the EU can benefit from the natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean region under the shadow of the Cyprus problem since it brings different actors with different and clashing interests together in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although Cyprus issue can be considered as one of the contestation points, the reasons for confrontation and contestation is not limited with the Cyprus issue, the prospect of natural gas resources have appealed to many actors such as Israel, and Egypt whom directly oppose the claims made by TRNC and Turkey. The contestation in the region have a potential to jeopardize EU's desire and plans. The existing literature on Cyprus issue and exploration and possible exploitation of natural gas are contradictory and consist of different perceptions of multi-stakeholders so that in order to have clear and accurate picture in analyzing the environment in the Eastern Mediterranean, triangulation method has used in this study by examining the government reports, news, analysis reports, official governmental documents and various data sets has been analyzed as well as official EU and UN documents, studies and reports.

The first chapter analyzes the root causes of the Cyprus issue by analyzing the different perspectives of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots as well as the guarantor countries, while evaluating how the stance of the EU led a change in the balance of power. It is

important to understand the historical background which shapes the attitudes of several international actors by having a profound effect on decision making process on several occasions.

The second chapter provides an analysis on the energy profile of the coastal states and sheds light on natural gas exploration and potentials for future cooperation while political conflicts lead the issue to be analyzed in terms of international law since the conflictual perspectives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots as well as Turkey and Greece on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas are unsolved. Therefore, there will be an investigation on whether the energy discoveries and further economic benefits drive cooperation and alleviates the tension in the conflictual environment or deepens the gap between the confronted parties and become a source of broader conflicts is discussed.

The last chapter focuses on the energy policy of the Union and questions the motivation behind the willingness of the EU for energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean region and specifically energy supply to the EU by EastMed Pipeline project, under the framework of the natural gas import dependency and diversification of the supplies.

Literature Review

The existing literature about the Cyprus issue did not touch upon the impact of the Cyprus issue on delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas, but rather analyzed to understand its impact on the relations of Turkey and the EU which generally seen as an obstacle for acquiring membership status (Süvarierol, 2003; Hisarlıoğlu, 2015) or investigates the way that EU involves in the Cyprus issue by having a broad analysis of the tendencies and transformations through years (Nugent, 2000; Christou, 2002; Müftüler-Bac & Güney, 2007; Tüzünkan, 2007; Onat 2008). As a counter argument, perception of Greeks towards Turkey's intervention in 1974 seen as an invasion and state their initial ambition as uniting with the mainland Greece (Fouskas, 2001). Except from the literature, to have a broader understanding on the issue and to sustain objectivity on the counter acts of both parties, the literature has cross-checked with the number of documents, reports, and fact sheets of the EU and UN, several news, and official ministerial documents, statements and reports of Greece, Turkey, Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Also, there are very few examples about the deterministic effects of EastMed project on the resolution of Cyprus issue or as a reverse scenario, the effects of Cyprus issue on the implementation of the EastMed Project is very few (Kahveci-Özgür, 2017; Olgun, 2019; Taştan & Kutschka, 2019),

The literature about the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas can be divided into two. Number of scholarly works tend to explain and support the legitimacy of the claims of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots while highly criticizing the attitudes and actions of Greece and Greek Cypriots and mentioning less about the perspectives of other littoral states so that the literature analyzes the Eastern Mediterranean region only around the Cyprus island and does not hold a holistic approach. Although the literature justifies itself by mentioning different international agreements, there is a possibility that the existing literature is biased and there are problems in terms of objectivity (Başeren, 2010; Şeker, 2012; Doğru, 2015; Kütükçü & Kaya, 2016; Arıdemir & Allı, 2019; Peker et al, 2019). The remaining literature on that topic can be considered as objective but because of the dynamism of the topic the data used or time frame is outdated so that the literature lacks of any analysis on the latest developments and assumptions about further projects (Stocker, 2012; Giamouridis, 2012; Grigoriadis, 2014; Eissler & Arasıl, 2014), such as EastMed Pipeline project (Khalova et al, 2019), EastMed Gas Forum (Ipek, 2019), MoU between Turkey and Libya and actions of Turkey in the region (Pamir, 2020), and sanctions imposed on Turkey by the EU.

As for the literature on delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas, the literature deals with the EU energy policy, and benefits of already existing projects and future projects are well designed to provide general framework and consists on economic assumptions about further projects, however the data can be considered as outdated and cannot be used today to make evaluations (Dickel, 2014; Jonsson, 2015; Goldthau & Sitter, 2015; Szulecki, 2016). Also there are several examples about the impact of the project on the EU energy security in terms of economic viability, but the probable contribution of the project on the regional cooperation or conflict remained unanswered and the papers generally deal with economic implications, rather than elaborating the political dimension of the projects (Dickel, 2014; Jonsson, 2015; Özdemir et al, 2015; Dellano-Paz et al, 2016; Ruble, 2017) but it should not be undermined that states are the implementers of the projects so that any economic assumption without political feasibility will mostly remain as project.

The data used in the literature generally refers to 2015 or before, however since then thus the nature of the energy profile of the Union has changed through adopting different policies and changing trends in time which resulted in developing alternative suppliers and resources. Thus, to better evaluate the changing environment, needs and outcomes of the policies and projects, the latest data published by Eurostat, BP, and IEA has been benefitted.

Chapter 1: Historical Overview of the Cyprus Issue

Analyzing the current energy based dynamics of the island is impossible without understanding the unsolved political problems in the recent history which leads the way for regional cooperation and conflicts of today. The Cypriot conflict has rooted in mid-1950s and since then, the aim of solution seeking has never ended. First the UK, Greece and Turkey intervened to the conflict, then the United Nations (UN) became the main actor for political settlements by proposing different set of solutions through years, and lastly the European Union (EU) made its presence felt and highly influenced the political future of the island. This chapter analyzes the root causes of the Cyprus problem by touching upon the key events in the recent history and aims to display how an internal political dispute turned into an international problem by acquiring different dimensions in time thanks to the involvement of different international actors to found a solution. So, in order to better examine the evolution of the dispute, the historical context divided into four as the developments between mid-1950s to Turkey's military intervention in 1974, the negotiations between 1974 to 1983 under the supervision of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the times of deadlock due to the unilateral acts of the Turkish Cypriots, and impacts of the EU on the Cyprus problem.

1.1: Historical Background Between mid-1950s to 1974

Cypriots have lived together on the island for 3 centuries under the Ottomans rule which was ended by the agreement reached with the UK in 1878, and at the end of the World War I, Turkey recognized the sovereignty of the UK on the island so that Cyprus became a British colony. Few years later, in 1931, the idea of unification of the island with Greece as known as *enosis* intensified and Greek community demanded self-determination and independence, while Turkish Cypriots demanded partition of the island and united under the idea of *taksim*. Starting from 1955, a guerilla organization EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was formed to end the British rule and unite with Greece, and on the other hand in following years, as a counterweight to EOKA, Turkish Cypriots formed the Turkish Resistance Organization –TMT (Hisarlioğlu, 2015). Although the clash of both communities were seen as an internal issue for the UK at the beginning, since both parties couldn't agree on one idea, Turkey and Greece considered starting negotiations on the political future of the island. Hence, on 5 January 1959, the Zurich Agreement signed by both

Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Constantin Karamanlis and Adnan Menderes with their Foreign Ministers, in order to establish an independent state by aiming to prevent any further claims like *enosis* or *taksim*. Following that agreement, on 19 February 1959, the Prime Ministers of the UK, Greece and Turkey as well as the leaders of both Cypriots signed a memorandum, called London Accord. Both agreements concluded that territorial integrity, security and independence were the main issues that both communities wanted to preserve. Therefore, the Republic of Cyprus was established on 16 August 1960 and these principals became the backbone of the newly established bi-communal and quasi-federal state.

Sustaining harmony and cooperation were so important for the guarantor countries namely the UK, Greece and Turkey, that the constitution of the Republic based on political equality and partnership of two communities, so that having a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president principle was under the guarantee of the constitution. Even though all the protective measures in the constitution, as a consequence of a crisis resulted from divergences on local administrations in 1963, Makarios proposed 13 constitutional amendments which slightly changed the balance of power on the island and put Turkish Cypriots into minority status (Hisarlioğlu, 2015). However, rather than spreading the idea of unification, the proposals eroded the constitutional order, and caused isolation of Turkish Cypriots from the political and public sphere. The political crisis turned into a civil war between the communities which led death of millions of people so that guarantor countries intervened to the crisis in line with the rights given them under the Treaty of Alliance, Establishment and Guarantee. They agreed to send a Joint Truce Force under the British command to arrange a ceasefire and establish a security zone, known as Green Line in December 1963 (Onat, 2008).

To observe the developments on the island, the Force requested the UNSC to take an urgent action to sustain international peace and order. Hence, on 4 March 1964, UNSC adopted the Resolution 186 and decided to establish peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) in order to “preserve international peace and security as well as prevent recurrence of fighting while contributing to the restoration of law and order” (UNSC- S/5575, 1964). While reaching stability and contributing to the maintenance of peace and order, UNFICYP expected other states to respect the constitutional principles and aimed to prevent any external intervention coming from Greece or Turkey which had a potential to resulted in different international problems. According to the Greek Cypriots side, the inter-communal fighting and clashes were resulted from the propaganda held by Turkish nationalists who

enforced partition of the island, threatened Greeks to invade their villages (Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). However, after UNFICYP settled on the island, a detailed survey prepared about the developments on the island and according to the report of the UNSC Secretary-General “109 villages, most of them Turkish Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting [...]” (UNSC –S/5950, 1964).

Daily Herald, a US news reported that “when I came across the Turkish Cypriot homes they were an appalling sight. Apart from the walls they just did not exist. I doubt if a napalm attack could have created more devastation” (Daily Herald, as quoted in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-a). Therefore, the establishment of the Republic in 1960 had not been successful on neither suppressing the separatist ideas as expected nor the creation of a solid identity to live in peace, and in fact the humanitarian costs of the political problem were higher than expected. After the abolishment of the constitution in 1963, since the violence continued tremendously, the guarantor countries had felt to intervene and an urgent action requested from the UNSC. Despite every effort made for sustaining peace and security of both communities, the gap between the Cypriots had sharpened in years due to the continuous violence. Consequently, the period between 1963 and 1974 known as the times when ethnic strife and inter-communal violence reached its peak (Müftüler-Bac & Güney, 2005).

1.2: 1974 Military Intervention of Turkey

On the 15 July 1974, Greek soldiers staged a coup d'état, proclaimed to annex the island to Greece, overthrew Makarios and declared Nicos Sampson as the new president whose ultimate goal was *enosis*. To prevent such idea, Turkey held a unilateral intervention under the Article 4 of Treaty of Guarantee¹ and Article 2 of Treaty of Alliance² as “Cyprus Peace Operations” on 20 July 1974, since the UK rejected the requested collaboration of Turkey (Onat, 2008). As a consequence of both Greek junta and Turkish intervention, UNSC

¹Treaty of Guarantee Art4: “In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measure necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.”

² Treaty of Alliance Art2: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus”

adopted Resolution 353 through which requested respect from all states to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus as well as requested withdrawal of the military personnel from the island without delay (UNSC Res. 353, 1974). Although Republic of Cyprus and several authors accept Turkey's military intervention as an invasion (Fouskas, 2001; Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), according to the UNFICYP and Council of Europe³, Turkey exercised its rights in respect of Treaty of Guarantee (UNFICYP; Council of Europe, 1974). Therefore, qualifying military intervention of Turkey as an invasion is unjustifiable according to international actors and indeed the intervention was required due to the rising violence towards Turkish Cypriots.

In 1981, a Greek newspaper –Eleftherotipia published an interview with Nicos Sampson which also noted in the Committee Hearings of the US Congress, Sampson claimed that “if the Turks did not launch the operation, we could not only succeed in *enosis* (union with Greece), but also eradicate the Turks from the island” (2000, p.776). However, on the other hand, the second operation of Turkey on 14 August 1974 is not qualified as necessary as the first case. The second operation took place after the Geneva Conference and led to partition along the Green Line and population exchanges between the two communities. UNSC stated its disapproval regarding the unilateral intervention by noting its concerns as “a most serious threat to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean area” (UNSC Res. 360, 1974). Differently from the previous bilateral interventions of Greece and Turkey to suppress the dispute, this time one party intervened to widen the gap between the Cypriots and made *enosis* dreams come true, and on the other hand, the other intervened party's aim was to protect the minorities. Therefore, since the settlement of UNFICYP into the island, the political tension had risen due to the external interventions of Greece and Turkey.

1.3: Times of Deadlock: The Unilateral Act of Turkish Cypriots

Following the external military interventions, on 13 February 1975 Turkish Cypriots unilaterally established Federated Turkish State which was not recognized internationally except Turkey. Also, Turkish side stated that the establishment was not an end to the negotiations with Greek Cypriots for the further political settlement and arrangements. To continue the negotiations with Greek Cypriots, on 12 February 1977 both

³ CoE Res.573/1974 Art3: “Regretting the failure of the attempt to reach a diplomatic settlement which led the Turkish Government to exercise its right of intervention in accordance with Article 4 of the Guarantee Treaty of 1960”.

parties had adopted Four Point Agreement, as known as High Level Agreement. As a framework for the future political settlements, the representatives of both parties agreed on the federal republic should be bi-communal, independent and non-aligned (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-b). However, despite the agreement signed with the Greek leader, Turkish Cypriots declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on 15 November 1983⁴ on the basis of self-determination principle⁵ as another unilateral act. The motivation behind that decision was the paranoia caused by the environment of mutual mistrust. In other words, rather than living with an uncertainty and hoping for a long term solution for the political disputes, Turkish Cypriots decided to take *de facto* partition one step further and put an end to the high level of insecurity which was not supported by the international community, including Turkey. Therefore, as the previous declaration, the establishment of TRNC is illegal and not recognized by the international community, apart from Turkey (UNSC Res. 541, 1983).

From the Greek Cypriots perspective, the illegal unilateral act of Turkish Cypriots was a clear sign of unwillingness towards a peaceful political settlement (Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Therefore, the bi-communal talks resumed under hard conditions due to the efforts made by Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali by proposing “Set of Ideas” which framed solutions in terms of peaceful settlement, including policies targeted political equality and confidence building measures in 1988 and 1992 respectively. Despite every effort made by the Secretary-Generals, due to the different expectations of the both Cypriots, UN peace-building efforts failed once more for the solution of the Cyprus problem (Hisarlıoğlu, 2015). After several resolution attempts for years, Greek Cypriots changed their perspective and gave much more importance to the EU membership rather than trying to solve the deadlock.

1.4: The EU Involvement into the Problem

The establishment of the TRNC formed the peak point of the political dispute so that since then the different perspectives for the future settlement became more visible and the

⁴ Turkish Cypriots declared that the establishment of the TRNC is not hindering them for further political settlements and declared their adherence to the Treaties adopted in 1960 (Declaration of Independence of the TRNC, 1983: Art. 22 and 23).

⁵ Self-Determination principle which is protected by the international law is the right of people to decide their own destiny. The principle is one of the core principles of UN, issued in the Charter of UN Ch.1/Art.1(2).

gaps between the Cypriots widened. The years between the establishment of the TRNC in 1983 and the Republic of Cyprus' application for the EU membership in 1990 can be seen as the deadlock times of the negotiations. According to Clement H. Dodd (cited in Tüzüncan, 2007) the underlying reasons for the deadlock are the different conceptualization of the status quo and ideals, and fluctuating interests for future settlements, and thus any solution targeted the long term peace eventually caused a problem for the other.

Before the constitutional breakdown, the Republic of Cyprus decided to apply to the European Community (EC) in 1962 and in following years Association Agreement signed for the creation of Customs Union. Having only economic relations led the Community to adopt a passive role for the resolution of the Cyprus problem in comparison with the UN. Therefore, the EU did not develop any constructive measures for the solution of the political disputes and framed their policy in terms of economic cooperation framed under Mediterranean policy (Redmond, 1997, cited in Hisarlioğlu, 2015). In 1990s, it was a common idea that the passive role of the EU towards Cyprus problem was about to change because of the EU membership application of the Greek Cypriots under the name of Republic of Cyprus as the representative of the whole island. Till the 1990, international community acknowledged that UN is the main actor who had the mediator role between the Cypriots to find a political solution, and the EU defined itself as “disinterested third party” who could only have a catalyzing effect towards problem solving (Christou, 2002). Therefore, the declaration of candidacy status of Cyprus on 4 July 1990, changed the dynamics of the island so that the neutral approach of the Community had shifted into a more active one. As a consequence of the application, Turkish Cypriots highly criticized the application of Greek Cypriots and considered the move as illegal and illegitimate since the decision was not negotiated by both communities and the decision was against the Treaty of Guarantee and 1960 Constitution. On the other hand, for the Greek Cypriots the EU membership was important since being a Community member brings security against any external interventions like a protective arm, besides to its political and economic benefits. Furthermore, the application without consulting the Turkish part proves that the Greek government was the only legitimate representative of the island (Tüzüncan, 2007).

From the EU perspective, in the case of the application of Cyprus, the ongoing political disputes was one of the major obstacles against the membership. In addition, the possible negative impacts of that problem to the Union was obvious and the best scenario for the EU was ratification of membership of Cyprus as a unified state by using its power of attraction. Hubert Védrine, the French Foreign Minister, stated that granting membership

to Cyprus as a divided country would be a mistake (Christou, 2002) and his statement got support from several other EU members. Therefore, it was stated by the Commission that the “Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership and that as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer, the Community is ready to start the process with Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession” (Commission Opinion, 1993 cited in Hisarlioğlu, 2015). So it was expected that the position of the EU would provide a positive incentive in terms of solution of the conflict. Also in 1992 Council meeting in Lisbon, EU made its stance much more clear by stating “... there is inevitably a link between the question of accession and the problem which results from the *de facto* separation of the island into two entities” thus it was inevitable that EU posed a leverage effect for the solution of the Cyprus problem (Nugent, 2000; Tüzünkan, 2007).

Although Cyprus problem was one of the major concerns of the EU which needed to be solved as soon as possible to start the accession period, in the Helsinki Summit in 1999 it was stated that “if a settlement has not been reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take into account all relevant factors” (European Council, 1999). The declaration made in Helsinki Summit was an explicit proof of the erosion of the conditionality principle for Cyprus. The perspective of the Union was changed respectively with Greece’s threat to use of veto power to block the Union’s eastern enlargement and its relations with Turkey⁶. Furthermore, Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos stated that “if Cyprus is not admitted, then there will be no enlargement of the community” (Tüzünkan, 2007) to show their deterministic stance towards membership of Cyprus which was one of the main foreign policy tools of Greece through it can exercise its veto power to steer the decision making process of the Union.

As a result of the promising statements of the EU, Greek Cypriots worked towards to get the membership rather than sustaining the peace negotiations with their Turkish counterparts. In other words, the high possibility of ratification of membership brought high level of unwillingness. One of the biggest sign of their unwillingness towards political settlement was their stance during the negotiations in 2002. In November 2002, ‘Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’ –known as Annan Plan was proposed by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General. The comprehensive plan proposed

⁶ Greece threatened the EU to veto Turkey’s accession to Customs Union. At these times, Turkey was the sixth largest trading partner of the Union. By using its veto power, the EU-Turkey relations would have hazarded very deeply for politically and economically.

the idea of federated state as United Cyprus Republic, and the plan included the principles agreed in previous negotiations and agreements by filling the gaps remained from the previous rounds. The plan revised for several times and the fifth revision was presented to the both communities for referenda on 31 March 2004. To get the positive results of the referenda, European Council expressed its support for the unified Cyprus as United Cyprus Republic was highly preferred for the accession to the EU, and they stated that if any settlement has not been reached, the *acquis* will be suspended for the northern part of the island (European Council, 2002). Despite of the supportive statements of the EU, approximately 76% of Greek Cypriots voted against while 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the referenda, thus the plan remained as a missed historical opportunity⁷ and did not practice by the island, and while Greek Cypriots as the Republic of Cyprus became an EU member on 1 May 2004, Turkish Cypriots stayed out of the process.

⁷ For further information about the referenda, see the Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2004/437).

Chapter 2: Energy Researches at The Eastern Mediterranean Region

The importance of the Eastern Mediterranean region has well preserved as one of the major trade routes throughout the history and the importance of the region gained a different dimension due to the potential energy resources. The energy researches gained momentum in the region, when Israeli government held successful discoveries in Tamar and Leviathan field in 2009 and 2010 respectively which led Israel became a net exporter. Further researches conducted by the Egyptian government, and Zohr field has discovered which is the largest gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean region (ENI, 2015). If the Cyprus' natural gas fields have similar potential natural gas reserves, littoral states should be more cooperative to benefit the most from the large share of reserves in the region. However, the continuation of the Cyprus problem which couldn't be solved despite the international efforts has a direct effect on the regional dynamics and leads conflict in the basin. After the promising statements of the EU regarding the approval of membership status of Republic of Cyprus, unilateral agreements on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas by Greek Cypriots has started in 2003 and continuous moves added another perspective on the political dispute so that the problem gained international law dimension.

There are two main reasons why Cyprus problem has a deterministic effect on the basin. First, Cyprus' complex relation with Turkey and Greece could lead conflict or cooperation and secondly Cyprus as an island has a geostrategic importance where trade routes intersects and surrounded by rich hydrocarbon resources. It was expected that potential energy reserves could have been supportive for the solution of the Cyprus problem, but rather the problem spread among the region so that the littoral states question their rights and it led a change in regional balance of power. Thus, it can be said that political atmosphere of the island is shaping the regional dynamics and policies. Despite the fact that the regional dynamics are proper for any conflict, and the region holds strong chaotic characteristic, some of the littoral states are seeking for cooperation since hydrocarbon resources are seen as a great opportunity for the regional powers to create new export routes and gain economic benefits. This chapter is designed to understand the impact of the Cyprus problem on the energy discoveries in region which has a potential to lead conflict or cooperation among states in the region. Therefore, first section analyzes the positions of the Cypriots and the effect of the unilateral acts of both for the solution of the political dispute. Afterwards, stances of Greece and Turkey is examined as guarantor countries in the shadow

of their ongoing Aegean dispute. Before touching upon the role of the UN and the EU, the approach of the regional actors is analyzed by understanding the rationale behind their cooperative manner.

2.1. Position of the Cypriots


2.1.1. The Position of the Greek Cypriots

Southern Cyprus or namely the Republic of Cyprus' total energy supply in 2018 was 2,308.403 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe), and more than 92% of that number is met from oil and petroleum products which corresponds to 2,033.498 toe and the share of renewables and biofuels in that number were 238.322 toe (Eurostat, 2020a). The imbalance between the fossil fuel and renewable energy consumption makes Cyprus the most oil dependent member of the EU. The large share of oil and petroleum products is parallel with the high import dependency on oil which stands at above 90%. The reason for high dependency is that the country is not able to produce petroleum products anymore so that the only onshore oil field had to end the operations in 2004. That's why the offshore natural gas discoveries are quite significant in order to decrease the import dependency.

UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) constitutes legal basis in a comprehensive way to regulate the seas and oceans. To cope with the any possible complexity between states, the terms and principles are stated in detail. According to the Convention, every state has right to establish territorial sea, and beyond that a contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf (CS) can be established⁸. The regimes of EEZ and CS are much more complex since the sovereign rights that states can enjoy here are limited, and also establishment of EEZ needs proclamation whereas CS exist *ab initio* and *ipso facto* since states have inherent rights here (UNCLOS, 1982). By proclaiming EEZ, states can manage its economic activities such as exploration and exploitation of natural resources, establishment of artificial islands (UNCLOS Art.56) and a state cannot proclaim EEZ without having a corresponding CS (ICJ, 1985).

⁸ According to the UNCLOS (1982), "every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined" (Art.3). The contiguous zone cannot extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (Art.33) and the EEZ shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (Art.57). Lastly, the continental shelf is limited to a distance of 200 nautical miles from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (Art. 76).

As a prospective member of the EU, the Republic of Cyprus signed a maritime delimitation agreement with Egypt in 2003 and lately proclaimed its EEZ, CS and contiguous zone in 2004 (Republic of Cyprus, 2014). Despite the condemnatory statements of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, maritime delimitation agreements signed with Lebanon in 2007 and Israel in 2010 continuously. At the same time, 2D and 3D seismic studies were conducted between 2006-2007 and consequently the Republic identified the offshore blocks and announced the First Exploration Licensing Round (Giamouridis, 2012). Following that development, Turkey announced that Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were not recognized the bilateral agreements and unilateral actions of Greek Cypriots which were violating the rights of both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in the region (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). Without taking into consideration of the objections, gas exploration licenses were awarded by Greek Cypriots to several international oil companies. One of the most promising exploration of that time was conducted by the US Noble Energy and Israeli Delek Group in block 12 the field known as Aphrodite. They announced that they had discovered 5tcf or approximately 147 billion cubic meters (bcm) reserves in the field. The discovery in the Aphrodite field raised the interest of the oil companies and other states to the region (Gürel et al, 2013). Exploration licenses of some of the blocks were granted to the international oil companies, namely Italian ENI, South Korean KOGAS, French TOTAL, the US ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum (see Map 1). Despite the high expectations, exploitable natural gas reserves could not found in Block 9 (Onasagoras and Amathusa fields) and Block 10 (Delphyne-1 field) whereas the estimated reserve discoveries in Block 11 (Onesiphoros West-1 field), and in second field of Block 10 (Glaucus 1 field) found economically not viable so that the companies decided not to start drilling operations.



Map 1: The Republic of Cyprus Licensing Blocks⁹

Against the condemnatory statements of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, since the first maritime delimitation agreement signed with Egypt, the Republic of Cyprus has continuously stated that the decisions and actions to benefit the natural resources in its EEZ are their statutory sovereign rights which conforms with international law and the UNCLOS (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Although the claims can be considered as accurate at de jure level, the main problem here is that because of the unresolved Cyprus problem, the right of exploration and distribution of revenues from exploitation activities are still needed to be clarified by the Greek side. In 2011, at the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly, the Greek president Christofias stated that,

“We believe that the possible discovery and extraction of hydrocarbons shall constitute yet another motive for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to expedite a just, functional and viable solution to the Cyprus problem, so that both communities can enjoy the natural wealth of our country in conditions of peace, security and prosperity. I wish to reassure our Turkish Cypriot compatriots that regardless of the circumstances, they will benefit from the possible discovery and extraction of hydrocarbons” (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

⁹ Source: Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry –Hydrocarbons Service

From that statement it can be understood that Greek side is aware of the rights of the Turkish side on offshore activities so that they are willing to make a just distribution only if peace is maintained. Nonetheless, from the perspective of Turkish Cypriots, although the statement of Greek side seems positive for the future, laying down peaceful settlement as a condition for revenue sharing undermines their inherent rights. So it is clear that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have totally different perspectives on ongoing disputes. In that zero-sum game, it can be said that political and economic disputes follow cyclical trend that had no catalyzing effect for the solution of each problem and rather escalates the tension on the island.

2.1.2 The Position of the Turkish Cypriots

The bilateral agreements signed or any activities allowed by Greeks considered as unacceptable and call for peaceful settlement or joint action for offshore activities are declared by Turkish side in every circumstance. There are two main reasons why exploration and drilling activities are illegal in the eyes of Turkish Cypriots. First, the proclamations comprised the territories, de facto, belong to the Turkish Cypriots and while Greek Cypriots proclaimed its EEZ by having bilateral agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel¹⁰, the claim was not negotiated with Turkish Cypriots where they have rights as well (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). Secondly, because of the unsolved Cyprus problem, Turkish Cypriots are facing an identity problem and not recognized by international community but by Turkey. Thus they cannot enjoy the same rights as their Greek counterparts. However, this does not mean that Turkish Cypriots don't have any rights as Greeks have.

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) believes that any unilateral act violates their rights and interests on the natural resources. Therefore, to give an end to the ongoing violations, Turkish Cypriots delivered a four points proposal to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, defended that any hydrocarbon exploration or exploitation activity should be suspended till reaching a political settlement or a joint body should be established to determine the future of the offshore activities as well as the distribution of revenues gained from the exploitations without undermining one parties interests in which both communities represented equally, and indeed, the proposal was coincided with the

¹⁰ The Maritime Delimitation Agreement was signed with Lebanon but not ratified by the Lebanon Parliament.

approach of international law to disputes¹¹. However, that proposal was rejected by Greek Cypriots by claiming that the proposal is downgrading their sovereign rights (Gürel et al, 2013).


Since Turkish Cypriots are in favor of peaceful political settlement, they avoided retaliations or taking actions and rather chose to protest and warn the provocative moves. However, no positive response had received from the Greek side and in fact on 19 September 2011, Republic of Cyprus announced that they have started exploratory drilling for hydrocarbons in their EEZ (BBC, 2011). This announcement was the breaking point of the passive protests. As a radical policy change, Turkish Cypriots determined to take a counter measure by signing continental shelf delimitation agreement with Turkey¹² on the basis of internationally recognized laws and principles. Additionally, Turkish state owned petroleum company Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) got the exploration licenses in certain areas. Turkish Cypriots clearly stated that the reason for signing a bilateral agreement with Turkey is to defend their legitimate rights, as a consequence of the Greek Cypriot's action which disregards the existence of Turkish part (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011; TRNC Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Since both parties declared their EEZ unilaterally without any negotiation or consultation to each other, there are overlapping areas. As shown in the map 2, blocks G and F claimed by TRNC are overlapping with the blocks 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12 and 13 claimed by Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, to show Turkish sides determination, between 27 September to 1 November 2011 *Piri Reis* 2D Seismic Survey Vessel of TPAO conducted exploratory research in the Block G which coincides with Block 8, 9, 12, 13 of RoC's EEZ. After the researches of *Piri Reis Vessel*, TRNC and TPAO signed another agreement to conduct broader researches, and also drill and operate wells in determined offshore and onshore areas. By having broader explorations in the Türkyurdu-1 well, significant implications of the presence of hydrocarbon sources in rock formation in the area has provided (Gürel et al, 2013). As a consequence of unsuccessful demarches by TRNC, the exploratory researches were intensified in their claimed EEZ by *Piri Reis* and *Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa Vessels*. In

¹¹ UN Charter Art. 2/3 declares that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered" and UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV) asserted that "States shall accordingly seek early and just settlement of their international disputes by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their choice".

¹² Maritime Delimitation Agreement signed between TRNC and Turkey on 21 September 2011.

parallel with these exploratory researches, in 2019 two drilling vessels *Fatih* and *Yavuz* as well as another research vessel *Oruç Reis* deployed in the licensed areas by TRNC to TPAO.

Besides with the activities in the region, TRNC continued to put forward future oriented proposals as making a joint operation with the Greek side and ask for the appointment of an intermediary by UNSG (Olgun, 2019). Even though no concessions have been made, both sides should have a part in negotiations about the future of the offshore areas to overcome the dispute in a peaceful manner. For the long term benefit of both parties, either a joint committee should be authorized to determine a roadmap for the future of the disputed areas and to determine the revenue sharing or Cypriots should decide to not hold any activities in the disputed zones by announcing the areas as green zone. The first option seems the most beneficial in terms of economic gains and have a possibility to act as a catalyzer for the solution of the ongoing political Cyprus problem. On the other hand, neutralizing the disputed zones is the clear cut solution which have no possibility to escalate the tension on the island again, but it is the least likely option since neutralizing the area which holds potential hydrocarbon reserves has no economic gains.



Map 2: Overlapping EEZ claims of TRNC and RoC¹³

2.2. Stances of the Guarantor Countries

2.2.1. The Stance of Greece

Greece fully supports the decisions and activities of Greek Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean region and both Greece's and Greek Cypriots EEZ claims are parallel. Greece's support is not only resulted from their guarantor status, but the political and economic gains that they would gain constitutes the motivation behind their support.

As mentioned before, the regulatory framework of the UNCLOS is well-defined which aims to overcome the possible disputes between states, therefore, it is expected that states should be able to find equitable and just solutions¹⁴. There is no specific method to deal with the disputes, but to issue equitable solutions, it is expected from states to consider


¹³ Source: Giamouridis (2012)

¹⁴ UNCLOS Art.74 (1): "The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution"

geographical and geomorphological factors such as opposite or adjacent coasts, comparative lengths of the relevant coastlines, basepoints and islands, as well as non-geographical factors as economic, political, security and other factors such as hydrocarbon resources, navigation, presence of third states, and environment (UNCLOS, 1982).

The EEZ and CS claim of Greece is based on the median line between RoC's EEZ without considering the presence and rights of Turkey in the area, so that the equity principle of the UNCLOS is violated. There are several reasons why Greece's claim is against the equity principle. First of all, according to Greece, the islands belong to Greece namely Crete (Krete/Girit), Kassos (Kasos/ Kaşot), Rhodes (Rodos), Karpathos (Kerpe) and Megisti (Kastelorizo/ Meis) constitutes Greek coastal line so that EEZ claim should cover these areas as well. However, since these islands are located very close to Turkey, these islands considered as opposite coasts to the mainland Greece, thus according to UNCLOS principles, in that circumstance, these islands cannot have full effect in the CS delimitation process¹⁵ (See Map 3). Disputes over opposite or adjacent coasts constitute several cases on delimitation of the continental shelf. UNCLOS states that islands have either reduced, partial, full or no effects on delimitation, as well as full or partial enclave circumstances can be issued in accordance with the features of the islands such as, population, location, and size. Taking into consideration of the features of the Greek islands which are distant from the mainland, in similar cases Courts give partial or no effect to islands (UNCLOS, 1982; UN Handbook, 2000). In other words, "islands located at a considerable distance offshore and opposed to mainland coasts as they would create a disproportionate impact [...] and have distortive effect on equity" (Erciyes, 2019).

¹⁵ See Case of UK-France (1977-78); Tunisia- Libya (1982); Libya- Malta (1985); Canada-France (1992); Denmark- Norway (1993); Yemen- Eritrea (1999); Qatar- Bahrain (2001); Nicaragua-Honduras (2007); Romania- Ukraine (2009); Nicaragua- Colombia (2012), and State Practices of Iran-Qatar Agreement (1969); Tunisia-Italy Agreement (1971); Canada-Denmark Agreement (1973); USSR-Sweden Agreement (1988); Papua New Guinea-Australia (1978).



Map 3: Potential Greek and Turkish EEZ Claim¹⁶

Secondly, in terms of geographical factors, non-encroachment and natural prolongation principles are quite significant for the equity principle in the name of the concept of proportionality (UN Handbook, 2000). According to proportionality principle, the relationship between the coastlines of both states and the ratio between CS/EEZ areas given to the states, as a result of delimitation, should be proportional, otherwise the situation leads to the violation of equity principle (Yaycı, 2012). Moreover, it is discussed that “the absence of disproportionality is to be used as a test to evaluate equitableness of a result obtained after other methods of delimitation have been applied” (UN Handbook, 2000). Lastly, besides with the geological factors, EEZ proclamation of Greece brings not only economic losses, but also political losses which will lead high security risks. In a scenario which Greek islands have full effect on delimitation as in the map 3, Turkey has to sacrifice the possible economic gains that can be extracted from the resource rich region. More importantly, this scenario will bring lack of security in terms of national defense and cut the

¹⁶ Source: Cihat Yaycı, 2019

direct connection with the northern part of Cyprus so that retain Turkey to access the island in case a support is needed by Turkish Cypriots.

Therefore, from the perspective of Turkey, the EEZ claim of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean holds maximalist characteristics which violates several geographical and non-geographical factors that UN gives importance to have a just and equitable delimitation of maritime zones. One of the logic behind maximalist policies of Greece is to weaken the position of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean region by squeezing it into Gulf of Antalya so that Turkey won't be a part of the decision-making process for the future hydrocarbon developments. Even if Greece would not be successful to disfranchise Turkey in Eastern Mediterranean by enforcing EEZ claims, they develop further strategies to alienate Turkey in the region through regional cooperation, and intergovernmental agreements. To benefit the most from the hydrocarbon resources in the future, Greece formed an alliance between Cyprus, and Israel by signing intergovernmental agreements, to develop projects in which Turkey is excluded. Moreover, because Turkey did not suspend offshore activities in the region and signed agreement to delimit its EEZ with Libya, in January 2020 Greece, Cyprus and Israel signed a deal for transportation of natural gas extracted from Eastern Mediterranean to Europe (Koutantou, 2020). After the trilateral agreement, EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF) established by the initiatives of trilateral coalition sided with Egypt, Italy, Jordan and Palestinian Authority in order to strengthen their relationship and follow a cooperative manner for the future of the hydrocarbons. In the forum, it mentioned that "what the EastMed agreement [...] does is to strengthen the already close relationship between Israel, Cyprus and Greece at what has become a more difficult time in the Eastern Mediterranean because of Turkey's aggressive actions", also Greek Energy Minister stated that Turkey could have been the part of the forum, if they had respect the international law (Geropoulos, 2020). So, it can be said that the reason why establishing a forum by only excluding Turkey, is to hinder further hydrocarbon explorations and possible cooperation that Turkey would want to establish.

2.2.2. The Stance of Turkey

The approach of Turkey to the hydrocarbon researches is a complex one since it is one of the guarantor countries in the Cyprus problem which aims to protect the Turkish Cypriots rights in the region while contributing to the peace process, and a littoral state who has sovereign rights in the region as well. So the existence of the ongoing political dispute on the island put Turkey in a difficult position.


When RoC declared the first maritime delimitation agreement with Egypt in 2003, Turkey stated that due to the number of states in the region, to not let any dispute happen in the future, delimitation agreements should be held by the participation of all relevant actors, rather than stating unilateral declarations or bilateral agreement (Başeren, 2010). Therefore, neither Turkey nor Turkish Cypriots sustained aggressive active actions against the Greek's activities in the region.

As issued in the several letters of Turkey¹⁷ submitted to the UN that by having the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has *ipso facto* and *ab initio* sovereign rights in the areas west of meridian 32°16'18"E (UNGA, A/74/550, 2019). While determining the maritime jurisdiction areas, Turkey applied the principle of vertical line rather than the principle of diagonal line as RoC applied, and in fact if Turkey applied the principle of diagonal line, Turkey would have claimed 189.000 km² areas which is more than what is claimed by Turkey officially as 145.000 km². The reason why Turkey did not apply the principle of diagonal line is that applying vertical line principle would bring peaceful and just solutions which serves to the equity principle of the UNCLOS. Moreover, according to the Greece's claims, because of the Greek islands in the region which they claim these islands have full effect on the delimitation, Turkey cannot claim 145.000 km² area and should respect the Greek legitimate rights (see map 3). If Turkey squeeze into Gulf of Antalya, this means that EEZ of Turkey would lose 104.000km² area and can only claim sovereign rights in 41.000² km area in the Eastern Mediterranean (Yaycı, 2012) which also brings further political and security risks and economic losses, as mentioned before. That is why, from the perspective of Turkey, the EEZ and CS claims of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean have maximalist characteristics which is violating the equity and proportionality principles in various ways.

Turkey signed its first maritime delimitation agreement with TRNC on 21 September 2011 and exploratory researches gained momentum after Greek Cypriots started first offshore drillings. Therefore, it is clear that the more RoC intensified its activities in its claimed EEZ, the more Turkey's and TRNC's activities became aggressive in terms of hydrocarbon resources in the region. As a result of these developments, tension has raised in the region since proclaimed EEZ of Turkey and TRNC are overlapping with the claimed EEZ of RoC either partly or wholly as seen in the map 4. Therefore, both parties

¹⁷ "2004/Turkuno DT/4739 dated 2 March 2004; 2005/Turkuno DT/16390 dated 4 October 2005; No. 2013/14136816/22273 dated 12 March 2013, and letters dated 25 April 2014 (A/68/857) and 18 March 2019 (A/73/804)" (UNGA, A/74/550, 2019).

objected to the UN about the activities conducted in the disputed zones¹⁸. While dispute was continuing, 2D and 3D seismic research conducted in the EEZ of TRNC by Turkish vessels.




Map 4: License Areas of Turkey, TRNC and GCA in the Claimed EEZs¹⁹

After the agreement between TRNC, till 2019 Turkey did not engage with other relevant coastal states to determine the outer limits of Turkish CS and EEZ. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Libya on 27 November 2019 to delimit the maritime jurisdiction areas claimed by Turkey in the Mediterranean which shown in the map 5. The agreement defines the limit of Turkish EEZ as in between the points E and F. Against the objections of Greece and Egypt, both Libyan and Turkish governments noted that the agreement has signed in accordance with the UNCLOS and other relevant international norms and laws (UNGA, A/74/634, 2019; Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)²⁰.

¹⁸ See: A/66/851 dated 19 June 2012; A/66/899 dated 7 September 2012 and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement No: 43 (2012); 140 (2012); 249 (2012); 74 (2016); 105 (2017); 400 (2017); 43 (2018); 265 (2018).

¹⁹ Source: Çağatay Erciyes, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

²⁰ Turkey is not a party to the UNCLOS because of the Aegean dispute with Greece. However, most of the regulations and provisions are respected by Turkey.



Map 5: Turkey's EEZ&CS Claim²¹

2.3. The Approach of Regional Actors

2.3.1. Egypt

Egypt is the first country which signed maritime delimitation agreement with Republic of Cyprus in 2003, and lastly they became a member of EastMed Gas Forum to boost cooperation for future projects. Natural gas production of Egypt has been fluctuating, since production numbers reached its peak in 2009 by 5.8 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) which decreased to 3.9bcf/d in 2016²² so that the change in the balance of production and consumption led the government close the LNG export terminal to meet the domestic demand and the country became one of the net importer of natural gas (EIA, 2018a). After the hydrocarbon explorations has raised in the Eastern Mediterranean, to divert its energy profile again into an exporter again, Egypt licensed Italian ENI to conduct researches. Consequently, the Zohr field found with estimated recoverable natural gas reserves up to 30tcf (850bcm) and the potential of the Zohr field seen as the largest natural gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean region (ENI, 2015). After the operationalization of the field, the total production capacity of Egypt reached 58.6bcm in 2018. According to the recent numbers, the production capacity of the field reached above 2.7bcf/d which expected to

²¹ Source: Çağatay Erciyes, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

²² These numbers correspond to 60.3bcm in 2009, and to 40.3bcm annual natural gas production capacity in 2016 (BP World Energy Statistical Review, 2019).

increase up to 3.2bcf/d by the end of 2019 (ENI). If the production capacity of Zohr field continues to follow an incremental trend, the country would exceed the previous total production numbers as in 2009. The promising natural gas reserves of Zohr field makes Egypt an important strategic partner of Greece, Cyprus and Israel who seek to export high volume of natural gas to Europe.

2.3.2. Lebanon

Republic of Cyprus signed the second maritime delimitation agreement with Lebanon in 2007 and with Israel in 2011. The agreement signed between RoC and Israel constitutes a huge problem for Lebanon. According to the Lebanon authorities, the agreement signed between RoC and Israel violates its sovereign rights in the Levant Basin, so that Lebanon asked RoC to renegotiate it. To prove its legitimacy, Lebanon submitted coordinates to the UN to define its EEZ in the Levant Basin²³. However, the coordinates issued in the agreement with Cyprus and the coordinates submitted to the UN are different. Since nothing has changed and the agreement ratified by both RoC and Israel, the agreement signed between RoC and Lebanon which seen as a big diplomatic mistake did not ratified by the parliament (Wählich, 2011). Because of the ongoing dispute with Israel, no extensive explorations conducted in the region, so the exact volume of natural gas is unknown. However, it is estimated that the 860 square kilometers disputed zone between Lebanon and Israel is possibly holds rich oil and gas reserves which is approximately 25tcf (EIA, 2014). Therefore, although Lebanon is located in the resource rich Eastern Mediterranean region, they are energy dependent and cannot become a trade partner of Greece, RoC and Israel.

2.3.3. Israel

Before the exploration of Tamar and Leviathan fields in 2009 and 2011 respectively, Israel was considered as an energy importer country. According to current numbers, Tamar field holds 318bcm and the Leviathan field holds 605bcm proved and probable reserves in the reservoir (Delek Drilling). Despite the high volume of hydrocarbon reserves, Israeli people are consuming less than 1% of produced natural gas so that they have a surplus of gas needs to be exported (The New York Times, 2019). Currently Israel exports natural gas to Egypt, but the fragile political environment and political instability of Egypt makes the trade risky. Other than Egypt, there are too many options for Israel, but the most outstanding one is the EU which has a large market share seeks for new trade partners.

²³ See: <https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/LBN.htm>

Therefore, Israel strengthens its relationship with Greece and RoC to supply natural gas to Europe via either pipeline or LNG.

2.3.4. Syria

Because of the ongoing civil war, oil and gas production has dropped extremely in the country. Before the political crisis, conversely to its net exporter neighbors, they imported natural gas from Egypt via Arab Gas Pipeline which is not operational anymore after several terrorist attacks. Before the political tensions reached its peak, in 2015 proved natural gas reserves was 300bcm and natural gas production dropped from 8.4bcm to 4.1bcm between 2010 and 2015 (BP World Energy Statistical Review, 2019).

2.3.5. Libya

Libya holds the 5th largest natural gas reserve in Africa by approximately 1.4tcm (50.5tcf) natural gas reserves. The total production in 2010 was 16bcm however due to the warfare, the production has decreased to 9.8bcm in 2018 (BP World Energy Statistical Review, 2019; EIA, 2015). The civil war changed the energy profile of the country which exported LNG to Spain before the LNG facility got damaged in 2011. On the other hand, the natural gas exports to Italy via Greenstream Pipeline has continuing since 2004 with an initial capacity of 8bcm/year which increased to 11bcm/year in years (EIA, 2015).

As mentioned before, Turkey and Libya has signed MoU that strengthens the position of Turkey in the region and justifies its EEZ claims by impeding Greece's ambitions as extending its EEZ to Crete island. The agreement between Libya and Turkey have further hindered the delicate balance in the region as actors dispute the claims of Turkey and Libya. The actors in the region, namely Russia, Egypt and Greece have disputed this agreement because of the status of Libya in terms of its government's legitimacy. Libya has become another contestation point as actors support different governments in the country to consolidate and strengthen their position in the region. Although Libya is not directly related with the exploration efforts in the region, it has a profound significance in changing the balance of power in the region as it provided Turkey and TRNC a foothold to uphold their claims while complicating the transportation of the possible natural resources for Israel, Egypt, RoC and Greece. Furthermore, Russia stands out as one of the pivotal actors in the Eastern Mediterranean whom seeks to extend its share in the region to remain as the most important natural gas exporter which no doubt results in impracticality of diversification policy of the EU (PISM, 2019).

2.4. The Role of the International Actors

2.4.1. The UN

Since the Greek Cypriots became an EU member state as Republic of Cyprus, the strong eminent role of UN has downgraded, but the peace negotiations has continued when the exploratory researches on hydrocarbons were conducted. As one of the last political settlement attempts, leaders of both parties held negotiations in 2014 and energy resources which always increased tension expected to have a catalyst effect on the solution, similar to 2004 Annan Plan when EU membership expected to have a catalyzing effect (Kahveci Özgür, 2017). However, as like other solution proposals, this one was also couldn't reached any success. Apart from the failed peace negotiations, UN has no direct effect or position on energy explorations in the region.

2.4.2. The EU

Besides with the reduced importance of the UN on the island, the role of EU became more visible and significant. While the Union has always reflected its support for reunification of the island and highlight the equality of the Cypriots, in terms of hydrocarbons dispute the EU always show its support and solidarity with its member state RoC. The European Parliament clearly stated that “[...] if properly managed, the discovery of significant hydrocarbon reserves in the region could improve economic, political and social relations between the two communities in Cyprus” (European Parliament, 2014/2921 (RSP), 2014). The potential reserve of energy resources considered as a catalyzer for the solution of political problems, but rather deepen the gap between the Cypriots. As a protective arm to the Greek Cypriots, the EU has continuously warned Turkey's provocative actions which considered as disrespectful to the sovereign and legitimate rights of RoC. In every circumstance, EU reminds Turkey that they should have good neighborly relations which is also a condition for being a member state, contribute to the peace negotiations of Cypriots, and suspend the illegal activities by respecting the rights of one of its Member States (Council of the EU, 2019)²⁴. Since Turkey did not respond the warnings of the Union, at the end of the 2019, the Council of the European Union imposed sanctions as travel bans and asset freeze for mentioned people and entities (Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894).

²⁴ See also the annual Turkey Progress Reports prepared by the European Commission.

Chapter 3: The Importance of the Energy Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean Within the Framework of the EU Energy Security Policy and Possible Scenarios

The energy policy of the EU is one of the most important policies which shapes security, defense and foreign policy. The main objective of the energy policy is to achieve sustainability, climate neutrality and energy efficiency through competitive policies, while obtaining energy security. The huge difference between energy production and consumption is tried to be balanced via two different ways; imports and indigenous production. Russia has the biggest share in terms of natural gas imports to the Union, however several cut offs of gas supplies let EU question their dependency on Russia. After unexpected indirect supply shocks, the EU understood that their dependency on Russia poses risks and let them be vulnerable against exogenous factors that they cannot control. Thus, the EU follows several strategies by cooperating with diverse suppliers that can eliminate risks and let Member States feel secure while enjoying natural gas from diverse sources. So, through adopting several regulations, directives and long term packages, the European Union decided to diversify its suppliers which prioritize energy security more.

Cooperating with alternative suppliers and giving emphasis on indigenous production draws the general framework of the long term energy strategy. For the indigenous production, since EU is lacked in fossil fuels and natural gas to produce energy, Union relies mostly on renewable energy sources and year by year an increase is recorded in the share of investments on renewables to meet the energy demand as much as they can. Therefore, as one of the main strategies, the EU is seeking for ways to be less dependent on imports and rather be more self-sufficient (Elbassousy, 2019) in a resilient way.

In terms of diversification of supply, there are several projects, however one of them gets attention and leads continuous debates due to its different characteristics from others, the –EastMed project. The project aims to diversify the gas supplies by benefitting the offshore natural gas reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean region, however the debate is still continuing whether the project is feasible enough to contribute diversification or bring more problems at different levels. This chapter analyzes the energy policy of the Union by focusing the level of vulnerability of the EU resulted from high levels of natural gas imports and whether the EastMed project can contribute the energy strategy or not.

3.1 EU Energy Policy

The energy policy of the Union has three main aspects; sustainability, competitiveness and energy security. In terms of sustainability, the EU stands at the forefront as one of the leaders so that the energy policy goes hand in hand with the green transformation. Development of green technologies which is environmentally less harmful has the main priority while combatting with the climate change. The policies and strategies are in full commitment with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Achieving climate neutrality and reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions as well as energy efficiency at its peak in line with the competitive economy can be considered as the load-bearing column of the Union's long-term policy framework (European Council, 2019).

Energy security can be a goal to be reached to reduce the fragility to exogenous factors or an instrument to shape the foreign policies accordingly. From the short term and long term energy strategies of the Union, it can be said that the energy security serves as a goal and an instrument for the common interests at the same time. Energy security is an instrument that shapes foreign policies through which countries are triggered to have more friendly and collaborative relations, rather than having an aggressive approach, such as countries that depends more on gas supplies of Russia –like Germany- are supporting further cooperation with Russia more than others. Whereas energy security it is a goal since the high levels of energy imports creates dependency to Russia which constructs a major risk and puts the EU in a fragile position and let EU adopt security oriented policies. Therefore, to enhance resilience to external shocks, 2020 Climate and Energy Package was enacted in 2009. By enacting the package, not only energy security was targeted but also decreasing the damages given to the environment through more sustainable policies as 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% of energy generation from renewables, and 20% improvement in energy efficiency was aimed to be achieved by the Union till 2020 (European Commission-a). Later on, 2030 Climate and Energy Framework was adopted in 2014 to be met till 2030. The framework raised the targets of 2020 Package and aimed to achieve 40% cut in greenhouse gas emissions, increasing the share of renewables in total energy supply to 32% and improving the energy efficiency to at least 32,5% (European Commission-b).

It was mentioned in the European Energy Security Strategy that “in the winters of 2006 and 2009, temporary disruptions of gas supplies strongly hit EU citizens in some of the eastern Member States. This was a stark "wake up call" pointing to the need for a common European energy policy” (European Commission, 2014). Therefore, besides with

the 2020 and 2030 targets, in 2015 the Energy Union Strategy (COM/2015/080) was published to have a common action against exogenous factors. The Energy Union based on five dimensions in which security, solidarity, energy efficiency, sustainability, decarbonization, competitiveness and internal energy market features are emphasized (European Commission, 2017). As a last measure, in parallel with the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement, 2050 Long Term Strategy was adopted in 2018 in which net-zero greenhouse gas emissions and climate neutrality are targeted (COM/2018/773). In addition to these long term visions, the EU implemented several directives, reports and strategies to enhance energy efficiency and strengthen solidarity while reducing the external energy dependency in short-term²⁵.


3.1.1 Import Dependency

Import dependency generates political and economic risks and creates insecurity because exporter country can try to get political and economic benefits from the insecurities by putting political pressures. So, it can be said that high levels of import dependency resulted in high levels of vulnerability which proves that the EU's energy supply is highly vulnerable to exogenous factors (Jonsson et al. 2015). For instance, Russia see its energy richness as a 'political weapon' to exercise its power as Europe experienced in 2006, 2009 and 2014 Russia-Ukraine energy crisis. At that time, 15% of total gas demand of the EU met by Russia through Ukraine so that conflicts between Kiev and Moscow affected Europe as well and led supply interruptions. Similar conflicts continued in years but when Crimea annexed by Russia in 2014, the EU was not able to impose sanctions on Russia because of the energy dependency (Ruble, 2017). Although Europe did not face direct threats from Russia against the energy supply or functioning of the system, as Donald Tusk discussed "excessive dependence on Russian energy makes Europe weak" (Financial Times, 2014), so that the insecure environment led the EU to transform its energy policy and define its priorities by reshaping the policy agenda which has an indirect effect on the foreign policy. As a political response, Security of Gas Supply Regulation (EU/994/2010)²⁶ was adopted to strengthen internal solidarity to eliminate risks in a cooperative manner and guarantee supply security to not let any Member State would face lack of supply in the future.

²⁵ Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU); Implementation of the Communication on Security of Energy Supply and International Cooperation and of the Energy Council Conclusions (COM/2013/638); European Energy Security Strategy (COM/2014/330); Renewable Energy Directive (2018/2001/EU); Security of Gas Supply Regulation (2017/1938/EU)

²⁶ Reg (EU) 994/2010 is no longer in force, and repealed by Reg (EU) 2017/1938.

The gap between energy production and consumption is striking since Europe is lacked in natural resources. In 2017, approximately 74,3% of the natural gas need was covered by imports since natural gas production was 241.9bcm whereas consumption was 531.7bcm (Eurostat; BP cited in Elbassoussy, 2019) so European's are dependent on external suppliers for oil and gas needs in general. In 2018, 58% of energy needs of Europe –including crude oil, natural gas and solid fuels- met by imports. The biggest share belongs to Russia for each energy need and in terms of natural gas imports Russia holds approximately 40.1% of total natural gas imports²⁷ (Eurostat, 2020b). Therefore, as seen from the graph 1, it can be said that Russia is one of the main trade partner of Europe, in spite of the risks.



Graph 1: Imports of Natural Gas from Main Trading Partners, 2018 and first semester of 2019²⁸

Mainly due to geographical stances of the Member States, their Russian natural gas import dependency varies. For example, 10 Member States (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland) heavily relies on Russian gas by importing more than 75% of their natural gas needs whereas the Russian gas covers between 25-75% of natural gas imports of Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the UK and has less importance for them, although they considered as major natural gas importers in general (Eurostat, 2020c). That's why it is significant to reduce the Union's import dependency to Russia through diversifying supply channels as external and internal

²⁷ In terms of natural gas imports, the second major supplier is Norway with 18.5% in 2018. Similar to natural gas import rates, in 2018 Russia holds 29.8% of crude oil imports followed by Iraq with 8.7% and in terms of solid fuel imports share of Russia is 42.3% followed by United States with 18.3% (Eurostat, 2020b).

²⁸ Eurostat database

measures. In terms of external measures, creating or enhancing alternative energy routes and networks are one of the strategies of Europe, as well as in terms of internal solutions, increasing the share of renewables in the energy consumption is one of the major priorities of the Union that leads interdependence between Member States which is more secure (Closson, 2008).

3.1.2 Diversification of Supply

Diversification is one of the most important aspect of the EU energy policy to reduce dense sensitivity towards exogenous factors and to secure the energy flows of the Member States. In other words, risk disruption at its highest levels will be achieved through diversified portfolio of the EU (Dellano Paz et al. 2016). Diversification does not only refer to diversification of suppliers, but also resources so that self-sufficiency will be achieved, and energy security will be sustained. While promoting inland renewable energy usage, as the single largest market, the EU aims to use its transformative power to spread its environmental ambitions to its neighbors and develop partnerships in respect to its long term vision towards a green future (COM (2019) 640).

Electricity can be produced from both fossil fuels and renewable energy sources to meet the energy demand of not only households but also different sectors. As mentioned before, the lack of natural gas resources resulted in high share of natural gas imports to meet the demands of Europeans so that the imported natural gas is not only used for heating but also for different purposes. For example, in 2017 energy transformation and transport demanded approximately 45% of energy whereas households needed 17.2% (Eurostat, 2020d). As an overall strategy to decrease the energy dependency, the share of renewable energy sources in electricity production is increasing day by day. In 2018, the share of conventional sources decreased, and 45.9% of electricity consumption was met by fossil fuel plants where coal, natural gas and oil burnt for electricity generation (Eurostat, 2020e). In addition to the electricity generation, it is obvious that electricity production from renewable sources varies from country to country in accordance with the natural resources, geographical position, political interests and potential to construct mass power plants. For instance, 71% of electricity production is met by nuclear energy in France, whereas 60% of electricity production came from hydropower in Austria and wind power covers 46% of electricity production in Denmark (Eurostat, 2020b). In overall, renewables cover 34.3% of total energy production and the share of renewables in energy consumption follows an incremental trend to meet the 2020 and 2030 targets. In 2018, 18.9% of energy consumption is met by only renewables (Eurostat, 2020b). It is assumed that the percentage

reached in 2018, will increase in the near future. At the same time, it should not be undermined that the capital and operational costs of renewable energy power plants were expensive in the last decade and cannot compete with the thermal power plants, so the tendency to generate electricity from fossil fuels were not changed to a large extent. However, due to the technological achievements electricity generation from renewable energy sources became cheaper and competitive, therefore the share of fossil fuels is decreasing.

According to 2014 Energy Security Strategy, the main priority is given to Southern Gas Corridor and intensify relations with Norway and therefore, to find other ways to decrease natural gas import dependency to Russia, besides with benefitting from renewable energy sources, the EU seeks to develop alternative natural gas supply routes. After the natural gas crises in 2006 and 2009, Europe strengthened its interconnections inside and outside EU and develop new gas supply projects to mitigate risks and to better manage further possible crisis so that more than 20 infrastructure projects have planned to strengthen the security in short term and long term. As being a member of European Economic Area (EEA), but not a Member State, Norway is a special trade partner of the EU, and seen as less risky, so that intensifying relations with Norway as a reliable neighbor is quite significant (COM (2013) 638). Norway is the 2nd largest natural gas supplier of the EU, and holds 35.1% of share in total natural gas imports in 2018.

Providing gas through Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)²⁹ vessels is one of the priorities of the EU in terms of diversification of gas supplies since LNG agreements does not create long term dependence to one supplier and huge amounts of gas can be supplied in comparison with pipelines in the first place. Any pipeline agreements are signed for at least 25 years and this creates long term dependence, but on the other hand LNG agreements can be signed for shorter terms or even spot transactions (less than 3 months' duration) are possible to meet the immediate high volumes of demand. In terms of global LNG supplies, contract duration of 4 years or less represents 27% of total supply contracts (CEER, 2019). In terms of LNG supplies of Europe, in 2017 it covered nearly 13% of global LNG trade and in 2019, 14 Member State imported 108bcm LNG in which the major LNG partner is Qatar by 28% share (EIA, 2018; European Commission, 2020a). Secondly, contrary to Russian hegemony on gas transitions via pipeline, in LNG market, supplier countries are various and

²⁹ While transforming gas to a liquid phase, a volume reduction occurs so that 1 unit of LNG can represent approximately 600 units of regular gas. Therefore, supplying gas in LNG form considered as much more profitable rather than supplying gas via pipelines (CEER, 2019).

sector is developing. Except from Qatar, Russia, the US and Nigeria are major LNG suppliers of the Union. As mentioned in the EU strategy for LNG and gas storage, dependence on single supplier is expected to end as a result of implementation of PCIs on LNG and let every Member State to reach LNG via constructing new terminals, interconnections or liquid hubs (COM (2016) 49). Therefore, it can be said that increasing the share of LNG on gas supplies can be seen as a direct way to decrease Russian dependency and enhance the resilience. However, the problem here is central-eastern Europe, south-east Europe and Baltic countries have no access to LNG supplies and still rely on Russian supplies. Thus, to eliminate that fragility, new investments and infrastructure projects are focused in these regions as mentioned in the latest PCI list published in 2019 such as development of Krk LNG terminal in Croatia, construction of terminals in Greece, Poland, Bulgaria and Serbia and construction of Poland-Slovakia, and Greece-Bulgaria interconnections etc. ((EU)2020/389).

One of the projects considered as vital for gas supply to Europe is Nord Stream –I which carries out Russian gas to Germany across the Baltic Sea by delivering 55bcm annually. The project inaugurated in 2011 against the objections of the eastern European countries, mainly Poland, because the project threatens the overall energy security policy of the Union and could act as a destabilizer in the future. While the sole aim of the Union is to weaken import dependency to Russia and diversify the energy supplies, the project rather strengthens Russia's hand. Also, since the project bypasses Ukraine and directly delivers gas to Germany without any need of a transit country, Ukraine's strategic position has been weakened. Despite the objections, to double the capacity of the pipeline, Nord Stream –II has planned to supply gas to the EU in 2020 or 2021 (Dickel et al. 2014). For both projects, Baltic countries, the US and Ukraine questioned the contribution of the project to the energy security vision whereas Germany and Austria are focused on possible economic benefits as having gas cheaper. Against the economic benefits of the project, before an agreement has reached between Russia and Germany, eight Member States –Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Lithuania delivered a letter to the European Commission to made their stance clear (Reuters, 2016; US News, 2018). However, whatever the positions of the eastern European countries, both projects were accepted without any adjustments, thus it was proved that the benefits and priority of Germany comes first than the others' because of Germany's advanced industry and economic supremacy as well as bargaining power over other Member States.

On the other hand, there were two different rival projects, Nabucco Project and South Stream Project (see map6). Nabucco Project aimed to supply gas from Turkey to Austria with an initial capacity of 10bcm/year which will be increased to 23bcm/year. South Stream project was planned to carry 63bcm/year Russian gas to Bulgaria through Black Sea without any third parties which cancelled in 2014 due to objections similar to Nord Stream project and incompatibility with the regulations of the Union. In 2010, it was decided to combine both projects rather to choose between in which Turkey stays as a transit country.



Map 6: Routes of Nord Stream, Nabucco Project and South Stream³⁰

There are two other gas supply projects to meet the large European demand. TurkStream is one of them which Russian gas carried by offshore pipelines to Turkey across Black Sea and an additional onshore pipeline has started to deliver approximately 16bcm/year³¹ gas to Europe by Bulgaria at the beginning of 2020 (Gazprom). The second major project which is eligible to divide Russian dependency is Southern Gas Corridor which divided into two as 4th and 5th energy corridors to the Union, as a Project of Common Interest (PCI)³². The plan of the 4th energy corridor is to reach the Azeri gas and transfer it

³⁰ Source: Energy Post

³¹ The total capacity of the project is 31bcm/year, but half of the amount is supplied to Turkey and remaining gas has delivering to Europe.

³² "PCIs are key cross border infrastructure projects that link the energy systems of EU countries. They are intended to help the EU achieve its energy policy and climate objectives: affordable, secure and sustainable energy for all citizens and the long term decarbonization of the economy in accordance with the Paris Agreement" (European Commission, 2020c).

to Italy. As the first phase of the project, at the end of 2020, initially 10bcm/year Azeri gas which is expected to rise 25bcm/year will reach to Greece –as shown in the map 7- via South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion (SCPx) from Sangachal Terminal in Azerbaijan to Turkey first, then Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey will transfer the gas to Greece, and for the final phase, two projects were developed as; Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) or Italy-Greece Interconnector (IGI). It was proposed that TAP will deliver the gas from Greece to Italy passing through Albania and Adriatic Sea, whereas IGI Project connects Greece and Italy through Ionian Sea. As the last word, European Commission decided to take TAP as the last phase of Southern Gas Project (European Commission, 2020b; Khalova et al, 2019). In the long term, Southern Gas Corridor seen as a way to reach Middle Eastern energy resources and contributions of Turkmenistan, Iran and Iraq to the Southern Corridor is expected by the Union as an enlargement process of the corridor.



Map 7: Planned Routes of TurkStream, Blue Stream and Southern Gas Corridor³³

Taking into consideration only the existing or planned natural gas transfer routes, Southern Gas Corridor has a little impact on Balkan countries, namely Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia, unless the projects are revised in that way. However, since the Southern Gas Corridor is the only project that depends on Caspian gas rather than Russian resources, it has a major significance for the EU energy security. As it is mentioned before, sometimes energy policies can be seen as an instrument to shape foreign policies, and in this case it is vital to sustain friendly and neighborly relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan

³³ Source: Digital Journal

to guarantee the future of gas supplies as well as Turkmenistan, Iran and Iraq. Apart from gas supplies from Caspian region, the other part of the Southern Gas Corridor as the 5th energy corridor is EastMed Pipeline Project.

3.2 Prospects of the EastMed Pipeline to the EU Energy Security and Alternative Projects

Besides with being a part of PCI, the EastMed project which planned to deliver 10bcm/year Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources to the EU by providing offshore pipeline connection from Cyprus to Crete Island to Greece seen as a secure transmission system that can meet the Union's needs and eligible to construct a single European gas market (European Parliament, 2017). As the internal direct link to gas resources, 1900 km EastMed Pipeline is planned to reach Italy via Poseidon Pipeline and southern European countries via IGB, shown in the map 8 (IGI Poseidon). In 2015, the EU granted €2.000.000 for Pre-FEED Study of the project which concluded that the EastMed Project is "technically feasible, economically viable and commercially competitive while promoting energy security" (European Commission, 2015) and in 2017, €34.500.000 allocated for the development phase study for further research and technical planning (European Commission, 2020c). Although the pre-FEED project is positive about the EastMed Pipeline, several energy experts question the economic and political feasibility.



Map 8: Proposed route of EastMed Pipeline and possible extensions³⁴

In terms of economic viability, the proved gas reserves and the volume of natural gas is critical. The results of several drilling activities in the licensed blocks by RoC were disappointing in terms of richness of the resources, and international companies decided not to extract the natural gas. Thus, from the supply side, except few of the blocks such as Leviathan and Tamar fields of Israel and Aphrodite field in the disputed zone between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the total proved natural gas resources of the basin are still unknown. Thus, to secure the future gas supplies, the proposed pipeline will transfer gas extracted from both Aphrodite and Leviathan gas fields which holds 147bcm and 605bcm proved and probable reserve, respectively. However, the total numbers prove the pipeline will mostly depend on Israeli resources. Although several cooperation agreements have signed between Cyprus, Greece and Israel, there is no guarantee for not having any future disputes or divergence, or supply disruptions. In addition to the supply side facts, from the demand side, between 2019 and 2040 the EU's gas demand is assumed to be decreased (IEA, 2019). Taking into consideration the continuously growing renewable energy investments, and tendency to adopt sustainable policies and green solutions, it is most likely that the assumption of the IEA will become true and the gas need of Europeans will fall gradually, so

³⁴ Source: IGI Poseidon

that if any reduction in the volume of gas occurred or halting the gas flow before the return of investment which is approximately 25 years, a huge depreciation will have resulted.

In terms of commercial competitiveness, competition in the EU is striking because of the low prices of LNG supplies from various suppliers and Russian supplies, increasing number of alternative gas supply routes –the latest as the 4th energy corridor-, so any gas supplier who wants to enter the market needs to keep its prices competitive and be aware of the risks such as bargaining power of suppliers in the market and threat of substitutes. Because the current global gas supply is larger than global gas demand, gas markets are facing a surplus which resulted in decline of the gas prices. Therefore, to compete with the low gas prices of the Russia or LNG supplies, any gas supplier should keep its price at \$5-\$6/MMBtu³⁵ in average however, to make the EastMed project profitable, price reductions are not feasible and expected to be \$7/MMBtu (Ellinas, 2018; Balkaş, 2019).

On the other hand, any gas supply from the Eastern Mediterranean region would reach at most 20bcm/year with the further capacity expansions so gas imports cannot be as larger as Russian imports which supply more than 58bcm/year via NordStream only (Gazprom, 2020). Moreover, renewable energy sources affect the market performance of natural gas supplies in an indirect way, even though gas suppliers via LNG or pipelines are the direct competitors of the EastMed pipeline, so that proposed pipeline should compete with the rising share of renewables in energy sources in order to find a market place. Therefore, under the current market structure, it is hard having optimistic approaches for the economic viability and commercial competitiveness of EastMed Pipeline.

Besides with the economic and commercial aspects of the project, due to the region that pipeline will pass through the project should be evaluated in a political spectrum as well since the operationalization of the proposed pipeline seen as a source of regional cooperation in theory. When the relationship of littoral states in the Eastern Mediterranean region is analyzed, it can be understood that there is a contested neighborhood environment, and even the local politics of the littoral states are not stable most of which are dealing with a political crisis, coups, revolutionary acts or wars. Bearing in mind the route of the pipeline proposed to pass through the middle of the conflicts, it is hard to guarantee the transit security. However, transit security has to be sustained in order to reach energy security (Tilliros, 2017), so that rather than expecting reaching cooperation

³⁵ MMBtu stands for 1 million British Thermal Units.

and stability in the region as an outcome of the project, contested relations should be dealt before in order to secure the gas transition and regional stability.

According to the project, the gas will be supplied to Europe from Cyprus, so to better target the risks, the political environment in Cyprus as endogenous factors that possibly affect the project should be well analyzed. Taking into consideration of the current political situation in the Cyprus island, the political problems between Cypriots remain unsolved and there are two separate entities on the island de facto, although the government of Turkish Cypriots (TRNC) is not recognized by other states except Turkey. The unilateral decisions of Greek Cypriots as the sole representative of the island such as EEZ claims, bilateral agreements with some of the littoral states and authorization of oil companies for exploration and drilling activities resulted in violation of rights of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in the region which raises tension in every move. Since, the route of the EastMed project passes through the disputed EEZ between Turkey, TRNC, Greece and RoC, the operationalization of the project will most probably bring diplomatic problems.

As experienced before by the ENI in 2018, when RoC licensed them for exploration in Block 3, the Turkish navy prevents their activities since TRNC claim rights in the licensed block (Reuters, 2018). In addition to the preventive actions by Turkey and TRNC, as a result of the MoU signed between Turkey and Libya, western boundaries of Turkey's maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean were defined so that this political attempt can push countries to cooperate with Turkey for developing economic initiatives in the region. In those circumstances, a solution-oriented dialogue should be established via diplomatic channels to overcome the political problems. Therefore, if energy resources are expected to act as a catalyst to boost the regional cooperation and stability, it should be a catalyst first to the Cyprus problem since the long lasting problem hinders peace and cooperation. Because otherwise it is highly possible to see that the project will act as a source of conflict between the main actors of the Cyprus problem as Turkey, Greece, and Cypriots, including Israel which is one of the decision makers in EastMed Project.

3.2.1. Alternative Projects to the EastMed Pipeline Project

Apart from the EastMed project, there are three alternative scenarios to deliver the natural gas to Europe (Ellinas, 2018). The first alternative proposes construction of a pipeline from Cyprus to Egypt which has massive LNG facilities to transfer the gas into LNG to be delivered to Europe. In this way, expenses of pipeline construction from Cyprus to

Italy can be avoided and Europe can reach Eastern Mediterranean gas in LNG format. However, the political regime in Egypt is not stable and open to any disruptions, thus there is no guarantee that LNG facilities would not be attacked. For example, the gas supply had stopped between Egypt and Israel in 2012, since the pipeline had attacked more than 10 times (Gürel et al, 2013).

Another alternative offers to deliver gas from Cyprus to Turkey via pipeline then domestic consumption and/or export the gas to Europe by already existing pipelines seems logical due to the increasing gas need of Turkey and their tendency to diversify gas supplies. The political environment in Turkey is stable in comparison with the other littoral states and transferring gas to Europe by crossing Turkey does not pose threats. Also because of the close range between Cyprus and Turkey, the length of the pipeline would reduce which leads to the reduction of the investment cost. According to a study, investment costs of a pipeline to Greece are five times higher than investment cost of a pipeline to Turkey (Gürel et al, 2013). However, because of the ongoing Cyprus problem and disputes over EEZ claims between Turkey and RoC, this proposal is not feasible and acceptable by parties.

The last proposal suggests delivering gas from Israel to Turkey via pipeline, but as like the others this proposal is problematic since the proposed offshore pipeline goes through the disputed EEZ and also because of the Mavi Marmara incident³⁶ that led to the suspension of diplomatic relations of Israel and Turkey. Although the relations are in reconciliation process for years, the political apathy has never ended, so this project can contribute to the normalization of the relations. But, against its probable positive outcomes, it is not likely to become operational from a realistic approach.

In sum, although EastMed Pipeline project can contribute to the energy security goals of the EU and seen as a possible channel for diversification of gas supplies, taking into consideration that the high possibility to trigger a diplomatic crisis and regional conflict, the operationalization of the project from the political angle is not reasonable, also economic feasibility and commercial competitiveness are controversial.

³⁶ The Mavi Marmara incident or Gaza Flotilla Raid occurred on 31 May 2010, in the international waters in the Mediterranean, Israel military forces held an operation against six Turkish ships which carried humanitarian aid to Gaza. According to the UN, the military operation was against the international law and as a result of the incident diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel had suspended. In 2013 Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu called Turkey's Prime Minister Erdoğan to made an apology on behalf of his nation and accepted to pay \$20million as compensation.

Conclusion

The prospect of natural gas in Eastern Mediterranean considered promising by the EU as it could address its long lasted energy dependency to Russia by opening up another route for energy transfer. The EastMed project is designed to reduce heavy reliance on Russian gas, in accordance with the energy security strategy the natural gas resources in Eastern Mediterranean could contribute to diversification and security of supply, the implementation of the project is challenging not only because of the technical and economic problems but also the political tension and instability that has been grooming over the region.

The efforts of exploration and exploitation of natural gas reserves in the region located around the island of Cyprus creates obstacles that are not so easily can be passed. The issue of Cyprus can be traced back even to the 1960s, but when the Greek Cypriot community applied for a membership to the EU, the issue significantly changed in favor of them. The impact of the EU over the communities of the island of Cyprus only brings them to the table for negotiating a political settlement that would have ended long lasting dispute in accordance with the guarantor agreement. Series of negotiations that shaped the landscape of the Annan plan have failed so that the balance of power fundamentally shifted in favor of the Greek Cypriots who since then recognized as the sole and legitimate representative of the whole island. The new status quo over the island have started a new phase which Greek Cypriots have the upper hand almost in every aspect on the island, thus making them less inclined to seek any political settlement in favor of the both communities. The ambition of the EU towards the region highlighted the importance of the Cyprus issue as it has been at the very center of the exploration, drilling efforts, and prospect of exploitation of natural gas resources. However, this time the actors involved in the issue is not limited with EU, TRNC, RoC, Turkey, and Greece, it also includes littoral states such as Israel and Egypt, Libya and Russia who all are invested in natural gas resources in the region, hence to create an environment where all the actors have the same desire and interest is near to impossible.

The future of the EastMed Pipeline project hangs on the balance over the Cyprus issue as it has the power to change the balance of power, or the strategies of actors in a way that either hinders cooperation and stability or to promote them. Therefore, ambitions to constitute an “energy hub” in the region will most likely to remain as a project until the

political and diplomatic problems has reached a solution. The possibility of constituting an energy hub could act as a catalyst to boost regional cooperation among diverse actors who have clashing interests, and also to promote stability in the region, but this possibility is dependent on the future of the island of Cyprus which has been the source of conflict in the process of exploration and drilling efforts. The two contested sides can have a meaningful and progressive dialogue over their future rather than sowing the seeds of conflict and tension that has been considered as “business as usual” for 70 years. The possible operationalization of the EastMed Project contributes to the EU energy security and diversification of supply, making EU less dependent on Russian gas and its repetitive course of action of strong arming EU based on its dire need of energy. Nevertheless, neither the EastMed Pipeline project nor the alternative proposals seem viable to constitute an energy hub that would transfer energy from Eastern Mediterranean to Europe due to the economic, diplomatic, and political reasons. Any project that foresee the exclusion of any party in the region, especially Turkey who have formulating and implementing policies to escalate tension, thus further destabilizing the region. Therefore, as an EU initiative, European Union has both the resources and the political power that would promote regional cooperation, stability, and prosperity, hence EU should formulate its foreign policy in a way that includes revenue-sharing between Cypriot communities, incorporating both Turkey and TRNC in the process of exploration, drilling, and exploitation of natural resources to prevent further conflict and tension while preserving the status-quo.

European Union despite its reluctance to take initiative and responsibility in the region, has a pivotal role in promoting cooperation, stability, and growth in the region that would benefit both the littoral states and itself, as the former would benefit from the gas, and mutually beneficial cooperation and co-existence while the latter would find another source of energy which would reduce its dependency to the Russian gas. Furthermore, alongside the economic and diplomatic benefits in the region, the revenue-sharing, and mutual collaborations on the process of exploration of the hydrocarbon resources around the island of Cyprus, the long standing divide between the communities of Cyprus can be ameliorated if not solved. First of all, Turkish Cypriots can have access to additional resources that would not dependent on Turkey which they can use it to advance their infrastructure, revitalize their shrunk economy. Second of all, it could invigorate the deadlocked relationship between Turkey, EU, and RoC whom all are intertwined over Turkey’s membership to the European Union, a sign of normalization of the relationship between Turkey and RoC can serve Turkey in the long-term. Third of all, disputes over the

EEZ and CS between Turkey, TRNC, RoC, and, Greece can be solved peacefully which can ignite further collaborations based on equal rights and equal share in their claims that would ultimately serve for a peaceful, stable, and prosperous environment. Finally, Eastern Mediterranean stands out as one of hot points over the years because of its potential for energy resources that would contribute to the prosperity, peace, and stability in the region but also it can be a zone of conflict, tension, and escalation. The stakes in the region is high and comprehensive because of the actors who are invested in the region, the future of the natural gas in terms of the exploration activities, drilling rights, and exploitation of the resources will determine the future of the states in the region. Although, the EU energy security has not been satisfied with the projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, EU's involvement in the region can have a positive input on many of the actors, especially for the Cyprus community by directing them a bit closer to a political settlement, and for the littoral states who may have start a new phase of cooperation, prosperity, and peace rather than tension, conflict, and instability.

Bibliography

- Balkaş, Ö., (2019). *Doğu Akdeniz’de Doğal Gaz Keşifleri, Pazarlama Senaryoları, Enerji Güvenliği ve Jeopolitika*. Ankara. Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) –Chamber of Geological Engineers.
- Başeren, S. H. (2010). Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları Uyuşmazlığı (Dispute Over Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction Areas). *Publications of TUDAV*. 31: 10-101
- BBC, (2011). ‘Cyprus Begins Controversial Oil and Gas Drilling’, *BBC News*, 19 September. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14968737> (Accessed: 30 May 2020)
- BP, (2019). *Statistical Review of World Energy, 68th Edition*. [online]. BP. [03 June 2020]. Available from: <https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/natural-gas.html>
- CEER, (2019). *How to Foster LNG Markets in Europe?* [online]. Brussels: CEER. [27 June 2020]. Available from: <https://www.ceer.eu/documents/104400/-/-/57d62db2-db0a-e611-2a49-85703d1d54d6>
- Christou, G., (2002). The European Union and Cyprus: The Power of Attraction as a Solution to the Cyprus Issue. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (JEMIE)*. I (2): 1-22.
- Closson, S. (2008). Energy Security of the European Union. *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*. 3(36). Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH Zurich.
- Commission Delegated Regulation, (EU) 2020/389 of 31 October 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the Union list of projects of common interest (2020) Official Journal of the European Union L 74/1
- Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Application to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984*, p.3
- Council of the EU, (2019). *Turkey’s Illegal Drilling Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Council Adopts Framework for Sanctions* [Press Release]. 11 November. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/11/11/turkey-s-illegal-drilling-activities-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-council-adopts-framework-for-sanctions/> (Accessed: 04 June 2020).
- Council Decision, (CFSP) 2019/1894 on ‘Concerning Restrictive Measures in the View of Turkey’s Unauthorized Drilling Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean’ (2019) Official Journal of the European Union L291/47
- Delek Drilling, (no date). Leviathan Gas Field. [online]. *Delek Drilling*. [Viewed 28 May 2020]. Available from: <https://www.delekdrilling.com/natural-gas/gas-fields/leviathan>

- Delek Drilling, (no date). Tamar Gas Field. [online]. *Delek Drilling*. [Viewed 28 May 2020]. Available from: <https://www.delekdrilling.com/natural-gas/gas-fields/tamar>
- EIA, (2014). *Country Analysis Brief: Lebanon* [online]. U.S. Energy Information Administration. [Viewed 02 June 2020]. Available from: <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/LBN>
- EIA, (2015). *Country Analysis Brief: Libya* [online]. U.S. Energy Information Administration. [Viewed 02 June 2020]. Available from: <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/LBY>
- EIA, (2018a). *Country Analysis Brief: Egypt* [online]. U.S. Energy Information Administration. [Viewed 02 June 2020]. Available from: https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Egypt/egypt.pdf
- EIA, (2018b). *Europe's liquefied natural gas imports have increased lately, but remain below 2011 peak* [online]. U.S. Energy Information Administration. [Viewed 27 June 2020]. Available from: <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37354>
- Eissler, E. R & Arasil, G (2014). Maritime boundary delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean. *The RUSI Journal*. 159: 2, 74-80, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2014.912809
- Elbassoussy, A. (2019). European Energy Security Dilemma: Major Challenges and Confrontation Strategies. *Review of Economics and Political Science* [online]. 4(4), 321-343. [Viewed 16 June 2020]. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1108/REPS-02-2019-0019>
- Ellinas, C. (2018). 'Price, not politics, stymying East Med gas'. *Cyprus Mail*. 28 January. Available at: <https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/01/28/price-not-politics-stymying-east-med-gas/> (Accessed: 30 June 2020)
- Energy Post, (2013). 'The Real Prospects for South Stream: It's All About Exemption' 15 October. Available at: <https://energypost.eu/the-real-prospects-for-south-stream-its-all-about-exemption/> (Accessed: 26 June 2020)
- ENI, (no date). Zohr: A Mediterranean Treasure Trove. [online]. *ENI*. [Viewed 02 June 2020]. Available from: <https://www.eni.com/en-IT/operations/egypt-zohr.html>
- ENI, (2015). Eni Discovers a Supergiant Gas Field in the Egyptian Offshore, the Largest Ever Found in the Mediterranean Sea. [online]. *ENI*. [Viewed 28 May 2020]. Available from: <https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/press-release/2015/08/eni-discovers-a-supergiant-gas-field-in-the-egyptian-offshore-the-largest-ever-found-in-the-mediterranean-sea.html>
- Erciyes, Ç. (2019). Legal and Political Framework Turkey's Views and Opinions. *Panel: Hydrocarbon Exploration Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, 2019, Strategic Technical Economic Research Center. Ankara, Turkey*.
- European Commission -a, 2020 Climate and Energy Package, [online]. *European Commission*. [viewed 14 June 2020]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en#tab-0-0

- European Commission -b, 2030 Climate and Energy Framework, [online]. *European Commission*. [viewed 14 June 2020]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en
- European Commission, (2014), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: European Energy Security Strategy, [online]. *European Commission*. [viewed 14 June 2020]. Available from: <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/european-energy-security-strategy.pdf>
- European Commission, (2015). Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Pipeline –Pre-FEED Studies 7.3.1-0025–ELCY-S-M-15 (Executive Summary). *Connecting Europe Facility –Energy*. [viewed 14 June 2020]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/inea/sites/inea/files/cefpub/summary_7.3.1-0025-elcy-s-m-15_final.pdf
- European Commission (2016), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on an EU strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage, 16 February 2016, (COM (2016) 49) final. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2016%3A49%3AFIN> [accessed 27 June 2020]
- European Commission, (2017), Energy Union, [online]. *European Commission*. [viewed 14 June 2020]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/energy-strategy/energy-union_en#documents
- European Commission (2018), Communication from the Commission: A Clean Planet For All, 28 November 2018, (COM (2018) 773). Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0773> [accessed 14 June 2020]
- European Commission (2019), Communication from the Commission: The European Green Deal, 11 December 2019, (COM (2019) 640). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-green-deal-communication_en.pdf [accessed 24 June 2020]
- European Commission, (2020a). Liquefied Natural Gas. [online]. *European Commission*. [viewed 26 June 2020]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/liquefied-natural-gas-lng_en?redir=1
- European Commission, (2020b). Diversification of Gas Supply Sources and Routes. [online]. *European Commission*. [viewed 26 June 2020]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/energy-security/diversification-of-gas-supply-sources-and-routes_en
- European Commission, (2020c). Key Cross Border Infrastructure Projects. [online]. *European Commission*. [viewed 26 June 2020]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest/key-cross-border-infrastructure-projects_en

- European Council, Meeting on 10-11 December 1999 in Helsinki, *Presidency Conclusions*, Paragraph 9b.
- European Council, Meeting on 12-13 December 2002 in Copenhagen, *Presidency Conclusions*, Paragraphs 10-12.
- European Council, (2019), Meeting on 12 December 2019 –Conclusions (EUCO/29/19)
- European Parliament (2017), ‘Energy: a shaping factor for regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean?’ *DG for External Policies*. doi: 10.2861/145448
- Eurostat, (2020a), Simplified Energy Balances. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database> (Last Access: 27 May 2020)
- Eurostat, (2020b), Shedding Light on Energy in the EU. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/index.html> (Last Access: 14 June 2020)
- Eurostat, (2020c), Statistics Explained –EU Imports of Energy Products –Recent Developments. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf> (Last Access: 16 June 2020)
- Eurostat, (2020d), Statistics Explained –Energy Statistics –an overview. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/29046.pdf> (Last Access: 16 June 2020)
- Eurostat, (2020e), Statistics Explained. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Main_Page (Last Access: 24 June 2020)
- Financial Times (2014). “A United Europe Can End Russia’s Energy Stranglehold”. *Financial Times*. 21 April. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/91508464-c661-11e3-ba0e-00144feabdc0> (Accessed: 23 June 2020)
- Fouskas, V. (2001). Reflections on the Cyprus Issue and the Turkish Invasions of 1974. *Mediterranean Quarterly*. 12(3):98-127. [Viewed 10 May 2020]. Available from: doi: 10.1215/10474552-12-3-98
- Gazprom (no date). TurkStream Gas Pipeline. Available at: <https://www.gazprom.com/projects/turk-stream/>
- Gazprom, (2020). “Volume of Supplies via the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline in 2019 Amounted to 58.5 Bcm”. Available at: <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/presscenter/news/2437/>
- Geropoulos, K. (2020), ‘EastMed Gas Forum Makes Cairo HQ’, *NewEurope*, 17 January. Available at: <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/east-med-gas-forum-makes-cairo-hq/> (Accessed: 02 June 2020).
- Giamouridis, A. (2012). The Offshore Discovery in the Republic of Cyprus, Monetization Prospects and Challenges. *The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*.

- Goldthau, A & Sitter, N (2015). Soft Power with a Hard Edge: EU Polity Tools and Energy Security. *Review of International Political Economy*. 22:5, 941-965. DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2015.1008547
- Gürel, A., Mullen, F. & Tzimitras, H. (2013). The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios. *Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)*.
- Hisarlıoğlu, F., (2015). *Europeanization of Foreign Policy of a Candidate Country: An Evaluation of Turkey's Policy Towards Cyprus (2002-2012)*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Bilkent University
- IEA, (2019). *World Energy Outlook 2019*, IEA, Paris <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2019>
- IGI Poseidon. EastMed: A direct Link to New Sources for Europe. Available at: <http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/eastmed>
- Ipek, P. (2019). "Turkey's Sovereign Rights in the Boundary Delimitation of the East Mediterranean Sea". *Bilkent Energy Notes (BEN) 20*. Bilkent Energy Policy Research Center Available from: www.bilkenteprc.com
- Jonsson D. K., Johansson B, Mansson A, Nilsson L. J., Nilsson M., Sonnsjö H. (2015). Energy Security Matters in the EU Energy Roadmap. *Energy Strategy Reviews*. 6, 48-56. [Viewed 17 June 2020]. Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2015.03.002>
- Khalova, G. O., Illeritskiy N. I., Smirnova V.A. (2019). Prospects for the Construction of the Poseidon Gas Pipeline as a Factor in Supplying the Needs of the Southern Europe Countries with Natural Gas. *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*. 9(1), 143-148.
- Kahveci- Özgür, H. (2017). Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons: Regional Potential, Challenges Ahead, and the 'Hydrocarbon-Ization' of the Cyprus Problem. *Center for Strategic Research (SAM)*. 22(2-3): 31-56.
- Koutantou, A. (2020). 'Greece, Israel, Cyprus Sign EastMed Gas Pipeline Deal'. *REUTERS*, 2 January. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-cyprus-israel-pipeline/greece-israel-cyprus-sign-eastmed-gas-pipeline-deal-idUSKBN1Z10R5> (Accessed: 02 June 2020)
- Müftüler-Bac, M. & Güney, A. (2005). The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961-2003. *Middle Eastern Studies*. 41(2):281-293. [Viewed 10 May 2020]. Available from: doi: 10.1080/00263200500035462
- Nugent, N., (2000). EU Enlargement and 'the Cyprus Problem'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 38 (1): 131-150
- Olgun, M. E., (2019). Hydrocarbons Will Determine the Political Future of Cyprus. *Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)*.
- Onat, E. A., (2008). *The Role of the European Union in the Solution of the Cyprus Dispute in the Light of the United Nations-Led Settlement Efforts*. M.A. Dissertation, Bilkent University

- Pamir, N., (2020). Energy and Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus Axis. [online]. *Insight Turkey*. [Viewed 20 May 2020]. Available from: <https://www.sigmaturkey.com/energy-and-geopolitics-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-and-cyprus-axis/>
- Pamir, N. (2020). Libya, Oil, the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey. [online]. *Insight Turkey*. [Viewed 20 May 2020]. Available from: <https://www.sigmaturkey.com/libya-oil-the-eastern-mediterranean-and-turkey/>
- Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Resolution 573 (1974)
- PISM (2019). "Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean: an Urgent Challenge for the EU". *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*. Available at: [https://pism.pl/publications/Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean an Urgent Challenge for the EU](https://pism.pl/publications/Tensions_in_the_Eastern_Mediterranean_an_Urgent_Challenge_for_the_EU) (Accessed: 05 July 2020)
- Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Historical Review". Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa08_en/mfa08_en?OpenDocument (Last access: 18 May 2020).
- Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011), "Speech of the President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr. Demetris Christofias at the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York- 22/09/2011". Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/All/D85849E091A23766C2257FA000459316?OpenDocument> (Last Access: 29 May 2020).
- Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012), "Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis at the Conference "Energy Developments, Security and Geostrategic Implications in the Eastern Mediterranean organised by the European Party of Cyprus and the Institute of European Democrats, Nicosia - 20/10/2012". Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/All/E32A18A03546B966C2257FA000459502?OpenDocument> (Last access: 29 May 2020).
- Republic of Cyprus, Office of the Law Commissioner (2014), "The Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf Laws 2004 and 2014". Available at: [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/all/8D450A891DD09140C2258042004122E8/\\$file/THE%20EXCLUDING%20ECONOMIC%20ZONE%20AND%20THE%20CONTINENTAL%20SHELF%20LAWS%202004%20AND%202014FINAL.pdf?openelement](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/all/8D450A891DD09140C2258042004122E8/$file/THE%20EXCLUDING%20ECONOMIC%20ZONE%20AND%20THE%20CONTINENTAL%20SHELF%20LAWS%202004%20AND%202014FINAL.pdf?openelement) (Last Access: 27 May 2020).
- Reuters, (2016). 'EU leaders sign letter objecting to Nord Stream-2 gas link'. 16 March. Available from: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-energy-nordstream-idUKKCN0W11YV> (Accessed: 25 June 2020).
- Reuters, (2018). 'Turkish blockade of ship off Cyprus is out of ENI's control: CEO'. 16 February. Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-natgas-turkey-eni/turkish-blockade-of-ship-off-cyprus-is-out-of-eni-control-ceo-idUSKCN1G01K0>

- Ruble, I. (2017). European Union Energy Supply Security: The Benefits of Natural Gas Imports from the Eastern Mediterranean. *Energy Policy*. 105 (341-353). [Viewed: 14 June 2020]. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.010>
- Stern, J., Rogers, H., Yafimava, K., Pirani, S., El-Katiri, L., Honore, A., Henderson, J., Hassanzadeh, E., Dickel, R., & for Energy Studies, O. I. (2014). Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas – distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics. 92.
- Stocker, J. (2012). No EEZ Solution: The Politics of Oil and Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean. *Middle East Journal*. 66:4, 579-597. Available from: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/23361618> (Accessed: 10 May 2020)
- Süvarierol, S. (2003), The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union. *Turkish Studies*, 4: 1. Available from: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/18507404.pdf> (Accessed: 09 May 2020).
- Şeker, B. Ş. (2012). "Deniz Alanlarının Sınırlandırılması ve Akdeniz'in Güvenliği (Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries and Mediterranean Security)" International Middle East Congress
- Taştan, K. & Kutschka, T, (2019). The Implications of Eastern Mediterranean Gas for Turkey. *the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)*. 7
- The New York Times, (2019). 'Israel's Energy Dilemma: More Natural Gas Than It Can Use or Export'. 5 July. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/business/energy-environment/israel-natural-gas-offshore.html> (Accessed: 02 June 2020).
- Tilliros, P. (2017). 'The Role of East Med Gas in the European Energy Security and the Best Cyprus Gas Monetization Option'. Greek Energy Forum. <https://www.greekenergyforum.com/publications/studies/2017/the-role-of-east-med-gas-in-the-european-energy-security-and-the-best-cyprus-gas-monetization-option> (Accessed: 20 June 2020)
- Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. No. 5712. Nicosia, on 16 August 1960.
- Treaty of Guarantee between United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey and Cyprus. No. 5475. Nicosia, on 16 August 1960.
- Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-a. "Cyprus (Historical Overview)". Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-historical-overview.en.mfa> (Last access: 18 May 2020).
- Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-b. "The Guidelines Agreed Between President Denktaş and the Late Archbishop Makarios on 12 February 1977". Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-guidelines-agreed-between-president-denktas-and-the-late-archbishop-makarios-on-12-february-1977.en.mfa> (Last access: 18 May 2020).
- Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2007). "Press Release Regarding the Efforts of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus to Sign Bilateral Agreements

- Concerning Maritime Jurisdiction Areas with the Countries in the Eastern Mediterranean". Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/p_30-january-2007_-press-release-regarding-the-efforts-of-the-greek-cypriot-administration-of-southern-cyprus-to-sign-bilateral-agreements-concerning-maritime-jurisdiction-areas-with-the-countries-in-the-eastern-mediterranean_br_p.en.mfa (Last Access: 24 May 2020).
- Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2011). "No. 216 Press Statement on the Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement Signed between Turkey and the TRNC". Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-216_-21-september-2011_-press-statement-on-the-continental-shelf-delimitation-agreement-signed-between-turkey-and-the-trnc.en.mfa (Last Access: 30 May 2020).
- Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2019). "QA-73, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding the Statements made by Greece and Egypt on the Agreement Signed with Libya on the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas". Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-73_-yunanistan-ve-misir-aciklamalari-hk-sc.en.mfa (Last Access: 03 June 2020).
- Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2014). "Press Statement on the "Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Mediterranean"". Available at: <https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/press-statement-on-the-agreement-on-the-delimitation-of-the-continental-shelf-in-the-mediterranean/> (Last Access: 30 May 2020).
- Tüzünkan, M., (2007). *The Cyprus Question: Continuity, Transformation and Tendencies*. Ph.D. Dissertation, METU.
- UNFICYP, (no date). "Events in the Summer of 1974" [online]. *UNFICYP*. [Viewed 14 May 2020]. Available from: <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/events-summer-1974>
- U.N., Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at: <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/> [accessed 30 May 2020].
- U.N. General Assembly, Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 10 December 1982, available at: https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf [Last Access: 01 June 2020].
- U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970, A/RES/2625 (XXV), available at: <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/25A1C8E35B23161C852570C4006E50AB> [accessed 30 May 2020].
- U.N. General Assembly, Agenda, A/74/634, 27 December 2019; A/74/550, 15 November 2019.
- U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Res. 186 in doc. S/5575, 4 March 1964.
- U.N. Security Council, Official Records, "Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus", S/5950, 10 September 1964.

- U.N. Security Council, Resolutions No: 353 (1974); No: 360 (1974); No: 541 (1983);
- U.N., (2000). Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries. *Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs*. United Nations Publications. Available from: https://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/publicationtexts/Handbook%20on%20the%20delimitation%20of%20maritime%20boundaries_Eng.pdf
- US Congress, (2000). Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *"Foreign Operations, Export Financing & Related Programme Appropriations for 2001"*. House of Representatives, 160. Congress, 2nd session. US Government Printing Office. Washington
- U.S. News, (2018). 'U.S. Says Planned Russian Pipeline Would Threaten European Energy Security'. 27 January. Available from: <https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/articles/2018-01-27/uss-tillerson-says-nord-stream-2-pipeline-would-undermine-europes-energy-security> (Accessed: 25 June 2020).
- Wählich, (2011). 'Israel-Lebanon Offshore Oil & Gas Dispute – Rules of International Maritime Law'. *Insights*, 5 December. Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20120813175200/http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight111205.pdf> (Accessed: 02 June 2020)
- Yaycı, C. (2012). Doğu Akdeniz'de Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Paylaşılması Sorunu ve Türkiye (The Problem of Delimitation of Maritime Areas in Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey). *Bilge Strateji*. 4(6).