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**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAELI MILITARIZATION, PALESTINIAN MASCULINE AND COLLECTIVIST
CULTURE, AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST PALESTINIAN WOMEN**

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Abstract

This work examines the factors that contribute to high rates of gender-based violence experienced by Palestinian women. Both Palestinian and Israeli variables and their interplay create an environment in which Palestinian women are readily slapped, beaten, sexually assaulted, and humiliated. Palestinian culture, premised on masculine gendered language, is undergirded by patriarchal, conservative religious, and collectivist values. Israeli militarization--primarily by land expansion and segregation--indirectly exacerbates these influences, thus heightening the prevalence of domestic violence. These indirect influences are examples of spiral transgressions, in which an Israeli military action--such as a home demolition--has reverberating, ripple effects into the intimate lives of Palestinian women. Israeli authorities are also responsible for direct experiences gender-based violence against Palestinian women in instances of arrest and detention. Because of a multitude of factors, including Israeli information control and a Palestinian cultural prescription for silence, Palestinian women's narratives and experiences have been invisibilized--silenced and marginalized. Palestinian women in civil society, with a focus on non-profit NGOs, have worked to self-empower and combat gender-based violence amidst restrictions on activism by Israel, Palestine, and the international human rights framework.

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Introduction

On August 22nd, 2019, 21-year-old West Bank resident and makeup artist Israa Ghrayeb died after being beaten by three male relatives who feared damage to the family's reputation. She had posted a photo on social media of her and her fiancée one day before their engagement was to be officially announced. Forensic tests revealed she had suffered numerous injuries, resulting in a collapsed lung and respiratory failure. Family members claimed that she was possessed by spirits, mentally ill, and had fallen from a balcony (Bateman 2019). Domestic violence and honor killings--or *femicide*--are common throughout the Arab world and in Palestine.¹ However, this case was one of the first instances of gender-based violence in Palestine that drew media attention and outrage, both domestically and internationally. The majority of Palestinian women's experiences of violence are silenced.

Gender-based violence is one of the most common human rights violations across the globe. The United Nations defines it as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women...whether occurring in public or private life." It is slightly different than violence against women, because gender-based violence can affect gender non-conforming people, like the trans community. When the term is utilized in this work, it refers only to violence against women. There is also a distinction between gender-based violence and domestic violence, the latter of which happens in the private sphere. Thus, gender-based violence encompasses domestic violence, while domestic violence does *not* include violent experiences that women face outside home life. Domestic violence may also be referred to as intimate partner violence. Domestic violence, violence against women, and gender-based violence most commonly manifest by physical violence, which will be the focus of this work. When these terms are utilized, they will connote physical violence unless otherwise stated.

The current population of Palestine is 5.05 million, and Israel's is 8.88 million. Of the Palestinian population, women represent about half ("Palestine Case Study"). Palestinian women

¹ Although "Palestine" is not a universally recognized nation-state, the word will be used in this thesis to connote Palestinian communities across Israel, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.

experience high rates of both public and private physical violence. One statistic suggests that 68% of Palestinian women have faced domestic violence (O'Campo 2017), while other research claims that 37% of Palestinian women have faced it, with the percentage soaring to 51% in Gaza ("Gender-based Violence"). Variation is partly due to women's lack of reporting for fear of retribution, but even the lowest statistics show that Palestinian women experience violence at a much higher rate than the global average. According to the World Bank, 35% of the global female population will experience gender-based violence in their lifetimes ("Gender-Based Violence - Violence Against Women and Girls").

No one discrete and isolatable variable causes these high rates of violence. Rather, a cluster of variables does so, stemming from both Palestinian and Israeli influences. Palestinian patriarchy, religion, and collectivism are main causes of gender-based violence. Israeli militarization, which includes policy aims like segregation and land expansion, aggravates these factors and indirectly contributes to instances of violence. Israeli authorities are also responsible for direct cases of violence, as exemplified by practices in arrest and detention. Both Palestinian and Israeli nationalisms uphold gender oppression, which aids in justifying violence against women. From these issues arises the research question of this thesis, as well as a secondary question on how Palestinian women combat violence within their communities.

Research Question

How have Palestinian patriarchal, religious, and collectivist values intersected with Israeli militarization to create high rates of physical violence against Palestinian women? How have Palestinian women in civil society utilized activism in empowering themselves, and what obstacles do they face?

Scope

The timeframe of this work covers Israeli statehood (1948) through the present-day, although the thesis will more readily emphasize present-day conditions and research regarding Israel and Palestine. When referencing "Palestinian women," there will usually be a designator as to their provenance--whether Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Israel proper, or a refugee

camp. Should there be no distinction, then it is to be assumed the phrase “Palestinian women” is a catchall to include women in all these locations. There will be less focus on Palestinians in refugee camps. Palestinians come from many different backgrounds, including Muslim, Christian, Druze, and Bedouin, but this work will focus mainly on the majority group--Muslim Palestinians.

Regarding violence, although Palestinian women face a host of different types of violence--including physical, psychological, economic, etc.--the focus of this work will be on physical, including sexual, violence. At times, psychological violence like shaming and humiliation tactics will be analyzed as it is often coupled with experiences of physical violence.

Analytical Framework and Methodology

Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian’s research in “Palestinian Women and the Politics of Invisibility Towards a Feminist Methodology” will be utilized in framing this work. In the most preeminent literature on the activities of the Israeli government and army, there is little focus on how the state affects Palestinian women. Their narratives and experiences have been “invisibilized.” Patriarchy, religion, and collectivism within Palestinian communities further invisibilize women. In these contexts, “to invisibilize” means to make invisible, to silence, and to marginalize.

Israel and Palestine have direct effects on Palestinian women, but in many instances, their cultures, policies, and rhetoric have indirect effects. Actions like home demolitions and arrests have the effect of a “spiral transgression,” a ripple effect in which a seemingly unrelated action affects women’s lives. This work will analyze these causes and effects through the lens of women’s experiences. It will attempt to situate the lives of Palestinian women in the context of military occupation, patriarchy, religion, and collectivism, and in how they experience and react to this intersection of oppressions. Their identities will not be reduced to “victim” or “oppressed,” and Chapter 4 on activism will highlight the ways in which Palestinian women are strong, resourceful, and intelligent.

In relying on a majority of sources from Arab and Palestinian female scholars, this work aims to avoid the Western feminist gaze in its analysis, especially in its attempts--inadvertent or

not--to save or “Other” Palestinian women. Lastly, one must be wary in that some Palestinian women choose to maintain their silence due to fear of retribution or re-traumatization. One must be cognizant in researching and discussing silence, so as not to ascribe it solely to a cultural norm or entreat women to open up about traumatic experiences.

This thesis has been researched and written through a qualitative lens, with the bulk of it being premised on textual analyses and synthesis of different source materials, primarily academic articles and a few books, like *Orientalism* by Edward Said. These materials have been supplemented by statistics from human rights rights documents and reports. A few news articles have been utilized when appropriate.

Outline

Chapter 1 on “A History of Israel and Palestine: Statehood, the Naqba, and Nationalism” explores the underpinnings of the present-day Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Starting in 1948 with Israeli statehood and the Palestinians’ Nakba (“catastrophe” in Arabic), Israel’s and Palestine’s intertwined ideologies and histories will be explored in relation to conflicts of land and culture. The next section focuses on the nature of nationalism and its relationship with gender oppression, masculine language, and conflict. Lastly, Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms will be examined with a focus on masculine language.

Chapter 2 on “Violence Against Women in Palestinian Communities: Factors and Experiences” builds upon this history to show the causes and effects of domestic violence in Palestinian communities. The chapter will commence with a brief overview of Palestinian government, followed by an exploration of the three principal factors--patriarchy, religion, and collectivism--that contribute to high rates of violence against Palestinian women. The instability of Palestinian government is in part responsible for the heightened power of the collective in utilizing violence as a means of control. The last two sections focus on women’s experiences in reaction to these factors. A section on physical violence gives a statistical overview of how many women are affected, with a focus on sexual violence. The last section focuses on femicide--commonly referred to as “honor killing.” Although this chapter mainly explores how the Palestinian milieu breeds high rates of violence against Palestinian women, in certain sections,

Israel will be a necessary background presence because it is so highly intertwined with Palestinian history, nationalism, and daily life.

Chapter 3 brings the focus onto Israel, which both indirectly contributes to violence against Palestinian women by exacerbating the three factors explored in Chapter 2; and by directly influencing women's lives and bodily integrity during interactions at checkpoints, arrest and detention, etc. that result in violence. The chapter begins with an overview of two main Israeli policy aims--land expansion and segregation--that aggravate poverty and other living conditions throughout Palestine. These living conditions exacerbate violence against women. The next section examines how land expansion and segregation affect Palestinian men such that the influences of patriarchy, religion, and collectivism are strengthened, and violence against women thus rises. A section on direct instances of Israeli violence against Palestinian women will follow, with an emphasis on physical and sexual violence during arrest and detention. A final section evaluates how and why Israel has restricted Palestinian women's attempts to seek help and redress.

Chapter 4 on Palestinian Women's Activism aims to answer the thesis sub-question. It will firstly differentiate between the two divergent strands of Palestinian female activism, the traditional, nationalist approach and the approach centered on women's rights discourse. The next section centers on the international human rights framework and how it limits Palestinian female activism. This will be followed by brief recommendations for improvements to the framework. The next two sections evaluate Palestinian and Israeli restrictions on activism. A last section on the successes of Palestinian women's activism will ensue.

Finally, the conclusion identifies future areas for research, especially regarding the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on gender-based violence throughout Palestine.

Chapter I. A History of Israel and Palestine: Statehood, The Naqba, and Nationalism

The exile, occupation, and dispossession that characterize the Palestinian experience set the stage for high rates of physical violence against women. These elements of Israeli colonialism combine with Palestinian history, nationalism, and culture to create even more intersections of oppression Palestinian women navigate.

Indeed, the Palestinian woman's historically invisible life has its roots in the history of two distinct but interrelated nationalisms. This chapter will begin with a brief overview of the dynamics between a state hegemon and minority groups, followed by an examination of the history and political milieu surrounding Israeli statehood and the Palestinian *Naqba*, or "catastrophe." This event set the foundation for the ensuing Israeli-Palestinian Crisis and marked the first time that sexual violence was utilized as a weapon of war by Israel against Palestine. Next, this chapter will outline the features of nationalism, its use of masculine gendered language, and how conflict strengthens this language. The last two sections outline Israeli nationalism and Palestinian nationalism, respectively, with attention to their relationships and their conceptualization of women. Neither Israel nor Palestine can be analyzed discretely for their impacts on an individual or womanhood in general; the two nations--one an official nation-state, the other a nation in limbo--are inextricably intertwined.

Israeli Statehood and the Palestinian Naqba

Dan Rabinowitz's work on minorities' relationship to the state is a valuable lens through which to analyze the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. Rabinowitz coined the term "trapped minority" to refer to Palestinians and others. He says, "A trapped minority is a segment of a larger group spread across at least two states. Citizens of a state hegemonized by others, its members are alienated from political power. Unable to influence the definition of public goods or enjoy them, its members are at the same time marginal within their mother nation abroad (Rabinowitz 2001)."

Indeed, the Palestinian Israelis have been cleaved off from the wider Palestinian community through 1948 Israeli statehood and the 1967 Six-Day War. Although they are

citizens, they have little political sway and unequal rights compared with Jewish citizens. As Palestinians were once intrinsically tied with the land--through agriculture, village, and home--Israeli domination (usurpation of agricultural land, demolitions, etc.) has hit doubly hard, as it has harmed their ability to maintain a collective identity and a spatial and temporal relationship with history, memory, and home (Rabinowitz 2001).

Although Rabinowitz's analysis refers to Palestinians who are citizens of Israel, it can be partly extended to stateless Palestinians, who are also suppressed by Israel. They too have been affected by incursions onto their land and its effects on collective identity and memory. This status of entrapment and inequality especially invisibilizes Palestinian women, who have been disadvantaged even more than men by Israeli colonialism and its spiral transgressions. This relationship underpins Palestinian nationalism, and it has its roots in the European Jewish settlement of Palestine.

In the late 1800s, European Jewish settlers immigrated to the land of Palestine to escape pogroms and other forms of anti-Semitic oppression in Eastern Europe. In 1917, the British Government issued the Balfour Declaration, which supported the establishment of Palestine as a "national home" for the Jewish people. It was unclear what exactly constituted a national home, but the document was important in that it marked the first public support of Zionism by a political power. This helped to rally worldwide support for Zionism, whose goals were first outlined in Basel, Switzerland in 1897. The declaration made clear that the rights of Palestine's indigenous Arabs should be respected, and that Jewish land holdings would not make up *all* of Palestine.

Following the Holocaust, waves of Jewish refugees fled to Palestine, over which Britain had held a colonial mandate since 1920. In 1948, Britain's mandate dissolved and the state of Israel was declared. This sparked a series of violent skirmishes between the new Israelis and the indigenous Arabs, who were joined by armies from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq; the battles, known collectively as the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, lasted for ten months and resulted in victory for Israel. The West Bank fell under control of Jordan, and Gaza under Egypt. In achievement of statehood, Jewish settlers razed Palestinian villages and forced 750,000 Palestinians (Rose 2011)

into an exile that lasts to this day. What Israelis call their Independence, Palestinians call their *Naqba*, or “catastrophe” in Arabic.

The Naqba marks one of the first instances of direct and violent interaction between Palestinians and Israelis. During the Naqba, sexual violence against Palestinian women was utilized as a weapon of war, particular as a method by which to compound the defeat of the indigenous people. Few accounts have survived, but those that do show that the Israelis were indiscriminate in their attacks on women, assaulting and killing both young girls and elderly women. Indeed, as Kim Zinngrebe says, “As ‘reproducers of the nation,’ indigenous women’s bodies are turned into a site on which settlers are able to practise the elimination of indigenous people based on the assertion that their bodies are violable, ‘rapable’ and ‘occupy-able’ — and, following this logic, so is their land (Zinngrebe 2016).”

Moreover, sexual violence as a systematic military tactic was also utilized to hurt Palestinian men, by shaming them for not having adequately protected their female family members. This use of sexual violence has been covered up by both Palestinians and Israelis. It does not fit the traditional, historic narrative of either side. Palestinian women fear the dismantling of their honor by discussing experiences of sexual assault, and Palestinian men chose to focus on nationalist concerns in the wake of the Naqba. After 1948, a Palestinian nationalist slogan was adopted that translates to “land before honor,” to imply that land ownership should supersede other concerns--like sexual assault--no matter what. Thus, accounts of sexual violence may be linked to guilt over land loss (Zinngrebe 2016). Israelis also do not readily talk about the violence in achieving statehood, in order to avoid self-incrimination (Zinngrebe 2016). Indeed, in 2009, the term Naqba was banned from use in Palestinian Israeli textbooks for fear that it would promote propaganda against the state² (Rose 2011). However Naqba accounts are censored, they all work to silence and invisibilize the experiences of Palestinian women.

Upon achievement of statehood, Israeli sought expansion of its land. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel conquered and occupied the West Bank and Gaza, greatly increasing its

² *Khirbet Khizeh*, a novelization of author S. Yizhar’s experiences as an Israeli soldier during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, depicts cruelties against Palestinians, including violence and expulsion. The book has sparked heated controversy in Israel, alternately included in high school curricula and at other times banned (Rose 2011). This demonstrates how strictly Israel controls information regarding its history.

boundaries. In 2005, Israel unilaterally disengaged from Gaza through removal of its Jewish settlers, though still holds the strip under tight military and economic control. In 2007, the political party and terrorist group Hamas took control of Gaza, ousting the less radical and more secular Palestinian National Authority (also referred to as the Palestinian Authority, PNA, or PA) and its main political party, Fatah. In response, Israel and Egypt instituted an air, land, and sea blockade against Gaza, which strictly regulates all movement of people and goods into and out of the strip.

The West Bank has been divided into a sector system by which land is divided into zones. Each zone falls under the authority of either Israel or the Palestinian Authority. This dictates who--Palestinian or Israeli--can travel where. An extensive checkpoint network further restricts mobility within the West Bank. Illegal Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank have continued to thrive despite international outcry and sanctions. Currently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the right-wing Likud party aims to annex part of the West Bank, beginning July 1st, 2020.

Jerusalem remains a contested city, claimed as the capital by both Israelis and Palestinians. US President Donald Trump's decision to move the United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem has validated Israelis' claim to Jerusalem and sparked massive protests along the Gaza border.

In maintenance of its control over Palestinians throughout Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel proper, Israeli has remained highly militarized. All citizens must complete a mandatory army service; the presence of tanks and other military equipment is normalized throughout the Israeli landscape; political and business leadership positions are reserved for graduates of elite army units; heightened security measures are maintained almost constantly; and discrimination against Palestinians for security measures is encouraged. Militarization is inextricably linked with masculinity, and according to Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, militarized societies promote violence against women, encourage patriarchy and masculine norms, and exacerbate already-existing problems of oppression. These issues are aggravated when the militarized society includes a disenfranchised, "Othered" group, as are the Palestinians (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2004).

This convoluted history of land dispossession and usurpation forms the basis of the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis and its associated nationalisms, and it has served to intensely fracture the Palestinian people. Communities were split up during the Naqba and families often unable to reunite because of new land demarcations and ownerships. This mode of living--one in which Palestinians' mobility is limited and communities are splintered by Israeli action--has survived to this day, and had spiral transgressions into the intimate lives of Palestinian women. This history has indeed restructured what exactly constitutes a "Palestinian."

Nationalism, Gender Oppression, Masculine Language, and Conflict

Nationalism is a crucial foundation of identity and belonging. It defines the relationship between a people (a nation-state, a group of people without a state, etc.) and a common identity, through myth, shared history and culture. Nationalist ideology prizes sovereignty over a homeland and a homogenized group identity, which sometimes lends itself to supremacy. Group-oriented as it is, it often strengthens itself through exclusivity.

Indeed, nationalism is very much so premised on an insider/outsider binary, in which the selfhood of the nation is juxtaposed against an "Other" in order to strengthen itself. In a context in which there is a colonizer-colonized relationship, nationalism is even more so augmented (and dangerous) because of the natural tension and power imbalance.

In times of such conflict, masculine language undergirding a particular nationalism is strengthened. War, the military, and violence are masculine gendered in how they are presented and perceived. Furthermore, Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms are premised on the masculine experience to begin with. Conflict thus exacerbates patriarchal norms and language, and as conflict is ever-present amidst the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis, these two nationalisms and their linguistic underpinnings have been greatly strengthened.

Gender oppression is thus deeply linked to nationalism and the prevailing politics and conflict of a country or territory. Nationalist rhetoric and policy solidifies gender oppression by forcing women to subscribe to traditional, generally restricted roles. For example, in response to Israel's "Othering" of Palestinian culture, Palestinian political and cultural leaders have reacted by strengthening nationalism in order to rebel against occupation and militarization. Nationalistic

language and norms relating to women's sexuality have thus been strengthened to seemingly create a more united front against Israel. Per this logic, the more women are controlled, the more powerful and cohesive the Palestinian community unit will be. Women's lives are co-opted in the fight against Israel. Indeed, Palestinian women are frequently referred to as *hamula*, or "clan property" in Arabic (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003). And the more Israeli nationalism--by rhetoric or policy--interferes in Palestinian lives, the more gender oppression is exacted by Palestinian men upon women. This has created a positive feedback loop in which Palestinian and Israeli actions reinforce each other, all while exacerbating factors that contribute to the control of Palestinian women. This control is often enacted by violence.

Overview of Israeli Nationalism

Israeli nationalism is premised on Zionism, which sought to establish Palestine as a homeland for the Jewish people. Now that this has been achieved, Zionism aims to maintain and expand the Jewish presence and land holdings in the nation-state of Israel. Although its symbolism is often religious, Zionism is rather secular, focusing on the strength of the Jewish male and the value of land.

Zionism initially arose in 1897 at the First Zionist Congress in Switzerland, but its ideology was further defined during World War II, with a marked turn towards the masculine. In the settling of Palestine in the wake of the Holocaust, Jewish leaders strove to compensate for a self-perception of weakness amongst Jews. This self-blame stemmed from what they considered the degradation of the male Jewish body. Zionism aimed to counteract these feelings of shame and humiliation by refashioning the Jewish people into "New Jews." The New Jew was meant to negate the Jewish people's past experiences of weakness by settling Palestine and working the land. Propaganda films and pamphlets depicted tall, muscular, tan, blonde European Jewish males ploughing fields and handling equipment. These images were purposefully overly-masculine as a juxtaposition to the perceived weak Jewish males who had been killed at extermination camps; the focus on manual labor was a direct foil against studying the Torah, which was considered bookish and effete. The focus on manual labor also pointed to the life settlers could expect in Palestine, which was rural and agriculture-oriented. The land was

underdeveloped and dry, so settlers worked to enact irrigation reforms and new farming techniques.

This agricultural focus aligned well with colonial aims in general, since it necessitated control of the land. This land-centric nationalism helped to justify incursions onto Palestinian land, through both violence and policy. Although Israel is no longer covered in collective farms (kibbutzes) as it once was, it has retained these expansionary goals.

Zionist imagery and rhetoric were also gendered, principally revolving only around the Jewish male experience. The Jewish man performed the labor and worked the land, which was conceptualized as feminine. The land was to submit to him and be readily conquerable. Women and children were conceptualized as part of an “idealized femininity (Ryan 2017),” one that required protection and domination by men. This adulation of male strength also played a part in how Zionism initially portrayed Arabs indigenous to Palestine. These Arabs were feminized in Zionist propaganda in order to help strengthen the ideal of the masculine New Jew. This “Othering” of the Arabs also helped to justify their conquest and legitimize their oppression.

The European basis for Zionism also helped Jewish settlers to differentiate themselves from Arabs. Zionism’s European origins lent the legitimacy of a great imperial power to the Jewish settlers; this helped to situate the Jews against the perceived barbarism and backwardness of Palestine’s indigenous people. As Jews from Middle Eastern and North African countries immigrated to Israel from the 1950s onwards, their histories and cultures were subsumed by the European-based Israeli nationalism. The European/non-European dichotomy negated the historical and cultural connections these Jews had with their Arab origins, in an attempt to further separate Israelis from Palestinians. European Jewish powers were anxious that, if Syrian, Moroccan, and Persian Jews were to feel more affiliation with a Middle Eastern history, perhaps they would not be so inclined to readily subjugate the Palestinian natives.

Palestinian intellectual Edward Said outlines this binary between the European and the “Other” in his 1978 seminal work *Orientalism*. Said believed that European powers purposefully strove to create cultural inequalities between themselves and the non-European world by

depicting the latter as weak, feminized, and irrational.³ These “immutable cultural essences,” in Said’s words, were solidified in the Western imagination to justify colonialism and the inequalities that stemmed from it. Thus, the strong and masculine European Jew had a duty in controlling the weak and feminine Arab.

This supremacy of Israeli nationalism persists to the present day. Statehood and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War trapped some Arabs within the borders of Israel, and these people have official Israeli citizenship. Almost 20% of its population is Palestinian, but Israel still premises its national narrative and symbols solely on the Jewish Israeli experience. Although this high proportion of Palestinian citizenship creates anxiety for Jewish leadership, it also helps them in propelling Israel’s nationalistic causes. By situating the Jewish majority against this minority, in effect “Othering” the Palestinians in an us-versus-them dichotomy, right-wing leadership is more effective in fear-mongering, forming coalitions, passing legislation, and rallying support for its expansionary aims.

A fair study of nationalism, though, must also focus on the “Other” in the equation. Similarly, Palestinians also utilize gendered imagery, though its context is resistance, not colonization.

Overview of Palestinian Nationalism

The nomenclature describing what constitutes a Palestinian is nuanced. Inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza are Palestinians. Refugees who were born in Lebanon are Palestinians, although they have never visited their homeland--they are essentially confined to the camp and are discriminated against by the Lebanese government. Many Palestinian refugees in Jordan actually have Jordanian citizenship and are not refugees anymore in the light of integration; however, other Palestinians actually live in refugee camps within Jordan, without citizenship. And lastly, Palestinians within the borders of Israel (that is, not in the West Bank or Gaza). This includes East Jerusalem, which is claimed by Israel though not readily recognized by the

³ These depictions arose from European travelers’ accounts throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and they were perpetuated through postcards, artwork, and literature. With the case of Israel and its European Jewish settlers, film solidified the image of the strong New Jew and the weak, native Arab.

international community. These men and women are actual citizens of the state,⁴ and may be referred to as Arab Israelis or Palestinian Israelis. Thus, though these Palestinians have an actual Israeli nationality, they are Palestinians by religion, nationalism, culture, family and community affiliation, and are bound by discrimination and oppression by the Israeli state. Furthermore, Palestinians are not a homogenous group, for they may be of Muslim, Christian, Druze, or Bedouin origin, though the majority are Muslim.

The construction of Palestinian nationalism also arose out of the origins of Israeli statehood, or the Naqba. Its nationalism is similarly premised on gendered language and its position with another power. While Israeli nationalism had its roots in film propaganda, Palestinian nationalism was first defined in literature. After 1948, a slew of Palestinian poets wrote work on massacres, the feeling of non-belonging, and exile; these poets become the touchstone for Palestinian culture and nationalism. Says Honaida Ghanim, “Intellectuals living in (post)colonial states do more than merely reflect or sympathize about the situation. Generally, they become active agents in the production of and intervention in the society (Ghanim 2009).” Indeed, they framed the Naqba in patriarchal terms by speaking on the loss of honor, the loss of the land, and the collective shame of experiencing such tragedies. Resistance is framed as an act of gender performance, as Palestinians are tasked with freeing the feminine land (Ghanim 2009), just as Palestinian men control and defend the sexuality, honor, and body of Palestinian women.

This heady gendered language was officially codified in some of Palestine’s post-1948 founding documents. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was the first government of sorts to fill the void left in Palestinian communities by 1948 Israeli statehood, issued two charters upon its establishment that served as a sort of constitution. In the Palestinian Nationalist Charter, the Israeli Jews are conceptualized as the rapists of Palestine, the very feminine gendered motherland of the Palestinians. In its fourth article, the charter states that Palestinian identity is transmitted from father to son, so women are relegated as secondary determinants of citizenship. In the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) communique number 5, the woman’s position is outlined: she is the soil on which the male qualities of respect and dignity are grown. She is important only as she relates to fertility (Massad 1995). This exclusionary language helps in invisibilizing women. This gendered

⁴ However, not all Palestinians in East Jerusalem have Israeli citizenship.

language creates a milieu in which women “have to construct their identity from silence, from a consciousness formed in a man’s world (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003).”

Today, Palestinian nationalism is strengthened through conflict. Palestinians are readily bonded through their shared history of oppression and longing for the return of their land. Naqba Day, commemorated every year to honor the experiences of Arabs during Israeli statehood, set off the most intense wave of protests against Israel in 2018. Many Palestinian villages feature large keys above gates and fences to symbolize their inhabitants’ eventual return to their ancestral homes, which were taken over by Israel through various wars. The rise of the Islamic Movement and Hamas has helped in consolidating a strong sense of nationalism amongst Palestinians across the territories. By situating themselves against Israel, they find a common purpose and enemy.

Thus, the identities of both groups, premised either as a conqueror or defender of the land, could not exist without each other. They serve as foils to each other. The oppression of Palestine has become integral to Zionism, and to resist Israel--often through violence and the control of Palestinian women--is crucial to the structure of Palestinian nationalism. Both nationalisms silence the experiences of women, especially Palestinian ones. Israeli nationalism uses imagery of the Arab and the feminine to connote weakness, in order to showcase the strength of the European, Jewish male. Palestinian nationalism, though built upon shared tragedies, does not focus on the unique experiences of women during the Naqba, like sexual assault. Women’s experiences are situated purely in a context that relates to the struggle against Israel.

Chapter II. Violence Against Women in Palestinian Communities: Factors and Experiences

Throughout Palestinian communities, 37% of women have experienced gender-based violence; in Gaza, this percentage rises to 51% (“Gender-based Violence”); and 60% of Palestinian males report that women should tolerate violence in order to maintain family bonds (“Facts and Figures”). These statistics are estimated to be much higher in reality, given the restrictions that Palestinian women face in reporting experiences of physical abuse. Patriarchy, religion, and collectivism within Palestine contribute to these high rates of physical violence against Palestinian women. Weak Palestinian leadership and institutions further exacerbate violence. These factors are then aggravated by Israel policy like discrimination, land expansion, and violence and humiliation as tools of war and colonialism.

This chapter will explore these factors through an initial overview of Palestinian government, followed by analyses of patriarchal, religious, and collectivist values and how they directly affect control of and violence against women. Patriarchal and religious values undergird collectivism, so the latter will be the main, and ultimate, focus of the factors. Collectivism is especially responsible in dissuading women from seeking redress; this cultural prescription for silence and invisibility will be addressed. States of conflict further solidify how the combination of these factors influence women’s lives.

The next section builds upon the exploration of these factors to focus on actual experiences of women and physical violence against them: what constitutes physical violence; how physical violence makes Palestinian women invisible; and the spiral transgressions caused by physical violence, like mental illness and suicide. The last section delves into femicide and how it exemplifies, to the extreme, the relationship between violence and control of women throughout Palestinian communities.

Although this chapter mainly focuses on the Palestinian milieu that has bred high rates of violence, such factors cannot be analyzed in a vacuum, and Israel will be a necessary background presence in such descriptions and analyses. Chapter three then focuses on particular Israeli

contributions to violence, and the confluence of both powers' influence will be shown throughout.

Palestinian Government

The West Bank and Gaza experience inept, unstable, and radical leadership under the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, respectively. These authorities exacerbate economic and political difficulties that aggravate violence against women.

The West Bank is relatively more stable and secular than Hamas, although it still suffers from an ongoing political stalemate and growing authoritarianism. Mahmoud Abbas--elected as President of the PA in 2005 for a four-year term--is still in power, and the Palestinian Parliament and Palestinian Legislative Council have not had an election since 2006. Corruption abounds and debt has ballooned. Abbas is not held accountable amidst the absences of rule of law and a system of checks and balances, and his leadership has thus grown increasingly authoritarian (Elgindy 2015). Currently, the political party Fatah--which is a faction of the secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) controls the PA.

The PA governed Gaza from 1994 to 2007, at which time Hamas took control and ousted them during the Battle of Gaza. Hamas has proven an even more authoritarian organization than the PA, with strict Shari'a laws on women's conduct and matters of personal life. Hamas's and Fatah's conflict has also exacerbated poverty and access to social services in Hamas, with Gazans experiencing water and electricity shortages, alongside poor infrastructure, hospitals, and schools.

Despite authoritarian tendencies, neither Hamas nor Fatah have even the semblance of sovereign power over their respective territories, controlled as they are by Israel. In the West Bank, which has been divided into zones, the Palestinian Authority only has jurisdiction over about 40% of the territory (Elgindy 2015). Checkpoints within the West Bank and Gaza, as well as checkpoints at their borders, regulate movement and the ability of people to work, go to school, and participate in politics. An Israeli and Egyptian land, air, and sea blockade against Gaza, imposed in 2007, has regulated humanitarian aid like food and medicines into the impoverished, overcrowded strip of land. Few Gazans are able to leave. The blockade and

control over the Gazan economy has aggravated shortages and downgraded citizens' quality of life.

The increasing influence of religion has also affected governance throughout the Palestinian Territories. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)--which was largely secular--held sway for decades throughout the territories. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Islam saw a rise within Palestine. With the annexation of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, Palestinians within the territories and in Israel experienced an increase in contact with each other and began to mobilize more readily. This heightened the strength of nationalism and Islam's power within it. Islamization grew to be a tool with which Palestinians could counter Israeli oppression (Daoud 2016).

Hamas's 2007 rise to power in Gaza exemplifies this return to Islam. Strict adherence to Shari'a law has given legitimacy to Hamas's control over women, and the aforementioned increase in communication between Palestinians across Israel and the Palestinian Territories has allowed Hamas's cultural influence to spread.

In some instances, like with Hamas's traditional and conservative interpretation of Islamic law, Palestinian government directly contributes to cultural elements like patriarchy, religion, and collectivism that have created high rates of violence against women. In other instances, as with the PA's lack of institutions and inability to provide social services to its citizens, it is the governmental void itself that has aggravated these factors. In the absence of strong leadership, collective values and religion have taken strong root in family life and cultivated an environment amenable to violence. Neither are there legal institutions through which women can seek redress.

Examples of governmental ineptitude with regard to social services include weak healthcare, especially pertaining to family planning services; and poor infrastructure, amidst an absence of building codes, inspection, and access to the most modern appliances. This is also affected by Israeli control, in that Israel limits economic growth in Palestinian communities and, in the case of Gaza, directly controls imported material.

Hospitals and clinics throughout the Palestinian Territories are underfunded and lack the resources to properly diagnose and treat basic medical issues. Abortion is illegal per strict adherence to Islamic law, so Palestinian women must travel to Israel to seek a pregnancy termination. Movement within and without the Palestinian Territories is highly regulated by

Israeli checkpoints, however, so women are unlikely to successfully enjoy Israeli medical care. Control by male household members further restricts women's ability to seek healthcare. Neither is birth control available within the territories (Shahawy and Diamond 2018). Besides Islamic law, Palestinian authorities have restricted family planning to uphold nationalistic values. The Palestinian woman is conceptualized as a mother who is responsible for the growth of the nation (Herzog 1998). Because her fertility is central to Palestinian nationalism and the collective, seeking an abortion would not only be illegal, it would bring dishonor to the family and community.

Poor infrastructure, amidst water shortages and frequent electric outages, also demonstrates how a lack of social services affect women. Household stress, which arises out of cramped, overcrowded, unsanitary, and unsafe living quarters,⁵ is frequent in Palestinian communities, and is a strong indicator for violence within such homes (Haj-Yahia 2013). This indicates, per Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian's work, how seemingly small factors like home ventilation have spiral transgressions onto Palestinian women's physical safety and quality of life.

Thus, Palestinian government or the lack thereof is important in understanding women's lives throughout Palestine, but at the crux of their experience are patriarchy, religion, and collectivism.

Patriarchy

In a study of domestic violence throughout Palestinian communities, 60% of Palestinian men claimed violence must be utilized against women to uphold the strength of the family ("Facts and Figures"). In another study, men were significantly more likely to support the use of violence if they held patriarchal values; this was measured by their responses to questions on female independence, female suffrage, and women-led businesses (Khawaja 2008).

In patriarchal societies, men dominate in leadership positions throughout politics and the household. Women are expected to exist within the domestic sphere and cater to the wants of their husbands, fathers, and brothers. They are highly controlled, especially when they leave the household. Throughout Palestine, women have drastically low education and labor participation

⁵ Poor ventilation and construction methods are primary safety concerns. The home itself thus contributes to feelings of entrapment, stress, and aggression (Haj-Yahia 2013).

rates. Although literacy rates are high in Palestinian communities, Israeli policy and Palestinian cultural restrictions prevent women from pursuing higher education. They have some of the lowest labor participation rates in the world; in 2011, women participated at a mere 17%, compared with men's rate of 69% ("Women's Participation in the Palestinian Labour Force"). This exclusion contributes to their invisible status and aims to internalize misogyny, which make it easier to control women's actions and prevent them from taking part in activism.

This exclusion and invisible status of women helps to keep the patriarchy entrenched. When women are unable to participate in the public sphere, they cannot as readily educate themselves and collaborate on issues of women's rights. Arabic does not even have a word for "feminism." Indeed, within Palestine, feminism is associated with a stereotypical western brand of promiscuous sexuality (Glavanis 1992).

Feminism is further subverted by being presented in alignment with imperial power and values, especially with the West and Israel. This is one reason Hamas has so eagerly tamped down on women's rights and hailed patriarchal values (Glavanis 1992). As Hamas has focused on stirring up greater nationalism, especially religious nationalism, it has sought to distance itself from the West, with all its connotations of female empowerment and feminism. Its hijab campaign, which started in the 1980s, seeks to enforce head-covering amongst Palestinian women. The campaign in part attempts to distance Palestine from powers like the United States and Israel through strict adherence to Shari'a and a shirking of women's rights influence. Per this logic, if equality undergirds Western society, then patriarchy must help to differentiate Palestinian society from the US and Israel.

In Palestine's patriarchal structure, domestic violence is often justified within this gender relations paradigm as set by religious, cultural, and political leaders. Its justification is so deeply embedded into institutions, norms, and values that women may not even question it, let alone seek help. Indeed, in patriarchal societies, women also hold patriarchal beliefs (or internalized misogyny). Research has shown that many Palestinian women blame themselves for violence they have experienced, not solely their husbands. They subscribe to the belief that they have somehow failed in fulfilling their duties as a wife. Variation exists, however. Palestinian women with higher levels of education tend to hold their husbands more responsible for abuse, while more sexually conservative and religious women hold their husbands *less* responsible (Haj-Yahia 2018). Amidst low education rates and the increasing sway of religion, it is thus more likely for

women to place more responsibility on themselves, and less on their husbands, for experiences of violence.

This normalization of violence and the acceptance of patriarchy begins at a young age. Young Palestinians are socialized that violence is an acceptable experience. In schools, corporal punishment is utilized, and at the home, it is a common method of discipline. Children grow up believing that experiences of corporal punishment are perpetrated against them because their parents love them. Boys who are hit while playing outside are encouraged to hit back, and girls who are hit are encouraged to be complacent and silent (Españoli 1997). This readily prepares husbands to beat their wives and for wives to accept it without question. Moreover, men who witness or experience violence during their childhoods are more likely to then abuse their wives in adulthood (Baloushah 2019).

This relationship between violence and control was best described by sociologist Michael Johnson, who dubbed their connection “patriarchal terrorism.” According to Johnson, patriarchal terrorism is “a product of patriarchal traditions of men’s right to control “their” women, [it] is a form of terroristic control of wives by their husbands that involves the systematic use of not only violence, but economic subordination, threats, isolation, and other control tactics (Johnson 1995).” Indeed, Palestinian women live not just with the experience of violence, but with the fear of it. This fear works to control them and limit their participation in activities outside the household, like activism and education initiatives.

Religion

In the 1990s, Hamas and other political parties began to shift their focus from military action against Israel to intensifying the presence of Islam in Gaza. This increased focus on Islam extended to the West Bank and Palestinian communities within Israel. The resurgence of religiosity and the Islamic Movement within Palestine eventually led to the dominance of these parties, most noticeably with Hamas’s 2007 defeat of Fatah and the PA in Gaza. Hamas’s policies and language have influenced gender politics even within the household, and its influence has spread well beyond Gaza. Violence is often justified through a religious lens, and women are considered naturally inferior by religious interpretation.

Although Hamas has encouraged the inclusion of women in the fight against Israel, women are expected to operate within the confines of Palestinian nationalism, which is

masculine. Neither are women encouraged to participate in *political* activism against Israel; rather, their actions are relegated mostly to the social, like informal, homebound women's groups. Educated women are encouraged to lead educational groups at mosques, and not much else (Muhanna 2015). In the struggle against Israel, women are generally conceptualized as the "mothers" of future fighters for Palestine, and not as agents of change in their own right (Daoud 2016).

Political parties within the Islamic Movement have actually sought to modernize the Palestinian Territories, but such rhetoric and actions rarely extend to women. Rhetoric aimed at females is often an attempt to consolidate power by manipulating women into believing support of Hamas is in the best interests of them and their family. These actions ensure further control of females and their continued invisibility in politics and religion. While a 2006 Hamas electoral campaign claimed to shift its focus to women's rights, it did so only through a religious lens. By emphasizing conservative Islamic values, Hamas encouraged veiling, sex segregation, and women's dependence on men (Muhanna 2015).

Religious interpretation has aided in normalizing violence against women. Throughout the Arab world, women are cast as temptresses, from which all evil flows; hence, the extreme measures to subordinate and blame them when they are a victim of violence, especially sexual violence (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 1999b). Rape is blamed on the victim, who is cast as having acted so seductively that the perpetrator was compelled to attack. Being so seductive, she must have defied the community's cultural and religious tenets. She is charged with being a poor Muslim and a poor family member, charges that strike at the very strength of the Palestinian community. This narrative and power dynamic invisibilizes women and contributes to a cultural prescription for female silence. By speaking up and seeking help, she is put in a position where she seemingly goes against her religious values and dismantles her family.

Collectivism

Collectivism utilizes religious and patriarchal values to further its goals and norms. Within collectivist societies, individual wants and needs are subsumed in prioritization of the group identity and goals. Strong alignment and integration with this in-group is expected throughout one's life; in exchange for protection from the in-group, "unquestionable loyalty" is required (Hofstede 2010). This is another way in which women's voice are invisibilized, as their

narratives, goals, and overall lives must adhere to strict cultural norms and familial expectations.

Throughout the Middle East, collectivism often dovetails with tribalism, in which society is structured into small, tightly-formed groups. In tribalist communities in the region, women's honor and reputation are considered the lynchpin of the tribe. If a woman dishonors the tribe by disobeying her husband or going into public without proper garb, she may be ostracized or even killed. This tribalism justifies the extreme control of Palestinian women, especially bodily and sexual control.

Palestinian family--or rather the Palestinian father and husband--operates as a sort of unofficial political entity, one that can unilaterally make decisions and act with impunity. The strength of the family is heightened when there is a lack of official power channels like effective government. The family unit, or collective, is the focal point of all realms: economic, social, and religious. This lack of separation makes for an intrusive society in which a woman's world, though relegated to the household, is never truly private. Collectivist society in Palestine is naturally hierarchal, and is highly linked with patriarchy. Women are even considered well below the social strata of much younger males (Berko 2007).

This hierarchy present in collectivism is well described by the power distance gradient. "Power distance" is a marker that describes to what extent a society tolerates inequalities between people and how stratified their culture and society are (Flicker 2019). A society with low power distance (PD) is the USA, where children talk to their parents as though they are peers and rebellion against the status quo is a culturally promoted value. Arab societies, on the other hand, have high PD; they are hierarchical and a lot of respect is awarded to leaders (Flicker 2019)--for example, to the father as the head of the household. This is a deeply embedded cultural construct, so much so that it would be rare for Palestinians to question it. Women often accept their low status as normative.

Despite such a low status in her community, the woman is considered the linchpin of the family; or rather, her honor is. A woman's value rests on her honor, which is defined sexually; she is expected to remain a virgin until marriage and then be at the disposal of her husband. Her reputation is paramount and should it be tarnished, her entire family can be endangered (Berko 2007). This low status, in confluence with the high importance placed on her sexuality, justifies the use of violence in controlling her.

To reiterate Chapter 1, Palestinian nationalism also strengthens the collectivist, tribalist tenets that focus on womanly honor. Literature on Palestinian memory and nationalism is highly gendered in its language and imagery. The land of Palestine, always conceptualized as a woman, is subject to the sexual violence of Israeli Jews; Zionism itself is premised on hyper-masculine norms. In turn, the men of Palestine, cast as its defenders, must guard the female land and its honor from Israel (Bleibleh 2019). This undergirds the notion that the Palestinian woman, as the core of Palestinian honor and value, must be controlled in order to be protected from outside invaders--essentially, anyone who is not her husband or father.

The combination of these factors gives rise to a very traditional and strict gender role. The Palestinian woman must be confined to the private sphere--the household. She helps to maintain her reputation and that of her family as she cooks, cleans, and cares for her children, siblings, and others. Her fertility is of supreme importance as she is conceptualized as the mother of future sons for Palestine. This is a further means of control, justified by the national narrative and cultural norms, in which her body is essentially co-opted for reproductive use and nationalistic aims. Confined in this role as she is, if she wants to participate in activities beyond the house, she must receive permission and/or accompaniment (Berko 2007). Rarely seen outside the house, and if so only in adherence with patriarchal, religious, and collectivist norms, Palestinian women are thus readily made to be invisible. They do not have agency over their own lives, and this reinforces the ease with which domestic violence is perpetrated against them.

Collectivism also presents barriers to seeking redress. Because the collective's importance comes before that of the individual in such societies, for a Palestinian woman to report an abuse is akin to her blaming and shaming her family for not protecting her adequately. Thus, female victims of violence are often silenced and the male strata is strengthened (Berko 2007). Women seeking divorce are often ostracized, as they are seen to be disrupting the collective. A recent study on Palestinian Israelis found that 92% of women responded that domestic violence should be handled privately, within the home. A mere 6% thought divorce an appropriate solution. In contrast, 70% of Arab American women believe domestic violence is a social problem that should be addressed through an official, legal route (Haj-Yahia 2018).

In a study of Palestinian female victims of physical abuse and the Israeli police officers responding to their calls for help, Palestinian Israeli officers were unreceptive to the calls.

Although the officers were in positions of authority to help the women, they principally aligned themselves with the collective values of Palestinian society. They judged that the victims should not dishonor their communities by appealing for help (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2004). This speaks to the collective value of leaving conflict to family elders, on maintaining a unified family front, and on the use of the female body as a sealant on the family's honor and respectability. In this way, she has no agency, neither bodily nor politically.

Women's Experiences: Physical Violence

Physical violence includes beating, slapping, hitting, and also forms of sexual violence like rape. It is usually coupled with verbal abuse like screaming, insulting, threatening, and shaming (Baloushah 2019b). Physical abuse is used as a means of control and punishment, and as a release when a man feels humiliation or shame. Because there is so much focus on the dynamics between Palestine and Israel, the ways in which Palestinian women are oppressed are often invisibilized. Their narratives have been subsumed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Only about .7% of survivors ever report their experiences of violence ("Gender-based violence"). Without pressures against the PA and Hamas, perpetrators and authorities have little incentive to act. Furthermore, because of internalized misogyny and social and cultural mores, many women do not recognize their experiences of violence as abuse. Marital rape is a commonly accepted experience in that husbands' control over their wives is culturally sanctioned. Incest is similarly conceptualized, in that male family members are already granted control over their sisters and nieces.⁶

Rape is committed principally by close family members. Seventy-five percent of sexual assault cases in the Palestinian Territories were committed by fathers, brothers, and uncles. Girls between the ages of four and thirteen are particularly vulnerable. In the West Bank and Gaza, few perpetrators are ever brought to justice; in 2006, only one person was incarcerated for rape, two in 2005, and none in 2002 and 2003 (Kuttab 2011).

These experiences of physical violence and abuse have spiral transgressions into other areas of women's lives. Minor and severe physical abuse, as well as physical injury, are linked with anxiety, depression, and PTSD. In one study of Palestinian women in Gaza who had faced

⁶ In one case, a young girl who was raped by a brother, and then impregnated, was incarcerated after stating that she had committed a sin and deserved to be jailed (Kuttab 2011).

domestic violence, 18% exhibited symptoms of anxiety and 14.7% exhibited symptoms of depression (Aziz 2017). Physical injuries are sometimes long-lasting and affect women's abilities to carry out her daily activities. This often incurs even more violence from a frustrated husband or father. Because of fears of retribution and shaming the family, amidst lack of access to healthcare, many injuries are left untreated.

Lack of agency is another common reaction to domestic violence (Baloushah 2019c). Many Palestinian women claim they are unable to leave their husbands due to financial dependence and fear for their children, so suicide is considered a viable exit from the relationship (Baloushah 2019a). Sometimes, suicide attempts are utilized as a way to protest against husbands, make them feel guilty, and threaten them with familial shame and dishonor (Dabbagh 2004).

Women's Experiences: Femicide

Between 2000 and 2012, 76 Palestinian women and girls in Israel were murdered by male family members (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2013). In 2019 alone, 24 women and girls in the West Bank and Gaza were similarly murdered ("Everything You Need to Know About Human Rights in Palestine"). The statistics are believed to be much higher due to lack of reporting or misreporting.

A *femicide* refers to the murder of a woman by a family member or members, usually due to a perceived dishonoring and shaming of the family. Femicides have historically been referred to as honor killings, though Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian suggests the term femicide⁷ in its place. With the inclusion of the word "honor" in the traditional phrase, its linguistic power is lessened by undue focus on community values rather than murder. By the phrase "honor killing," murder is framed by the woman's actions and reputation within her community and family, instead of by the murder itself. "Honor killing" connotes necessity and blame (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2013).

⁷ Shalhoub-Kevorkian's definition of femicide extends beyond the act of murder. Femicide does not refer solely to the cumulative death of a woman, but also to the *buildup* alongside the physical death. The buildup may include shaming, threats, lesser violence, and fear. She writes, "In the new definition that I propose, death has already occurred by the time a female is put on 'death row'--that is, when she is effectively sentenced to death by murder and lives under the continual threat of being killed. Even at this point, I consider her a victim of femicide, and I thus redefine death as the inability to live. Although victims of femicide are technically alive, they are in a mode of life that they never wanted and completely reject, a mode that is perhaps best described as death-in-life (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003).

Palestinian males commit femicide for perceived infractions against the patriarchal, religious, and collectivist values explored in previous sections in this chapter. Women who disobey, shame, and dishonor their fathers and husbands are at risk of femicide, especially if her actions have included a sexual--or perceived sexual--component. Premarital and extramarital relations of a sexual or non-sexual nature (like a friendship construed suspiciously) and experiences of sexual assault are common factors that contribute to the murder of Palestinian women. Virginity is an especially valued construct in Palestinian communities, so women who engage in premarital sex or experience a rape are considered irredeemable. Indeed, even non-consensual sex puts women at risk of femicide. The victim is construed as having invited the attack and brought shame to the family.⁸ Although male family members such as fathers, husbands, brothers, uncles, and cousins usually carry out the act of murder, female family members are often complicit. Mothers and others sometimes actively encourage femicide, while in other instances are bereaved but do not attempt to dissuade the perpetrators or seek redress afterwards.⁹ In rarer cases, victims are encouraged to self-harm or commit suicide, even though this violates religious and cultural norms against it.¹⁰

Although the direct perpetrator of femicide within this context is the Palestinian male relative or relatives, often abetted by female ones, the Israeli-Palestinian power dynamic indirectly influences male and female interactions within Palestinian communities. In reaction to control from Israel, Palestinian males attempt to subvert this control by asserting dominance over their own community members. They also attempt to slough off Israeli cultural tenets, values, and practices, such as Westernized clothing and manners, sexual relations before marriage, and a focus on individualism. In efforts to strengthen Palestinian identity and eschew Israeli influence,

⁸ In one case, Khawla, a 17-year-old Palestinian woman, was raped continuously by her brothers. Her parents knew but did not intervene. Khawla's mother once hit her when she discovered one of the brothers attacking her. Her narrative demonstrates the cultural prescription for silence within Palestinian communities, for she expressed fear that she could never seek help in the face of murder. In an interview, she calls herself a *meyyeteh a'aisheh*, a "dead person alive" in Arabic. Other victims of violence have used similar diction: "preferring actual death," "feeling dead with their families and intimate ones," and "living death." Families members similarly use death-centered rhetoric in reaction to perceived sexual infractions: "I should slaughter and get rid of her," "I hope she dies," and "I could make believe that she has never been born (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003)."

⁹ One case saw the rape of a three-year-old girl by a relative. Her father demanded that the mother kill her (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003).

¹⁰ A Palestinian victim of incest, attempting to burn herself with gasoline, was brought heating oil by her father. He instructed her that it would be more "effective" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003).

Palestinian men are thus more inclined to control women. Says Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “Exercising control over women, especially their sexuality, constitutes a patriarchal means of maintaining control of and managing the internal social equilibrium (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2013).” Thus, the imposition of formal Israeli policy serves to strengthen informal Palestinian modes of power, ones that affect vulnerable groups like women and children.

Legal means of redress in both Israel and the Palestinian Territories have invisibilized women by dissuading reports of femicide and attempted femicide; not treating reported cases as instances of murder; and offering impunity to the killer or killers. In Israel, femicide is legally considered an honor killing. This linguistic framework affects how police and courts investigate and adjudicate murders of Palestinian women, which are thus frequently treated as expressions of patriarchy. This contributes to skewed statistics regarding femicide of Palestinian women within Israel, which are estimated to be much higher than reported (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2013).

Neither do the Israeli police investigate threats against a Palestinian woman’s life. In court, perpetrators often receive pardons or lenient plea bargains. In the West Bank, a murderer may be freed should the court exercise the “exonerated excuse” provision. Between 1996 and 1999, in the Palestinian attorney general’s files regarding the deaths of 234 femicide victims, the cases were closed due to a classification of “fate and destiny (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003).”

The collectivist makeup of the Palestinian family, in which women are reliant on men for financial support, representation, and permission to leave the home, also ensures that potential victims of femicide do not seek help. Many Palestinian women fear intervention by both Israeli and Palestinian NGOs and social services. If a woman were to be successfully removed from her home and placed in a shelter, she faces further dishonor from her community, ensuring she cannot safely return. Neither are most Palestinian women equipped with an adequate education and financial means to support themselves independently. This inaction on the part of the criminal justice system, coupled with social and cultural norms that shame and restrict women’s voices, prevent women who have experienced threats against their lives from reporting and seeking redress (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2013).

Thus, patriarchal, religious, and collectivist norms--in collusion with and upheld by inept Palestinian government and gendered nationalism--contribute to high rates of physical violence against Palestinian women, including sexual violence and femicide. Palestinian men often react

to Israeli militarization by exercising heightened control over women, whose experiences are further invisibilized by restrictions on reporting and criminal justice system inaction. Shalhoub-Kevorkian says, “The killers’ need to define themselves by ending the life of a female relative makes the act a public performance, designed to impress and make them heroes within the family and close community. The performative aspect of the act demands that it should appear impulsive and intimate, in order to showcase the male power of domination. This expression of domination manifests in both the acts themselves as perpetrated by Arab-Palestinian men and the unwillingness on behalf of the Israeli formal legal system to intervene in cases of femicide (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2013).”

Indeed, Palestinian women’s lives are highly regulated and delegitimized to serve cultural and nationalist prescriptions for gender oppression, and these factors are magnified by Israeli occupation and militarization. Chapter 3 will more thoroughly examine how Israel directly and indirectly affects the bodily integrity of Palestinian women.

Chapter III. Israeli Militarization: Direct and Indirect Influences on Violence Against Palestinian Women

In interviews with Palestinian female citizens of Israel, one researcher found that every single interviewee reported instances of racism from Israeli institutions, including “prejudice, segregation, and discrimination in housing, hiring, and job promotion (Herzog 2004).” These Israeli policies and actions, amidst others, directly and indirectly contribute to the high rates of physical violence that Palestinian women experience, whether at a checkpoint or within the home. The most salient of these policies and actions include segregation, from which stems discrimination, and land expansion.

Statistics on how many Palestinian women face domestic violence vary widely, in part due to issues surrounding silence and reporting. United Nations statistics reveal that 37% of Palestinian women have faced gender-based violence, and 51% of women in Gaza have experienced it (“Gender-based violence”). Some academic studies show otherwise. According to a 2017 study, 68% of Palestinian women citizens of Israel experience domestic violence as opposed to 28% of Jewish Israeli women. The study found an association between increased domestic violence against Palestinian women in Israel and neighborhood problems. These problems--such as poverty, lack of quality schools, etc.--are directly linked to Israeli policy against these communities (O’Campo 2017). Although this study was conducted within Palestinian communities in Israel, these same problems persist--though often magnified--in the Palestinian territories due to Israeli action.

Israel’s control over Palestinian mobility, infrastructure, and economy in the West Bank, Gaza, and Palestinian Israeli communities contribute to their impoverishment, lack of economic development, and inadequate schools and general institutions. With the failure of official institutions, the Palestinian family steps in and takes control, with often deleterious effects on women. Palestinian men strengthen gendered masculine nationalist language and aims, as well as cultural norms and values that put women at risk. And as men lack official channels through

which to feel empowered, they often take out their victimization and humiliation in the form of physical violence against wives and daughters.

Meanwhile, Israel directly contributes to Palestinian women's experiences of violence. Israeli soldiers employ violence--such as sexual assault and harassment--during arrests and detentions, checkpoints, and other interactions between Palestinians and Israelis. A study analyzing a group of 174 Palestinian women living in the West Bank and Gaza aimed to identify mental health stressors. The single-most stressful experiences in their lives were harassment by Israeli soldiers and/or settlers. A mere 11% of the women had never faced harassment by a soldier. When harassment dovetailed with poverty, women were more likely to feel the stress in contrast with peers who were more well-off. According to the research, the events that caused the most stress were ones that evoked "helplessness, a sense of humiliation, lack of self-esteem and victimization (Punamäki 1986)." By targeting women, Israel aims to deconstruct the Palestinian family unit, which--per Palestinian collectivist values--weakens Palestinian society as a whole. Other actions, like home demolitions, have spiral transgressions that disproportionately affect Palestinian women.

This chapter will first explore two specific Israeli policy aims, land expansion and segregation, and their effects on Palestinians. All the effects help to create an environment in which physical violence and female invisibility are more readily cultivated. The first Israeli policy aim is land expansion, the effects of which influence how Palestinians generate income and build homes. The second Israeli policy aim is segregation, through discriminatory policies and restrictions on mobility. Segregation prevents Palestinians from securing work and an education. Land expansion especially is rarely viewed through a feminist methodology, so Shalhoub-Kevorkian's work in invisibility will be of essential use in analyzing its effects on women. Next will follow a brief section on how these aims affect the psychology and livelihoods of Palestinian men, and how this in turn affects Palestinian women. The chapter will then delve into specific examples of Israeli-instigated violence through an examination of arrest and detention, during which Palestinian women experience physical and sexual abuse, coupled with verbal abuse. Arrest and detention will be explored for its direct and indirect effects on

Palestinian families and women women. Israel's restrictions on Palestinian women who seek help and redress will be explored in a final section.

Land Expansion

Although Israel is ostensibly a democracy with legal protections for minorities, it aims to expand the area of Jewish land and squelch the power of Palestinian Israelis and Palestinians in the territories. Palestinian Israelis, although they are designated a few seats in the Knesset,¹¹ are unable to enjoy the legal protections and benefits that Jewish citizens enjoy. They are also excluded from national rites and symbols that forge a group identity within Israel. For one, they are exempt from army service, which helps to bond Jewish Israelis in participating in a state and national identity and prepare them for the workplace. Indeed, it is difficult to find higher-level employment in Israel without army credentials. Regarding social services, Israel spends on average 35% more on Jewish citizens than Palestinian ones (Cockburn 2014). Schools in East Jerusalem are underfunded compared to ones in Jewish areas, and a 2000-classroom shortage is the principle cause of East Jerusalem's 53% school attendance rate ("Education"). Palestinian neighborhoods and towns receive less funding for infrastructure, sewage, and electricity, and Palestinian schools receive one-third less funding than their Jewish counterparts (Cockburn 2014). The 2009 Economic Efficiency Law allows government to "use sweeping discretion to classify towns, villages and areas as 'National Priority Areas' (NPAs) and to allocate enormous state resources without criteria ("Palestinian poverty level almost double Israel average")." While 553 Jewish towns have received the NPA designation, which makes them more receptive to government funding, only four Palestinian villages have been labeled ("Palestinian poverty level almost double Israel average").

These inequalities within Israel are exacerbated with regard to Palestinian female citizens of the state. Palestinian women in the job force are often unprotected by labor laws--they are paid less than minimum wage and do not receive the correct amount of vacation and sick days per the law. A mere 3% of them have received a university degree (Cockburn 2014). These inequalities also have disproportionate effects on violence against Palestinian women. For

¹¹ Palestinian Israelis currently hold 17 out of 120 seats in Israeli parliament.

example, lack of access to quality education due to inadequate teacher training, poor school building infrastructure (“Education”), and restricted mobility affects rates of violence in that lower education rates are linked with increased rates of domestic violence. Low education is also coupled with poverty and early marriages, both of which are linked with the prevalence of domestic violence.

In maintaining these inequalities, Israel pursues its policy of land expansion to strengthen the geographic, political, and cultural influence of the Jewish national identity. Indeed, land expansion underpins the Israeli national narrative, which prizes the imagery of Jewish males conquering Arab land. In pursuit of land expansion, Israel focuses on individual properties like that of Palestinian Israeli farmers, as well as broad swaths of land such as the West Bank.

Palestinian Israelis, people who once had a tradition of working the land, are discouraged from land ownership. Complicated and exclusionary property law is such that they own about 3.5% of Israeli land (Cockburn 2014), despite making up 20% of the Israeli citizenry. This contributes to a lack of economic independence alongside humiliation, as land is symbolically associated with Palestinian heritage. This precludes Palestinians from engaging in upward social mobility. Any kind of economic activity requires permission from a committee or council, which are composed of Jewish members. A 2018 report revealed that 47.1% of Palestinian Israeli families live below the poverty line, in contrast with the national average of 28.4% (“Palestinian poverty level almost double Israel average”).

Another example is the case of building in East Jerusalem, which is claimed by Israel but not legally recognized by the international community. Israel has pursued a discriminatory urban planning policy that disfavors Palestinian citizens. Palestinians wishing to build homes must garner a planning permission and construction permits are only applicable to certain zones; meanwhile Israeli settlers in the West Bank can be granted planning permission in retrospect so as to escape demolitions. In East Jerusalem, where 70% of the population is Palestinian, only 10% of the area is available for Palestinian construction. Living conditions are inferior to those of Jewish counterparts (Hutchinson 2012). Poor infrastructure, like ventilation and plumbing, contribute to household stress, a factor in domestic violence rates (Haj-Yahia 2013).

Stateless Palestinians, those in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem are even more at the mercy of Israeli power and its land expansion goals. The Oslo Accords divided the West Bank into A, B, and C administrative zones, effectively dividing the land even further so that there is no cohesive, continuous strip. Israel has the power to shift these borders at any time, through checkpoints, roadblocks, and more (Ryan 2017).

Currently, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu aims to annex a large swath of the West Bank by July 1st, 2020. The proposed area, largely encompassing the Jordan Valley area, makes up 22% of the West Bank. Twenty percent of it is Palestinian-owned, and 65,000 Palestinians live in the area, alongside 11,000 Israeli settlers. Because of the location of the land, which is situated on the easternmost edge of the West Bank and is thus not contiguous with Israel, the annexation could preclude Palestinians from ever having their own state. The plan has become compared to South African Apartheid, in that it will impose greater control over areas in which the PA has enjoyed a modicum of independence and codify inequalities (“Data on Netanyahu’s Jordan Valley Annexation Map”).

Even without the annexation, Israel has already exacted control over the West Bank and encouraged encroachments onto the land. With impunity, settlers have attacked shepherds in an attempt to expel them from pastures. Illegal settlements and their inhabitants in the West Bank, although they violate international law, have faced few consequences by the Israeli government. Authorities have demolished homes and established IDF training zones to further take land from Palestinians (“Data on Netanyahu’s Jordan Valley Annexation Map”). In keeping Palestinians from land ownership, Israel draws from their ability to successfully garner an income. World Bank data from 2016 shows that 29.2% of people in the West Bank live in poverty (“West Bank and Gaza”). Poverty and financial stress are linked to heightened rates of domestic violence. They give rise to household stress and causes humiliation and anger to men, who then use violence and control of female family members to restore their sense of masculinity.

Home demolitions are another method used by Israeli authorities in pursuit of land expansion, and they have particularly insidious spiral transgressions into the lives of Palestinian women. Homes are chosen for demolition often arbitrarily, and they are often torn down without warning to the family. In response to demolitions, Palestinian families often move in with relatives or friends, sometimes for years. This puts Palestinian women at increased risk for domestic violence, since they are then surrounded by more (and new) men. Crowded spaces also

prevent her from having privacy, which puts her in closer contact with her new household. This results in increased sexual assault and other forms of physical abuse, like beating and slapping. In 2019, cases of home demolitions spiked in East Jerusalem. Israeli authorities tore down 169 housing units, leaving 328 Palestinians homeless--more than any year since 2004 (“Israeli house demolitions spiked...”).

Segregation

Israel also attempts to strengthen its Jewish stronghold and nationalism by segregating Jews and Palestinians, which has been codified in Israeli law. Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Israelis attend different schools (Cockburn 2014) and live in different neighborhoods; the latter are dissuaded from moving into homes in Jewish areas, even though they are themselves citizens. Although not enshrined in law, Jewish patients are separated from non-Jewish ones in hospitals. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are also segregated by restrictions on movement, which affect access to education and job opportunities. Common restrictions include checkpoints, roadblocks, IDF training zones, and the separation wall.

The separation wall, commonly referred to as the Israeli West Bank barrier or just the “security fence,” spans 708 kilometers, with 15% of its length within Israel and 85% in the West Bank. Building began in 2000, and its stated aim is to quell Palestinian terrorism, though Palestinians generally refer to it as an apartheid wall. Indeed, it has functioned to effectively create new borders; it has cut off 25,000 Palestinians from the rest of the West Bank. In the Palestinian town of Qalquilya, people once enjoyed thriving markets, traveled with ease, and had ready access to agricultural land and water supply. The wall has now isolated the town from 80% of its land and 19 wells, and travel is so restricted that a car can no longer travel from one side of the town to the other. People can no longer readily attend schools. Over 600 businesses have been closed and the town faces blackouts should it be unable to pay its electric bill. Unemployment soared to 69% in the wake of the wall construction (Bedell 2003).

These effects have spread to other Palestinian communities encircled by the wall. Impoverishment, low education, household stress, and unemployment are linked with high rates of domestic violence (O’Campo 2017). Indeed, Israeli policy has not focused solely on specific security threats, rather at weakening Palestinian society as a whole. This demonstrates a

concerted attempt to destroy or punish a people they consider inferior, a purposeful attempt to enshrine inequalities in expansion of Jewish Israeli strength, and a disregard for international law.

Israel's military checkpoints, another instance in which mobility is restricted and Palestinians are segregated, are the main source of interaction between stateless Palestinians. Beginning in 1991, Israel began to monitor movement of Palestinians by commencing its checkpoint system, which was ratcheted up during the Oslo peace process. Meanwhile, a permit requirement was foisted upon Palestinians wishing to enter Israel. There are currently over 100 checkpoints within the West Bank and Gaza, along with checkpoints that are spontaneously instituted. These checkpoints, contrary to popular belief, are most often utilized to restrict movement within the Palestinian Territories, and not into and out of Israel (Naaman 2006).

The checkpoints, beyond cultivating an environment of fear and insecurity,¹² have had quantifiable repercussions; girls' access to education has been restricted by both checkpoints and curfews (Moghadam 2005). Some girls' access to education has been restricted because of the lessened mobility they now face, and other girls' families prevent their daughters from attending school so that they can avoid sexual harassment from IDF soldiers. This creates a spiral transgression in that girls marry and give birth at a younger age, which results in increased poverty (Arat 2004). The confluence of these factors--lack of education, young marriage age, and poverty--give rise to high rates of violence against women.

Segregation and its effects are especially heightened in Gaza. Overcrowded,¹³ unsanitary, and impoverished, Gazans' mobility is even more restricted than that of their counterparts in the West Bank. Because of the 2007 Israeli and Egyptian blockade against Gaza, all imports to the strip are heavily regulated and monitored, and hardly anyone is allowed to leave. Economic opportunities are few, and people do not have ready access to healthcare. Since 2006, what had once been a decline in the infant mortality rate began to stagnate (van den Berg 2018). Gazans have higher instances of disability than people in the majority of developing countries (Harsha

¹² Pregnant Palestinian women have long feared checkpoints, where they might be caught in an hours-long line in the desert climate. Some have indeed given birth at checkpoints. Healthcare is thus inaccessible to them for fears of being waylaid and endangering both mother's and child's lives.

¹³ Gaza hosts the third densest population in the world, after Singapore and Hong Kong ("Palestine Case Study").

2019). In 2017, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics released a report showing that 53% of Gazans lived below the poverty line, and about one third are unemployed. About 17% of male-led households live below the deep poverty line; these men are unable to provide children with minimum requirements for food, clothing, and housing. Female-headed households were even more at a disadvantage, with 20% of them living below the deep poverty line (“Poverty Profile in Palestine, 2017”). Poverty is accentuated in households with a large amount of children; the birth rate in Palestine is about 4.1 children per woman (“Palestine Case Study”). Gazans have a high birth rate due to early marriages, low education levels, and lack of access to family planning. These factors are all linked with increased levels of gender-based violence.

High unemployment rates amongst men, due in part to their limited mobility, especially helps in creating an environment that allows physical violence to flourish. Because men in such a patriarchal milieu feel a sense of shame at not being able to provide, they often channel their anger in the form of violence against women (Arat 2004). Although some Palestinian women have sought work in Israel, they do not earn as much as their Jewish counterparts, and their work is often within informal labor markets, unprotected by labor laws (Huntington 2001).

Scholars Amalia Sa’ar and Taghreed Yahia-Younis have further explored how the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, so premised on geopolitics and conflict, has had spiral transgressions into the intimate lives of Palestinian women. They argue that high rates of violence against women in Palestinian communities has arisen because there are no healthy outlets for the expression of masculinity by its men. They position this problem as a problem not so much of the men, but of the “collective identity (Sa’ar 2008),” one that is degraded by Israel, the policies and actions of which have left Palestinian towns in socioeconomic ruin, caused humiliation, etc. In reaction, men--whose gender performance has been restricted--act out in destructive way (Sa’ar 2008).

Say Sa’ar and Yahia-Younis of Palestinian men in Israel, “Considering the restricted space allowed for their collective expression, Israeli-Palestinian Arabs do not have legitimate, institutionalized channels for militaristic-violent masculine performances. They can neither identify with Israeli national military heroes nor endorse openly Palestinian heroes, whose very glory is derived from their resistance to Zionism and later to Israel (Sa’ar 2008).” To be both a Palestinian and an Israeli positions them into an ultimate liminal status.

Israeli-instigated Violence: Arrest and Detention

Israel employs gender-based violence against Palestinian women because it strikes at the heart of Palestinian collectivist society. Palestinian patriarchy aims to negotiate its identity through the control of women, so for these women to be dishonored and defiled by Israel, the collective is shamed and exposed. Sexual violence creates a stigma around the family and the community as a whole, and it aggravates social fissures. In arrests, typically carried out in the early morning hours and without search warrants or arrest orders, homes are broken into. The woman under arrest is verbally abused, often with sexual language, and an accompanying female soldier will perform a strip search or inspection. Sometimes, women are prohibited from putting on their hijab and are beaten in front of male relatives (Francis 2017). By publicizing this abuse and harassment of women in front of their family members, the whole family experiences shame, dishonor, and humiliation.

Indeed, beginning in the Second Intifada, Israeli military action began to center on the family through deportations, home demolitions, and collective punishment (Harker 2012). Arrest and detention--often arbitrary--are employed throughout the Palestinian Territories in part to instill a state of security in which Palestinians feel constant fear and helplessness. People watching their relatives arrested in the middle of the night, often violently, feel a sense of humiliation (Francis 2017), and this is one way in which the strong collective Palestinian identity is disintegrated. A society undergirded by honor and keeping face begins to fracture. Palestinian masculinity is especially threatened.

Torture and abuse continue upon detention. Until 1999, torture techniques included electric shocks, rape with an instrument, beating, and insertion of needles into the genitals. In this year, the Israeli High Court of Justice declared torture illegal, so contemporary methods are ones that leave no lasting proof. Such methods include sleep deprivation, being shaken while suspended from the ceiling, solitary confinement, sexual harassment, threats of rape and home demolition, and being tied up in unusual positions. Such physical forms of torture are designed to have a psychological component that causes shame and weakness; prisoners experience profound trauma (Francis 2017).

While in prisons, women do not have access to adequate medical services, and pregnant women are especially maltreated. Their hands and feet are shackled until the moment of delivery. Children born in this manner are kept imprisoned with the mother. Indeed, matters of reproduction strike at the rigid gender roles of Palestinian society, in which a woman is socialized to believe her primary value is as mother and wife. To attack this component of her self is to destruct Palestinian society. One woman, Raja' al-Ghoul, was mocked for her infertility issues (Francis 2017).

Isolation from the family is another way in which the social structure of Palestine is dismantled, since the family collective unit is the most important structural component of Palestinian communities. Prisoners are denied family visits, and during rare visits, are prohibited from engaging in physical touch with their family members as they are placed behind a glass window. Mothers may physically interact with children, under the age of six, for a mere ten minutes. This causes psychological trauma for both parties, often depression for the mother and PTSD for the child. During the interrogation of Qahira al-Saedi, “the interrogators threatened al-Saedi to arrest her ten-year old and sixteen-year-old daughters and rape them in front of her if she did not confess (Francis 2017).”

Furthermore, Israel sometimes employs rape as a tool of war during arrest and detention as a means by which to dismantle the familial strength of Palestinians.¹⁴ Rape demonstrates control and superiority and engenders humiliation. On a metaphorical level, it deconstructs the victim's nationalism--especially in the case of Palestine--as women are usually construed to be the holders of the nation's honor and the bearer of its children, its future fighters (Rosenberg-Friedman 2018). It was first utilized by Israel against Palestinian women during the 1948 Naqba, during which Israeli militants sexually assaulted Arab women and girls. This violent history of Israeli statehood has been hidden by the integration of “Return to the Biblical Homeland” and “War of Liberation” narratives in Israel (Kornberg 2019).

¹⁴ There are few statistics regarding the rape of Palestinian women under Israeli detention because of survivors' shame and Israeli authorities' unwillingness to self-incriminate. A few accounts exist, though. One woman claimed that she and fifteen other detainees were raped by interrogators, and that the sexual assault was filmed for use in future blackmail as it would deeply dishonor her family and result in further violence, perhaps femicide, by them (“Israeli Guards Rape Palestinian Woman”).

Attempts at resistance have largely failed despite infractions against international human rights law, and Israel is generally able to act with impunity in its treatment of detainees, prisoners, and their families. This further invisibilizes Palestinian women (Francis 2017).

Israeli Restrictions on Palestinian Women's Attempts to Seek Help and Redress

Israel has invisibilized Palestinian women's attempts to share their narratives and seek help and redress. The state employs a sort of gendered cultural oppression called pinkwashing, launched in 2007 as part of a PR campaign called Brand Israel, in which it lauds its liberal cultural and political stances on the LGBTQ community as a way to juxtapose itself against the conservative and restrictive norms of Palestine. This is meant to draw attention from its human rights abuses against Palestinians as well as strengthen its argument that Israelis and Palestinians cannot coexist (Papantonopoulou 2014). Palestinian women are thus cast as "Others," which contributes to how readily they are stereotyped and and treated.

Even when women overcome Palestinian cultural barriers to seeking redress, Israeli stereotypes and politics affect the quality of help she will receive. One study on Palestinian Israeli women and Israeli Jewish police officers showed that the women's experiences of violence were often invalidated by the authorities. Palestinian women who have called the police face suspicion and an unwillingness to help. Many of the police officers' reported rhetoric included binary language by which they treated the Palestinian women as if they were on the wrong side of national security, cultural, and religious mores, and were thus unworthy of help. Prevailing stereotypes and perceptions of Palestinians "lock the officers into binary oppositions of victim/victimiser and domination/resistance, frequently causing concerns or fears that, in turn, evoke a response of control/protect/subdue (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2004)." Although some police officers felt sympathetic towards the Palestinian women, they believed that the "security issue" should take precedence over responses to domestic violence (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2004). This shows that Palestinian women, conceptualized as part of a monolithic entity, are invisibilized by Israeli authorities. They are not imbued with individual voices, experiences, and needs.

Thus, Israeli soldiers purposefully utilize physical abuse and harassment as a means to control the Palestinian population and dismantle its strengths. Indeed, the fear of harassment alone often restricts the mobility of Palestinian women and prevents them from traveling where

they might encounter checkpoints. By focusing on women, Israeli strikes at the very heart of Palestinian cultural values that prize female sexual purity. In humiliating Palestinian women, Palestinian men are in turn humiliated. They perceive that the linchpin of the family--the honor of the wife and mother--has been violated. The collective unit is thus attacked.

This Israeli oppression reinforces Palestinian influences that contribute to high rates of violence against women. As Israel flounders in its protection of Palestinian women from violence and fails to deliver any modicum of social services, Palestinian religious authorities and male family members step into this void to take more control in women's lives. This then reinforces restrictive gender roles, even if the Palestinian men are serving to "protect" the Palestinian woman. Protecting her sexuality and body is also a form of sexism, in which those elements of her are conceptualized as something controllable and essential to her value (Zinngrebe 2016). The collective is thus strengthened even more, putting more pressure on women's roles within a patriarchal structure (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003).

Meanwhile, Israel benefits from cultural differences and societal unrest within Palestine in that it can position itself against the Palestinian "Other" and maintain a heightened sense of security and control. With an ever-present security threat, Israel is implicitly allowed to suspend adherence to human rights law. Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls this kind of state a "State of Exception," wherein power may be expanded--such as the ability to establish checkpoints wherever, whenever--under the guise of a crisis (Agamben 2005).

Chapter IV. Palestinian Women's Activism

Many Palestinian women utilize activism to counteract the intersection of oppressions they face and to make their struggles visible. They utilize official routes of redress and empowerment, like participation in politics and civil society. However, legal protections, enforcement, and judiciary processes are often inadequate in protecting Palestinian women, and they face obstacles in taking part in the public sphere, including politics and civil society. One of the biggest roadblocks in the Palestinian woman's way is a cultural prescription for silence. This chapter will explore the two divergent strands of women's activism in Palestine; the limitations of the international human rights framework and how female Palestinian activists work within it; recommendations for the international human rights framework; restrictions activists face from Israeli and Palestinian authorities, especially a cultural prescription for female silence and invisibility; and what particular successes Palestinian female activists have achieved. The focus on activism in this chapter will center on participation in civil society, with a focus on non-governmental, not-for-profit organizations.

Palestinian Female Activism: A Traditional Approach

Many Palestinian women are active in women's groups that are *not* focused on "women's issues." These women are purely focused on activism against Israeli power. Although they do not readily talk about women's rights, they are important agents of empowerment. They help to bring women into the visible.

When the Palestinian women's movement was first formed in the late 1970s and 1980s, it was *not* done so on the premise that they were second-class citizens, nor were issues addressed through a gendered lens. Women's committees focused on nationalistic and political goals rather than anything related to women's rights in particular (Glavanis 1992).

The First Intifada, 1987-1993, further helped to bring Palestinian women out of the private sphere. Women peaceably marched in demonstrations and spearheaded resistance group activities; others threw stones at Israeli soldiers or helped to hide men from Israeli capture. They

were finally able to exit their roles in the household and assume leadership positions (Huntington 2001).

Then--in 1995-- Hamas launched its political wing, the Islamic National Salvation Party, which spurred on the increased involvement of Islam in politics throughout the Palestinian Territories. Since, Hamas has promoted--in Gaza--an expansion of women's roles in promotion of the national agenda, in stark contrast to secular aims that are not nationalism-based. So, while women's roles have in some regards expanded, they have in other instances been more grounded in patriarchy as heightened nationalism promotes a return to traditionalism (Jad 2011).

Palestinian Female Activism: An Explicit Focus on Women's Rights

In contrast to women who visibilize themselves through acceptable, nationalistic modes, other Palestinian women explicitly fight for equal rights, a reduction in domestic violence, and inclusion in politics and the public sphere. These women work at domestic violence centers, hotlines to help women escape abuse, and women's rights centers. Their activities have been historically oppressed by Palestinian government in an attempt to invisibilize women.

Hamas's actions, despite cultivating--only at times--women's increased involvement in nationalistic groups, have promoted a rebellion of sorts amongst Palestinian women. These women have created a new strand of the Palestinian women's movement, one that would be more familiar to Western feminists.

In 1988--during the First Intifada-- Hamas launched a campaign to coerce women into wearing headscarves. When not all women complied, Hamas operatives threw stones and entered classrooms to attack women. Such attacks continued for a year until resistance leaders ordered them to stop. By this time, women realized that the Intifada was not necessarily going to advance their rights, so they needed to found a movement that was separate from the political zeitgeist (Barron 2002). Women's health issues and violence against women began to be addressed directly. Educational centers opened where one could learn about polygyny and arranged marriages; and hotlines were established to counsel women facing divorce and abuse (Barron 2002).

Thus we see contrasting facets of female empowerment in Palestine, one in which women operate within culturally accepted values and women's issues are subservient to national aims;

another in which women directly question cultural norms and combat violence and discrimination.

The International Human Rights Framework and its Limitations

Female Palestinian-led initiatives for peace and empowerment are often tainted by inherent problems in dealing with a colonial power and operating within the Western framework of human rights. International human rights organizations and documents traditionally derive from Western values and philosophies. Palestinian female activists who wish to engage in human rights and fight against Israeli militarization must ironically interact with power structures and linguistics that are more amenable to Israel and the West. Common documents within the human rights sphere include the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights; the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security; and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

According to Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “My definition of the ‘Grammar of Rights’ refers to the manner in which the available language/activism of human rights is constrained (literally regulated, as grammar regulates that which is possible in any language) by the legacies and contemporary realities of both formal and informal colonial regulatory regimes. These regimes — together with concomitant interpretations and assumptions — constitute and delimit the space in which advocacy and ideology concerning rights is formulated in the Palestinian context (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2012).”

As such, Israel has had the power to linguistically frame the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which thus underlies how Palestinian resistance and activism are able to operate. Palestinian activists are thus not only disadvantaged by Israeli policy, but the very paradigms that inform it (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2012).

In cultivating its national narrative and power, Israel employs a sort of divide-and-conquer tactic, by imposing identity based on language and encouraging internal divisions. The colonized is positioned as “pre-modern” in order to justify dispossession and segregation. Thus, when human rights activists from Israel and the West attempt to help Palestinian women, they are often operating within this primitive/civilized binary, even though their intentions may be genuine. They may then end up aggravating social tensions. And as human rights discourse is

historically Eurocentric, Palestinian activists are trapped; to challenge colonialism, they must engage with human rights, but to do so accepts the very legacy they are trying to resist. Human rights documents, legal codes, etc. employ language formulated in organizations like the UN, of which Israel is a member, and this disadvantages Palestinians in fighting for themselves on their own terms. In attempts at redress, human rights activism--as it works within legal methods--must function within legal codes in Israel and international law that are inherently biased towards favoring one group over another. Palestinians are unable to frame the conflict and power imbalance through their own perspective (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2012).

Meanwhile, Israel violates human rights with Western complicity because it is involved with and included in the construction of human rights language. Its colonial mission is rewarded, for it is seen as noble and necessary (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2012). Palestinian resistance is framed as “terrorism,” while Israel’s human rights violations are often overlooked. In reaction, Palestinians feel a lack of trust and hope in human rights organizations to help them in the wake of events like home demolitions. And as they have been so intensely “Othered,” human rights organizations sometimes review their testimonies with suspicion and fear, which causes Palestinians to feel as though they must prove their obvious struggles to them (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2012). This serves as another way in which Palestinian women are silenced and invisibilized. To have to prove one’s trauma is often a means through which a victim is re-traumatized. Furthermore, Palestinian women have not grown up or been educated in a Western framework, which makes human rights discourse more inaccessible to her.

These inherent biases are well shown in the world’s most important and precedent-setting human rights document. In 1948, the same year as Israel achieved statehood and the Palestinians experienced their Naqba, the United Nations passed its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). Israel was shortly thereafter admitted (in May of 1949, but only after its third application) into the UN as a member state. One condition of admittance included the requirement that member states integrate UNDHR principles into its own national documents. Says Ariella Azoulay, “Universal human rights were conceived as the prerogative of states; the general public was neither consulted nor invited to participate in the formulation of these rights. Rather, it was expected to accept them as ready-made discursive objects and to naturalize the differential application of them in different contexts (Azoulay 2014).” As such, for Israel to be admitted into the UN was an implicit approval of its human rights abuses against Palestine.

Israel's inclusion drew away from the idea that human rights are universal, since they are allowed to be differently applied in the Israeli-Palestinian context. This shows how certain states and institutions have the power to define human rights abuses, often to their favor¹⁵ (Azoulay 2014).

In 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the first international agreement that held women's rights as human rights. The treaty promotes the full breadth of possible woman's rights; it calls for the elimination of discrimination, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, aggression, and foreign occupation (UN General Assembly 1979). Where CEDAW fails, though, is that it does not mention violence a single time: it is not mentioned in descriptions of oppression against women, nor is any linkage made between occupation, colonialism, and violence. Neither is CEDAW able to fully implement its values and ensure that signatories adhere to them (Mullins 2018). Indeed, many states that regularly commit human rights violations are more willing to sign UN human rights treaties to avoid sanctions and align themselves more readily with the Liberal order.

Lastly, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, adopted in 2000, recognizes the effects of armed conflict on women and girls, and it aims to more fully promote lasting peace and security to include women. Throughout the Palestinian Territories, numerous organizations have incorporated its values into their respective missions; such organizations include The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH) in the West Bank and the Wisal Coalition in Gaza. However, efforts to promote women's status and peace throughout Palestine have not lived up to the resolution's goals. Gender oppression is too deeply ingrained in society, and lofty UN language is often inaccessible to the average woman in a developing community. The language in UNSCR 1325 does nothing to give these women the actual tools to participate in its discourse, linguistically or politically. Neither is the UN trusted as well as local, grassroots leaders. This

¹⁵ Upon admittance into the UN, the General Assembly declared that Israel was a peace-loving state "able and willing" to carry out the obligations delineated in the charter. The eleventh clause of the UN General Assembly's resolution 194 of 1948 states that refugees should have the right to return and should receive compensation for damaged property. This demonstrates that Israeli sovereignty superseded the value of Palestinians' human rights within the international human rights framework (Azoulay 2014).

demonstrates how, although the international human rights framework is often rooted in sound theory and good intentions, it is not attuned to the practicalities of life in Palestine.

Recommendations for the International Human Rights Framework

In crafting policy aimed at helping Palestinian women, there are several factors the international human rights framework must be cognizant of. Firstly, redress often doubly traumatizes victims, forcing them to relive experiences of violence. Redress can threaten Palestinian women's place within a collectivist culture, in which family members believe that for a woman to seek help outside the family is to implicitly blame them for not protecting her. Silence is paramount to the family; indeed, many parents of rape victims do not even seek punishment for fear of shaming and ostracizing the family.

When outside help attempts to get involved, it often compounds these issues. For example, the US government in its attempts to promote female empowerment throughout the Islamic World has ignored real narratives and discourse from the women themselves. Its neo-Orientalism, though well-intentioned, is grounded in ignorance and does not allow for women's agency in helping themselves (Saleh 2016). Indeed, women do not exist in a discrete vacuum in which one mode of empowerment may be foisted upon them; to impose policy and aid could disrupt delicate cultural balances and norms, resulting in more violence against them.

Another main reason why Western feminism may not be applied to developing nations is that, for the latter, feminism is often intertwined with an anti-colonial struggle (Sayigh 1998). Failure to recognize this intersection could dismantle the aims of the developing country and even further entrench it within an imperialist framework. Many women in Gaza would find Western feminism alien, as they have been socialized to accept restricted modes of empowerment within Hamas's framework.

Neither can the case of Palestinian women be divorced from that of Israel. Even when issues they face--domestic violence, high birth rates, and religious oppression--seemingly stem from Palestinian culture, Israel must be considered for its indirect effects on Palestinian culture, nationalism, and daily life. Thus, for the human rights framework to successfully evaluate and help in the issues facing Palestinian women, it must unanimously acknowledge Israeli occupation and its negative effects.

Indeed, many human rights reports tend to conceptualize violence against Palestinian women as a lone-standing phenomenon reflective of Palestinian society, and not how Palestinian religion, patriarchy, and collectivism interact with Israeli militarization. Penny Johnson of Birzeit University argues that a 2006 Human Rights Watch report *A Question of Security: Violence Against Palestinian Women and Girls* exemplifies this silence on Israel's culpability. The report mainly blamed gender-based violence on the Palestinian Authority, which does not even have criminal jurisdiction outside the West Bank's Area A. Although the PA does indeed provide inadequate leadership throughout the West Bank, the report included no discussion of Israeli occupation's deleterious effects on PA institutions (Johnson 2008). This suggests that reports must be more academically grounded and researched, lest they perpetuate harmful misinformation.

Furthermore, Israel's linguistic and conceptual framing of the conflict aggravates women's low status. Security, which takes ultimate precedence in Israeli politics, is usually meant to connote military security. If the definition were to be expanded, then security policies could intertwine more readily with human security policies; this would recognize the links between security, democracy, human rights, living standards, etc. Indeed, the 2003 *Report of the UN Commission on Human Security* defines this "other" form of security as one in which a human is free of want, free of fear, and able to have one's own agency (Nusseibeh 2011). Women are especially at risk of being denied human security, so neither can these two securities be separated from women's rights. Unfortunately, women have never been explicitly mentioned in a major Israel-Palestinian peace agreement, neither in the Oslo Accords, the Cairo agreement, the Wye River Memorandum, nor the Quartet-backed Roadmap (Moghadam 2005).

Thus, it is clear that security goals must be broadened in their definitions. The absence of war on political and military levels does not necessarily guarantee Palestinian women a better standard of safety. Even if problems directly linked to Israeli occupation and militarization are staunch, Palestinian women will face insecurities and dangers to her bodily integrity elsewhere. They will still be vulnerable to domestic violence, a lack of education, and early marriages.

Palestinian Restrictions on Activism

Some Palestinian women believe that Palestinian Authority policy and rhetoric purposefully aims to tamp down on women's activism, and that only drastic, structural change can bring about gender equality. They critique the PA for adopting policy suggested by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund that encourage privatization and dampen governmental aims to invest in social services. "[These women] maintain that development is a fundamental requirement to complement the process of national liberation and democratization (Jamal 2001)."

One of the most extreme examples of PA oppression of women and activism is a systemic, institutionalized lack of due process for women. Within the Palestinian Territories, incest may be brought to court only if a male relative of the victim instigates the legal process. This presents an obvious problem: the perpetrators are often a male relative of the victim, and neither do families want to put a spotlight on incest for the shame it would bring to the collective (Barron 2002). Women and their rapists are then encouraged to marry so that the man can avoid criminal prosecution and the woman can avoid bringing shame to the family ("Time to End Violence... 2007)."

This coercion is often accompanied by an implicit threat of violence. A lack of due process makes it difficult for women to engage in activism, since their ability to participate in legal means of empowerment is hindered.

Furthermore, Palestinian women face many daily threats and obligations--from poverty, to child-rearing, to domestic violence--that they often have no time or resources to expend on politics and activism. A lot of new non-violent resistance movements are run by men, and elite Palestinian women do not have local trust or influence, instead garnering support from abroad. Furthermore, since women are generally relegated to the private sphere, they are even more removed from the political process, so their modes of resistance are unknown to men in politics. Thus, in men's accounts of what Palestinians do to resist, they invisibilize women's narratives, as the private household sphere is considered inferior to the public one (Farr 2011). Indeed, to participate in the public sphere makes Palestinian women especially noticeable and vulnerable. They risk assassination from Israel or violence and repression from different Palestinian political parties (Farr 2011).

Meanwhile, elites involved in peace efforts have also excluded grassroots organizations by utilizing high-level and inaccessible language and processes, as exemplified by UNSCR 1325.

As such, peace processes between Israel and Palestine generally entrench the status quo and power discrepancy between the two, which maintains gender oppression (Farr 2011).

Some problems in implementing change reside deep within Palestinian culture--no matter the legal protections and societal intervention offered, culture presents barriers to reporting violence, seeking help, and engaging in activism. In 1991, the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) passed the Law Against Family Violence, intended to punish offenders of domestic violence and bring the issue into the spotlight. Indeed, violence against women in the household has, in most of human history, been a private--and even sanctioned--affair. Palestinian Israeli women have hesitated in reporting instances and histories of abuse for fears of retaliation and not being believed by the authorities. They also have a general suspicion of the criminal justice system, a system that may have excluded them to the extent that they see no point in seeking its aid (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 1999a).

These fears are exacerbated in collectivist societies. Because collectivist societies place more primacy on the family and the unit than on a unique identity, should a woman aggravate her place in the family (by, say, going to the police or seeking a divorce) she is considered a disruption to the very bedrock of her society. She threatens her family's honor. In a study of domestic violence in Gaza, 68.8% of the women interviewed had never spoken of their abuse to anyone (Baloushah 2019). These cultural tenets must be considered in outlining any policy recommendation on addressing violence against Palestinian Israeli women, who are in many ways unlike their Israeli counterparts. Israeli society has made a huge shift from collectivism to individualism in the past forty to fifty years, and the majority of its population is secular. Israeli women are not bound by blockades and lack of access to travel documents. Thus, its cultural infrastructure is more well-suited to certain types of redress. The Law Against Family Violence is thus more practical in helping Jewish Israelis.

Israeli Restrictions on Activism

Israeli policy restricts the actions of female activism through its normalization of the occupation. Although many Israeli institutions, education initiatives, and leaders work towards engendering peace between Israelis and Palestinians, their rhetoric and actions are not underpinned by the notion that the occupation is illegal. This then normalizes Israeli occupation,

militarization, and the inequalities and oppression that stem from colonialism. Peace processes are made superficial in the absence of a focus on the root causes of the conflict. Palestinian activists who work with such entities sometimes assume the mindset of the colonized and oppressed; they accept that Israeli laws and actions are the status quo and that there is no other route. Thus, Israeli organizations and institutions may promote rhetoric and initiatives that ostensibly aim to foster peace, but in the background, Israel is allowed to continue in its violations of human rights (Najjar 2011).

Palestinian activism is further disadvantaged because of institutionalized racism within Israel. Even well-intentioned laws like the Law Against Family Violence are not workable if authorities do not properly adhere to its regulations.

Lastly, because the issues of Palestinian-Israeli relations and national security are at the forefront of Israel's political and economic goals, women's rights are further pushed down the agenda.

The Successes of Palestinian Women's Activism

Despite the dearth of women in formal power structures and the Palestinian Authority's restriction on the activities of female activists (Al-Ali 2003), many Palestinian women continue to be active in civil society with a focus on women's empowerment and gender-based violence. The main roles of NGOs throughout Palestine include raising awareness, advocacy, psychosocial intervention, legal intervention, referral, health initiatives, and protection and shelter (Hammami 2017). Notable organizations and institutions include the Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), the Institute of Women's Studies at Birzeit University, the Women's Affairs Technical Committee (WATC), the Women's Studies Centre (WSC) (Moghadam 2005), and the One Stop Centre.

Some NGOs have an indirect effect on violence against Palestinian women. The WATC, which works across the West Bank and Gaza, aims to eliminate discrimination against women and promote female independence. It achieves these goals by promoting social awareness and monitoring laws and policies that strive to protect vulnerable women. The NGO publishes Palestine's only monthly newsletter on women's issues in Palestine, and it has been instrumental

in encouraging the visibility of Palestinian women and normalizing their participation in public spheres.

Other NGOs have a specific focus on gender-based violence. The One Stop Centre in Ramallah, the West Bank is a 24-hour facility that provides legal and medical aid, psychosocial support, shelter, and police protection to victims of domestic violence. Since its 2017 establishment, it has helped over 400 women and girls. It marks a drastic improvement over other domestic violence centers, in that it is open at all hours and houses a variety of support forms under one roof. This allows Palestinian women to avoid traveling between centers in search of support, which puts their privacy and safety at risk. Indeed, the Once Stop Centre also includes female receptionists and a second entryway hidden from the main road. And because its services are so comprehensive, women do not have to repeat their stories to multiple centers in seeking various types of aid, which puts them at risk of re-traumatization (“In Palestine’s first One Stop Centre...”).

The Women’s Studies Centre also has a specific focus on gender-based violence. One of its main projects is the reduction of violence against women and girls, and it works to achieve this goal through attempts at influencing cultural attitudes towards women and promoting protective law and policy. The WSC offers training programs to empower young women to take on leadership roles in the community, which helps to bring women’s narratives into the visible and encourage them in entering the public sphere.

These centers are remarkable because they have partly succeeded in overcoming cultural barriers to seeking help. By working within cultural norms--and not against them, as some Western NGOS might--they respect a woman’s need for privacy and alleviate her suspicion of out-group forms of help. The One Stop Centre well exemplifies how women are visibilized without exposing themselves to shame and further spiral transgressions. Other activists focus on helping survivors of domestic violence through political and legal channels.

The passing of the 2001 Israeli Family Courts Law, which diminished the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts, is one of the most important contemporary successes of Palestinian female activism. Israel lacks civil courts; Jewish and Muslim citizens of Israel fall under different jurisdictions in matters of marriage and divorce, so Muslims must bring cases to Shari’a courts and Jewish Israelis to Jewish ones. In the Shari’a judiciary structure, women are not even allowed to serve as judiciaries and judges. The legal system is thus set against them from the

start. Decisions are arbitrary and harsh, at the whims of men. A judge can ask a random man on the street how much alimony a female plaintiff and her two kids should be granted per month (Españoli 1997). In helping to weaken the strength of Shari'a courts, Palestinian activists were crucial in dismantling one form of institutional oppression against women. Because the courts were so powerful, their lessened power had ripple effects throughout Palestinian women's lives. Palestinian women are now less susceptible to the harsh and gendered judgments passed by courts pre-2001.

In 2018, PA President Abbas signed Law no. 5, which repealed article 308 of the 1960 Penal Code, which allowed for rapists to marry their victims to escape prosecution. Women's groups had long worked to overturn the article. The WCLAC, however, warns that pregnant victims may still be forced to marry the perpetrators due to the difficulty in acquiring birth certificates for children born out of wedlock and the illegality of abortion ("Palestine: 'Marry-Your-Rapist' Repealed").

In the Palestinian Territories, female Palestinian activists are currently pushing for a comprehensive domestic violence bill. The PA has been reviewing a draft since 2016, but has failed to act. Although this legislation has been stalled,¹⁶ activists have still made progress in influencing stereotypes and raising awareness on domestic violence. For example, marital rape is generally not considered a form of sexual assault, and activists are trying to change this and other ideas on what constitutes violence (Begum 2019). Arab and Palestinian female activists throughout Palestine are often better at enacting change because they are able to garner local support better than Western presences, which often provoke mistrust.¹⁷

Furthermore, amidst underfunded Palestinian institutions like schools and other education centers, Palestinian civil society often takes its place in providing services. Throughout the West Bank and Gaza, although students rarely enter higher education, dropout rates for primary and secondary education are low, in part due to the role of NGOs. In primary education, the overall

¹⁶ Unlike the Family Courts Law, which was passed in Israel, this bill would have to be passed through the Palestinian Authority legislature, which is unstable and undemocratic. The Palestinian Legislative Council has not held an election since 2006.

¹⁷ People from collectivist cultures more readily differentiate between the in-group and the out-group. This shows that it could be more difficult to garner the trust of a Palestinian woman if you are part of the out-group: male, non-Arab, etc. Thus, Palestinian women in need of help often fear aid agency outreach if its workers do not speak Arabic, are Western, etc. (Flicker 2019).

Palestinian dropout rate for boys is .9% compared to .5% for females, and these rates are lower in Gaza. There are only four public preschools in Palestine, but civil society operates 1132 preschools. The female literacy rate is 94.1% (“Education”).

This shows that, despite the restrictions civil society faces, it has an opportunity to establish itself and its goals in the place of unstable and unreliable Palestinian institutions. NGOs are able to streamline their activities and goals in a quicker and more united fashion than the stalled PA or the infighting Hamas, both of which are unreceptive to women’s rights discourse anyway. Indeed, NGOs in Palestine have been instrumental in 2020 in protecting women’s rights amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. In May, the WCLAW published a report on its response to the pandemic alongside women’s rights violations; a coalition of Palestinian NGOs sent a letter to the International Labor Organization requesting help in urging Israel to protect Palestinian workers during the pandemic; and Gisha: Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement urged Israel to help in repairing essential medical equipment in the Gaza Strip (“Civil Society and the Question of Palestine”).

Conclusion

It is thus clear that Palestinian women are a particularly vulnerable group in the many intersections of oppression they face, which result in high rates of gender-based violence. The patriarchy, collectivism, and conservative religiosity that mark their communities and breed violence are exacerbated by Israeli occupation and militarization. In response, Palestinian women show a rich history of activism and civil society participation, despite limitations. They need further support, though. Education needs to be the premier priority amongst social service initiatives within their communities; their forays into politics must be eased; international law must include more inclusive, less Western language; and Israel must be held accountable for occupation and its effects.

Indeed, at the crux of these issues is that Palestinian women cannot find peace without an Israeli-Palestinian peace. The two nations are too inextricably intertwined, in nationalism, history, policy, and daily life. Before practical peace policy may be enacted, the very linguistic underpinnings of the nations--in terms of labeling, gendered nationalism, etc.--must be restructured, or at least understood by both sides and international mediators.

Interesting questions present themselves for further study. How would a power shift towards Israel's Labor Party affect relations with Palestine? How will the partial West Bank annexation aggravate the factors that contribute to gender-based violence? Will Benny Gantz, when he takes the position as Israeli Prime Minister in October 2021, pursue fewer policies of land expansion and segregation? How would this affect the daily lives of Palestinian women? How might the UN craft international human rights law that is more accessible to non-Western communities? If Palestinian women were equipped with family planning services, how could they be more empowered within the household? How can Palestinian men work to dismantle unequal gender relations?

During the final stages of this thesis, the COVID-19 pandemic overtook the globe, affecting both Israel and Palestine. Rates of gender-based violence soared throughout Palestinian communities. As people were forced into self-isolation and quarantine, jobs laid off workers, and supply chains were disrupted, families' financial security was threatened and household members

spent more time together. Palestinian men's senses of power and masculinity were threatened. Economic stress, household stress like crowding, and angered and disenfranchised men have all been linked with high rates of domestic violence. A future work could analyze how the pandemic has interplayed with factors explored in this thesis--like collectivism, patriarchy, religion, and occupation--in leading to exceptionally high rates of violence against Palestinian women.

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