



Institute Européen des Hautes Études Internationales
Diplôme des Hautes Études Européennes Internationale
Année 2006/2007



BRINGING PEACE TO A TROUBLED CONTINENT

Peacekeeping, Mediation and Other
Forms of Intervention in
African Conflicts

Case studies: Angola and Rwanda



Author:
Alina Mihaela VASILE

Directeurs de Recherche:
Prof. Claude Nigoul
Lct. Dagmar Roeches

CONTENTS

CONTENTS	1
ABBREVIATION LIST	3
ABSTRACT	6
INTRODUCTION	7
CHAPTER I	13
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND	
1.1. Conflict, war and peace	13
1.2. African conflicts. General overview	15
1.3. Ways of solving conflicts.	
Intervention by a third party:	20
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building	
1.4. UN peacekeeping mechanisms	23
1.5. Organisation of African Unity (OAU) peacekeeping mechanisms	26
1.6. Peacekeeping operations. Between failure and success	29
CHAPTER II. <i>Case study 1: Angola</i>	31
BETWEEN NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND PEACEKEEPING.	
FAILURE OF BRINGING PEACE AND SECURITY IN ANGOLA	
2.1. Background	31
2.2. Parties involved in the conflict	32
2.3. Steps towards peace process in Angola	35
<i>Alvor Talks</i>	
<i>Meeting in Zaire</i>	
<i>Peace Accords for Angola(Bicesse Accords)</i>	
<i>Lusaka Protocol</i>	
<i>Luena Memorandum</i>	

2.4. Peacekeeping	44
<i>UNAVEM I</i>	
<i>UNAVEM II</i>	
<i>UNAVEM III</i>	
2.5. External intervention	46
2.6. Conclusions.	49
CHAPTER III. Case study 2: Rwanda	52
THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA	
3.1. Background and parties in conflict	52
3.2. Steps towards peace	55
<i>N'Sele and Gbadolite cease-fire agreements</i>	
<i>Arusha Peace Accords</i>	
3.3. Peacekeeping	60
<i>UNOMUR</i>	
<i>UNAMIR I</i>	
<i>UNAMIR II</i>	
<i>Opération Turquoise</i>	
3.4. External intervention	65
3.5. Conclusions	69
CHAPTER IV. LESSONS LEARNED	71
4.1. Where the theory does not have all the answers	71
4.2. UN peacekeeping. Past, present and future	78
4.3. Failures and responsibility	82
ANNEX	85
BIBLIOGRAPHY	93

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASF	African Standby Force – AU subsidiary body that acts as a conflict prevention mechanism
AU	African Union
BBTG	Broad-based transitional government. One of the most important objectives of the Arusha Peace Accords
CCPM	Joint Political-Military Commission. The CCPM was created to verify the demobilisation process in Angola
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République- Hutu extremist political party in Rwanda
FAA	Forças Armadas Angolanas (Angolan Armed Forces) – the formal name of the Angolan government's military force since the 1992 elections
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FAR	Force Armées Rwandaises (Rwandan Armed Forces)
FDLA	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Angola. For a short period of time it was an independent party, which joined the MPLA together with MINA
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
GIAMDA	Inter-ministerial Office to Support the Demobilized Military of Angola; inter-sectoral body for reintegration of former combatants in Angola
JPMC	Joint Political Military Committee- committee that functioned in parallel with the Arusha talks
MDR	Mouvement Democratique Républicain (Rwanda Democratic Movement); main opposition party to the Habyarimana regime. The party split and some members joined the genocide, while others became victims
MINA	Movement for the National Independence of Angola. Created as an

	independent party, MINA joint the MPLA soon after its creation.
MONUA	United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MRND	Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement-political party whose members were the main organisers of the genocide in Rwanda.
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group; it was created under the N'Sle Agreement as a basis for future ceasefire negotiations in Rwanda and it was composed of military observers
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
PCA	Angolan Communist Party. Together with PLUA, Angolan Communist Party formed the MPLA. Later, two other parties, namely MINA and FDLA joined for the creation of a stronger MPLA
PL	Parti Libéral (Liberal Party)
PLUA	Party for the United Struggle for Africans in Angola. Angolan Communist Party. Together with PCA, the party formed the MPLA. Later, two other parties, namely MINA and FDLA joined them for the creation of a stronger MPLA
PSC	Peace and Security Council - conflict prevention mechanism within the AU
PSD	Parti Social Démocrat (Social Democrat Party)
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army, the military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front (Tutsi party)
RTL	Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines; radio station in Rwanda that used to broadcast during the genocide inciting to violence
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UPA	Union of Angolan People. Movement established (1957) to fight the colonial power that became in 1962 the FNLA

ABSTRACT

The objective of the paper is to analyse two of the most significant failures of the international community to bring peace in Africa. I will mainly use the comparative and empirical method to point out the similarities and the divergent aspects of the two case studies and to gather information from different sources including international and regional organisations, research institutes and literature for the theoretical part. Since the subject is very complex, I will mostly focus on peacekeeping operations and mediation process. I will also pay a special attention on other form of intervention of the third parties, or in other words, the involvement of sovereign states in the two conflicts and their attitude towards the parties.

The paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter comprises a theoretical approach on armed conflicts and their termination with special emphasis on African conflicts. Chapter 2 contains the case study of Angola, while chapter 3 presents the case of Rwanda. In the last chapter I draw up some conclusions related to the failure of peacekeeping comparing the theoretical approach with the analysis of the two study cases. The last part of the fourth chapter contains some conclusions related to the future peacekeeping operations.

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, Africa had been an arena for superpower rivalry. The effects of these conflicts on Africa are the intensification of the mistrust within and among African nations to the extent that there is an increasing explosion of cleavages in most African states. The conflicts have exacerbated political, economic and social instability.

At the end of the Cold War, everybody hoped that the “New world order” would bring certain stability and less violent conflicts would emerge.

Unfortunately, this was not the case. Violent conflicts continued to arise at an alarming level. Starting with 1990, we are witnessing major changes on the international arena, while international organisations are trying to find a solution to nowadays challenges.

Nigeria, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Zaire, Gambia, Senegal, Togo, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Cameroon, Comoros are just a few of the African countries that have not known peace especially in the context of all the changes that took place at global level since the nineties. In most of the cases, international organisations, and NGOs and sometimes sovereign states reacted promptly and tried to find a solution to end the conflicts. Regional and international organisations took part at the negotiation process, trying to find a solution to end the conflict and to repair the damages caused by war. In some countries they succeeded. The international organisations through their member states took responsibility and supported the peacekeeping missions, humanitarian interventions and the reconstruction in the aftermath of the wars. Unfortunately, there are also cases where all the efforts of the international or regional organisations failed. Therefore, it is pertinent at this point to ask several questions: What were the challenges during the attempts of ending the conflicts? Can we compare at all two conflicts and the process of war termination, considering the different context they occur? Why didn't the international community react promptly in all cases? Are the international and regional organisations capable to

react effectively when they are facing a violent conflict? Do they have the resources and other tools to prevent the eruption of conflicts?

These are some of the questions that I will try to answer in the next chapters of the paper.

Why Africa?

I decided to approach this subject together with its challenges for several reasons. First of all, because Africa has experienced more armed conflict and endured more direct and indirect casualties of war than any other continent. The violence and instability in many African countries prevented them from economic growth, development and generated into social and political crisis.

Another motivation arises from the dimension and the nature of the African conflicts. I can start this argument saying that the statistics show that the most of the large-scale conflicts that erupted after 1990 took place in Africa (see fig.1, p.15) and most of the times civilians were much more affected than combatants.

Moreover, despite the differences, the conflicts in Africa share some common aspects. The countries on the continent experienced colonialism and after regaining independence they struggled to re-establish a balance that would eventually lead to development. But the cleavages were too deep and the desire for power too strong. Before 1990 most of the African conflicts were mainly either about regaining independence or part of the Cold War ideological rivalry of the two superpowers.

In the post- Cold War era, new types of conflicts emerged. Most of them were intrastate warfare that has deep root causes that date back to the colonisation period.

A dominant characteristic of African warfare is the externalisation of the conflicts in the way that foreign powers and international organisations became involved in internal disputes, or in other words, internal conflicts became international. Peace and security in Africa have become greater global concerns. Regional and international organisations started to develop strategies to stop the violence and to prevent its spreading in the neighbouring countries. Sovereign

countries offered to mediate the negotiation process, while non-governmental organisations (NGOs) played an active role in humanitarian matters. But unfortunately, sometimes, the attempt to do well, if poorly planned and lacking in strategy can do more harm than good¹. While the agreements failed to be implemented in Liberia, Rwanda and Angola, international actors served as custodians for successful peace processes in Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe².

In African conflicts there is a predominance of ethnic tensions that are closely linked to the colonial times, either due to artificially created ethnicity as in the case of Rwanda, or due to arbitrary territorial division with no respect for Africa's cultural, economic and political realities.

After regaining their independence, most of the African countries experienced dictatorial regimes that limited the access to power and to resources to a certain category of people, the lack of a stable political structure and institutions. The paradox is that on the one hand, states did not have the capacity to end the internal tensions, and on the other hand, the conflicts erode the state system and its legitimacy. In addition, prolonged conflicts in Africa prevented human and economic development.

And last but not least, one of the most important aspects of these conflicts is the human dimension. The internal struggle for power, racial or ethnic issues that generated into conflicts, led to a real humanitarian crisis. International organisations and NGOs reported millions of deaths³ among the civilian population. About 60 per cent of the deaths from armed conflict in the contemporary world have occurred in the region⁴. The number of internally displaced people and refugees was in continuous growth, in spite of the

¹ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *"Words over war"*, Carnegie Corporation of N.Y., Ed.: Melanie C. Greenburg, John H. Barton Margaret E. McGuinness, N.Y., 2002

² Ibidem

³ According to the *Millenium Development Goals Report 2005*, published by the UN Department for Public Information DPI/2390 – May 2005, the estimated number of deaths in conflicts between 1994 – 2003, was of 13.341.200, out of which, 9.210.000 only in Sub-Saharan Africa.

⁴ Kwesi Kwaa Prah, *"African Wars and Ethnic Conflicts – Rebuilding Failed States"*, The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society, Africa Regional Background Paper: Human Development Report 2004, UNDP, Cape Town, 2004

humanitarian aid provided. In the civil wars of the '90s, the lines between combat and civilians are not existent. Nearly 75 per cent of the casualties of these wars are civilians. Frequently, children are soldiers; UNICEF estimated that two hundred thousands children under the age of 15 are fighters in today's wars⁵.

Starting with 1990, *UN has intensified its engagement in Africa and, by December 2005, 75 per cent of UN resources, both personnel and peacekeeping budgets, were devoted to Africa and nearly half the number of deployed peacekeeping personnel is African*⁶. Therefore, Africa was the region with the highest concentration of large, multi-dimensional, costly peace operations.⁷

Peacekeeping operations in Africa had to respond to the difficult task of dealing with the challenges posed by the nature of the warfare on the continent. The missions deployed on the African continent varied a lot according to the context, from observation missions and traditional peacekeeping operations, to the more complex ones comprising a wide range of aspects such as political, humanitarian, police and military. Some of them succeeded – like in the case of Mozambique, Namibia or Zimbabwe – while others failed – as it is the case of Liberia, Rwanda and Angola.

Failure or successful story, the peacekeeping missions in Africa have some common characteristics. First of all, there is the regional approach. Regional African organisations believed that the solution should come from inside, but it was clear that their members could not face the challenges by themselves. They had the political will, but the lack of financial and technical means to deal with such conflict issues, determined them to address to the UN. But sometimes this co-operation led to co-ordination problems. Usually, most of the troops in these operations were coming from African countries and the equipment from western states. Even though it seems to be a good solution, most of the times there are the differences of military culture and approaches in problems solving that create a gap, which, when cumulated to other elements, might lead to the failure of the

⁵ Stephan John Stedman, *“International Actors and Internal Conflicts”*, Rockefeller Brothers Fund Inc., 1999, New York

⁶ SIPRI Yearbook 2006, *“Armaments, Disarmament and International Security”*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 145

⁷ Ibidem

mission.

One common problem of the peacekeeping operations sent on the African continent especially in the early nineties, was that traditional forms were not efficient anymore in the new context. The personnel were not trained to deal with the new challenges. As mentioned above, the conflicts in Africa led to a real humanitarian disaster and one of the peacekeepers' tasks was to respond to this situation.

Aims, objectives and methodology

Aims and objectives

The main aim of the paper is to analyse two of the most significant failures of the international community to bring peace in Africa. Therefore, I will choose as case studies Rwanda and Angola.

I will reach the targeted aim focusing on the following objectives:

- review the most significant literature related to peacekeeping
- point out the main causes of the conflicts in the study cases
- analyse the context and the evolution of the conflicts
- describe the evolution of the negotiation process and of the peacekeeping operations
- analyse the involvement of third parties in the conflicts and its role in ending the violence and create the proper conditions for the establishment of peace
- drawing the most important on peacekeeping operations.

Methodology

In terms of methodology, I will mainly use the comparative and empirical method. Therefore, I will start from a general theoretical approach to particular cases to assess the failure of the mediation process and peacekeeping operations. I will use the comparative method to point out the similarities and the divergent aspects of the two case studies.

I will use the empirical method to gather useful information from different sources including international and regional organisations, research institutes and literature.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

"War is the continuation of policy by other means"

Clausewitz

1.1. Conflict, war and peace.

According to their research objectives, scholars have tried to give a general definition of conflicts, but there is still no unanimity among them. Professor Heinz-Jürgen Axt reviewed the literature on conflicts and selected some of the most spread definitions on conflict. Since the classification of conflicts is very broad, including among other categories violent or non-violent conflicts, armed conflicts- which comprise minor armed, intermediate armed conflict and war, I will further refer to violent armed conflicts.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) gives the following definition:

"A 'major armed conflict' is defined as the use of armed force between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people in any single calendar year and in which the incompatibility concerns control of government and/or territory⁸." (Sollenberg, Wallenstein 1999: 15)

Heinz-Jürgen Axt considers the definition above too narrowly focused on military personnel, with disregard to the death casualties among civilian population⁹. Therefore, he proposes the definition given by Bonacker and Imbusch:

⁸ Margareta Sollenberg; Peter Wallenstein, *"Major Armed Conflicts"*, SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p.15

⁹ Prof. Dr. Heinz-Jürgen Axt, *"Conflict – a literature review"*, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute for Political Science, Jean Monnet Group, Duisburg, February 2006

„Konflikte lassen sich entsprechend definieren als soziale Tatbestände, an denen mindestens zwei Parteien (Einzelpersonen, Gruppen, Staaten, etc.) beteiligt sind, die auf Unterschiede in der sozialen Lage und/oder auf Unterschieden in der Interessenskonstellation der Konfliktparteien beruhen.“

(Bonacker and Imbusch (2005, p.71) in: Heinz-Jürgen Axt, “Conflict – a literature review” 2006, p.3)

Still, according to Heinz-Jürgen Axt this approach on conflict arises the problem of functionality.

Regarding the characteristics of conflicts, Heinz-Jürgen Axt argues that a violent phase of a conflict can be determined when parties go beyond seeking to attain their goals peacefully, and try to dominate damage or destroy the opposing parties’ ability to pursue their own interests¹⁰. Heinz-Jürgen Axt further states that in political conflict analysis the use of force, physical damages and human casualties are the characteristics of a violent conflict¹¹.

For most of the authors that contributed to the literature on concepts of conflict and war, the two notions are almost equivalent. What makes the difference between war and armed conflict is the intensity level.

As conflict, war can be seen from different perspectives as well, and according to some authors it is strongly connected to the notion of peace:

“Many political realists point out that the common basis of policy in both peace and war, namely the quest for power, makes them two inseparable parts of the same social activity. Blainey contends that the causes of war and peace dovetail into one another: “War and peace are not separate compartments. Peace depends on threats and force; often peace is the crystallization of past force.” (Blainey 1973) Or formulated most succinctly: “In a system of power politics, there is no difference in kind between peace and war.”¹²
(Schwartzberger, 1950 in: Johan M.G. van der Dennen, 1981 p. 129)

¹⁰ Ibidem

¹¹ Ibidem

¹² Schwartzberger in: Johan M.G. van der Dennen, “On War: concepts, definitions, research data - a short literature review and bibliography”, article published as a chapter in: *UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies 1980*, Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1981, p. 128-189

Birger Heldt who quotes Wallensteen & Sollenberg, considers that war refers to cases with an annual rate of at least 1000 battle related deaths, while “conflict” refers to cases that have incurred at least 25 – but less than 1000 – battle deaths per year¹³. This is in fact the difference that SIPRI makes between conflicts and major armed conflicts. Therefore, I will conclude saying that since I don't see a major difference between the two concepts (major armed conflict and war), I will treat them as equivalent notions.

1.2. African Conflicts. General overview

Several theories explain outbreaks of armed conflicts in less developed countries. Indeed, the statistics show that most of the conflicts after 1990 took place in developing countries and mainly in Asia and Africa (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Therefore, a simple assessment of the situation in Africa might drive us to the conclusion that the violence is more present there because the continent is poor. But on the other hand, the continent remains poor because it is consumed by instability and armed conflicts¹⁴. Although the absence of conflicts or wars does not guarantee the economic development, no real development can occur in an insecure environment. However, it is now widely accepted that poverty itself is not cause of conflict.

¹³ Wallensteen & Sollenberg 2000 in: Birger Heldt, “*Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions*”, National Defence College of Sweden, Department of Operational Studies, Stockholm, 2001


¹⁴ Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, “*Peace and Conflict 2005. A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy*”, University of Maryland, June 2005

Table 1. Regional distribution, number and types of major armed conflicts, 1990-2003

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Africa	11	11	7	7	6	5	3	4	11	11	9	7	6	4
Americas	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	3
Asia	13	11	12	10	10	11	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	8
Europe	-	1	3	5	4	3	1	-	1	2	1	1	1	1
Middle East	4	6	5	6	6	6	6	4	4	3	4	4	2	3
TOTAL	32	33	30	31	29	28	23	19	27	27	25	24	21	19

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Project, www.pcr.uu.se/research/data.htm


Figure 1. Regional distribution and total number of major armed conflicts, 1990-2003



Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Project, www.pcr.uu.se/research/data.htm

Figure 2 shows a general overview of major armed conflicts in Africa. During the cold war, period that coincides with the process of decolonisation, there is an constant increasing trend of armed conflicts in Africa. The peak of this trend is in the early nineties. Over 40 per cent of the conflicts in the region concentrated in 1993. This may be easily explained by the changes that took place all over the world at the end of Cold War.

Figure 2. Africa: Regional Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946 - 2004



Source: Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development, “Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946 – 2004. A Macro Comparative Perspective”, Report prepared by the Government of the United Kingdom for the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, Center for Systemic Peace (<http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/conflict.htm>)

Most of the armed conflicts in the region are the so-called “societal wars” or intrastate wars, comprising ethnic, revolutionary, inter-communal, and political mass murder. The process of decolonisation led to anti-colonial movements that degenerated into civil wars. One of the common aspects of the African conflicts is

the foreign support that became in some cases direct military intervention that undermined the efforts of bringing peace and creating a secure environment on the continent. Interstate wars are not significant in the region and they are mainly border-disputes¹⁵.

Conflicts in Africa as Samuel Amoo concluded are as tragic as they are complex¹⁶. Several theories explain outbreaks of armed conflicts in less developed countries. **Economic and social inequality** and **access to political power** are considered to be some of the main causes of violent conflicts¹⁷.

William Zartman suggests six main causes of conflicts in Africa¹⁸. Half of the causes identified by Zartman are closely related to the colonisation period: the fight for power after the decolonisation, territory and new consolidation after the independence. Before the independence, all the movements that emerged had a common enemy: the colonial power. Afterwards, new matters of disputes appeared such as political and ideological problems, delimitation of frontiers. Zartman further identifies other three subsequent causes of the African conflicts, such as creation of new movements of national liberation (extremist movements), structural rivalries and use of resources.

Figure 3 shows again the trends in African armed conflicts but this time in relation to the intrastate wars. According to the graphic, the armed conflicts with the biggest magnitude comprise either political or ethnic conflicts. Around one quarter of the countries experienced an armed conflict during the Cold War. The number of states directly affected by serious armed conflicts increased sharply during the transition to a post-Cold War political environment.


¹⁵ Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development, “*Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946 – 2004. A Macro Comparative Perspective*”, Report prepared by the Government of the United Kingdom for the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, Center for Systemic Peace, available on the CSP website: <http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/conflict.htm>

¹⁶ Samuel G. Amoo, “*The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives*”, Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, May 1992

¹⁷ Ibidem

¹⁸ I. William Zartman, “*La resolution des conflits en Afrique*”, Editions L'Harmattan, Paris, 1990

Figure 3. Africa: Regional Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946 -2004 (II)



Source: Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development, “Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946 – 2004. A Macro Comparative Perspective”, Report prepared by the Government of the United Kingdom for the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, Center for Systemic Peace, available on CSP website: (<http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/conflict.htm>)

1.3. Ways of solving conflicts. Intervention by a third party: Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building

Regarding the matter of intervention there is always the issue of legitimacy and efficiency. Is it right to intervene in conflicts? If the answer is yes, there are other questions that arise: under what conditions may a third party intervene? Is the intervention really efficient?

The critics of intervention argue firstly that intervention implies the violation of national sovereignty and secondly, that intervention is usually not efficient¹⁹. Crocker believes that nations should compare the cost of intervention to the cost of doing nothing before they decide to intervene.

The intervention is not limited to international organisations. Sovereign states may decide to intervene either unilateral or as a coalition of states – multilateral intervention. In this chapter I will only focus on the intervention of the international organisations. The two case studies include as well other forms of intervention of third parties.

The UN Charter provides in the Article 2(7) that the UN should not intervene in matters that are under the domestic jurisdiction of any state. However, Chapter VII allows such intervention in the case of a major threat to international peace and security. There is a lot of debate about the legitimacy of the intervention of the third parties in armed conflicts, but it is not the purpose of this paper. Therefore, I will further refer to the most common forms of intervention, namely peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building.

As described by Samuel Amoo, the third party's primary role thus constitutes a form of intervention, an action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself²⁰. One of the preconditions of an efficient intervention by a third

¹⁹ Chester Crocker, *"Lessons on Intervention,"* in Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World: The Role of Intervention. Report of the Aspen Institute Conference, 2-6 August, 1995

²⁰ Samuel G. Amoo, *"The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives"*, Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, May 1992

party is neutrality or impartiality of the mediator. In other words, the third party should abstain in pursuing its national interest when mediating a conflict.

In order to re-establish peace and security, most of the scholars agree to three stages of this process: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building. These notions can be easily confused, therefore, for clarity reasons I will make a clear distinction between them.

Peacemaking refers to the process of finding a viable solution to the peaceful settlement of a dispute. Usually, the whole process is mediated by a third party, often an official diplomat. In other words, the mediator assists the entire negotiation process and he facilitates the communication between the parties. His role is very important as the practice shows that it takes much more than an agreement to bring peace in a conflict area. The mediators' biggest challenge is to create an atmosphere of trust between the parties. The mediation techniques vary a lot, but the most common ones include negotiation, mediation, official and unofficial, or "track two" diplomacy.

The term of **peacekeeping**, generally refers to the international effort to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of long-standing disputes. In practice, peacekeeping prevents the attacks of the two parties through the interposition of neutral soldiers. What distinguishes peacekeeping from the other two concepts is the fact that the soldiers do not interfere in the dispute. Their main role is to keep the parties apart from each other and to prevent armed confrontations. Neutrality is therefore requested.

Especially after the Cold War, the missions had to be adapted according to the new context of international relations. Therefore, a so-called "new generation" or "second generation" of peacekeeping missions emerged.

Traditional peacekeeping involved the deployment of lightly armed troops with the permission of the host state as an interposition force following a cease-fire with the aim of separating combatants and promote an environment suitable for conflict resolution²¹. According to Diehl, Druckman and Wall²², this new

²¹ Paul E Diehl, Daniel Druckman, James Wall, "*International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications*", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1, February 1998

generation of peacekeeping includes today other elements like election supervision, nation building and other functions, depending on the conflict area. Nowadays, peacekeeping missions have adopted more coercive tactics and strategies. The authors distinguished twelve **categories of peacekeeping** as it follows: traditional peacekeeping, observation, collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian assistance during conflict, state/nation building, pacification, preventive deployment, arms control verification, protective services, intervention in support of democracy, sanctions enforcement.

“In summary, peacekeeping missions are believed to contribute to peace by decreasing distrust among parties, and by increasing the cost of defection from agreements²³.” (Birger Heldt: 2000, p.5)

Usually, the term of peacekeeping is associated with the United Nations (UN), though regional organisations may establish such missions, when authorised by an UN mandate. Below I will refer to the peacekeeping mechanisms within the UN and Organisation for African Unity (OAU)/ African Union (AU).

Peace building is the final stage of bringing peace in a conflict area. It refers to the full spectrum of intervention that is focused on restoring relations between groups that have been in conflict. Peace building involves a number of different aspects, which may include disarming, the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal process of political participation.

Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building are not separate activities; they complete one another in the attempt of bringing peace in a conflict region. They use different tools and approaches to reach the same goal.

Since the peace building process is also very complex especially in the two

²² Ibidem

²³ Birger Heldt, “*Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions*”, National Defence College of Sweden, Department of Operational Studies, Stockholm, 2000, p. 5

case studies I chose, I will only focus on the first two (peacemaking and peacekeeping) with emphasis on peacekeeping.

1.4. UN peacekeeping mechanisms

At its creation after the World War II, the United Nations had as main goal the establishment of a system that would be capable to prevent the eruption of new wars in international relations and to promote co-operation among member states. The idea was to create a system of collective security that would allow the intervention in defined situations and under certain conditions. But these conditions were never defined in the UN Charter.

Even if the UN Charter does not include peacekeeping operations, they are in line with UN purposes and objectives as set out in the Article I which stipulates that the member states should take “*effective collective measures for the prevention and the removal of threats to peace*”²⁴ (Art. 1 of the UN Charter). Furthermore, all the provisions regarding international peace and security are included in Chapter VI – which refers to means for peaceful settlement by negotiation, conciliation and arbitration - and Chapter VII of the Charter – which mentions the mechanism of peace-enforcement in the cases where the peaceful means provided in Chapter VI fail. The Chapter VII refers to enforcement measures such as: arms embargoes, economic sanctions and eventually the use of force. Therefore, without clear provisions the peacekeeping operations are placed between the two chapters of the UN Charter. This is why peacekeeping mission are also known under the name of Chapter six and a half or the “grey area” as Connaughton calls it²⁵.

As mentioned above, peacekeeping operations evolved together with the changes of the international relations. Therefore, during the Cold War, the role of the peacekeepers was mainly a reactive one, meaning that they were not supposed

²⁴ Charte des Nations Unies et Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice, Département de l'information des Nations Unies, DPI/511, Réimpression – avril 2005

²⁵ Richard Connaughton, 2001, “Military Intervention and Peacekeeping. The reality”, cited in: Facil Tesfaye Bedada, “*The Prostitution of Peacekeeping: The Rwandan Experience*”, “Les opérations de paix: de Suez à Kandahar”, CEPES, no. 33, Québec, Février 2007

to take the initiative. They mainly served as facilitators to promote peace that had been established in conflict zones²⁶. With the end of Cold War, the peacekeeping operations evolved from simply containing and stabilising the situation until negotiations produce a lasting peace agreement to and expansion of activities including, human rights monitoring, demobilisation activities, policing and temporary administration.

The climate within Security Council also changed while the superpowers abandoned their zero-sum game for spheres of influence. The biggest change was to come from the Russian delegation. While before they were suspicious about the peacekeeping operations, they started to have a supportive approach, which meant a revitalisation of the UN and the international security efforts.

According to the UN Charter, the Security Council is the sole UN body entitled to take collective actions in order to maintain international peace and security. Therefore, all peacekeeping missions should be authorised through a resolution by the Security Council. The missions are composed by military personnel, civilian police officers and civilian personnel, coming from the member countries that are willing and/or have the means to support the respective mission.

UN reform

A few years after end of cold war the UN was incapable of facing new challenges without rethinking the entire structure of the organization and adapting it to the latest developments in international relations. Therefore, the idea of a reform started to be highly debated. As one of the main bodies of the UN, the Security Council was one of the first institutions that were considered for reform. Moreover, the failures in achieving its main goal, namely ensuring peace and security has been severely criticised especially in the last decade. Still the debates on the UN reform are not over yet and it will probably take some time until its implementation. Anyway, as I have different objectives in this paper, I will only

²⁶ M.A. Vogt and L.S. Aminu, *"Peacekeeping as a Security Strategy in Africa"*, Fourth Dimension Publishing Co.Ltd, Enugu, 1996

briefly present some of the most relevant aspects the reform proposed for the Security Council reform in close relation to peacekeeping operations.

The new UN vision for world peace, expressed in an Agenda for Peace and later in Brahimi Report²⁷, challenges the traditional value of order, which rejects interventionism and expands universal values such as democracy, human rights, humanitarian intervention and social justice²⁸. In the report, the UN is more than an international organisation; it is a universal organisation that should be capable to deploy its peace operations effectively. In the view of past experiences when peacekeepers, due to the lack of mandate and equipment failed in defending the civilians and sometimes even themselves, the report argues that the mandates should be clear, credible and achievable.

“The current practice is for the Secretary-General to be given a Security Council resolution specifying troop levels on paper, not knowing whether he will be given the troops and other personnel that the mission needs to function effectively, or whether they will be properly equipped. [...] the Council should leave its authorizing resolution in draft form until the Secretary-General confirms that he has received troop and other commitments from Member States sufficient to meet those requirements”²⁹. (Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations)

I will further develop the UN reform in the last chapter with focus on Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the new proposals for future missions.

²⁷ Brahimi Report was inspired from “An Agenda for Peace” published in 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali

²⁸ Sorpong Peou: “*The UN, Peacekeeping and Collective Human Security: From An Agenda for Peace to Brahimi Report*”, International Peacekeeping, no. 9, Summer 2002

²⁹ Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809, 17 August 2000, available on UN website: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

1.5. Organisation of African Unity peacekeeping mechanisms

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) suffered a lot of changes since its creation in 1963. But latest and the most important that dates from the early 2000, represents a revolutionary change that determined a complete rethinking of the entire system. I will briefly refer to these changes below. Since the case studies presented in the second part of this paper refer to conflicts that date before the creation of the African Union (AU), I will refer to the organisation with its old name and I will focus its presentation according to the old structure.

OAU was founded for the purposes stated in Article II of its Charter: African unity and solidarity, collective pursuit of African well-being and advancement, defence of African sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa, international co-operation.

The OAU was conceived as a collective security regional organisation, committed to the principle of "*peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration*"³⁰ (Art. III (4) of the OAU Charter). Therefore, a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was created as one of the main organs of the OAU in order to prove the commitment of the organisation to peaceful settlement of regional conflicts. Although the Commission was never made functional, its protocols are most important first of all because they indicate the extent to which African states are willing to get involved in the management of regional conflicts, and the practices and modalities they are disposed to tolerate and secondly, they continue to guide the process of intervention in regional conflicts by the main institutions or subsidiary (ad hoc) bodies of the OAU³¹.

Even though it was conceived as a collective security organisation, OAU

³⁰ OAU Charter, available on AU website:

http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf

³¹ Samuel G. Amoo, "*The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives*", Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, May 1992

does not have coercive powers and it did not prove its capacity to work effectively in establishing regional security. In other words, as Samuel Amoo concluded, OAU may have the salience and enthusiasm as a mediator, but it has failed to demonstrate competence³². Furthermore, the author argues that another drawback of the organisation resides in its incapacity of remaining impartial and insulates itself from the regional political dynamics.

From OAU to African Union

Since OAU became in 2001 African Union all the organisation's structure changed radically. The main idea of the changes was to transform it into a real economic, political and defence union on the model of the European Union. And the whole security mechanisms needed a serious reform. Therefore, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was created to replace the conflict prevention mechanism that existed under the OAU. This new body was inspired by the UN Security Council. The group comprises 15 members, all of whom are elected on the basis of equal rights, with 10 members elected for 2-year terms and 5 members elected for 3-year terms. A set of regional criteria strongly influences the membership, as well as the contribution these countries make to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa and respect for constitutional governance, rule of law and human rights³³.

Within the PSC, several subsidiary bodies were created which include a Chairperson of the Commission, a 'Panel of the Wise', a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff Committee. Even though the organisation has a different structure and new committees devoted to maintain peace and security in the region still, the problems of resources and management have not been solved.

³² Ibidem

³³ Cranfield University, Centre for Security Sector Management, website:
<http://www.ssronline.org/>

OAU vs UN

In the light of the above presented characteristics of the OAU (or the newly created AU), the idea of co-operation between UN and OAU, instead of a direct involvement of the latter is broadly spread. Samuel Amoo goes even further stating that Africa could be better served if regional leaders would purposefully enlist the assistance of influential global actors in devising U.N. peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace servicing packages for Africa's trouble spots on the lines of U.N. intervention³⁴. He argues that the objective such a multilateral initiative would be to take advantage of the salience and ideal resources of the OAU as a mediator, while employing extra-regional powers and agencies to supply other mediator resources such as leverage, moral authority, credibility, legitimacy and physical resources. His optimism goes even further saying that the only efficient source of external assistance in waging peace in Africa would be the UN. While the UN can insulate reluctant external powers from direct intervention in conflicts in some remote corner of Africa, logistic and other material assistance from these powers such as air transportation for troops, supplies and equipment could be channelled through the UN system and thereby made more acceptable to all shades of African opinion³⁵.

³⁴ Samuel G. Amoo, *"The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives"*, Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, May 1992

³⁵ Ibidem

1.6. Peacekeeping operations. Between failure and success

Under what conditions the peacekeeping operations are successful? Most of the authors approaching this question tried to conceptualize and theorize it using different variables in order to create a general framework that may be applied in future peacekeeping missions. Other authors like Birger Heldt analysed the success of peacekeeping operations starting from the statistical point of view. I will briefly review the literature that refers to the conditions under which peacekeeping missions are successful and test some of the arguments that might by apply to the study cases below.

Heldt formulated fourteen sentences that might be related to the success of a peacekeeping operation and made a statistical analysis based on what he considered to be the most important factors of the success of a peacekeeping operation. I will choose some of his hypothesis that I consider to be relevant for the two case studies:

- Peacekeeping missions in democratic host states are more likely to be successful.
- Peacekeeping missions in host states with low or high levels of ethnic fragmentation are more likely to be successful.
- The higher the GDP per capita in the host state, the more likely that a peacekeeping mission will be successful.
- Peacekeeping missions are more likely to become successful if the previous period of time was characterized by peace.
- Peacekeeping missions are more likely to become successful in civil conflicts over government than over territory.
- The later a peacekeeping mission is sent to a civil war, the less likely it will be successful.
- The longer the duration of the peacekeeping mission, the more likely it will be successful.
- The larger the peacekeeping mission, the more likely it will be successful.

- The less comprehensive the mandate, the more likely that the peacekeeping mission will be successful.

Taking into account that Heldt proved statistically his hypothesis I believe that some of them are difficult to be transposed in practice and some are too vague, while some elements are missing. Therefore I would propose two more sentences related to the peacekeeping operations and two related to mediation process:

- Peacekeeping operations are more likely to be successful when they are adapted to the conflict's profile
- Peacekeeping operations are usually not successful when they are mandated and deployed according to a fixed framework.
- The mediation process cannot be successful when there is no trust among the parties and when the parties don't trust the mediator.
- In order for the mediation process to be successful, the third party should act for the termination of war and abstain in pursuing its national interest.

I will refer to all these hypothesis in the last chapter.

CHAPTER II.

BETWEEN NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND PEACEKEEPING. FAILURE OF BRINGING PEACE AND SECURITY IN ANGOLA

"Behind both phenomena, war and peace,

*lies the
same dimension of power."*

Barbera, 1973



Case study 1: Angola

2.1. Background

The paradox of Angola consists of two important features of the country: on one hand, it is very wealthy with enormous supplies of oil and diamonds, and on the other hand, it is one of the poorest countries in the world and a real humanitarian disaster. As Africa's second largest producer of oil, Angola provides the United States with 7 per cent of its oil imports. Angola's diamonds are among the highest quality and most sought-after gemstones in the world. But a country that has the potential to be an African success story is instead one of Africa's most notorious humanitarian disasters³⁶.

The struggle for power (which was the essence of the civil war) lasted more than twenty years and it turned Angola into one of the poorest countries in the world with a very low life expectancy. Several attempts to restore the peace failed and the continuing growth of the number of victims became a matter of concern for the international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). But still, the international community failed to find a concrete solution to prevent further violence. (See annex I for more information related to the history of Angola).

All attempts to bring peace and stability in Angola failed for several reasons that will be fully described within this chapter. Within this context, there

³⁶ Ian S. Spear, "Southern Africa Report", SAR, Vol 15 No 1, December 1999, p.7

are three important factors that caused the failure of the peace attempts in Angola. One internal factor is the lack of will from the parties in conflict to reach an agreement and restrain from further cease-fire violations, since both MPLA and UNITA were hoping to have full access to power and natural resources. The parties in conflict kept fighting for their cause without considering the impact on the population. As for the external factors, United Nations and the so-called “Troika³⁷” had a major influence in the evolution of the conflict.

Even though UN established several missions in Angola, the peace process seemed to be far away until the death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimibi.

The parties in conflict, namely the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) which represented the government of Angola on one hand, and União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) on the other hand fought for more than two decades for power and control. The main aspects of the conflict as well as a brief presentation of the parties in conflict will be further developed below.

2.2. Parties in conflict

The conflict between the government of Angola and UNITA dates back to independence from Portugal in November 1975.

During the colonial influence, three independent movements emerged in Angola, which initially fought for the same ideal: the independence from Portugal. The three movements were Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) – a Marxist-Leninist movement, União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) – party of Maoist orientation, and Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA)- tribal based party.

The FNLA used to play a major role just after Angola's independence. It was founded in 1957 as the Union of the Populations of Northern Angola (União das Populações do Norte de Angola) and played an important role in fighting the

³⁷ Troika comprised by United States, Russia and Portugal was established in order to monitor and investigate all the breaches of the Lusaka Protocol. They will be further referred under this name.

Portuguese colonial rule. Originally, it was a nationalist movement established under the name of Union of Angolan People (UPA) whose main objective was the independence of the Northern provinces. In 1962 it changed the name into FNLA demanding the independence of the entire country³⁸. Shortly after the independence, the power and importance of FNLA decreased significantly mostly due to the strong opposition of the UNITA against the government, undermining the actions of FNLA. Even if the party was financially and militarily supported from outside the country (mainly China and former Zaire), they were not able to reorganise, and in the late '70, FNLA ceased their existence. They reorganised as a political party before the elections in 1992 under the same leadership of Holden Roberto. The 2,4 per cent of the votes received at the elections were mainly concentrated in the northern regions of the country. The FNLA won 5 seats in the Parliament.

The MPLA was founded in 1956 by the fusion of the Party for the United Struggle for Africans in Angola (PLUA) and the Angolan Communist Party (PCA). Later on, the Movement for the National Independence of Angola (MINA) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Angola (FDLA) merged as well into MPLA, which used to have strong ties with the European communist parties and especially to the Soviet Union. After 1990, they became full members of the Socialist International as a social democratic party. During the civil war, the MPLA was backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Currently it is the leading power in Angola.

Finally, UNITA was founded in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, who was originally affiliated to FNLA, and before decided to establish his own movement, he joined the MPLA³⁹. Jonas Savimbi was the leader of the party until his death in 2002. During the civil war, UNITA received backing as well, but this time from South Africa and the United States.

Initially, all three parties fought for independence from the colonial power. When Angola became officially free, both MPLA and UNITA claimed the

³⁸ Jean-Marc Balencie, Arnaud de La Grange, "*Mondes rebelles. Acteurs, conflits et violence politique*", Vol. 1, ed. Michalon, Paris, 1996, p 507-524

³⁹ Ibidem

right to govern, and since the MPLA had the support of the majority of people especially around the capital of Luanda, they were able to form the first independent government in Angola. Shortly after the establishment of the new government in an independent Angola, UNITA claimed equal participation.

The main rivals in the Angola Civil war – the MPLA and the UNITA, have both maintained their military capacity through the long years of war, despite the embargoes imposed repeatedly by the international community.

In order to understand better the challenges of the negotiation process and in the context concerning the parties in conflict, the perception on one another should be emphasised. Therefore, UNITA considered themselves as an anti-Marxist, pro-western, truly Angolan fighting for the well-being of the whole Angolan population. At the same time, they saw their adversaries – the MPLA – just the opposite: pro-Portuguese Marxist party, composed by mix-raced members that cannot have common interests and that cannot possibly identify with the Angolans. The MPLA on the other side, perceived UNITA as a tribal party that was not fighting for the well-being of all Angolans, but who only concentrate to achieve more power and influence and for the interests of Ovimbundu⁴⁰ people⁴¹.

In 1991 UNITA and MPLA agreed to demobilize and hold presidential elections. After the defeat of UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi contested the elections and the fighting resumed. In 1994 a new peace agreement was signed between the two parties. The agreement known under the name of “Lusaka Protocol” failed in the attempt of restoring peace.

⁴⁰ The largest ethnic group in Angola (37 per cent of the population) which is mainly located in the central Angola. They were the main forces behind the UNITA rebel army.

⁴¹ “*Angola's Choice: Reform or Regress*”, Africa Report N 61, April 2003, Luanda/Brussels International Crisis Group <http://www.crisisweb.org>

2.3. Steps towards a peace process in Angola

Alvor talks

Just after the independence, in January 1975, the Portuguese Government decided to establish a programme for transition to independence. Therefore the talks started at Alvor, Portugal, with all three Angolan liberation movements. The MPLA did not wait for the official proclamation of independence (which was supposed to take place between November and December) and started establishing a new government declaring itself the ruling political party. The agreement signed at Alvor soon fell apart, and the three groups fought one another with support from a variety of international sources, including Cuba, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Meeting in Zaire

In the summer of 1989 at a summit hosted by the Zairean president Mobuto Sese Seko at Gbadolite, the representatives of the two parties, the Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos and the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, were both invited. This was considered to be the first formal step towards a cease-fire agreement between the Angolan government and UNITA. During the meeting, the two parties verbally committed to the cessation of fire and expressed their desire to put an end to the civil war and begin the national reconciliation process. During their statements, they agreed to end all foreign interference in the internal affairs, the integration of UNITA into the public institutions and the acceptance of Savimbi's temporary and voluntary retirement.

The verbal commitment between the two parties lasted only a few days as Savimbi refused to admit that he had accepted those terms. Therefore, the violence erupted again.

Peace Accords for Angola (Bicesse Accords)

Provisions and implementation

The next step towards the peace process in Angola and the first comprehensive one, was taken in Lisbon in May 1991 with the Bicesse Accords, which is also known as “Peace Accords for Angola”.

The peace talks hosted by Portugal and with participation of United States and Russia as observers, finally led to concrete agreement, after one year of negotiations (April 1990- May1991). In general lines, the agreement provided an immediate cessation of fire, interdiction of military assistance from third countries, creation of a unified army, liberation of political prisoners, regaining of governmental control in the territories occupied by UNITA and organisation of free elections.

The final document provided as well the implementation of a national army which should include military personnel from the two parties. It also mentions that general elections should be held after the demobilisation and disarmament of both UNITA and the government forces. Furthermore, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was responsible for monitoring the implementation of the agreement. Therefore, the initial mandate of UNAVEM I was extended at the request of Angola and included verification of the cease-fire and neutrality of the Angolan police, as well as observation of the presidential elections. In reality, the mission did not have any power, but more an observer status, being even in an inferior position to the Troika members. (Further information related to the mission and its mandate is to be found below and in the annex III).

An important achievement during the negotiations had been the acceptance by both sides and the Troika of the so-called 'triple-zero' clause in which the parties agreed to refrain from acquiring arms, and the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to cease all supplies to any of the parties and encourage other countries to do likewise. However, the rate of disarmament was slow, as significant numbers of UNITA troops reported to the quartering areas unarmed,

and the lack of seriousness or confidence between the belligerents as well as a reluctance to hand over weapons which could be sold for profit in areas with few employment opportunities⁴².

A Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) was established in order to oversee and verify the process, composed of the Government and UNITA, with the Troika as observers. The CCPM had been divided in two main commissions: Joint Commission for Verification and Surveillance and the Political Commission. The Commission for Verification and Surveillance was responsible for demobilisation and cessation of fire. Since it was a part of the CCPM, it was composed by the parties in conflict and Troika members as simple observers with no right of veto. Therefore, the demobilisation process was practically left in the hands of belligerents. At the end, UNITA did not comply with the demobilisation requirements, while the government kept investing in armament⁴³.

In order to control the disarmament process it was created the so-called “double-key system” which consisted in storing the weapons and one key was supposed to remain to the Angolan authorities and the other with the United Nations. This system would have facilitated the process of verification of disarmament, but unfortunately it was never implemented.

A new inter-sectoral body, the Inter-ministerial Office to Support the Demobilized Military of Angola (GIAMDA), was created with the aim of establishing a broad programme for reintegration of former combatants⁴⁴.

Another important outcome of the negotiations was the organisation of elections which were to be held in 1992. This provision was respected according to the initial timetable. As stated in a UN report, the process was “generally free and fair”, and in his report to the Security Council dated 9 September 1992, the Secretary-General remarked that the results of the registration exercise had surpassed expectations⁴⁵. During the campaign, Savimbi held violent speeches

⁴² Saferworld, Angola: “*Conflict Resolution and Peace-building*”, Report co-ordinated and edited by Simon Higdon, September 1996, p. 21

⁴³ João Gomes, Imogen Parsons, “*Sustaining the Peace in Angola. An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration*”, Published in Monograph no.83, April 2003

⁴⁴ Ibidem

⁴⁵ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
<http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm>

while on the other side, the MPLA used all the financial means to organise a good campaign that determined the population to prefer a “*voleur instead of an assassin*”⁴⁶. Since none of the candidates obtained the majority, a second round had been planned. But since UNITA rejected the results and went back to war, the second round of elections never took place.

Main challenges of the Bicesse Accords

Trying to identify what went wrong during the negotiation process or with the agreement itself, Margaret Anstee, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to Angola between 1991–1993 and Head of UNAVEM I, indicated the absence of resources, the short time of mandate⁴⁷ as the main problems that caused the failure of the mission and the new escalation of violence.

During the British-Angola Forum, a conference which was held in London on July 2005⁴⁸, Margaret Anstee summarized the reasons for the failure of the elections to prevent the resumption of war:

- The limitations of the terms of the Bicesse Accords, which set arbitrary and unrealistic deadlines, and did not specify preconditions for holding elections;
- The failure in advance of the elections to disarm the 200,000 men under arms;
- The ‘winner-takes-all’ system, exacerbated by the fact that Angola was still largely a centrally planned economy, so that ‘the state was the prize’, and there were no employment opportunities for the losers, and hence no incentive to lay down their arms;
- Lack of democratic traditions and institutions.

With regard to the challenges of the elections, the main conclusions of the conference referred to the lack of a census, a limited role of the UN in monitoring

⁴⁶ Jean-Marc Balencie, Arnaud de La Grange, “*Mondes rebelles. Acteurs, conflits et violence politique*”, Vol. 1, ed. Michalon, Paris, 1996

⁴⁷ Christine Messiant, „*MPLA et UNITA Processus de paix et logique de guerre*“, CEA-EHESS, Paris 1995, p. 41

⁴⁸ “*The Challenges for Free and Fair Elections in Angola*”, Conference Report, The Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, 4-5 July 2005

rather than supervising or administering the elections, short run-up times, long delays in government's decisions and again, the lack of resources⁴⁹. Apart from these challenges, there are other elements that contributed to the outcome of the process, such as the lack of a democratic culture from both the political parties that were not ready for power sharing and also from the citizens that were not prepared for the entire process.

In fact, one of the key issues was that the peace process was left in the hand of the belligerents. The agreement focuses narrowly on the transition period until the elections from political and military perspective, defining the tasks, duration, succession, roles and prerogatives of various national and international actors. But the major issue is being forgotten: even if the importance and the necessity of the participation of the other political forces and the society are being understood, there are no provisions that state clearly the conditions under which they may exercise these rights⁵⁰. From the point of view of the international organisations, the situation is different. The UN was in the position of accepting a mission with almost no resources and insufficient mandate and furthermore, being in a marginal position next to the former colonial power and two permanent members of the Security Council. Moreover, all three observers were far from being objective since they provided military support to one party or the other, and as C Messiant said: „*Les observateurs connaissent les observés et savent ce qui est en jeu*⁵¹“. (C. Messiant: 1995, p.43)

⁴⁹ Ibidem

⁵⁰ Christine Messiant, „*MPLA et UNITA Processus de paix et logique de guerre*“, CEA-EHESS, Paris 1995

⁵¹ Ibidem, p. 43

Lusaka Protocol. New improvements from Bicesse

The agreement was signed at a moment when UNITA rebels were in a weak position and wanted to stop its territorial losses⁵².

The Lusaka Protocol was signed by the Angolan government and UNITA (but not by Savimbi who refused to participate), on 20 November 1994 in Lusaka, Zambia and consisted of 10 annexes, each relating to a particular issue on the agenda of the peace talks, covering legal, military and political issues, while provisions on human rights were only mentioned in the protocol, without paying a special attention. The main military issues focused on the re-establishment of the ceasefire; the withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces; the disarming of civilians; and the completion of the formation of FAA (Angolan Armed Forces). The major political issues included the power sharing (participation of UNITA in the government and in the administration), neutrality of the national police and the integration of UNITA elements into its ranks; the mandate of the United Nations and the role of the observers of the Peace Accords; the completion of the electoral process; and the question of national reconciliation.

In fact, the Lusaka Protocol reaffirmed the Bicesse Accords and several UN resolutions setting forth the details of a cease-fire, a second round of presidential elections, demilitarisation, and the formation of a unified armed force and national police force⁵³.

A joint commission including the UN and Troika members was established and it had as main goal to investigate all the breaches of the agreement. In practice, the commission became a depositary for the human rights and military violation reports but there was little inclination by the UN to investigate or publicize these incidents⁵⁴.

The UN mission was further expanded and it was created UNAVEM III.

⁵² “*Angola Unravels, The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*”, Human Rights Watch Report, September 1999

⁵³ João Gomes, Imogen Parsons, “*Sustaining the Peace in Angola. An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration*”, Published in Monograph no.83, April 2003

⁵⁴ “*Angola Unravels, The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*”, Human Rights Watch Report, September 1999

The new peacekeeping mission had a two-year mandate which included a formal role in overseeing the demobilisation and integration of the armed forces, and responsibility for decreeing when the conditions were appropriate for elections to be held.

The cessation of fire was constantly violated but it was put on the account of unauthorised troops, or acts banditry.

Even if the agreement turned out to be another failure, the international community learned something from the failure of Bicesse Accords and tried to avoid doing the same mistakes. Therefore, the UN had a better and clearer mandate and more personnel were engaged in the whole process. In contrast to the Bicesse Accords when the UN's mandate was limited to verifying the implementation of the cease-fire, under the Lusaka Protocol the UN was more present in the whole process and it was reinforced. Furthermore, Lusaka protocol included a new form of power-sharing: the participation of UNITA in the government is guaranteed at least for a transition period after the loss in the elections in 1992. UNITA was supposed to be represented with four ministers, several posts of vice-ministers, one post of vice-president, several embassies etc. The power sharing involved as well a decentralisation of the administration and elections for the local representatives. Another step forward was not to set a precise date for the elections. The second round of the presidential elections would not take place until the political and material conditions would be fulfilled.

Regarding the demobilisation process, quartering⁵⁵ and reintegration of UNITA's troops failed after Bicesse Accords. Unfortunately, Lusaka process was also very slow and it involved few key UNITA troops, many in the camps being civilians⁵⁶. The demobilisation process and the creation of a common army were original. The first step was the integration of the military personnel from the two parties and then demobilised progressively strengths up to an army composed by 90 000 people. The objective was to limit the social risk of demobilised military

⁵⁵ Government and UNITA troops were to be disengaged and confined to specific assembly areas

⁵⁶ "Angola Unravels, The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process", Human Rights Watch Report, September 1999

that would leave the army without a minimum of professional re-orientation⁵⁷.

During the Bicesse Accords UN had a marginal role, while Troika members were practically involved in the whole peace process. There was no secret that these countries were far from being neutral, that rises the question of their impartiality since all the Troika countries influenced in a way or another the destiny of the country. Portugal, as former colonial power and on the other hand, USA and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council and important arms-suppliers for the parties in conflict, they both took advantage of the situation in their fight for hegemony during the cold war.

The international community had as well its contribution. It could also have brought its input to support the re-establishment of the peace in Angola, or in other words, as Christine Messiant emphasised in a critical article “*a situation of 'too many interests' among the 'real' international community*”⁵⁸.

The failure of Lusaka protocol was due to a number of reasons but the most important factor that brought Angola back to war was the mistrust and the lack of commitment to the Protocol from all the parties involved⁵⁹.

Luenta Memorandum and latest developments

Shortly after the death of the UNITA leader Savimbi, on 4 April 2002, the two parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cessation of hostilities, known under the name of Luenta Memorandum.

The main objectives as stated in the Memorandum include a commitment by the parties to a ceasefire, the resolution of military issues and, subsequently, the definitive resolution of the armed conflict.

The document also includes fundamental principles as: respect for the rule of law, the democratic institutions in Angola, the observance of the Constitutional Law and of other legislation in force. Another principle included the fulfilment of

⁵⁷ Jean-Marc Balencie, Arnaud de La Grange, “*Mondes rebelles. Acteurs, conflits et violence politique*”, Vol. 1, ed. Michalon, Paris, 1996

⁵⁸ Christine Messiant, „*Why did Bicesse and Lusaka fail? A critical analysis*“, article published on „Conciliation Ressources » website: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/bicesse-lusaka.php>

⁵⁹ Ibidem

the obligations that result from the Protocol and Security Council resolutions as legal and political instruments relevant to the peace process. The agreement also provides that the recognition that respect for democracy is essential for peace and national reconciliation.

The document details the responsibilities of FAA and UNITA forces for the observation of the ceasefire, collection and destruction of weapons. It was also created the “Joint Military Commission”, as responsible authority for the supervision of the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. The commission includes members of the FAA, UNITA military forces and military observers from the United Nations, United States, Russia and Portugal.

In the Report of the Secretary-General, presented to the Security Council on 26 June 2002, he mentioned that since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, fighting has stopped in the entire country and no violations of the ceasefire have been reported⁶⁰.

In the same report, there have been identified several challenges for the peace consolidation such as:

- the reintegration of former combatants (estimated to around 150.000)
- restoring rule of law and normalisation of state administration
- organisation of free and democratic elections, which needs an appropriate legal framework, voter registration, education, confidence-building and national reconciliation programme.

The death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002 and the collapse of UNITA led to a cease fire agreement in which the government recognised UNITA as a legitimate political movement. In April 2002, the UN Security Council authorised a new mission in Angola, this time to promote political reconciliation.

⁶⁰ Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Angola, S/2002/834, from 26 July 2002

2.4. Peacekeeping

UNAVEM I

Between 1989 and 1999, the Security Council established four peacekeeping missions.

The first mission - United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVM I) – was established in 1989 at the request of the Angolan and Cuban government and their mandate was to verify the complete withdrawal of Cuban troops from the Angolan territory, which ended in May 1991, one month before the deadline stated in the agreement. The Secretary-General observed that the *"success of UNAVEM again demonstrates what can be achieved by a United Nations peacekeeping operation when it receives the full cooperation of the parties concerned."*⁶¹

UNAVEM II

In 1991, through the resolution no. 696 (30 May 1991), UN Security Council adopted the mandate of UNAVEM II increasing the number of personnel involved from 70 (UNAVEM I) to around 400 soldiers and police forces⁶². Even though considerably increased, the number of people engaged in the operation was too small to ensure the success of the mission. The main tasks of the peacekeepers referred to the control and verification of the disengagement of forces and monitor the cease-fire, assist in the establishment of quartering areas, disarming of civilians, co-ordination and support of humanitarian activities, as well as participating in mine-clearance activities and finally, support and monitoring of the electoral process. In practice, UN observers were supposed to join mixed UNITA-MPLA teams in charge with the control of cessation of fire, help in finding a solution to prevent further escalation of violence. The

⁶¹ UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations website:
<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem1/unavemi.htm>

⁶² UN DPKO website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/Unavem2.htm>

peacekeepers were also in charge with the registration of arms and troops in the quartering areas. Created under the Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the mission did not have power to get too much involved in the peace process. It was mainly an observation mission as the previous one with limited financial and human resources.

UNAVEM II mandate had been several times expanded according to the latest developments, but not sufficiently enough so it could have become really efficient. For the first time, after almost twenty years of civil war, in September 1993, the Security Council voted the resolution 864 under Chapter VII of the Charter, imposing an embargo on arms and fuel for UNITA. Still, until the end of the mission, UNAVEM II was characterised by lack of resources and insufficient co-ordination⁶³.

The failure of UNAVEM II might be explained by at least three reasons. First of all, there is the low number of personnel involved. The choice regarding the form and the amplitude of UNAVEM II was influenced by the success of the mission in Namibia. But the number of people involved in Angola during the elections was ten times less than the one in Namibia and reporting it to the number of population, it means 1/150 in Namibia and 1/16 000 in Angola⁶⁴.

Secondly, the demobilisation of the troops did not take place according to the plan and to the provisions of the agreement.

Finally, there is the problem of conflict resolution through democratisation: free and fair elections placed under the control of an international organisation are not an easy means of conflict management as we might think. *In fragmented societies those who lose the elections tend to see it more as a total failure and not as just a loss of the elections. Resuming the war as Savimbi did, is not at all something unexpected and extravagant as it might seem to the Europeans*⁶⁵.

⁶³ Jean-Marc Balencie, Arnaud de La Grange, "Mondes rebelles. Acteurs, conflits et violence politique", Vol. 1, ed. Michalon, Paris, 1996

⁶⁴ Winrich Kühne, Guido Lenzi & Alvaro Vasconcelos „Gestion de crise et règlement des conflits en Afrique sub-saharienne: rôle de l'UE", Institute d'Études de Sécurité de l'UEO, 1996; chapitre: „Le maintien de la paix en Afrique – Angola, Mozambique, Somalie, Rwanda, Liberia – Leçons à tirer“ par Winrich Kühne

⁶⁵ Ibidem

UNAVEM III

After the failure of the second mandate of UNAVEM, on 8 February 1995, the Security Council created UNAVEM III through resolution no 976, after MPLA and UNITA signed Lusaka Protocol (20 November 1994). This time it seems that the UN learned from previous mistakes. Therefore, the UN forces were more important both as number (about 8000 people, both civilian and military personnel) and participation and the UNAVEM III mandate would be re-enforced. The peacekeeping troops would not be any more directly involved in the disarmament process of the UNITA troops.

2.5. External intervention

United States

After its independence in 1975, Angola became a tool in for the interests of the two superpowers during the Cold War. As a Marxist group - MPLA - gained the power, the United States decided to support any group that might challenge the Angolan political orientation.

Until early 1975, the United States had been a minor participant in Angolan affairs, providing assistance to the FNLA, whose leader, Holden Roberto, was the brother-in-law of the closest U. S. ally in the region, Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko. After Angola became independent, the United States started to raise its subsidy to the FNLA from \$100,000 annually to \$300,000⁶⁶. Only days after the January 15, 1975, following the signing of a peace agreement establishing a transitional power-sharing government and October elections, the C.I.A. intervened. It sent \$300.000 in cash to the FNLA, which most likely interpreted it as an indication of unconditional U.S. support. This payment was made without the knowledge of the U.S. Congress or the public⁶⁷. The FNLA used the money to finance an all-out

⁶⁶ Article available on Brooklyn College website
<http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/clark.htm>

⁶⁷ Sieste Bosgra, "Henry Kissinger and the Angola Saga", article available on International

military attack on the MPLA.

Since the FNLA did not prove to be strong enough, the American support was redirected towards UNITA. Therefore, the rebel group received financial means as well as political and military guidance from U.S. conservatives and it soon became the second largest recipient of covert aid from the U.S., after Afghanistan during the cold war.

The Cold War was over, but Angola still remained in the centre of attention for the big powers. It was one of the Clinton's administration's Africa priorities throughout the period of the Lusaka peace process. Human Rights Watch found evidence that the U.S. provided U.S. \$500 million dollars for humanitarian assistance and to strengthen democratic institutions and civil society in Angola, while providing a major market for Angola's oil. When U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Angola in December 1997, she said that Angola supplied the U.S. with up to 7 per cent of its oil imports, representing three times what Kuwait supplied just before the Iraqi invasion⁶⁸. Despite the fact that Reagan did not approve the Angolan marxist regime, it didn't stop him to invite Dos Santos to the White House, and in 1987, the American president invited as well Savimbi at the White House. Moreover, the big oil companies never stopped their businesses in Angola.

Russia

Russia has been one of the most important arms suppliers during the whole period of the civil war. The fact that it was one of the Troika members and consequently it was supposed to help the parties in conflict to find a solution that would finally bring peace to Angola, did not stop the Russian government to follow its economic interests by trading arms in Angola. Not even the embargo imposed in 1993 or the Lusaka Protocol and its provision regarding the so-called 'triple-zero' clause made Russia restrain from selling arms to Angola. According to Human Rights Watch report, in January 1996, Boris Kolokolov, the Russian

Campaign against Impunity website: <http://www.icaonline.org/76519,46136.html>

⁶⁸ "Angola Unravels, The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process", Human Rights Watch Report, September 1999.

vice-minister for foreign affairs visited Lisbon to explain that Russian weapons delivered to Angola were of a pure commercial nature⁶⁹. Moreover, at the beginning of 1998, Angola and Russian Federation signed a military co-operation agreement which provided technical assistance and the modernisation of the Angolan military equipment in Russia. The same report reveals that Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, signed an agreement in Luanda which included a five-year plan to build an arms factory in Angola, which would act as workshop for the whole region to update and repair Russian-manufactured military equipment. After the meeting in Angola, he openly declared to the media that it will be further established whether Russia would receive hard currency or diamonds in exchange for the weapons⁷⁰.

Portugal

Formal colonial power and currently Troika member, the Portuguese government did not hide its close cooperation especially in the military field with the government of Angola. According to a Human Rights Watch report, in 1998 Portuguese defence minister announced that he would assist in training Angolan military officers and would develop its military relationship further by carrying out multiple co-operation projects in Angola. On January 1999, after the war flared up again, the defence minister said that Portugal would continue its “technical military co-operation” with the government despite the renewed war⁷¹.

Apart from the Troika members, countries from all over the world sold weapons and military equipment in Angola without considering the embargoes imposed. Human Rights Watch provides a list with the countries that did not respect the embargo: Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Poland, South Africa, Czech Republic, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Ukraine, Zimbabwe.

⁶⁹ Ibidem, p.65

⁷⁰ Ibidem, p.66

⁷¹ Ibidem, p.65

South Africa influenced as well the development of the conflict as strong supporter of UNITA. South Africa did not hesitate to engage itself in direct confrontations with Angolan and Cuban troops on the territory of Angola. In the '80, at least four big confrontations took place: Operation Protea in 1981, Operation Askari in 1983, defence Mavinga in 1987 and Cuito Cuanavale attack in 1988⁷².

Zaire of Mobutu had always been a strong ally of UNITA that used Zaire's territory to launch attacks in the northern and eastern part of Angola. In exchange, Zaire benefited a lot from the diamond traffic that was mainly exported via Zaire.

2.6. Conclusion

As described above, the conflict in Angola was mainly about power and control. But there are also authors that classified it as essentially a “resource war” where the “protagonists” in control of specific resources empowers their military struggle and provides a sub-state economy able to sustain a long-term military campaign⁷³. Indeed, during the entire conflict there was a sort of delimitation and repartition of the natural resources between the two parties: MPLA had control over the oil resources and UNITA over diamonds. UNITA knew from the beginning that it could not profit from the oil resources, since it did not have neither the financial resources, nor the credibility to start a partnership with big oil companies.

In the light of the facts presented above, in the case of the Angolan civil war, the international community failed to find a solution that could bring the parties to peace and to spare the population of unnecessary suffering since the Angolan people were for more than two decades caught in the middle of the struggle for power.

The conflict in Angola is a very complex one and trying to go back in time

⁷² Jean-Marc Balencie, Arnaud de La Grange, “*Mondes rebelles. Acteurs, conflits et violence politique*”, Vol. 1, ed. Michalon, Paris, 1996

⁷³ Garth Shelton, „*Promoting Peace on a Troubled Continent*“, *Nouveaux Mondes*, no 10, Printemps 2002, p.25-45

and give a solution that could have been applied successfully is an utopia. What I will try to instead, is to summarise some of the drawbacks and mistakes made by the parties involved in a way or another in the conflict.

First of all, I think that the solution should come from the inside because without the political will of the two parties, the mediation and support coming from outside, as well intentioned as it might be, are useless. In all the attempts of bringing peace but especially in the case of Bicesse Accords and Lusaka Protocol, the implementation process started in an atmosphere of mistrust. Both parties had doubts that agreement would be respected by the other. And moreover, neither party rushed into put it into practice.

The provisions regarding disarmament were not respected either since the government on one side failed to disarm the civilian population and UNITA on the other side, did not hand over its military equipment as it was supposed to. One of the people who worked in one of UNITA bases declared during an interview of Human Rights Watch:

*“We spent much time replenishing our supplies. [...]We have fuel and weapons storage facilities in many secret locations. Few people know where they are [...]We never handed over any of our best equipment. Why? We needed it and if we didn't we could make money by selling it to traders. There are markets for our weapons in the Congos and South Africa.”*⁷⁴ (Human Rights Watch Report, September 1999, p.25)

At all the breaches of both agreements, the international community turned a blind eye. When arms embargo was finally imposed in 1993, neither UNITA nor the MPLA rushed in respecting it and neither the arms suppliers. And the sanctions did not come. The same situation was in the case of violations of human rights. All the observers and most important the UN were updated with the violations of human rights but they were not able to find the appropriate measures to stop it.

One of the reasons of the failure of the UN peacekeeping missions was the lack of resources. The countries that could afford to bring their contribution to the missions chose to stay aside and play a double role: on one hand continuing to

⁷⁴ “*Angola Unravels, The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*”, Human Rights Watch Report, September 1999, p.25

develop profitable business: arms against diamonds or big sums of money, and on the other hand, condemning the lack of will of the parties to be ready to negotiate and make compromise for the well being of the population who experienced a long and traumatised war.

Since it is difficult to find an answer to all this questions, the explanation given by C. Messiant is the most logical. *“In fact, for the US (with the consent of the two others), peace was not the first and only aim. The peace process was perceived more as a route for UNITA to come to power. This outcome, almost taken for granted, would be achieved with minor political and financial costs, thanks to the central role attributed to the Troika. That is mainly why the UN's mission was so marginal, and the means at its disposal so derisory⁷⁵.”*

⁷⁵ Christine Messiant, „Why did Bicesse and Lusaka fail? A critical analysis“, article published on „Conciliation Ressources“ website: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/bicesse-lusaka.php>

CHAPTER III.

THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA



Case study 2: Rwanda

3.1. Background and parties in conflict

Animosity between the "indigenous" people and the Tutsis goes back to the colonial period, when first the Germans and then the Belgians imposed their rules on Rwanda's territory. The colonial powers chose the Tutsi minority as a ruling class, considering them superior.

According to the scholars that did research on Rwandese population, there is not significant difference between the three different ethnics living in Rwanda. The division between ethnic groups dates from the colonisation period, when the Belgians gave the Rwandese people three different identities: Hutu, Tutsi and Twa favouring the Tutsi over Hutus and both over the Twa population and even more, ethnic identity cards were issued. Therefore, even though they were a minority, the Tutsis had better access to study, good positions in the administration, while the Catholic Church allowed only Tutsi to become priests. Shortly, the Tutsi population became the leading group, using any possible means to dominate the Hutu.

The organising principle for colonial rule was the racist Hamitic thesis stating that everything of value in Africa could be traced to Caucasian origin. Early anthropologists identified the Tutsi as Hamites; based on this classification, colonial administrators came to regard and promote the Tutsi as the intellectually superior, naturally aristocratic race⁷⁶.

⁷⁶ Joel Stettenheim, "Arusha Accord and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda"; chapter in: Greenberg, M. C., Barton, J. H., & McGuiness, M. E. (Eds.), Words over war:

The Tutsi, whose supremacy was reinforced, further believed they were born to dominate and lead others, while the Hutu, deprived of all political power and materially exploited by both the whites and the Tutsi, were told by everyone that they were inferiors who deserved their fate and who came to believe it⁷⁷.

During the Habyarimana regime, Rwanda experienced significant economic development. From 1976 to 1990, Rwanda moved from the bottom to the top of a per capita GNP ranking of regional countries. During the 1980s, the World Bank considered Rwanda a relative success. In 1987 its debt was 28 per cent of its GNP, one of the lowest rates in Africa. Although Rwanda's human rights record was still problematic, the situation was considered to be improving. Before 1990, no major ethnic violence had occurred during Habyarimana's regime, and, to some extent, he was favoured by the internal Tutsi⁷⁸.

In spite of the improving economic situation, the cleavages between the main ethnic groups erupted several times in 1959, 1963, and 1973⁷⁹ and again in 1990 a war that would lead to the genocide of 1994. The Tutsi people became the main victims of the repetitive cyclical massacres and in addition to the continual internal repression of both Tutsis and Hutus in various geographical locations (depending upon who wielded the power)⁸⁰. (See Annex II for further information related to the historical background of Rwanda)

The political crisis in Rwanda that led to the genocide broke out in October 1990, when the rebels of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded the country from their base in Uganda. Most of the people engaged in this operation were Rwandan

Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict, N.Y., 2002, p. 219

⁷⁷ Steve Utterwulge, „*Rwanda's Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategy*“, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Issue 2.3, August 1999

⁷⁸ Joel Stettenheim, „*Arusha Accord and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda*“; in Greenberg, M. C., Barton, J. H., & McGuiness, M. E. (Eds.), Words over war: Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict, N.Y., 2002, p. 221

⁷⁹ In 1959 a „Hutu“ revolution replaced the Tutsi monarch with an independent Hutu republic led by Kayibanda and southern Hutu political elites. In 1963 the Tutsi rebels based in Burundi organised an attack, which ended with a large number of victims among the Tutsis. In 1973, the coup led by Juvenal Habyarimana transferred power to northern Hutu

⁸⁰ Ami R. Mpungwe, „*Crisis and response in Rwanda. Refelections on the Arusha Peace Process*“, published in Monograph No. 36: „Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?“, April 1999, available on internet: <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No36/Contents.html>

refugees trained in Ugandan refugee camps having full support of the host country. Another part of the RPF is composed by Tutsi deserters from the Ugandan army. Their main aim was to change Habyarimana regime.

The attack comes in a context of changes in Rwanda. After the economic boom, there was a period of economic crises accentuated by the decreasing of the price of coffee on the international markets. Apart from this, Rwanda experienced also political changes, since under internal and external pressure, Habyarimana introduced the multi-party system.

But the trigger that led to the genocide was the death of the President Habyarimana in April 1994. Just the day after the crash of the president's plane the massacre began. Over 800,000 moderate Tutsis and Hutus were killed by the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and Interahamwe militiamen. The genocide resulted in an exodus of two million refugees, mainly to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania. The civil war and genocide ended on July 7, 1994, when the RPF seized power and the perpetrators of the genocide and Hutu refugees fled to DRC. A government of national unity was formed following the RPF's victory in 1994, although Paul Kagame effectively retained power⁸¹.

Joel Stettenheim identified several elements that determined the evolution of the civil war in Rwanda that led to the genocide. First, in the late 1950s, the struggle for power had become defined in ethnic terms. Second, the ascension of the first Hutu republic began a cycle in which power was transferred from one political elite to another in a zero-sum game of winner-takes-all. Third, the large Tutsi refugee population displaced by fighting and repression became the source of the RPF guerrilla army. Fourth, intra-Hutu tensions that developed during the first and second republics (1962–90), mainly between northern/western and southern groups, dominated Rwanda's multiparty democracy and then hobbled the government of Rwanda negotiating team during the Arusha Accord negotiations⁸²

⁸¹ Ibidem

⁸² Joel Stettenheim, "Arusha Accord and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda"; chapter in Greenberg, M. C., Barton, J. H., & McGuiness, M. E. (Eds.), Words over war: Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict, N.Y., 2002

3.2. Steps towards peace

N'Sele and Gbadolite cease-fire agreements

At the beginning of the civil war in 1990, the neighbouring countries reacted fast and decided to organise a summit at regional level in order to put immediately an end to the conflict. The initial objectives were to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict, starting with a cessation of the hostilities or a cease-fire agreement. At early talks, without considering Zaire's military involvement in Rwanda, Mobutu Sese Seko was chosen as a mediator.

Several rounds of regional summits⁸³ were held in this regard and eventually produce a cease-fire agreement (at N'Sele on 29 March 1991) which was later amended at Gbadolite on 16 September 1991. However, the cease-fire agreement was short-lived, as President Habyarimana, despite his political and diplomatic overtures, still believed in the military solution, and conflicting interests among regional and international players denied the agreement the total and genuine support that was imperative for its success⁸⁴.

The N'Sele Agreement only formalised the creation of Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) and developed the basis for future talks. The main changes at Gbadolite were the shift of the military leadership of the NMOG from Zaire to Nigeria and the mediation role to Tanzanian President Mwinyi.

⁸³ The first held in Mwanza, Tanzania, on 17 October 1990. Subsequent summits were held in Gbadolite, former Zaire (26 October 1990); Goma, former Zaire (20 November 1990); Zanzibar, Tanzania (17 February 1991); Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (19 February 1991), N'sele, former Zaire (29 March 1991), and again in Gbadolite, former Zaire (18 September 1991).

⁸⁴ Amy R. Mpungwe, "*Crises and Responses in Rwanda: Reflections on the Arusha Peace Process*", Published in Monograph no. 36, "Whither Peacekeeping in Africa", 1999, available on internet: <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No36/Contents.html>

Arusha Peace Accords

The Arusha Peace Accords are a tragic example of a negotiated agreement failing miserably in its implementation. Almost immediately following the signature of the Arusha Accords, Hutu extremists who felt left out of the process and threatened by the results organized a horrific massacre of Tutsi and Hutu moderates. Between 800,000 and one million people died between April and July 1994⁸⁵.

In reality, the talks were flawed because the Government of Rwanda was forced to negotiate not only with the RPF, but also with opposition members of its own party. This meant that while the RPF was disciplined and well organised, the government was fragmented. Ultimately the different levels of negotiating competence led to a final settlement that was essentially a victory for the RPF⁸⁶.

From the beginning, the negotiations were mediated by the OAU and Tanzania.

The most important objectives of the agreement were the creation of a broad-based transitional government (BBTG) together with establishing transitional institutions; deploying a neutral international force; withdrawing all foreign troops; integrating the gendarmerie; disarming, and demobilizing both parties; and protecting the expatriate community.

Position of the parties during negotiations. In order to understand the failure of the agreement one important is to know which was the position of the parties during the negotiations, as well as the perception about one another.

The RPF considered they were fighting for a right cause. During the negotiations, they insisted on the establishment of the rule of law together with the creation of a pluralistic society that guaranteed individual rights that are not based on ethnicity. Furthermore, they stressed the importance of a power-sharing arrangement that included a veto over essential government functions, an

⁸⁵ Joel Stettenheim, "Arusha Accord and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda"; chapter in: Greenberg, M. C., Barton, J. H., & McGuiness, M. E. (Eds.), Words over war: Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict, N.Y., 2002

⁸⁶ Ibidem

integration of the national army, and the right of return for refugees. Moreover, the RPF conditioned the cessation of fire to Habyarimana's withdrawal from the power in favour of an interim government⁸⁷.

The opposition leaders considered themselves the only capable of a real reform and they were very suspicious of the RPF. They feared the rebel force as a throwback to previous aristocratic Tutsi rule. At the beginning of July, just a few days before the end of the genocide, Paul Kagame, the RPF leader conditioned the cessation of fire and the establishment of the broad-based government stated in Arusha Accords. He demanded that no one would be blamed for the genocide and there will be no negotiations with the interim government.

The main characteristics of the RPF that led to their success at the negotiation table were their good organisation and unity. On the other side, Government's delegation was fragmented and disturbed by internal disputes.

The RPF were a disciplined and highly effective guerilla army. A former RPF official described the basis of the party's success at the table as fourfold: 1) they were highly motivated because they felt that they were fighting for a just cause, 2) their strong organization and discipline allowed them to speak unfailingly with one voice, 3) they were in a strong negotiating position because of their military successes, and 4) they were able to more effectively develop support among the observer group⁸⁸.

The government's delegation was composed of representatives from the MRND and the opposition parties, MDR, PSD, and PL, which were essentially negotiating the intra-Hutu power dynamics of a future government while at the same time trying to resolve issues with the RPF. The leader of the delegation, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira, an MDR member, commented that it was often more difficult to reach agreement within the government than with the RPF. Ngulinzira, an MDR member, commented that it was often more difficult to reach agreement within the Rwandese government than with the RPF.⁸⁹ This is why, during the negotiations, government's delegation did not have a coherent approach and

⁸⁷ Ibidem

⁸⁸ Ibidem, p. 225

⁸⁹ Ibidem p. 226

started the negotiations from an inferior position.

The opposition parties had in general lines the same objectives as the RPF. They were also for the removal of Habyarimana from the power and against the continuation of the war, but at the same time, they did not trust that the RPF would respect their commitment, especially regarding the power-sharing.

President Habyarimana had a duplicatory position between the moderates and extremists who did not consider reconciliation as an alternative. Several times during the negotiation he withdrew his support since he was not content with the new developments.

According to some of the observers, Habyarimana had no intention to respect the terms of the Accords and he expected the talks to break down and to blame the failure on his political opponents⁹⁰.

The most important outcomes of the negotiations are to be found in the Protocol. The principle of creation of the rule of law was one of the most important demands of the RPF. They focused on this particular aspect since they believed it was the main cause of the conflict and its correct implementation would be a major input for the restoration of peace.

The provisions related to the political aspects mainly referred to power sharing and the enlargement of the transition government including RPF members, but excluding and the CDR extremists. Furthermore, a new constitution would be drafted and approved by a referendum. Since the power was supposed to be transferred from the presidency to the parliament, the creation of a transition parliament was needed. Regarding the elections, they were to be organised at the end of the transition period.

One of the most sensitive issues during the negotiations was the creation of a national unified army. In this context, the highly debated issue referred to the proportion that each party would have in the new integrated army. The initial government's offer was to give 20 per cent to the RPF according to the per cent age of the population. RPF insisted on 50 per cent which was actually achieved. In addition, there was established a Joint Political Military Committee (JPMC)

⁹⁰ Ibidem

which was actually a forum that functioned in parallel with the Arusha talks in order to address military issues, especially cease-fire violations.

The agreement also recognized the importance of the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Main challenges of the Arusha Peace Accords

One of the main challenges in the implementation of the agreement was the involvement of the extremist, even though they were theoretically excluded. The definitely had no intention to comply as they did not believe in the reconciliation. They organised and trained local militia that had as target the Tutsis and the moderate Hutus. They were also responsible for the promotion of ethnicity based hatred through the national media. Some of the academic writing argues that the Arusha Accords broke a fundamental tenet of conflict resolution by failing to give the extremists a stake in the new government⁹¹. But on the other hand, giving to much power to a party that does not consider peaceful means to solve the conflict, it is also risky. What is clear is that no practical alternative had been found.

Most observers correctly saw Arusha as a political rather than a peace agreement⁹².

Steve Utterwulghe considers that Arusha was essentially a strategic solution of containment with limited vision⁹³; it was clearly the output of an elite and state-centric approach that did not take into consideration the real threat coming from the extremists.

⁹¹ Ibidem, p 234

⁹² Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “*National Intelligence Council Project on intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Rwanda*”, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC., 2001

⁹³ Steve Utterwulghe, „*Rwanda's Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategy*“, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Issue 2.3, August 1999

3.3. Peacekeeping

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda - UNOMUR

In June 1993, the Security Council passed resolution 846 authorizing a U.N. Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) which became operational in July. The mission was mandated for an initial period of six months with possibility of extension. Comprising approximately a hundred military and civilian personnel, its primary task was to ensure that no military assistance reached the Rwandan rebels—the Front Patriotique Rwandais—across the Uganda border⁹⁴.

The main tasks of the mission were patrolling, monitoring and surveillance of the whole border area between Uganda and Rwanda.

Since the situation in Rwanda became increasingly a matter of concern which UNOMUR's mandate could not face the new developments, the Security Council adopted resolution 872 in October 1993 authorizing a contingent consisting of some 2,500 military personnel known as the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)⁹⁵.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMIR I

At the beginning, the mission seemed to have a big chance to succeed. The Hutu led government and the Tutsi rivals asked the UN to establish a peacekeeping operation that would support the process of reconciliation⁹⁶. The initial objective of the mission was to monitor and support the implementation Arusha Accords. But the problems that were to appear were not anticipated in the due time.

According to the mandate, the mission was supposed to monitor the cease-fire agreement and the security situation and assist in the co-ordination of

⁹⁴ R.A. Dallaire, B. Poulin, “*UNAMIR Mission to Rwanda*”, published in “Joint Force Quarterly”, Washington DC. 1995

⁹⁵ Ibidem

⁹⁶ Facil Tesfaye Bedada, “*The 'Prostitution' of Peacekeeping: The Rwandan Experience*”, in: “Les opérations de paix: de Suez à Kandahar”, CEPES, no. 33, Québec, Février 2007

humanitarian assistance. Starting with April 1994, when the violence resumed, UNAMIR was adjusted so that it could act as an intermediary between the warring Rwandan parties.

The major aspects that the mission confronted with were the insufficient financial and human resources. The initial evaluation recommended 8000 or at least 5000 troops, but in the end, the agreement was on 2 458 troops of which 2 217 would be staff officers and troops and 331 military observers. Regarding the troops, another important aspect should be mentioned: Belgium was the only developed country that contributed with troops. Apart from Belgium, the rest of the military personnel came from developing countries with no equipment and insufficiently trained for such a complex mission.

Since there were not enough personnel, the mission could not assure the overall security in Rwanda, therefore the troops focused on Kigali in the attempt of creating a weapon-secure area in and around the capital city.

With the mandate given by the Security Council, the peacekeeping forces were practically in the position of assisting to the violence and incapable of reacting. The mandate was given under the provisions of the Chapter VI of the UN Charter and the personnel was supposed to contribute to the security of Kigali in co-operation with the local police. The problem was that the local police allied with Interahamwe⁹⁷, responsible for the killing during the genocide.

UNAMIR's modest mandate could not meet the flagrant distribution of arms to militias and civilians by roving Hutu death squads responding to the Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines⁹⁸ (RTLM) call to exterminate Tutsis⁹⁹. During the genocide, the radio was perceived as the voice of authority and therefore they had a significant contribution in promoting the massacres. Everybody who accused the Hutu extremists easily became a target of the RTLM. The broadcasting included even the names and a short description of the people that "deserved to be murdered". On the list there was the general in command of

⁹⁷ Interahamwe (those who attack together) – militant anti Tutsi group attached to the young wing of the ruling MRND party; the group was responsible for the killing during the genocide

⁹⁸ Radio station that used to broadcast between 8 July 1993 and 31 July 1994. It received some financial support from French services

⁹⁹ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *"National Intelligence Council Project on intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Rwanda"*, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC., 2001

the peacekeeping operation and also members of Médecins sans Frontières that made strong accusation to the extremists.

Co-ordination problems between the civilian and military staff started from the beginning of the mission. First of all, there was a delay in establishing an office for the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh. Therefore, the civilian staff was also subordinated for a while to the military command. After the creation of the civilian administration, the military became subordinated to it and did not have any control on the financial resources¹⁰⁰.

On 5 April 1994, the Security Council resolution 909 extended UNAMIR's mandate until 29 July 1994. But after the withdrawal of the Belgian¹⁰¹ and Bangladesh contingents, the Security Council voted on the reduction of UNAMIR forces with 270 people¹⁰², which made the continuation of the operation almost impossible.

General Dallaire, the general in command of the UN mission in Rwanda underlined the problem of political will: „*The United Nations wanted to send me more troops, but the sovereign states made sovereign decisions not to do so*“¹⁰³.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMIR II

UNAMIR II started its mandate in May 1994 in a moment when the genocide seemed to be almost impossible to be stopped and when the capital city was split between the government and RPF.

UNAMIR II was created through UN Security Council Resolution 891 (1993). As main tasks, the mission was mandated to provide safe conditions for displaced persons and to help with the provision of assistance by humanitarian organizations.

Even in the light of the latest events, the Security Council still did not

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem

¹⁰¹ Following the death of ten national soldiers, Belgium decided to withdraw the troops.

¹⁰² The reduction of UNAMIR personnel was made following a decision of the Security Council dated 21 April 1994 (Facil Tesfaye Bedada, 2007)

¹⁰³ Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, „*Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*“, Carroll & Graf Publishers, N.Y., 2004, p. 208

authorize an enforcement action according to the Chapter VII of the Charter. Therefore, the mission remained mostly humanitarian. The peacekeepers were allowed to use force only in case of self defence.

Since no Western country was willing to contribute with troops, a compromise solution had been found: African countries would provide the military personnel, while some European countries, together with India and United States would provide logistical and financial support to the new mission. The troops that finally were deployed in Rwanda after long delays were not equipped and the mission had to wait for the resources that did not arrive in time either. At the same time, the massacre continued under the eyes of helpless peacekeepers.

In October 1994 all the troops and equipment finally arrived. But it was unfortunately too late because by that time, the RPF controlled the entire territory and the genocide had ended.

By March 1996 when UNAMIR finished its mandate, the total expenses raised up to some 453,9 million US dollars and the lives of 27 of its personnel¹⁰⁴.

Operation Turquoise

On 21st of June the UN Security Council mandated another operation, at the request of French government and this time under Chapter VII of the Charter, to intervene in Rwanda. The mandate was given through the Resolution no 929, and it was to be composed by a coalition of troops under French command.

The two operations – UNAMIR II and Turquoise – were not created to work in parallel. Therefore, UNAMIR was supposed to withdraw progressively and to allow Turquoise to operate independently. The mission was meant to last no more than 60 days and UNAMIR was supposed to be deployed by then. Moreover, UNAMIR was not supposed to communicate and provide information to the troops from Turquoise operation before their deployment in Rwanda.

¹⁰⁴ Connaughton: 2001 cited in: Facil Tesfaye Bedada, “*The 'Prostitution' of Peacekeeping: The Rwandan Experience*”, in: “Les opérations de paix: de Suez à Kandahar”, CEPES, no. 33, Québec, Février 2007

The troops under the French command landed in Zaire even before the adoption of the resolution, which proves that when there is a political will, resources, troops and equipment are not such a big problem as some politicians tried to explain. Operation Turquoise comprised 2.500 military personnel well trained and fully equipped. The team was very well co-ordinated and the members of the team worked together for a long time. In addition, they were all familiar with the African conflicts.

Even if they established a humanitarian protection zone in south-western Rwanda, Operation Turquoise had no solid humanitarian plan and moreover they were too aggressive for a humanitarian intervention¹⁰⁵. Apart from that, in Rwanda, everybody rejected it. The RPF rejected the idea of a French intervention, but apparently only publicly. In fact, they co-operated better with them than with UNAMIR. The explanation resides in the fact that the RPF was not happy with gaining only a part of the territory, but they wanted the whole control and an unstable situation could be favourable for them¹⁰⁶.

Operation Turquoise was a French initiative. France was trying to intervene in Rwanda, but not contributing with troops to the multinational forces. Since everybody in Rwanda was against such a direct intervention, they had to find an acceptable solution for the parties. Therefore, they addressed to the Security Council to adopt a resolution that would allow entering the country. UNAMIR command understood the danger of this operation. That would mean undermining UNAMIR's efforts in restoring the peace. Burundi and Uganda opposed the operation as well. They denied French troops' transit on their territory. Initially, the OAU was against the operation, but it finally agreed under the pressure of Franco-African states. At the same time, the DPKO was under a lot of pressure from the countries who already sent troops for UNAMIR.

One of the critics and the paradox of the operation was that some of the officers involved used to be military advisers of the RGF before the war started. Therefore, UNAMIR peacekeepers were afraid that the French intervention would

¹⁰⁵ Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, *"Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda"*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, N.Y., 2004

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem

undermine their mission. The troops were immediately ready to be deployed and the mission could have had started even before the Security Council mandate.

But why did France insist in organising the operation? Starting with the '70s, France showed interest in the former Belgium colony and until the beginning of the civil war, the two countries signed several military co-operation agreements that mainly provided training and equipment for the government's army. In addition, the two presidents had friendly relations:

"I had been told that the Habyarimana family had close ties to President Mitterand: one of his sons had serious business interests inside Rwanda"¹⁰⁷. (Dellaire: 2004, p. 450)

3.4. Reaction of the international community and failure of Arusha Accords

External intervention

The failure of the implementation of Arusha Accords should be put together with the failure of the UN mission and with the failure of the international community to respond to the needs of the mission, as all these elements are interdependent and could have made a difference and avoid the disaster.

The international community's inaction at the time of the genocide still receives strong criticism from Rwandan authorities and not only. In 1999, the United Nations acknowledged its responsibility, owing to "incomprehensible caution" stemming from the absence of resources and "political will." On December 23, 2003, the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution, which proclaimed April 7, 2004 "International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda"¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem op.cit. p.450

¹⁰⁸ Canadian ministry of foreign affairs - http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/africa/rwanda_background-en.asp)

Belgium

At the outburst of the conflict in 1990, Belgium together with France and Zaire, were the first to send troops to support Habyarimana's regime. But as the conflict further developed, they decided to withdraw the troops, invoking neutrality. Belgium was the only developed country that sent troops to compose UNAMIR. But unfortunately, after the death of ten Belgium soldiers, the entire contingent was completely withdrawal.

France

During the conflict, France led a dual policy supporting Habyarimana government militarily on the one hand and promoting at the same time a negotiated settlement.

France did not limit its involvement to the military support given to the government. France was one of the destinations of the influential extremist leaders: „*Many powerful members of the extremist regime were alive and well in France and even in Belgium*“¹⁰⁹.

By propping up the government with military and economic aid, France encouraged intransigence on the part of the government and provided a shield behind which the extremists were able to develop their desperate plan. The counterargument, however, is that the positions taken by France and the Rwandese government would have ultimately proved to be more sustainable¹¹⁰.

It is crucial not to forget the important contribution that French troops had during the so-called „Operation Turquoise“ which was authorised by the Security Council and was meant to support temporarily UNAMIR II. The French reinforcement came in a time when they were mostly needed. The peacekeeping mission was still waiting for resources, equipment and troops and the massacres did not cease in intensity.

Operation Turquoise has been criticized for granting refuge to Hutu

¹⁰⁹ Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, „*Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*“, Carroll & Graf Publishers, N.Y., 2004, p.394

¹¹⁰ Joel Stettenheim, „*Arusha Accord and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda*“; in Greenberg, M. C., Barton, J. H., & McGuinness, M. E. (Eds.), *Words over war: Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict*, N.Y., 2002, p. 228

perpetrators of genocide and facilitating their safe exit into Zaire with their arms intact. In addition, French forces never made any effort to stop the inflammatory broadcasts by the defeated government from its security zones. These criticisms reflect the long-standing tensions between the RPF and France¹¹¹, but they diminish the extraordinary humanitarian efforts of saving lives and managing a difficult situation¹¹².

United States

During the first peace talks, the United States did not play a major role. Since the negotiations were far from reaching some conclusions, United States offered some technical assistance, encouraging further talks.

In the Arusha process United States did not play a major role either. One explanation could be the lack of interest in the region. Another explanation is that between 1992 and 1993 US were contributing to peacekeeping missions in other locations. Moreover, two days before the Security Council meeting on UNAMIR, 18 American soldiers had been killed in Somalia. The death of the soldiers was followed by a presidential decision that limited the costs and the risks of the peacekeeping. The low level of US involvement however, had negative consequences, since US officials were repeatedly asked for support by providing equipment and technical assistance¹¹³.

One good example of the American cinism was very well described in the book written by Lt. Gen. Roméo Dellaire, the general in command of the UN mission in Rwanda:

„Madeleine Albright, the US permanent representative to the UN and Sir David Hannay, her British counterpart, had for some time resisted the use of term „genocide“ in UN debates, but now that their objections had been swamped in a deluge of factual reports out of

¹¹¹ France has been always seen by RPF as an ally of the government. The presence of French troops was perceived as a try to reinforce and support the government.

¹¹² Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “National Intelligence Council Project on intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Rwanda”, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC., 2001

¹¹³ Joel Stettenheim, “Arusha Accord and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda”; in Greenberg, M. C., Barton, J. H., & McGuinness, M. E. (Eds.), Words over war: Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict, N.Y., 2002

Rwanda, the United States fell back on the argument that African security problems should be solved by African troops¹¹⁴.” (Dellaire: 2004, p.374)

But none of the countries that were willing to contribute did not have the capacity to deploy and sustain their forces without help.

„The United States and the United Kingdom committed other acts of sabotage on deployment to Rwanda. For instance, I had long been arguing with New York that the RTLM had to be shut down as it was a direct instrument in promoting genocide. The UN did not have the means to stop the broadcasts, either through jamming, a direct air strike on the transmitter, or covert operations, but it made a formal request of the United States, which had the means to try all three. The issue was studied by Pentagon, which in due course recommended against conducting the operation because of the cost - \$8.500 an hour for a jamming aircraft over the country – and the legal dilemma. [...] Pentagon judged that the lives of the estimated 8.000 – 10.000 Rwandans being killed each day in the genocide were not worth the cost of the fuel or the violation of Rwandan airwaves¹¹⁵“.(Dellaire: 2004, p.375)

Tanzania

In undertaking and sustaining the year-long negotiations, Tanzania was motivated by the mutually compatible goals of humanitarian concern, self-interest in resolving the long-standing refugee problem, and the promotion of regional stability through the development of a sustainable Rwandan government¹¹⁶. During the negotiation process they remained neutral and president Mpungwe was a good mediator and liaison between the parties and international community.

¹¹⁴ Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, *“Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda”*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, N.Y., 2004, p. 374

¹¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 375

¹¹⁶ Joel Stettenheim, *“Arusha Accord and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda”*; chapter in Greenberg, M. C., Barton, J. H., & McGuiness, M. E. (Eds.), *Words over war: Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict*, N.Y., 2002, p. 227

3.5. Conclusions

The civil war in Rwanda that ultimately led the genocide that massacred hundred thousands innocent people had a constructed ethnicity as main root cause, cumulated with poverty, increasing population and struggle for power. I believe that the issue related to ethnicity is an artificially created one that dates from the colonization period. It was in fact an issue of constructed ethnicity since it was the colonial power that issued identity cards and chooses the ones who 'deserve' to be leaders.

The attempts of bringing peace at the negotiation table failed. Several countries failed as mediators. At regional level, the OAU had the political will to find a viable solution to restore peace and security, but the lack of resources and the poor co-ordination between OAU and UN, prevented it to achieve its goal. So the ultimate solution was left in the hands of the UN and international community.

Unfortunately, the peacekeeping mission was not efficient either. As described above, they did not have the mandate, financial, logistical or human resources to be able to face the disaster in Rwanda. The mandate allowed them to engage only by providing humanitarian assistance. And they managed to save many lives. But they could have saved much more and prevent the massacre with the willingness of the international community.

It is true that during 1992 – 1993 the UN had to respond to other international crises. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that Rwanda is a small country with no significant geostrategic importance¹¹⁷ and therefore, the governments that could afford to support the mission either financially or by deploying troops or sending equipment did not react in time.

In January 1995, the RPF described UNAMIR as "costly, useless, and undisciplined." As the RPF looked for bilateral military support to boost its security needs, it perceived UNAMIR II as an impediment; moreover, since humanitarian agencies were performing the humanitarian functions of UNAMIR II, the RPF saw the latter role as superfluous¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁷ Colette Braeckman, Rwanda. « *Histoire d'un génocide* », Fayard, 1994

¹¹⁸ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "National Intelligence Council Project on intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Rwanda", The Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC., 2001

In addition to all these, the media campaign organised by the RTLM incited hatred and fear especially among Hutu population. Their rhetoric opposed directly to Arusha Accords and to peacekeeping operations. The international community failed again in finding a solution to stop the promotion of the genocide invoking financial problems and the principle of non-intervention in another country's internal affairs.

LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

4.1 Where the theory does not have all the answers

Scholars have tried to compare different peacekeeping operations and to understand why some of them fail, while others are successful. They all arrived to the same conclusion: it is difficult to make such comparison since the context of their deployment is always different.

As presented in the Chapter 1 of this paper, Birger Heldt statistically tested fourteen hypotheses.

Following his research, Heldt concluded that a successful peacekeeping operation has the following characteristics: it is sent to cases where peace has been established or when war has not yet broken out, or is deployed early after the outbreak of civil war; the host state is democratic, ethnically polarized, and very poor; the mission has been deployed for a considerable period of time; and the chief executive is not from the region of the conflict.

The nature of the conflict

Heldt further states that the sources of war are much more important in evaluation of the peacekeeping mission's success than peacekeeping characteristics themselves. Indeed, the causes and intensity of the conflict may influence the termination of war, but I believe that a mission that is adapted to the nature of the conflict might be successful. One wrong thing to do is to assume from the very beginning that there is no solution to put an end to the violence. There are no two identical operations as there are no identical contexts. Therefore, the mission should be adapted to the given circumstances. In the case of Rwanda both the troops and even UNAMIR leadership were not prepared to face the genocide. The Canadian General Romeo Dallaire who was mandated to lead UNAMIR mission from October 1993 until August 1994, used to train Canadian peacekeepers, but he had never been on the field within a peacekeeping mission.

Moreover, he was not a specialist in African conflicts or in ethnic ones. In the case of Angola, everybody trusted in the success of the operation. Everybody was euphoric about the recent success in Namibia and they didn't take into account the fact that the context is different, the nature of the country or even that the country is bigger and more personnel would be needed. These arguments can be concluded through two of the hypothesis that are to be found in the first chapter of this paper that state that *“Peacekeeping operations are usually not successful when they are mandated and deployed according to a fixed framework”* and “peacekeeping operations are more likely to be successful when they are adapted to the conflict's profile.

In the same context related to the nature of the conflict, Heldt believes that peacekeeping missions are more likely to become successful in conflicts over government than over territory. This argument cannot be related to the case studies. Both conflicts were related to access to power, so more over government and not over territory.

Context and conditions

Heldt argues that peacekeeping operations are more likely to be successful when the host country is democratic, has either a low or a high level of ethnic fragmentation, has a high GDP per capita, and when the period preceding the conflict was characterised by peace. It is difficult to analyse this approach throughout the two study cases. Both in Angola and Rwanda we cannot talk about democracy. They are both poor countries with a very low GDP per capita, while the period preceding the conflicts cannot be characterised by peace. Moreover, I don't think that these elements related to the context and the conditions of the conflict are decisive for the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation. As mentioned above, I think that the mission should be evaluated the context of deployment and adapt it to the conditions in the field.

Mistrust among parties in conflict

Birger Heldt, assumes that peacekeepers may refrain insincere parties from restarting conflicts. Therefore, peacekeeping missions are believed to contribute

to peace by decreasing distrust among parties, and by increasing the cost of defection from agreements¹¹⁹.

One of the common problems of the two conflicts analysed above it is for sure the mistrust among the parties both in Angola and Rwanda. UNITA did not trust that the MPLA would disarm and therefore they did not consider disarming as an option either. In the case of Rwanda, the opposition parties in the government did not trust that the RPF would respect their commitment regarding power sharing, while president Habyarimana had indeed no intention to respect the agreement. The logic behind this was that he was sure that the RPF would fail in respecting its obligations and he can easily blame them for the failure of re-establishing peace. Moreover, in Rwanda, the parties did not believe in the impartiality of the peacekeepers either, while in Angola the parties did not believe in UN capacity to bring stability.

This is usually one of the major problems that the mediator is confronted with in almost all violent conflicts. In other words, each party agrees to comply with the provisions of an agreement under the condition that the other respects its obligations first. And depending on the characteristics of the conflict, this can undermine the entire peace process. This is why one of the key roles of the peacekeeping operations is to respond to this question: how to establish trust between the parties?

Diehl and Fortna¹²⁰ argue that monitoring compliance with agreements, mutual trust among warring parties is created. Monitoring is indeed one of the functions of a peacekeeping mission but I believe that this argument is not strong enough to consider it a key element that leads to the establishment of confidence among parties. In Angola the peacekeepers had to monitor the demobilisation process and they could not do anything about breaches in the agreement because of a weak mandate. In practice, the mediators in the case of Angola were mainly the Troika members and the UN had the observer's role. Moreover, the parties

¹¹⁹ Birger Heldt, *“Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions”*, National Defence College of Sweden, Department of Operational Studies, Stockholm, 2001

¹²⁰ Diehl 1987, Fortna 2000 cited in: Birger Heldt, *“Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions”*, National Defence College of Sweden, Department of Operational Studies, Stockholm, 2001

understood the weak role of the organisation and they did not believe that a viable solution would be found in the near future. In the case of Rwanda the situation was even worse. The peacekeepers became a target of the RTLM and soon their credibility fell apart.

A better argument is the one given by Patrick Regan and Aysegul Aydin that it is more about the manipulation of the information by the third party. Regan and Aydin explain that third parties should influence the information and facilitate the communication between the belligerents.

“The outside mediators can help the adversaries communicate sincerely to learn about each other and solve their differences with non-violent means¹²¹”. (Regan; Aydin: 2006, p. 740)

The moment when the parties should start to compromise is the most difficult. Therefore, the mediator should find issues that can be negotiable for both sides. They have to develop mutual understanding; they may communicate to the other side, what are the adversary's demands. When this communication stops, a crisis in the mediation process is inevitable. This proves the hypothesis that is to be found in chapter 1 according to which, *“the mediation process cannot be successful when there is no trust among the parties and when the parties don't trust the mediator”*.

The question impartiality

Diehl and Johansen argue that peacekeeping is most likely to succeed when peacekeeping forces maintain neutrality, have the consent of the warring parties, only intervene in interstate conflicts, are lightly armed, and use their weapons in self-defence only¹²².

Regarding neutrality and the consent of the warring parties, these are two of the main characteristics of the peacekeeping operations. Furthermore,

¹²¹ Patrick M. Regan, Aysegul Aydin, *“Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars”*, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, no. 5, October 2006, Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, New York

¹²² Birger Heldt, *“Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions”*, National Defence College of Sweden, Department of Operational Studies, Stockholm, 2001

according to international law, the host country should give its consent for the deployment of peacekeeping troops on its territory; otherwise, it would mean a violation of the sovereignty of the respective country. In the case of Rwanda, the neutrality of peacekeepers had been seriously contested and the UN impartiality had been doubted by both sides. It is though very difficult to try to mediate when the mediator itself is not trusted as argued before.

Intervention of third parties

In both cases, third countries participated or influenced the evolution of the conflict in a way or another. The question is why do they intervene? And more important is the question whether their intervention can actually bring peace. The answer to the last question: it depends on the third country's national interest.

The first reason that determines parties to mediate a conflict according to Zartman is self-interest. Zartman makes the distinction between defensive and offensive interests of the third party involved in the mediation.

“Defensive interests include promoting international stability, and protecting the mediating nation's foreign interests. Often nations will attempt to mediate a conflict in order to prevent rival powers from intervening and expanding their influence. States may also fear being drawn into the escalating conflict. When motivated by defensive interests, mediators often have some stake in achieving particular outcomes. When acting on the offense, states mediate conflicts in order to extend and increase their own influence. For instance, successful mediation may earn the gratitude of other nations. In such cases states usually have less interest in the content of the settlement.”¹²³. (Zartman; Touval: 1996, p. 446)

He also makes the distinction between the interests of big powers, less powerful countries and international organisations. Therefore, as quoted above, the big powers are mainly interested in gaining more influence and promote their foreign policy. Small countries' interest is to avoid being drawn in the conflict. As for the international organisations, they are influenced by the interests of the

¹²³ I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, *"International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era"*, published in: *"Managing Global Chaos"*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, p.446

member states.

As for the motivation of the parties, it mainly resides in the pressure of the international community, or when they think that outcome of the mediation will be more favourable than if they would decide to continue the conflict.

Indeed, all the ideas presented by Zartman can be applied to the two study cases. In both cases, the mediators' interest or lack of interest as it was the case of Rwanda can be easily identified. On the one hand, in Angola all of the countries involved in the peace process were motivated - especially after the cold war by commercial purposes. During the cold war, Angola was in the middle of the struggle for spheres of influence of the two superpowers, without putting aside the economic dimension. The countries involved in the conflict in Angola understood the great potential of the country's natural resources. And the fact that they were supposed to keep their neutrality, it didn't stop them to sell weapons in exchange to oil or diamonds. In Rwanda on the other hand, the big powers did not have an interest in a small country of no geostrategic importance. Therefore they decided that it was not profitable to support financially or logistical the mission. As for the United Nations, the decision was to be taken in the Security Council which was in fact the position of the member states.

Dellaire considers that one of the reasons for the failure of Arusha Accords was the no-reaction of the international community. He blames especially France and United States:

"I truly believe the missing piece in the puzzle was the political will from France and United States to make the Arusha accords work and ultimately move this imploding nation toward democracy and a lasting peace. There is no doubt that those two countries possessed the solution to the Rwandan crisis. [...] France moved in too late and ended up protecting the génocidaires and permanently destabilising the region, and the U.S. government [...] actively worked against an effective UNAMIR and only got involved to aid the same Hutu refugee population and the génocidaires, leaving the genocide survivors to flounder and suffer¹²⁴". (Dellaire: 2004, p. 514-515)

¹²⁴ Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, *"Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda"*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, N.Y., 2004, p. 514 -515

All the above mentioned arguments may lead us to the conclusion that third parties are willing to intervene for ending an armed conflict when they have a particular interest. Following this logic, we might assume that when the third party's interest can be linked to the war termination, the peace process might be successful. This argument leads us to the other hypothesis formulated in the first chapter, according to which, *“in order for the mediation process to be successful, the third party should abstain in pursuing its national interest”*.

Mandate, use of force and other conditions

Another of Heldt's findings is related to the mandate of the mission. According to his statistics the mandate has no influence on the outcome of the mission. In practice, as we could see in both case studies, the mandate had a crucial impact and one of the reasons that led to the failures was the lack of a clear and updated mandate according to both the needs of the operation and to the latest developments of the conflict. Though, Heldt analysed the characteristics from the statistical point of view, which does not always reflect the reality.

While Heldt statistically proved that the mandate has no influence on the operation, Chinchilla argues that *“failures could be the result of imprecise mandates”*¹²⁵. A more complex perspective related to the success of the peacekeeping operations is given by Urquhart who argues that success depends on: viable and supportive political context, feasibility of the mandate, quality of the command, military discipline of the troops, and co-operation from the parties. In addition, Malaquias mentions the importance of adequate resources. Bratt mentions comprehensive settlement agreement as an important element for the success of a peacekeeping mission and he argues for the limitation of the use of force.

Indeed, all the above elements have an influence on the evolution of the operation. Regarding the issue on the limitation of the use of force, there are some cases when enforcement is required. In the case of Rwanda for example, peacekeepers asked for the reinforcement of the mandate in order to be able to

¹²⁵ Fernando A. Chinchilla, *“Deterrence, Protective and Preventive International Interventions in Civil War Contexts”*, University of Montreal, London (Ontario), 2005

react in critical situations. They were unable to control the violence under a Chapter VI mandate. Several times they were in the position of assisting – unarmed – at the massacres and they were incapable of reacting. I think that under certain conditions enforcement is required, otherwise, the mission cannot be efficient.

4.2. UN Peacekeeping. Past, Present and Future

The UN defines peacekeeping as "an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict." As already mentioned in the first chapter, there are no clear legal provisions in the UN charter related to such operations, so the operations mainly developed through precedent. Also known under the name of "Chapter six and a half" or "grey area"¹²⁶ where there is no peace to be kept", peacekeeping operations have occupied an ambiguous place between the diplomats and the democracy¹²⁷.

Some say that UN peacekeeping operations before the collapse of the bipolar system were in general efficient. One of the explanations resides in the nature of the operations and also in the capacity of the two superpowers to put pressure on belligerent parties, according to the spheres of influence. The traditional peacekeeping operations were relatively small involving not too much personnel. They had usually an interposition nature, focusing mainly on supervising a truce or a ceasefire agreement. The operations could not have been designed as having too ambitious objectives, since everything depended on the attitude of the two superpowers. Both Soviet Union and U.S. had a veto in the Security Council as permanent members, and the idea was to find a solution that would be acceptable for both. Moreover, USSR was not too much in favour of the idea of peacekeeping operations. As a result, most of troop contributors were small non-aligned countries and in general poor and therefore, UN did not dispose

¹²⁶ Connaughton 2001 cited in Facil Tesfaye Bedada, 2007

¹²⁷ Emel Osmançavuşoğlu, "Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping operations in the Post-Cold War era", Journal of International Affairs, No. 4, Vol. IV, December 1999 – February 2000

of adequate forces and could not afford expensive mandates. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, led to new changes in the nature of the conflicts and new threats emerged. Now peacekeepers have to confront mainly with intra-states conflicts: collapse of regimes, internal political struggle or ethnic based disputes. Together with the changes that occurred in the nature of the conflicts, peacekeeping operations changed progressively both in numbers and nature. Of the 55 major UN peacekeeping operations initiated since 1945, nearly four fifths, or 41 have begun since the end of the Cold War. The new generation of peacekeeping operations include political and humanitarian work such as the supervision of elections, verification of human rights practices or the delivery of humanitarian relief. To face all these challenges more personnel – both civilian and military - is needed.

Before, for a successful operation the co-operation and support of the parties was essential. Nowadays, UN has been acting without the clear consent of the parties to the conflict¹²⁸. Even the the three traditional principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force became inadequate as the UN faced internal conflicts and confronted hostile and heavily armed internal factions¹²⁹. The deployment conditions of the peacekeepers are also different nowadays and comparing to the traditional operations, the risks for both military and civilian personnel is higher (see fig. 4 and fig. 5). This is also one of the reasons why the contributing countries refuse to send troops in conflict areas – they don't want to endanger the lives of their citizens.


¹²⁸ Ibidem

¹²⁹ Panel Discussion, 50 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Headquarters, 11 June 1998, UN website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/50web/5.htm>


Figure 4

**Total fatalities in peace-keeping operations,
1988-1995**

Military, civilian police and observers




Local and United Nations staff



Source: UN DKPO <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko>

Figure 5



Source: UN DKPO <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko>

All the aspects related to UN capacity to deal with security matters – that was in fact the reason for its creation - are subjects of all reform proposals. The Brahimi report focuses on the role of peacekeeping in promoting human security. First of all the peacekeepers should be credible and in order to be credible, the time factor is crucial as *“the first six to twelve weeks following a ceasefire or a peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers¹³⁰.”* The report includes proposals of co-operation among states in order to create *“several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping*

¹³⁰ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809, August 2000; website: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

operations¹³¹”. In order to avoid the deployment of untrained and unequipped troops, the contributing countries should fulfil concrete requirements. Since many operations could not respect the time line and were not able to fulfil its tasks due to the lack/insufficient resources, the report mentions as well logistic aspects. Therefore, DPKO should always have at its disposal a special budget and other resources that might be used to respond to a crisis situation. The UN should be able to deploy 5.000 troops as a brigade formation that has common training common doctrine and common standards¹³².

Traditionally, peacekeepers were lightly armed and had the right to use the force only in cases of self-defence. In some cases they should be capable to protect civilian population. One of the major questions that are being posed is whether peacekeeping operations should become enforcement operations and the mandates should include the use of force in determined conditions.

4.3. Failures and responsibility

“Some say that the example of Rwanda proves that the UN is an irrelevant, corrupt, decadent institution that has outlived usefulness or even its ability to conduct conflict resolution. Others have blamed the Permanent Five of the Security Council, especially the United States and France, for failing to see beyond their own national self-interest to lead or even support international intervention to stop the genocide. Some have blamed the media for not telling the story, the NGOs for not reacting quickly and effectively enough, the peacekeepers for not showing more resolve¹³³” [...]
(Dallaire: 2004, p. 512)

The above-mentioned remark may be applied in the case of Angola as well. The international community watched passively a war that lasted for more than twenty years, incapable of finding a solution to bring it to an end. They done even more than that: they helped the parties continuing the war by providing them

¹³¹ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809, August 2000; website: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

¹³² Sorpong Peou, “The UN, Peacekeeping and Collective Human Security: From An Agenda for Peace to the Brahimi Report”, International Peacekeeping no. 9, Summer 2002/S.51-68

¹³³ Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, “Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda”, Carroll & Graf Publishers, N.Y., 2004, p. 512

weapons and braking all embargoes imposed by themselves.

UN indeed had difficulties in taking decisions in due time. There were also co-ordination problems and logistic ones. But UN depends on their member states and their political will. The peacekeeping operations and the DPKO were not able to react as they did not have the consent of the Security Council and its member states. The countries that could have contributed to the missions, played a double role in both cases.

There is no doubt that both sides played their role in spreading the genocide in Rwanda. The extremism concentrated around MDNR, CDR and president Juvénal Habyarimana but also around the Tutsi refugees in Uganda. But we don't have to forget that the ethnic matters were artificially created under the Belgian colonial rule and further promoted through discrimination and exclusion that eventually led to the notorious genocide.

In the case of Angola, both parties believed they knew what was best for the population, but none of them was willing to stop fighting, to start the disarmament process and to respect the already signed agreements. On the other hand, the US and USSR did not respect the “triple-zero clause” and continued supplying weapons to the parties.

And the list can go on. I will stop here because I believe that it is much more important to find an equitable solution at least to some of the issues described in this paper than to find the guilty ones.

I will conclude with a citation from Dellaire's book¹³⁴ related to question of “humanity”:

“Certainly we in the developed world act in way that suggests we believe that our lives are worth more than the lives of other citizens of the planet. An American officer felt no shame as he informed me that the lives of 800,000 Rwandans were only worth risking the lives of ten American troops; the Belgians, after losing ten soldiers, insisted that the lives of Rwandans were not worth risking another single Belgian soldier. The only conclusion I can reach is that we are in desperate need of a transfusion of humanity. If we believe that all humans are human, then how are we going to prove it? It can only be proven

¹³⁴ Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, “*Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*”, Carroll & Graf Publishers, N.Y., 2004, p. 522

by our actions. Through the dollars we are prepared to spend to improve conditions in the Third World, through the time and energy we devote to solving devastating problems like AIDS, through the lives of our soldiers which we are prepared to sacrifice for the sake of humanity.” (Dallaire: 2004, p. 522)

Chronology of major events in Angola

1300s - Kongo kingdom consolidates in the north.
1483 - Portuguese arrive.
1575 - Portuguese found Luanda.
 17th and 18th centuries - Angola becomes a major Portuguese trading arena for slaves. Between 1580 and 1680 a million plus are shipped to Brazil.
1836 - Slave trade officially abolished by the Portuguese government
1885-1930 - Portugal consolidates colonial control over Angola, local resistance persists.
1951 - Angola's status changes from colony to overseas province.
1956 - The early beginnings of the socialist guerilla independence movement, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), based in northern Congo.
1950s-1961 - Nationalist movement develops, guerilla war begins.
1961 - Forced labour abolished after revolts on coffee plantations leave 50,000 dead. The fight for independence is bolstered.
1974 - Revolution in Portugal, colonial empire collapses. Independence
1975 - Angola gains independence but power struggle ensues between MPLA, backed by Cuba, and the FNLA plus UNITA, backed by South Africa and the USA.
1976 - MPLA gains upper hand.
1979 - MPLA leader Agostinho Neto dies. José Eduardo dos Santos takes over as president.
1987 - South African forces enter Angola to support UNITA.
1988 - South Africa, Angola, Cuba sign agreement on withdrawal of Cuba's 50,000 troops from Angola by mid-1991. South African army withdraws.
1989 - Dos Santos, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi agree cease-fire, which collapses soon afterwards and guerrilla activity resumes.

Annex I

Chronology of major events in Angola

1991 April - MPLA drops Marxism-Leninism in favour of social democracy.
May - Dos Santos, Savimbi sign peace deal in Lisbon which results in a new multiparty constitution.
1992 September - Presidential and parliamentary polls certified by UN monitors as generally free and fair. Dos Santos gains more votes than Savimbi, who rejects results and resumes guerrilla war.
1993 - UN imposes sanctions against Unita. The US acknowledges the MPLA.
1994 - Government, Unita sign Lusaka Protocol peace accord.
1995 - Dos Santos, Savimbi meet, confirm commitment to peace. First of 7,000 UN peacekeepers arrive.
1996 - Dos Santos, Savimbi agree to form unity government join forces into national army.
1997 April - Unified government inaugurated, with Savimbi declining post in unity government and failing to attend inauguration ceremony. **May** - Tension mounts, with few Unita troops having integrated into army.
1998 - Full-scale fighting resumes. UN plane shot down. Angola intervenes in civil war in Democratic Republic of Congo on the side of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
1999 - UN ends its peacekeeping mission.
2002 February - Savimbi killed by government troops. **April** - Government, Unita sign ceasefire. **May** - UNITA's military commander says 85 per cent of his troops have gathered at demobilisation camps. There are concerns that food shortages in the camps could threaten the peace process. June - UN appeals for aid for thousands of refugees heading home after the ceasefire. Medical charity Medecins sans Frontieres says half a million Angolans are facing starvation, a legacy of civil war. August - Unita scraps its armed wing. "The war has ended," proclaims Angola's defence minister.
2003 January - President Dos Santos appoints Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, known as Nando, as prime minister. The post had been vacant for more than three years. **February** - UN mission overseeing the peace process winds up. June - UNITA - now a political party - elects Isaias Samakuva as its new leader.
2004 April onwards - Tens of thousands of illegal foreign diamond miners are expelled in a crackdown on illegal mining and trafficking. In **December** the government says 300,000 foreign diamond dealers have been expelled. September - Oil production reaches one million barrels per day.
2005 March-May - Marburg virus, which is deadlier than Ebola, kills more than 300 people, most of them in the north. **June** - Cholera epidemic claims 1,900 lives, mainly in Luanda. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits, promises to extend more than \$2 billion in new credit, in addition to a \$3 billion credit line Beijing has already given Luanda.
2006 August - The government signs a peace deal with a separatist group in the northern enclave of Cabinda. **October** - The UN refugee agency begins "final repatriation" of Angolans who fled the civil war to the neighbouring DR Congo. Some 60,000 are still due to return under the scheme which began in 2003 and which has repatriated 180,000 people.

Source: BBC World News

1300s - Tutsis migrate into what is now Rwanda, which was already inhabited by the Twa and Hutu peoples.

1600s - Tutsi King Ruganzu Ndori subdues central Rwanda and outlying Hutu areas.

Late 1800s - Tutsi King Kigeri Rwabugiri establishes a unified state with a centralised military structure.

1858 - British explorer Hanning Speke is the first European to visit the area.

1890 - Rwanda becomes part of German East Africa.

1916 - Belgian forces occupy Rwanda.

1923 - Belgium granted League of Nations mandate to govern Ruanda-Urundi, which it ruled indirectly through Tutsi kings.

1946 - Ruanda-Urundi becomes UN trust territory governed by Belgium.

1957 - Hutus issue manifesto calling for a change in Rwanda's power structure to give them a voice commensurate with their numbers; Hutu political parties formed.

1959 - Tutsi King Kigeri V, together with tens of thousands of Tutsis, forced into exile in Uganda following inter-ethnic violence.

1961 - Rwanda proclaimed a republic.

1962 - Rwanda becomes independent with a Hutu, Gregoire Kayibanda, as president; many Tutsis leave the country.

1963 - Some 20,000 Tutsis killed following an incursion by Tutsi rebels based in Burundi.

1973 - President Gregoire Kayibanda ousted in military coup led by Juvenal Habyarimana.

1978 - New constitution ratified; Habyarimana elected president.

1988 - Some 50,000 Hutu refugees flee to Rwanda from Burundi following ethnic violence there.

Annex II

Chronology of major events in Rwanda

1990 - Forces of the rebel, mainly Tutsi, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invade Rwanda from Uganda.

1991 - New multi-party constitution promulgated.

1993 - President Habyarimana signs a power-sharing agreement with the Tutsis in the Tanzanian town of Arusha, ostensibly signalling the end of civil war; UN mission sent to monitor the peace agreement.

1994 April - Habyarimana and the Burundian president are killed after their plane is shot down over Kigali; RPF launches a major offensive; extremist Hutu militia and elements of the Rwandan military begin the systematic massacre of Tutsis. Within 100 days around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus are killed; Hutu militias flee to Zaire, taking with them around 2 million Hutu refugees.

1994-96 - Refugee camps in Zaire fall under the control of the Hutu militias responsible for the genocide in Rwanda.

1995 - Extremist Hutu militias and Zairean government forces attack local Zairean Banyamulenge Tutsis; Zaire attempts to force refugees back into Rwanda.

1995 - UN-appointed international tribunal begins charging and sentencing a number of people responsible for the Hutu-Tutsi atrocities.

1996 - Rwandan troops invade and attack Hutu militia-dominated camps in Zaire in order to drive home the refugees.

1997 - Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebels depose President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire; Laurent Kabila becomes president of Zaire, which is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo.

1998 - Rwanda switches allegiance to support rebel forces trying to depose Kabila in the wake of the Congolese president's failure to expel extremist Hutu militias.

2000 March - Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, resigns over differences regarding the composition of a new cabinet and after accusing parliament of targeting Hutu politicians in anti-corruption investigations. **April** - Ministers and members of parliament elect Vice-President Paul Kagame as Rwanda's new president.

2001 October - Voting to elect members of traditional "gacaca" courts begins. The courts - in which ordinary Rwandans judge their peers - aim to clear the backlog of 1994 genocide cases. **December** - A new flag and national anthem are unveiled to try to promote national unity and reconciliation.

2002 April - Former president Pasteur Bizimungu is arrested and faces trial on charges of illegal political activity and threats to state security. **July** - Rwanda, DR Congo sign peace deal under which Rwanda will pull troops out of DR Congo and DR Congo will help disarm Rwandan Hutu gunmen blamed for killing Tutsi minority in 1994 genocide. **October** - Rwanda says it has pulled the last of its troops out of DR Congo, four years after they went in to support Congolese rebels against the Kabila government.

2003 May - Voters back a draft constitution which bans the incitement of ethnic hatred. **August** - Paul Kagame wins the first presidential elections since the 1994 genocide. **October** - First multi-party parliamentary elections; President Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front wins absolute majority. EU observers say poll was marred by irregularities and fraud. **December** - Three former media directors found guilty of inciting Hutus to kill Tutsis during 1994 genocide and receive lengthy jail sentences.

2004 March - President Kagame rejects French report which says he ordered 1994 attack on president's plane, which sparked genocide. **June** - Former president, Pasteur Bizimungu, is sentenced to 15 years in jail for embezzlement, inciting violence and associating with criminals.

2005 March - Main Hutu rebel group, FDLR, says it is ending its armed struggle. FDLR is one of several groups accused of creating instability in DR Congo; many of its members are accused of taking part in 1994 genocide. **July** - Government begins the mass release of 36,000 prisoners. Most of them have confessed to involvement in the 1994 genocide. It is the third phase of releases since 2003 - part of an attempt to ease overcrowding.

2006 January - Rwanda's 12 provinces are replaced by a smaller number of regions with the aim of creating ethnically-diverse administrative areas. **December** - Father Athanase Seromba becomes the first Roman Catholic priest to be convicted for involvement in the 1994 genocide. The International Criminal Tribunal sentences him to 15 years in prison.

Source: BBC World News

Annex III

UN Peacekeeping operations in Angola – mission profile

UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION - UNAVEM I

Duration of the mandate: January 1989 – May 1991

Headquarters: Luanda, Angola

SC Resolution: 626 (1988)

Force commander: Brigadier-General Pericles Ferreira Gomes (Brazil)

Personnel/ forces engaged: 70 military observers, supported by international and local civilian staff. At withdrawal in May 1991: 61 military observers, supported by international and local civilian staff

Contributors of military personnel: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain and Yugoslavia

Mandate: verification of the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola

Source: UN DPKO

UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION - UNAVEM II

Duration of the mandate: May 1991 to February 1995

Headquarters: Luanda, Angola

SC Resolution: 696 (1991); 747 (1992); 804 (1993); 811 (1993); 834 (1993); 952(1994); 966(1994)

Secretary General Special Representative and Chief of mission:

Margaret Joan Anstee(United Kingdom) -- February 1992--June 1993

Alioune Blondin Beye (Mali) -- June 1993--February 1995

Force commanders:

Brigadier-General Péricles Ferreira Gomes (Brazil) -- May 1991--September 1991

Major-General Edward Ushie Unimna (Nigeria) -- October 1991--December 1992

Brigadier-General Michael Nyambuya (Zimbabwe) -- December 1992--July 1993

Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria) -- July 1993--February 1995

Personnel/ forces engaged:

May 1991-January 1993 (authorized) 350 military observers and 126 civilian police. There were also a civilian air unit and a medical unit, as well as some 87 international civilian and 155 local staff. In addition, during the polling, UNAVEM II fielded a total of 400 electoral observers

January 1993-May 1993 (authorized): 75 military observers, 30 civilian police and 12 paramedics. These were supported by some 50 international civilian and 70 local staff □ June 1993-October 1994 (authorized): 50 military observers, 18 civilian police, 11 military medical personnel. There was also provision for 40 international civilian and 75 local staff □ October 1994-February 1995 (authorized): 350 military observers, 126 civilian police and 14 military medical staff. There was also provision for some 220 international civilian and 145 local staff □ As of 31 January 1995 (at transition to UNAVEM III): 171 military observers, 122 civilian police and 11 military medical staff, supported by international and local civilian personnel

Contributors of military personnel: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Czechoslovakia (Slovak Republic from January 1993), Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe

Mandate: monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, observation of the presidential elections (resolution 747 (1992))

Source: UN DPKO

UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION - UNAVEM III

Duration of the mandate: February 1995 – June 1997

Headquarters: Luanda, Angola

SC Resolution: 976 (1995), 1008 (1995) – extension of mandate, 1045 (1996) – implementation of Lusaka Protocol

Secretary General Special Representative and Chief of mission: Alioune Blondin Beye (Mali)

Force commander: Major-General Phillip Valerio Sibanda (Zimbabwe)

Personnel/ forces engaged: total of 4,220 military personnel, composed of: 283 military observers, 3,649 troops and 288 civilian police

Contributors of military personnel: Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Congo, Egypt, France, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, India, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Tanzania, Ukraine, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Mandate: To assist the government and UNITA in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation on the basis of the previous agreements

Tasks: to provide good offices and mediation to the Angolan parties; to monitor and verify the extension of State administration throughout the country and the process of national reconciliation; to supervise, control and verify the disengagement of forces and to monitor the cease-fire; to verify information received from the Government and UNITA regarding their forces, as well as all troop movements; to assist in the establishment of quartering areas; to verify the withdrawal, quartering and demobilization of UNITA forces; to supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments; to verify the movement of Government forces (FAA) to barracks and the completion of the formation of FAA; to verify the free circulation of persons and goods; to verify and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the disarming of civilians, the quartering of the rapid reaction police, and security arrangements for UNITA leaders; to coordinate, facilitate and support humanitarian activities directly linked to the peace process, as well as participating in mine-clearance activities; to declare formally that all essential requirements for the holding of the second round of presidential elections have been fulfilled, and to support, verify and monitor the electoral process.

UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN ANGOLA – MONUA

Duration of the mandate: 30 June 1997 – 26 February 1999

Headquarters: Luanda, Angola

SC Resolution: 1118 (1997)

Secretary General Special Representative and Chief of mission: Issa B.Y. Diallo (Guinea)

Force commander: Major-General Seth Kofi Obeng (Ghana)

Personnel: 222 troops, 12 military observers, 6 civilian police monitors; and supported by international and locally-recruited civilian staff.

Contributors of military personnel: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Egypt, Ghana, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Mandate: assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country.

Tasks: completion of the demobilization process, incorporation of ex-combatants of the UNITA into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the Angolan National Police (ANP), integration of UNITA personnel in all levels of State administration, elimination of all impediments to free circulation of people and goods, as well as disarmament of the civilian population. The unit would also monitor the collection of weapons from civilians, supervise their proper storage or destruction and oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders. After the withdrawal of the main infantry units, a reduced number of military observers would be retained in Angola to investigate allegations of offensive troop movements, the presence of any UNITA armed elements and the existence of weapons caches.

Source: UN DPKO

Annex IV

UN Peacekeeping operations in Rwanda – mission profile

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA -- UNOMUR

Duration of the mandate:

Headquarters: Kabale, Uganda

SC Resolution: 846 (1993)

Personnel/ forces engaged: 81
military observers (by
September 1993)

**Contributors of military
personnel:** Bangladesh,
Botswana, Brazil, Hungary,
Netherlands, Senegal, Slovak
Republic and Zimbabwe

Mandate: verification of transit
or transport of lethal weapons,
ammunition and other military
equipment across the border.

Source: UN DPKO

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA - UNAMIR

Duration of the mandate: October 1993 - March 1996

Headquarters: Kigali, Rwanda

SC Resolution: 872 (1993)

Secretary General Special Representative and Chief of mission:

Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh (Cameroon) -- November 1993-June 1994

Shaharyar M. Khan (Pakistan) -- July 1994-March 1996

Force commander:

Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada) -- October 1993-August 1994

Major-General Guy Tousignant (Canada) -- August 1994-December 1995

Brigadier-General Shiva Kumar (India) (Acting) -- December 1995-March 1996

Personnel/ forces engaged:

5 October 1993-20 April 1994 (authorised): 2,548 military personnel, including 2,217 formed troops and 331 military observers, and 60 civilian police; supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff 21

April-16 May 1994(authorised): 270 military personnel; supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff 17 May 1994-8 June

1995(authorised): Some 5,500 military personnel, including approximately 5,200 troops and military support personnel and 320 military observers, and 90 civilian police [in February 1995, the authorized strength of the civilian police was increased to 120]; supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff 9 June-8 September 1995 (authorised): 2,330 troops and

military support personnel, 320 military observers and 120 civilian police; supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff 9 September-11 December 1995 (authorised): 1,800 troops and military support personnel, 320 military observers and 120 civilian police; supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff 12 December 1995-8 March 1996

(authorised): 1,200 troops and military support personnel and 200 military observers; supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff 29 February 1996 (Strength at withdrawal): 1,252 troops and military support personnel, 146 military observers; there were also approximately 160 international and 160 local civilian staff and 56 United Nations Volunteers

Contributors of military personnel: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe


Original mandate: to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the cease-fire agreement; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.

Improved mandate (April 1994): secure their agreement to a cease-fire; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; monitor developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR.

Source: UN DPKO


Annex V

Natural resources in Angola



During the conflict in Angola there was a sort of delimitation and repartition of the natural resources between the two parties: MPLA had control over the oil resources and UNITA over diamonds, because UNITA knew that it could not profit from the oil resources, since it did not have neither the financial resources, nor the credibility to start a partnership with big oil companies.

Annex VI



BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Amoo, Samuel G., *"The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives"*, Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, May 1992

Axt, Heinz-Jürgen (Prof. Dr.), *"Conflict – a literature review"*, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute for Political Science, Jean Monnet Group, Duisburg, February 2006

Balencie, Jean-Marc; De La Grange, Arnaud: *"Mondes rebelles. Acteurs, conflits et violence politique"*, Vol. 1, ed. Michalon, Paris, 1996

Bedada, Facil Tesfaye: *"The Prostitution of Peacekeeping: The Rwandan Experience"*, in: *"Les opérations de paix: de Suez à Kandahar"*, CEPES, no. 33, Québec, Février 2007,

Braeckman, Colette: *"Rwanda. Histoire d'un génocide"*, Fayrad, 1994

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *"Words over war"*, Carnegie Corporation of N.Y., Ed.: Melanie C. Greenburg, John H. Barton Margaret E. McGuinness, N.Y., 2002

Chinchilla, Fernando A.: *"Deterrence, Protective and Preventive International Interventions in Civil War Contexts"*, University of Montreal, London (Ontario) 2005

Crocker, Chester, *"Lessons on Intervention,"* in *Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World: The Role of Intervention*. Report of the Aspen Institute Conference, August 2-6, 1995

Dallaire, Roméo (Lt. Gen), *"Shaking Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda"*, N.Y. 2004

Dallaire R.A.; Poulin B. *"UNAMIR Mission to Rwanda"*, published in *"Joined Force Quartely"*, Washington DC., 1995

Diehl, Paul E.; Druckman, Daniel; Wall, James: *"International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications"*, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1. (Feb., 1998)

Gomes, João; Parsons, Imogen: *"Sustaining the Peace in Angola. An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration"*, Published in Monograph no.83, April 2003

Gurr, Ted Robert and Marshall, Monty G. *"Peace and Conflict 2005. A Global*

Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy", University of Maryland, June 2005

Heldt, Birger, "*Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions*", National Defence College of Sweden, Department of Operational Studies, Stockholm, 2001

Khadiagala, Gilbert M., "*National Intelligence Council Project on Intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Rwanda*", The John Hopkins University, Washington DC., 2001

Kühne, Winrich, Lenzi, Guido & Vasconcelos, Alvaro: „*Gestion de crise et reglement des conflits en afrique sub-saharienne: role de l'UEO*” [Winrich Kühne, Le maintien de la paix en Afrique – Angola, Mozambique, Somalie, Rwanda, Liberia – Leçons a tirer“]- Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité de l'UEO 1996

Messiant, Christine, "*MPLA et UNITA Processus de paix et logique de guerre*", CEA-EHESS, Paris 1995

Messiant, Christine: „*Why did Bicesse and Lusaka fail? A critical analysis*“, article published on „Conciliation Ressources » article available on „Conciliation Ressources” website: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/bicesse-lusaka.php>

Mpungwe, Ami R., "*Crisis and response in Rwanda. Refelections on the Arusha Peace Process*", [Published in Monograph No 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? April 1999](#)

Osmançavuşoğlu, Emel: "*Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-Cold War Era*", Journal of International Affairs, No. 4, Vol. IV, December 1999 – February 2000.

Peou, Sorpong: "*The UN Pecekeeping and Collective Human Security: From an Agenda for Peace to Brahimi Report*", International Peacekeeping, no.9, summer 2002

Prah, Kwesi Kwaa, "*African Wars and Ethnic Conflicts – Rebuilding Failed States*", (The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society), Africa regional Background Paper: Human Development Report 2004, UNDP, Cape Town, 2004

Regan Patrick M.; Aydin Aysegul: "*Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars*" ", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, no. 5, October 2006, Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, New York

Shelton, Garth, „*Promoting Peace on a Troubled Continent*“, Nouveaux Mondes, no 10, Printemps 2002, Afrika-Studiecentrum, Leiden, Netherlands

SIPRI Yearbook 2006, *“Armaments, Disarmament and International Security”*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 2006

Sollenberg, Margareta; Wallenstein, Peter: *“Major Armed Conflicts”*, SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999

Spear, Ian S., *“Southern Africa Report”*, SAR, Vol 15 No 1, December 1999

Stedman, Stephan John, *“International Actors and Internal Conflicts”*, New York 1999, Rockefeller Brothers Fund Inc.

Stettenheim, Joel, *“Arusha Accord and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda”*; in Greenberg, M. C., Barton, J. H., & McGuiness, M. E. (Eds.), *Words over war: Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict*, N.Y., 2002

Utterwulge, Steve „*Rwanda's Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategy*“, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Issue 2.3, August 1999

Van der Dennen, Johan M.G. *“On War: concepts, definitions, research data – a short literature review and bibliography”* article published as a chapter in: *UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies 1980*, Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1981

Vogt, M.A.; Aminu, L.S.: *“Peacekeeping as a Security Strategy in Africa”*, Fourth Dimension Publishing Co.Ltd, Enugu, 1996

Zartman, I. William, *“La resolution des conflits en Afrique”*, Edition L'Harmattan, Paris, 1990

Zartman, I. William; Touval, Saadia: *“International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era”*, in *Managing Global Chaos*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996

Reports and websites:

“Angola's Choice: Reform or Regress”, Africa Report N 61, April 2003, Luanda/Brussels International Crisis Group <http://www.crisisweb.org>

“Angola Unravels, The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process”, Human Rights Watch Report, September 1999

BBC World News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1839740.stm

Bosgra, Sietse: *“Henry Kissinger and the Angola Saga”*, available on the website: <http://www.icaonline.org/76519,46136.html>

Brooklyn College website:

<http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/clark.htm>

Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/africa/rwanda_background-en.asp)

Charte des Nations Unies et Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice, Département de l'information des Nations Unies, DPI/511, Réimpression – avril 2005

“The Challenges for Free and Fair Elections in Angola”, Conference Report, London, 4-5 July 2005

Cranfield University, Centre for Security Sector Management, website:

<http://www.ssronline.org/>

„Millenium Development Goals Report 2005“, published by the UN Department for Public Information DPI/2390 – May 2005

Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development, *“Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946 – 2004. A Macro Comparative Perspective”*, Report prepared by the Government of the United Kingdom for the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, available on the website: (<http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/conflict.htm>)

OAU Charter, available on: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf

Panel Discussion, 50 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Headquarters, 11 June 1998

“Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations”, UN Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809, August 2000; website: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

“Report of the Secretary- General to the Security Council on Angola”, S/2002/834, from 26 July 2002

Report of the United Nations Peace Operations

http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations

Saferworld. Angola: *“Conflict Resolution and Peace-building”*, Report co-ordinated and edited by Simon Higdon, September 1996

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website: <http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/>

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations,

<http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm>

UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations website:
<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem1/unavemi.htm>

UN DPKO website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/Unavem2.htm>

Uppsala Conflict Data Project website: www.pcr.uu.se/research/data.htm