

Integration of immigrants: A comparison of Moroccan immigrants in Spain with Turkish immigrants in Germany

Master thesis by: Rosa María de la Asunción Villaverde

Supervisors: Matthias Wächter
Ragnar Leunig

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List of abbreviations

BAMF	German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (<i>Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge</i>)
CDU	German Christian Democratic Union party (<i>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands</i>)
CEFR	Common European Framework of Reference for Languages
EC	European Community
ENI	Spanish National Immigration Survey (<i>Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes</i>)
EU	European Union
MIPEX	Migration Policy Index
PP	Conservative Spanish Popular Party (<i>Partido Popular</i>)
PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (<i>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</i>)
SRC	Spanish Sociology Research Center (<i>Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas</i>)

1. Introduction

European societies have experienced an increasing flow of incoming immigrants¹ since the end of World War II. Up to the 1970s large scale migration was mainly of an economic nature to cover labor shortage in north-western European countries in the context of World War II economic recovery. Immigration waves were tried to control by national law and administration. The oil crisis of 1973 changed the patterns of international migration from predominantly male workers to family reunification. In addition, traditional emigration countries, such as Spain, gradually transformed to immigration countries. By the 1990s the illusion of temporary migration had disappeared and most European countries had a net immigration gain. In 2009, third-country nationals residing in the EU were around 31.9 million, representing 6.4% of the total EU population (Vasileva, 2010, pp. 1 – 3). Integration gradually became a fundamental aspect of migration policies.

During the past decades traditional European migration countries recurred to different patterns to cope with large scale immigration. Academic literature has distinguished between three models of integration. The multicultural model was based on the respect of cultural diversity and the willingness to promote the maintenance of ethnic identities. The Netherlands and Sweden are classical examples of this approach. In contrast, assimilationism was characterized by the complete assimilation of immigrants to the host society. It aims at unifying cultural values and creating a common identity. It was applied for example in France. The exclusionist model was based on restrictive immigration policies to

¹ For the purpose of this research paper, the term immigrant is used to define first and second generation migrants and the distinction will be made when applied. The author has no purpose in offending anyone or using this term in a pejorative way. First generation immigrants refers to foreign-born people that currently residing in the host society, and second generation immigrants are children that are born in a country, however one or two of their parents were not born in the country of residence (Molcho, 2009, p. 7). Despite the different meanings, the author has opted for using the common term *immigrant* as throughout the paper they are analyzed to a great extent at the same time.

keep the temporary nature of the immigrants in the country, such as in Germany or Austria (Carrera, 2006, p. 2).

As a result of the failure of these national models for integration the concept of integration evolved. Today, the integration process is considered “a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States” (COM, 2007, p. 11). It has multiple dimensions, for instance a structural, cultural and social dimension. Structural integration refers to the acquisition of rights in the host country, such as political participation or equal access to social benefits, and the access to positions in society (for instance in the educational system or in the labor market). The cultural dimension refers to the cultural, behavioral and attitudinal aspects of both the immigrant community and the native population (Heckmann et al, 2003 p. 10; Focus, 2008, p. 1). As abovementioned, integration is a two way process that involves the immigrants and their host society. Thus, it is essential to measure the public perception of the native population towards the immigrant group. Social integration evaluates the different networks and relations, including marriage, friendships or participation in social groups. The different dimensions are interdependent. No specific integration indicator alone is by itself a mean of integration. For instance, social integration presupposes a certain degree of language knowledge and predisposition from the immigrant community and the host society.

During the past decade the issue of integration has gradually become a recurrent debate in the European Union as a successful immigration policy requires an effective integration framework. However, even though there is a growing number of initiatives at European level, member states have maintained their own integration policies. There is a need for cross – country comparative research on integration to identify the policies or specific measures that have facilitated the successful integration of immigrant communities. This paper aims at determining whether Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are successfully integrated respectively in Germany and Spain.

Chapters two and three of the thesis focus on an in-depth analysis of the integration process of on the one hand Turkish immigrants in Germany and on the

other hand Moroccan immigrants in Spain. At the beginning of each chapter an overview of the different migratory phases of the country is presented and the major policy implementations are examined. Furthermore, key immigration legislation is summarized with special emphasis on integration policies. This is followed by a detailed evaluation of multiple integration indicators to measure the degree of integration of the specific immigration community in the respective country. As a first indicator the administrative status is assessed, which refers to the naturalization process and its possible contribution to a successful integration. This is followed by an analysis of the economic integration and the educational performance of immigrants. The possible causes for the failure or success of their integration are underlined. It is paid special attention to the female migration population for being significantly worse integrated and to social interaction, based on marriages, family dynamics and friendships. Finally, considering that integration is not a one-way-street but a mutual commitment, it is essential to analyze the public perception of the native population towards immigration. The third chapter deals with the comparison of both immigrant groups to establish common trends and possible differences. The research is based on academic literature, electronic articles, journals and statistics.

2. Turkish integration in Germany

2.1. Historical context and legislation overview

*Workers were called,
And humans being came.*

Max Frisch

During the 1950s, West Germany's booming labor industrial-oriented economy faced a shortage of unskilled working force due to demographical and social factors. Its working population had decreased due to human losses suffered during the Second World War. Besides, working life had been shortened, as a result of the adoption of a better retiring system and the increase of the education period (Frey, 2010, p. 11; Woellert et al., 2009, p 12). A strong inflow of young, strong workers was needed to maintain West Germany's growing economic rates. Thus, in 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy signed the first bilateral recruitment agreement known as *Anwerbeabkommen*, which was followed in 1960 by agreements with Spain and Greece. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the subsequent drastic reduction of constant flow of workers coming from East Germany resulted in the approval of bilateral working agreements with Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and the Yugoslavia (1968).

The migrant workers became known as *Gastarbeiter* ("Guest workers"). As this term implies, the idea behind these working agreements was to obtain cheap labor force from abroad by 'inviting' foreign workers to West Germany to cover the labor shortage and afterwards send them back to their country of origin. The temporary nature of the worker's stay implied that no integration policies seemed necessary at the time. *Gastarbeiter* had to complete a strict selection process based on three basic criteria: age, health and physical condition. Language knowledge and academic background were excluded from the selection criteria (Ennigkeit, 2008, p 46; Keskin, 2009, p 33).

In the case of Turkey, on the 30th of October of 1961 an *Anwerbeabkommen* was signed. It was promoted by the Turkish government in the hope of reducing unemployment rates in Turkey and benefiting economically from the workers' remittances. Initially, most Turkish migrants were male, had between 20 and 40 years of age and came from poor, rural areas of the country. In 1961, 6,700 Turkish workers entered the country, this number increased gradually during the next decade (Firat, 1996, pp 34 – 35). Between 1970 and 1973, Turkish migrant population nearly doubled and consequently became the biggest non-German group. By 1973, the number of Turkish workers was 910,500.

During the 1970s, the global economic crisis, worsened by the oil crisis of 1973, resulted in a drastic change in migration policies all over Europe, including in West Germany. To overcome the high levels of unemployment, on the 23rd of November of 1973 the Federal Republic's government issued an *Anwerbestopp* to end the inflow of non-German labor. Furthermore, *Gastarbeiter* were encouraged to return to their countries of origin by means of financial incentives. However, instead of reducing the number of migrant workers, the *Anwerbestopp* produced the opposite results. It turned temporary non-German workers into permanent residents. By the end of the 1970s, the number of non-German workers in Germany increased to around 4.5 million. Furthermore, the new law changed the demographic composition of migrant groups, especially within the Turkish population.

Compared to other non-German workers, the Turkish population was one of the least keen to return to their country of origin due to the new restrictive measures and the political unstable situation in Turkey. Turkish *Gastarbeiter* initial aspirations changed: they decided to settle and opted for family reunification. Consequently, the number of children and women increased significantly. In 1974, the proportion of Turkish women present in the country was of 35.7%, by 1985, the proportion of women had increased to 42.3% (see figure 1). Likewise, the number of young Turkish people under twenty-one increased from 29.6% in 1974 to 45.6% by 1985 (see figure 2). Women were isolated of the German society due to their poor German language skills and their low education level.

Figure 1: Distribution of the Turkish population by gender, 1974 – 1985

	1974		1985	
	Absolute numbers (in 1000)	Percentage	Absolute numbers (in 1000)	Percentage
Man	661, 2	64.3	808, 5	57.7
Women	366, 6	35.7	593, 5	42.3
Total population	1027, 8	100	1401, 9	100

Source: own calculations based on the Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1974 and 1985 (Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1974 & 1985)

Figure 2: Age distribution of the Turkish population, 1974 – 1985

	1974		1985	
	Absolute numbers (in 1000)	Percentage	Absolute numbers (in 1000)	Percentage
0 – 6	117,5	11.4	152, 1	10.8
6 - 10	51,4	5.0	120, 6	8.6
10 – 15	47,8	4.7	167, 6	12.0
15 - 18	37,5	3.6	100, 3	7.2
18 - 21	50,3	4.9	98, 0	7.0
Above 21	722,5	70.3	763,3	54.4
Total Population	1027, 8	100	1401, 9	100

Source: own calculations based on the Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1974 and 1985 (Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1974 & 1985)

The above described changes triggered by the *Anwerbestopp* initiated a minor shift in policy-makers' approach to the *Gastarbeiter* issue. In 1978, the Chancellor Helmut Schmidt created the position of the commissioner for foreign affairs (*Ausländerbeauftragte*) to enhance national integration efforts (Chin, 2009, p. 87). Concrete measures were adopted at the time in the form of German language courses and integration courses for migrant women. In 1979, the Social Democrat politician appointed to direct this commissioner, Heinz Kühn, issued a memorandum advocating for a change in the Federal Republic's migration policy stand. According to Kühn "a development has occurred that is no longer reversible, and the majority of those affected are no longer 'guest workers' but rather immigrants." (Chin, 2009, p 88).

Despite the small steps taken towards the implementation of an integration policy, the government's official discourse firmly denied that the Federal Republic was a country of immigration. In 1977 the report of the newly created "Bund-Länder-Kommission" stated that:

"Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland. Sie versteht sich als ein Aufenthaltsland für Ausländer, die in der Regel nach einem mehr oder weniger langen Aufenthalt aus eigenem Entschluss in ihre Heimat zurückkehren²." (Bund-Länder-Kommission, 1977, p. 3).

Along the lines of the government's official approach, in 1983 the law *Gesetz zur befristeten Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländer* was issued in an attempt to decrease the number of migrants in the Federal Republic. During a period of one year *Gastarbeiter* willing to return to their country of origin had the possibility to receive back the amount paid for the retirement insurance. Unemployed *Gastarbeiter* would receive a financial incentive of 10. 500 DM. 250. 000 non-Germans returned to their country of origin Nevertheless, a high number of returnees had already decided to return to their home countries. Among the Turkish population, it is estimated that between 1984 and 1987 only around

² Translation: "Germany is not an immigration country. It is a temporary residence country for foreigners, who after a period of time more or less extensive return to their home country for personal reasons".

45.000 Turks returned to Turkey motivated by the financial incentives. Therefore, according to Ennigkeit and Hönekopp the law failed to achieve its objective and the non-German population kept increasing steadily (Ennigkeit, 2008, p. 82; Hönekopp, 1987, pp 187 - 341).

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union increased drastically the influx of *Aussiedler* (Ethnic German migrant) and asylum seekers. The number of the latter increased from around 100.000 in 1980 to 438.00 in 1992 (Frey, 2010, p. 13). Between the years 1991 and 1994 four million people applied for asylum, mostly from the former Yugoslavia. With regards to *Aussiedler*, from the late 1980s onwards “*Aussiedler* number reached unprecedented heights” (Gibney et al, 2005, p 208), around 38.000 per year (Münz und Ohliger, 1998, p 151). The increase of non-German population hindered the integration of migrants in the German society.

It was not until the late 1990s that the first significant integration policy steps were taken. For almost an entire century, acquiring German citizenship had been based upon the principle of *ius sanguinis* (ethnic descent or blood) as stated in the provisions of the Nationality Law of 1913 (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*). In 1998 the newly formed coalition government of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with Alliance 90/ The Green initiated a controversial debate between the main political parties that led to the approval of a new Nationality Act which came into force in the year 2000. Naturalization was regarded as an essential element of the integration process. This new piece of legislation included on the one hand the principle of *ius soli* for children born in Germany whose parents had been residing legally in the country for the past 8 years and on the other hand the temporary acceptance of dual citizenship. Children with migration background could have both nationalities until their 23rd birthday, when he or she was legally bound to choose one. Consequently the naturalization process was easier. The following reform approved in 2004, the so-called *Zuwanderungsgesetz*, laid emphasis on the integration requirements as preconditions to acquiring the nationality (Hailbronner, 2006, pp. 214 - 225). For instance, the proof of adequate German language knowledge was a prerequisite

for naturalization (Residence Act, section 9, art. 2, n. 7). These changes symbolized the acceptance of the statement “Germany is an immigration country”. In 2007, the prior acquisition of language skills was reinforced. A standardized integration test was introduced, normally subsequent to the attendance of an orientation course. Furthermore, applicants had to prove knowledge of the “legal system, society and living conditions of Germany” (Schieber, 2010, p. 10).

2.2. Administrative status

Naturalization is regarded as an essential element in the successful integration process. It constitutes the legal precondition for the attainment of political rights and access to civil servant jobs.

The nationality law of 1913, valid for almost the whole 20th century, hindered naturalization of immigrants due to its *ius sanguinis* clause. In 1990 a reform in the law facilitated naturalization of young immigrants and long term residents. In 1998, a new formed “red-green” coalition government of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with Alliance 90/ The Greens (*Bündnis 90’/ Die Grünen*) initiated debates on integration issues (Van Oers, 2010, p. 70). Policy-makers believed that the acquisition of German nationality was necessary to obtain a successful integration of migrants in the German society. As a result of these debates, two years later a new Nationality Law (*Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*) came into force, which introduced the element of *ius soli* (place of birth) for children born in Germany territory if at least one of their parents had been residing legally in the country for the past 8 years. The deep public and political division over dual nationality led to a stronger toleration of dual nationality. However, dual nationality was still considered an exception to the law. In the case of newborn naturalized by the principle of *ius solis* dual nationality was tolerated temporarily. The introduction of the “option model” clause forced foreign children to choose a nationality by their 23rd birthday. In addition, the naturalization of long term residents was facilitated by lowering to eight the years that migrants had to wait to

apply for citizenship. These changes symbolized a shift in the perception of immigrants, no longer considered *Gastarbeiter* but permanent residents in Germany (Hailbronner, 2006, pp. 214 - 216).


In 2004 the Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) was adopted in order to strengthen the integration requirements and introduce security measures as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attack (Hailbronner, 2006, p. 216). The proof of an adequate knowledge of German was a legal prerequisite for naturalization (Residence Act, section 9, art. 2, n. 7). In addition, immigrants were entitled to attend an integration course, which consisted of a language course and an orientation course on “the legal system, culture and history of Germany” (Residence Act, Section 43, art. 3). Naturalization was further facilitated by the reduction of residence titles to just two: a residence and a settlement permit. The Immigration Act represents the acknowledgment that Germany is an immigration country.

In 2007, the implementation of EU directives in the area of migration and asylum legislation led to the approval of new reforms. The integration requirements were further reinforced. A standardized integration test was adopted in 2008 to prove applicants’ knowledge of the political system, the German society and living conditions in Germany. In addition, applicants had to provide a certificate in German of at least level B1 of the Common European Reference Framework for Languages (CEFR) (Hailbronner, 2010, p. 10). Thus, written abilities in German language had to be proven. A language requirement has also been introduced for family members in their home country.

As a result of the first reforms adopted in the beginning of the 1990s naturalization increased steadily, from 45,000 in 1993 to 291,331 in 1998 (Hailbronner, 2006, p. 232). In 1999, Turkish nationals made up two-thirds of all naturalizations. Nevertheless, the implementation of the nationality law in 2000 and the subsequent reforms led to a gradual decrease of the number of naturalized foreigners in Germany, especially among Turkish citizens. In the following years, the number of Turkish immigrants that obtained the German citizenship fell from 76,563 in 2000 to 24,149 in 2008 (see figure 3). The decline in numbers was attributable to several reasons. On the one hand, the introduction of the *ius solis*

clause led to the automatic acquisition of the German nationality by newborn that fulfill the abovementioned preconditions. Thus, these babies were not included in the statistics. On the other hand, the implementation of the new Nationality Act in 2000 tightened the acceptance of the dual nationality, at least in the case of Turkish citizens. The failure to renounce to your prior citizenship led to the lost of the German nationality. Unaware of this new reform, approx. 40,000 Turkish nationals that previously had benefitted from a “legally doubtful procedure” lost their German citizenship (Hailbronner, 2006, p. 233). Before the Nationality Act, former Turkish citizens reacquired their home country nationality “with the silent agreement of the Turkish authorities” once obtaining the German nationality. (Hailbronner, 2010, p. 25). Having their habitual residence in Germany made it possible for them to keep the newly acquired German nationality. The Nationality Act of 1999/ 2000 brought to an end this abuse of the law.

Figure 3: Naturalization of immigrants in Germany between 1995 and 2008



Source: *Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, 1995 - 2008*

The acceptance of dual citizenship is a high controversial issue in the German society. According to the current legislation, dual citizenship should be avoided with the exception of some specific cases. For instance, currently dual citizenship

is accepted for nationals of EU member states or if immigrants are not able to give up their former nationality. Temporary citizenship is tolerated in the case of minors. Statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office (*Statistisches Bundesamt*) illustrate a significant difference in the toleration of dual citizenship among non-EU nationals. In 2007, 99.9% of citizens from Morocco, Iran and Afghanistan were naturalized without having to renounce to their previous citizenship. Dual nationality has also been particularly tolerated in the case of nationals from Serbia, Montenegro, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Lebanon and Tunisia (BAMF, 2008, p. 26). With regards to Turkish nationals, even though they are the largest naturalization group in Germany, they do not benefit from this exception clauses. In 2007, only 17.1% was granted dual citizenship. Compared to the previous non-EU states mention, Turkish nationals are in a significant disadvantage.

The issue of dual nationality triggered highly controversial public and political debates already by the end of the 1990s. The two main German political parties defended opposite views (Hailbronner, 2010, pp. 22 – 23). On the one hand, SPD promoted the acceptance of dual nationality based on a simultaneous emotional attachment to two different nations. On the other hand, CDU firmly believed that it could be counterproductive for the integration process of immigrants as it could provoke a conflict of loyalties. Polls have showed that the public opinion has always been deeply divided too. On the whole, German legislation has been formulated based on the belief that dual nationality is “inconsistent with the concept of loyalty and attachment to Germany” (Hansen et al., 2002, p. 123) and counterproductive to the integration process. However, does dual nationality really promote a conflict of loyalties? The second and third generations of Turkish immigrants often face identity issues, living halfway between two different cultures. “Their citizenship has frequently become only an emotional attachment to the home country of their parents and is sometimes considered a mere reassurance” of their family ties (Hansen et al., 2002, p. 122). The acceptance of dual nationality could help them find a balance between their Turkish family traditions and the German culture.


Naturalization is considered a fundamental element of immigrants' and natives' successful integration in the recipient country. Studies have been conducted to prove whether naturalization is the beginning or the end of a successful integration process. Is acquiring the German citizenship a cause or a consequence? According to the Immigration Commissioner of the borough of Neukölln in Berlin, Arnold Mengelkoch³, naturalization can be considered a cause due to the positive impact it has on the integration of immigrants, since they feel more involved in the society and less discriminated. Thus, it increases their desire to integrate.

Studies have proven that a substantial proportion of Turkish nationals who acquire the German nationality tend to have specific characteristics, based on gender, education achievements, and German identity. Older educated Turkish citizens with closer ties to the German society have a higher probability to obtain the German nationality as younger unqualified Turkish migrants (Diehl, 2005, p. 331). Furthermore, Turkish women receive more often the nationality than men. Once naturalized, former Turkish citizens tend to obtain more often a job and have a higher level of the German language.

In terms of education, according to the Integration survey conducted in the year 2000 by the *Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung* (see figure 4) Turkish nationals have a relative low level of education: around 14% have a high educational qualification (*Abitur*); 44% have attended *Hauptschule*, the lower level secondary school track and approx. 14% have not completed their compulsory education. These figures improve considerably when it comes to Turkish nationals that have the German citizenship. The percentage of those with a high educational qualification increases to approx. 21%; around 33% attended *Hauptschule* and only 8.3% do not have an educational certificate.

³ Data proportionate by means of a private interview by Arnold Mengelkoch, Commissioner of the Immigration of the borough of Neukölln.

Figure 4: Academic qualification results from interviewees aged 15 to 30 years old



Source: Integration survey of the BiB (*Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung*) conducted in the year 2000

A high percentage of Turkish nationals do not apply for naturalization, in spite of having fulfilled all the criteria. The Survey for the Federal Office for Migration conducted in the year 2009 pinpointed the main reasons why immigrants did not opt for naturalization. Within the Turkish community, around 57% want to preserve their Turkish nationality, approx. 23% are satisfied with their residence status and the rest either yearn for returning to their home country or are afraid of the language test (BAMF, 2009, p. 29; Schieber, 2010, p. 15).

Naturalization is a necessary condition for the successful integration of immigrants. However, further integration measures are needed since by itself it is not a mean of integration. To what extent does naturalization influence positively the integration process? Former Turkish citizens are the largest naturalized group in Germany. In 2004, Turkish migrants made up approx. 35% of the total of naturalized citizens in Germany. This percentage decreased to 25% by 2008. However, Even though Turks have a high naturalization rate, they still remain the migrant community that opts more often for naturalization. Followed by citizens from the former Yugoslavia (around 7% in 2008) (Statistisches Jahrbuch, 2009,

p. 54). Nevertheless, Turks are still the worst integrated immigrant community in Germany. According to the Berlin institute study conducted in 2005, they have the lowest educational qualifications, are the worst paid and have a higher rate of unemployment. Thus, naturalization may be regarded as part of the integration process but not necessarily the outcome.

2.3. Economic integration

The unemployment rate of the immigrant population is an important indicator of socio-economic integration. Economic integration reveals earning disparities based on gender and nationality, immigrants' main occupation, possible discrimination and/or education disparities. A lack of economic integration limits immigrants' upward mobility and hinders their full integration in the society.


The first generation of Turkish immigrants was recruited to cover the increasing demand of unskilled labor force in West Germany. The majority came from the poorest and most underdeveloped regions of Turkey. Language knowledge and academic background were excluded from the selection criteria. Thus, initially Turkish immigrants were mainly male young workers with no educational background or German language knowledge. They were usually employed in the industrial sector. The economic crisis of 1966/67 followed by the oil crisis of the early 1970s led to a ban of the bilateral recruitment labor agreements. Against all expectations, the immigrant population increased steadily during the next decades due to family reunification and asylum migration.

Until the 1990s, the employment rate of Turkish male immigrants remained steady. However, Turkish women had a considerable low employment rate, below 40% (Liebig, 2007, pp. 19 – 23). The second economic recession in the early 1990s and the increasing demand for high-skilled workers resulted in a significant deterioration of Turkish immigrants' labor market performance. Language barriers and low educational attainment jeopardized their access to high skilled jobs and subsequently there was a decline in Turkish employment levels. According to Arnold Mengelkoch, Commissioner of Immigration of the borough

of Neukölln, after the fall of the Berlin Wall 150, 000 Turks became unemployed in West Berlin⁴.

The employment rate of Turkish immigrants still remains well below the one of native Germans and other immigrant groups. According to the German Federal Statistic Office, in 2009 48.5% of Turkish male immigrants and around 38% of Turkish women were employed (see figure 5) versus approx. 77% of male native Germans and 68.4% of women. Besides, first and second generations of Turkish immigrants have a significant lower income than native Germans. Within the Turkish community, gender differences are also apparent in occupation and income. Almost half of the Turkish male active population (42.5%) is employed in the manufacturing sector, while the same percentage of Turkish women works in the service sector (BAMF, 2010 pp. 132 – 133). Women monthly average salary is below 1000 euro, while men earn between 1000 and 2000 euro a month (BAMF, 2010, p. 139).

Figure 5: Employment rate of 15 to 65 year old workers, based on gender and former nationality. Micro census 2009




Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2010 (SeebaB et al, 2011, p. 60)

⁴ Data proportionate by means of a private interview by Arnold Mengelkoch, Commissioner of the Immigration of the borough of Neukölln.

The micro census conducted in 2005 and again in 2009 confirmed that the unemployment rate for first and second generation migrants is constantly twice as high as the unemployment rate for native Germans. Russian immigrants are the most affected by high unemployment rates, closely followed by Turkish and Serbian migrants. In 2009, around 7% of native German men were unemployed and approx. 6.5% of women, in comparison to 18.2% of male Turkish migrants and 11.8% of women (see figure 6). However, the percentage of economically inactive women, including housewives, is not taken into account in the unemployment statistics. If considered, the number of Turkish women without an employment is much higher. The causes of this high unemployment rate are rooted in low education levels and poor German language knowledge. According to a comparative study of the labor market situation of Turkish immigrants in Germany and Netherlands, “education increases the probability of being employed for almost all immigrant groups” (Euwals et al, 2007, p. 26). However, for Turkish women in Germany other factors also play an important role. In their case, along with education, being a second generation immigrant increases their employment probability significantly. A possible explanation could be that traditional gender roles are more prevalent among first generation Turkish immigrants, and many women opt for staying at home and raising a family.

Figure 6: Unemployment rate of 15 to 65 year old workers, based on gender and former nationality. Micro census 2009



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2010 (SeebaB et al, 2011, p. 60)

To overcome unemployment since 1985 there has been a gradual increase of entrepreneurs among first and second generation Turkish migrants in Germany. The number of Turkish entrepreneurs increased from approx. 22,000 in 1985 to around 59,500 in 2000. By 2003, there were approx. 60,000 Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany (Kiliçli, 2003, p.2). Findings point out that self-employed immigrants have significant higher income than salaried immigrants. Therefore, “self-employment may help immigrants to overcome structural obstacles in the German labor market which prevent them from gaining the same wages as Germans.” (Liebig, 2007, p. 50).

Despite high unemployment rates, both male and female second generation Turkish immigrants have a relatively higher employment rates than the first generation (Euwals et al, 2007, p. 26). However, the generally high unemployment rate among first and second generation of Turkish migrants hinders their social integration and limits their chances for upward social mobility.

2.4. Education

Education is the main tool for the successful socio-economic and cultural integration of the migrant population. While during the so-called “economic miracle” *Gastarbeiter* were mainly workers from poor rural backgrounds without German language knowledge hired to cover the shortage of unskilled jobs in West Germany, the growing demand for skilled labor during the past three decades increased the importance of educational qualifications when it comes to obtaining a job. Consequently, education has become an indicator of the integration level of immigrants.

The educational level of first and second generation immigrants in Germany is to a great extent lower than the level of native Germans. PISA studies conducted between 2000 and 2006 highlighted the strong correlation present in Germany between socioeconomic and educational background of parents and students’ educational achievements, especially among students with migration

backgrounds. (OECD, 2011, p 209). Germans with Turkish backgrounds scored the worst among the migration groups in Germany. Based on PISA results, in the year 2000 48.3% of 15 year old pupils with at least one parent born in Turkey attended *Hauptschule*, nearly 3 times more than native Germans. Furthermore, only 12.5% of German with Turkish backgrounds attended *Gymnasium* compared to 33.2% of native population. (Avenarius et al, 2006, p. 164). These results were once again confirmed in the micro census survey conducted in 2005 at a national level, where 30% of students with Turkish background did not complete the formal education vs. 1% of native Germans (Woellert et al, 2005, p. 49). Nevertheless, despite poor school performance, the second generation has better educational attainments than the first generation.

The poor results obtained in the various studies can be explained by a number of factors, being the lack of sufficient German language knowledge the most discussed in literature and German press. A majority of Germans with Turkish background do not dispose of sufficient German language knowledge when they start primary school at the age of six (Keskin, 2009, p. 115). Their lack of exposure to the German language at an early age becomes a handicap to their educational progress. Thus, the attendance of kindergarten is recommended prior to entering mandatory education.

“Whereas for German children there is no clear correlation between kindergarten attendance and later school success, this observation does not hold in the case of non-German children. Of those foreign children who had attended kindergarten 51.4% succeeded in entering intermediate or higher secondary school tracks. In contrast, only 21.3% of the children who had not attended kindergarten reached the same school level.” (Söhn et al, 2008, p. 101).

Therefore, attending kindergarten seems especially important in the German educational system, where compulsory education only starts at the age of six. This seems to be particularly true for Turkish immigrants, due to the aforementioned lack of exposure to the German language at home. However, approximately 44% of the Turkish children do not attend kindergarten (Von Below, 2003, p. 66).

After the completion of primary school a selection procedure based on pupils' academic abilities takes place to position them in the 'appropriate' school track. Secondary education is divided into three different school types: *Gymnasium*, *Hauptschule* and *Realschule*. *Gymnasium* is attended by pupils with higher grades and leads to the *Abitur* certificate and subsequently to the possibility of attending university. *Realschule* is considered the intermediate type of secondary education and leads normally to higher vocational schools. In *Hauptschule* the same subjects are taught at a slower pace and pupils have also the opportunity to enroll in a vocational school until the age of 18. Although pupils have the possibility to switch to a higher-level school type, it rarely occurs.

Besides language problems there are other factors that contribute to the poor performance of students with migration backgrounds. For instance, the already mentioned parents academic background. The first two decades of the 'economic miracle' were characterized by a constant inflow of young, unskilled workers coming from southern countries. A majority of Turkish *Gastarbeiter* were male workers from rural poor background without German language knowledge. Most of them had not even finished primary school. This background has a direct impact on their children, since many are not able to help them with their homework and do not even promote their stay at school (Erzan et al, 2008, pp. 108 – 109; Luft, 2009, p. 252). Furthermore, Turkish parents do not understand the German education system, thus it is more difficult for them to help their children. According to Richard Alba and Viktor Nee, a third of pupils with at least one non-German speaking parent attend *Hauptschule*, while this figure drops by 50% if both parents have good German language knowledge (1994, pp. 218).


2.5. Women and family structure

In the 1960s there was an inflow of Turkish male migration from Germany, mainly encompassing unskilled workers. The economic crisis of 1966/67 and the subsequent *Anwerbestopp* adopted by German policy-makers in 1973 gradually led to a shift in the initial migration waves to a second phase of family migration.

Turkish nationals' initial aspirations changed: they decided to settle and opted for family reunification. Consequently, there was a significant increase in the number of women and children. In 1974, "increased family reunification led to one million residents of Turkish nationality living in Germany among which only 600,000 were workers" (Sonmez et al, 2008, p. 5). The proportion of female Turkish migrants in the country increased from approx. 35% in 1974 to 42% in 1985 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1974; Statistisches Bundesamt, 1985). Family reunification has become the main source of legal incoming migration from Turkey. In the past years the number of visas granted for the purpose of family reunification to Turkish nationals has been gradually declining, from 25,068 in 2002 to 11,980 in 2006 (BAMF, 2007, pp. 40 – 41). However, Turkey remains the main country of origin for family reunification migration in Germany. By 2009 the percentage of Turkish women in Germany was of 47.6% (BAMF, 2009, p. 223). The feminization of the Turkish incoming population in Germany has had effects on the integration levels of this specific immigrant group. The Turkish community is not a homogeneous group anymore. Studies repeatedly show that the female Turkish population is still significantly less integrated than the male one.

In terms of educational attainments, young Turkish women have slight poorer academic achievement than their male fellows. In 2007, around 35% did not obtain a school degree in comparison to approx. 23% of Turkish men (see figure 7). Among those who completed compulsory education, the majority attended *Hauptschule* (40.8%) or *Realschule* (13.3%), the two lowest school tracks in the German school system. Only 10.2% obtain the *Abitur* certificate. Striking educational differences based in gender begin after completing the secondary education. The high rate of young marriages and the patriarchal family structures that prevail in the Turkish culture cause an acute decrease of female enrollment in post-secondary education. Around 80% of Turkish women do not obtain a vocational certificate and only around 2.5% complete university studies (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009, pp. 182 – 183). Thus, Turkish male migrants' average years of schooling exceeds that of women.

Figure 7: Turkish pupils by gender and type of school, 2007



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2007 Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 (Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2007)

Currently, gender inequalities still exist in the German labor market. The labor force participation rate of Turkish women (29%) is significantly below to the employment rate of Turkish men (46%) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005)⁵. Furthermore, the unemployment rate among Turkish women is also considerably high. According to the micro census conducted in 2005, around 47% of women aged between 20 and 26 years old are unemployed or economically inactive, this later term refers mainly to housewives. In contrast, approx 29% of Turkish men in the same age range are unemployed or economically inactive. The significant share of women that stay at home and become housewives also differs with the German native female population (10%) and even with the average of economically inactive women with migrant origins (23%).

The employment rate decreases drastically among married Turkish migrant women (Von Below, 2003, p. 55). More than half of them become housewives

⁵ Employment rates of Turkish men and women between 20 to 26 years old.

and therefore economically dependent to their husband.⁶ This situation is once more a result of the firmly established traditional gender roles in the Turkish culture and the impact of conventional family structures (Avenarius et al, 2006, pp. 172 – 173). Thirty five percent of Turkish migrants aged between 18 and 30 stated that they believe in traditional gender roles (Von Below, 2010, p. 215).

Turkish family ties and conventional structures are upheld by keeping in contact to family members of Turkish origin. Intra-ethnic and trans-national marriages are still common among second generation Turkish migrants in Germany (61.1%), which imply the existence of strong ties with their home country and culture (Kontos, 2007, p. 8). According to the micro census conducted in 2008, only around 3% of Turkish women marry with native German and approx. 8% of Turkish men (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). In addition, outside the family Turkish migrants also keep a tight contact to members of their own community. For instance, the Turkish community is the migrant group that builds fewest friendships with native Germans (14%) (BAMF, 2010, p. 6).

The above described family structures, the isolation of Turkish women, the high unemployment rates and poor academic achievements has led politicians, academics and citizens fear the emergence of ‘parallel societies’. This term denotes segregated immigrant communities that “practice a form of voluntary segregation, are unwilling to integrate themselves into German society and are a danger to the liberal democratic base of the German state.” (Hiscott, 2005, p. 1).

The so called parallel societies fit in the image portrayed by the media and literature of Turkish female women. They are frequently associated with domestic violence, forced marriages and honor killings. This association has created a cultural barrier between Turkish migrants and native Germans, who believe that these types of crimes form part of the Turkish culture and way of life. This fabricated perception deeply damages Turkish-German relations and promotes the isolation of the Turkish community (Karcher, 2010, pp. 19 -20).

⁶ According to the data obtained by the Federal Statistical Office in 2009, around 54% of Turkish women depend economically on their family members’ income (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009, 236 – 237).

Unfortunately the number of studies on violence against Turkish women in Germany is limited. It is unknown the number of Turkish families who defend and practice honor killings in Germany. According to a representative study of violence against women published in 2004 37% of all interviewees had experienced at least one form of physical violence since the age of 16.⁷ In the case of Turkish migrant women, this percentage increased significantly to around 46%. Besides they had suffered more violent forms of violence, such as be threaten with a weapon or beaten up. Turkish women (9%) suffered less sexual violence than natives (12%) or possibly it was reported less frequently due to cultural taboos (BMFSFJ, 2004, pp. 116 – 133).

On the whole, the above described family structure, high unemployment rate among first and second generation Turkish female migrants, their isolation, language barriers and reduced contact to native Germans results in an extremely poor integration level.

2.6. Public perception of immigration

Over the past decade Germany has been placed among the top four countries in the European Union that display a negative perception towards immigrants (Guiraudon, 2000, p. 164). In a survey conducted by the major US think tank the German Marshal Fund Germany was ranked the second in associating immigration with crime (46%). In addition, around 60% of German interviewees believed that immigrants benefited from social and health services and did not contribute to society. Germany had the lowest number of respondents who believed that Muslims were well integrated (36%) (German Marshall Fund, 2011, pp.)

⁷ The study was based on 10, 264 interviews conducted nationwide. There were supplementary studies conducted with different immigration groups, such as the Turks. 250 Turkish women were interviewed.

The growing discrimination in the country is possibly rooted to its past migratory history. Until the year 2000 Germany was not officially considered an immigration land and therefore the integration of immigrants was not a debated in the political and public sphere. Germans believed Gastarbeiter were temporary workers. In 1966 a study organized by the institute INFAS stated that two thirds of the native population desired the return of immigrants to their home country. By the 1980s the percentage had increased to approx. 82% (Guiraudon, 2000, pp. 157 – 163). The acceptance that immigrants had become permanent residents resulted in the acknowledgment that “Germany is an immigration country”. Consequently, integration became a hot debated issue. Immigration and integration related issues frequently made headlines of newspapers and the question of whether immigrants were successfully integrated entered the political and public debate.

The Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that “multiculturalism had failed”. The term “parallel societies” is regularly used in the political debate to imply that immigrants opt for segregation and actively refuse to integrate by not acquiring the necessary linguistic and cultural knowledge leading to a poor economic and social integration in the host society. Immigrants, especially the Turkish population residing in the country, have been indirectly blamed for their integration problems. The German banker Thilo Sarrazin published the book “Germany Does Away with Itself”, where he claimed that Turkish immigrants were not willing to integrate and fuelled a debate about integration in the country. Despite being accused of xenophobic and racist, he has divided Germany’s public opinion and found many followers (Spiegel Online, 2010).

Germans have not a homogeneous opinion of all immigrant groups. According to an opinion poll⁸ conducted by Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony Turks are the least sympathized by the German population. While around 9% of the interviewees consider their Turkish neighbors “very pleasant”, 38% had a negative attitude towards them. In contrast 40.9% of the Turkish participants liked

⁸ 1600 first and second generation Turkish immigrants and more than 20.000 young participated in the opinion poll.

their German neighbors and only 9% disliked them (Drobinski et al, 2010). Other findings confirm a negative public attitude towards Muslims (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005, p. 589).

The German opinion of Turkish immigrants is partly based on the negative image portrayed by the media and the abovementioned political debate. Issues such as domestic violence, possible terrorist threats and parallel societies have frequently made headlines in Germany. The image of the Turkish female immigrant is habitually associated to honor killings, forced marriages and domestic violence. This fabricated image has created a cultural barrier between Turkish and native Germans, who strongly believe that these crimes form part of the Turkish culture (Karcher, 2010, pp. 19 -20). In addition, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have contributed to increase the discrimination towards Muslim immigrants.

It is essential to implement anti-discrimination measures in all aspects of society to improve the image of immigrant groups in Germany, especially Turkish immigrants. Integration is a two-way process and therefore the predisposition of native Germans towards third-country nationals is fundamental for a successful integration.

3. Moroccan integration in Spain

3.1. Historical context and legislation overview

Traditionally Spain has been an emigrant rather than an immigrant country. During the 19th and 20th century increasing waves of Spaniards went to Latin America and other European countries. At the beginning of the 20th century the main destination countries were Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela. By the 1950s European countries, such as Germany, Switzerland and France, had gained popularity due to their geographical proximity and promising job opportunities on the basis of bilateral recruitment agreements. On the one hand, the number of Spanish emigrants who went overseas decreased gradually during the next two decades, from 55,314 in 1950 to 3,345 in 1983. On the other hand, a total of 2,341,004 Spaniards emigrated to European countries between 1960 and 1973 (Sagaama, 2009, pp. 106 - 113). The economic crisis of 1966/67 worsened by the oil crisis of 1973 put an end to labor recruitment and led to a noteworthy decrease of Spanish emigrants. However, emigration continued through family reunification and controlled recruitment programs. The end of the Spanish dictatorship and the subsequent entry of Spain in the European Community in 1986 gradually ended the waves of emigrants and initiated a return migration. During the 1980s and 1990s, a total of 1.5 million Spaniards returned home. It was probably not only due to the change in the political situation of the country but also due to the fact that a significant number of guest workers had reached retiring age and wished to spend their remaining days in Spain (Focus migration, 2008, pp. 1 – 4).

Since the mid-1970s Spain steadily changed from an emigration to an immigration country. This shift was not only due to its favorable economic conditions and change in the political situation of the country. The stricter labor conditions that were imposed in traditional European immigration countries, like France, Germany and Switzerland, made immigrants start to consider Spain as an alternative. Until the mid-80s Spain's borders were still easy enough to cross and its immigration policy was not fully established. In addition, the increasing


internal population movements from rural to urban areas and the improvement in the educational attainments of the native population produced a shortage of unskilled workers in certain sectors, such as agriculture and construction. The growing informal economy in the country also attracted numerous undocumented workers (Castles et al, 2000, p. 181). Spain's strategic geographical position also contributed to the drastic increase of incoming immigrants, especially from Northern Africa.

At the beginning, most incoming immigrants were elderly retired northern and western Europeans looking for a warmer place to retire. They were not perceived as *immigrants* by the Spanish population rather as tourists or rich residents, due to their middle or high class status (Sagaaman, 2009, p. 131). The term *immigrant* is associated to a low income foreigner looking for job opportunities. Soon the economic stability present in Spain and its entrance to the European Community attracted migrant workers from different geographical regions. The first waves of economic immigrants came from North Africa, specifically from Morocco.

During the 20th century there have been regular flows of population between Morocco and Spain due to its geographical proximity and historical ties. Spain was under Moroccan rule for seven centuries and Morocco became a Spanish protectorate during the first half of the 20th century (Rubio Marín, 2009 p. 31). Until the 1970s, Moroccans considered Spain merely a transit country, through which labor immigrants could get to other European countries, such as France, Germany, Belgium and Holland. A bilateral agreement signed between Morocco and Spain in 1964 allowed its citizens to enter Spanish territory without visa requirements. During the 1960s, Moroccan immigration to Spain was limited to middle class Jews fleeing from the increasing Arab nationalism present in Morocco after it gained its independence in 1956. An insignificant number of immigrants coming from Morocco were Muslims looking for work in the agricultural or construction sector. By the mid 1970s Moroccan workers increasingly decided to settle in Spain due to the restrictive migration policies adopted by traditional European countries as a consequence of the economic crisis of 1966/67 and the oil crisis of 1973. Bilateral recruitment agreements signed by

Morocco with France (1963), the former West Germany (1963), Belgium (1964) and the Netherlands (1969) were ended (Requena et al, 2009, pp. 251 – 255). In the decade of the 1970 the Moroccan community in the country was doubled. There was an intensification of labor migration and a drastic decline of Moroccan Jews. By the 1980s the push and pull factors of incoming Moroccans were primarily economic (Pérez-Díaz et al, 2004, pp. 211 – 212). They were employed in low-wage unskilled jobs, mainly in the agriculture and construction sectors. The Moroccan immigrant population increased steadily during the next two decades (see figure 8). The first waves of Moroccan immigrants were followed by migrants from East Asia, central Africa, Latin America and in recent years from Eastern Europe.

Figure 8: Evolution of Moroccan immigrant stock in Spain (1992 - 2008)




Source: INE, padrón 2008

Currently the immigrant population in Spain is not geographically or culturally homogeneous. The composition of its foreign population consists of immigrants from all continents. The majority are citizens from the European Union (40.2%) due to the increase immigration from Central and Eastern Europe over the past decade, followed by nationals from South America (29.5%) and the African continent (17.2%) (see figure 9). Based on nationality, Moroccans were considered the largest community of immigrants in Spain until 2007. However, in


2008 Romanians nationals became the most numerous immigrant group in the country, representing 11.7% of the total foreign population (see figure 10). In contrast, Moroccans account for 11.3% of the total number of foreign residents and are the largest African nationality (approx. 72%) (Sagaama, 2009, p. 137).

Figure 9: Percentage of foreign population based on regions



Source: Spanish National Statistic Institute (Sagaama, 2009, pp. 134 – 135)

Figure 10: Percentage of foreign population based on countries of origin



Source: Spanish National Statistic Institute, *Padrón Municipal* (Sagaama, 2009, p. 292)

The transformation of Spain in an immigration country required the development of a political immigration framework. In the following paragraphs the key Spanish immigration laws will be explained.

Until 1985 Spain lacked of regulation of policies related to the settlement of foreign nationals in the country. The first Immigration Law was adopted in 1985 to comply with the prerequisites needed for the successful accession of Spain to the European Community (EC) in 1986. At that time, migration issues were not included in the political agenda or in public debates. The pressure exerted by the EC to strengthen Spain's borders to avoid incoming non-EC citizens resulted in the adoption of legislation aimed at controlling migration rather than developing an integration policy. Thus, the Immigration Law of 1985 (*la Ley de Extranjería*) focused on reinforcing border controls (Focus migration, 2008, p. 3). It did not recognize family reunification, promoted temporary migration and it limited immigrants' social rights. In addition, the terms adopted for immigrants to enter legally the country were virtually impossible to meet. The prerequisite for immigrants to be granted a visa in their country of origin was to receive a job contract from a Spanish employer. The difficulty to fulfill this requirement resulted in the illegal entrance of immigrants to the country or by means of a tourist visa (Aja, 2006, pp. 20 – 21).

At the beginning of the 1990s migration issues slowly entered the political debate. The entrance of Spain into the Schengen agreement in 1991 triggered the introduction of new regulations that shaped all areas of migration legislation. Spanish authorities were still mainly concerned about security issues. A visa requirement was introduced for numerous countries, including Morocco and Tunisia. Border controls were tightened and the asylum policy was amended (Rohrmoser, 2009, p. 70). As a result of the restrictive legislation the stock of undocumented immigrants further increased. Among them the huge majority were Moroccan citizens (Moreno, 2000, pp. 12 – 14). With the growing number of illegal immigrants the topic soon became a hotly debated issue in Spain. To regulate migration flows and reduce illegal migration the Spanish government implemented several initiatives.

Initially, it resorted to regulation campaigns to legalize undocumented immigrants residing in the country (Moreno, 2000, p. 20). In 1991, more than 100,000 undocumented workers were legalized; among them 44% were Moroccans (Martín Pérez, 2010, p. 18). Even though the regulation processes were conceived as a one-time measure, they have been implemented repeatedly in the past two decades (1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005). In all campaigns Moroccans have been the largest immigrant group, which illustrates the significant stock of undocumented Moroccans in the country. In addition, in the 1990s an annual quota system was adopted to cover the shortage of labor in specific sectors in the Spanish labor market by hiring legal immigrants. However, illegal immigrants used it to regulate their status in Spain. In 2002, the quota system was modified. Prior to granting working permits to foreign workers, no unemployed Spanish native workers had to be available. Besides, to avoid illegal immigration, foreign workers had to be hired from their country of origin.

During the 1990s, besides the development of a restrictive immigration framework, the first integration steps were implemented. In 1993, the General Office for Migration dependent on the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs was created. A year later the first official national strategy of integration was drafted. However, the so-called ‘National Plan for the Integration of Immigrants’ was not binding and focused again on controlling mechanisms (Aparicio et al, 2003, p. 229). The lack of a solid national integration framework led to the development of timid integration initiatives at a local and regional level.

In the year 2000 began a new phase of migration policy with the adoption of the ‘Law Concerning the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners and their Social Integration’ (*Ley Orgánica 4/2000*) by the Socialist Party (PSOE) (Sagaama, 2009, pp. 178 – 191). The new law aimed at resolving the increasing social problems in the country. Immigration was finally acknowledged and it became a controversial issue in the political arena. The new Immigration Law promoted the development of social integration policies and facilitated legal migration. Family reunification rights were accepted and immigrants’ social rights, such as education, health and legal assistance, were enhanced. Besides, education and

health rights were also granted to illegal residents. Despite the liberal approach adopted, the existing controlling mechanisms remained unchanged. This Immigration Law was amended three times as a result of the changes in the government constellation. In March 2000, the Popular Party (PP) won the parliamentary elections and decided to tighten the new law (*Ley Orgánica 8/2000*) to restrict the rights of illegal immigrants (Aja, 2006, pp. 30 – 34).⁹ Furthermore multiple agreements were signed with a number of countries to try to reduce illegal migration. In 2001, a bilateral agreement was concluded with Morocco to regulate temporary migration to the country. Temporary working permits were to be granted to Moroccan citizens to cover the shortage of unskilled workers of certain sectors. In addition, Morocco agreed to accept the return of Moroccan workers who had entered unlawfully the country. Due to political disagreements, the treaty did not come into effect until 2005 (Focus migration, 2010, p. 8).

The law 8/2000 also promoted the emergence of the so-called *Plan Greco*. It was presented as a multilayer initiative of limited duration (2001 – 2004) aimed at the implementation of integration policies at a regional and local level to improve the integration of the immigrant population. However, according to Eliseo Aja, in practice it just enumerated a number of unconnected and incoherent projects and it was not successful (ILO, 2009; Aja, 2006, pp. 34 - 35). Two more instruments were created to promote integration: the Immigration Integration Forum and the Permanent Immigration Observatory (OPI). The Forum was established as an assistant body to the government and the OPI was conceived to facilitate the coordination and cooperation of the Spanish national government with the autonomous communities.

The immigration law was modified again three years later and jointly approved by the two main ruling parties, PSOE and PP (*Ley Orgánica 11/ 2003*). It focused on relating immigration, domestic violence and public safety (Aja, 2006, p. 36). The

⁹ By 2003 the rate of illegal Moroccan migrants reached 26% of the total Moroccan population registered in the country (Colectivo Ioé, 2010, pp. 1 – 2).

Spanish change of government on March 14, 2004, from the Conservative Party (PP) to the Socialist Party (PSOE) shifted migration policies again towards a more liberal approach and led to the adoption of a new amendment in the law (*Ley Orgánica 14/2003*). New integration policies were adopted and a campaign to legalize undocumented migrants took place in 2005.

In 2007 the ‘Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration 2007 - 2010’ was adopted with the aim of defining national guidelines for integration programs and promoting social cohesion. Based on the European common agenda for integration, the concept of integration was defined as a “two-way process of mutual adaptation”. “Immigrants themselves and all social players must share the responsibility for the integration process and its management.” (Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración, 2007, p. 20). It is based on the three principles: equality and non-discrimination; citizenship and interculturality.

Over the past decade migration has become one of the most controversial issues in Spanish public debate due to the drastic and rapid increase of the migration population during this period of time. From 1975 to the year 2000 the foreign population increased drastically. By the beginning of the century Spain’s foreign population represented 2.5% of the average Spanish population. By 2005 it increased by around 40% and by 2008 it had increased to 6,044,528 people by 2008, accounting for around 13% of the national population (Reher, 2009, p. 289). The increase in the total number of immigrants, the need to reinforce integration policies and to adopt a number of European directives on immigration has led to the drafting of a new immigration law (Aja, 2009, p. 25 – 40). The most significant changes are the automatic acquisition of a working permit for reunified family members and the reduction of family reunification rights.

In the following chapter we are going to analyze whether the Moroccan immigrants are successfully integrated in the Spanish society by means of a number of factors: naturalization, employment rate, education, women and religion.

3.2. Administrative status


Spanish nationality legislation reflects the position of a traditional emigration country. It is mainly based on the principle of *ius sanguinis* (nationality is acquired by descent) to preserve links with the community of emigrated Spaniards and their descendants. Nevertheless, the system includes *ius solis* elements “for those born in Spain only if one of the parents was also born in Spain (double *ius solis*)” (Rubio Marín et al, 2010, p. 11). Automatic acquisition of the Spanish nationality is also granted to children younger than 18 years through adoption.

Legislation envisages other modes to acquire the Spanish nationality. The most common way for foreign nationals to obtain the nationality is by residence. Non-automatic acquisition of nationality by residence requires ten years of continuous and legal residence, renunciation of the previous nationality, an oath of loyalty to the King and to the Spanish Constitution, proof of good civic conduct, sufficient social integration and registration in the Civil Registry (art. 23 of the Civil Code). Language knowledge is not an official requirement, however authorities may ask for basic Spanish language to prove their social integration in the country (Rubio Marín, 2009, p.20). Residence requirements are shortened to two years for citizens from Latin American countries, Portugal, Andorra, Philippines and Equatorial Guinea and for Sephardic Jews based on their common historical ties. In addition, dual nationality is tolerated for nationals from the latter group of countries (art.23.b and 24.1 of the Civil Code). At the beginning, bilateral agreements were signed with countries with a significant stock of emigrated Spaniards to avoid their loss of the Spanish nationality. Since 1990 it was extended to countries with common cultural, historical and linguistic ties.

The number of foreigners naturalized since the mid-1980s has gradually increased from 3,709 in 1985 to 71,810 in 2007. In 1997, only around 1.5% of Moroccan immigrants had been granted the Spanish nationality (1,056 out of 77,189) while nationals from Latin American countries, such as Argentina (7.5%) or Peru (6.4%) were naturalized in a higher proportion. In 2000 this ratios remained similar: 1.18% of Moroccans (1,921 out of 161,870) received the nationality. During the following decade, Moroccans’ naturalization rates increased gradually

from 2,822 in 2001 to 8,615 in 2008 due to the fulfillment of the ten-year residence requirement. During this period of time Moroccans were always among the top three most naturalized immigration communities (see figure 11), despite having stricter naturalization requirements as other immigrant groups. This is possibly explained by the high stock of Moroccan immigrants residing in Spain (Martín Pérez et al, 2010., p. 10).


Figure 11: Naturalization by countries of origin



Source: Spanish National Statistics Institute 2009

In the year 2009, around 51% of Moroccan immigrants naturalized by means of residence, while approx. 34% acquired the Spanish nationality by double *ius solis*. (see figure 12). This implies that the Moroccan community has a relatively long presence in Spain, as double *ius solis* is granted to third generation immigrants. The number of Moroccans that received the nationality by marriage is relatively low (14.04%). Intra-ethnic and trans-national marriages prevail among the Moroccan community, due to cultural and religious reasons. In 2009, around 87% of all marriages were with people from their same community. Intra-ethnic marriages help maintain ties with their home country and culture (Requena et al, 2009, pp. 281 – 282).

Figure 12: Moroccans' reasons for naturalization. 2009



Source: Spanish National Statistic Institute 2009

There are a limited number of surveys that examine to what extent the acquisition of Spanish the nationality contributes to a better integration of Moroccan nationals in the country. Nevertheless, recent OECD findings state that “naturalized immigrants tend to have better labor market outcomes than foreign-born foreigners, even after controlling for other factors such as education, country of origin, and length of stay.” (Liebig, 2010, p. 2).

3.3. Economic integration

Employment is fundamental in the integration process, in order for immigrants to sustain themselves economically and form part of the host society. The economic integration of immigrants remains an important issue for the Spanish government. This has been materialized by the fact that it is the Ministry of Labor and Immigration the one in charge of “the migratory policy defined by the government regarding immigration, integration of immigrants, and Spanish citizenship abroad” (MTIN, 2010). The economic performance of Moroccan immigrants is fundamental to their successful integration due to the economic nature of the

migration. In the present section, labor market integration of Moroccans will be measured by analyzing employment status, earnings and occupational sectors.


The economic nature of Moroccan immigrants is reflected in the age and sex structure of the population. Moroccans have a high proportion of people among the working age population. Around 67% are aged between 16 and 39, a fifth are in the 40 – 64 age group and only about 1% are aged 65 or above (Arango et al, 2009, p. 14). Other immigrant groups, such as Latin Americans or East Europeans, have also a relatively young population; however Moroccans are the immigrant group with the largest working age population despite being the one residing longer in the country. This is due to their early average arrival age of 26 (Requena et al, 2009, pp. 258 – 259). Furthermore, among Moroccan immigrants there is a relatively high proportion of male workers. This again differs with their long stay in the country, as usually by then the number of women should have increased through family reunification. According to the National Immigration Survey (INE) in 2007, there were 76% more Moroccan men than women (Requena et al, 2009, p. 299). This feature prevails among Moroccan immigrants in contrast to other migrant groups, especially the ones coming from Latin America: sex ratios are even (Argentina, Peru) or there is even an overrepresentation of women (Colombia; Ecuador). Despite the significant share of Moroccans in the working age population, their integration in the labor market tends to be worse than the native population or even other immigrant groups.

From 1995 to 2007 Spain experienced a period of continuous economic growth and stability. As a result, the percentage of immigrant workers employed in the Spanish labor market increased to around 19% (Colectivo Ioé, 2010, p. 2). However, economic integration differs amongst the multiple immigration groups. In the case of Moroccans, in 2007 their employment rate was below 60% (see figure 13)¹⁰. With the exception of immigrants coming from developed countries, such as Germany and England, as the majority is already retired; this rate is the lowest among all immigrant groups in Spain. The low economic performance can

¹⁰ Approximately 89% of male Moroccans were economically active and around 40% of women.

be partly explained by the low economic activity of female Moroccan immigrants: only around 41% were actively employed. The majority were economically inactive and only one third of those who are willing to work were employed. Those economically inactive stay at home and the others are mainly employed in the domestic sector¹¹. Their employment rate is even lower than the one of women coming from developed countries (with the exception of those coming from Great Britain). Besides, the unemployment rate of Moroccans is relatively high: 11.7% of active Moroccan men and 22.1% of active women were unemployed in 2007. In comparison the unemployment rate among Spaniards was of only 5.4% of men and 9.9% of women that same year. (Arango et al, 2009, p. 15).

Figure 13: Economic status of immigrants by country of origin



Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes, 2007 (Requena et al, 2009, p. 303)


Moroccan migrants are concentrated in the agriculture, construction and service sectors¹² and within them in the lower skilled segments and low paid jobs (figure 14). Around 75% are employed in unskilled jobs and approx. 90% are wage-

¹¹ Many do not form part of the statistics because they have an illegal status.

¹² With regards to the service sector, many are female workers who work in the domestic sector.


earners. In addition, they usually work in seasonal jobs and have short-term contracts. In 2007 after Romanians (63.3%) Moroccans (62.9%) were the immigrant group most employed in temporary jobs (Colectivo Ioé, 2010, p. 2). The economic integration of immigrants is usually correlated to the number of years residing in the host country. For instance, a third of immigrants that arrived to Spain before 1987 find employment in the higher section of the occupational scale, working in managerial and professional occupations (ENI, 2009, p. 206). However, despite the many years of residence Moroccans remain in low-skilled jobs (ENI, 2007, p 105). They occupy the most changeable, precarious and unstable jobs. With regards to income, their monthly average salary is below the median wage of the native population. Nevertheless, it is not ranked the lowest among all immigrant groups (see figure 15). Their low economic performance can be explained by their low educational attainments, cultural differences and discrimination in recruitment. Their level of education is among the lowest. In 2007, around 21% of first generation Moroccan immigrants stated to be illiterate and approx. 60% had not completed compulsory education (ENI, 2007, pp. 29 – 30).

Figure 14: Employment sector by country of origin



Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes, 2007 (Requena et al, 2009, p. 303)

Figure 15: Monthly average income by country of origin in 2007



Source: Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes 2007 (Colectivo Ioé, 2010, p. 3)

The economic performance of Moroccan immigrants was significantly worsened by the current financial crisis. Since 2007 the economic crisis has deteriorated the state of the Spanish labor market and increased drastically the level of unemployment in the country to around 21% of the total population in 2010. The immigrant population has been severely affected. While the unemployment rate of native Spanish was 15.2% in 2009, among immigrants it had risen to approx. 29%. They account for 26.4% of the unemployed workers in the country (ENI, 2007, pp. 11 – 12). Among immigrants, the economic integration of Moroccans deteriorated the most, followed closely by Romanians and Ecuadorians. Between 2007 and 2010 their unemployment rate increased dramatically. Younger generations of Moroccans are affected the most. The unemployment rate of Moroccan workers under 25 years old has risen to about 62.5%, while among worker aged 40 or above it is approx. 40% (Colectivo Ioé, 2010, p.1). With a breakdown by gender, 41.7% of Moroccan men are unemployed and 51.2% of female Moroccans. While the high unemployment rates of other immigrant groups, such as Romanians, are due to their significant increase in their active population, in the case of Moroccans unemployment is a direct consequence of

the loss of jobs. Around 26% of migrants coming from Morocco lost their jobs due to the reduction of seasonal, temporary and unskilled jobs in the construction sector. In addition, there has been a gradual decrease in the number of working permits granted. The permits have declined from 17,000 in June 2008 to 3,450 in December of the same year (ENI, 2007, p. 23). Irregular immigrants from Morocco have been significantly affected by employment cuts. Around 46% have lost their jobs and due to their illegal status they have not been able to receive unemployment benefits.

Long-term unemployment affects negatively social cohesion and family structures. In the case of Moroccans, return migration has never been a feature of this immigrant group. This immigrant group has always wanted to stay permanently in the country. However, the reduction of income has gradually started return waves of children and wives to their country of origin, while the husband stays in Spain.

On the whole, Moroccans' economic integration faces high levels of unemployment, high proportion of low-skilled, low-paid jobs, short-term contracts and high rates of turnovers.

3.4. Education

Findings have repeatedly showed that education and linguistic abilities have on the one hand a strong impact on the future professional life of immigrants and contribute to enhance their social integration in the host country. On the other hand, they have been acknowledged as a tool to promote respect, tolerance and equality among the native population.

Until the year 2000, the right to access to education was limited to foreigners with legal status. The Immigration Law 4/2000 *Concerning the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration* granted equal access to compulsory education to all minor immigrants, regardless of their legal status. Non-resident foreigners under 18 have “access to basic, free and obligatory

education”; have the right to obtain “the corresponding academic title” and have “access to public financial aid system” (Law 4/2000, article 9). In 2007 the Constitutional Court extended the access to education to all persons, regardless of their legal status, age or educational level they want to attend (Zarauz, 2008, p. 62).

In the Spanish educational system there has been a drastic increase of the share of immigration population. In 2007, the number of foreign pupils represented 8.35% and in some autonomous communities it has even reached 15%. Pupils from Latin America are the largest group (43%), followed by Africans and Eastern Europeans. Based on countries of origin, after Ecuadorians Moroccans (90,955 students, approx. 14%) are the most widely represented (Maiztegui-Oñate et al, 2010, p. 2).

According to the National Immigrant Survey (ENI), the overall educational attainment of the immigrant population is slightly worse than the one of the native Spanish population (Izquierdo, 2003, pp. 28 – 29; ENI, 2007, pp. 29 – 30). PISA results confirm the low performance of immigrant pupils in all analyzed areas: mathematics, reading and science. Around 60% of the immigrant population aged 20 to 34 years have completed the compulsory secondary education, 17% have higher education studies and 23% have only completed primary education. However, the level of education varies significantly between different regions of origin. While immigrants coming from developed countries have a higher level of education, North African migrants and specifically those coming from Morocco have extremely low education performances. The number of illiterate first generation immigrants coming from Morocco is around 21% and approx. 58% have not completed their secondary education (Requena et al, 2009, pp 263 – 264). Their average years of school attended is about 11. There is a high rate of drop-out and a high proportion does not want to continue their studies beyond secondary education. In fact, the population of Moroccan origin “is one of the highest in obligatory secondary education, and at the same time, one of the lowest in higher education” (Maiztegui-Oñate et al, 2010, p. 2). In general, Moroccan

pupils tend to attend vocational training. This could be partly due to their interest in accessing the labor market to help their families economically.

Gender differences constitute a distinct feature among Moroccan immigrants. In this immigrant group, there are a higher proportion of illiterate women. In addition, there are fewer women enrolled in secondary and university education. In 2007, around 6% of Moroccan female immigrants had completed university studies, versus 9 % of men. In general, women tend to study fewer years than men (Arango et al, 2009, p. 14).

Cultural differences, linguistic barriers and low socio-economic and educational status of the parents pose severe problems and hinder the successful integration of immigrant pupils in the Spanish educational system. In comparison to immigrants from Latin America that share the same language with Spaniards, Moroccan immigrants face linguistic barriers that worsen their education performance. Around 30% of first generation immigrants from Morocco do not speak Spanish and less than half declare to have a good command of the Spanish language (Requena et al, 2009, pp. 277 – 278). With regards to education, knowledge of the Spanish language is strongly correlated to the incorporation age of pupils to the school system. If the child incorporates at an early age to school he/she overcomes linguistic difficulties.

The Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration 2007 – 2010 promotes tuition in the mother tongue and the preservation of the culture of origin in the school system by means of a number of measures. The incorporation of the mother tongue in the instruction of immigrant pupils is considered fundamental in their education (Eurodyce, 2009, p. 2), as it enhances their self-esteem and helps immigrant children acknowledge their family roots. Proficiency in their language of origin also makes it easier for pupils that arrived at a later age to learn the language of the country. However, adopting measures to integrate the language of origin in the school curriculum has proven to be costly and difficult to organize. In the case of Arabic language, in 1980 Spain signed a bilateral agreement with Morocco to promote the teaching of the language and culture in schools (Aja et al, 2006, pp. 269 – 270). In practice, the success of this agreement has been limited

to a few schools that have incorporated Arab as an extracurricular subject or even during regular school hours. In some Autonomous Communities, such as Catalonia, the effort has been made to incorporate tuition of the language of origin in the mainstream school curriculum.

The regular participation of parents in their children's education is essential. However, Moroccan parents encounter linguistic and cultural difficulties that hinder their involvement in the education of their children. The communication between school and parents has been enhanced by the use of cultural mediators, social workers, written information about the school system in their mother tongue and the use of immigrant pupils and/or families that have been living in the country for a longer period of time who act as interpreters (Eurodyce, 2009, pp. 12 – 14).

The poor performance of immigrant pupils can be also partly explained by the uneven distribution of the immigrant population in schools. In Spain, pupils can attend three types of school: public, private or semi-public (*colegios concertados*). The latter are privately managed but receive public funding and are obliged to follow the same guidelines as public schools. During the last years the number of native pupils in public schools has gradually decreased while the proportion of immigrants has drastically risen. In the year 2006, more than 80% of foreign pupils were enrolled in public schools and only 17% attended semi-private schools (Zapata-Barrero, 2009 pp. 81 – 83). The Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration 2007 – 2010 emphasized the importance to avoid high concentration of immigrant pupils in public schools to avoid segregation with the Spanish community and the danger of transforming public schools into “ghettos” (Maiztegui-Oñate et al, 2010, p. 3). To reverse the negative effects of this situation, the Commissions of Schooling of Immigrant Pupils have been formed to obtain an even distribution of pupils. However, in the long run it has proven to have disadvantages, like the high cost of transportation and the ethical problem of moving only migration families.

3.5. Women and family structure

During the past decades, there has been a growing feminization of migration flows in Spain, mainly due to the growing demand for unskilled workers in traditional female sectors such as domestic services. Already in the 1980s arrived the first waves of migrant women, mainly from Morocco (12%), Dominican Republic (5%) and Peru (5%) (Colectivo Ioé, 2010, p. 7). The share of foreign women increased drastically during the following years; however it did not augment evenly among all immigrant groups. While Latin American migration has been predominantly female, African migration has been characterized by the high proportion of male workers, especially among Moroccan immigrants. In the 1970s around 12% of the total Moroccan immigrant population in Spain was female migrants and it increased to approx. 32% by the year 2001 (Martín Muñoz, 2003, p. 38). According to the National Immigration Survey (INE), in 2007 there were 76% more Moroccan men than women. This meant that there were 63.8% of men and 36.2% of women (Requena et al, 2009, p. 260).

Uneven sex ratios are not unusual in early phases of migration, however the increase in family reunification and a growing recruitment of female workers in the labor market leads to a feminization of migration flows. In the case of Moroccans, despite being the immigrant group of economic nature residing the longest in the country, family reunification flows are still not significant and the flows of Moroccan male workers have even been intensified from 1998 to 2006 (Requena et al, 2009, p. 261).

Low female migration flows are due to cultural and social factors. Moroccan families respond to the model of a patriarchal family. In Morocco, while men are considered to be the “breadwinners”, women duties consist of raising a family and doing domestic chores. They are economically dependent of their husbands. Thus, the majority of female Moroccan immigrants entered the country by means of family reunification. However, Moroccan female migration flows are not completely homogeneous (Martín Muñoz, 2003, pp. 42 – 44). In addition to family reunification, since the 1980s there has been a limited number of incoming pioneer women. Most of them have an urban background and seek employment.

The low proportion of women is reflected in the household structures. Moroccans are one of the immigrant groups with a highest percentage of married members. According to the National Immigration Survey (INE), in 2007 approx. 64% were married, however 19, 6% did not live with their spouse. This percentage is drastically higher among men (15%) than among women (2%) (Requena et al, 2009, p. 262). Furthermore, Moroccans are one of the immigrant groups that cohabit in households with a high proportion of men and without a family nucleus.

Moroccan family ties and conventional structures are upheld by keeping in contact to family members of Moroccan origin. Intra-ethnic and trans-national marriages are still common among Moroccan migrants in Spain which implies the existence of strong ties with their home country and culture. Cultural and religious factors result in a high percentage of intra-ethnic marriages (87%) and a low percentage of exogamic marriages (10%). Due to the patriarchal family structures it is more difficult for Moroccan women to have a spouse of a different ethnic group. They have the lowest rate of exogamic marriages (8%) and the highest percentage of intra-ethnic marriages (89%) among all immigrant groups (Requena et al, 2009, pp. 281 – 282).

Gender inequalities are present in the Spanish labor market. The employment rate of Moroccan female immigrants (30%) is drastically below the one of Moroccan men (74%) (Requena et al, 2009, pp. 273 – 274). It is even lower than the one of women coming from developed countries. In addition, in 2007 two thirds were economically inactive. Moroccan women predominantly are employed in the domestic services, which entails little social protection and low-wages. Besides, there is a high proportion that is employed in the informal sector, where working conditions are unstable and social recognition is low. Their low participation rate in the labor market is again due to cultural and family factors.


According to the ENI, in 2007 only around 35% of female Moroccan immigrants had good knowledge of Spanish, while more than 4 out of 10 declared to have no basic knowledge of the language or need to improve it (Requena et al, 2009, p. 278).

The closed family structures, their linguistic barriers, the isolation of Moroccan women, the high unemployment rates and their precarious work conditions has led to a low socio-economic integration of this population group.

3.6. Public perception of immigration

Over the past ten years, migration has become one of the most controversial issues in Spanish public debate. The drastic and rapid increase in migrant population has “created the perception of a massive and uncontrolled flow of immigrants” (Marrero Rocha, 2005, p. 415). From 1996 to 2006 it seems that there has been a shift in public opinion towards a negative perception of migrants. According to the Survey of public opinion conducted by the Sociology Research Center (SRC) already by 2003 immigration was considered the fifth most serious issue in Spain. Two years later it was on the top three (see figure 16) and in November 2006 it was considered the first problem in the country. In addition, in 2003 around fifty percent of the interviewees associated immigration with crime. However, to the question of which problem “affects you directly” immigration is hardly mentioned. Possibly this is due to the fact that immigration could be considered as a fabricated problem by media and politicians, but it does not affect negatively the daily life of the native population (Colectivo Ioé, 2005, pp. 196 – 197). Besides, public opinion is influenced by ongoing events at the time. This explains why the current economic crisis has shifted public and political attention away from immigration and towards unemployment. During the first two years of the crisis, 2007 and 2008, immigration was not even among the top three problems of the country. However, by 2010 it had risen again to be within the top three problems with 15.4% (figure 16).

Figure 16: Problems of Spain perceived by the Spanish native population




Source: Survey of public opinion conducted by the Sociology Research Center

The periodic survey conducted by the Sociology Research Center also illustrates that Spaniards have not a homogeneous opinion of all immigrant groups. Immigrants from north-western Europe are not considered *immigrants* rather as tourist or rich residents (Sagaaman, 2009, p. 131). The term *immigrant* is used to refer to incoming third-country nationals looking for job opportunities. Among the so-called economic immigrants Spaniards express also different attitudes. On the one hand, there is a clear inclination towards Latin American due to the fact that they share the same culture, language and religion. On the other hand, African immigrants, especially Moroccans, are the ones most affected by prejudices and ethno-cultural stereotypes. Moroccans have always been the immigrant group less appreciated by the Spanish population, as can be seen from figure 17, where around 57% of Spaniards state to have no or little sympathy for this specific group. Furthermore, Moroccans have suffered from collective racist attacks (Marrero Rocha, 2005, pp. 418 – 420), like the ones that took place in Terrasa in 1999 and El Ejido in the year 2000¹³.

¹³ To read in details about the racist attacks that took place in Terrasa and El Ejido consult: Marrero Rocha, I. (2005) *The Implications of Spanish-Moroccan Governmental Relations for Moroccan Immigrants in Spain*, European Journal of Migration and Law, The Netherlands.

Figure 17: Sympathy of Spaniards towards certain immigrant groups in 2003



Source: Survey 2545 conducted by the Sociology Research center in 2003 (Requena et al, 2003, p. 283)

The Spanish opinion of Moroccan immigrants is partly based on the image portrayed by the media. The media's negative coverage of the migratory phenomenon prevails over the positive contribution of immigration to the Spanish society, such as enhancing integration, toleration and multiculturalism. Immigration is usually linked to security issues, such as prostitution, crime and drugs (Cantero Sánchez, 2001, pp. 79 – 95). In the case of Moroccans, especial attention has been given to the illegal entry of African immigrants by means of small boats called *cayucos* o *pateras*. As a consequence of the human tragedies reported and the apparently uncontrolled arrival of undocumented sub-Saharan immigrants to the coast of Andalusia illegal immigration has become a contested issue in the public and political debate. Along with the incoming illegal migrants through the strait of Gibraltar, the periodic regulations carried out by the Spanish government to legalize the situation of many undocumented migrants have also contributed to create a sense of rapid and uncontrolled growth of immigrants in the country. The last regulation taken place in 2005 may explain the fact that in the same year 'immigration' was considered by 38% of the population to be the

second worst problem in Spain (see figure 16). Illegal immigration is strongly linked to Moroccan nationals and therefore contributes to damage their public image.

Another event that may have contributed to damage the image of Moroccans in Spain are the terrorists' attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2003, which have had a profound effect on shaping Spanish foreign and security policy. It has significantly increased the negative perception of Moroccan immigrants among Spaniards. However, it is possibly not based on the fact that most of the detainees were originally from Morocco, but that the terrorists' attacks were carried out by a terrorist group extremely linked to the Islamic religion (Marrero Rocha, 2005, p 413). Besides these attacks, the high concentration of Moroccan immigrants in specific geographical regions, the difference in culture and religion also affects the image of Moroccans in Spain.

Despite the shift in public opinion towards a negative perception of migrant, within the European Union Spain is considered one of the most tolerant countries towards immigration¹⁴.

¹⁴ The Eurobarometer on racism and xenophobia of 1997 ranked Spain the third most tolerant country in Europe. The survey Sora conducted in 2001 classified Spain as "passive tolerant" (Ayerdi et al, 2008, pp. 97 – 98).

4. Comparison of integration policies and outcomes: Turks in Germany and Moroccans in Spain

During the past decade the issue of integration has gradually become a recurrent debate in the European Union. The majority of member states are confronted with integration challenges due to the regular inflow of incoming immigrants. Even though there is a growing number of initiatives at European level, member states have maintained their own integration policies. Therefore it is interesting to compare Germany and Spain due to their different immigration history and in the case of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants, their similar integration outcomes.

Germany is considered a traditional immigration country in the European Union. Since the 1950s it has been receiving regular inflows of migrant workers. In spite of its long migration history, Germany has officially a short-standing integration policy due to the fact that immigrants were not considered permanent residents until the late 1990s. It was not until the year 2000 that it was officially acknowledge that “Germany is an immigration country” and subsequently the first steps towards the development of a concrete integration policy were taken. In comparison, Spain gradually transformed from a traditional emigration to an immigration country in the beginning of the 1980s. After northern European countries imposed stricter labor conditions as a consequence of the economic crisis of the 1970s it experienced an increasing inflow of immigrants. Until the mid-1980s Spain lacked of immigration legislation. The entrance in the European Community led to the adoption of a restrictive immigration policy, focused on controlling immigration flows but far from integration policies. As in Germany, the first integration measures were adopted with the start of the new century. In the case of Spain, the integration framework developed slowly and in some cases incoherently. Immigration laws kept focused on controlling incoming migration, especially irregular immigrants. In both countries, the lack of a concrete policy on integration has directly affected the integration of their immigrant groups and the question has risen to whether the integration policies were successful. As

previously analyzed, in the case of Moroccan population in Spain and Turkish immigrants in Germany integration has failed to a large extent.

In the following section we are going to present similarities and differences of the integration policies implemented by Spain and Germany on the one hand and on the other hand the integration outcomes of both immigration communities. To compare the integration framework we are mainly going to use the last results published by the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) of the year 2010. MIPEX evaluates in detail the integration framework in 31 countries in Europe and North America and bases its results on multiple factors, such as labor market mobility, education or family reunion. Measuring integration policies is essential to confirm if immigrants' rights, responsibilities and opportunities are guaranteed on the host country in an equal basis with the native population. While Spain has been ranked among the top ten and is considered to have slightly favorable policies towards immigrants, Germany is in position twelve and its integration framework is perceived as halfway favorable to immigration (MIPEX, 2011).

4.1. Demographic structure

The economic nature of both immigrant communities is reflected in the relatively young age of its population. Nonetheless, as a result of their migration history there are significant differences in the demographic structure of both groups. While the first generation of Turkish immigrants arrived to Germany in the 1960s, Moroccan immigrants started their settlement in Spain at the beginning of the 1980s. Turks have already been in the country for an average of 23 years (BAMF, 2009, p. 14). Therefore, there is a gradual ageing of the population: more than 20% of second generation Turkish immigrant are 55 years of older. In contrast, only around 1% of Moroccans are aged 65 or above. Furthermore, 67% of Moroccans are aged 16 to 39 and a fifth is in the 40 to 64 age group (Arango et al, 2009, p. 14; Naegele, 2008). This means that the majority are in the working age population. In comparison, among Turkish immigrants there are a higher number of children due to the presence of families.

Differences in the gender distribution were also observed in both immigrant groups. While in the Moroccan community there is an overrepresentation of men (63.8%), among the Turkish immigrant population there is an even representation of both genders since the 1990s. In 2010, the male to female ratio of the Turkish immigrant population was 52.3:47.7 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011, p. 31; Requena et al, 2009, p. 260). Uneven sex ratio is typical of early phases of migration. The first generations of Turkish *Gastarbeiter* were predominantly male, however the restrictive migration policies implemented in Germany as a consequence of the oil crisis of 1973 led to the feminization of its demographic population by means of family reunification. In the case of Moroccans, despite their long length of residence in Spain (almost three decades) and their intention to stay in the country, family reunification flows are still not very significant (Requena et al, 2009, p. 261).

The feminization of migration flows has also consequences in the household's composition. While members of the Turkish community usually live in nuclear or extended households¹⁵, Moroccans cohabit in households with a high proportion of men and no family nucleus (despite being one of the immigrant groups in Spain with the highest percentage of married members) (Requena et al, 2009, p. 262).

4.2. Administrative status

In terms of access to nationality, Spain has been ranked 16th by MIPEX and is considered to have “unfavorable” naturalization policies, while Germany is in the 9th position and its naturalization process has been classified as “favorable” for integration (MIPEX, 2011, p.). Both countries privilege the acquisition of nationality by descent (*ius sanguinis*) and have set multiple prerequisites for the acquisition of citizenship. Over the past decade both legislations have undergone

¹⁵ “Nuclear household is defined as a household consisting entirely of a singly family nucleus.” “An extended household consists of a single family nucleus and other persons related to the nucleus.” (UNDATA, 2010).

amendments to facilitate naturalization for foreigners in the country. However, German policies have resulted to be significantly more open and flexible. While the German naturalization process has incorporated elements of *ius solis* for second generation migrants, in Spain automatic acquisition based on *ius solis* is granted to third generation immigrants (double *ius solis*). In addition, in Spain preferential treatment is granted to nationals from former colonies, such as significantly shorter residency requirements (two years) and tolerance of dual nationality. Citizens from African, European or Asian countries are required ten year residence and dual nationality is not accepted. The preferential treatment given to certain countries seems worrying. In particular, the exclusion of Moroccans, which constitute the largest non-European foreign community in Spain, could be argued to be unfair. To what extent are they excluded for their religion or cultural differences? On the one hand the argument of common historical ties is not valid as Spain was under Moroccan rule for seven centuries and Morocco became a Spanish protectorate in the 20th century. On the other hand, the argument of repairing historical damage can be also applicable to Moroccans, taking into account that Sephardic Jews are granted special treatment (both Moors and Sephardic Jews were expelled at the end of the 15th century of Spain) (Rubio Marín, 2009 p. 31). In Germany naturalization is granted after seven years of residency and with the fulfillment of certain criteria, such as a citizenship and language test. Language knowledge is not officially required in Spain. A prerequisite applied is proof of “good civil conduct and sufficient integration in Spanish society” (Martín Pérez et al, 2010, p.5). Even though the interpretation remains controversial, it usually means clean criminal record and basic knowledge of Spanish or a regional language (however it is applied subjectively. There is no language test).

Moroccans and Turks have both high rates of naturalization, despite the strict integration requirements. Moroccan have always been among the top three most naturalized immigrant communities in Spain and Turkish nationals make up two thirds of all naturalizations in Germany (Hailbronner, 2010, p. 25; Requena et al, 2009, pp. 281 - 282). This is possibly explained by the high stock of migrants from both communities residing in the respective country.

Naturalization is considered an essential element to evaluate the degree of integration of immigrants. Naturalized Turkish immigrants tend to have better labor market outcomes and educational attainments than Turkish nationals residing in Germany. Nevertheless, their integration level is still considerably low. Therefore, we should ask ourselves to what extent does naturalization contribute to a better integration. By itself naturalization is not a mean of integration, thus further integration measures are necessary.

4.3. Economic integration

Integration policies focus first on increasing employment rates and educational attainments among first and second generation immigrants. It is considered that integration is not possible without labor market participation as it enables immigrants to sustain themselves economically and actively participate in the host society. Besides, a lack of economic integration limits immigrants' upward mobility.

In terms of the integration legislation, Spain (ranked 4th) and Germany (ranked 6th) are considered to have 'favorable' or 'slightly favorable' economic integration policies (MIPEX, 2011, p. 8). In Spain all immigrant workers have the same access as the native population to self-employment and to the private and public sector. In contrast, in Germany equal access is guaranteed to most workers; however non-EU workers have problems accessing the public sector. In addition, since 2009 Spain grants reunited family member immediate access to the labor market to avoid the employment in the informal sector and promote the fully integration of spouses in the society. Both countries have made improvements in the recognition of foreign qualifications to promote among immigrants the finding of jobs that correspond to their qualifications. However, many works are still misplaced and employed in jobs below their education and skill level. In Germany more measures have been taken to reduce inequalities and inform immigrants about their job and educational opportunities.

Despite favorable economic integration policies, Moroccan and Turkish immigrants have low labor market participation. Common features are high levels of unemployment, short-term contracts and high rates of turnovers. In addition, they are usually wage-earners employed in low skilled and low paid jobs. For both countries, the labor market position of immigrants is less favorable than the position of natives. Nevertheless slight differences can be distinguished between both groups.

Before the economic crisis the unemployment rate for male Moroccans (11.7%) was twice as much as the Spanish average (5.4%), while the unemployment rate for male Turkish immigrant was three times higher than the native population in Germany. In comparison to Turkish immigrants, the unemployment rate gap between Moroccans and native Spaniards increased dramatically as a result of the current economic downturn. Around 26% of migrants coming from Morocco lost their jobs due to the reduction of temporary and unskilled jobs in the construction sector. The unemployment rate increased to approx. 40% in 2009 and it especially affected workers under 25 years. The crisis affected mostly irregular immigrants: around 40% lost their jobs. As a result of their illegal status they cannot receive unemployment benefits. In the case of Turkish immigrants, the majority at least benefits from *Hartz IV*, the unemployment and welfare benefits program of Germany.

In both cases, the low economic performance can be partly explained by their low educational attainments, linguistic barriers and discrimination in recruitment due to cultural differences and stereotypes. A slight distinction has to be made when comes to the Turkish community. During the 1980s and 1990s many immigrant workers in Germany lost their job and became long-term unemployed. According to Arnold Mengelkoch, this situation led to a feeling of frustration that has been transmitted to the younger generations. This feeling also contributes to a loss of faith in the system and to a lower motivation to seek better jobs. The high unemployment rate has made an increasing number of Turks opt for self-employment. The percentage of Moroccans that opened their own business is relatively low. Possibly due to the fact that they have not been long enough in the

country and many still work in the informal sector due to their illegal status. Both communities are overrepresented in the service and industrial sector.

4.4. Education

In terms of education, Turkish and Moroccans have similar educational attainments. Both communities tend to have a relatively low participation in higher education, a high rate of dropouts and at least one third has not completed compulsory education. In addition, second generation migrants tend to perform better than their parents. There are a number of common factors that hinder the successful integration of pupils from both immigrant communities in the school system: low socio-economic and academic background of parents, linguistic barriers and cultural differences. In both communities, first generation immigrants were predominantly male workers from poor economic backgrounds, without academic qualifications or language knowledge. Around 21% of incoming Moroccans are illiterate, approx. 58% have not obtained the secondary education certificate and many have not even finish primary education (ENI, 2007, pp. 29 – 30). Their educational background has a direct impact on their children.

Comparing both cases, possibly the two major differences are the structure of the school system and the importance of language courses. While Spain has a common primary and secondary education for all pupils, the German school system divides children already by the age of ten in different school tracks. Excellent school performance is essential at an early age to enter *Gymnasium* (grammar school) and its completion offers pupils the possibility to enter university. However, in the case of Turkish immigrants only around 10% attend this specific school track. The majority attend *Hauptschule* (approx. 50%) or *Realschule* (around 13%), the two lowest school tracks in the German school system (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007). According to several surveys, the problem lies partly in the linguistic barriers. The majority of Turkish immigrants

start to learn German at school. Attending school is compulsory at the age of six¹⁶ and kindergartens are available from an earlier age. However, despite the demonstrated linguistic advantages it brings to immigrant children to attend school nurseries, Turkish parents frequently opt for raising their children at home until the age of six. According to Professor Klaus Bade “the German school system decides too early which path children will take... Right away children from immigrant backgrounds are disadvantaged here, because many achievement problems depend on language deficits in the schools.” (Wroe, 2010). Besides, different experts and surveys have repeatedly stated the disadvantages that the German school system has to immigrant pupils. PISA results ranked Germany among the bottom of the list of developed countries. The UN special rapporteur Vernor Munoz strongly criticized the structure of the school system because it “excludes children from poor families and immigrant backgrounds” (Andell, 2008, p. 9).

The Spanish education system presents also disadvantages to immigrants; however they are of a different nature. It has been heavily criticized due to uneven distribution of pupils in the different school centers. There has been a high concentration of immigrant pupils in public schools, which results in the segregation of the native population from the immigrant communities. It can be argued that there is the same tendency in Germany with the placement of immigrants in the lowest school tracks. With regards to language, if Moroccan children are incorporated to school at an early age, linguistic barriers can be avoided. However, for late newcomers with linguistic difficulties there are less resources available than in Germany. Even though Spanish language courses are also offered, along with other measures, funding is limited and it is not well structured.

The importance of learning the language of the country is considered key to the successful integration of immigrants. “Basic knowledge of the host society’s

¹⁶ In Spain, compulsory education starts at the age of four.

language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration' (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 13). In contrast to Spain, acquiring basic knowledge of German has been even incorporated as prerequisite for naturalization and for members that would like to immigrate to Germany by means of family reunification. The main focus in the German integration program is language acquisition. There are a higher number of language courses available in Germany than in Spain. However, according to Arnold Mengelkoch¹⁷ there are still many immigrants are not able to join the language course due to the overwhelming number of participants. Despite all measures taken by the German government to promote language acquisition, Turkish immigrants speak and write German poorly. Their comprehension is better but still low. Language difficulties are a common characteristic they share with Moroccans in Spain.

4.5. Public perception of immigrants

Within the European Union Spain is considered one of the most tolerant countries towards immigrants, while over the past decade Germany has been placed among the European countries that present a negative perception towards immigrants. In the Eurobarometer survey conducted in the year 2000 stated that in Germany the level of acceptance of immigrants is relatively low (SORA, 2001, p. 10). Nevertheless, negative attitudes towards immigrants from Muslim countries are prevalent in both countries. Moroccans and Turks are the immigrant groups less liked by the public opinion in Spain and Germany respectively, especially after 9/11.

The realities of these two immigration groups are portrayed frequently in the media. Immigration is repeatedly associated with crime and violence. In Germany news related to immigration are mainly based on the failure of the integration process, the unwillingness of Turks to integrate, women with headscarves or

¹⁷ Data proportionate by means of a private interview.

domestic violence. In Spain the media usually reports about undocumented incoming immigrants through the Strait of Gibraltar, which has given rise to the belief that there is an “uncontrolled inflow of illegal immigrants” in the country (Marrero Rocha, 2005, p. 415). The fabricated image of immigrants by the media has considerably deteriorated the image of both communities in the host country and gradually given rise to discrimination in the country. However, despite the presence of negative stereotypes of Turks and Moroccans in both countries, integration issues are more present in the German political debate. German politicians have focused on the emergence of “parallel societies” and the failure of integration, especially among Turkish immigrants.

In Spain and Germany the education level and socio-economic status exerts a considerable impact on attitudes towards foreigners. Native citizens with low education achievements, unemployed or with economic difficulties display a more racist attitude towards immigrants.

5. Conclusion

This paper compares the degree of integration of Turkish immigrants in Germany and Moroccan immigrants in Spain. It aims at identifying common trends and possible differences to understand the indicators that contribute to enhance the integration of immigrants and to identify possible national policies or initiatives that facilitate the social integration of third-country nationals. Cross-country comparative research seems especially important due to the numerous national integration models that exist within the European Union. Turkish and Moroccan immigrants have been chosen for the case studies for several reasons. Both are the largest immigrant community in their host country¹⁸ and share a common religion.

The thesis point out that Moroccans and Turks are poorly integrated in their host societies despite their long length of stay in the country. Both immigrant groups are significantly behind the native population in all integration aspects. They demonstrate poor academic performances measured by high level of dropouts, low proportion of pupils enrolled in higher education and at least one third have not obtained the secondary school certificate. Poor results of immigrant pupils are a consequence of their parents low academic and socio-economic background, of linguistic difficulties, of the increasing segregation of pupils from native pupils by the *ghettoization* of schools, of teachers' lack of intercultural training and, in the case of Germany in particular, of the structure of the school system that presents a clear disadvantage for first and second generation migrants. Poor academic achievements have led to a low participation in the labor market. They have a high unemployment rate, a high presence in low-skilled and low paid jobs, a high degree of turnovers and short-term contracts. In comparison to Turkish migrants, a significant share of Moroccans has an illegal status in Spain and thus works in precarious and unstable conditions. With the current crisis around 46% undocumented Moroccan immigrants lost their job and due to their irregular status cannot receive unemployment benefits. To improve their economic integration it

¹⁸ Since 2009 the Romanian immigrants form the largest migration group in Spain, followed closely by Moroccans.

is essential to regularize their legal situation. Linguistic barriers, a low socio-economic status and poor integration in the labor market hinder social interaction between immigrants and the native population. In the case of Moroccans and Turks, both have small contact with members of the host society and a high degree of trans-national and ethnic marriages. The different cultural values and the negative attitude towards immigrants contribute to increase the isolation of the immigrant community.

The present paper has clearly shown that the different dimensions of integration are interdependent. No specific integration indicator alone is a recipe for success. Economic integration and education success presupposes a certain degree of language knowledge. Language acquisition and individual predisposition is essential to build ties with members of the host country. For this reason, the author believes that social integration of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants has failed due to multiple factors, such as restrictive immigration policies, linguistic barriers, the absence of mutual understanding or in the particular case of Spain, lack of a legal residence status. Surprisingly both immigrant groups present a similar level of integration.

To improve the successful integration of immigrants it is essential to apply a holistic approach. Schooling and training are fundamental tools to increase the educational achievement of pupils and prepare them for the future labor market. In my opinion, a common school track for all pupils attending primary and secondary is more effective to overcome linguistic difficulties and possible cultural problems, as the immigrant pupil has more time to adapt. Furthermore, if willing, doors are still open to attend higher education. Language learning is essential to build friendships with native Germans and participate actively in the society. However, one must never forget that by itself is not a mean of integration. It needs to be complemented with other measures. Finally, it is vital to implement anti-discriminatory measures to enhance the receptiveness of the host society towards immigrants. Even though it seems impossible, changing the fabricated image that the media portrays is essential to improve the perception towards

immigrants. At the end the purpose of integration is the building of mutual respect and tolerance to cohabit peacefully in the same society.

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