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IDENTITY AND POWER

**American Foreign Policy under Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush : Change and Continuity**

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“Some have tried to pose a choice between American *ideals* and American *interests*- between *who we are* and *how we act*. But the choice is false. America, by decision and destiny, promotes political freedom- and gains the most when democracy advances.”

(Governor George W. Bush, ‘A Distinctly American Internationalism‘ , Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999)

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Introduction

Is there any relation between who we are and how we act, between a nation's self-perceived identity and the way it organizes, uses and project its political, economic and military power, between ideals and interests, between ethics and power? When analyzing the foreign policy of a state, there is a question, which reasonably comes in our mind from the very beginning: what are the motivations behind states' international behavior? Are self-perceptions as much as real economic or political powers responsible for how a state defines its goals and limits of actions in the international arena? Does 'the national interest derives from national identity, the nature of the country whose interests are being defined'¹? Power is not its own justification and is relevant to the spread of ideals. But is there possible to establish a sense of equilibrium between these two foreign policy extremes?

One of the aims of the present paper is to provide an answer to the above questions, when they are applied to the foreign policy of the United States of America between 1993 and 2004. By doing so, we hope to reach an other and more important aim here: to elucidate the degree of continuity and change between the foreign policies elaborated and pursued by two American presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in his first term.

We will start by analyzing the essential elements associated with the American national identity. We will see how America's identity and its presumed mission are so closely related. The result is a dialectic process of identity building where mission and identity are interchangeable and enrich each other. The vision of America's role in the world dominates American politics almost the entire 20th century. To serve American interests and to promote American values were constantly the rationales which shaped the way and the degree U.S. decided or not to engage the world.

This pragmatic equilibrium between American ideals and interests will be coherently articulated, incorporated and presented by Clinton and Bush in the

form of 'liberal grand strategies'. Known as 'National Security Strategies', these foreign policy doctrines encapsulate liberal ideas related to how democratic polities, economic interdependence, international institutions and political identity provide *independently* or *combined* the sources of a "stable, legitimate, secure, and remunerative" international order. It is an approach that finds strong supporters both on the left and the right sides of American political arena and accounts for a considerable degree of continuity in the foreign policy of Republican and Democrat presidents.' It is the fusion of strategy and values, the merging of the practical and the ideal - and not an overemphasis on one at the expense of the other.'² Yet, both Clinton and Bush champion complementary and with different intensities a key role for the U.S. military in defending America's security at home and abroad. This reflects a realist and prudent understanding of how the world looks like. They try to keep a fair balance between how the world is and how it ought to be and not to take one for another.

The structure of the paper mirrors the structure of the argument. Thus, while the first chapter deals with the issue of the American national identity and America's role in the post-cold war world, the second one features the core principles underlying Clinton's and Bush's NSS. The ensuing three chapters will provide a thorough analysis and comparison of the principles and implications associated with the political, economic and military dimensions of each NSS.

While trying to explore the degree of continuity and change between Clinton's and Bush's foreign policy and military doctrines, we will unveil how each president and administration pursues a highly integrated strategic approach. Thus, their endeavor to promote America's political, economic and military security relies on an integrative security strategy, where each element needs, implies and enriches the others.

¹ See Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Erosion of American National Interests', *Foreign Affairs* 76, no.5 (1997), p. 28.

² Henry A. Kissinger, 'Realists vs. Idealists', *International Herald Tribune*, May 12, 2005.

I. National Identity and America's Role in the Post-Cold War Era

It is not always easy to understand why a country pursues a particular foreign policy agenda and disregards other possible approaches. This is more true when applied to the U. S. foreign policy in general, or to the foreign policy agendas under Bill Clinton's presidency and the first term of George W. Bush. We may try to use in our explanations the variety of private or institutional actors and interests implied in the decision-making processes, or one could rely on arguments proposed by different theories of international relations with due regard to the nature and structure of the prevailing world affairs. Although each of these arguments can bring precious insights, they offer incomplete answers. I argue in this chapter that a clear analysis of the elements related to the American national identity will give us useful instruments to apprehend both the way America perceives its role in the post Cold War era and the national security strategies as core guidelines for foreign policy shaping. We will present then in more detail the views provided by Clinton and Bush administrations with regard to the role the U.S. should play in world affairs, while trying to see their degrees of continuity and discontinuity within each administration, between the two administrations and last but not least between the two administrations and the U.S. foreign policy tradition.

1. American National Identity

When analyzing the foreign policy of a state, there is a question, which reasonably comes in our mind from the very beginning: what are the motivations behind states' international behavior? Are self-perceptions as much as real economic or political powers responsible for how a state defines its goals and limits of actions in the international arena? "Today, two big ideas dominate the way Americans think about themselves and the use of national

power.”³ The first one is the *national interest* and the second one is *the balance of power*. The national interest of the United States would pertain to a clear set of material priorities such as defending American soil and promoting economic prosperity. These interests derive directly from America’s physical and geopolitical position and are assumed to objectively delineate the first scope of action. But America is not only a piece of land that has to be secured, it represents at the same time the core values of a liberal democracy. The degree of threat posed to U.S. by actions taken by other states draws heavily on similarities or disparities in terms of values these actions are supposed to defend. It is the national identity that organizes the international responses of U.S. and not only its geopolitical imperatives. This becomes more clearly if we consider the idea of *balance of power*. Used in order to express the untiring struggle among nations for their own survival and independence, the balance of power almost always tends to reflect a moral order. At the heart of the Cold War were not only power rationales opposing U.S. and the Soviet Union. The conventional and nuclear power was balanced to defend and validate two different communities of values, liberal on the one side, communist on the other. Even realist scholars admit that in the end the “national interest derives from national identity, the nature of the country whose interests are being defined.”⁴

How could we define and measure national identity? Lacking quantitative instruments for this purpose, an inspired qualitative alternative is proposed to us by Henry R. Nau. “National identity measures the nation in nonmaterial terms. It addresses the key factor that motivates national power, namely the consensus by which the citizens of a nation agree that only the state can use force legitimately. This consensus has two dimensions in the study of foreign policy - an internal one that defines the rules by which the state can use force legitimately against members of its own society, and an external one that defines the rules by which the state can use force legitimately against other

³ See for this discussion Henry R. Nau , *At Home Abroad : Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2002), p.15.

⁴ See Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Erosion of American National Interests ‘, *Foreign Affairs* 76, no.5 (1997) p. 28

societies.”⁵ As a person’s identity which is shaped by external (physical, social) and internal (biological psychological and rational) factors, a nation’s identity stems from its internal features and its external relationships.⁶ The use of force by state at the domestic or international level takes its consensual justification on the basis of protecting an ethnic or traditional community (characterized by common language, culture and religion), or of securing an ideological community sharing the same values and ideals. While having both an ethnic and ideological identity at the beginning of its history, America had to decide itself through the Civil War what factor has preeminence in legitimating the use of power against its own citizens. The state has both the capacity and the moral empowerment to use its force. Thus, legitimacy and capacity, although independent one from another, both contributes to the definition of the identity of a state. The differences among states in the internal dimension of identity are real and they determine to a large extent the threat level in terms of what states intend to do with their power. Since the internal identity is mostly about the perception a country has about itself, it is quite difficult to have a quantitative assessment of it. Nonetheless, America’s perception of itself as a mature liberal democracy could be quantified by using institutional and normative indicators which may be found in reports issued by Freedom House in New York for example. It is these institutional and normative rules by which countries like U.S. legitimate the internal use of force. According to these institutional and normative standards, a democracy has three basic features.⁷

1. Free, fair and broadly participatory elections in which opposing political parties compete and rotate periodically in government, transferring power back and forth peacefully over a long period of time.
2. Separation of powers among governmental institutions, all of which, including in particular the military, are under the control of and accountable to elected officials.

⁵ Nau, *At Home Abroad*, 20.

⁶ For a comparative discussion on the nature of identity formation at the personal, national, and international levels, see William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

⁷ As presented by Nau, *At Home Abroad*, p.23.

3. Fundamental protection of civil liberties, including, among other rights, freedom of speech, assembly, association, and religion; protection of private property; due process of law; trial by jury; independent judiciaries; and the right to vote.

America's self-perception as a model of liberal democracy considerably explains what it is usually called "American exceptionalism". America sees its destiny as set by God. As Woodrow Wilson clearly put it: "It is as if in the Providence of God a continent had been kept unused and waiting for a peaceful people who loved liberty and the rights of men more than they loved anything else, to come and set up an unselfish commonwealth."⁸ Religious elements of a puritan inspiration are common place in the political discourse of others American presidents: Ronald Reagan paraphrases St. Matthew when speaking about America as "the shining city on the hill"⁹; George H. W. Bush explained the America's Cold War victory "by the grace of God" and Bush the son consistently uses religious references in justifying his "crusade" against global terrorism and forging "un nationalisme de droit divine"¹⁰ The following discussion of the American external identity will shed more light on the presumed "nation's sacred mission" in the world.

The "external dimension of national identity deals with how states evaluate ethnic, ideological, and other sources of identity in their relations with other states."¹¹ In other words, it refers to the pattern of relations developed by states among themselves as a result of their internal order. This is especially important since no state enjoys a full monopoly over the legitimate use of force in the international system as it does at home. But while internal identities of states shape their external behavior, the last one

⁸ Ed. Arthur S. Link, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 37 (Princeton University Press, 1981), pp.213-214

⁹ John Winthrop, the puritan spiritual leader of Great Migration from 1630, prompted his fellows on the way to New-England ' For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill , the eyes of all people are upon us ' as quoted in Matthias Waechter, *Die Erfindung des Amerikanischen Westens: Die Geschichte der frontier-Debatte*, (Freiburg im Breisgau : Rombach Verlag, 1996), p.28-29.

¹⁰ As characterized by Isabelle Richet quoted in Maxime Lefebvre, *La politique étrangère américaine* (Paris : PUF-Que Sais-Je ? 2004), p.66.

¹¹ Nau, *At Home Abroad*, p.23.

hinges as well on the international distribution of national identity differences.¹² Besides these two identity variables, there is another one which counts for the way states interact among them, namely the historical record of diplomatic relations. This record stands for a gradually developed and shared understanding of *who* states are and *how* their motivations may look like. National identity and national power variables combined with a historical overview of inter-state behaviors leads to formation of what is usually called in the specialized literature "security communities" or "communities of power". "A security community constitutes a particular social structure of international relations, which then generates peaceful relations among the members."¹³ The type of security community developed among U.S., Western European countries and Japan is the best exemplification of the concept. The striking and unprecedented feature in the social structure of the current international system is not the overwhelming preeminence of American political, economic and military power, but the fact that all great powers, with the exception of China, are liberal and capitalist democracies. "The current world order is dominated by liberal states."¹⁴ Their combined self-perceptions strengthen the "in-group/out-group" or "self-others" dividing line with regard to the democratizing or non-democratic states of the world. This clear cut perceived division between mature liberal communities and non-democracies justifies to some extent the use on both sides of religious inspired "black and white" images in order to characterize the counterpart. Ironically, both U.S. and some autocratic countries see each other as "empires or axes of evil" and their political or religious leaders are often demonized.

The "in group/out group" differentiation is a phenomenon almost always present during a nation's identity building process. The overemphasis of different attributes instead of similar ones has the role of giving a sense of

¹² For more detailed studies on the recognized distinction between internal and external identity of a state see ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)

¹³ See Thomas Risse, 'U.S. Power in a Liberal Security Community ' in ed. G. John Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled : The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca/London : Cornell University Press, 2002), p.267.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 261

uniqueness, of exception, and thus of inimitable value. The history of America provides us with a very good example of a “sacred” and “exceptional” identity construction of a nation whose “people was chosen by God” and bestowed with an “unique destiny”. America sees itself as an instrument of God’s will. America’s mission is an ideal one and its accomplishment is the reason of the nation’s existence on the earth, tells us Woodrow Wilson. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush continue this visionary understanding of America’s mission in the world. Bush told the National Religious Broadcasters’ convention in early 2003 that:

“Liberty is not America’s gift to the world. Liberty is God’s gift to every human being in the world. America has great challenges; challenges at home and challenges abroad. We are called to extend the promise of this country into the lives of every citizen who lives here. We’re called to defend our nation and lead the world to peace, and we will meet both challenges with courage and confidence.”¹⁵

It is highly interesting to see how America’s identity and its presumed mission are so closely related. We are witnessing a dialectic process of identity building where mission and identity are interchangeable and enrich each other. Since the identification process is a constant and everlasting one, so becomes the necessity to assign to itself and believe in a mission, in a role. And while stemming from God, this mission provides America with supreme and eternal legitimacy in world’s eyes.

The vision of America’s role in the world dominates American politics almost the entire 20th century. To serve American interests and to promote American values were constantly the rationales which shaped the way and the degree U.S. decided or not to engage the world. Exemplary America at home versus interventionist America abroad, advancing national interests on the homeland or defending them abroad, “free hand” policy and /or multilateral framework of action, these are the patterns defining the limits of

a spectrum with options for American foreign policy. The search for a right course of action and philosophical questions concerning a fair balance between interests and values in the definition of a role for America became imperative with the end of the Cold War era and the beginning of a “new world order”. We will try to see now the degree of continuity or discontinuity between Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s views with regard to the role America should play in this post-Cold War international arena.

2. America’s Role in the Post Cold War Era

The foreign policy issues U.S. confronted with at the end of World War II were not related to what America *could* do abroad, but to what it *should* do abroad. ”Should the United States define its interests regionally or globally? What were the threats to U.S. security? How should the United States respond to these threats?”¹⁶ A reasonable equilibrium between moral and strategic interests, between “free hand “policy and a gradual expansion of the rule of law in international affairs, between the power to act and the right to act had to be found. After the Cold War was over, the terrible threats America had to deal with for almost fifty years suddenly disappeared, and Washington found itself with little if no intellectual preparation to come up with a coherent concept on what’s the new type of mission of the world’s only remaining superpower. A noteworthy answer was given by Jeane Kirkpatrick, former ambassador to the United Nations: the new goal of American foreign policy was to make possible for the United States to become a “normal country in normal times.”¹⁷ In a time of changes of “biblical proportions”(George H. W. Bush), the United States would have to “thread its way between an overly brutal realpolitik and an unworkable

¹⁵ George W. Bush, ‘Remarks by the President at the 2003 National Religious Broadcasters’ Convention’, Nashville, Tennessee, February 10, 2003 www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030210-5.html – accessed May 2005).

¹⁶ See Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C. Brooking Institution Press, 2003), p.8.

¹⁷ Jeane Kirkpatrick, ‘A Normal Country in a Normal Time’, in ed. Owen Harries, *America’s Purpose* (San Francisco :ICS Press,1991), p.155.

idealism.”¹⁸ Or as George Bush replied to the Democratic Party’s sharp critic:

“We need not respond by ourselves to each and every outrage of violence. The fact that America can act does not mean that it must. A nation’s sense of idealism need not be at odds with its interests. Nor does principle displace prudence.”¹⁹

Too much prudence fired back the Democrats. While the end of the Cold War offered such a significant opportunity for U.S. to fashion a new international order drawn on American interests and values, America could fear of change in such a fundamentally changing world. With Bill Clinton the political timing had come for a “new vision” of America’s role in a “dynamic world”.

A. Clinton’s View

In Clinton’s opinion, Bush had favored too much “the status quo with its old geography of repression rather than a new *map of freedom*. The test of leadership was to grasp how the world had changed.”²⁰ Too much driven by national interests defined in terms of geopolitics, U.S. foreign policy, argues Bill Clinton, could not be separated by “the moral principles most Americans share”. His inaugural address revealed a concept of a new role in the world for America:

“Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the cold war assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom...Our hopes, our hearts and our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America’s cause.”²¹

¹⁸ Francis Fukuyama, ‘The Beginning of Foreign Policy’, *The New Republic*, August 17 and 24, 1992.

¹⁹ George H.W. Bush, ‘Remarks by the President to the West Point Cadets’, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., January 5, 1993, Office of the White House Press Secretary.

²⁰ William G. Hyland, *Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 18.

²¹ President Clinton, ‘Inaugural Address’, January 20, 1993, in U.S. Department of State *Dispatch*, January 25, 1993.

Thus, the main goal of American power in the world is for Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, to preserve, promote and defend democracies and human rights.²² The new U.S. role appears as a blend of leadership, moral exemplarity, and security interests where a different understanding on the economic and technological nature of threats and power becomes evident. For the Clinton's "pragmatic neo-wilsonianist" administration the world needs international cooperation under American leadership in order to tackle the global challenges to security and prosperity. As Samuel Berger, Clinton's assistant for national security affairs, explains, the president recognized from the very beginning America's responsibility to lead in today's world. This leadership has *four dimensions* continues Berger : *a)* the nation's military and economic strength; *b)* the use the American capacity to be an effective peacemaker where American interests and values are at stake ; *c)* the imperative to keep on reducing the nuclear threat; *d)* the great challenge to set up new institutions and new arrangements in the world that reinforce the growth of democracy and civil society.²³

There were nonetheless a strong dilemma of demand and supply of American leadership brought about by differences in American camp, where the Republicans controlled the majority of votes in the Congress. The risk to be internationalist in words and isolationist in facts, to want to lead but not to spend, to recognize in abstracto the need for engagement, but to refuse it on the ground. These political internal contradictions and public domestic pressure considerably restrained the initial enthusiastic internationalism of the Clinton's administration. They forced it to recognize the necessity to adapt aims to capabilities, ideas to reality. It's exactly this post Cold War reality haunted by the nationalism, religious fanaticism and poverty that Clinton finally failed to understand, said his critics, and where a new administration should unveil a new kind of mission for America.

²² Anthony Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement', remarks at Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. September 21,1993.

²³ S. Berger , 'Challenges Approaching the Twenty-first Century' in ed. Robert L. Hutchings, *At the End of the American Century: America's Role in the Post-Cold War World* (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998), p.184.

B. Bush's view

“At the start of the campaign it was difficult to pin down exactly what Bush believed about America's role in the world...he was a doer, not a thinker; his natural element was action not analysis.”²⁴ Nonetheless, while being on the campaign trail, Bush was able to outline a quite coherent foreign policy concept that set as goals for America's engagement abroad: security, prosperity and freedom. In his worldview, United States should assume an active role in world affairs and “not shrink from leadership.”²⁵ America has “a great and guiding goal: to turn this time of American influence into generations of democratic peace.”²⁶ It is the American influence and primacy that Clinton failed to assert, argued Bush, while entangling the country in illusory multilateral frameworks that endangered national and even broader international interests. Bush promised to offer to American people a clear set of priorities based on a realist evaluation of nation's strategic interests. “I am an authentic realist without illusions when it comes to assess how the world works” seemed to usually declare Bush before taking the office.²⁷ This doesn't mean though that Bush's view didn't take over a substantial degree of wilsonianism.

“Some have tried to pose a choice between American ideals and American interests- between who we are and how we act. But the choice is false. America, by decision and destiny, promotes political freedom- and gains the most when democracy advances.”²⁸

This pragmatic equilibrium between the promotion of both American ideals and interests abroad is firmly supported in statements coming from other high officials of Bush's administration. “America's national interest has been defined

²⁴ Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.35.

²⁵ Governor George W. Bush, ‘A Distinctly American Internationalism’, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, quoted in Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 36.

²⁶ *ibidem*

²⁷ See Christian Hacke, *Zur Weltmacht verdammt : Die amerikanische Aussenpolitik von J.F. Kennedy bis G.W.Bush* (Munich : Ullstein Taschenbuchverlag, 2001), p.626.

²⁸ Governor George W. Bush, ‘A Distinctly American Internationalism’

instead by a desire to foster the spread of freedom, prosperity, and peace.”²⁹ says C. Rice. In other words, Washington’s desire is world’s desire.

September 11 didn’t change Bush’s view of the world, but even strengthened it. The former candidate who promised to run a “humble nation” seized the chance to make America the leading international crusader in the name of democracy and freedom. Fighting terrorism all over the world became the core and long-searched mission of America. It was a fight between good and evil, where America’s divine destiny rightfully recommended it to lead the world.

“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”³⁰

Bush was one of the most religious occupants of the Oval Office in more than a century, and his public statements incited the overall perception that he considered both America and himself as God’s instruments.

Ironically, both Bush and John Quincy Adams (1824) are among the four American presidents who gained the majority of electors, but not that of population’s votes. Adams argued in a speech made before the House of Representatives on July 4, 1821, that America

“ goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the champion and vindicator only for her own. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force. She might become the dictatress of the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit.”³¹

For Bush the new role of America was exactly the contrary: to haunt the monster of terrorism every where in the world in order to destroy it forever. He shouldn’t forget though, as Adams warningly put it, that fighting with a monster

²⁹ Condoleezza Rice, ‘Promoting the National Interest’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol.79 (January/February 2000), p.62.

³⁰ Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, Washington D.C. September 20, 2001(www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html) -accessed May 2005.

³¹ John Quincy Adams, ‘Address of July 4, 1821’ in ed. Walter La Feber, *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire: Letters, Papers, and Speeches* (Chicago :Quadrangle Books, 1965), p.45.

America is running the risk to become itself a monster. If this monster hadn't come into being by itself, it should have been invented, so that America could enjoy a mission, which legitimates and reinforces its identity of a world's leader. The history will teach us how this actually happened.

3. Elements of Continuity

This brief analysis of how Clinton and Bush understands the role America should play in world affairs reveals strong elements of continuity between their views and between these and American foreign policy tradition. U.S. has to assume and defend its leadership in the world by promoting its core values and national interests. Security, prosperity, respect for human rights, democratic principles and institutions at home and abroad define the goals America has to pursue and achieve as a mission assigned to it by God or by the Founding Fathers. After World War II it turned out as self-evident for Americans that they have to engage the world in order to accomplish this mission. What will make the difference between foreign policies agendas of successive administrations, and this applies as well to Clinton and Bush as we will see immediately, pertains to how and to which degree this engagement abroad should take place.

4. Elements of Change

What finely separates Clinton and Bush is the legitimating source of America's mission in the world. While Clinton consistently refers to the ideals of the noble men who wisely devised the American Constitution in the summer of 1787 in Philadelphia, Bush vindicates America's and his mission by steadily invoking God. While Clinton advocates a slightly more philosophy-based moralism and idealism, Bush pleads for a more religious humanism. We will see further the core elements of the national security strategies developed by both Clinton's and Bush's administrations in order to achieve the role they envisaged for America. They will thus better feature elements of continuity and change between the two presidents in approaching the world.

II. The ‘Grand Strategies’ of Clinton and Bush

Is there an American foreign policy strategy that can be tracked down if we put together the plenty of governmental statements and addresses, public and off the record briefings delivered by senior experts in foreign affairs or high-ranked officials, regular reports and studies issued by Washington-based think-tanks and research institutes or by influential international newspapers and reviews? The openly expressed rivalries and competition between US Navy and US Air Force, for example, or between FBI and CIA are additionally blurring the picture. As it is to be expected in a mature democratic society, the American political discourse is very generous, highly available and almost systematically disseminated. At the same time, the overall distribution of public competencies and institutions respecting the principle of a democratically legitimated “checks and balances” system lies at the heart of American political system. Nonetheless, this shouldn’t lead us to the erroneous perception that there is no strategy or leading principles in the definition and practice of American foreign policy. John Lewis Gaddis is one among many other prominent personalities who decisively refuse this simplistic interpretation in his prestigious book *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford, 1984). He successfully managed to explain there that American foreign policy is of an impressive coherence despite political party disputes or governmental crises. This coherence is also strongly backed by a considerable degree of continuity. All presidents of the United States from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush - with the exception of Lyndon Johnson - devoted most of their time in office to foreign policy issues. Moreover, the presidents tried to provide foreign policy doctrines, which encapsulated theoretical and practical principles for the US engagement abroad.³² They not only reflect and integrate a personal understanding of presidents and their administrations regarding the role of America in the world, but also set forth goals and innovative strategies to achieve them, while duly taking into account American traditional values and national interests. They best illustrate the

³² See for an educated presentation of American foreign policy doctrines Cecil Crabb, *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*, (Baton Rouge, 1982).

specificity of American strategic culture, since we don't find an equivalent for them in Europe or other part of the world. It is important to notice that presidential doctrines, although highly influential, do not explain entirely the content and shape of American foreign policy conduct. This is to be explained through the specificity of American political system, where the president has not exclusive competence in foreign policy-making, but has to share it together with the Congress, State Department, Ministries of Finance and Defense, while searching to constantly accommodate public opinion preferences. The analysis of "grand strategies" proves to be indeed very useful in critically assessing elements of continuity and change in American foreign policy, but its explanatory function should not be overestimated.

The relationship between war and strategy was almost completely reversed in the wake of World War II. Strategy can no more be found solely in the way to fight a war, but war became a part of a "complete strategy". Lucien Poirier defines this as "Théorie et pratique de la manœuvre de l'ensemble des forces de toute nature, actuelles et potentielles, résultant de l'activité nationale, elle a pour but d'accomplir l'ensemble des fins définies par la politique générale."³³ It consists of three general strategies: economic, cultural and military. The American Edward Mead Earle and the British Liddell Hart were among the firsts who characterized the full use of resources of a nation for winning a war as "grand strategy" while referring to the World War II.³⁴ Since then, the *grand strategy* was also called by Americans *national security strategy*. "Elle reflète des décisions politiques au plus haut niveau couvrant toutes les activités de l'Etat. Elle gère, coordonne et, si c'est nécessaire, crée des instruments appropriés pour mettre en œuvre la politique de l'Etat, en drainant tous les éléments de la puissance nationale, incluant la pression diplomatique, la force militaire, les ressources industrielles, la position commerciale, la base technologique, les données du renseignement, l'attrait idéologique et la cohésion politique. Alors que la stratégie militaire s'occupe d'abord de l'utilisation de la puissance militaire dans la guerre, la grande stratégie guide l'emploi de toute la gamme des instruments de la politique dans la paix

³³ Lucien Poirier, *Stratégie théorique II*, (Paris : Economica, 1987) , p.113-116.

³⁴ Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Introduction à la stratégie*, (Paris : Collège Interarmées de Défense, 1995-1996), I, pp.39-40.

comme dans la guerre. La *grande stratégie* fait donc référence au développement et à l'application coordonnée des instruments politiques, économiques et militaires de la puissance pour défendre les intérêts et les objectifs nationaux dans toutes les circonstances.”³⁵ The American National Security Strategy (NSS) sets national priorities and means to achieve them, tries to design a right balance between aims and capabilities in order to reach the nation's desired security and prosperity and to acquire the best public support possible. While not initially used to necessarily designate foreign policy in general, or the American foreign policy in particular, it turned out to guide the whole spectrum of foreign policy activities and to be identified even with the foreign policy in itself. Stanley Hoffmann elucidates this generous use of the term in America as an effect of a technical and managerial approach typical of Americans that can be very well summarized under the label of “skill thinking”. It gives the illusion of a pragmatic “objectivity” and “rationality” in a society fascinated by technique and less interested in philosophical thinking.³⁶ By trying to analyze the American foreign policy in terms of a strategic approach, it becomes possible for us to not only find its overall coherence, but to also discover the manifest and less manifest links between American economic, political and military interests abroad. The military strategy builds the core of the NSS and it is framed most precisely and clearly. This is a consequence of the fact that state is the only responsible for the control and use of military force. Not the same can be said with regard to economy and culture.

In March 1992, an article published in New York Times unveils a version of the *Defense Planning Guidance*, a classified report that provides a strong military interpretation of the “new world order” concept of George H. W. Bush. Prepared by officials of State Department and Pentagon, under the guidance of the under-secretary of defense for political affairs, Paul D. Wolfowitz and in close relation with National Security Council, the document articulates explicitly the will of U.S. to preserve its status of the world's unique superpower. To this

³⁵ John J. Kohout III, ‘Alternative Grand Strategy Options for the United States’, *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 14, 1995, 362-363 quoted in Bruno Colson, *La Stratégie américaine et l'Europe* (Economica and Institut de stratégie comparée, 1997), p. 8.

³⁶ Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp.148-161.

purpose, the military power proves to be essential and it will be used unilaterally, if necessary. Europe's and Japan's ambitions to emerge as great powers should be hindered if not fully eliminated. Although seriously criticized by public opinion for the role of "world's sheriff" it envisaged for U.S., the report resulted from the lack of a clear strategic concept organizing America's foreign policy. This acute shortcoming was due to be fixed by the new elected administration run by Bill Clinton.

We will explore now the principles of the National Security Strategies developed by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Immediately after that we proceed with a brief comparative approach in order to underline their general degree of continuity and/or discontinuity. A more detailed explanation and comparison of the political, economic and military implications of both NSSs will be the task of the ensuing chapters.

1. Clinton's Strategy of 'Engagement and Enlargement'

For the governor Bill Clinton (April 1992) "it is time for America to lead a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated communism."³⁷ Only few months after he took the oath of presidential office, it was clear for some members of his new administration that the country lacked the resources for pursuing such lofty goals. A note of cold reality came in May 1993 from Peter Tarnoff, newly appointed under-secretary of state for political affairs. Former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Tarnoff accentuated in an off the record talk with a group of correspondents that America's limited capabilities require a more restrictive foreign policy agenda. "We simply don't have the leverage, we don't have the influence, we don't have the inclination to use military force. We don't have the money to bring about positive results in the next future."³⁸ Although severely criticized by his fellows, Tarnoff's statements highlighted a gloomy reality and a particular passivity in the first months of the administration's activity. The search for a coherent foreign

³⁷ Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 1, 1992 quoted in William G. Hyland, *Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Publishers, 1999), p.12.

policy concept started earlier in the campaign and it will take some years until a structured articulation of the NSS will be presented.

Amidst intellectual confusion at the beginning of the '90s concerning the role of the United States in the "new world order", there were few noteworthy proposals in this regard. One came from Richard Gardner, professor at the University of Columbia, who would define the first options of Clinton's foreign policy.³⁹ Trying to avoid the political extremes like isolationism, global unilateralism or interests-blind multilateralism, Gardner came out with a possible unifying concept of American foreign policy. "Practical internationalism" advances a leadership role for U.S. in creating together with other nations a peaceful world by means of functional international organizations. While achieving the role of security multipliers, NATO, UN or OSCE may promote both international accountability and American national interests and values.⁴⁰ According to another concept, "multilateral security", that was advanced by Peter Tarnoff one year later, U.S. should use its military force only within a multilateral framework and act unilaterally only when vital national interests are at stake. International mechanisms of "collective security" and "cooperative security" would make the world safer. The American military debacle in Somalia and the intervention in Bosnia will pressure the Clinton administration to amend this concept⁴¹ and to accept that multilateralism is an instrument not a goal in itself.⁴²

Yet, the American military commitment abroad should go hand in hand with the promotion of American values. Fostering democracy on a global scale was likely to become the new top priority of U.S. foreign policy. Already in the early '90s (March 30, 1990) James Baker anticipated that the main goal of America throughout the world could be "the promotion and consolidation of

³⁸ See *Washington Post*, May 27 1993, p.1.

³⁹ Michael Kramer, 'Clinton's Foreign Policy Jujitsu', *Time*, March 30, 1992, p.28.

⁴⁰ Richard N. Gardner, 'Practical Internationalism' in ed. Graham Allison & Gregory F. Treverton, *Rethinking America's Security. Beyond Cold War to New World Order* (New York: Norton, 1992), pp. 267-268.

⁴¹ Charles Krauthammer, 'The UN Obsession', *Time*, May 9, 1994, p.52.

⁴² Mark T. Clark, 'The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defense Policy: Multilateral Security', *Comparative Strategy*, vol.13,1994, p.181-195.

democracy”.⁴³ Clinton took over this vision as a third pillar along with economic growth and solid defense of his still unclear concept of foreign policy at the beginning of 1993.⁴⁴

Few months later, it was Clinton’s national security adviser, Anthony Lake, who laid out in a speech at the Johns Hopkins University’s SAIS center in Washington the strategy of “enlargement” as opposed to that known so far under the name of “containment”.⁴⁵ It was focused on four areas of interests: the existing market democracies, the emerging democracies and market economies, authoritarian states, and human rights. The aim of this strategy was both to strengthen and expand the model and values of market democracy and human rights all over the world. A more democratic world would be much safer and prosperous and, above all, would reflect the values and security interests of United States.

Back in 1991, Stephen J. Solarz, a democrat from New York who would enter the advising staff of Bill Clinton, was very inspired in recognizing the first challenge for America’s national security in the economic competition with Europe and Japan.⁴⁶ Under these circumstances, the main target of America would be to preserve and develop new international markets for trade and investments and to regain its global competitive character. American economic concerns were intelligently exploited by Clinton’s electoral staff and laid down in the popular slogan “it’s the economy, stupid!” Bill Clinton and Warren Christopher declared from the very beginning that American “economic security” was the main goal of their foreign policy.⁴⁷ World entered an era where political influence stems more from economic than military power, and where “the business of America is business”.

⁴³ James Baker, ‘Democracy and American Diplomacy’, speech before World Affairs Council, Dallas, Texas, March 30, 1990 quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, ‘America’s Changing Strategic Interests’, *Survival*, vol.33, 1991-1, p. 7.

⁴⁴ Warren Christopher, ‘Economy, Defense, Democracy to be U.S. Policy Pillars’, *USIS*, January 14, 1993, p.7.

⁴⁵ Anthony Lake, ‘From Containment to Enlargement. Address at the SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., September 21, 1993’ quoted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, September 27, 1993, vol.4, no.39, pp. 658-664.

⁴⁶ Stephen J. Solarz, ‘Of Victory and Deficits’ in ed. Owen Harries, *America’s Purpose. New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy* (San Francisco : ICS Press, 1991), pp. 90-92.

⁴⁷ Bill Clinton, ‘A Democrat Lays Out his Plan’, *USIS*, November 13, 1992, p.6-7.

An agile American strategy would have had to cautiously consider and wisely integrate realist and idealist principles and proposals, while searching to best accommodate them to the international strategic environment where American interests and values have to be advanced.⁴⁸ It seems though that in the early '90s Clinton's administration refused to take its time to devise a unifying foreign policy strategy, as the report *Changing Our Ways*, which instrumentally guided the first foreign policy steps of the administration, attested.⁴⁹ In spite of that, White House presented an as clear as possible articulated national security strategy in February 1996 with an introductory word by Bill Clinton.⁵⁰

The strategy applies two key concepts of "engagement" and "enlargement" to its economic, military and political/cultural dimensions and lays down the practical principles concerning the international framework of its promotion. The new NSS has three main targets: 1) to enhance American physical security by deterring any potential aggression; 2) to spur domestic economic recovery and prosperity by opening up international markets; 3) to foster democratic values throughout the world. These goals are not to be pursued for themselves, but to preserve and extend US centrality-economic, military, and political- in the global system. It is critical to grasp the philosophy underlying this strategy, if we really want to correctly assess its novelty. It combines neo-liberal and Kantian elements in an original way.

The first aspect of this philosophy pertains to the *blurring limits between domestic and foreign policy*. The increase in transnational movement and exchange of people, goods, services, capital and information lead to a more interdependent world, where the classical physical and political borders of nation-states are losing their value. The temporal and spatial "intensification" of the world makes thus the geographical, political, economic and cultural distinctions inside/outside, national/international more and more irrelevant. If what happens at "home" depends on what happens "abroad", a coordinated and selective

⁴⁸ David M. Abshire, 'U.S. Global Policy: Toward an Agile Strategy', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol.19, 1996-2, p.41-61.

⁴⁹ François Géré, 'Aux sources de la nouvelle grande stratégie des Etats-Unis. Le rapport Changing Our Ways et ses prolongements' in *Politique étrangère*, 1993-2, p.463.

⁵⁰ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, February 1996. In May 1997 a reviewed version will be published under the title: *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*.

international engagement turns out to be vital. Economic prosperity, political stability and military security at home require active and *effective involvement abroad* and provide us with the second element of Clinton's strategy logic. In order to address potential threats, the U.S. has to get "inside" the new global, regional and even national levels, and work from within. The "*imbrication*" strategy involves a multi-level approach and dissemination of US influence at all these levels.

The third key aspect refers to the priority gained by *economic security*. In the absence of a serious military or political threat, the main challenge for America comes from its domestic economic weaknesses and from strong international economic competition. " Clintons Hauptkenntnis hinsichtlich der Art und Weise, wie sich die Welt verändert hat, ist die, dass das geopolitische und geostrategische System des kalten Krieges einer Ära der Geo-Ökonomie und des Geo-Finanzwesens Platz gemacht hat. Die Abrüstungsgipfel zwischen den Supermächten, aus denen die Hochdiplomatie des Kalten Krieges bestanden hatte, waren bereits durch internationale Handelspakete und Wirtschaftsgipfel ersetzt worden. An die Stelle von Raketen, die jeden Punkt auf der Erde erreichen konnten, waren Exporte getreten, die sowohl harte wie sanfte Macht verkörperten, vom Jumbo Jet bis zur Computer-Software, von CNN bis zu Finanzderivaten."⁵¹ Clinton's revolutionary achievement lies in a paradigm change of American foreign policy thinking. He elevated "economic / commercial diplomacy" at the center of America's new security strategy. American diplomatic and political presence and "engagement" abroad is aimed at preserving, securing and "enlarging" international markets for "Made in U.S.A." products and at facilitating global access to raw materials. This rationale leads necessarily to strategic political implications.

They are encapsulated in the fourth element of Clinton's philosophy, the "*enlargement*" of the democratic geography of the world. Democracy promotion

⁵¹ Martin Walker, *The President We Deserve. Bill Clinton : His Rise, Falls and Come Backs*, (New York, 1996), 286 quoted in Christian Hacke, *Zur Weltmacht verdammt : Die amerikanische Aussenpolitik von J.F. Kennedy bis G.W. Bush* (Munich : Ullstein Taschenbuchverlag, 2001), p.547.

abroad had to reflect and consolidate American political values, but also to advance American commercial and financial interests. Democratic polities provide the best political and legal framework for the emerging and functioning of market-economies. They represent liable trading partners and are less likely to fight each other, but use to build “security communities” and to establish resolution mechanisms of their economic conflicts.

“The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”⁵²

The promotion of peace and democracy is the foundation and purpose of international structures U.S. is committed to build in order to stabilize and integrate the post Cold War world. Nonetheless, the institution-building agenda articulated by the Clinton administration aims at creating regional and international institutional frameworks that enhances U.S. economic, political and military leverage. This institutional logic offers the reasons behind the first NATO enlargement after the end of the Cold War in order to include Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and is also embodied in NAFTA, APEC and WTO initiatives.

The new task of NATO is to encourage the emerging of new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and to “enlarge” and secure the geographical scope of American economic interests. “The economic and security components of our foreign policy must go hand in hand if each of them is to succeed,” says Nancy Soderberg, senior adviser of Bill Clinton in national security affairs.⁵³ Richard Holbrooke reiterates the message while speaking on NATO enlargement: “We believe that the security and economic issues are indivisible as we hope that Europe will be indivisible.”⁵⁴

NATO and American military don’t lose their traditional tasks at all. The NSS provides for a credible American military deployment overseas. In times of

⁵² The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p.2-7.

⁵³ ‘ Soderberg Says U.S. Leadership Makes “ Vital Difference” ‘, *USIS*, October 21, 1996, p.4.

⁵⁴ ‘ Holbrooke Says There is no Timetable for NATO Expansion ‘, *USIS*, February 27,1995, p.1.

peace, it should secure American economic and strategic interests abroad. In times of war, America should be able to deter and fight two regional wars with states like Iraq, Iran or North Korea. Nonetheless, U.S should enhance its non-conventional power projection and deterring capabilities and prevent their proliferation through arms controls, non-proliferation treaties, exports controls and economic sanctions. If all these are to fail and America is threatened with nuclear strikes, it should be in a position to defend itself by developing an anti-ballistic missiles system. As long as military interventions are concerned, they should be justified when American interests are threatened and get legitimated through UNO endorsement.

In the wilsonianist enthusiasm of its first term, Clinton administration assigned great value to multilateral institutions. IMF, World Bank, GATT, NATO, OSCE, UNO appeared as the most useful instruments for global order building and for managing and preserving America's unique superpower. The price was a "reduction in Washington's policy autonomy. Institutional rules and joint decision making reduced U.S. unilateralist capacities. But what Washington got in return was worth the price. The United States' partners also had their autonomy constrained ...and U.S. gets a more predictable environment and more willing partners."⁵⁵

Nonetheless, this environment has allegedly changed meanwhile and America under George W. Bush had to find another security strategy to cope with the new perils of the world.

2. The 'Bush Doctrine' and the War on Terror

In the wake of September 11, 2001, Bush administration officials frequently declared that "everything has changed" without specifying precisely how. Certainly, for modern America, the terrorist attacks were singular in their

⁵⁵ G.John Ikenberry, 'Multilateralism and U.S. Grand Strategy ' in ed. Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy : Ambivalent Engagement*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp.137-138.

defiance and proportions. And they aroused uniquely strong and persistent support among Americans for vigorous military action abroad. But neither the terrorist threat nor the conditions that shaped it were new. September 11 had been gestating for some time. The declarations of change are best understood as the announcement of a new spirit in US security policy — not a new world, but a new impetus in America's approach to the world. Given the strategic power and reach of the United States, this new spirit will touch all the world's shores and borders. In this sense, the statement "everything has changed" is not so much an observation as a promise, as some commentators contend.

George W. Bush didn't miss any opportunity during the presidential campaign to criticise Clinton for "confusing the world as it is with the world as it ought to be."⁵⁶ It was a world of "terror and missiles and madmen" and the unfortunate confirmation of this dark worldview was delivered by the terrifying aggression from 9/11. In order to tackle the security challenges for America, Bush "set in motion a revolution in American foreign policy. It was not a revolution in America's goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them."⁵⁷ And it wasn't brought about by September 11, but it relies on a philosophy developed and made known well in advance. Before exploring and understanding the elements of what has been called "Bush Doctrine", we consider necessary to recall its underlying principles.

The team built by Bush in order to run the country included both traditional hard-line realists willing to use American military power unilaterally to address threats to U.S. security and so-called neoconservatives favouring the use of American capabilities to fashion the world in its image. Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleeza Rice represent the first group, called also "assertive nationalists". Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, or Dov Zakheim pride themselves for belonging to neoconservative thinking. The logic underlying Bush foreign policy finds its roots in the ideological blend of these two schools of thinking the international relations, a combination usually labeled as *hegemonism*. But what is striking at Bush's doctrine is the combination of realist and liberal

⁵⁶ Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound*, p.42

ideas. 'Notwithstanding their being Realists in their views about how states influence one another, Bush and his colleagues are Liberals in their beliefs about the sources of Foreign policy.'⁵⁸ While taking over the realist conception of states as key actors of international arena, he don't seem to agree that the world is a "war of all against all", but rather a war between liberal democratic community, on the one side, and terrorists of global reach and rogue states, on the other. He admits the role of military power to assure the self-defense, but he also share liberal convictions with regard to the role of democratic polities, international trade and free-market economies in providing international peace and use liberal instruments in fighting terrorism. John Lewis Gaddis consider that this liberal agenda lies in fact at the heart of Bush's 'war on terror'⁵⁹ Let us closer explore now the five main ideas that characterise the philosophy of hegemonism, as they are presented by Daalder & Lindsay.⁶⁰ The first one points to the dangerous world U.S. lives in. Bush and Cheney share this worldview while referring to perils coming from states like China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea or from terrorists. "Russia is a threat to the West and to our European allies in particular," argues Rice in late 2000.⁶¹ Secondly, self-interested nation-states are the key actors in world affairs. "Whenever they (Bush and his advisers) mentioned terrorism, they almost always linked it to rogue regimes and hostile powers. The assumption was that terrorists were the creatures of states, and they would wither without state support."⁶² The will to acquire and use military, economic and political power, and to make use of them, if national interests are threatened, is the third idea of hegemonists. "Power matters, both the exercise of power by the United States and the ability of others to exercise it," says Rice.⁶³ When and where national security interests are at stake, U.S. will not refrain from using its power. Only national interests legitimate American use of power and not international institutions.

⁵⁷ ibidem, p.2.

⁵⁸ Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine' in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.118, no.3., Fall 2003, (The Academy of Political Science, New York), p.367.

⁵⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, ' Bush's Security Strategy' in *Foreign Policy* 133, (November/December 2002), pp. 50-57.

⁶⁰ ibidem, p.41.

⁶¹ 'Entretien avec Condoleeza Rice ', *Politique Internationale*, no. 10 (Winter 2000-01), p.30

⁶² ibidem, p.42.

⁶³ Condoleeza Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest ', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.79 (January/February 2000), p.62.

Multilateral frameworks and institutions are not vital to promote American interests, but they can help. This reluctance to build, belong to and work through international institutions is the fourth principle of the hegemonist philosophy. Although not completely ruled out by Bush and his team, America will turn to UN, NATO, IMF, and WTO only if immediate, concrete American interests are better served. Since international treaties “offer only words and false hopes and high intentions”⁶⁴, Washington would rather better assert its freedom of action and of building “coalitions of the willing”. Only by these means can U.S. remain and enhance its status of world's *unique* superpower. This is the fifth and the last hegemonist assumption. But America leads the world in the name of freedom, democracy and prosperity. Its enemies are those who intend to threaten essential human values that are at the heart of American identity and of the international community of liberal democracies. America is a “benevolent hegemon”. World’s peace and prosperity is a spill-over effect of America’s global pursuit of national interests. This is the point where ideological continuity within the Bush team is weaker. On the one side, neoconservatives push for an America deploying its hard and soft power to remake the world in its own image. Neglecting the risks of nation building in terms of resources and security, they advocate regime-change in order to creating democracies. For the assertive nationalists, U.S. military “is not a civilian police force” designed for state-building operations, argues Rice. “There is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is , in a sense, a second-order effect.”⁶⁵ The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stressed out this ideological discontinuity, while championing his “doctrine”. U.S., says Powell, should use force as a last resort for meeting clear security threats and for this it needs the large consent of American public opinion. Great emphasis should be placed on multilateral instruments for effectively addressing the threats. Clarity of threats and purposes combined with a strong belief in international legitimisation are the defining concepts of this doctrine. They will not find their place in the National Security Strategy delivered by George W. Bush on September 20, 2002. On December 12, 2002 unclassified portions of National

⁶⁴ Governor George W. Bush, ‘A Distinctly American Internationalism’, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, quoted in Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound* .p.45

Security Presidential Directive 17 and Homeland Security Policy Directive 4 (NSPD-17/HSPD-4) were released to public. Drafted by National Security Council and approved by Bush in June 2002, these two documents formed the basis for the NSS and for the presidential speeches at West Point and Fort Drum in the same summer month. NSS, NSPD-17 and HSPD-4 “are the most detailed and comprehensive statements of how the president intend to protect the national security interests of the United States in the post-September 11 world...and form the essence of what some have referred to as the *Bush Doctrine*.”⁶⁶ While some analysts keep on arguing that this documents represent the first coherent NSS since the end of Cold War and advance a critical shift in the U.S. grand strategy in the last 50 years, Collin Powell, Bush’s Secretary of State, holds that there is no such a radical change in the content of the recommended course of action. Let us now briefly analyse what are the defining aspects of the Bush Doctrine, while recalling their development in the wake of September 11 events. The “doctrine” answers two key questions: what are the security threats to U.S. and how should the country address them ?

A. From Great Power Competition to the War on Terrorism

When asked before becoming president what would be the main challenges in his foreign policy, Bush definitely answered:” I believe the big issues are going to be China and Russia...in the long run, security in the world is going to be how to deal with China and how to deal with Russia.”⁶⁷ As the above look at hegemonist philosophy demonstrated, Bush and his team understood the world politics as dominated by relations among states (great powers or rogue nations) and repudiated the role of non-state actors. While on the leave, Samuel Berger met the woman who was due to replace him as national security adviser, Dr. Condoleeza Rice, and told her: ”You’re going to spend more time during your four years on terrorism generally and al Qaeda specifically than any other

⁶⁵ Condoleeza Rice, ‘ Promoting the National Interest ‘, p.47.

⁶⁶ Lawrence J. Korb, *A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2003, p.3.

⁶⁷ George W. Bush quoted in Maureen Dowd, ‘Freudian Face-Off ‘, *New York Times*, June 16, 1999, A.29.

issue.”⁶⁸ George Tenet met with Bush, Cheney and Rice around a week before the presidential inaugural address and told them that al Qaeda was a “tremendous and immediate threat” along with the proliferation of WMD and China’s emerging power. ⁶⁹ How immediate it was, shocked the whole administration, country and world. On September 11 the unthinkable happened. The Clinton and Bush administrations were guilty of a grave sin of analysis once described by the economist Thomas Schelling, namely ”to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is therefore improbable; what is improbable need not be taken seriously.”⁷⁰ What had happened on September 11 was very real and had to be very seriously considered. Nine days after the attacks Bush told the nation that America faced a threat which was not new and different, but old and familiar, for it continues the criminal ideologies of the 20th century. And indeed America suffered repeatedly because of terrorist attacks on its citizens during the 1980s and 1990s. Each time it responded to them quite ineffective and considered them crimes rather than acts of war. Not this time. The magnitude of the September 11 attacks in terms of human lives, material and symbolical damages had awakened America to wage a war to defend its people, its values and its interests at home and abroad. The war on terrorism becomes the top priority and mission of America in the world. The “terrorists with global reach” responsible for the attacks against America had to be punished immediately. Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network established in Afghanistan since 1996 with the support of the Taliban had to pay a stiff price for the crimes they have perpetrated. The dismantling of al Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan became the first target of the war. But the toppling of the Taliban partially confirmed in fact what Bush and his team thought from the very beginning. Terrorists ultimately depend on states, which assist and harbour them. This link proved to be “the principal strategic thought underlying our strategy in the war on terrorism.”⁷¹ Terrorism-sponsoring

⁶⁸ Quoted in Barton Gelmann, ‘A Strategy’s Curious Evolution’, *Washington Post*, January 20, 2002, p. A 16.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (Simon and Schuster, 2002), p.34.

⁷⁰ Thomas C. Schelling, ‘Introduction’ in Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, (Stanford University Press, 1962), p. vii-ix..

⁷¹ Douglas Feith quoted in Nicholas Lemann, ‘After Iraq’, *New Yorker*, February 17 and 24, 2003, p.72.

states become thus the second target of the war. "We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants" underscores Bush in his NSS.⁷² But "what September 11th to me said was this is just the beginning of what these bastards can do if they start getting access to so-called modern weapons, and that it's not something you can live any longer,"⁷³ explains Paul Wolfowitz. The nuclear terrorism completes the mosaic of vital threats to United States. Not only the terrorists and their supporters, but the weapons they might acquire and deploy are now the priority. Terrorists "are seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Given the means, our enemies would be a threat to every nation and, eventually, to civilisation itself,"⁷⁴ declares Bush. Who could provide them with such means? Most of those responsible in administration to give an answer to this question worried that rogue states might supply or help terrorist acquire such deadly weapons and technologies. In this way, the threat shifted again towards states, more exactly, again rogue states that were able and ready to assist the terrorist. In his State of the Union from January 2002, Bush announced that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were keen on acquiring weapons of mass destruction and that they "constitute an axis of evil". In the 2002 NSS, Bush is warning the Americans and the world by saying:

"Today, our enemies see weapons of mass-destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbours."⁷⁵

The threats to America's security and interests at home and abroad were thus identified in a deadly combination of terrorism, tyrants and technologies. It was the high time to devise a wise and original strategy to deal with such a unique danger.

⁷² *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, D.C., September 2002 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html –accessed in May 2005).

⁷³ Paul Wolfowitz, 'Interview with Sam Tannenhaus of Vanity Fair', May 9, 2003, Washington, D.C., (www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html –accessed May 2005)

⁷⁴ George W. Bush, 'Remarks to the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism', Warsaw, Poland, November 6, 2001 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-2.html - accessed May 2005).

B. The 'Free Hand' Policy and the Doctrine of Preemption

How to fight this war? Since the threats are new in their nature, so should be the war to defeat them. All options should be at hand at any time. Although having a UN resolution providing for “all necessary steps”⁷⁶ to fire back against terrorists and the NATO willingness to activate the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, America decided to forge a “coalition of the willing” under its command to fight the Taliban regime. In the remaining months of 2001, U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, blocked international efforts to invigorate the Biological Weapons Convention and to put on the track the International Criminal Court. Counterterrorism at home and abroad was set as top priority, but it will take up to two years for the Bush administration to find the right strategy⁷⁷. Meanwhile, the Congress adopted soon after September 11 a \$9.8 billion supplement for homeland security, and the budget for 2003 rose to \$37.7 billion. The Patriot Act was backed by the continuation of the project of a missile defense system for America.” We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery”, says Bush in NSS. But the war on terror can't be won only on the defensive. “We need to fight it overseas by bringing the war to the bad guys”⁷⁸. In other words, the best defense is the offense. The need to fight abroad “terrorism of global reach” refashioned America's relations with the whole world. This war allowed no rooms for neutrality. “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” warned Bush. A strategic cooperation of America with the other great powers was critical. But not formal international organizations will provide the privileged pattern of negotiations. Bilateral agreements and “coalitions of the willing” will take the lead. Not the alliance decides the mission, but the mission build the alliance will reinforce Donald Rumsfeld. Although ready to work with other nations ‘to deny, contain and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies’ and ‘to enlist the support of international community, we

⁷⁵ *The National Security Strategy of the United States.*

⁷⁶ *UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001)*, adopted on September 12, 2001.

⁷⁷ Ivo H. Daalder, James M.Lindsay, *America Unbound*, p.90.

will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of *self-defense* by acting *preemptively*,' announces Bush in 2002 NSS. In a speech to the students of the National Defense University he argues that defending terrorism "requires that we take the war to the enemy."⁷⁹ In his State of the Union address in January 2002 Bush declares

"Time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."⁸⁰

Few months later, in the commencement address at West Point on June 1, 2002, Bush lays out already the doctrine of preemptive attack.

"We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act...Security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives."⁸¹

The strategies of containment and deterrence are outdated to fight this new war. Although America has and wants to preserve "unparalleled military strength", there is nothing to deter when terrorist have nothing to lose and containment turns out to be ineffective in a globalized world.

"Deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents or against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the

⁷⁸ Bush quoted in Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, p.281

⁷⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, '21st Century Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces', National Defense University, Washington, D.C., January 31, 2002 quoted in Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound*, p.121.

⁸⁰ George W. Bush, *State of the Union Address*, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2002 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html – accessed May 2005)

⁸¹ George W. Bush, 'Remarks at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy', West Point, N.Y., June 1, 2002 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html – accessed May 2005).

wealth of their nations.”⁸²

And in other place

“The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”⁸³

The doctrine of preemptive war, as presented by Bush, blurs the limits between preemptive and preventive wars. While a preemptive war pertains to actions taken by a country to match imminent attacks by another country, a preventive war is launched by a state against another one although it was not threatened before and no clear sign of such a threat exists, but still with the rationale to eliminate the threat before it arises. This confusion between the two kind of wars draws on the asymmetrical and unconventional methods used by terrorists to achieve their goals. In spite of being a risky strategy, which may put under question the law underpinning the current international political system, nobody can’t deny to America its right to legitimate self-defense in such a dangerous world, argued its defenders. This was a core innovation after the World War II that provided America with increased freedom of action. The combination of two factors—America’s universal political principles and unprecedented global power and influence—makes the Bush Doctrine a whole greater than the sum of its parts and it is likely to remain the basis for U.S. security strategy for decades to come. It unveiled though its limits and risks. North Korea’s recent actions remind America of ways in which the possession by others of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles places limits on policy options. America can’t wage completely alone this war and needs international support to get the intelligence necessary for homeland security, for preventing WMD proliferation and for

⁸² *The National Security Strategy of the United States.*

⁸³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States*

justifying preemptive strikes against rogue states and terrorists. The risk is to provoke an assertive uneasiness among great powers about the new “freed” America and a quiet but resolved arms race among them, which in the long run might make the world much more dangerous than it is.

3. Elements of Continuity

Both Clinton’s and Bush’s NSS set as goal a more secure, peaceful, democratic and prosperous world, where everybody can benefit from political, economic and civic freedoms. The two presidents share the same liberal ideas related to how democratic polities, economic interdependence, international institutions and political identity provide independently or combined the sources of a “stable, legitimate, secure, and remunerative” international order. It is a grand liberal strategy that finds strong supporters both on the left and the right sides of American political arena and accounts for a considerable degree of continuity in the foreign policy of Republican and Democrat presidents. Bush and Clinton feel persuaded by the truth of ‘democratic peace’ theory, according to which democracies don’t fight each other. Besides, democratic polities offer the best framework for economic freedom to flourish. Free trade and market economies represent for Bush and Clinton the best instruments to produce economic growth and to create democratic impulses and patterns of democratic behaviour and institutions. Both Clinton and Bush regard globalization and democracy as instruments to enhance America’s security: economic security for Clinton, military security for Bush. But they both are exposed to the risks of double standards in the pursuit of their goals: ‘selective engagement’ and ‘low intensity democracies’ at Clinton, the need to work with less democratic regimes to fight terrorists of global reach at Bush.

Both Clinton and Bush are willing to codify and institutionalize the international political, economic, judicial and military cooperation, but both wish to preserve for America a “vital space” for unilateral action when vital interests are at stake. Both share the desire to keep America’s military ‘second to none’, to deploy it overseas and to develop alliances and coalitions in America’s interests.

Clinton and Bush are willing to advance America's political, economic and military security using an integrative security strategy, where each element needs, implies and enriches the others.

Clinton and Bush reinforce "America First" goal and strategy altogether. In a world where America is no more defended by its oceans, both National Security Strategies recognize the need for "engagement" in order to secure American values and interests or to "foster a world environment where the American system can survive and flourish," as Paul Nitze put it in 1950, in the famous "NSC 68" memorandum.

4. Elements of Change

The two foreign policy doctrines of Clinton and Bush represent the realities in international politics of the post-cold-war, sole-superpower world. There are both similarities and differences in them.

One may distinguish at Clinton and Bush a different emphasis of the elements belonging to their integrative security strategies. This was the result of their exercise of threat assessment, which led them to engage the world with different ideas in mind. If Clinton saw the main threat coming from America's economic weaknesses, for Bush the main challenges to America's security were of a military nature: terrorists, rogue states and deadly new technologies. Clinton's strategy tries to play upon a highly integrated world, where economic, financial, political and social ties create important interdependencies that could help America's economy regain its competitive character on the global market. For Bush, the world is full of monsters striving to weaken America and the 'democratic civilization'. His strategy tries to deal mostly with the military challenges to American security. If Clinton understands democracy promotion as a 'selective engagement' to 'enlarge' the global scope of market economies and free trade, Bush regards the global spread of democracy as an instrument to fight terrorism. The urgency of the terrorist threat replaces the defensive and passive democracy promotion policy of Clinton with a more offensive 'regime change', the political equivalent of military preemptive strategy. While free trade and the

global multiplying of free-market economies are primarily due, in Clinton's view, to upgrade America as the first economic power of the world, Bush strongly advocates the economic openness and freedom around the world as channels to integrate non-democracies in the world economic system, to open them up to democratic values and institutions, and to make them less vulnerable to terrorist interference and blackmail. America's wealth and economic benefits from globalization can be defended and increased as long as the U.S. feels ready to shoulder together with other democratic nations of the world the burden of democratic nation and state-building of former 'rogue states'.

Clinton continues the traditional Wilsonian strategies of "enlightened self-interest" designed to build economic and political alliances under U.S. global leadership and to strengthen international institutions. Bush's America shares this willing "to enlist the support of international community" in order to promote global security, prosperity and peace, but shall not hesitate to act unilaterally if its vital interests are at stake. While Clinton advocated the rising role of international institutions, Bush abused of the arguments related to 'self-defence' and 'vital interests', to justify actions that U.S. may pursue unilaterally. He very often deprived international institutions of the necessary powers and legitimacy to respond to traditional and non-traditional security issues. He deemed almost any kind of entanglement, for the most part, unnecessary and out of touch with today's threats and global power structure characterized by major power imbalances between the America and the world. The pursuit of free hand policy and the "coalitions of the willing" reflect an American foreign policy tradition initiated by George Washington. As the eighteenth century ended, President George Washington admonished his countrymen to "steer clear of permanent alliances," and Thomas Jefferson attempted to strike a delicate balance between trade and national security by warning "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." ⁸⁴

Bush is consistent with the history of active U.S. interventionism. Since the early days of the American Republic, presidents have embodied a nationalist

⁸⁴ George Washington, "Farewell Address to the People of the United States," *Independent Chronicle*, September 26, 1796. Jefferson's quote is found in Stephan Howard Browne, *Jefferson's*

and idealist approach that has transformed U.S. foreign policy into a moral crusade or visionary quest for spreading American values throughout the world via armed intervention. Peace and democracy by sword, and not by institutions, would say Bush. In a new century and under new strategic circumstances, Bush's America lost its patience. It is not more willing to wait for imminent threats, but to preemptively strike before they are manifest. Bush's doctrine of self-defense by preemptive military intervention is a huge change from Clinton's strategy. While the latter recommends American military intervention mostly with the legitimisation of international institutions, for Bush any preemptive military intervention is legitimised by self-defense against non-traditional threats. Although not new in its content and in its potential application by America, as Collin Powell rightly put it, Bush is the first American president who publicly made the case for preemption. This first strike strategy against "evildoers" encapsulates many of the cultural features of American exceptionalism and interventionism. Strongly advocated now, it risks or maybe intends to rewrite the basic rules of international law. While its ultimate rationale is to enhance America's power and security, it remains to be seen whether this will be the case.

III. American Democracy Promotion

It is widely assumed that America's stubborn commitment to promoting democracy all over the world stems from an "idealist" reflex created by a political tradition of moralism and exceptionalism. America's core mission, claim idealists, is to put at work all its resources for spreading the benefits of liberal democracy to all peoples of the earth. This is not only a dangerous approach in the international politics, replies the realist camp, but also a deceiving rethoric articulated in order to sell foreign policy both to domestic and international public. But a fair assessment of the reasons and influence of placing democracy at the heart of US foreign policy has to overcome the myopic dualism of the idealist and realist

Call for Nationhood: The First Inaugural Address (College Station: Texas A&M University, 2003).

traditions. It is no doubt that “the self-image of any nation affects its foreign policy” says Henry Nau. Nonetheless, national interests shape foreign policy as much as internal self perceptions. “Thus, foreign policy begins with how a nation thinks about and organizes itself internally to project its economic and military power abroad.”⁸⁵ Consequently, American policy of democracy promotion abroad after World War II “reflects a pragmatic, evolving, and sophisticated understanding of how to create a stable international political order and a congenial security environment”⁸⁶ and is an essential part of a liberal grand strategy. This strategy encapsulates liberal ideas related to how democratic polities, economic interdependence, international institutions and political identity provide independently or combined the sources of a “stable, legitimate, secure, and remunerative” international order. It is a strategy that finds strong supporters both on the left and the right sides of American political arena and accounts for a considerable degree of continuity in the foreign policy of Republican and Democrat presidents. We will proceed now with exploring the political impulses underlying Clinton’s and Bush’s national security strategies, while in the next chapter we will pay attention to the economic rationales of democracy promotion and with the democratic rationales of economic openness and interdependence.

1. Clinton’s Concept of ‘Democracy Enlargement’

In the prominent speeches delivered during the electoral campaign Clinton played the democratic card of his potential foreign policy. In his major foreign policy address at Georgetown on 12 December 1991, Clinton put George H. W. Bush on defense while criticizing the favouring of “stability and his personal relations with foreign leaders over a coherent policy of promoting freedom and

⁸⁵ Henry Nau, ‘Identity and Democracy Promotion’ in ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, *American Democracy Promotion :Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p.130.

⁸⁶ G.John Ikenberry, ‘America’s Liberal Grand Strategy :Democracy and National Security in the Post-war Era’ in ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, *American Democracy Promotion :Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p 103.

economic growth.”⁸⁷ In the summer edition of *Harvard International Review*, Clinton argued that “President Bush too often has hesitated when democratic forces needed our support in challenging the status quo”. In the speech at World Affairs Council on 13 August 1992, Clinton accused Bush of being indifferent to democracy and the “democratic revolution”. And, finally, in a speech at University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee on 1 October 1992, Clinton kept Bush responsible for being “un-American” and for not being “at home in the mainstream pro-democracy tradition of American foreign policy.” Clinton’s electoral rethoric seemed to imply that he preferred a foreign policy led by democratic principles than considerations of power. But Clinton was “hardly a liberal rambo in search of new frontiers to conquer. Pragmatic in outlook and keen to assuage key domestic constituencies, ultimately he always viewed democracy promotion as a policy instrument to advance American power rather than a moral duty. Thus, if he supported the cause of democracy, he did not do so for idealistic reasons, but because he felt this supported US national security and America’s economic goals in the wider international system.”⁸⁸ Highly cautious and sensitive to American public opinion, Clinton appeared consistently inapt or unwilling in the early years of his first term as president of United States of America to articulate a foreign policy concept that enjoyed a sound support at home and abroad. This happened to a certain extent in late 1993 under the label of “democratic enlargement”. Besides its conceptual simplicity, the phrase turned out to have optimistic implications able to overcome unhappy scenarios foreseen by the “clash of civilizations” theory. “America’s overriding purpose is to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies,”⁸⁹ declared Clinton on 27 September 1993 in his address to United Nations. But why democracy? And why would the shift in the politics organizing other countries increase America’s security?

⁸⁷ Quoted in Michael Cox, ‘Democracy Promotion under Clinton’ in ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, *American Democracy Promotion : Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p 220. All the quotations from Clinton’s speeches come from Cox’s article.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, p.221.

⁸⁹ ‘Clinton Warns Of Perils Ahead Despite Cold War’s End’, London , United States Information Service, 28 September 1993.

For De Tocqueville, America was not only a solid and successful democracy, but also the best example for others to follow.⁹⁰ At the end of the 20th century, democracy gained the reputation of “the best form of political organization”⁹¹ and created an almost unstoppable tide in the world. It was argued that democracy represented the “end of history” in the sense of the best possible political organization mankind is able to design.⁹² Clinton exemplified the “American genius” in the way he conceived American foreign policy as an expression of its core principles, and it was nothing more important in the American system of values than the principle of democracy. But it was more than that. Already Woodrow Wilson saw democracy at the heart of a peaceful international political order. “His belief in the inherent goodness of man, in progress as the law of organic life and the working out of the divine plan in history, and in democracy as the highest form of government led him straight to the conclusion that democracy must some day be the universal rule of political life.”⁹³ Wilson advocated ideas that could be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s *Zum ewigen Frieden*. There he argues that liberal constitutional democracies or “republics” tend to develop peaceful relations with each other due to their internal structures and common political and cultural values. The security implications of democratic polities are underscored also by Clinton: “How others govern themselves” is an issue about which United States is highly interested because “democracies don’t go to war with each other”.⁹⁴ For Talbott, this thesis almost represented an empirical truth of political science, although not so self-evident.⁹⁵ He was very convinced of the argument that America’s and the world’s security and prosperity depended on the successful transition of world’s states to democracy: “Our answer to the sceptics, the critics, and the self-styled realists is straightforward: look at history, and look at the world around us. Democracy

⁹⁰ Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, (1835; London :Oxford University Press, 1946), p.370

⁹¹ See Strobe Talbott, *The New Geopolitics: Defending Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era*, speech delivered at Oxford University on 20 October, 1994.

⁹² See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York, The Free Press, 1992), pp.39-51.

⁹³ Arthur S. Link, *Wilson the Diplomatist*, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), p.13

⁹⁴ Bill Clinton, ‘A New Covenant for American Security’, speech delivered at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, (Washington, D.C., 12 December 1991).

⁹⁵ Strobe Talbott, *The New Geopolitics*.

contributes to safety and prosperity, both in national life and in international life-it's that simple. The ability of a people to hold their leaders accountable at the ballot box is good not just for a citizenry so enfranchised-it is also good for that country's neighbours, and therefore for the community of states."⁹⁶ The argument of 'democratic peace' is backed by other arguments that pertain to the spill-over effects in international behaviour and outlook of domestic institutionalized and democratically legitimated distribution of power, of the rule of law and transparency of political processes. Anthony Lake resumes in 1995 the liberal idea that democracies are more likely to build "peaceful, continuous, rule-based, institutionalized and legitimate relations" with each other:

"We led the struggle for democracy because the larger the pool of democracies, the greater our own security and prosperity. Democracies, we know, are less likely to make war on us or on other nations. They tend not to abuse the rights of their people. They make for more reliable trading partners. And each new democracy is a potential ally in the struggle against the challenges of our time-containing ethnic and religious conflict; reducing the nuclear threat; combating terrorism and organized crime; overcoming environmental degradation."⁹⁷

Despite being constantly tempered by security-driven motivations, this policy of democracy promotion was running the risk of transforming an American engagement abroad in a "reckless crusade". Clinton and his team were extremely cautious not to let their 'democratic enlargement' rhetoric being misinterpreted. While eagerly criticizing Bush's bad record on democracy promotion, Clinton was keen to clarifying his pragmatic position. "Our actions abroad had always to be tempered with prudence and common sense."⁹⁸ What did that mean? It meant that America wouldn't give up suddenly to strategic partnerships established with authoritarian regimes, and would have to tune its "commitment to democracy and

⁹⁶ 'Democracy and the International Interest', remarks by deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to the Denver Summit of the Eight Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights, 11 October, 1997, p.2. See also Strobe Talbott, 'Democracy and the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, 75/6 (1996), pp.47-63.

⁹⁷ Anthony Lake, 'Remarks on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Center for Democracy', Washington, D.C., 26 September 1995.

human rights” with its security needs and economic interests. Besides, U.S. should not impose its liberal democratic values developed over a long time on countries with non-democratic cultures and traditions and with a less appetite for democracy. Democracy is our best merchandise to export, would say Clinton, but we can’t force people to buy it. Otherwise, it loses its value. Democracy comes into being as a natural result of the internal alchemy of a society over an unspecified time, or it is promoted through a “stick and carrot” mechanism, which in turn implies a self-imposed democratic behaviour from the part of non-democracies with the perspective of important material benefits. Lake proves to be highly supportive of this idea of “selective engagement”. A three “P” logic transpires from his statements: prudence, patience and pragmatism: “Our interests in democracy and markets do not stand alone...other American interests at times will require us to befriend and even defend non-democratic states for mutually beneficial reasons.”⁹⁹ Also in Talbott’s view has America to confine its democratic impulses, since “for the United States, the attractions and advantages of supporting democracy abroad must be balanced against other strategic interests, against the difficulty of sponsoring transitions that will inevitably entail a degree of disruption, if not instability. Support for democracy was not an absolute imperative.”¹⁰⁰

The way Clinton and his team deal with the rationales of democracy promotion abroad highlights that they learned from the mistakes made by their predecessors in the White House. Neither democracy, for democracy’s sake, nor power for power’s sake. They were not ready to bandwagon America on a mission impossible to “make the world safe for democracy” no matter the price. “Neither rigidly Wilsonian nor classically realist” as Lake finally put it, America should design a successful foreign policy, where identity and power projection abroad combine, reinforce each other and substantially enhance America’s security at home. This will be also the main goal of George W. Bush, whose rhetoric of

⁹⁸ Governor Bill Clinton, *Democracy in America*, speech delivered at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 1 October, 1992.

⁹⁹ Anthony Lake, ‘Lake Says U.S. Interests Compel Engagement Abroad’, London: United States Information Service, 22 September 1993, p. 5.

¹⁰⁰ Strobe Talbott, ‘Democracy and the National Interest’, *Foreign Affairs*, 75/6 (1996), p.52.

democracy promotion makes him sometimes more idealistic than Woodrow Wilson.

2. Democracy Promotion in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants and Weapons of Mass Destruction

As we saw in the second chapter, Bush and his team regard the main threats to the security of the United States as coming from terrorists, rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although these threats are to be addressed by using a large and diversified set of tools, from military intervention to intelligence gathering and cutting off the financial support of terrorists, America is keen to fight its war by also promoting democracy, free markets, and human rights all over the world. This is a part of a clear strategy to advance a peaceful international order favourable to America's security:

“We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”¹⁰¹

Bush seems to strongly believe in democratic peace:

‘The United States have a great and guiding goal: to turn this time of American influence into generation of democratic peace.’¹⁰²

Also for the National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleeza Rice, democracy promotion abroad represents the warrant of a more secure and peaceful America and world:

“Lasting peace and long-term security are only possible through the advance of prosperity, liberty, and human dignity. »¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, D.C., September 2002, p.3 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html –accessed in May 2005)

¹⁰² Governor George W. Bush, ‘A Distinctly American Internationalism’

¹⁰³ Remarks by National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleeza Rice, at the McConnell Center for Political Leadership, University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky , Office of the Press Secretary March 8, 2004 (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040308-15.html> -accessed May 2005) .

Or at other place:

‘The defeat of terror and the success of freedom in those nations will serve the interests of our Nation, because free nations do not sponsor terror and do not breed the ideologies of murder.’¹⁰⁴

The NSS designed by Bush administration continues the pragmatism of Clinton’s strategy, where democracy was a goal among others, but not an undeniable priority. This appears at Bush under the form of an ambiguity concerning the real place of democracy promotion in American security strategy. It functions both as goal in itself and instrument of peace.

‘America’s power and purpose must be used to defend freedom, while the spread of democracy leads to lasting peace.’¹⁰⁵

“Rogue states” were defined as non-democratic states that were hostile to U.S. and civilized world, didn’t comply with the international law and obligations deriving from it, and breed hate and an ideology of terror by threatening irrationally and recklessly with the use of WMD. In order to prevent non-democracies from assisting terrorists, from seeking and/or helping others acquire deadly technologies America “actively works to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”¹⁰⁶ Although there is no direct link between poverty, non-democracy and terrorism, “yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”¹⁰⁷

Bush’s rethoric of democracy promotion bears many marks of an idealist approach urging for a crusade in the name of democracy all over the world:

¹⁰⁴ *ibidem*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem.*

¹⁰⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, D.C., September 2002, p.4.

¹⁰⁷ *ibidem*

'This war also is a conflict of visions. In their worship of power, their deep hatreds, their blindness to innocence, the terrorists are successors to the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. And we are the heirs of the tradition of liberty, defenders of the freedom, the conscience and the dignity of every person. Others before us have shown bravery and moral clarity in this cause. The same is now asked of us, and we accept the responsibilities of history.'" ¹⁰⁸

If the Cold War was not only a balance of power politics, but also an ideological conflict, the war on terror is a struggle of two visions reiterates Rice:

' We must never lose sight of a central truth: the War on Terror - like the Cold War - is as much a conflict of visions as a struggle of armed force.' ¹⁰⁹

The ruthless enemies of America are striving to destroy freedom as a way of life. America will not allow this and the new 'Bush doctrine' boldly advances the idea of regime change that is the political equivalent of the military preemptive strategy. The urgency of terrorist threat can't wait the self-emergence of democracies. The democracy must sometimes be forced on tyrants. As a consequence, Bush's America is ready to engage in missions impossible like that of 'nation/state-building'. 'Iraq and Afghanistan are vanguards of this effort to spread democracy and tolerance and freedom throughout the Greater Middle East' ¹¹⁰, says Rice. The democratic imperialists from Bush's team eminently seized the chance to use the president's impulse of crusader to remake the world in America's image. No matter the price. But the price seems to be very high in terms of human lives, money and disregard to current international law, institutions and cooperation. If America will still afford the price of its strategy,

¹⁰⁸ George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Winston Churchill and the War on Terror, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Office of the Press Secretary, February 4, 2004 (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html> -accessed May 2005).

¹⁰⁹ Remarks by National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleeza Rice at the McConnell Center for Political Leadership.

¹¹⁰ *ibidem*

and whether this strategy will finally upgrade the world's and America's peace and security, remains to be seen.

3. Elements of Continuity

Both Clinton and Bush are strong advocates of 'democratic peace' theory. In line with the tradition initiated by Woodrow Wilson, they consider democracy at the heart of a peaceful international political order. They both prove to be very pragmatic in justifying democracy promotion abroad, but their expediency leads sometimes to double standards. In the form of 'selective engagement' and 'low intensity democracy' to Clinton and in the need to sometimes cooperate with less democratic regimes in fighting terrorism to Bush. The promotion of democracy is not for democracy's sake, but for America's security sake. And this appeal finds both Bush and Clinton on the same side in claiming and reassuring America's role of global leader in defending and promoting democracy.

4. Elements of Change

Clinton is more cautious and perceives America's democracy promotion abroad as a 'selective engagement' to 'enlarge' the global scope of market economies and free trade, while not disregarding U.S. economic and strategic interests. For Bush the global spread of democracy serves as an instrument to fight terrorism. He seems to be willing to take risks and playing the crusader card. Bush's America preferred at times strain relations with its European allies and other close partners, as the intervention in Iraq clearly demonstrated, than giving up its democratic cause and conviction. The financial burden for nation/state building in Afghanistan and Iraq that Bush's America is ready to shoulder reinforces the difference. The emergency of the terrorist threat obliges America not to take Clinton's defensive stance in spreading democracy, but to take up a more offensive approach in the form of "regime change", the political equivalent of military preemptive strategy. Unexpectedly, Bush appears sometimes more

liberal and idealist than any other American president, but not at the expense of his also firm realist convictions.

IV. Peace, Globalization and Democracy

The discovery of Americas in 1492 by Christopher Columbus created the first important European impulse towards globalization and resulted in the settlement and the foundation of what eventually was called the United States of America. As an effect of globalization, America strives to pass the benefits of its multicultural society, political identity and economic system to the whole world through the same process that led to its birth. This process was strongly intensified in the post-cold war period under the form of an accelerated economic liberalization. The American political and economic elite understood very well that the U.S. central position in the current global economic and political system could not be preserved and reinforced without an active American engagement in the world. The U.S. developed an network of bilateral, regional and global agreements and institutions aimed at a high integration and stabilization of a world, where America keep its leading status and best secure its national interests.

The national security strategies shaped by Clinton and Bush reflect this fundamental understanding concerning the critical role of globalization for defending American economic, political and military security and primacy in a more secure, peaceful and democratic world. But what are the philosophical rationales and implications of these strategies having at their heart the globalization? First, we will briefly explore this philosophical background. Then, we will try to emphasize how this philosophical and political background is integrated in the NSS of Bush and Clinton. By doing so, we will better understand the degree of continuity and change between the two presidents in their strategic approach to globalization.

1. From Democratic Pacifists to Commercial Pacifists

We saw in the previous chapter the arguments concerning the political sources of international peace. Peace in the world, it was argued, could be reached by creating a world of liberal constitutional democracies that will naturally tend to develop peaceful relations among them in the international arena. But Kant suggested in his *Perpetual Peace* that it is not enough to have representative governments, separation of powers and the rule of law. We need additionally both respect for human rights and social and economic interdependence. Each of these elements is deemed as necessary, but only together they prove to be sufficient for securing the peace in the world. Kant's argument led to the establishing of a particular stream in the liberal school of international relations called commercial pacifism. Adam Smith and Joseph Schumpeter acknowledged that representative government may be important for spreading peace, but the real source of international peace was commerce. At this point, three lines of argument were elaborated. The first one says that there is an almost direct link between international trade and peace. The increased economic and social exchange creates powerful interdependencies, which weakens gradually the states' capacity to control economy and to wage war. 'There is an expectation that trade will create new forms of mutual dependence through the progressive evolution of specialization and functional differentiation of national economies. This process in turn creates a blurring of national economic borders and interests, which in turn debilitates the capacity of the state to determine and act upon narrow nationalist economic interests. The state's interests are broadened to include a stake in the stability and functioning of the larger international order.'¹¹¹ The second one assumes that there is an indirect link between international trade and peace. Trade creates economic growth, that in turn refashions political values, structures and identities towards a more democratic outlook, which in turn is conducive to more international peace. This argument is very well advanced in the following words: 'it is only under conditions of prosperity and capitalism that elites can accept defeat peacefully at the polls, secure in the knowledge that they will have fair

opportunities to regain political power, and opportunities for economic benefit when they are out of power.’¹¹² Additional arguments for the positive impact of economic growth refer to the increase in terms of education and democratic political culture, to the emergence of a middle class thirsty for more information, freedom of movement and of action. Markets mechanisms spill over into political patterns of behavior. ‘Markets make for *collective solutions* - equilibrium prices – separate from those of individual producers who seek to sell dear and individual consumers who seek to buy cheap.’¹¹³ The third and last line of arguments holds that there is indeed a direct link between trade and peace, but in order to enhance international trade, we need to multiply the markets and especially the market-economies. Yet, only democratic polities provide the best political and legal framework for these market economies to flourish. There is a strong linkage between democracy and market economy, says the argument. Besides, the global commercial peace as a result of high economic interdependence presupposes the integration of as many economies as possible, which can’t be opened up without the domestic emergence or existence of democratic values and institutions.

The three types of arguments stem from a reductionist and a consequential interpretation of Kant’s arguments. While Kant assumes that representative government, human rights and social and economic interdependence can lead to international peace only together and simultaneously, different liberal camps emphasize only one element of the three, or try to work out how to reach democratic peace going from economic interdependence, or the other way around. The thread that unites these arguments refers to a dialectic relation between economics and politics. The security strategies of Clinton and Bush will consistently integrate one or more from these lines of arguments presented above.

¹¹¹ G. John Ikenberry, ‘America’s Liberal Grand Strategy : Democracy and National Security in the Post-war Era ‘ in ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, *American Democracy Promotion*, p.117.

¹¹² Thomas J. Volgy and John E. Schwartz, ‘Free Trade, Economic Inequality and the Stability of Democracies in the Democratic Core of Peace’ in *European Journal of International Relations*, 3/2 (1997), p. 240.

2. Clinton's 'Enlargement of Market-Democracies'

The security strategy of Clinton and his team offers a 'rather interesting attempt to relate the politics of democracy promotion to the economics of the global market.'¹¹⁴ Clinton's revolutionary achievement lies in a paradigm change of American foreign policy thinking. He elevated "economic / commercial diplomacy" at the center of America's new security strategy. The emphasis changes towards foreign economic policy, while military security assumes a lower profile. American political presence and "engagement" abroad is aimed at preserving, securing and "enlarging" international markets for "Made in U.S.A." products and at facilitating global access to raw materials. The "*enlargement*" of the democratic geography of the world, has to reflect and consolidate American political values, but also to advance American commercial and financial interests.

'Our national security strategy is therefore based on enlarging the community of *market democracies* while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies and *our interests*. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.'¹¹⁵

For Clinton, intensified trade may very well lead to more international peace, but what is more important is that it makes America regain its competitive character in the global market and increase its economic growth. 'What Clinton liked best about Lake's enlargement policy was the way it was inextricably linked to economic renewal with its emphasis on making sure the United States remained the number one exporter.'¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Michael Doyle, 'Peace, Liberty and Democracy : Realists and Liberals Contest a Legacy' in ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, *American Democracy Promotion : Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p 30.

¹¹⁴ Michael Cox, ' Democracy Promotion under Clinton ' in ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, *American Democracy Promotion*, p.231.

¹¹⁵ White House, 'National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement', February 1996, p.2-7 (www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm– accessed in May 2005)

¹¹⁶ See Douglas Brinkley, 'Democratic Enlargement: the Clinton Doctrine', *Foreign Policy*, 106 (1997), p. 117.

The target of enlargement is not the democracy in itself, but the market democracy. For Clinton and his team 'market' and 'democracy' imply each other. This means that market economy and international trade are conducive to democratic values and institutions.

'China's economic growth has made it more and more dependent on the outside world for investment, markets, and energy. These linkages bring with them powerful forces for change. Computers and the Internet, fax machines and photo-copiers, modems and satellites increase the exposure to people, ideas, and the world beyond China's borders.'¹¹⁷

In turn basic elements of democratic polity provide the political framework for a market to evolve and to open it up to the global economic system. The rule of law was for Warren Christopher an 'essential element of free market economy.'¹¹⁸ But it was critical for international trade as well.

'Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for reliable partners and are less likely to wage war on one another.'¹¹⁹

Clinton's 'selective engagement' policy for promoting democracy and his interests in new markets rather than new democracies had resulted in the proliferation of 'low intensity democracies' in which 'formal electoral democracy is promoted, but the transformatory capacity of democracy is limited in order to facilitate neo-liberal economic policies.'¹²⁰

Clinton's pursuit of power and national interest in order to make America 'first' was related with less liberal policies in order to protect U.S. markets at home. This confirmed the warning issued by Anthony Lake that Clinton's foreign

¹¹⁷ White House Press Release, 'Remarks by the President in Address on China and the National Interest', October 24, 1997.

¹¹⁸ Warren Christopher, statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 14, 1995, (USIS European Wireless, February 15, 1995), p.4.

¹¹⁹ White House, 'National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement', February 1996, p.2-7

¹²⁰ Barry K. Gills, 'American Power, Neo-liberal Economic Globalization, and Low-Intensity Democracy : An Unstable Trinity' in ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, *American Democracy Promotion*, p. 326.

policy will be 'neither rigidly Wilsonian nor classically realist'.¹²¹ George W. Bush may be characterized with the same words. His ideas on globalization go almost hand in hand with those of Clinton's team, but focusing on another main target: fighting terrorism, reducing the rogue states' incentives to acquire WMD and mitigating the nuclear threat coming from non-democratic nuclear powers.

3. Globalization and the War on Terror

'The terrorists attacked the World Trade Center, and we will defeat them by expanding and encouraging world trade,'¹²² told Bush to a group of California businessmen six weeks after September 11. This statement summarizes Bush's understanding of the role globalization might play as long he will stay in office. Bush integrates in his security strategy the liberal logic that points to the democratic effects of market-economy and international trade. Speaking on the necessity to improve trade with China, Bush admits that 'economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy.'¹²³ Nonetheless, the first thing in his mind is America's interests and security. As Rice put it, world's peace and prosperity is a spill over effect of America's pursuit of interests. What America wants is good for the whole world: 'America's pursuit of the national interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets, and peace. Its pursuit of national interests after World War II led to a more prosperous and democratic world. This can happen again.'¹²⁴ American presence in Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus, for example, is due to fight terrorism that threatens the democratic part of the world, but also to secure American access to raw materials and to create new free-market democracies.

This security strategy is the first one who elaborates on removing the roots of terrorism and authoritarian regimes. Thus, U.S. is firmly committed to

¹²¹ A. Lake, 'The Need for Engagement', *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, 5/49 (December 5, 1994), pp. 804-7.

¹²² George W. Bush, 'President Outlines War Effort', Sacramento, California, October 17, 2001 quoted in Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound*, p.91.

¹²³ *ibidem*

¹²⁴ C. Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest', p.47.

enlarge the realm of free-market democracies in every corner of the world. But democracy and free market don't emerge on their own. America has to take up its leadership role of urgently promoting them. The 'regime change' and 'nation-building' policies along with intensified trade are the adequate instruments, says the strategy, for attaining these immediate goals. To this purpose, American and international businesses appear both for Clinton and Bush as reliable partners in this strategic endeavor. Globalization created strong nationalisms, spread poverty, religious radicalism and class differences, which in turn bred terrorist ideology. Bush will try to fire back against terrorism by using the same process that partially produced it. It seems that there is an internal contradiction, which stems from Bush's firm conviction that open economy shapes politics in a democratic way. It remains again to be seen whether this weapon to fight terrorism will prove its effectiveness.

4. Elements of Continuity

Clinton and Bush share the liberal ideas that free market-economies and trade create economic growth, which in turn refashions political values, structures and identities towards a more democratic outlook, which in turn is conducive to more international peace.

Both Clinton and Bush regard globalization and democracy as instruments to enhance America's security: economic security for Clinton, military security for Bush. Last, but not least, both presidents are exposed to the risks of double standards in the pursuit of their goals: 'selective engagement' and 'low intensity democracies' with Clinton, the need to work with less democratic regimes to fight terrorists of global reach to Bush.

5. Elements of Change

While free trade and the global multiplying of free-market economies are primarily due, in Clinton's view, to upgrade America as the first economic power of the world, Bush strongly advocates the economic openness and freedom around

the world as channels to integrate non-democracies in the world economic system, to open them up to democratic values and institutions, and to make them less vulnerable to terrorist interference and blackmail. America's wealth and economic benefits from globalization can be defended and increased as long as the U.S. feels ready to shoulder together with other democratic nations of the world the burden of democratic nation and state-building of former 'rogue states'. Bush is not willing to wait the gradual emergence of free-market economies. Strategic imperatives and the urgent terrorist threat compel to immediate action in the form of "regime change" and 'nation-building'. As we underlined in the last chapter, in his stubbornness to world-widely promote democracy and free market, Bush appears sometimes more liberal than Clinton, but not giving up his also strong realist impulses.

V. Military Strategies

The National Security Strategies of the United States define 'the nation's plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments of state power – non-military as well as military - to pursue objectives that defend and advance its national interest'.¹²⁵ Determining the method and means of achieving goals assigned by policy, the NSS remains subordinated to policy, as the National Military Strategy is derived from and takes its guidelines from the NSS.

Military strategy is thus elaborated as to attain, through the use of military assets, military and security objectives. It provides the efficient means to fulfil the goals assigned by NSS. The clarity with which NSS is defined provides clear military objectives and thus facilitates efficient and focused strategy. In Liddel Hart's words the true aim of military strategy 'is not so much to seek battle, as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produces the

¹²⁵ Terry L. Deibel, *International Military and Defence Encyclopedia*, ed., TN Dupuy (USA: Brassey's 1993), pp. 2577-2578.

decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. In other words dislocation is the aim of strategy'.¹²⁶

The end of the cold war brought about for the United States a decisive change in the global strategic environment. The 'eye-to-eye' struggle with the Soviet Union once disappeared, America saw itself deprived of the 'vital threat' that shaped the American strategic culture and mobilized the Western world for almost 50 years. The search for a new role of America in world affairs in the post-cold war era was backed by a search for a new military strategy able to meet the challenges of a 'new world order'. Since 1991 the Pentagon agreed to four major defense policy reviews: the Joint Chiefs of Staff-led Base Force Review (1991), the Clinton administration's Bottom-Up Review (1993), and the 1997 and 2001 QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review), which were mandated by Congress. The NSS from September 2002 provided ground-breaking additional guidelines. These regular assessments of US defense strategy, force size and structure, weapons systems, overseas deployments, alliances, organization and functioning of the Department of Defense, and last, but not least, of the budget allocated for defense were aimed at matching the security and economic challenges, needs and interests for the United States at home and abroad and at preserving its primacy and envisaged central role in the international system. We will further explore the core principles of the defense policy reviews completed during Clinton and Bush administrations, while trying to feature their degree of continuity and change.

1. Military Strategic Concepts of the Clinton's Administration

Soon after the end of the cold war, American military strategists have been searching to identify a new strategic enemy for U.S. This effort was led by General Colin Powell, armed forces chief-of-staff until 1996, who established a special planning group inside the Pentagon shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This group came to the idea to refashion American military strategy around the threat posed by hostile powers in the third world - countries like Iran and Iraq, with significant military forces and a history of antagonism toward the West.

¹²⁶ Liddell Hart, *Strategy. The Indirect Approach* (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., Mc mxli), p. 335

This new approach, called the *Regional Defence Strategy*, was agreed upon by senior Pentagon leaders and President George Bush in the spring of 1990. It was then presented to the American people by the president in a speech delivered on 2 August 1990, the day chosen by Saddam Hussein for the invasion of Kuwait.¹²⁷

In the wake of the Gulf War, it seemed that the problem of the "missing enemy" had been fixed. From now on, US forces would be trained and equipped to fight wars against Iraq-like regional powers in the third world. At that time defence secretary, Dick Cheney, explained how "The Gulf War presaged very much the type of conflict we are most likely to confront again in this new era major regional contingencies against foes well-armed with advanced conventional and unconventional [i.e. nuclear or chemical] munitions"¹²⁸.

Clinton's defense secretary, Aspin, deemed Bush's security concept too conservative and outdated and initiated the so-called *Bottom-Up Review*. Nonetheless, he took over the Bush's threat assessment that became the basis for the military strategy of the Clinton Administration. In the 1993 *Bottom-Up Review*, the Pentagon concluded that, despite the overwhelming defeat of Iraq, Washington would have to deal with a significant threat posed by hostile third world powers or "rogue states". To match this threat America would need to keep a sufficient military force capable of waging and win two "major regional conflicts" (MRCs) simultaneously¹²⁹. It was generally assumed that one of these conflicts will occur in the Persian Gulf region (against either Iran or Iraq) and the other in Korean Peninsula, most probably against North Korea. Besides, ethnic and religious struggles would require that U.S. forces be also able to accomplish peace making/keeping mission under UN aegis. In 1996 Pentagon recognized for the first time officially that 'the global proliferation of nuclear, chemical and

¹²⁷ As shown Michael R. Gordon's 'Military Services Propose Slashes in Existing Forces', *New York Times*, 12 May 1990.

¹²⁸ Statement before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, Washington, 19 March 1991.

¹²⁹ See US Department of Defense, *Bottom-Up Review: Force Structure Excerpts*, Washington, 1 September 1993. See also Michael R. Gordon, 'Military Plan Would Cut Forces But Have Them Ready for Two Wars', *New York Times*, 2 September 1993.

biological weapons represent a preeminent threat for the national security of the United States in the post cold war world.’¹³⁰

Although the 1997 QDR admitted the increasing role of high-technology weapons and the need to prepare for ‘smaller-scale contingencies’, it still called for readiness to fight wars with ‘rogue states’. It affirmed that the greatest danger to American security today comes from ‘the threat of coercion and large-scale, cross-border aggression against US allies and friends in key regions by hostile states with significant military power.’¹³¹

All these defense strategies proved to be excessively ‘focused on near-term contingencies at the expense of long-term preparedness and modernization’, overemphasized ‘the potency of the threats in these regions at the expense of other conventional challenges.’¹³² They were build around a ‘threat-based’ approach that implied a clear identification of the enemy (rogue states), of the places it could strike (Persian Gulf, Korean Peninsula), and even the time(in the near future). It was assumed that a successful strategy to cope with these threats was the static and passive deterrence. Aggression from rogue states had to be deterred by keeping an American global military engagement. The deterrence against the proliferation of WMD had to be realized in three steps, according to Clinton’s defense secretary in the second term, William Perry. The first ‘line of defense’ was represented by arms controls, non-proliferation treaties, export controls and economic sanctions. The second step was the deterrence realized through the deployment of significant conventional and nuclear forces. The third step was the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system on the soil of U.S.¹³³

As already mentioned, Clinton saw the main security threat not in military attacks against U.S. or its allies, but in America’s economic weaknesses. In this regard, American military had to be globally engaged in order to secure the existing markets for U.S. products, to enlarge the spectrum of free-market democracies in the form of NATO enlargement towards Central and Eastern

¹³⁰ James Kitfield, ‘Nuclear Arms Prompt Alarm’, *National Journal*, April 27, 1996, pp.936-938.

¹³¹ US Department of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, May 1997

¹³² Lawrence J. Korb, *Reshaping America’s Military : Four Alternatives Presented as Presidential Speeches*, (New York : Council On Foreign Relations, 2002), p. 7

¹³³ ‘Secretary of Defense on Nuclear Proliferation’, speech of William Perry at George Washington University on April 25, 1996, USIS, April 29, 1996, pp.1-2.

Europe and maybe even to facilitate America's access to world's raw materials. In fact Clinton was often criticized for not making enough to secure America's access to oil-rich strategic regions. Since U.S. obtained more than half of its oil supplies from foreign sources, and its strategically important dependence would grow in the years ahead as domestic sources were gradually depleted, it was said, then more should be done to enhance American control over gas and oil resources in the Persian Gulf or in the Caspian area.

In the absence of serious military threats to U.S., Clinton administration lowered the importance of the U.S. military forces. But this policy had its limits. In fact Clinton kept a level of military spending high enough to assure that America will remain the first military power of the world, second to none.

A. Military Size, Structure, Budget and Global Posture

The defense reviews completed under Clinton administration rested quite insensitive to the potential new threats of the post cold war world. Identifying the main military threats in possible aggressions from 'rogue states', the 1993 BUR and the 1997 QDR prescribe almost the same structure of the American overseas deployments as during the cold war. America's forces continued to be arranged essentially to fight large armies, navies, and air forces. Favoring a defensive approach rather than an offensive one, U.S. military abroad should accomplish a deterring function. But it was a static deterrence by size and quantity, which was combined with increasing, but not sufficient attention, paid to the threats coming from the IT technology incorporated in the military capabilities and warfighting. Due to the lower profile of the defense policy in the Clinton's NSS and to the American economic shortcomings, American military forces were reduced from 2,2 millions active soldiers to 1,45 millions, while the defense budget was cut by about one-third over five years (1992-1997) to amount only 4% of U.S. GDP. The budget for military research and development was even more reduced by 57 %. This will have serious effects on the envisaged RMA, which will be developed to quite a slow pace.

B. Revolution in Military Affairs

The 1997 QDR recognized the increasing importance of the information technology (IT) in ameliorating the effectiveness of military capabilities and the battlefield awareness during warfighting, but it didn't place too much emphasis on it. The IT gave rise to new processes, activities and products. New envisaged instruments and processes of fighting wars like information warfare (IW), network-centric-warfare (NCW), integrated command and control (C4ISR), system of systems, all powered by information technology were meant to lead to a revolution in military affairs (RMA). As we will see in the 'capabilities-based planning' approach during the Bush administration, RMA was due to considerably change the American thinking about national security affairs. The military had to fight with the 5th dimension of warfare, information, in addition to land, sea, air and space. The strategy planners were then required to consider the economic, political, military and information aspects in their policy and decision making.

From militaries driving the market to market driven militaries—this is the impact of the RMA that was recognized by the US Department of Defence (DoD) in its 1997 QDR. This defense review acknowledges the need to take advantage of the Revolution in Business Affairs. “Over the past decade, the American commercial sector has reorganized, restructured, and adopted revolutionary new business and management practices in order to ensure its competitive edge in the rapidly changing global marketplace. DoD is examining the best opportunities to outsource and privatize non-core activities. We need to deregulate defense just as we have deregulated many other American industries so we can reap the cost and creativity benefits of wide-open private competition.”¹³⁴ As we may see, the Clinton administration was fully aware of the role the IT played in enhancing America's competitive character on the global economic market and it was decided to make full use of this instrument so that America keep its status of the first economic power of the world. It was a strategic approach, which was likely

¹³⁴ US Department of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, May 1997.

to have a spillover effect in the military affairs as well. It will be the task of the Bush administration to considerably integrate the IT progresses in the American military strategy.

C. National Missile Defense System

Early in his campaign (December 12, 1991), Clinton discussed national security issues in a speech at Georgetown University. He then advocated the need to maintain an important nuclear deterrence.¹³⁵ But what if the deterrence doesn't work? After he took the oath in office, Clinton advocated the deployment of a limited land-based missile defense system, designed to protect the territory of the United States. The idea was not new. In his 1983 'Star Wars' speech, President Ronald Reagan proposed the creation of a worldwide protection against a massive Soviet ballistic missiles strike. But Clinton reduced significantly the scope of the project. Besides the fact that this change in the strategy of US required an agreement with Russia for the revision of the ABM Treaty, the European and Asian allies made their protests heard. Although Clinton administration tried to assuage them by arguing that a land-based missile shield would make America more willing to intervene abroad to protect allied interests, the allied feared that their security would be 'decoupled' by that of the United States. In a second stage, Clinton advanced a superior offer: sharing missile defense technology with the allies.¹³⁶ Such a limited land-based system, as that proposed by the last Clinton administration, seemed a cost-effective approach to deal with a then considered limited threat. The envisaged budget to deploy such a system was fixed at about \$5.4 billion. The system will be developed in stages and will be approved only after successfully passing all real world tests.

¹³⁵ Governor Bill Clinton, 'A New Covenant for American Security', Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1991.

¹³⁶ Charles Babington, 'U.S. Set to Share ABM Research: Clinton Offers Data to 'Civilized States'', *Washington Post*, June 1, 2000, p. A1.

Although important for its military security, the Clinton's America placed a great emphasis on the internationally institutions-based security. UN, NATO will gain a special attention and reflected Clinton's belief in the cost-effectiveness and the assured legitimacy of a multilateral approach.

D. Cooperative Security – Alliances and International Institutions

The willingness of Clinton administration to closely cooperate with the international institutions in order to assure global stability and order was the expression of the strong liberal belief of its members that institutions matter. 'The claim is that when states create and operate within international institutions, the scope and severity of their conflicts are reduced.'¹³⁷ American political tradition unveils the high value Americans associated with the institutions. They were meant to integrate conflicting interests and to channel them towards a mutually accepted solution. Moreover, the balanced distribution of political power prevented any power abuses. Since Clinton claimed that the American foreign policy had to not only advance U.S. interests in the world, but also to reflect its cultural and political identity, the international institutions received during his presidency a strong impetus and a key role. 'The sheer asymmetry of power relations between the United States and its potential post-war partners made institutions an attractive way to reassure Europe and Japan that it would neither dominate nor abandon them.'¹³⁸ The enlargement of the realm of democracies, the protection and promotion of human rights were part of the mission U.S. had to accomplish in the post-cold war era, advocated Clinton administration. America would intervene for 'every prisoner of conscience, every victim of torture, every individual denied basic human rights', announced Warren Christopher to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, June 14, 1993. The interventions under UN umbrella in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia, or the NATO attack against the

¹³⁷ G. John Ikenberry, 'America's Liberal Grand Strategy', p.118

¹³⁸ *ibidem*, p.119.

former Yugoslavia, although without the UN endorsement, were justified by this democratic and humanitarian rationale.

Yet, Clinton's multilateral approach fully reflected his pragmatism. By working with the international community and institutions, America would pay less, and gain more. IMF, World Bank and WTO were instrumentalized in the same way as UN, and NATO in order to promote global political and economic stability, to open up new markets and promote international trade. This was also one of the purposes linked with the first post-cold war NATO enlargement towards Central Europe. The enlargement was likely to promote and consolidate not only democratic values and institutions, but also new free-market economies. Under Clinton, NATO became an effective instrument to defend and promote America's political and economic interests. Every bilateral, regional, or international engagement was thus due to serve to Clinton's main goal: making America the first economic power and keeping its centrality in the international political and economic system. John Ikenberry was right when he observed that "the secret of the United States' long brilliant run as the world's leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks."¹³⁹

2. A New Strategy for a New War

The terrorist attacks on September 11 not only raped innocent lives, but also destroyed a wing of the Pentagon's building. America discovered its vulnerability and this had to be fixed. 'On September 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability. But we will not live in fear,' said Bush in his Cincinnati speech on October 7, 2002. If Bush's statement 'has little logical meaning, the emotion it embodies is an understandable fear of fear, a drive to gain certainty, an impulse to assert control by acting'¹⁴⁰ Uncertainty can be eliminated by taking the initiative:

¹³⁹ John Ikenberry, 'On the Sustainability of U.S. Power,' *The Globalist* (September 12, 2002), available at <http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2714>

¹⁴⁰ Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine' in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.118, no.3, Fall 2003, (The Academy of Political Science, New York), p. 372. For a detailed analysis about

‘In the new world we have entered’, says Bush in the letter introducing the new NSS, ‘the only path to peace and security is the path of action. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction.’¹⁴¹ America was at war. It was a new war against asymmetrical threats. ‘The struggle against global terrorism is different from any war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes- some seen, some unseen.’¹⁴² Donald Rumsfeld recognizes the new nature of America’s war by saying ‘The enemy cannot defeat the coalition in a conventional war on any battlefield. But they don’t seek conventional war. Their weapons are terror and chaos. They are convinced that if they can win the battle of perception -- and they are very good at managing perceptions -- that we will lose our will and toss it in.’¹⁴³ Indeed, this war had to be fought on many fronts and with different instruments, warned Bush, but primarily with a new strategy in mind. The strategy of containment and deterrence, which were so effective during the cold war, seemed outdated when enemies had nothing to lose or risk prone. ‘After September 11’, argues Bush, ‘the doctrine of containment just doesn’t hold any water... My vision shifted dramatically after September 11 because I now realize the stakes, I realized the world has changed.’¹⁴⁴ The same message came from Donald Rumsfeld, who says that ‘history has long warned great nations of the perils of seeking to defend themselves by using the successful tactics and strategies of the last war.’¹⁴⁵ The new defense strategy of the United States, as it transpires from the September 30 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, drew upon a ‘capabilities-based’ approach rather than a ‘threat-based’ model, on emerging capabilities rather than on conflict scenarios ‘We do not know who may threaten us or when or where. But we do have some sense of what they may threaten us with and how. We also have a

the influence of feelings of vulnerability on policy, see Charles Kupchan , *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1994).

¹⁴¹ George W. Bush in *National Security Strategy of the United States*, ii, 15.

¹⁴² *National Security Strategy of the United States*(2002), p.5.

¹⁴³ Council on Foreign Relations, *Remarks Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld*, New York City, New York, Monday, October 4, 2004.

¹⁴⁴ *New York Times*, February 1, 2003.

¹⁴⁵ Global Posture Testimony As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 23, 2004.

(<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040923-secdef0783.html>)

sense of what capabilities can provide us important new advantages against our enemies.¹⁴⁶ Terrorist attacks, advanced conventional, biological, chemical, and nuclear and cyber-space capabilities are long-term threats U.S. have to be ready to deal with. Since there is difficult to punish the aggressor, the deterrence should shift the focus on deterrence by denial, while contemplating options for escalation dominance, multiple nuclear options, and defense against ballistic missiles.¹⁴⁷ And because even this deterrence by denial may not work effectively against potential attacks from terrorists or rogue states, America has to be ready to go for preventive war in order to get rid of threats even before they are fully manifest. Here is the place where the Bush Doctrine brought about a radical shift in the American military practice rather than thinking. To match this new pattern of action, American military, which would play a primordial role in fighting the new asymmetric threats,¹⁴⁸ had to undertake considerable changes. Bush called for this change even from September 23, 1999, when as governor he declared: 'Our Nation is entering a period of consequences- a time of rapid change and momentous choices...As President, I will give the Secretary a broad mandate-to challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of American defense for decades to come.'¹⁴⁹ Some key words are constantly repeated by the officials of the Bush administration: non-traditional threats, rapid, preemptive and effective action, rapid change. They are briefly integrated by Bush when he recommends to the Pentagon "to move beyond marginal improvements -- to replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies. Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project our power over long distances, in days or

¹⁴⁶ Lawrence J. Korb , *Reshaping America's Military : Four Alternatives Presented as Presidential Speeches*, (New York : Council On Foreign Relations, 2002), p.9

¹⁴⁷ The father of this school of thinking was Albert Wohlstetter, who trained , among others, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle.

¹⁴⁸ Speech to the Committee on the Present Danger and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies By Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 29, 2004. <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040929-depsecdef0861.html>)

¹⁴⁹ *Facing the Future :Meeting the Threats and Challenges of the 21st Century*, Report produced by Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs in the Department of Defense, February 2005, p.7

weeks, rather than months.’¹⁵⁰This war was a sort of *time race*. The winner will have to gather, process, change and use information *faster*, to move *rapidly*, to strike *first* and deadly. It was a preemptive offensive for addressing integrated threats. U.S. defense architecture had to be changed indeed.

A. Military Size , Structure and Global Realignment

The 2001 QDR called for a strategic movement from the two Major Theater War (MTW) force-planning construct. Focused on near-term challenges, this approach was created to cope with regional military threats coming from rogue states like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Yet, the new global threat assessment realized in the wake of September 11 attacks led to the conclusion that a static deterrence was inappropriate to tackle the new spectrum of military challenges. America entered an era where its enemies are hidden in small cells scattered across the globe. For successfully fighting these enemies, plans have been developed for a more flexible and effective force posture for the 21st century. Revolutionary changes in the American military global posture were undertaken under the name Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). The size of the active duty army was increased by about 30,000 troops. But the structure of the army at home and abroad was transformed as well. American military had to become a faster, more efficient force that is ready and able to combat the asymmetric challenges. ‘We are reorganizing it into more agile, lethal and deployable brigades with enough protection, fire power and logistics assets to sustain themselves. And we're increasing the number of these brigades from currently 33 to 43 or possibly 48 over the coming two and a half to three years,’¹⁵¹ said Donald Rumsfeld at the Council on Foreign Relations in fall 2004. There are some principles underlying this momentous transformation of American forces, underlines Rumsfeld.. First, ‘troops should be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed, and

¹⁵⁰ Global Posture Testimony As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 23, 2004. (<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040923-secdef0783.html>)

¹⁵¹ Council on Foreign Relations, *Remarks Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld*, New York City, New York, Monday, October 4, 2004.

needed.’ Second, ‘American troops should be located in environments that are hospitable to their movements’, which are quick and unexpected. Third, ‘we need to be in places that allow our troops to be usable and flexible.’¹⁵² As a result of these new ways of thinking ‘main operating bases in places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea, will be consolidated, but retained. We hope to rely on forward operating sites and locations, with rotational presence and pre-positioned equipment, and to gain access to a broader range of facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence, but with periodic service or contractor support,’¹⁵³ features Rumsfeld. The principles elaborated in Pentagon were applied to every strategic region of the world. ‘In Asia, our ideas build upon our current ground, air, and naval access to overcome vast distances, while bringing additional naval and air capabilities forward into the region. We envision consolidating facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea, establishing nodes for special operations forces, and creating multiple access avenues for contingency operations. In Europe, we seek lighter and more deployable ground capabilities and strengthened special operations forces -- both positioned to deploy more rapidly to other regions as necessary -- and advanced training facilities. In the broader Middle East, we propose to maintain what we call “warm” facilities for rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we envision a diverse array of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access.’¹⁵⁴

All these changes in the global outlook of American military forces were only a part of the necessary changes to enhance the effectiveness of the preemptive-strike overall strategy. But they were not enough. During the first Bush administration, the new ‘capability-based’ approach increased the importance of RMA , which had to shape and be incorporated not only into the deterrence by denial strategy, but also into the global preemptive offense.

¹⁵² *ibidem*.

¹⁵³ Global Posture Testimony As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 23, 2004. (<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040923-secdef0783.html>)

¹⁵⁴ *ibidem*.

B. Revolution in Military Affairs

The four targets of the RMA envisaged by the US were focussed logistics, dominant battlespace awareness, good command and control and precision weaponry. This was made possible because of the revolutionary change in information technology. In his speech to the cadets of The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina on September 23, 1999 the at that time governor Bush argued that :’ We are witnessing a revolution in the technology of war. Power is increasingly defined not by mass or size but by mobility and swiftness. Influence is measured in information, safety is gained in stealth, and force is projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons. This revolution perfectly matches the strengths of our country, the skill of our people, and the superiority of our technology. The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms. We must shape the future with new concepts, new strategies, and new resolve.’¹⁵⁵

The ongoing technology revolution in which information is the resource, the target and the weapon has led to a the strategic concept of information warfare (IW). IW is defined in terms of information superiority, which means “any action taken to deny, exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy’s information and its functions, while protecting ourselves against those actions and exploiting our own military information functions.”¹⁵⁶ Unless U.S. becomes a preeminent information power, its military, ships, submarines and aircraft will be fighting wars with their hands tied. But the emergence of new technologies created the conditions for network-centric computing, which help the military improve its logistics management. Thus a structure or logical model for network-centric warfare has emerged. ‘Network-centric warfare enables a shift from attrition-style warfare to a much faster and more effective warfighting style characterized by the new concepts of speed of command and self-synchronization. Strategically it allows an understanding of all elements of battlespace and battletime, operationally it

¹⁵⁵ George W. Bush quoted in *Facing the Future: Meeting the Threats and Challenges of the 21st Century*, p.11.

¹⁵⁶ Martin C. Labicki, *What is Information Warfare?* (Washington D.C: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996).

provides a close linkage between the units and the operating environment, and tactically it provides speed. It is one of the most important impacts of the RMA.¹⁵⁷ As technology has developed, new methods of gathering information have emerged. These new methods have ameliorated the battlefield awareness of military commanders and soldiers. *Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)* has enabled the integration of all these new inputs. C4ISR provides situational awareness, which enables the integration and coordination of joint element maneuvers. This is what was called 'system of systems' approach. It refers to the 'application of information technologies to warfare with a view to integrate and network existing and emerging technologies that can look, shoot, and communicate.'¹⁵⁸ The goal of this last approach is to assure a 'joint warfighting' of US Navy, US Air Force, and US Army that could make the United States superior to any other military force of the world and would secure its rapid and total win of any war.

If in the Kosovo War the percent of 'smart bombs' fired on the former Yugoslavia amounted to no more than 20%, in the offensive on Afghanistan and Iraq it raised to almost 70%. One of the 'six transformational goals' identified in the 2001 QDR called for a significant increase in the use of 'information technology to give our joint forces a common operational picture.'¹⁵⁹

In an intervention from the fall of 2004, Rumsfeld confidently declared: 'In terms of lethality and precision weapons, we have greatly expanded our capability, while significantly reducing the number of weapons needed.'¹⁶⁰ The massive investment in RMA consistently ameliorated the effectiveness of U.S. military interventions. 'We're increasing the ability of the branches of the armed services to work seamlessly together. Joint operations are no longer an exception. They must become the rule. Communications and intelligence activities have been improved in the department. We've significantly expanded the capabilities and

¹⁵⁷ Akshay Joshi, 'A Holistic View of The Revolution in Military Affairs' in *Strategic Analysis*, February 1999, vol. XXII, no.11, p.4

¹⁵⁸ *ibidem*, p. 5.

¹⁵⁹ *Facing the Future :Meeting the Threats and Challenges of the 21st Century*,p. 16.

¹⁶⁰ Global Posture Testimony As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 23, 2004. (<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040923-secdef0783.html>)

missions of the special operations forces and much more,¹⁶¹ said Rumsfeld in another place. All these were not enough though. The deterrence by denial presupposed that America be prepared against any potential attack at home by long-range ballistic missiles armed with WMD. The Bush administration wanted to extend the scope of this system, so that America could pursue its preemptive strategy without any risks.

C. National Missile Defense System

If Clinton administration advocated only a limited land-based missile defense system, Bush wanted to build a much more comprehensive defense to include land-, sea- and space based weapons. The goal of such a project is not only to secure the U.S. homeland, but to project a more effective shield ‘ behind which the United States can move against potential regional adversaries possessing weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles to deliver them.’¹⁶² The idea is that once having built this ‘thicker defense’, U.S. could shape a more active interventionist foreign policy, without risking any strike on its soil or against its allies. ‘What matters most is deterrence. Not our ability to deter others, but their ability to deter us,’¹⁶³ writes Robert Kagan. Bush’s vision is not only a global system that would protect America, ’ but a global system capable of engaging all classes of ballistic missiles to protect U.S. forces deployable worldwide, U.S. allies, and other friendly countries.’¹⁶⁴

During President Bush's State of the Union address in January 2003, he said, "This year, for the first time, we are beginning to field a defense to protect this nation against ballistic missiles." And it seems that his resilience to deploy such a system is undefeatable. The 2004 budget requests \$9.1 billion for missile defense programs, a significant increase over the amount in the last Clinton administration budget (\$5.4 billion). The Pentagon is projecting yearly missile

¹⁶¹ Council on Foreign Relations, *Remarks Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld*, New York City, New York, Monday, October 4, 2004.

¹⁶² Ivan Eland, ‘Let’s Make National defense System Truly ‘National’’, in *Foreign Policy Briefing*, no 58, Cato Institute, June 27, 2000.

¹⁶³ Robert Kagan, ‘A Real Case for Missile Defense’, *Washington Post*, May 21, 2000, p. B7

¹⁶⁴ Charles V. Pena, ‘Missile Defense: Defending America or Building Empire?’ in *Foreign Policy Briefing*, no 77, Cato Institute, May 28, 2003

defense funding to reach \$11.5 billion by 2007. Though substantially surpassing the Clinton administration's spending on missile defense, these sums represent only the down payment on the actual cost of deploying the system.

The Bush administration policy to strongly support the project of a missile defense system goes hand in hand with debilitating the international arms control regime both by withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and by putting forth a new nuclear war fighting doctrine. Bush's "new idea" is that the U.S. should create flexible nuclear weapons that can be deployed in a variety of circumstances from busting Tora Bora caves to bailing out U.S. forces in a conventional conflict. 'Following the recommendations from the Bush administration's *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR), the declared role of U.S. nuclear weapons could change from a tool of deterrence and a weapon of last resort to a central, to a usable component of the U.S. anti-terror arsenal.¹⁶⁵ This approach endangered considerably the success and credibility of Bush's nuclear non-proliferation policy and was about to start a new era of arms race among the world's great powers, which is exactly what America wanted to hinder.

D. Budgetary Outlook

Bush's defense policy is maybe the best exemplification of his firm believe in the 'America First' principle. America was at war and no war can be waged without money. But Bush administration had a deeper meaning of the budget America will use in its war on terror. Through the financing of its defense, U.S. aimed at dissuading any future military competitors. This was clearly implied by Bush when he declared to the graduating cadets at West Point: 'America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge- thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other era pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and

¹⁶⁵ Michelle Ciarrocca, 'Missile Defense', *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Volume 8, Number 1, May 2003.

others pursuits of peace.’¹⁶⁶ This was clear also in the draft defense guidance written by Paul Wolfowitz for Dick Cheney at the end of the first Bush administration.¹⁶⁷

The 2003 Pentagon budget has been set at \$379 billion — a 15 percent increase over the 2002 budget. The 2002 budget was itself 8 percent higher than the 2001 budget in real terms. The 2003 Pentagon budget is 93 percent as high as the average annual expenditure during the Cold War decade of the 1980s. Further increases are planned for the future: the FY 2007 Pentagon budget is presently set to be \$451 billion (future dollars) — approximately 8 percent higher in real terms than the FY 2003 budget.

When the FY 2003 budget cycle began in October 2002, the United States accounted for approximately 42 percent of all global defense spending. However, with both China and Russia eager to renovate their armed forces, the present ratio between their spending and America's may not decline much further than in the 1990s, despite the Bush budget increase. China and Russia together account for 80 percent of all spending by potential adversary states.

All these numbers are impressive. What seems to us strikingly important is that this new defense policy of Bush administration meant not only high level of military spending that discourage any competition, but also the use of force on behalf of the others, so that they will not deem necessary to develop powerful military establishments on their own. This should imply though a congruency between American interests and the country or group of countries on behalf of which the force was used, which is not always the case. Nonetheless, the new war on terror provided us with an impressive supply of ‘consensual American leadership’. Despite its unique strength, America can’t go always alone. Not in this war at least.

¹⁶⁶ George W. Bush, ‘Remarks at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy’, West Point, N.Y., June 1, 2002. .

¹⁶⁷ The Wolfowitz draft is presented in *New York Times*, March 8 and May 24, 1992.

E. Cooperative Security – Alliances, ‘Coalitions of the Willing’, and International Institutions

The War on Terror refashioned the entire shape and content of America's relations with the world. It was a war against networks, and it had to be fought and won by building and making use of networks among states. Intelligence sharing, law enforcement, joint military actions to win battles against terrorists and organized crime, and enhanced know-how cooperation to build nations and failing states were decisive. Tactical coalitions and strategic alliances were contemplated and used. The principle was clearly enunciated by Donald Rumsfeld: the mission shapes the coalitions, not the other way around. And the principle was applied already with the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. After obtaining the UN resolution condemning the terrorist attacks, America prepared itself to strike alone. Only afterwards was it willing to accept the NATO and UN assistance on the ground in the effort to stabilize and build the country. Afghanistan provided the model of the new way America conceived its international political and military cooperation: an American war on terrorism fought together with ‘the willing allies’ under American leadership. The willing partners could be nations, international institutions and military alliances altogether. But in the new war, America wanted to have its hands free for any option at any time. If UN was rendered irrelevant by the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, this was possible because the Bush administration considered any preemptive military intervention as legitimized by self-defense against non-traditional threats. The legitimization came no more from the international institutions, but from the America’s pursuit of its own security and strategic interests that would be beneficial for the whole world in the end. America’s new strategic approach towards international cooperation resulted in a new understanding of the NATO role. A new NATO would redefine itself as an offensive alliance under American leadership better able to provide forces and capabilities for a variety of new out-of-area missions in fighting terrorism rather than simply as a defensive establishment. NATO would provide the practical model and most of the tactics, techniques, and procedures in these missions. In the press conference preceding his meeting with NATO Secretary General, Jaap

de Hoop Scheffer, Bush said very assuring: 'my nation is committed to a strong and vibrant NATO.'¹⁶⁸ But he meant a NATO with an already constructive role in Afghanistan and maybe in Iraq as well. Thus, NATO decision to train Iraqi security personnel represented an important start.

Yet, NATO was no more for America the strategic alliance of highest importance. Facing new threats, America needed as much space of maneuver as possible. NATO could be useful, but only if it adapted its mission to match the challenges of the new strategic global environment. The 2004 NATO enlargement with seven new members was motivated not only by the desire to bring in the alliance nations very supportive to America, but also by the intention to show that terrorism was not to fight only militarily. NATO had to function as a free-market democracy-multiplier. Thus, the Partnerships for Peace developed with so many countries from the 'Greater Middle East' institutionalized a political and economic dialogue in order to bring about more democratic changes. At the same time, they had to channel with more facility the American strategic movements in the area and to secure American access to new markets and raw materials. 'NATO is constructed in a way that is not only effective, but one that continues to foster free societies and democracy around the *world*,'¹⁶⁹ says Bush in the press conference. A NATO that was bequeathed with a global vision and mission resembling those America claimed for itself and that had to serve American security interests beyond Europe's borders. The mission shapes the coalition, and not the other way around. And the mission was clear: "America First".

3. Elements of Continuity

Clinton and Bush shared to some degree a realist understanding of the important role the military force of a nation has in order to advance its security

¹⁶⁸ Remarks by President Bush and NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer, The Oval Office, Office of the Press Secretary, November 10, 2004 (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041110-6.html> accessed May 2005)

¹⁶⁹ *ibidem*

and national interests. Bush, like Clinton, deemed American military engagement worldwide as critical to promote American security. Both kept a high level of military spending to assure America's military primacy in the world. They favored the deployment of a national defense system to protect America against any attack with WMD via long-range ballistic missiles and tried to counter WMD proliferation. They recognized the increasing role of the IT revolution in promoting American security and ameliorating the effectiveness of military interventions. They both instrumentalized the international institutions in order to serve American interests and kept for the U.S. the option to act unilaterally, if self-defense interests called for. Clinton and Bush enlarged and used NATO and the transatlantic relations with Europe to promote American security interests and leadership, to enhance U.S. political leverage and to encourage the development of new free-market democracies. Last, but not least, both presidents legitimized American military interventions to defend and promote democratic values and human rights. Nonetheless, Bush's rupture from Clinton in the way they approached America's military defense and strategy is striking and accounts for the most important change between the NSSs of the two presidents.

4. Elements of Change

First and above all, Clinton's America is at peace, Bush's America is at war. As a result, Clinton lowered the role of military defense and strategy in his NSS and foreign policy, while Bush upgraded them as America's top priority. If Clinton uses the global military engagement to mostly serve economic interests, Bush is preoccupied to fight terrorists, rogue states and the proliferation of WMD. Clinton's defense reviews were focused on a 'threat-based planning', Bush's QDR and NSS adopted a 'capabilities-based planning'. Clinton favored a military and nuclear static deterrence, Bush shifted to more offensive military and nuclear deterrence and to a preemptive strike strategy. If American military forces under Clinton had almost the same global structure as during the Cold War in order to fight large armies, navies and air forces, Bush called for a new global defense architecture aimed at more agile, lethal and deployable brigades which had to be

deployed in areas where they were needed, welcomed, and wanted. While Clinton administration advocated only a limited land-based missile defense system, Bush wanted to build a much more comprehensive defense to include land-, sea- and space based weapons. He wanted a 'global system capable of engaging all classes of ballistic missiles to protect U.S. forces deployable worldwide, U.S. allies, and other friendly countries.' Clinton's endeavor to create such defense system was considered possible only within the framework of the ABM Treaty and only after negotiations with Russia and the allies. The Bush administration's policy to strongly support the project of a missile defense system goes hand in hand with debilitating the international arms control regime. Clinton wanted a decrease in the importance of nuclear weapons and pursued a multilateral policy for hindering a global proliferation of WMD. Bush's "new idea" was that the U.S. should create flexible nuclear weapons that can be deployed by US forces in a variety of circumstances. This approach endangered considerably the success and credibility of the U.S. non-proliferation policy. Clinton administration was fully aware of the role the IT played in enhancing America's competitiveness on the global economic market and it was decided to make full use of this instrument so that America keep its status of the first economic power of the world. It was a strategic approach, which was likely to touch upon the military affairs only as a spillover effect. Yet, it was the task of the Bush administration to considerably integrate the IT progresses in the American military strategy. Bush's new 'capability-based' approach increased the importance of RMA, which had to shape and be incorporated not only into the deterrence by denial strategy, but also into the global preemptive offense. New instruments and methods of fighting wars like information warfare (IW), network-centric-warfare (NCW), integrated command and control (C4ISR), system of systems, and joint warfighting were due to become common place. The goal was to make the United States superior to any other military force of the world and would secure its rapid and total win of its war against terrorists. In Clinton's time, American military forces were reduced from 2,2 millions active soldiers to 1,45 millions, while the defense budget was cut by about one-third over five years (1992-1997) to amount to only 4 % of U.S. GDP. The 2003 Pentagon budget has been set at \$379 billion — a 15 percent

increase over the 2002 budget. The 2002 budget was itself 8 percent higher than the 2001 budget in real terms. And the FY 2007 Pentagon budget was set to be \$451 billion. Moreover, 300,000 recruits joined U.S. forces until the end of 2004. Clinton's multilateral approach reflected both his economic pragmatism and his strong belief that institutions matter in international security. IMF, World Bank and WTO were instrumentalized in the same way as UN, and NATO in order to promote global political and economic stability, to open up new markets and promote international trade. Facing new threats, Bush's America needed as much space of maneuver as possible. Tactical coalitions and strategic alliances were contemplated and used. The global war on terror had to be fought together with 'the willing allies' under American leadership. The willing partners could be nations, international institutions and military alliances altogether. For Clinton, NATO had the role to strengthen the political and military relations with Europe and to enlarge European realm of 'free-market democracies'. In Bush's view, NATO was bequeathed with a global vision and mission in fighting terrorism militarily and politically. For Bush, the mission shapes the coalition, and not the other way around. And the mission was clear: 'America First'.

Final Remarks

What this paper consistently tried to emphasize pertains to the fact that American foreign policy in the post-cold era overcomes the myopic debate between realism and idealism. Neither realist, nor idealist, both realist and idealist. ‘The realist school does not reject the importance of ideals or values. The idealist school of thought...does not necessarily reject the geopolitical aspect of realism. But it translates it into a call for crusades on behalf of regime change’¹⁷⁰. The foreign policies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush during his first term eminently reflect liberal and realist principles and visions. Both presidents strive for more democratic polities around the world, but they also interested in increased access to global resources and markets. They both work through multilateral economic and security institutions, but they instrumentalize them at the same time for enhancing America’s political, economic and military security and leverage in the world. Bush, like Clinton, is willing to justify military interventions abroad for defending democratic values and human rights, but they both believe in the comparative advantage provided by a superior military force in defending America’s political, economic and military security and invest impressive resources in order to preserve America’s military primacy in the world.

This pragmatic balance between values and interests, between identity and power is not something characteristic only to Clinton and Bush. It finds strong supporters both on the left and the right sides of American political arena and

accounts for a considerable degree of continuity in the foreign policy of Republican and Democrat presidents in the post World War II period. If there are some differences, they are confined to the extent to which values or power interests take hold. A perfect equilibrium in politics is hard to imagine. 'Some elites embrace democracy, the rule of law, and human rights as an end in itself; others see its promotion as a way to expand and safeguard business and markets; and others see indirect payoffs for national security and alliance management'.¹⁷¹

Identity and power. There is a profound dialectic process between them. We do not know which influences the other first and to which extent. But we do know that they go hand in hand, they shape, enrich, help, change and motivate each other at any moment. Identity gives power a sense and power makes identity flourish. Used in order to explain the degree of coherence and continuity in America's foreign policy, these two concepts prove to be highly instrumental. They define the limits of a spectrum with options which independently or together accounts for American exceptionalism. Exemplary America at home versus interventionist America abroad, advancing national interests on the homeland or defending them abroad, "free hand" policy and /or multilateral framework of action, America's foreign policy appears to us as a refined balance between identity and power. America wants to preserve and affirm its identity by accumulating and projecting its power.

¹⁷⁰ Henry A. Kissinger, 'Realists vs. Idealists', *International Herald Tribune*, May 12, 2005.

¹⁷¹ G. John Ikenberry, 'America's Liberal Grand Strategy' in *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts*, p.125

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